05000324/FIN-2012005-05
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Finding | |
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| Title | Inadequate Maintenance Procedure for Fluorescent Lights over Safety-related Equipment |
| Description | The inspectors identified a Green finding for the licensee not having an adequate procedure for maintenance on fluorescent lights over safety-related equipment. Specifically, between plant startup and August 29, 2012, the licensee did not have instructions for closing S-hooks on fluorescent lights over safety-related equipment during maintenance on the fluorescent lights. This resulted in over 40 S-hooks open in safety-related buildings which could result in fluorescent lights falling and impacting safety-related equipment during a seismic event. The licensees corrective actions included closing the open S-hooks and adding instructions for closing S-hooks to work order (WO) 431558. The licensee entered this issue into the CAP as NCR 551646. The performance deficiency associated with this finding was the failure of the licensee to have an adequate procedure for maintenance on fluorescent lights over safety-related equipment. The finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected, the deficiencies could lead to a more significant safety concern. If left uncorrected, the failure to provide procedural guidance to close the S-hooks on fluorescent lights over safety-related equipment could lead to fluorescent lights falling on safety-related instruments during a seismic event resulting in a reactor trip. This finding is also associated with the design control attribute of the Initiating Events Systems Cornerstone. Using IMC 0609, Appendix A, issued June 19, 2012, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance because the finding did not cause a reactor trip and the loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a stable shutdown condition. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the CAP attribute because the licensee did not identify the open S-hook issue completely, accurately, and in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance during the Fukushima walkdowns. |
| Site: | Brunswick  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000324/2012005 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2012 (2012Q4) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Nielsen D Lanyi J Laughlin J Montgomery M Bates M Catts M Schwieg P Niebaum R Baldwin R Musser R Rodriguez |
| CCA | P.1, Identification |
| INPO aspect | PI.1 |
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Finding - Brunswick - IR 05000324/2012005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Brunswick) @ 2012Q4
Self-Identified List (Brunswick)
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