05000313/FIN-2015002-04
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Perform Testing of Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Piping |
| Description | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, for the licensees failure to establish and maintain an adequate testing program for the fuel oil transfer piping for Units 1 and 2. Specifically, the licensee did not establish inservice testing to detect degradation of the fuel oil piping between the fuel oil storage tanks and the emergency diesel generator day tanks. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2015-01092. The failure to perform the required testing of the fuel oil piping is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the protection against external factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and affects the cornerstone objective to ensure availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequence. Specifically, the licensee failed to perform examinations required to provide reasonable assurance that the piping could perform its intended function during design basis seismic events, and therefore maintain the ability to supply fuel to the emergency diesel generators. Using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems, the inspectors determined the finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not involve the loss or degradation of equipment or function specifically designed to mitigate a seismic initiating event. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, associated with conservative bias, because the licensee did not use decision-making practices that emphasized prudent choices over those that were simply allowable. Specifically, during the buried piping initiative inspections that were completed in August 2013, the licensee failed to identify that the condition of the safety-related piping had never been evaluated and was being treated as a run to failure component [H.14]. |
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000313/2015002 Section 1R08 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2015 (2015Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.08 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Tindell J Drake L Carson M Phalen M Williams M Young N O'Keefe Z Hollcraft |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XI |
| CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
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Finding - Arkansas Nuclear - IR 05000313/2015002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Arkansas Nuclear) @ 2015Q2
Self-Identified List (Arkansas Nuclear)
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