05000313/FIN-2015002-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Inadequate Procedure for Severe Weather Preparation |
| Description | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, & Drawings, for the failure to establish appropriate procedures for preparations for severe weather. Specifically, inspectors observed that the licensee failed to ensure that all outside areas were inspected in order to secure material prior to severe weather, to reduce the probability of light material missile damage on plant equipment. The licensee concluded that the assignment of responsibilities was unclear in Procedure EN-FAP-EP-010, Severe Weather Response, Revision 1, leading to confusion among the two operating crews. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Reports CR-ANO-C-2015-00854 and CR-ANO-C-2015-00859. The failure to have a procedure to ensure that all outside areas would be inspected in order to secure loose material prior to the arrival of severe weather, to reduce the probability of light material missile damage on plant equipment was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, during severe weather, unsecured material could become a missile that impacts equipment and upsets plant stability. Using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, the inspectors determined that the finding had very low safety significance (Green) because it did not represent an actual reactor trip and the loss of mitigation equipment. This finding has a human performance crosscutting aspect associated with work management, in that the organization failed to implement a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities, including coordination with different groups or job activities. Specifically, only one crew performed the required inspections when severe weather had been forecast since the procedure in use did not clearly assign responsibilities to both operating crews [H.5]. |
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000313/2015002 Section 1R01 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2015 (2015Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.01 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Tindell J Drake L Carson M Phalen M Williams M Young N O'Keefe Z Hollcraft |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Arkansas Nuclear - IR 05000313/2015002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Arkansas Nuclear) @ 2015Q2
Self-Identified List (Arkansas Nuclear)
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