05000368/FIN-2013005-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Inadequate Operability Evaluation Due to Failure to Characterize Weld Flaw |
| Description | Inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.55a(b)(5), In-Service Inspection Code Cases, for the licensees failure to implement ASME Code Case N-513-2, Evaluation Criteria for Temporary Acceptance of Flaws in Moderate Energy Class 2 or
Piping,Section XI, Division 1. Specifically, when a service water weld developed a leak the licensee failed to characterize the flaw using a volumetric inspection method. Th licensee corrected the condition by performing volumetric inspections of the flawed weld and then repaired the weld. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2013-01961. Inspectors concluded that the licensees failure to characterize a service water weld flaw was a performance eficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences, and is therefore a finding. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure the reliability of the service water system wasnt adversely affected by a significant weld flaw. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 2, the inspectors determined this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the degraded condition was not a design deficiency that affected system operability; did not represent an actual loss of function or a system; did not represent an actual loss of function of a single train or two separate trains for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time; did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety significant; and did not involve the loss or degradation of equipment or function specifically designed to mitigate a seismic event. The finding was determined to have a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, associated with resources, for the licensees failure to ensure adequate training of personnel. Specifically, personnel performing the flaw inspection were not adequately trained in the non-destructive testing requirements of the code case. |
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
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| Report | IR 05000368/2013005 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2013 (2013Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Hairea Fairbanksb Tindell G Werner K Clayton L Ricketson M Young |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification 10 CFR 50.55a |
| CCA | H.9, Training |
| INPO aspect | CL.4 |
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Finding - Arkansas Nuclear - IR 05000368/2013005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Arkansas Nuclear) @ 2013Q4
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