05000311/FIN-2014003-04
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Establish and Implement Adequate Radiation Protection Procedures |
| Description | The inspectors identified a self-revealing NCV of very low safety significance associated with the failure to establish and implement adequate radiological controls for the transfer and control of radioactive material within the Unit 2 fuel transfer canal, and subsequent work performed on reactor vessel level instrumentation in the Unit 2 upper reactor cavity. Specifically, PSEG did not conduct necessary and reasonable surveys required by 10 CFR 20.1501 to detect radiation levels emanating from the fuel transfer canal on May 4, 2014. Further, on May 4, PSEG also did not provide sufficient high radiation area dose rate monitoring required by TS 6.12.1 to identify that workers were encountering increasing radiation dose rates. Finally, PSEG did not inform workers of the storage and transfer of radioactive material, required by 10 CFR 19.12(a), prior to performing work in the field on May 4. Upon identification of the radiation concern, PSEG implemented appropriate controls of the affected areas and initiated additional radiation surveys and controls for the sources of the radiation. This issue was determined to be more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the performance deficiency (PD) had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern if personnel were exposed to elevated radiation dose rates. Further, the PD was related to the programs and process attribute of the Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine reactor operation. The finding was assessed using IMC 0609, Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety SDP, dated August 19, 2008, and was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because: it was not related to ALARA; did not result in an overexposure or a substantial potential for overexposure; and did not compromise the licensee's ability to assess dose. This finding was associated with the Work Management aspect of the Human Performance cross-cutting area. Specifically, PSEG did not implement adequate planning, control and execution of work activities associated with transfer of radioactive material to ensure the identification and management of risk commensurate to the work such that nuclear safety was an overriding priority. |
| Site: | Salem  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000311/2014003 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2014 (2014Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Or Safety |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | P Finney R Barkley R Nimitz A Ziedonis C Cahill E Andrews F Arner G Dentel H Gray J Hawkins J Schoppy |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 20.1501, Surveys and Monitoring Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Salem - IR 05000311/2014003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Salem) @ 2014Q2
Self-Identified List (Salem)
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