05000286/FIN-2016002-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Withdrawn - Failure to Follow Operability Determination Procedure for Unit 3 Baffle-Former Bolts |
| Description | The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," because Entergy did not adequately accomplish the actions prescribed by procedure EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process, for a degraded condition associated with the Unit 3 baffle-former bolts. Specifically, Entergy incorrectly concluded that no degraded or non-conforming condition existed related to the Unit 3 baffle-former bolts and exited the operability determination procedure. Entergy subsequently performed the remaining steps in the procedure and provided appropriate justification for their plans to examine the baffle-former bolts at the next Unit 3 refueling outage (RFO). Entergys immediate corrective actions included entering the issue into its corrective action program (CAP) as CR-IP3-2016-01961 and documenting an operability evaluation to support the basis for operability of the baffle-former bolts and the emergency core cooling system (ECCS). This performance deficiency is more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). In accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, issued June 19, 2012, the inspectors screened the finding for safety significance and determined it to be of very low safety significance (Green), because the finding did not represent an actual loss of system or function. After inspector questioning, Entergy performed an operability evaluation, which provided sufficient bases to conclude the Unit 3 baffle assembly would support ECCS operability. This finding is related to the cross-cutting aspect of Problem Identification and Resolution, Operating Experience, because Entergy did not effectively evaluate relevant internal and external operating experience. Specifically, Entergy did not adequately evaluate the impact of degraded baffle bolts at Unit 3 when relevant operating experience was identified at Unit 2. [P.5 Operating Experience] |
| Site: | Indian Point  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000286/2016002 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2016 (2016Q2) |
| Type: | Other: |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Haagensen G Dentel G Newman J Furia J Poehler K Mangan N Floyd S Galbreath S Richb Haagenseng Dentel G Newman J Furia K Mangan N Floyd S Galbreath S Rich J Poehler |
| Violation of: | Pending |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Indian Point - IR 05000286/2016002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Indian Point) @ 2016Q2
Self-Identified List (Indian Point)
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