05000272/LER-2004-003, Regarding Completion of Plant Shutdown to Comply with Technical Specifications - 3.6.1.1 Containment Integrity
| ML042230276 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 08/02/2004 |
| From: | Fricker C Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LRN-04-0331 LER 04-003-00 | |
| Download: ML042230276 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown |
| 2722004003R00 - NRC Website | |
text
PSEG Nuclear LLC P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 PSEG AUuclear LLC AUG 0 2,o LRN 0331 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:
LER 272/04-003-00 SALEM - UNIT I FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 This Licensee Event Report, "Completion of Plant Shutdown to Comply With Technical Specifications - 3.6.1.1 Containment Integrity," is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(A).
The attached LER contains no commitments.
Sincere Ca cker Sa em Plant Manager Attachment IEHV C
Distribution LER File 3.7 95-2168 REV. 7/99
Abstract
On June 2, 2004 at approximately 1230 hours0.0142 days <br />0.342 hours <br />0.00203 weeks <br />4.68015e-4 months <br />, the 1 SW26 valve (service water to the turbine building isolation valve) was declared Inoperable as a result of investigation into an abnormal condition with Service Water in the turbine building. A plant shutdown was initiated in accordance with Technical Specification 3.6.1.1 "Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY".
On June 2, 2004, non-licensed operations personnel identified an abnormal condition in the control of the turbine building service water pressure. During a routine tour of the turbine building while returning Unit I from its sixteenth refueling outage, the operator noticed that the temperature in the number 11 main turbine lube oil heat exchanger was approximately 110 degrees F. Further investigation revealed that the service water to the turbine building regulating valve (1 ST1) was full open with only 72 psig in the service water turbine header downstream of I ST1. These conditions, low pressure and high temperatures, were not normal for the plant conditions at the time. Further troubleshooting indicated that the service water to the turbine building isolation valve (1SW26) had been improperly installed and its motor operator improperly set up.
The root cause of this event and its contributors has not yet been fully identified. The valve actuator was removed, the valve disc was rotated 180 degrees, and re-tested satisfactorily.
This is being reported under the requirement of 10CFR50.73(a)(2XiXA), as a completion of a plant shutdown to comply with Technical Specifications.
NRC FORM 3665(7-2D01)
(If more space Is required, use additional copies of NRC Fonn 366A) (17)
PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION
Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor (PWRI4)
Service Water (SW) {BI} *
- Energy Industry Identification System {EIIS) codes and component function identifier codes appear as
{SS/CCC}
IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE Event Date: June 2, 2004 Discovery Date: June 2, 2004 CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE Salem Unit 1 was in Mode 1 at approximately 18% Rated Thermal Power There was no equipment out of service at the time of the event that contributed to the event.
DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE On June 2, 2004, non-licensed operations' personnel identified an abnormal condition in the control of the turbine building service water pressure. During a routine tour of the turbine building while returning Unit I from its sixteenth refueling outage, the operator noticed that the temperature in the number 11 main turbine lube oil TD) (MTLO) heat exchanger was approximately 110 degrees F. Further investigation revealed that the service water to the turbine building {NM} regulating valve (1 STI) was full open with only 72 psig in the service water turbine header downstream of 1 STI. These conditions, low pressure and high temperatures, were not normal for the plant conditions at the time.
A detailed troubleshooting plan was developed which included the instrumentation of the service water bays and turbine building header. The data showed the service water pressure to be approximately 130 psig at the Unit 1 service water bays with 83-84 psig upstream of 1 ST1. In contrast, the Unit 2 service water pressure at the bays was 112 psig with 109 psig upstream of 2ST1. Additionally, the troubleshooting showed that when the disc was stroked in the clockwise direction, open to close indication on the motor operator, that flow increased through the line. Further analyses of this data indicated that the valve 1 SW26 was improperly installed and the motor operator improperly set up.
(if more space Is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 3664) (17)
DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE (contd.)
At Salem Station the service water to the turbine building header isolation valve (1SW26) is required to be operable to maintain containment integrity. During design basis accidents, the 1SW26 valve is required to close fully to isolate the non-safety related loads in the turbine building. Isolation of these loads provide enough flow/pressure to the containment fan coil units to maintain saturation conditions in the discharge piping and thus preventing severe water hammer events. Therefore, the Containment Integrity Technical Specification applies whenever this valve becomes inoperable. The Containment Integrity Technical Specification states in part... Without primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, restore CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />." The Mode applicability is 1 through 4.
At approximately 1230 pm, on June 2, 2004, licensed operators declared the 1 SW26 valve inoperable and a plant shutdown was initiated to comply with the requirements of Technical Specification 3.6.1.1, as stated above.
Mode 3 was entered on June 2, 2004 at approximately 1624.
CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE Although troubleshooting identified that valve 1 SW26 was improperly installed and the motor operator improperly set up, the root cause and its contributors have not yet been fully identified Investigation of several scenarios is currently in progress to determine the root cause(s), contributing causes and corrective actions to prevent reoccurrence. Once completed, a supplement to this LER will be issued.
This LER supplement is expected to be submitted by September 3, 2004.
PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES
A review of LERs at Salem and Hope Creek Generating Stations for the years 2001 through 2004 did not identify any previous similar events related to improper installation of a valve disc or actuator. Once the root cause is completed another review will be performed against the identified root cause.
SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPUCATIONS There were no safety consequences associated with this event Although the 1 SW26 service water to the turbine building isolation valve was not able to close fully due to improper installation during the refueling outage, the redundant isolation valves from the two nuclear safety related headers were operable and capable to isolate the non-safety related turbine building.
(if more space Is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 3684) (17)
SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS (cont'd)
Therefore, isolation of the non-safety related loads in the turbine building to provide enough flow/pressure to the containment fan coil units to maintain conditions below saturation in the discharge piping would have been met.
This event does not constitute a Safety System Functional Failure (SSFF) as defined in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
The valve and valve actuator were properly installed and tested satisfactorily.
Additional corrective action will be taken at the completion of the root cause evaluation and this LER will be supplemented appropriately.
COMMITMENTS
The corrective actions cited in this LER are voluntary enhancements and do not constitute commitments.