05000272/LER-2002-007, Regarding Core Alterations Performed Without Direct Communications
| ML023600364 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 12/13/2002 |
| From: | Waldinger L Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LR-N02-0411 LER 02-007-00 | |
| Download: ML023600364 (6) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 2722002007R00 - NRC Website | |
text
PSEG Nuclear LLC P.O Box 236, Hancocks Bndge, New Jersey 08038-0236 DEC 1 3 2002 0 PSEG Nuclear LLC LR-N02-041 1 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 LER 2721 2002- 007 - 00 SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT I FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272
Dear Sir or Madam:
This Licensee Event Report entitled "Core Alterations Performed Without Direct Communications" is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of IOCFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B). The attached LER contains no commitments.
Sincer L. H. Waldinger Director Site Operations Attachment
/KMB C
Distribution RTL 3E.111 95-2168 REV 7/99
Document Control Desk 12113102 LER 272102-007-00 LR-N02-0411 C:
Mr. H. Miller, Administrator - Region I U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Mr. R. Fretz, Project Manager - Salem U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 8B2 Washington, DC 20555 USNRC Senior Resident Inspector - Salem (X24)
Mr. K. Tosch, Manager IV Bureau of Nuclear Engineering PO Box 415 Trenton, New Jersey 08625 2
Abstract
On October 16, 2002 at approximately 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br />, lifting of the upper internals from the reactor vessel (defined as a CORE ALTERATION in Technical Specifications) was commenced and continued until the upper internals were placed in their stand without incident. Technical Specification 3.9.5 states "Direct communication shall be maintained between the control room and personnel at the refueling stations and is applicable during CORE ALTERATIONS. Although the licensed operator maintained intermittent communication with control room operators, direct communication through the use of dedicated personnel on headsets on the refueling floor and in the control room did not occur.
The apparent cause for this event was conflicting procedural definitions of what constitutes a core alteration.
A contributing cause includes the lack of procedural guidance clearly defining whose responsibility it is to ensure that communications are established and maintained between the control room and refueling floor.
Another contributing cause was a less than adequate pre job brief.
Corrective actions include procedure revisions for clarification, initiation of a license change request, and review of the event with affected personnel.
This event is reportable in accordance with 1 OCFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as an operation or condition that is prohibited by the plant's Technical Specification.
NRC FORM 366 (7-2001)U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
( 6-1998)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION DOCKET (2)
FACILITY NAME (1)
NUMBER (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
It lSEQUEN'1lAL lREVISION YEAR I
NUMBER I NUMBER SALEM UNIT 1 05000272 l02 0
0 7
00 2 OF 4 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION
Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor
- Energy Industry Identification System {EIIS} codes and component function identifier codes appear as (SS/CCC)
IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE Event Date: October 16,-2002 Discovery Date: October 16, 2002 CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE Salem Unit 1 was in Mode 6 with core alterations in progress. No structures, systems, or components were inoperable at the time of the occurrence that contributed to the event.
DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE On October 16, 2002 at approximately 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br />, lifting of the upper internals from the reactor vessel (defined as a CORE ALTERATION in Technical Specification 1.9) was commenced in containment. The Salem 1 fifteenth refueling outage (S1R15) was in progress.
Technical Specification Definition 1.9 states a CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement or manipulation of any component within the reactor pressure vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.9.5 states direct communication shall be maintained between the control room and personnel at the refueling station and is applicable during CORE ALTERATIONS.
At the start of unlatching of the control rods, communication via headset between the control room and the refueling floor was established. After control rod unlatching was completed, contractor personnel who were stationed in the control room manning the headsets left the control room. Direct communication through the use of dedicated personnel on headsets on the refueling floor and in the control room was not reestablished for the upper internals lift; however the refueling licensed operator and the Control Room Supervisor communicated intermittently by telephone during the evolution.
The upper internals lift was completed without incident.US. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (6-1998) l LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) l TEXT CONTINUATION DOCKET (2) lFACILITY NAME (I)
NUMBER (2)
LER NUMBER (X6 l
PAGE (3) l SEQUENTIAL REVISION YEAR I
NUMBER I NUMBER SALEM UNIT 1 05000272 02 0
0 7
00 13 OF 4 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies ofNRC Form 366A) (17)
CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The apparent cause for this event was conflicting procedural definitions of what constitutes a core alteration. The refueling procedure and the maintenance procedure for moving the upper internals contain conflicting definitions of what constitutes a core alteration. The operations integrated operating procedure does not contain guidance concerning required communications. Contractor and utility licensed personnel believed that upper internals movement was not a core alteration. The contractor personnel involved have performed this task at other stations that have adopted the Westinghouse Owners Group improved standard technical specifications (ISTS). CORE ALTERATION (as defined in the ISTS) "shall be the movement of any fuel, sources,-or reactivity control components, within the reactor vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel."
Stations that have adopted the ISTS do not consider lifting of the upper internals a core alteration and therefore would not be expected to require direct communications to be established.
A contributing cause includes lack of procedural guidance clearly defining whose responsibility it is to ensure that communications are established and maintained between the control room and refueling floor. Another contributing cause was a less than adequate pre-job brief. The pre-job brief did not discuss direct communication requirements for the upper internals lift evolution.
PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES A review of LERs at Salem and Hope Creek generating stations for 2001 and 2002 determined that no other reportable events occurred related to conflicting procedural definitions related to core alterations. However LER 2001-004-00 reported an event that occurred on April 13, 2001 related to the performance of core alterations while a boration flow path was inoperable. The apparent cause was attributed to human error in not properly linking in the outage schedule that the removal of the equipment hatch impacted the operable boration flow path. Corrective actions associated with this event would not have been expected to preclude the performance of core alterations during S1 R1 5 without direct communication. Corrective actions focused on the identification of the proper sequence of work activities during outages and procedural guidance for removing Emergency Diesel Generators from service during outages.
- - U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (6-1998)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION DOCKET (2)
FACILITY NAME (I)
NUMBER (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
SEQUENTIAL REVISION YEAR S0NUMBER 0
NUMBER0 SALEM UNIT 1 105000272 L02 0
0 7
00 J4 OF 4 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS
The reactor was shutdown and a refueling outage was in progress. There was no impact to safety systems or components that are needed to shutdown the reactor and maintain safe shutdown conditions, remove residual heat, control the release of radioactive material, or mitigate the consequences of an accident due to this event. All systems maintained their ability to perform as designed. Technical specification 3.9.5 applies only during refueling outages and only when moving items within the reactor vessel. Based on the above, there was no impact to the health and safety of the public.
A review of this condition determined that a Safety System Functional Failure (SSFF) did not occur as defined in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
- 1. An immediate corrective action was taken to issue a Temporary Standing Order to clarify roles and responsibilities, and define direct communication between the control room and the fuel handling building or refueling floor. This order was reviewed with refueling and operating crews.
- 2. Procedure S1/2.0P-10ZZ-0007, "Cold Shutdown to Refueling" will be revised to eliminate conflicting guidance that exists surrounding core alterations, upper internals movement, and the establishment of direct communications.
- 3. Procedure SC.MD-FR.FH-001 1, "Reactor Vessel Upper Internals Removal and Installation "will be revised to eliminate conflicting guidance that exists surrounding core alterations, upper internals movement, and the establishment of direct communications.
- 4. Procedure SC.RE-FR.ZZ-0019, 'Refueling" was revised to ensure continuous communications are maintained between the Control Room and Containment during core alterations.
- 5. Human performance aspects of the causal factors (i.e., conflicting procedures, lack of discussion of direct communication requirements during pre-job briefing for the upper internals lift evolution) have been addressed in accordance with PSEG company policy.
COMMITMENTS
The corrective actions cited in this LER are voluntary enhancements and do not constitute
commitments