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e OPS~G Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Dear Sir:
SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 UNIT NO. 1 October 5, 1994 SUPPLEMENTAL LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 93-014-02 This submittal is made to reclassify an occurrence as a Voluntary Report for informational purposes.
This occurrence had been previously identified as reportable pursuant to Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR 50.73.
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9410200158 941005 PDR ADOCK 05000272 s
Sincerely yours, 95-2189 REV 7-92
N~C FORM 366
.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 (5-92)
EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COME'LY WITH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST:
50.0 HRS.
FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE. PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31S0-0104), OFFICE OF (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.
FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET NUMBER (2)
II PAGE (3)
Salem Generating Station - Unit 1 05000 272 1 OF 04 TITLE (4)
Voluntary Reporting of 4 Kilo-Volt Vital Bus Second Level Undervoltage (UV)
I Protection DroJout Setvoint.
EVENT DATE (5)
LER NUMBER f6 REPORT NUMBER f7)
OTHER FACILITl!':S INVOLVED (8)
SEQUENTIAL REVISION FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NUMBER MONTH DAY' YEAR 05000 311 Salem Unit 2 FACILITY NAME DOCKET. NUMBER 05000 07 22 93 93 014 02
.10 05 94 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more (11)
- MODE (9) 1 20.402(b) 20.405(c) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 73:71(b)
I L:~E~~~O) I 80 I 20.405(a)(1) 0)
- 50. 73 (a)(2)(v) 73.71 (c) 20.405 (a)(1 )(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) x OTHER I
20A05(a)(1)(iii)
- 50. 73 (a)(2)(i) 50.73(a) (2) (viii) (A)
(Specify in Abstract 20.405(a) (1) (iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)
- 50. 73 (a)(2)(viii)(B) below and in Text, NRC Form 366A) 20.405 (a)(1 )(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)
Voluntarv J LICENSEE:CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12).
NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
M. J. Pastva, Jr. - LER Coordinator (609) 339-5165 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
CAUSE
SYSTEM.
COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TONPRDS TO NPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 14 EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR I
YES NO SUBMISSION (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) x DATE (15)
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)
On 7/22/93, it was determined that the 91. 6% dropout set point for second level undervoltage protection of both Salem Units' 4* kilovolt (KV) vital buses would not fully protect the 230 and 460 volt (V) motors should the 4KV bus voltage degrade to less than 93.2%, but greater than 91. 6%.
At that time it was concluded the intent of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report and guidance provided in "Safety Evaluation And Statement Of Staff Positions Relative To The Emergency Power Systems For Operating Reactors" NRC letter, dated 6/2/77, were not fully met.
Continued operation of both Sa_lem Uni ts was based upon self-imposed administrative controls on 4KV bus p.lignment until implementation of design changes to change the dropout setpoint.
A subsequent detailed study shows the motors would have performed their intended safety functions with the 91. 6% setpoint.
As such, this report is made voluntarily for informational purposes.
NRG FORM 366 (5-92)
BLOCK NUMBER 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 REQUIRED NUMBER OF DIGITS/CHARACTERS FOR EACH13LOCK NUMBER OF DIGITS/CHARACTERS TITLE UP TO 46 FACILITY NAME 8 TOTAL 3 IN ADDITION TO 05000 DOCKET NUMBER VARIES
'PAGE NUMBER UP T076 TITLE 6TOTAL 2 PER BLOCK EVENT DATE 7 TOTAL 2 FOR YEAR 3 FOR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER LER NUMBER 2 FOR REVISION NUMBER 6 TOTAL 2 PER BLOCK REPORT DATE UP TO 18 FACILITY NAME 8 TOTAL - DOCKET NUMBER OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 3 IN ADDITION TO 05000 1
OPERATING MODE 3
POWER LEVEL 1
CHECK BOX THAT APPLIES REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR UP TO 50 FOR NAME 14 FOR TELEPHONE LICENSEE CONTACT CAUSE VARIES 2 FOR SYSTEM 4 FOR COMPONENT EACH COMPONENT FAILURE 4 FOR MANUFACTURER NPRDS VARIES 1
CHECK BOX THAT APPLIES SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 6 TOTAL 2 PER BLOCK EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE
VOLUNTARY LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER 5000272
PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION
Westinghouse
- - Pressurized Water Reactor LER NUMBER 93-014-02 PAGE 2 of 4 Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as {xx}
REPORT IDENTIFICATION:
Voluntary Reporting Of 4 Kilo-Volt Vital Bus Second Level Undervoltage (UV) Protection Dropout Setpoint Date of Discovery:
7/22/93 Report Date:
10/5/94 This report was initiated by Incident Report No.93-320.
INITIAL"CONDITIONS:
Unit 1:
Mode 1 Reactor Power 80% - Unit Load 815 MWe Unit 2:
Mode 1 Reactor Power 100%
Unit Load 1140 MWe DISCUSSION:
On July 22, 1993, an initial determination was made that the 91.6%
dropout setpoint for second level undervoltage protection of both Salem Units' 4 kilovolt (KVJ vital buses* {VJ}, would not fully protect the 230 and 460 volt (V) motors should the 4KV bus voltage degrade to less than 93.2%, but greater than 91.6%.
At that time it was concluded the intent of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
{UFSAR) and guidance provided in "Safety Evaluation And Statement Of Staff Positions Relative To The Emergency Power Systems For Operating Reactors" NRC letter, dated June 2, 1977, were not fully met.
This was identified during a self-initiated adequacy review to ensure the intent of the 1977 NRC letter was being met.
Continued operation of both sa.lem Units was based upon ensuring that the 4KV bus voltage would be maintained at or above 93.2% by imposition of additional administrative controls on 4KV bus alignment until implementation of design changes to change the dropout setpoint.
The NRC was notified of this determination pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b) {l) (ii) (B).
In addition, on August 20, 1993, this issue was reported pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a) (2) (ii) (B) and 10CFR50.73(a) (2) (v) (D)
A subsequent detailed study shows the motors would have performed their intended safety functions with the 91.6% setpoint.
Therefore, a reportable occurrence with the setpoint, as described, does not 1
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VOLUNTARY LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER 5000272 LER NUMBER 93-014-02 PAGE 3 of 4 DISCUSSION: (cont'd) exist pursuant to 10CFR50.72 or 10CFR50.73.
ANALYSIS:
In July 1993, a self-initiated adequacy review concluded the 91.6%.
dropout setpoint for second level undervoltage protection of both Salem Units' 4 KV vital buses, would not fully protect 230 and 460V motors.
Continued operation of both Salem Units was based upon the following self-imposed administrative controls regarding 4KV bus alignment:
- 1.
Hourly logging of 4KV vital bus voltages, maintained between 4.3KV and 4.5KV.
- 2.
Maintaining only two vital buses energized from their operating transformer, if both the corresponding group buses are on their respective Auxiliary Power Transformer (APT).
3a.
Maintaining three vital buses energized from the operating transformer, if one of the corresponding group buses is transferred to the operating Station Power Transformer (SPT) or 3b.
Maintaining three vital buses energized from the operating transformer, if the load which can be transferred from the APTs is reduced by 5 mega volt amps.
However, revision 01 to calculation ES-15.00S(Q), "Salem Units 1 and 2 Degraded Grid Study", shows worst case recovery vital bus voltage is 93.2% of 4KV following transfer of the APTs to the SPTs.
A subsequent detailed study shows that the 230 and 460V motors will perform their safety functions with the 91.6% setpoint.
As such, the self-imposed administrative controls serve to add greater enhancement to the performance of these motors, from a reliability standpoint.
The initial determination that the 91.6% dropout setpoint did not meet the intent of the UFSAR and the BTP resulted from overly restrictive conservatism in reviewing/assessing the ES-15.00S(Q), revision 01 calculations, without benefit of the results of the subsequent detailed study.
Dropout setpoint selection at 91.6%*was based on the lowest voltage the 4.16KV motors could be allowed to operate (i.e.
90%) due to voltage drops in the motors' cables and relay inaccuracy considerations.
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VOLUNTARY LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Unit l DOCKET NUMBER 5000272 LER NUMBER 93-014-02 PAGE 4 of 4 SIGNIFICANCE:
This report is made for informational purposes, since the dropout setpoint provides adequate protection for the worst case design basis event.
As such, this issue is not reportable pursuant the requirements of 10CFR50.73.
ACTIONS TAKEN/PLANNED:
Related design changes, including changing the dropout setpoint, were implemented on Unit 1 during its last refueling outage and are scheduled for Unit 2 during its next refueling outage.
The self-imposed administrative controls will be maintained for Unit 2 until implementation of the aforementioned design changes.
License Change Requests have been submitted to revise Technical Specifications regarding the second level undervoltage relay setpoint.
The importance of adequately considering lower voltage levels whenever evaluating 4KV setpoints for changes has been discussed with the Electrical Engineering Group.
Appropriate changes to the UFSAR will be implemented.
Appropriate documents will be revised to incorporate the results of the subsequent study involving the 91.6% dropout setpoint.
MJPJ:pc SORC Mtg.94-077 ager -
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| 05000311/LER-1993-001-01, :on 921209,under-frequency Protection for 2H 4 Kv Group Bus Unknowingly Inoperable Due to Mispositioned Test Switch.Caused by Personnel Error.Group UV & Uf Monthly Procedures Will Be Revised |
- on 921209,under-frequency Protection for 2H 4 Kv Group Bus Unknowingly Inoperable Due to Mispositioned Test Switch.Caused by Personnel Error.Group UV & Uf Monthly Procedures Will Be Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000272/LER-1993-001, :on 930111,TS 3.0.3 Intentionally Entered Twice Due to Removal of Main & Auxiliary 115-volt Power Supply Fuses.Caused by Equipment Failure.Design Change Will Be Installed to Relocate Flange |
- on 930111,TS 3.0.3 Intentionally Entered Twice Due to Removal of Main & Auxiliary 115-volt Power Supply Fuses.Caused by Equipment Failure.Design Change Will Be Installed to Relocate Flange
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000272/LER-1993-002, :on 920116,manual Reactor Trip Initiated When 12 SGFP Tripped Due to Turbine Trip FW Isolation Signal. Caused by Equipment Failure.Faulty Turbine Bypass Sys Components Replaced |
- on 920116,manual Reactor Trip Initiated When 12 SGFP Tripped Due to Turbine Trip FW Isolation Signal. Caused by Equipment Failure.Faulty Turbine Bypass Sys Components Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000311/LER-1993-002-01, :on 930128,pumps Tripped on Low Suction Pressure.Caused by Equipment Failure.Loose SGFP Master Controller Test Jack Repaired & Other Jacks in SGFP Speed Control Loop Inspected & Repaired as Required |
- on 930128,pumps Tripped on Low Suction Pressure.Caused by Equipment Failure.Loose SGFP Master Controller Test Jack Repaired & Other Jacks in SGFP Speed Control Loop Inspected & Repaired as Required
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(o)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(o)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(o)(2)(ii) | | 05000311/LER-1993-003-01, :on 930131,level Indicator of 21 Bast Declared Inoperable Due to False High Level Indications.Caused by Design Construction/Installation.Design Change Will Be Developed to Reduce Bast Boron Concentration |
- on 930131,level Indicator of 21 Bast Declared Inoperable Due to False High Level Indications.Caused by Design Construction/Installation.Design Change Will Be Developed to Reduce Bast Boron Concentration
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000272/LER-1993-003, :on 930123 & 27,both Basts Declared Inoperable Due to Respective False High Level Indication.Cause by Bubbler Tube Blockage.Number 11 Bast Level Indicator Bubbler Tube Blown Down to Remove Blockage |
- on 930123 & 27,both Basts Declared Inoperable Due to Respective False High Level Indication.Cause by Bubbler Tube Blockage.Number 11 Bast Level Indicator Bubbler Tube Blown Down to Remove Blockage
| 10 CFR 50.73(o)(2)(v) 10 CFR 50.73(o)(2)(vii) 10 CFR 50.73(o)(2)(i) | | 05000311/LER-1993-004, :on 930206,both Main Turbine first-stage Impulse Pressure Indication Channels Indicated False Readings.Caused by Inadequate Sensing Line Protection. Failed Heat Tracing Will Be Repaired |
- on 930206,both Main Turbine first-stage Impulse Pressure Indication Channels Indicated False Readings.Caused by Inadequate Sensing Line Protection. Failed Heat Tracing Will Be Repaired
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000272/LER-1993-004-01, :on 930216,automatic Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Overtemperature Delta Temp Signal.Caused by Equipment Failure.Module Output Gain Selector Switch 1QM411B Cleaned & Exercised & Capacitors Replaced |
- on 930216,automatic Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Overtemperature Delta Temp Signal.Caused by Equipment Failure.Module Output Gain Selector Switch 1QM411B Cleaned & Exercised & Capacitors Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000272/LER-1993-005, :on 930218,experienced Reactor Protection Sys Reactor Trip/Turbine Trip Signal,When 12 SG Level Decreased. Caused by Personnel Error.Event Will Be Reviewed for Incorporation in Applicable Training Program |
- on 930218,experienced Reactor Protection Sys Reactor Trip/Turbine Trip Signal,When 12 SG Level Decreased. Caused by Personnel Error.Event Will Be Reviewed for Incorporation in Applicable Training Program
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000311/LER-1993-005-01, :on 930316,reactor Trip Occurred on 24 SG low-low Level.Caused by Mgt/Qa Deficiency.Heater Drain Sys Level Control Booster Will Be Replaced |
- on 930316,reactor Trip Occurred on 24 SG low-low Level.Caused by Mgt/Qa Deficiency.Heater Drain Sys Level Control Booster Will Be Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000311/LER-1993-006-01, :on 930415,unexpected Train a SI Sys Signal Occurred Due to Steam Line Differential Pressure.Caused by Operating Characteristics of Error Inhibit Switch.Procedures Re Manipulation of Switches Reviewed |
- on 930415,unexpected Train a SI Sys Signal Occurred Due to Steam Line Differential Pressure.Caused by Operating Characteristics of Error Inhibit Switch.Procedures Re Manipulation of Switches Reviewed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000272/LER-1993-006, :on 930221,station Power Transformers 12 & 22 Deenergized Due to Tripping of Common 13 Kv Ring Bus Section 4 Breakers & 500 Kv Section 1 Breakers.Caused by Inadequate Communication.Caution Tags Hung on Breakers |
- on 930221,station Power Transformers 12 & 22 Deenergized Due to Tripping of Common 13 Kv Ring Bus Section 4 Breakers & 500 Kv Section 1 Breakers.Caused by Inadequate Communication.Caution Tags Hung on Breakers
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(o)(2) | | 05000272/LER-1993-007, :on 930225,initial Investigation Indicated High Resistance Readings at Coil Stacks Resulting to TS 3.0.3 Entry.Caused by Sys Design.Review of Event in Progress & C/A Will Be Implemented Based on Results |
- on 930225,initial Investigation Indicated High Resistance Readings at Coil Stacks Resulting to TS 3.0.3 Entry.Caused by Sys Design.Review of Event in Progress & C/A Will Be Implemented Based on Results
| | | 05000311/LER-1993-007-01, :on 930528,all Four Rods of Control Rod Bank C, Group 1 Unexpectedly Dropped Fully Into Reactor Core.Caused by Degraded Signal from Regulation Board.Card Replaced & Firing Circuit Satisfactorily Tested |
- on 930528,all Four Rods of Control Rod Bank C, Group 1 Unexpectedly Dropped Fully Into Reactor Core.Caused by Degraded Signal from Regulation Board.Card Replaced & Firing Circuit Satisfactorily Tested
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000311/LER-1993-008-01, :on 930527,determined That Postulated Single Failure Concern Existed Where Failure of One Rod Control Sys Slave Cycler Decoder Card,In Conjunction W/Rod Motion Command Signal May Cause Rcca Withdrawal |
- on 930527,determined That Postulated Single Failure Concern Existed Where Failure of One Rod Control Sys Slave Cycler Decoder Card,In Conjunction W/Rod Motion Command Signal May Cause Rcca Withdrawal
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(i)(2) | | 05000272/LER-1993-008, :on 930304,determined That Design of Control Air Sys Containment Outboard Isolation air-operated Valves Inconsistent W/Description in Updated Fsar.Caused by Design/ Mfg Defect.Documentation Will Be Revised |
- on 930304,determined That Design of Control Air Sys Containment Outboard Isolation air-operated Valves Inconsistent W/Description in Updated Fsar.Caused by Design/ Mfg Defect.Documentation Will Be Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000311/LER-1993-008, :on 930527,control Rod 1SA3 Withdrew to Approx 15 Steps from Fully Inserted in Response to Manual Insertion Command Due to Failure of Integrated Circuit Chips.Emergency License Amend Requested on 930617 |
- on 930527,control Rod 1SA3 Withdrew to Approx 15 Steps from Fully Inserted in Response to Manual Insertion Command Due to Failure of Integrated Circuit Chips.Emergency License Amend Requested on 930617
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor | | 05000311/LER-1993-009-01, :on 930629,automatic Start of Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Occurred Due to Mgt/Qa Deficiency. Troubleshooting Procedures Developed |
- on 930629,automatic Start of Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Occurred Due to Mgt/Qa Deficiency. Troubleshooting Procedures Developed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000311/LER-1993-010-01, :on 930629,reactor Shutdown Initiated Per TS 3.0.3 Due to Inoperability of More than One Control Rod Analog Rod Position Indication Per Control Bank.Signal Conditioning Modules of Affected Rods Adjusted |
- on 930629,reactor Shutdown Initiated Per TS 3.0.3 Due to Inoperability of More than One Control Rod Analog Rod Position Indication Per Control Bank.Signal Conditioning Modules of Affected Rods Adjusted
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000272/LER-1993-010, :on 930407,determined That Svc Water Flow Through DG Jacket Water & Lube Oil Coolers Less than Design Requirement of 700 Gpm.Caused by Design/Mfg Deficiency. Proper Setpoint Developed & Verified |
- on 930407,determined That Svc Water Flow Through DG Jacket Water & Lube Oil Coolers Less than Design Requirement of 700 Gpm.Caused by Design/Mfg Deficiency. Proper Setpoint Developed & Verified
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000311/LER-1993-010, :on 930629 & 30,TS 3.0.3 Entered Due to More than One Inoperable Analog Rod Position Indicator Per Bank. Caused by Sys Design.Signal Conditioning Modules of Affected Rods Adjusted |
- on 930629 & 30,TS 3.0.3 Entered Due to More than One Inoperable Analog Rod Position Indicator Per Bank. Caused by Sys Design.Signal Conditioning Modules of Affected Rods Adjusted
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000311/LER-1993-011, :on 931019,RMS Channels 2R13 A,B,C Were Inoperable Due to Efficiency Being Adjusted to Reduced Level.Implemented Design Changes & 2R13 A,B, & C Were Calibrated & Returned to Service |
- on 931019,RMS Channels 2R13 A,B,C Were Inoperable Due to Efficiency Being Adjusted to Reduced Level.Implemented Design Changes & 2R13 A,B, & C Were Calibrated & Returned to Service
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000311/LER-1993-011-01, :on 931019,inoperability of Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitors Discovered Due to Use of Incorrect Source Decay Tables Values.Caused by Mgt/Qa Deficiency.Channels 2R19A,B,C & D Recalibrated |
- on 931019,inoperability of Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitors Discovered Due to Use of Incorrect Source Decay Tables Values.Caused by Mgt/Qa Deficiency.Channels 2R19A,B,C & D Recalibrated
| | | 05000272/LER-1993-011, :on 930608,automatic Reactor Trip from 85% Power Occurred Due to Main Turbine Trip from Low Condenser Vacuum & P-9 Trip Permissive.Caused by Mgt/Qa Deficiency. Circulating Water Intake Structure Dredged |
- on 930608,automatic Reactor Trip from 85% Power Occurred Due to Main Turbine Trip from Low Condenser Vacuum & P-9 Trip Permissive.Caused by Mgt/Qa Deficiency. Circulating Water Intake Structure Dredged
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000311/LER-1993-012-01, :on 931030,TS 3.0.3 Entered Due to Inoperability of 21 Bast Level Indication While 22 Bast Out of Svc.Caused by Design Deficiency.Design Change Installed |
- on 931030,TS 3.0.3 Entered Due to Inoperability of 21 Bast Level Indication While 22 Bast Out of Svc.Caused by Design Deficiency.Design Change Installed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000272/LER-1993-012, :on 930609,vital Bus 1C Sensed Undervoltage Condition,Resulting in Automatic Start & Blackout Loading of DG 1C.Caused by Inattention to Detail on Part of Personnel. Positive Disciplinary Action Completed |
- on 930609,vital Bus 1C Sensed Undervoltage Condition,Resulting in Automatic Start & Blackout Loading of DG 1C.Caused by Inattention to Detail on Part of Personnel. Positive Disciplinary Action Completed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000272/LER-1993-013, :on 930711,experienced Reactor/Turbine Trip Signal Due to Steam Flow/Feed Flow Mismatch.Caused by Inattention to Detail.Operations Personnel Disciplined |
- on 930711,experienced Reactor/Turbine Trip Signal Due to Steam Flow/Feed Flow Mismatch.Caused by Inattention to Detail.Operations Personnel Disciplined
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000311/LER-1993-013-01, :on 931202,DG 2C Declared Inoperable Due to Cracking in 3R Cylinder Liner.All Cylinder Liners Installed in 2C & 1B DGs Inspected & Previously Installed Canadian Allied Diesel Liners Replaced W/Alco Liners |
- on 931202,DG 2C Declared Inoperable Due to Cracking in 3R Cylinder Liner.All Cylinder Liners Installed in 2C & 1B DGs Inspected & Previously Installed Canadian Allied Diesel Liners Replaced W/Alco Liners
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown | | 05000272/LER-1993-014-01, :on 930722,concern Raised Re 4 Kv Vital Bus Second Level Undervoltage Protection Dropout Setpoint Due to Design,Mfg,Const/Installation.Analysis of Event Continuing. Suppl LER Will Be Submitted |
- on 930722,concern Raised Re 4 Kv Vital Bus Second Level Undervoltage Protection Dropout Setpoint Due to Design,Mfg,Const/Installation.Analysis of Event Continuing. Suppl LER Will Be Submitted
| | | 05000272/LER-1993-014, :on 930722,determine 4 Kv Vital Bus Second Level Undervoltage Protection Dropout Setpoint Would Not Protect Motors.Detailed Study Showed Motors Would Have Performed Intended Safety Functions |
- on 930722,determine 4 Kv Vital Bus Second Level Undervoltage Protection Dropout Setpoint Would Not Protect Motors.Detailed Study Showed Motors Would Have Performed Intended Safety Functions
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000311/LER-1993-014-01, :on 931228,ESF Actuation & Resultant & Pressurizer Overpressure Protection Sys Channel 1 Actuation Occurred.Caused by Defective Procedure.Slave Relay Surveillance Procedures Revised |
- on 931228,ESF Actuation & Resultant & Pressurizer Overpressure Protection Sys Channel 1 Actuation Occurred.Caused by Defective Procedure.Slave Relay Surveillance Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000272/LER-1993-015, :on 930913 & 16,BAST 12 Level Indicator Declared Inoperable Due to False Level Indications.Caused by Design of Bast Level Indication Sys.Design Change to Reduce Boron Concentration Will Be Implemented |
- on 930913 & 16,BAST 12 Level Indicator Declared Inoperable Due to False Level Indications.Caused by Design of Bast Level Indication Sys.Design Change to Reduce Boron Concentration Will Be Implemented
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000272/LER-1993-016, :on 931021,ESF Actuation Occurred Due to Electrical Short within 4 Kv Switchgear.Caused by Personnel Error Associated W/Ongoing Relay Maint Activities.Imposed Vital Bus & Switchyard Work Standdown |
- on 931021,ESF Actuation Occurred Due to Electrical Short within 4 Kv Switchgear.Caused by Personnel Error Associated W/Ongoing Relay Maint Activities.Imposed Vital Bus & Switchyard Work Standdown
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000272/LER-1993-017, :on 931106,infeed Breaker 13BSD from Station Power Transformer (Spt) 13 Failed to Close Due to Personnel Error.Discipline in Accordance W/Util Positive Discipline Program Conducted |
- on 931106,infeed Breaker 13BSD from Station Power Transformer (Spt) 13 Failed to Close Due to Personnel Error.Discipline in Accordance W/Util Positive Discipline Program Conducted
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000272/LER-1993-018, :on 931203,determined That Monthly Testing of Ssps Containment Pressure Hi Hi Input Channels Did Not Verify That Ssps Input Circuit Path Reclosed.Applicable Procedures Will Be Revised |
- on 931203,determined That Monthly Testing of Ssps Containment Pressure Hi Hi Input Channels Did Not Verify That Ssps Input Circuit Path Reclosed.Applicable Procedures Will Be Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000272/LER-1993-019, :on 931203,TS Action Statement Entered Due to Waste Gas Holdup Sys Oxygen Concentration Being Greater than 2% for More than 48 H.Oxygen Concentration within Waste Gas Sys Reduced to Less than 2% on 931212 |
- on 931203,TS Action Statement Entered Due to Waste Gas Holdup Sys Oxygen Concentration Being Greater than 2% for More than 48 H.Oxygen Concentration within Waste Gas Sys Reduced to Less than 2% on 931212
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000272/LER-1993-020, :on 931223,RCS Accumulator Upper Range Level Indication Inaccuracies Affecting Units 1 & 2 Identified. Caused by Use of Incorrect Original Scaling Factors. Accumulators on Both Units Correctly Rescaled |
- on 931223,RCS Accumulator Upper Range Level Indication Inaccuracies Affecting Units 1 & 2 Identified. Caused by Use of Incorrect Original Scaling Factors. Accumulators on Both Units Correctly Rescaled
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
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