05000263/FIN-2015003-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Perform High Radiation Area Portable Fire Extinguisher Surveillances |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and an NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.d when the licensee failed to implement procedures associated with Fire Protection Program Implementation, to ensure that required refueling outage surveillances were performed for fire extinguishers located in high radiation areas (HRAs). Specifically, between March 2007 and May 2015, the licensee failed to implement steps 9 and 10 of 1123, Portable Fire Extinguishers, which required weighing and verifying adequate hydrostatic testing of the fire extinguishers in HRAs on a refueling outage frequency. Corrective actions included surveillance process changes and evaluation of the current status of the high radiation area fire extinguishers which resulted in the determination that outside of the surveillance process, a separate work activity had exchanged all the affected extinguishers with ones that were current on their surveillances in May 2015. This issue was entered into the licensees Corrective Action Program (CAP) 1484257
The inspectors determined that the failure to implement HRA fire extinguisher surveillances was a performance deficiency requiring evaluation. The inspectors determined the issue was more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Factorsincluding fire, and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The inspectors assessed the significance of this finding using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings," and IMC 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection SDP, and determined that it had very low safety significance. The inspectors determined that the contributing cause that provided the most insight into the performance deficiency was associated with the cross-cutting area of Human Performance, Work Management aspect because of the failure to implement a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding priority and the failure to identify the need for coordination with different groups or job activities |
| Site: | Monticello  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000263/2015003 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2015 (2015Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Hunt K Riemer M Doyle M Ziolkowski N Shah P Laflamme P Voss P Zurawski R Elliott S Bell J Havertape |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Monticello - IR 05000263/2015003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Monticello) @ 2015Q3
Self-Identified List (Monticello)
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