05000263/FIN-2014005-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and NCV of 10 CFR 50.55a(f)(4) for the licensees failure to test main steam line drain containment isolation valves MO2373 and MO2374 in accordance with the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Operation and Maintenance (OM) code requirements or maintain the valves in the alternative configuration specified in an NRC-approved Relief Request (VRR05). Specifically, on October 17, 2014, the NRC identified that the licensee had failed to maintain the approved alternative configuration which had been accepted by the NRC in lieu of the required quarterly stroke testing of MO2373 and MO2374. Corrective actions for this event included immediate restoration of the NRC-approved configuration specified in the relief request, cancellation of the noncompliant procedure temporary revisions, and cancellation of the associated 10 CFR50.59 screening. The licensee also initiated an apparent cause evaluation
which was in progress at the end of this inspection period. The inspectors determined that the failure to test MO2373 and MO2374 in accordance with the ASME OM code or maintain the relief request approved plant configuration was a performance deficiency. The inspectors evaluated the issue and determined that the finding was more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, because it adversely impacted the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone attributes of Design Control and Configuration Control, and affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers, including containment, protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors assessed the significance of this finding in accordance with IMC 0609, and determined that this finding was of very low safety significance because it did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment, and did not involve an actual reduction in function of hydrogen igniters in the reactor containment. The inspectors concluded that this finding was cross-cutting in the Human Performance Decision making aspect because of the failure to use a consistent, systematic approach to make decisions and a failure to ensure that risk insights are incorporated as appropriate. [H.13] |
| Site: | Monticello  |
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| Report | IR 05000263/2014005 Section 1R04 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2014 (2014Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity, Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.04 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Mcneil J Beavers K Riemer M Phalen P Voss P Zurawski S Bell |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50.55a |
| CCA | H.13, Consistent Process |
| INPO aspect | DM.1 |
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Finding - Monticello - IR 05000263/2014005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Monticello) @ 2014Q4
Self-Identified List (Monticello)
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