05000261/FIN-2011004-02
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Take Prompt Corrective Actions to Establish Guidance to Monitor and Operate Service Water Strainers Following LOOP |
Description | The inspectors identified a Green NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1, Administrative Controls, Procedures, for failure to establish procedural guidance to monitor Service Water System (SWS) parameters and operate the SWS strainers following a loss of offsite power (LOOP). Following a LOOP, the operator's ability to recover from a plugged SWS strainer would be impacted due to the loss of the associated control alarm and the lack of procedural guidance to manually operate the SWS strainers. The licensee has revised plant procedures to include additional instructions that will ensure that operators can recover from plugged SWS strainers and preserve the operation of the SWS following a LOOP. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as NCR 473900. The failure to establish procedural guidance to locally monitor SWS parameters and manually operate the SWS strainers following a LOOP was a performance deficiency. This issue was more than minor because if left uncorrected this finding would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the inability to clean the service water strainers, following a prolonged LOOP, could impact the operation of the service water system. The SDP Phase 1 screening determined that this finding was within the mitigating systems cornerstone and was potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding or severe weather initiating event and therefore required a Phase 3 SDP analysis. An NRC Senior Reactor Analyst (SRA) determined the lack of procedure for a loss of the service water strainers due to an external event (i.e., loss of offsite power removing power to the strainers and causing debris to clog the system) was of very low risk significance i.e., Green. The main contributors to the low risk results were: 1) the low likelihood of a total loss of service water event, and 2) the probability of recovery of the strainers and/or the system despite the lack of procedures. The inspectors determined that the finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the Corrective Action Program component of the Problem Identification and Resolution area, because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate the issue such that the resolution addressed the cause and extent of conditions, as necessary. Specifically, licensee's evaluation of the NCR associated with the lack of plant procedures to manually operate the SWS, failed to recognize that the control room indication associated with a plugged SWS strainer would be lost following a LOOP. |
Site: | Robinson ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000261/2011004 Section 1R15 |
Date counted | Sep 30, 2011 (2011Q3) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
Inspectors (proximate) | C Scott C Stancil E Coffman J Austin J Hickey M Coursey R Musser T Chandler |
CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
INPO aspect | PI.2 |
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Finding - Robinson - IR 05000261/2011004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Robinson) @ 2011Q3
Self-Identified List (Robinson)
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