05000219/LER-1981-066, Forwards LER 81-066/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Forwards LER 81-066/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
ML20040B147
Person / Time
Site: Oyster Creek
Issue date: 12/31/1981
From: Carroll J
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO.
To: Haynes R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20040B148 List:
References
NUDOCS 8201250210
Download: ML20040B147 (3)


LER-1981-066, Forwards LER 81-066/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
Event date:
Report date:
2191981066R00 - NRC Website

text

_

0 Jersey Central Power & Light Company

,,--m,---

l b

ff y' Mornstown, flew Jen,ey 07900 Mad' son Avenue at Punch Bowl Road ha.wl.Ah cy--;

o (201)455 8200 BI

,gh LI.! s December 31, 1981 s'/

/

.s/

S Mr. Ibnald llaynes, Director N-l' Office of Inspection and Enforcutent T3 G\\ ' } {o b i

lbl on I

~

DU

(({gna United Staten Nuclear Pegulatory Cminission

'h2)

Y 631 Park Avenue mc King of Pninsia, Pesutsylvania 19406 tt N

as

Dear Mr. Ilaynes:

SUltilrl':.)fster Creek Nuclear Generating Station mxket No. ',0-219 Licensee INent leport l'eportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-66/3L This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee INent leport to report Iteportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-66/3L in empliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b.1 of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,

)

, (t vu'l '

. T. Carrull, c Acting Director fater Creek J'JC :dh 12Tclosures cc: Director (40 copies)

Of fice of Inspection and 1'nforement UniLal Slates Nuclear Ibjulatory Coninission Washington, D.C.

20555 Di. rector (3)

Of fice of Rinagenent Informtion and Program Control Unital States Nuclear Regulatory Camti.ssion Washington, D. C. 20555 NIC ltesident Inspector (1)

Oyster Creek Nuclear Cenerating Station 1'orkal River, N. J.

8201250210 ejg733 hDRADOCK 05000219 PDR b

pt u, c, o,a %...r 3, t y,1 m,m m. a n er e.. o. e. u em m.

,,.m,n pj

4 OYSTER CMH !JUCLEAR GUIEPATItJG STATICH Forked River,IIew Jersey 08731 Licensee Event Report Reportable Occurrence 11o. 50-219/81-66/3L Pcport Date December 31, 1981 Occurrenw Date Decarber 1, 1981 Identification of Occurrence During surveillance testing, the Main Steam Line high flow sensors RE-22C, RE-22E arxl RE-22F tripped at values greater than the desired setpoint as given in the Technical Specification, Tabic 3.1.1 sections B.2 and B.3.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b.l.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence The plant was operating at steady state power.

(

t&ljor Plant Parancters Power:

Peactor 1900 MWt Generator 649 f&le 4

Flow:

Pccirculation 15.4 x 10 gpn Feedwater 7.14 x 106 lb/hr Description of Occurrence During performnce of the IIigh Flow in the Nin Steam Line Test and Calibration Surveillance, high flow sensors RE-22C, RE-22E and RE-22F trippcxl at values greater than the Technical Specification limit of 197.5 psid. 'Ihe testing yielded the following data:

Sensor Designation Desired Setpoint Ipsid) As Found (psid)

As Inft (psid)

RE-22A

<92.5 93.0 93.0 IE-22B 792.5 96.0 92.5 RE-22C 792.5 99.0 92.0 IE-22D 792.5 94.5 92.0 RE-22E 792.5 101.0 92.0 RE-22F 792.5 100.0 91.5 RE-22G 792.5 97.0 92.0 RE-2211

<92.5 96.5 92.5

Reportable Occurrence Page 2 Report No. 50-219/81-66/3L Apparent Cause of Occurrence

'Ihe causes are attributal to instrurrent repeatability and instrurent drift. 'Ite total design accuracy is +7.25 psid (6.0 psid due to instrument accuracy and 1.25 psid due to calibration accuracy). Sensor P.E-22C was last reset at 92 and tripped at 99.0, therefore, it was operating within the design criteria of the instrunent (repeatability). Sensors RE-22E and IE-22F were both last reset at 92.5 and tripped at 101.0 and 100.0, so they were, therefore, operating outside of the design criteria (drift).

Analysis of Occurrence Doth of the Main Steam Lines will isolate due to a line break as sensal by either a high taiperature or a high flow condition. Each line contains 4 high flow sensors, which are part of the logic systan which will initiate closure of the Main Steam Isolation valves (MSIV). 'Ihe logic synton contains 2 channels, and initiation of MSIV closure requires a j sigrul frun both channels. Additionally, each channel containing 4 sensors is further divided into 2 circuits.

With the existing logic systan, the event is limited to a togorary loss of rulundancy in each circuit of one trip channel and one circuit of the other trip channel. In the case of RE-22C, sensor RE-22G is located in the sane trip circuit and would have actuatal within the raIuired limit.

In the case of RE-22E and RE-22F, sensors RE-22A and RE-22B respectively are located in the same trip circuits and they also would have actuated within the desired limit. Based on the above discussion, the safety significance of the occurrence is considered muumal.

Corrective Action

All of the sensors were reset to trip within the procedural limits of 92.5&1 psid (note the "As Left" values in the Description of Occurrence).

An engineering study to investigate the problan of repeatability associated with this type of sensor has recantended the replacerent of this type of sensor with qualified sensors of inproved accuracy. '1he replacanent is planned for a future refueling outage.

Failure Data Manufacturer:

I'IT Barton Model:

  1. 228A Pressure Indicating Snap Action Switch Range:

0-200 psid i