05000219/LER-1981-025, Forwards LER 81-025/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

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Forwards LER 81-025/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
ML20009A674
Person / Time
Site: Oyster Creek
Issue date: 07/01/1981
From: Finfrock I
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO.
To: Grier B
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20009A675 List:
References
NUDOCS 8107130462
Download: ML20009A674 (3)


LER-1981-025, Forwards LER 81-025/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
Event date:
Report date:
2191981025R00 - NRC Website

text

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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION I

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(609)693-6000 P.O. BOX 388

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  • 08731 ce~ a e c un e 3,se-July 1, 1981 Mr. Boyce h. Grier, Director Office of Inspection and Enforement Region I United ""tes Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnission 631 Parx Ave.nue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

SLT Cr.Cf: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket No. 50-219 Licensee Event Report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-25/OlT This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-25/0lT in ccrcpliance with paragraph 6.9.2.A.2 and 6.9.2.A.6 of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,

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y Ivan R. Finfrock m.

Vice President C

Director - Oyster Creek IRF:dh Enclosures

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Office of Managment Informaticn Q7

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and Program Control United States Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnission Washington, D. C. 20555 NRC Resident Inspector (1)

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Forked River, N. J.

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OYSTER uttX NUCIEAR GENFfATING STATION Forked River, New Jersey 08731 Licensee Event Report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-25/01T Report Date July 1, 1981 Occurrence Date June 17, 1981 Identification of Occurrerce Violation of the Technical Specifications paragraph 3.5.B.1, when secondary containment integrity was not maintained for five minutes when both reactor building railro d airlock doors were open.

'Ihis event is considered to be a reportable occarrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.A.2 and 6.9.2.A.6.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence 4

Flow:

Pecirculating 15 x 10 y Feedwater 7.2 x 106 lb/hr Pmer:

Generator 600 Mie Reactor 1768.08 Mit Description of Occurrence Cn Wednesday, June 17, 1981, at approximately 1347 hours0.0156 days <br />0.374 hours <br />0.00223 weeks <br />5.125335e-4 months <br />, the secondary con-tainment integrity was broken when both reactor building ra,1 road airlock doors were open together.

The outer railroad airlock door was open to permit work on the door closure interlock circuit and the inner door was in the closed position. The inner door swung partially open at the top breaking a securing latch.

A broken inner door latch peraitted the door to open partially at the top when normal reactor bnilaing ventilation systs was switched from the Standby Gas l

Treatment System, after testing, to nonral ventilation. 'Ihe operator failed to start the supply fan after starting the exhaust fan. The time the railroad airlock doors were open did not exceed five minutes sLre the probl e was diagnosed inrcMiately by the electrician working on the cater door who closed the outer door within minutes of the event.

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Repartable Occurren Page 2 Beport No. 50-219/81-25/01T Apoarent Cause of Occurrence operator error and failure of inner door latch permitting the door to partially open frcm excess Beactor Biilaing vacuum caused this event.

Analysis of Occurrence Seamdary containment is required to minimize ground level release of airborne radioactive material and to provide for controlled, elevated release of the building at:nasphere under amiaant ecoditions. 'Ihe ability of secondary con-tainment to perform its intended function with both airlock doors open was degraded. Considering the length of time concerned, the safety significance of this event is considered to be minimal.

Corrective Action

'Ibe closure latch was repaired and replaced within one and one half hours after the event. 'Ibe supply fan was started inmediately to correct the situation.

Additionally, the incident was discussed with the operator involved and a nuorandun will be issued to all operators discussing the event and the prop?x operation of the doors. As a follow-up a revision to Procedure No. 329 "Peactor Biilaing Heating, Cooling and Ventilation System" will be made in order to insure correct practi s are followed.

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