05000219/LER-2022-001, Compensatory Measures Not Implemented Per Sites Physical Security Plan Due to Multiplexer (Mux) Power Supply Failure
| ML22021B551 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 01/21/2022 |
| From: | Fleming J Holtec Decommissioning International |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| HDI-OC-22-002 LER 2022-01-00 | |
| Download: ML22021B551 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| 2192022001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
Krishna P. Singh Technology Campus, 1 Holtec Blvd., Camden, NJ 08104 H O LT E C -------------- ------Te-1-ep_h_o_n_e-(8_5_6_) 7-9_0_0 D ECOMMISSIONING 1NTERNA T 10NAL Fax (856) 797-0909 January 21, 2022 Attn: Document Control Desk Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Renewed Facility License No. DPR-16 NRC Docket Nos. 50-219 and 72-15 10 CFR 73.71 (a)(4)
Subject:
60-Day Written Report 2022-001-0, Compensatory Measures Not Implemented per Site's Physical Security Plan Due to Multiplexer (MUX) Power Supply Failure
Dear Sir or Madam:
Pursuant to 10 CFR 73. 71 (a)(4), Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC (HDI) is submitting Licensee Event Report (LER) 2022-001-0, "Compensatory Measures Not Implemented per Site's Physical Security Plan Due to Multiplexer (MUX) Power Supply Failure".
NRC Forms 366 and 366a were utilized as specified in NUREG 1022, Revision 3.
This letter contains no new commitments. If you have any questions or need further information, please contact me at (856) 797-0900, ext. 3578.
Sincerely, Jean A. Fleming HDI Vice President, Regulatory and Environmental Affairs Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC Day Written Report 2022-001-0, Compensatory Measures Not Implemented per Site's Physical Security Plan Due to Multiplexer (MUX) Power Supply Failure cc:
USNRC Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards USNRC Director, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response USNRC Regional Administrator, Region I USNRC Project Manager, NMSS - Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station USNRC Region I, Lead Inspector-Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station HDI-OC-22-002 Page 1 of 1 Digitally signed by Jean A. Fleming DN: cn=Jean A. Fleming, c=US, o=Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC, ou=Regulatory and Environmental Affairs, email=J.Fleming@Holtec.com Date: 2022.01.21 12:59:18 -05'00' Jean A.
Fleming
H o L T E c _____
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Telephone (856) 797-0900 ATTACHMENT 1 To OCNGS Letter HDI-OC-22-002 60-Day Written Report 2022-001-0 Fax (856) 797-0909 Compensatory Measures Not Implemented per Site's Physical Security Plan Due to Multiplexer (MUX) Power Supply Failure
Abstract
On May 7, 2021, at 1638 a power supply inside of Multiplexer (MUX) associated with the security computer system located in the Central Alarm Station (CAS) failed. The failure of the MUX power supply interrupted the communication pathways between the Security Computer System, Select Line Board (SLB) and Card Reader lnterface (CRI) equipment in the field. Security performed an extent of condition but were not knowledgeable of what security equipment the SLB affected. On May 8, 2021, at 0815 the alarm station operator discovered an issue with the Protected Area (PA) Intrusion Detection System (IDS) when an anticipated alarm was not generated. An extent of condition was performed, additional PA IDS zones were found to be inoperable. The cause of the PA IDS zones inoperability was connected to the MUX power supply failure and SLB alarms received more than 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> earlier on May 7, 2021. Compensatory measures for the inoperable IDS zones exceeded the time allowed by the site's Physical Security Plan (PSP). Furthermore, security missed the 1-hour notification to the NRC in accordance with Appendix G of Part 73 (l)(c) any failure, degradation, or the discovered vulnerability in a safeguard system that could allow unauthorized or undetected access to a protected area, material access area, controlled access area, vital area, or transport for which compensatory measures have not been employed. On January 5th, 2022, at 0911 hours0.0105 days <br />0.253 hours <br />0.00151 weeks <br />3.466355e-4 months <br />, a 1-hour report was made to the NRC.
BACKGROUND Iv...
!2022!-1 SEQUENTIAL REV NUMBER NO.
01 1-LJ The Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station is located in Lacey Township, New Jersey. On May 7, 2021, the plant was configured in the permanently defueled mode, post-zirc fire window for decommissioning with Plant Risk at the Green level. The Spent Fuel Pool Gates were installed and spent fuel relocation activities were in progress.
EVENT DESCRIPTION
At 1638 on May 7, 2021, an acrid odor was identified in the security Central Alarm Station (CAS). While Security, Maintenance and Operations personnel were attempting to identify the source of the odor, security computer system alarms began actuating. The alarms received included a Multiplexer (MUX) Supervisory Line Board (SLB) communication alarms and 2 CRI (Card Reader Interface Alarms).
Security personnel immediately attempted to determine the cause for all alarms received. Some alarms had not been experienced prior to this event (i.e., MUX 8 and SLB). Security was unable to determine the source of SLB alarms after reviewing the security computer vendor manual. Security personnel made an incorrect assumption that the SLB communication alarms must have been associated with card reader alarms and a non-conservative extent of condition review was performed.
During the day shift on May 8th, 2021, the source of the actual SLB alarms became self-revealing when several IDS perimeter zones were found to be nonfunctional during a scheduled work evolution in an affected perimeter zone. It was later determined that the received SLB alarms affected several perimeter zones. The affected perimeter zones did not have the proper compensatory measures in place on May 7, 2021 per the PSP, therefore a 1-hour notification to the NRC was required per 10 CFR 73.71(b)(1).
Furthermore, security he 1-hour notification to the NRC in accordance with Appendix G of Part 73 (l)(c) any failure, degradation, or the discovered vulnerability in a safeguard system that could allow unauthorized or undetected access to a protected area, material access area, controlled access area, vital area, or transport for which compensatory measures have not been employed.
CAUSE OF THE EVENT
Power supplies to the MUX had failed. Holtec Decommissioning International (HDI) personnel did not adequately identify and assess in a timely manner the equipment impacted by a failure of a MUX power supply for more than 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> and did not establish adequate compensatory measures within the time required by the site Physical Security Plan (PSP).
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
An interim standing order is put in place on the action's security personnel are required to perform following upon the loss of a MUX. Root Cause (OYS-02250) was performed, and corrective actions are documented in the sites Corrective Action Program (CAP). Procedure DPP-OC-101-102, Compensating for Security System Failures was updated to contain directions for compensatory actions and recovery actions of a MUX loss on Oyster Creek's ISFSI security computer system.
REPORT ABILITY On January 5th, 2022, at 0911 hours0.0105 days <br />0.253 hours <br />0.00151 weeks <br />3.466355e-4 months <br />, a 1-hour report was retroactively submitted to the NRC.
REPORTABILITY CONTINUED Pursuant to the provisions of 1 O CFR 73.71 (b)(1 ), licensees shall notify the NRC Operations Center within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of discovery of the safeguards events described in paragraph I of Appendix G to Part 73.10. Appendix G paragraph I identifies events to be reported to the NRC within one hour of discovery, followed by a written report in 60 days.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Additional information required by security reports (Items required by section 3.2 of RG 5.62 "Reporting of Safeguards Events," provided below):
- 5. Type of security force onsite: Proprietary
- 6. Number and type of personnel involved: 4, Security
7. Method of discovery
Self revealing, work in area
- 8. Procedural errors involved: NA 11. Local, State, or Federal agencies contacted: None
- 12. Description of media interest or press release: None
13. Similar events
None 14: Knowledgeable Contact: Joseph Dwyer
- 15. Description of failed or malfunctioned equipment: MUX power supply, Advanced Power Supply Model #APS60PU
- 16. Apparent cause of each component or system failure. Unknown
- 17. Status of the equipment prior to the event: Operating
- 18. Secondary functions affected (for multiple-function components). IDS, card readers
- 19. Effect on plant safety: Uncompensated security zones
- 20. Unusual conditions that may have contributed to failure, e.g., environmental extremes: None Page 3
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