05000219/LER-1981-018, Forwards LER 81-018/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 81-018/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20003J004
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	04/30/1981
From:	Finfrock I JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20003J005	List: 05000219/LER-1981-018, Forwards LER 81-018/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl 05000219/LER-1981-018-01, /01T-0:on 810417,equipment Operator Found Valves Were Blocked from Fully Opening by Scaffolding Placed by Contractor Personnel.Caused by Personnel Error.Scaffolding Repositioned
References
NUDOCS 8105080318
Download: ML20003J004 (3)

LER-1981-018, Forwards LER 81-018/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
2191981018R00 - NRC Website

text

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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

'JCP&L.

GPU

"* C*Lu*.O'so?O.m (609)693-6000 P.O. BOX 388

• FORKED RIVER e NEW JERSEY e 08731 A

'MA,oc vi c

April: 30,1981 9

t Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director 4

Office of Inspection and Enforcment D

Region I l-fN.

United States Nuclear Regulatory Cmmission

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, ?-/

631 Park Avenue c)

, A' King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 glg

Dear Mr. Grier:

SURTECT: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket No. 50-219 Licensee Event Report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-2.9/81-018/01T-0 This letter forwards three copies of a Licens Event Report to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-018/0lT-0 in empliance with paragraph 6.9.2.a(6) of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours, d

Ivaa R. Finf r.

Vice President - JCP&L Director - Oyster Creek IRF:dh Enclosures cc: Director (.40 copies)

Office of Inspection and Enforement United States Nuclear Regulatory Cm mission Washington, D.C.

20555 Director (3)

Office of Management Information and Program Control United States Nuclear Regulatory Cm mission Washington, D. C. 20555 NBC Resider: Inspector (1)

Oyster CrcrA Nuclear Generating Station

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Forked Rivtr, N. J.

8105 os c 3;g l

OYSIER CREEK NUCT. EAR GENERATING STATION Forked River, New Jersey.08731 Licensee Event Report asportable Occw- = ce No. 50-219/81-018/OlT-0 i

Report Date April 30, 1981 Occurrence Date April 17, 1981 Identification of Occw.tii=sce Reactor biildig to stypression chamber self actuating vacutan breaker valves V-26-15 and V-26-17 were found to be prevented frcan fully opening in violation of Technical Specifications paragraph 3.5.A.4.a.

m is event is considered reportable in accordance dth Technical Specification 6.9.2.a(6).

Conditions Prior to Occurrence 2e plant was operating at steady state power. Major plant paraneters at the time of occurrence were:

Power:

Core 1420 M4t Electrical 395 MGe 4

l Flow:

Recirculation 12.2 x 10 gpn Feedwater 5.0 x 106 lb/hr Description of Occurrence On Friday, April 17, 1981, at about 1340 hours0.0155 days <br />0.372 hours <br />0.00222 weeks <br />5.0987e-4 months <br /> an equignent operator was dis-patched to open the reactor bi41 ding to sugpression chanber vacuum breaker valves in order to purge the torus of nitrogen in preparation for plant shutdown.

j 2e operator discovered that valve V-26-17 was ccmpletely prevented frtan opening and that valve V-26-15 was prevented frtan opening more than 75% due to the i

l installation of scaffolding.

l te operatcr secured the valves as far open as possible to facilitate purging.

Plant shutdown was e2s-u:d at 2309 hours0.0267 days <br />0.641 hours <br />0.00382 weeks <br />8.785745e-4 months <br /> and the reactor was in the cold shutdown condition at 1325 hours0.0153 days <br />0.368 hours <br />0.00219 weeks <br />5.041625e-4 months <br /> on Saturday, April 18.

i It was determined during the investigation of the event that the scaffolding had been in place since the afternoat of mursday, April 16.

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Reportable Occurrence Page 2 Report No. 50-219/81-018/OlT-0 Agarent Cause of Occtutarcs The cause of this occurrence is attributed to personnel error. Contractor personnel pluwl scaffolding in a position to block the valves frun opening.

Additionally, measures taken by cognizant personnel _to prevent occurrences of this nature have been shown to be inadequate as the ocntractor patwwe.1 were not aware of the consequences of the placernent of scaffolding around the valve lever anns.

Analysis of Occtumcs N vacuun relief systs fran the reactor bi41 ding to the pressure suppression charter (torus) consists of two 100% vactun relief valve subsystans (two parallel sets of two valves in series). h purpose of the vacuum relief valves is to equalize pressure so that containment external design pressure limits are not exceeded., h safety significance is considered minimal since valve V-26-15 would have opened far enough to perfonn its intended functius.

Corrective Action

'Ihe reactor coolant tenperature was reduced to <212 at 1115, and the reactor was in cold shutdown at 1325 hours0.0153 days <br />0.368 hours <br />0.00219 weeks <br />5.041625e-4 months <br /> on April 18, 1981.

The scaffolding blocking the valve operators was repositioned by about 1100 hours0.0127 days <br />0.306 hours <br />0.00182 weeks <br />4.1855e-4 months <br /> on Itnday, April 20.

Additional Administrative Controls will be inplemented to better control contractor work on site.

l Failure Data Not applicable.

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