05000219/LER-1981-012, Forwards LER 81-012/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

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Forwards LER 81-012/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
ML19352A718
Person / Time
Site: Oyster Creek
Issue date: 04/10/1981
From: Finfrock I
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO.
To: Grier B
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML19352A719 List:
References
NUDOCS 8104170480
Download: ML19352A718 (3)
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LER-1981-012, Forwards LER 81-012/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
Event date:
Report date:
2191981012R00 - NRC Website
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text

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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

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(609)693 6000 P.O. BOX 388

  • FORKED RIVER
  • 08731
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April 10, 1981

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a Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director I

i Office of Inspection and Enforcenent I

L C-Region I 2 --

United States Nuclear Regulatory Cannission

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Appy7yggy, b 631 Park Avenue

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King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

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Dear Mr. Grier:

SUBJECT: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket No. 50-219 Licensee Event Report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-12/3L This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-12/3L in car.pliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b(1) of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,

/

AFLk

['

Ivan R. Finfrock, Vice President - CP Director - Oyster Creek IRF:dh Enclosures cc: Director (40 copies)

Office of Inspection and Enforcenent United States Nuclear Regulatory Cm mission Washington, D.C.

20555 Director (3)

Office of Management Ldor: ration and Program Control United States Nuclear Regulatory Cm mission Washington, D. C. 20555 NRC Resident Ins ector (1)

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Forked River, N. J.

810.4170y?O g

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Forked River, New Jersey 08731 Licensee Event Report Reportable Occtums No. 50-219/81-12/3L Report Date April 10, 1981 Occurrence Date March 13, 1981 Identification of Occurrence Electrmatic Relief Valve high pressure sensors 1A83C and 1A83E were found, during survmilance testing, to exceed the limiting safety systen actuation setpoint, Technical Specification 2.3.4.

'Ihis event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b(1).

Conditions Prior to Occurrence The plant was in the cold shutdcun condition.

Description of Occurrence On Friday, March 13, 1981, during performance of the Electrunatic Relief Valve Pressu r consor Test and Calibration (Plant procedure 602.3.004) pressure actua'

'.tches lA83C and 1A83E were found to trip at a setting less con-servt

.an the Technical Specifications limit of <1070 psig. Surveillance test data was as follows:

Sensor

  • As Found Trip (psig)
  • Required Setting
  • Tech Spec Limit (psig) per Procedure (psig) 1A83A 1056 1054 - 1059 1079.15 1A83B 1081 1079 - 1084 1084.5 1A83C 1080 1071 - 1076 1076.8 1A83D 1062 1057 - 1062 1082.2 1A83E 1088 1077 - 1082 1082.2

'Ihe pressure switches were WAiately reset to trip within the required limit as part of the surveillance procedure.

  • Includes head co. M on.

Apparent Cause of Occurrerre

'Ihe cause of the occurrence is attributed to instrument repeatability. Both instruments were observed to be operating well within their design accuracy.

(+l% of the setpoint)

1 Beportable Occurrence Page 2 Report No. 50-219/81-12/3L Analysis of Occurrence Primary system relief valves are provided to remove sufficient energy frm the primary system to prevent the safety valves frm lifting during the most severe transients that include a scram. 'Ibe trip that produces the most limiting pressure transient is the turbine trip fra full design power with a failure of the bypass systen to function. An analysis of this transient has shown that even with a relief valve setpoint of 1125 psig the ele L.ouatic relief valves are capable of limiting the peak pressure below the setpoint of the first group of safety valves and well below the fuel design pressure limits and reactor coolant systen pressure safety limit.

'Ihe relief valve Technical Specification limit of 1070 psig (not including head correction) was chosen to maintain an adequate margin betwen peak pressure and the setpoint of the first group of safety valves.

Since the relief valves were still functional and tripped only slightly higher than the desired setpoint and considering that relief valves "A" and "D" are set well below the specified limit, the safety significance is considered minimal.

Corrective Action

The pressure sensors were reset to trip within the Technical Specification limits as part of the surveillance test.

Failure Data Barksdale Pressure Switch Mxlel #B2SH12SS Bange: 0-3000 psig i

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