RBG-47630, Resubmittal of License Amendment Request - Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule, River Bend Station - Unit 1

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Resubmittal of License Amendment Request - Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule, River Bend Station - Unit 1
ML15345A389
Person / Time
Site: River Bend Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 12/03/2015
From: Olson E
Entergy Operations
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
RBF1-15-0181, RBG-47630
Download: ML15345A389 (19)


Text

A IZutergy Vt. i~romns !i LA 7077t Te, 22-P*3-4;74 Erl W.elaon Site V'ooPrurent RBG-47630 RBFI-1 5-0,181 December 3, 2015'.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Gommission Attn: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555

SUBJECT:

Resubmittal of LicenseSchedule-.:...

Plan Implementation Amendment Request - Cyber Security River Bend Station *,Unit 1 ,'.,

License No, NPF-47 DoCket No. 50-458 ".

REFERENCES:

1. NRC Internal Memorandum to Barry Westreich from Russell Felts, Review Criteriafor 10 CFR'73.54, Cyber $ecurity lmplementatien Schedule Milestone8 LicenSe ArnendrnientRequests, dated October 24, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13295A467)
2. NRC letter to Entergy, Issuanc of Amendment Re: Approval of Cyber Security Plan,dated July 29, 2011 (RBC-50945) -
3. NRC letter to Entergy, Issuance of Amendment Re: Approval of Cyber Security Plan, dated December 12,.2014 (RIBC.51271) (ADAMS Accession No. ML14304A181)
4. NRC Internal memorandum from the Director Cyber Security Directorate, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, to the Region I through IVDirectors of Reactor Safety, Enhanced Guidance for Licensee Near-Term Corrective Actions to Address Cyber Security inspection Findings and Licensee Eligibility for "Good-Faith" Attempt Discretion, Enclosure 2, Milestone 4 Resolution Actons, dated July 1, 2013

RtBG-47630 Cyber Security Implementation Schedule License Amendment Request Page 2 of 3

Dear Sir or Madam:

This letter is provided to replace prior submittal, "License Amendment Request Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule," dated June 29, 2015 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML15188A369).

This submittal contains administrative changes by removing Safeguards level of information only and does not change the technical content of the original.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.4 and 10 CFR 50.90, Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy) hereby requests an amendment to the Renewed Facility Operating License for River Bend Station (RBS). In accordance with the guidelines provided by Reference 1, this request proposes a change to the RBS Cyber Security Plan Milestone 8 full implementation date as set forth in the Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule approved by References 2 and 3. provides an evaluation of the proposed change. Attachment 2 contains proposed marked-up operating license pages for the Physical Protection license condition for River Bend Station to reference the commitment change provided in this submittal. contains the proposed revised operating license pages. Attachment 4 contains a change to the date of implementation Milestone 8.

The proposed changes have been evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.91 (a)(1) using criteria in 10 CFR 50.92(Q), and it has been determined that the changes involve no significant hazards consideration. The bases for these determinations are included in .

Entergy requests this license amendment. be effective as. of its date of issuance. Although this request is neither exigent nor emergency, your review and approval is requested prior to June 30, 2018.

The revised commitment contained in this submittal is summarized in Attachment 5, Should you have any questions concerning this letter, or require additional information, please contact Mr. Joseph Clark at (225)381-4177.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on November 16. 2015.,

Sincerely, EWO/JAC/tib

" BG-47630 Cyber Security Implementation Schedule License Amendment Request Page 3 of 3 Attachments: 1. Analysis of Proposed Operating License Change

2. Proposed RBS Operating License Change (mark-up)
3. Revised RBS Operating License Page
4. Revised Cyber Security Plan implementation Schedule
5. List of Regulatory Commitments cc: Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region WV 1800 East Lamar Boulevard Arlington, TX 76011-4511 NRC Senior ReSident Inspector P0) Box 1050 St. Francieville, L.A 70775 U. S, Nuclear Regulatory Commission "

Attn: Mr. Stephen Koenick, Project Manager MSS8BIA One White Flint North 11555 Rockviiie Pike Rockville, MD 20852 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Mr. Alan 8. Wang, Project Manager MS 0-8 81 One White Flint North 11555 Rockvl!!e Pike .

Rockvlille, MD 20852 Ji Young Wiley (wlo Attachments 1 and 4)

Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality Office of Environmental Quality P. O, 8ox4312 Baton Rouge, LA 70821-4312 Central Records Clerk (w/o Attachments 1 and 4)

Public Utility Commission of Texas 1701 N. Congress Ave, Austin, TX 78711-332_8

Attsebment 1 Anamlysis of Proposed Operating License Change to RBG-47830 Page 2 of 8 1.0

SUMMARY

DESCRIPTION .. ,., ,

This license amendment request (LAR) includes a proposed change to the RB$ Cyber Security Plan (CSP) Implementation' Schedule* Milestone 8 full implementation date and a proposed revision to the existing operating, license Physical. Protection license condition, 2.0 DETAILED DESCRIPTION .. -, '* * *..

in Reference 1, the NRC provided criteria to be used for evaluation of a license amendment request to revise the Cyber Security lmplementation Schedule Milestone 8 :date. In Reference 3, the NRC issued a license amendment to the: Facility Operating License for ABS that approved the RBS C$P and associated implementation milestone schedule. The CSP Implementation Schedule approved by Reference 8 :was utilized as a portion of the basis for the NRC's safety evaluation report provided by Reference 3. Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy) is proposing a change to the Milestone 8 date from June 30, 2018, to December 15, 2017, for full impfementation of the CSP for all applicable safety, security, and emergency preparedness (SSEP) functions. ,*.. * *..

  • I

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

Below is Entergy's discussion of the eight evaluation criteria provided by Reference 1:

1. Identlfication of the specific requirement or requirements of the C$P that the licensee needs additional time to implement., .'. ., .  ;

The CSP Sections 3 and 4 describe requirements for application and maintenance of cyber security controls listed in Nuclear Energy institute (NEI) 08-09, Revision 6, jfber~Security Plan for Nuclear Power Reactors, Appendices D and E. Application of the controls is accomplished after completion of detailed analyses (the cyber security assessment process) that identify "gaps," or the' difference between current configuration and a config~uration that satisfies each cyber security control. Gap, closure can require any"° combination of physical, logical (software-related), or programmaticlprocedUral -changes.

a. Entergy is in the process of determining the need for automated security information and event management (SIEM) systems, and designing/Implementing these .. .

systems for, monitoring activity on networks of critical digital assetS (COAs), pursuant to NE1 08-09, Revision 6, Appendix D-2 (Audit and Accountability), and Appendices 2-3.4 (Monitoring Tools and Techniques), 3.5 (Security Alerts and Advisories), and 4.3 (Personnel Performing maintenance and Testing Activities)

b. Additional physical controls for CDAs *outside the secUrity protectedl area pursuant to NEI108-09, Revision 6, Appendix E-5.1 (Physical and; Operational Enviro)nment Protection Policies and Procedures)* ... * ** * "..
  • Attachment RBG-47630 1 to

.Page3 of 8 c., Significant programmatic change ~management associated with approximately 40

, .-procedure~changes pursuant to NE) 08-00, Revision 6, Appendix E (Operational and Management Cyber Security Controls).

2, Detailed justification that describes the reason additional time is required to implement the specific requirement or requirement=, identified*.- 1 ." *,,*..

a,. Entergy hosted a "'pilot, Mllestone 8 inspection at the indian Point site in March 2014.

During the pilot, insight was gained into NRC interpretation on how to apply the cyber

  • security controls listed in NE1 08-09, Revision 6. These interpretations were not :

previously available. During the pilot inspection, *the NRC team reviewed several examples of critical. digital: assets (CDAs) with Entergy and indicated, the level of detail and depth expected for the technical analyses against cyber security controls referenced in NE1 08-09. Based on this review, tt is evident to= Entergy that theidetail and depth of the technical analysis exceeds Entergy's prior Understanding and requires a considerably, greater effort to achieve than initially antiipated.... .. ".

b. During 2015, each Operating Entergy licen~see has an inspection of compliance With interim Milestones I through 7., The preparation 'for and support Of these Inspectons has required a significant commitment of time from Entergy's most knowledgeable subject matter experts on nuclear. cyber security, exceeding the estimate previously .

developed and therefore, drawing those resources away from Milestone 8.

implementation activities. ...

c. Development of an endorsed written standard for interpreting and, applying the
  • NE1 08-09 cyber s=ecurity controls has contin~ued to be a work-in.progress over, the past.

five years. NEi 13-10, Revision 2, a guideline intended to provide some reduction of controls Implementationibased on equipment safety significance, has been endorsed.

However, an initial screening of Entergy CDAs using this guideline indicates the.

reduction inboth analytical work and actual application of conltrols would not be' significant.r:

d. InJune 2014, NE) submitted a petitiOn for rulemaking tothe Commission. '-The petition:

was subsequently found acceptable for review. The petition proposes a change to~the rule to more precisely, align the scope of the rule with the underlying objective of preventing radiological sabotage, which NEl estimates could potentially result in a reduction in the scope, of cyber security~implementation, While Entergy does not intend

,to suspend any implementation work in anticipation of the petition being approved, the petition being submitted is indicative 'that the final process for implementing the rule has not stabilized, and therefore, Entergy requires additional time to receive any implementation benefit from such rulemaking.

e, Benchmarking data gathered on Milestone 8 implementation schedules for nonEritergy licensees indicates that a significant number of licensees have either gained approval for a new Milestone 8 date or submitted an extension request significantly beyond Entergy's current due date; therefor~e, Entergy's request is consistent with .theo industry.

RBG.47630 I t~o Attachment Page 4 of 8 S. Proposed completion date for Milestone 8 consistent with the remaining scope of work to be conducted and the resources .available.

The proposed completion date for Milestone 8 Is December,15, 2017,

4. valat~n f te ipat tat headditional time to implement the requirements will hvew on the effectiveness of the overall cybor security program in the context of milestones already completed.

The impact of the requested additional implementation time on the effectiveness of th~e overall cyber security program is considered to be very low, because the Interim Milestones already completed have resulted in a high degree of protection of safety-related, Important-to-safety, and security CDAs against threat vectors associated with external connectivity (both wired and wireless),

and portable digital media and devices. Additionally, extenisive physical and administrative measures are already Inplace for ODAs pursuant to the RBS Security Plan and Technical Specification requirements. in the context of cyber security milestones already completed, the following is noted:

a. An Entergy Cyber Security Assessment Team: (CSAT) has been implemented consisting of highly experienced personnel knowledgeable in reactor and balance-of -plant design, licensing, safety, security, emergency preparedness, information technology, and cyber security. The CSAT is provided with the authority, via written procedure, to perform the analyses and oversight activities described in the CSP. Entergy employs a single overall fleet-wide OSAT to ensure consistency of results among the fleet.
b. Critical systems and 0DMs have been identified, documented, and entered in
  • a controlled database.
c. The plant process computer network and the plant security computer network have been deterministically isolated per the requirements of cyber security Interim Milestone 3. ,
d. ,Safety-related, important-to-safety, and security CDAs have been eXtensively reviewed and verified (or modified) to be deterministically isolated and not to employ wireless network technology.
e. Procedures have been implemented for porta~ble digital media and devices periodically connected to CDAs, per NEI 08-09, Revision 6, Appendix D, Section 1.19. . . . .. , .
f. CDAs associated with physical security target sets have, been analyzed per*

the requirements of the OSP Section 3,1.6 and either. (1) verified to satisfy..

the Technical Cyber Security Controls described In NEi, 08-09, Revision 6, Appendix D or (2) actions required to satisfy the Technical Cyber Security

Aftachment 1 to RBG-47630 Page 5 of 8 Controls described in NE1 08-09, Revision 8, Appendix D, are captured in the

, .Co rrective A ctio n Pro g ram . . . . ... .,. .. *
g. Employees have been provided with training on cyber security awareness, tamPering, and control of portable digital media and devices periodically connected to CDAs,. * := '
h. Entergy has transitioned from the previoUs cyber security program described
  • , by NEI 04-04. Revisions have been made to Procedures that control plant modifications, planning, and maintenance, establishing ties to cyber security procedures for ODA analysis and control of portable digital media and devices periodically connected to CDAs.
5. Description of the miethodotogy for priorltiling completion of work for CDAs-associated with significant $SSP consequences and with reactivity effect. in the balance of plant., ..... *
  • Because CDAs are plant components, prdoritization follows the normal work management process that places the highest priority on apparent conditions adverse to quality in system, structure, and component design function and related factors such as safety risk and nuclear defense-in-depth, as well as threatSetocontinuity of electric power generation inthe balance-of-plant (BOP). Further, in regard to deterministic isolation and control of portable media devices (PMD) for. safety-related, Important-to-safety (including BOP), and security CDAs, maintenance of one-way or air-gapped configurations and implementation of control of PMD remains a high priority.. This prioritization enabled completion* of cyber security Interim Milestones 3 and 4. Hi-gh focus continues to be maintained on prompt attention to any emergent Issue with these COAs that Would potentially challenge the established cyber protective barriers, .Additionally it should be noted that these CDAs encompass those associated with physical security target sets.
6. Discussion of the cyber seurity program performance up to the dote of the license amendment request..  :...:,.*. *.

No compromise of SSEP function by cyber means has been identified.; Additionally, a Quality Assurance (QA) audit was conducted inthe fourth quarter of 2014 pursuant to the

  • physical security program review required by 10 CFR 78.55(m). The QA audit Included review of cyber security program implementation...There were no significant findings related to overall cybor security program performance and effectiveness.  :.' .*
7. Discuesion of cyber seurty issues pending in the corrective action program, No significant (with 'significant' meaning constituting a threat to a CDA via cyber means or calling into question program effectiveness) nuclear cyber security issues are currently pending inthe CAP. Several non-significant issues identified during the QA audit described above and identified during NRC inspections of compliance with nuclear cyber security Interim Milestones I through 7 have been entered into CAP, However, when the Reference 4 internal NRC memorandum was shared with Entergy, the actions described regarding cyber security Interim Milestone 4 were entered into= CAP for evaluation by the OSAT.:

Aftachment I to RBG-47630 Page 6 of 8

8. Discussion of modifications completed to support the cyber security program and a discussion of pending cyber security modifications *'- ... I Modifications completed include those required to deterrninlstloaily isolate the Level 3 and 4 ODAs, as required by Interim Milestone 3, by data diode or air gap. Potential; modifications not yet implemented Include automated security information event monitoring systems for monitoring activity on networks of CDAs, pursuant to NE1 08-09, Revision 6, Appendix D-2 (Audit and Accountability), and Appendices E.3.4 (Monitoring Tools and Techniques), 3.5 (Security Alerts and Advisories), and 4.3 (Personnel Performing Maintenance and Testing Activities), and additional physical controls for CDAs outside the Protected Area pursuant to NEI 08-09, Revision 6, Appendix E-5.1 (Physical and Operational Environment Protection Policies and Procedures),

This LAR Includes the proposed change to the existing operating license condition for "Physical Protection" (Attachments 2 and 3) for RBS. This LAR also contains the proposed Revised GSP Impiementation Schedule (Attachment 4), and this LAR also provides a revised list of regulatory commitments (Attachment 5).

4.0 REGUJLATORY EVALUATION .  :, ..

4.1 Aw~licable Reouiatorv Reouirements/Criteria.

10 CFR 73.54 requires licensees to maintain and implement a cyber security plan (CSP). RBS Facility Operating License No. NPF-47, includes a Physical Protection license condition that requires Entergy Operations, inc. (Entergy) to fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commlsslon-approved CSP, including changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 OFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p).

4.2 Slanlfi.ca.nt Safety Hazards Consideration .

Entergy is requesting an amendment to the NPF-47 Facility Operating License to revise the Physical Protection license condition as it relates to the OSP.: This change includes a proposed change to a CSP implementation Schedule milestone date and a proposed revision 'to the NPF-47 Facility Operating Ucense to include the proposed deviation.* Specifically, Entergy is:

proposing a change to the implementation Milestone 8 completion date.. * *'

Entergy has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on the three standards set forth in-1'0 CFR 50.92, "Issuance of Amendment, 6 as discussed below:.

1. Does the proposed change involve a Significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? ..

Response: No. **.'

The proposed change to the CSP Implementation Schedule is administrative in nature.

This change does not alter accident analysis assumptions, add any Initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the manner in which systems are operated, maintained,

Attachment I to RBG-47630 Page 7 of 8 modified, tested, or inspected. The proposed change does not require any plant modifications which affect the performance capability of the structures, systems, and components relied upon to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents and has

.. .no impact on the probability or consequencesof an accident previously evaluated.  :

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. .::: ' * .*  :

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change to the CSP Implementation Schedule is administrative in nature.

This proposed change does not alter accident analysis assumptions, add any initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the manner in which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The proposed change does not require any

  • plant modifications which affect the performance capability of the structures, systems, and components relied upon to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents and does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.-. ,, ,, -, ,:.. ', . . - , ,,-,

Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind 1of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3.- Does the proposed change involive a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No..: .. , . ., :*. * .. *:-i, ** .*" :.

Plant safety margins are established thr~ough limiting conditions for operation, limiting safety system settings, and safety limits specified in the technical specifications. The proposed change to the CSP implementation Schedule is administrative in nature. in addition, the milestone date delay for~full implementation of the CSP has'no substantive impact becauseother measures have been taken which provide adequate protection during this period of time. Because there is no change to established safety margins as a result of this change, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reducton in a margin of safety.

Based on the above, Entergy concludes that the proposed change presents no significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 1i0 CPR 50.92(c), and accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideratlon" is justified.

Attachment I to RBG-47630 Page 8 of 8 4.3 .o...~o Inconclusion, based on the considerations discussed above: (1)there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation Inthe proposed manner; (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; arid (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

5,0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION The proposed amendment provides a change to the CSP Implementation Schedule. The proposed amendment meets the eligibility criterion for a categorical exclusion set forth In 10 CFR 51 .22(c)(12). Therefore, pursuant to 10 OFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared Inconnection with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0 REFERENCES

1. NRC Internal Memorandum to Barry Westrich from Russell Felts, Review Criteriafor 10 CFR 73.54, Cyber Security implementation Schedule Milestone 8 License Amendment Requests, dated October 24, 2013 2, NRC letter to Entergy, Issuance of Amendment Re: Approval of Cyber Security Plan, dated July 29, 2011 (RBC-50945)
3. NRC letter to Entergy, issuanceof Amendment Re: Approval of Cyber Security Plan, dated December 12, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14304A181 )
4. NRC internal memorandum from the Director Cyber Security Directorate, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, to the Region I through IVDirectors of Reactor SafetY, Enhanced Guidance for Licensee Near-Term CorrectiveActions to Address Cyber Security Inspection Findingsand Licensee Eligibilityfor "Good-Faith"Attempt Discretion, Enclosure2, Milestone 4 Resolution Actions, dated July 1,2013

Attahment 2 R.BG4763O Proposed River Bond Stedon OpratIng License Change (mark-up)

D. The licensee shall fuily physical implement and maintain trainingInand effect all provisions Commission-approved security, qualification, andof the safeguards contingency plans including amendments made pursuant to the provisions of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and 27822) and to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p:). The combined set of plans, which contain

,Safeguards Information protected under 10 OFR 73.21, is entitled: "Physical Security, Safeguards Contingency and Training &Qualification Pa,"

submitted by letter dated May 16, 2008.

E. The licensee shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved cyber security plan (CSP), including changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The licensee's CSP was approved by License Amendment No. 17t*T

  • r*f1*vf'
  • _!3/4!'W *
  • 184, and F. Except as otherwise provided in the Technical Specifications or Environmental Protection Plan, EWi shall report any violations of the requirements contained in Section 2, Items C.(1); C.(S) through (9); and C.(11) through (18) of this license in the following manner: initial notification shall be made within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to the NRC Operations Center via the Emergency Notification System with written followup within 60 days in accordance with the procedures described in 10 CFR 50.73(b), (c) and (e).
  • G. The licensee shall have and maintain financial protecton of such type and In such amounts as the Commission shall require in accordance with Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to .coverpublic liability claims.

H. This license is effective as of the date of issuance and shall expire at midnight on August 29, 2025.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1.Attachments 1-5

2. Appendix A- Technical Specifications (NUREG-1 172)
3. Appendix B - Environmental Protection Plan
4. Appendix C - Antitrust Conditions Date of Issuance: November 20, 1985 Revised: December 16, 1993 Amendment No.70061 1611 184, xxx

.... ,,Attachment 3 ..  :

RevsedRivr BndStation Operating License Page-

-7 D. The licensee shall fully implement Commission-approved and maintain physical security, trainingInand effect all provisions qualification, andof the safeguards contingency plans including amendments made pursuant to the provisions of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFA 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and 27822) and to the authority'of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50,54(p). The combined set of plans, which contain Safeguards Information protected under 10 CFR 73.21, is entitled: "Physical Security, Safeguards Contingency and Training & Qualification Plan,"

submitted by letter dated May 16, 2008.

E. The licensee shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved cyber security plan (CSP), including changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 60.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The licensee's CSP was approved by License Amendment No. 171 as supplemented by changes approved by License Amendment Nos. 184, and

,xxx.

F. Except as otherwise provided in the Technical Specifications or Environmental Protection Plan, EOI shall report any violations of the requirements contained in Section 2, Items C.(I); C.(3) through (9); and C~(1 1) through (18) of this license in the following manner: initial notification shalt be made within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to the NRC Operations Center via the Emergency Notification $ystem with written followup within 60 days in accordance with the procedures described In 10 CFR 50.73(b), (c) and (e).

G. The licensee shall have and maintain financial protecton of such type and in such amounts as the Commission shall require in accordance with Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to cover public liability claims.

H. This license Is effective as of the date of issuance and shall expire at midnight on August 29, 2025.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

5. Attachments 1=5
6. Appendix A- Technical Specifications (NUREG-1 172)
7. Appendix B6- Environmental Protection Plan
8. Appendix C - Antitrust Conditions Date of Issuance: November 20, 1985 Revised: December 18, 1993 Amendment No. 70 70, 110 125 1,=471,184

S~uOWlwWuoO A*o~;jnO; lo ;sg, o*ut,,-*gu

Ahtachment 5 to RBG-47630 Page 1 of 1 List of Regulatory Commitments The following table identifies those actions committed to by Entergy in this document. Any other statements in this submittal are provided for information purposes and are not considered to be regulatory commitments.'j TYPE (Chec One)SCHEDULED

( _he ___One _ COMPLETION COMMITMENT 0NE . - . DATE.

TIME CONTINUING (If Required)

_____________________ACTION COMPLIANCE ______

'Full impeettio oFiBS Cyber X December 15, 2017 Security Plan for all safety,~ security, and emergency preparedness functions will be achieved._____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Attachment 4

  • , RBG-47030 Revised Cybor Security Plan implementation Schedule

4 Attachment 4 to RBG-47630 Page 1 of 1 Revised Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule O implementation Milestone Cmlto o Full implementation of River December 15, By the completion date, the RBS Bend Station (RBS) Cyber 2017 Cybor Security Plan will be fully Security Plan for all safety, Implemented for all SSEP functions in security, and emergency accordance with 10 OFR 73.54. This preparedness (SSEP) functions date also bounds the completion of all will be achieved. individual asset security control design remediation actions including those that require a refueling outage for implementation.

A IZutergy Vt. i~romns !i LA 7077t Te, 22-P*3-4;74 Erl W.elaon Site V'ooPrurent RBG-47630 RBFI-1 5-0,181 December 3, 2015'.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Gommission Attn: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555

SUBJECT:

Resubmittal of LicenseSchedule-.:...

Plan Implementation Amendment Request - Cyber Security River Bend Station *,Unit 1 ,'.,

License No, NPF-47 DoCket No. 50-458 ".

REFERENCES:

1. NRC Internal Memorandum to Barry Westreich from Russell Felts, Review Criteriafor 10 CFR'73.54, Cyber $ecurity lmplementatien Schedule Milestone8 LicenSe ArnendrnientRequests, dated October 24, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13295A467)
2. NRC letter to Entergy, Issuanc of Amendment Re: Approval of Cyber Security Plan,dated July 29, 2011 (RBC-50945) -
3. NRC letter to Entergy, Issuance of Amendment Re: Approval of Cyber Security Plan, dated December 12,.2014 (RIBC.51271) (ADAMS Accession No. ML14304A181)
4. NRC Internal memorandum from the Director Cyber Security Directorate, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, to the Region I through IVDirectors of Reactor Safety, Enhanced Guidance for Licensee Near-Term Corrective Actions to Address Cyber Security inspection Findings and Licensee Eligibility for "Good-Faith" Attempt Discretion, Enclosure 2, Milestone 4 Resolution Actons, dated July 1, 2013

RtBG-47630 Cyber Security Implementation Schedule License Amendment Request Page 2 of 3

Dear Sir or Madam:

This letter is provided to replace prior submittal, "License Amendment Request Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule," dated June 29, 2015 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML15188A369).

This submittal contains administrative changes by removing Safeguards level of information only and does not change the technical content of the original.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.4 and 10 CFR 50.90, Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy) hereby requests an amendment to the Renewed Facility Operating License for River Bend Station (RBS). In accordance with the guidelines provided by Reference 1, this request proposes a change to the RBS Cyber Security Plan Milestone 8 full implementation date as set forth in the Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule approved by References 2 and 3. provides an evaluation of the proposed change. Attachment 2 contains proposed marked-up operating license pages for the Physical Protection license condition for River Bend Station to reference the commitment change provided in this submittal. contains the proposed revised operating license pages. Attachment 4 contains a change to the date of implementation Milestone 8.

The proposed changes have been evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.91 (a)(1) using criteria in 10 CFR 50.92(Q), and it has been determined that the changes involve no significant hazards consideration. The bases for these determinations are included in .

Entergy requests this license amendment. be effective as. of its date of issuance. Although this request is neither exigent nor emergency, your review and approval is requested prior to June 30, 2018.

The revised commitment contained in this submittal is summarized in Attachment 5, Should you have any questions concerning this letter, or require additional information, please contact Mr. Joseph Clark at (225)381-4177.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on November 16. 2015.,

Sincerely, EWO/JAC/tib

" BG-47630 Cyber Security Implementation Schedule License Amendment Request Page 3 of 3 Attachments: 1. Analysis of Proposed Operating License Change

2. Proposed RBS Operating License Change (mark-up)
3. Revised RBS Operating License Page
4. Revised Cyber Security Plan implementation Schedule
5. List of Regulatory Commitments cc: Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region WV 1800 East Lamar Boulevard Arlington, TX 76011-4511 NRC Senior ReSident Inspector P0) Box 1050 St. Francieville, L.A 70775 U. S, Nuclear Regulatory Commission "

Attn: Mr. Stephen Koenick, Project Manager MSS8BIA One White Flint North 11555 Rockviiie Pike Rockville, MD 20852 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Mr. Alan 8. Wang, Project Manager MS 0-8 81 One White Flint North 11555 Rockvl!!e Pike .

Rockvlille, MD 20852 Ji Young Wiley (wlo Attachments 1 and 4)

Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality Office of Environmental Quality P. O, 8ox4312 Baton Rouge, LA 70821-4312 Central Records Clerk (w/o Attachments 1 and 4)

Public Utility Commission of Texas 1701 N. Congress Ave, Austin, TX 78711-332_8

Attsebment 1 Anamlysis of Proposed Operating License Change to RBG-47830 Page 2 of 8 1.0

SUMMARY

DESCRIPTION .. ,., ,

This license amendment request (LAR) includes a proposed change to the RB$ Cyber Security Plan (CSP) Implementation' Schedule* Milestone 8 full implementation date and a proposed revision to the existing operating, license Physical. Protection license condition, 2.0 DETAILED DESCRIPTION .. -, '* * *..

in Reference 1, the NRC provided criteria to be used for evaluation of a license amendment request to revise the Cyber Security lmplementation Schedule Milestone 8 :date. In Reference 3, the NRC issued a license amendment to the: Facility Operating License for ABS that approved the RBS C$P and associated implementation milestone schedule. The CSP Implementation Schedule approved by Reference 8 :was utilized as a portion of the basis for the NRC's safety evaluation report provided by Reference 3. Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy) is proposing a change to the Milestone 8 date from June 30, 2018, to December 15, 2017, for full impfementation of the CSP for all applicable safety, security, and emergency preparedness (SSEP) functions. ,*.. * *..

  • I

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

Below is Entergy's discussion of the eight evaluation criteria provided by Reference 1:

1. Identlfication of the specific requirement or requirements of the C$P that the licensee needs additional time to implement., .'. ., .  ;

The CSP Sections 3 and 4 describe requirements for application and maintenance of cyber security controls listed in Nuclear Energy institute (NEI) 08-09, Revision 6, jfber~Security Plan for Nuclear Power Reactors, Appendices D and E. Application of the controls is accomplished after completion of detailed analyses (the cyber security assessment process) that identify "gaps," or the' difference between current configuration and a config~uration that satisfies each cyber security control. Gap, closure can require any"° combination of physical, logical (software-related), or programmaticlprocedUral -changes.

a. Entergy is in the process of determining the need for automated security information and event management (SIEM) systems, and designing/Implementing these .. .

systems for, monitoring activity on networks of critical digital assetS (COAs), pursuant to NE1 08-09, Revision 6, Appendix D-2 (Audit and Accountability), and Appendices 2-3.4 (Monitoring Tools and Techniques), 3.5 (Security Alerts and Advisories), and 4.3 (Personnel Performing maintenance and Testing Activities)

b. Additional physical controls for CDAs *outside the secUrity protectedl area pursuant to NEI108-09, Revision 6, Appendix E-5.1 (Physical and; Operational Enviro)nment Protection Policies and Procedures)* ... * ** * "..
  • Attachment RBG-47630 1 to

.Page3 of 8 c., Significant programmatic change ~management associated with approximately 40

, .-procedure~changes pursuant to NE) 08-00, Revision 6, Appendix E (Operational and Management Cyber Security Controls).

2, Detailed justification that describes the reason additional time is required to implement the specific requirement or requirement=, identified*.- 1 ." *,,*..

a,. Entergy hosted a "'pilot, Mllestone 8 inspection at the indian Point site in March 2014.

During the pilot, insight was gained into NRC interpretation on how to apply the cyber

  • security controls listed in NE1 08-09, Revision 6. These interpretations were not :

previously available. During the pilot inspection, *the NRC team reviewed several examples of critical. digital: assets (CDAs) with Entergy and indicated, the level of detail and depth expected for the technical analyses against cyber security controls referenced in NE1 08-09. Based on this review, tt is evident to= Entergy that theidetail and depth of the technical analysis exceeds Entergy's prior Understanding and requires a considerably, greater effort to achieve than initially antiipated.... .. ".

b. During 2015, each Operating Entergy licen~see has an inspection of compliance With interim Milestones I through 7., The preparation 'for and support Of these Inspectons has required a significant commitment of time from Entergy's most knowledgeable subject matter experts on nuclear. cyber security, exceeding the estimate previously .

developed and therefore, drawing those resources away from Milestone 8.

implementation activities. ...

c. Development of an endorsed written standard for interpreting and, applying the
  • NE1 08-09 cyber s=ecurity controls has contin~ued to be a work-in.progress over, the past.

five years. NEi 13-10, Revision 2, a guideline intended to provide some reduction of controls Implementationibased on equipment safety significance, has been endorsed.

However, an initial screening of Entergy CDAs using this guideline indicates the.

reduction inboth analytical work and actual application of conltrols would not be' significant.r:

d. InJune 2014, NE) submitted a petitiOn for rulemaking tothe Commission. '-The petition:

was subsequently found acceptable for review. The petition proposes a change to~the rule to more precisely, align the scope of the rule with the underlying objective of preventing radiological sabotage, which NEl estimates could potentially result in a reduction in the scope, of cyber security~implementation, While Entergy does not intend

,to suspend any implementation work in anticipation of the petition being approved, the petition being submitted is indicative 'that the final process for implementing the rule has not stabilized, and therefore, Entergy requires additional time to receive any implementation benefit from such rulemaking.

e, Benchmarking data gathered on Milestone 8 implementation schedules for nonEritergy licensees indicates that a significant number of licensees have either gained approval for a new Milestone 8 date or submitted an extension request significantly beyond Entergy's current due date; therefor~e, Entergy's request is consistent with .theo industry.

RBG.47630 I t~o Attachment Page 4 of 8 S. Proposed completion date for Milestone 8 consistent with the remaining scope of work to be conducted and the resources .available.

The proposed completion date for Milestone 8 Is December,15, 2017,

4. valat~n f te ipat tat headditional time to implement the requirements will hvew on the effectiveness of the overall cybor security program in the context of milestones already completed.

The impact of the requested additional implementation time on the effectiveness of th~e overall cyber security program is considered to be very low, because the Interim Milestones already completed have resulted in a high degree of protection of safety-related, Important-to-safety, and security CDAs against threat vectors associated with external connectivity (both wired and wireless),

and portable digital media and devices. Additionally, extenisive physical and administrative measures are already Inplace for ODAs pursuant to the RBS Security Plan and Technical Specification requirements. in the context of cyber security milestones already completed, the following is noted:

a. An Entergy Cyber Security Assessment Team: (CSAT) has been implemented consisting of highly experienced personnel knowledgeable in reactor and balance-of -plant design, licensing, safety, security, emergency preparedness, information technology, and cyber security. The CSAT is provided with the authority, via written procedure, to perform the analyses and oversight activities described in the CSP. Entergy employs a single overall fleet-wide OSAT to ensure consistency of results among the fleet.
b. Critical systems and 0DMs have been identified, documented, and entered in
  • a controlled database.
c. The plant process computer network and the plant security computer network have been deterministically isolated per the requirements of cyber security Interim Milestone 3. ,
d. ,Safety-related, important-to-safety, and security CDAs have been eXtensively reviewed and verified (or modified) to be deterministically isolated and not to employ wireless network technology.
e. Procedures have been implemented for porta~ble digital media and devices periodically connected to CDAs, per NEI 08-09, Revision 6, Appendix D, Section 1.19. . . . .. , .
f. CDAs associated with physical security target sets have, been analyzed per*

the requirements of the OSP Section 3,1.6 and either. (1) verified to satisfy..

the Technical Cyber Security Controls described In NEi, 08-09, Revision 6, Appendix D or (2) actions required to satisfy the Technical Cyber Security

Aftachment 1 to RBG-47630 Page 5 of 8 Controls described in NE1 08-09, Revision 8, Appendix D, are captured in the

, .Co rrective A ctio n Pro g ram . . . . ... .,. .. *
g. Employees have been provided with training on cyber security awareness, tamPering, and control of portable digital media and devices periodically connected to CDAs,. * := '
h. Entergy has transitioned from the previoUs cyber security program described
  • , by NEI 04-04. Revisions have been made to Procedures that control plant modifications, planning, and maintenance, establishing ties to cyber security procedures for ODA analysis and control of portable digital media and devices periodically connected to CDAs.
5. Description of the miethodotogy for priorltiling completion of work for CDAs-associated with significant $SSP consequences and with reactivity effect. in the balance of plant., ..... *
  • Because CDAs are plant components, prdoritization follows the normal work management process that places the highest priority on apparent conditions adverse to quality in system, structure, and component design function and related factors such as safety risk and nuclear defense-in-depth, as well as threatSetocontinuity of electric power generation inthe balance-of-plant (BOP). Further, in regard to deterministic isolation and control of portable media devices (PMD) for. safety-related, Important-to-safety (including BOP), and security CDAs, maintenance of one-way or air-gapped configurations and implementation of control of PMD remains a high priority.. This prioritization enabled completion* of cyber security Interim Milestones 3 and 4. Hi-gh focus continues to be maintained on prompt attention to any emergent Issue with these COAs that Would potentially challenge the established cyber protective barriers, .Additionally it should be noted that these CDAs encompass those associated with physical security target sets.
6. Discussion of the cyber seurity program performance up to the dote of the license amendment request..  :...:,.*. *.

No compromise of SSEP function by cyber means has been identified.; Additionally, a Quality Assurance (QA) audit was conducted inthe fourth quarter of 2014 pursuant to the

  • physical security program review required by 10 CFR 78.55(m). The QA audit Included review of cyber security program implementation...There were no significant findings related to overall cybor security program performance and effectiveness.  :.' .*
7. Discuesion of cyber seurty issues pending in the corrective action program, No significant (with 'significant' meaning constituting a threat to a CDA via cyber means or calling into question program effectiveness) nuclear cyber security issues are currently pending inthe CAP. Several non-significant issues identified during the QA audit described above and identified during NRC inspections of compliance with nuclear cyber security Interim Milestones I through 7 have been entered into CAP, However, when the Reference 4 internal NRC memorandum was shared with Entergy, the actions described regarding cyber security Interim Milestone 4 were entered into= CAP for evaluation by the OSAT.:

Aftachment I to RBG-47630 Page 6 of 8

8. Discussion of modifications completed to support the cyber security program and a discussion of pending cyber security modifications *'- ... I Modifications completed include those required to deterrninlstloaily isolate the Level 3 and 4 ODAs, as required by Interim Milestone 3, by data diode or air gap. Potential; modifications not yet implemented Include automated security information event monitoring systems for monitoring activity on networks of CDAs, pursuant to NE1 08-09, Revision 6, Appendix D-2 (Audit and Accountability), and Appendices E.3.4 (Monitoring Tools and Techniques), 3.5 (Security Alerts and Advisories), and 4.3 (Personnel Performing Maintenance and Testing Activities), and additional physical controls for CDAs outside the Protected Area pursuant to NEI 08-09, Revision 6, Appendix E-5.1 (Physical and Operational Environment Protection Policies and Procedures),

This LAR Includes the proposed change to the existing operating license condition for "Physical Protection" (Attachments 2 and 3) for RBS. This LAR also contains the proposed Revised GSP Impiementation Schedule (Attachment 4), and this LAR also provides a revised list of regulatory commitments (Attachment 5).

4.0 REGUJLATORY EVALUATION .  :, ..

4.1 Aw~licable Reouiatorv Reouirements/Criteria.

10 CFR 73.54 requires licensees to maintain and implement a cyber security plan (CSP). RBS Facility Operating License No. NPF-47, includes a Physical Protection license condition that requires Entergy Operations, inc. (Entergy) to fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commlsslon-approved CSP, including changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 OFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p).

4.2 Slanlfi.ca.nt Safety Hazards Consideration .

Entergy is requesting an amendment to the NPF-47 Facility Operating License to revise the Physical Protection license condition as it relates to the OSP.: This change includes a proposed change to a CSP implementation Schedule milestone date and a proposed revision 'to the NPF-47 Facility Operating Ucense to include the proposed deviation.* Specifically, Entergy is:

proposing a change to the implementation Milestone 8 completion date.. * *'

Entergy has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on the three standards set forth in-1'0 CFR 50.92, "Issuance of Amendment, 6 as discussed below:.

1. Does the proposed change involve a Significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? ..

Response: No. **.'

The proposed change to the CSP Implementation Schedule is administrative in nature.

This change does not alter accident analysis assumptions, add any Initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the manner in which systems are operated, maintained,

Attachment I to RBG-47630 Page 7 of 8 modified, tested, or inspected. The proposed change does not require any plant modifications which affect the performance capability of the structures, systems, and components relied upon to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents and has

.. .no impact on the probability or consequencesof an accident previously evaluated.  :

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. .::: ' * .*  :

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change to the CSP Implementation Schedule is administrative in nature.

This proposed change does not alter accident analysis assumptions, add any initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the manner in which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The proposed change does not require any

  • plant modifications which affect the performance capability of the structures, systems, and components relied upon to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents and does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.-. ,, ,, -, ,:.. ', . . - , ,,-,

Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind 1of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3.- Does the proposed change involive a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No..: .. , . ., :*. * .. *:-i, ** .*" :.

Plant safety margins are established thr~ough limiting conditions for operation, limiting safety system settings, and safety limits specified in the technical specifications. The proposed change to the CSP implementation Schedule is administrative in nature. in addition, the milestone date delay for~full implementation of the CSP has'no substantive impact becauseother measures have been taken which provide adequate protection during this period of time. Because there is no change to established safety margins as a result of this change, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reducton in a margin of safety.

Based on the above, Entergy concludes that the proposed change presents no significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 1i0 CPR 50.92(c), and accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideratlon" is justified.

Attachment I to RBG-47630 Page 8 of 8 4.3 .o...~o Inconclusion, based on the considerations discussed above: (1)there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation Inthe proposed manner; (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; arid (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

5,0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION The proposed amendment provides a change to the CSP Implementation Schedule. The proposed amendment meets the eligibility criterion for a categorical exclusion set forth In 10 CFR 51 .22(c)(12). Therefore, pursuant to 10 OFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared Inconnection with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0 REFERENCES

1. NRC Internal Memorandum to Barry Westrich from Russell Felts, Review Criteriafor 10 CFR 73.54, Cyber Security implementation Schedule Milestone 8 License Amendment Requests, dated October 24, 2013 2, NRC letter to Entergy, Issuance of Amendment Re: Approval of Cyber Security Plan, dated July 29, 2011 (RBC-50945)
3. NRC letter to Entergy, issuanceof Amendment Re: Approval of Cyber Security Plan, dated December 12, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14304A181 )
4. NRC internal memorandum from the Director Cyber Security Directorate, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, to the Region I through IVDirectors of Reactor SafetY, Enhanced Guidance for Licensee Near-Term CorrectiveActions to Address Cyber Security Inspection Findingsand Licensee Eligibilityfor "Good-Faith"Attempt Discretion, Enclosure2, Milestone 4 Resolution Actions, dated July 1,2013

Attahment 2 R.BG4763O Proposed River Bond Stedon OpratIng License Change (mark-up)

D. The licensee shall fuily physical implement and maintain trainingInand effect all provisions Commission-approved security, qualification, andof the safeguards contingency plans including amendments made pursuant to the provisions of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and 27822) and to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p:). The combined set of plans, which contain

,Safeguards Information protected under 10 OFR 73.21, is entitled: "Physical Security, Safeguards Contingency and Training &Qualification Pa,"

submitted by letter dated May 16, 2008.

E. The licensee shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved cyber security plan (CSP), including changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The licensee's CSP was approved by License Amendment No. 17t*T

  • r*f1*vf'
  • _!3/4!'W *
  • 184, and F. Except as otherwise provided in the Technical Specifications or Environmental Protection Plan, EWi shall report any violations of the requirements contained in Section 2, Items C.(1); C.(S) through (9); and C.(11) through (18) of this license in the following manner: initial notification shall be made within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to the NRC Operations Center via the Emergency Notification System with written followup within 60 days in accordance with the procedures described in 10 CFR 50.73(b), (c) and (e).
  • G. The licensee shall have and maintain financial protecton of such type and In such amounts as the Commission shall require in accordance with Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to .coverpublic liability claims.

H. This license is effective as of the date of issuance and shall expire at midnight on August 29, 2025.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1.Attachments 1-5

2. Appendix A- Technical Specifications (NUREG-1 172)
3. Appendix B - Environmental Protection Plan
4. Appendix C - Antitrust Conditions Date of Issuance: November 20, 1985 Revised: December 16, 1993 Amendment No.70061 1611 184, xxx

.... ,,Attachment 3 ..  :

RevsedRivr BndStation Operating License Page-

-7 D. The licensee shall fully implement Commission-approved and maintain physical security, trainingInand effect all provisions qualification, andof the safeguards contingency plans including amendments made pursuant to the provisions of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFA 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and 27822) and to the authority'of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50,54(p). The combined set of plans, which contain Safeguards Information protected under 10 CFR 73.21, is entitled: "Physical Security, Safeguards Contingency and Training & Qualification Plan,"

submitted by letter dated May 16, 2008.

E. The licensee shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved cyber security plan (CSP), including changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 60.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The licensee's CSP was approved by License Amendment No. 171 as supplemented by changes approved by License Amendment Nos. 184, and

,xxx.

F. Except as otherwise provided in the Technical Specifications or Environmental Protection Plan, EOI shall report any violations of the requirements contained in Section 2, Items C.(I); C.(3) through (9); and C~(1 1) through (18) of this license in the following manner: initial notification shalt be made within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to the NRC Operations Center via the Emergency Notification $ystem with written followup within 60 days in accordance with the procedures described In 10 CFR 50.73(b), (c) and (e).

G. The licensee shall have and maintain financial protecton of such type and in such amounts as the Commission shall require in accordance with Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to cover public liability claims.

H. This license Is effective as of the date of issuance and shall expire at midnight on August 29, 2025.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

5. Attachments 1=5
6. Appendix A- Technical Specifications (NUREG-1 172)
7. Appendix B6- Environmental Protection Plan
8. Appendix C - Antitrust Conditions Date of Issuance: November 20, 1985 Revised: December 18, 1993 Amendment No. 70 70, 110 125 1,=471,184

S~uOWlwWuoO A*o~;jnO; lo ;sg, o*ut,,-*gu

Ahtachment 5 to RBG-47630 Page 1 of 1 List of Regulatory Commitments The following table identifies those actions committed to by Entergy in this document. Any other statements in this submittal are provided for information purposes and are not considered to be regulatory commitments.'j TYPE (Chec One)SCHEDULED

( _he ___One _ COMPLETION COMMITMENT 0NE . - . DATE.

TIME CONTINUING (If Required)

_____________________ACTION COMPLIANCE ______

'Full impeettio oFiBS Cyber X December 15, 2017 Security Plan for all safety,~ security, and emergency preparedness functions will be achieved._____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Attachment 4

  • , RBG-47030 Revised Cybor Security Plan implementation Schedule

4 Attachment 4 to RBG-47630 Page 1 of 1 Revised Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule O implementation Milestone Cmlto o Full implementation of River December 15, By the completion date, the RBS Bend Station (RBS) Cyber 2017 Cybor Security Plan will be fully Security Plan for all safety, Implemented for all SSEP functions in security, and emergency accordance with 10 OFR 73.54. This preparedness (SSEP) functions date also bounds the completion of all will be achieved. individual asset security control design remediation actions including those that require a refueling outage for implementation.