ML20057G184

Oceansiders 2.206 Petition Closure Letter

ML20057G184
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre, HI-STORM 100
Issue date:	03/04/2020
From:	Kevin Williams NRC/NMSS/DMSST
To:	Weigel W Oceansiders Against San Onofre Corruption
Allen W
References
OEDO-19-00453
Download: ML20057G184 (6)

Text

March 4, 2020 Oceansiders Against San Onofre Corruption Attn: William Weigel 302 Wisconsin Ave.

Oceanside, CA 92054

SUBJECT:

PETITION TO STOP FUEL LOADING OPERATIONS AT THE SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UMAX INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION

Dear Mr. Weigel:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I am responding to the petition submitted by Oceansiders Against San Onofre Corruption (Oceansiders) pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section 2.206, Requests for action under this subpart, dated August 3, 2019 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML19322B094), as supplemented on January 20, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20034E843). The NRCs Executive Director for Operations referred Oceansiders petition to the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) for appropriate review or action.

Petition The petition included several requests. It requested that the NRC revoke Coastal Development Permit No. 9-15-0228; issue an immediate cease and desist to Southern California Edison (SCE or the licensee) et al. to halt fuel movement to dry storage in the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) UMAX Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI);

require the permit holder (SCE) to procure safer storage for the spent fuel in thick walled, easily transportable canisters; relocate the spent fuel at SONGS to a temporary storage site further away from densely populated areas and not on a military installation; obtain third party verified American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) evaluations of the Holtec International (Holtec) equipment being used at SONGS; and obtain correspondence from the Secretary of the Navy associated with the engineering design of the ISFSI relative to potential enemy attack.

As the basis for the request, the petition stated that:

• the spent fuel at SONGS is located in a tsunami zone, next to a major earthquake fault line;

• failure of containment via multiple uncontrollable factors would not be identifiable causing death or serious bodily injury;

• the public is jeopardized by the inability to inspect said canisters for damage during or after down loading into the concrete storage structure;

• [work] has been conducted by insufficiently trained workers with inadequate safeguards to protect the public safety;

• SCE cannot self-correct with more training and improvements;

W. Weigel 2

• Holtec [UMAX] canisters are designed and authorized for use at sites that are not on military installationsand therefore vulnerable in the event of any act of terror or war;

• [no] engineering has accounted for potential terrorist attacks on the casks or storage system; and

• manufacturing incompetence of Holtec equipment currently in use at the

[independent spent fuel storage installation] calls into question claims of safety for the canisters and the overall spent fuel storage system.

Staff Action On November 8, 2019, the NRC provided a response to Oceansiders by e-mail (ADAMS Accession No. ML19319B626) stating that the NRC staff concluded, in accordance with Section II.B.1 of Management Directive (MD) 8.11, Review Process for 10 CFR 2.206 Petitions (ADAMS Accession No. ML18296A043), that the request to issue an immediate cease and desist to SCE did not warrant immediate action. On November 18, 2019, the NRC informed Oceansiders via e-mail (ADAMS Accession No. ML19323C423) that the request to revoke Coastal Development Permit No. 9-15-0228 had been screened out of the 10 CFR 2.206 process and that a petition review board (PRB) was performing its initial assessment of the remaining petition requests to determine if they should be accepted into the 10 CFR 2.206 process.

On December 20, 2019, the NRC provided Oceansiders the PRBs initial assessment via e-mail (ADAMS Accession No. ML19354B676). It stated that the PRB had concluded that the petition did not meet the criteria for consideration under 10 CFR 2.206 because it appeared that all the issues raised in the petition had previously been the subject of NRC staff review and did not raise concerns that the NRC staff has not previously considered and resolved. On January 22, 2020, the PRB conducted a public teleconference with Oceansiders at your request. The meeting gave Oceansiders the opportunity to provide any relevant additional explanation and support for the petition after receiving the PRB's initial assessment. The NRC staff placed a transcript of the meeting into ADAMS (ADAMS Accession No. ML20030B157). The PRB considered the information presented during the January 22, 2020, discussion as well as the original petition and the supplemental information submitted in reaching its final determination as discussed below.

NRC Staff Response to Specific Concerns Protection of Public Health and Safety The NRC has continued to carefully regulate the licensees decommissioning activities at SONGS, which include its review of the UMAX fuel storage system design, inspections encompassing the physical facility as well as the licensees operational performance, and appropriate enforcement actions. Specifically, after performing a thorough review, the NRC approved the UMAX storage system used at SONGS in 2017 through a public rulemaking (ADAMS Accession No. ML16341B061). The NRC staff reviewed calculations performed by the licensee in accordance with 10 CFR 72.212(b), which demonstrated that the site environmental conditions at SONGS (e.g., seismic events, tsunamis, etc.) were bounded by the Holtec storage systems design parameters (ADAMS Accession No. ML18200A400). In addition, the NRC staff continually performs oversight to ensure that the storage of spent nuclear fuel at SONGS does not pose a threat to public health and safety.

NRC inspections of decommissioning activities at SONGS, including inspections related to the ISFSI, are documented in publicly available inspection reports (e.g., ADAMS Accession No. ML19316A762).

W. Weigel 3 The NRC staff also considered the statements in the petition regarding the August 3, 2018, canister misalignment event. The NRCs regulatory review and oversight actions included a detailed assessment of the significance of the events, specific enforcement actions, and subsequent consideration of the licensees corrective actions (ADAMS Accession No. ML19190A217). Specifically, NRC inspectors concluded that appropriate corrective actions in the areas of licensee oversight and training were identified and implemented. In addition, NRC inspectors determined that localized scratches (peak stresses) on the canisters are not a safety concern from the standpoint of ASME Code Section Ill, Subsection NB stress intensity limits.

The NRC inspectors also concluded, after performing independent calculations, that statistical evaluations performed by the licensee using visual data obtained with a robotic crawler were conservative and reasonably bounded the maximum anticipated scratch or wear depths resulting from operational activities. These evaluations adequately demonstrated that canister scratches from incidental contact for previous and future canisters will not prevent the canisters from performing the confinement design functions specified in the UMAX Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) or from satisfying the ASME Code Section III canister wall thickness tolerances.

In addition, the NRC staff notes that the 0.0584 inch scratch depth calculated by the licensee, which NRC inspectors determined was conservative and reasonable, is less than the ASME code limit for the SONGS canisters of 0.0625 inches and approximately one-third the 0.175 inch margin available for localized losses of shell thickness identified in Oceansiders supplemental submittal. Therefore, the staff does not find a basis for requiring third party ASME Sections III, V, XI tests as requested in Oceansiders supplemental submittal (ADAMS Accession No. ML20034E843).

Oceansiders also raised concerns about statements made in the January 9, 2019, Pre-decisional Enforcement Conference between the NRC and Holtec, which discussed apparent violations involving Holtec's failure to: (1) establish adequate design control measures as a part of the selection and review for suitability of application of materials, parts, equipment, and processes that are essential to the functions of the structures, systems, and components which are important to safety as required by 10 CFR 72.146(a); and (2) perform a 10 CFR 72.48 evaluation prior to implementing proposed changes and failure to obtain certificate of compliance amendments pursuant to 10 CFR 72.244. This resulted in the April 24, 2019, issuance of one Severity Level (SL) III Notice of Violation (NOV) and one SL IV NOV (ADAMS Accession No. ML19072A128). An SL III violation constitutes escalated enforcement action, which subjected Holtec to increased inspection effort.

The NRCs regulatory review and oversight actions included a detailed assessment of the significance of the events and a follow-up inspection to review Holtec's corrective actions involving the violations identified in the NRCs letter dated April 24, 2019. The NRC inspectors reviewed Holtecs corrective action program, implementing documents, and resultant quality issue reports and concluded that appropriate corrective actions were taken to ensure that the loaded spent fuel canisters at SONGS are in a safe condition. Specifically, NRC inspectors reviewed a Holtec thermal evaluation, which determined that the UMAX canisters at SONGS will meet the UMAX FSAR thermal limits under long term storage conditions. NRC inspectors also reviewed a Holtec structural evaluation, which determined that the shim standoffs, under three dynamic simulations with varying input conditions, will withstand design basis seismic loads without a structural failure. The inspection report can be found at ADAMS Accession No. ML19228A016. In addition, the NRC inspectors determined that completed or planned corrective actions sufficiently and comprehensively addressed the performance issues that led to these violations. Finally, regarding Oceansiders request that the NRC require Holtec provide third-party verified ASME compliant test results documenting the steel manufactured and subsequently used for the canisters meets the required certificate of compliance specifications,

W. Weigel 4 the NRC staff notes that the violations associated with the January 9, 2019, Pre-decisional Enforcement Conference were solely associated with design and manufacturing issues and were completely unrelated to the materials used to manufacture the canisters. Therefore, the staff does not find a basis for requiring third party verified test results on the material used to fabricate the canisters.

As a result, the NRC remains confident that reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety can be maintained for as long as fuel is stored in accordance with the requirements of the SONGS license, the certificate of compliance for the UMAX system, as well as any other licensed systems that may be implemented in the future at the SONGS site, and other applicable requirements.

Environmental Impacts Regarding Oceansiders concerns about the environmental impacts of decommissioning activities, the NRC staff concluded in its review of the SONGS Post Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report (ADAMS Accession No. ML15204A383) that these activities are bounded by the previously issued NUREG-0586, "Final Generic Environmental Impact Statement [GEIS] on Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities," and its supplements, and did not find any deviations from the previously issued Environmental Statement for SONGS (ADAMS Accession No. ML18239A414). In addition, the NRC staff determined that the licensee is satisfying the regulatory requirements of 10 CFR 72.104 and 10 CFR 72.106 that limit the exposure to individuals beyond the controlled area boundary during normal operations, anticipated occurrences, and design basis accidents (ADAMS Accession No. ML18200A400).

Therefore, the NRC is confident that the environment is adequately protected.

Military Installations and Acts of Terror Regarding Oceansiders concerns that Holtec canisters are not intended for use at military installations and are vulnerable to acts of war, the regulations in 10 CFR 72.236 require, among other things, that design bases and design criteria be provided for structures, systems and components important to safety (e.g., MPCs and Vertical Ventilated Modules). Holtec provided design criteria for structures, systems and components important to safety for the UMAX system in Table 2.2.13 of the UMAX FSAR in accordance with 10 CFR 72.236 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12363A284). These criteria included an overpressure value associated with explosive events. The NRC staff reviewed these criteria and found them acceptable (ADAMS Accession No. ML15093A510).

Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Commission alone has the responsibility for interpreting and implementing the common defense and security standard set forth in the Act. Therefore, since the NRC has exclusive jurisdiction over the entire field of radiological safety in relation to nuclear facilities, as stated on page one of Oceansiders petition (ADAMS Accession No. ML19322B094), Oceansiders request that the NRC obtain correspondence from the Secretary of the Navy associated with the engineering design of the ISFSI relative to potential enemy attacks is not warranted.

The NRC staff also considered the statements in the petition regarding acts of terrorism. The NRC continually evaluates the threat environment, in coordination with the intelligence and law enforcement communities, to determine whether any specific threat to ISFSIs exists. The NRC staff conducted security assessments for ISFSIs using multiple storage cask designs similar in design to those currently certified by the NRC. Plausible threat scenarios considered in the generic security assessments for ISFSIs included a large aircraft impact similar in magnitude to the attacks of September 11, 2001, and ground assaults using expanded adversary characteristics consistent with the design basis threat for radiological sabotage for nuclear power plants. Because the results of these security assessments contain sensitive unclassified

W. Weigel 5 information, they are not publicly available. Based on these assessments, the NRC concluded there is no need for security measures at ISFSIs beyond those currently set forth in the NRCs existing regulations in 10 CFR 72, Licensing Requirements For The Independent Storage Of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level Radioactive Waste, And Reactor-Related Greater Than Class C Waste and 10 CFR Part 73, Physical Protection of Plants and Materials, and appropriate security orders issued after September 11, 2001. These security orders contain safeguards information and therefore are not publicly available. Taken together, the NRC staff is confident that these regulatory requirements minimize the likelihood of a successful terrorist attack.

For SONGS specifically, the NRC staff has performed security inspections, which are non-public because they contain security related information, that document the adequate implementation of the security requirements contained in the NRCs regulations and security orders. In addition, the NRC staff documented that the licensee adequately implemented the physical security requirements of Subpart H to 10 CFR Part 72 in the inspection report that covers the NRCs review and approval of the SCE 72.212 report for using the UMAX ISFSI design at SONGS (ADAMS Accession No. ML18200A400). Therefore, the NRC is confident that the licensee is implementing an effective physical security program for the SONGS UMAX ISFSI.

Conclusion Having considered inspection results, the applicable environmental documents, the applicable licensing documents and the information provided in the petition, the PRBs final determination is that the petition does not meet the acceptance criteria in MD 8.11, Section III.C.1(b), because the issues raised in the petition have been the subject of a facility-specific or generic NRC staff review, and none of the circumstances in Section III.C.1(b)(ii) applies. The NMSS Office Director was briefed on and supported this conclusion.

Thank you for bringing these issues to the attention of the NRC.

Sincerely, Kevin Digitally signed by Kevin Williams Williams Date: 2020.03.04 12:48:43 -05'00' Kevin Williams, Deputy Director Division of Materials Safety, Security, State, and Tribal Programs Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Docket No(s). 50-206, 50-361, 50-362, 72-41 and 72-1040

Letter ML20057G184 *by e-mail OFFICE NMSS/DFM/STLB/PM NMSS/DFM/STLB/LA NRR/DORL/LPL2-2 R-IV/DNMS/RIB NAME WAllen WWheatley

• PBuckberg

• SAnderson

• DATE 2/13/20 2/14/20 2/14/20 2/18/20 NMSS/Enforcement OFFICE NMSS/DUWP/PM NMSS/DFM/IOB NMSS/DFM/STLB/BC Coordinator NAME MDoell

• JWoodfield

• SHoliday

• DDoyle

• DATE 2/13/20 2/14/20 2/20/20 2/20/20 OFFICE OGC - NLO NMSS/MSST (PRB Chair) NSIR NMSS/D NAME RCarpenter

• KWilliams

• SHelton

• JLubinski

• DATE 2/26/20 2/20/20 3/2/20 3/2/20