05000285/FIN-2012301-04
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Finding | |
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| Title | Five Examples of Inadequate Procedures for the Initiating Events Cornerstone |
| Description | The team identified a finding of very low safety significance involving a non-cited violation of Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, with five examples. Example 1: Alarm Response Procedure ARP-CB-10,11/A12 for a main feedwater pump trip does not provide guidance that the auxiliary lube oil pump must be started prior to starting the main feedwater pump. After identification, the licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 2012-03140. Example 2: Alarm Response Procedure ARP-CB-1,2,3/A2 provides inadequate instructions for restoration of letdown following a controller or instrument failure that causes letdown isolation. After identification, the licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 2012-03140. Example 3: Alarm Response Procedure ARP-AI-66A/A66A does not contain guidance to determine if an auxiliary feedwater actuation is inadvertent nor does it contain guidance to enter AOP-28, Auxiliary Feedwater System Malfunctions, if the operators determine that the actuation is inadvertent. After identification, the licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 2012-03140. Example 4: Alarm Response Procedure ARP-CB-1,2,3/A1 does not contain guidance for entering AOP-35, Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions, when there is a seal cooler leak. After identification, the licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 2012-03140. Example 5: Alarm Response Procedure ARP-CB-1,2,3/A2 does not contain any procedural guidance for a failure of the VCT level instrument. After identification, the licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 2012-03140. These failures to prescribe activities affecting quality by procedures or to include appropriate acceptance criteria are performance deficiencies. Each example is more than minor and therefore a finding because it adversely affects the procedure quality attribute of the initiating events cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. These examples either could have significantly affected, or were shown during examination preparation and administration to have actually affected the operators ability to perform the activity affecting quality. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, a phase 1 screening was performed and each example except for Example 1 was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because each example does not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions will not be available. For Example 1, a phase 1 screening was performed and the finding was determined to contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions will not be available and required a phase 3 analysis. A senior reactor analyst determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because the calculated bounding delta core damage frequency was 1.4 E-7. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program component because the licensee did not implement a corrective action program with a low threshold for identifying issues in that licensed operators deviate from procedures when procedures cannot be implemented as written without writing necessary condition reports to fix the deficient procedures. |
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000285/2012301 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2012 (2012Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | T Buchanan T Farina B Larson C Osterholtz G Apger M Hay R Devercellyb Larsond Strickland K Clayton M Haire N Hernandez T Buchanan |
| CCA | P.1, Identification |
| INPO aspect | PI.1 |
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Finding - Fort Calhoun - IR 05000285/2012301 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Fort Calhoun) @ 2012Q2
Self-Identified List (Fort Calhoun)
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