05000285/FIN-2011014-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Ensure That the 480 Vac Electrical Power Distribution System Design Requirements Were Implemented and Maintained |
| Description | The failure to ensure that the 480 Vac electrical power distribution system design requirements were properly implemented and maintained through proper maintenance, modification, and design activities led to a catastrophic fire in a switchgear impacting the required safe shutdown capability of the plant. Three self-revealing apparent violations were identified with this performance deficiency: A violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure to ensure that design changes were subject to design control measures commensurate with those applied to the original design and that measures were established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis for those safety-related structures, systems, and components were correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions; A violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI Corrective Action, for the failure to establish measures to assure that a significant condition adverse to quality was promptly identified and corrected, and measures taken to preclude repetition;nnA violation of License Condition 3.D, Fire Protection Program, for the failure to ensure that the electrical protection and physical design of the 480 Vac electrical power distribution system provided the electrical bus separation required by the fire protection program. Specifically: (1) design reviews and work planning for a modification to install twelve new 480 Vac load center breakers failed to ensure that the cradle adapter assemblies had a low-resistance connection with the switchgear bus bars by establishing a proper fit and requiring low resistance connections; (2) preventive maintenance activities were inadequate to ensure proper cleaning of conductors, proper torquing of bolted conductor and bus bar connections, or adequate inspection for abnormal connection temperatures; and (3) design reviews of the electrical protection and train separation of the 480 Vac electrical power distribution system were inadequate to ensure that a fire in load center 1B4A would not adversely impact operation of redundant safe shutdown equipment in load center 1B3A, as required by the fire protection program. The licensee entered these issues into their corrective action program under numerous condition report numbers, which are described in the body of this report. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it affected the Initiating Events Cornerstone and was associated with both the protection against external events attribute (i.e., fire) and the design control attribute. The finding affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 V Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, Table 4a, directed the process to a Phase 3 analysis because the finding increased the likelihood of an external event (fire), and impacted mitigating systems needed to respond to that initiating event. A Phase 3 analysis was completed using the plant-specific Standardized Plant Analysis Risk Model for Fort Calhoun, Revision 8.15, the Individual Plant Evaluation of External Events (IPEEE), and hand calculations. The analysis covered the risk affected by the performance deficiency for postulated fires of any of the remaining nine continuously energized breakers including the potential for multiple fire initiators. Additionally, seismically-induced fires were postulated based on the characteristics of the performance deficiency. Based in the best available information the performance deficiency was preliminarily characterized as a finding of high safety significance (Red). This performance deficiency had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the resources component because the licensee did not ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources were adequate to assure nuclear safety. Specifically, the licensee did not ensure that design documentation, procedures, and work packages were adequate to assure that design margins were maintained. |
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000285/2011014 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2012 (2012Q1) |
| Type: | Violation: Red |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 93812 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Loveless G Miller J Josey S Achen S Graves |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III, Design Control 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI License Condition - Fire Protection |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
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Finding - Fort Calhoun - IR 05000285/2011014 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Fort Calhoun) @ 2012Q1
Self-Identified List (Fort Calhoun)
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