05000285/FIN-2011005-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Inadequate Performance Monitoring Test for Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers |
| Description | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, which requires, in part, that a test program shall be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that structures, systems, and components will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures. Test procedures shall include provisions for assuring that all prerequisites for the given test have been met, that adequate test instrumentation is available and used, and that the test is performed under suitable environmental conditions. Specifically, prior to November 16, 2011, the prerequisite calculated heat loads used to demonstrate validity of the performance testing of component cooling water heat exchanger AC-1A test conditions did not agree to within the expected uncertainty, and ultrasonic flow meters were not calibrated to the appropriate range of test flow conditions. The licensee has entered this violation into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2011-9401. The inspectors determined that the failure to perform testing and evaluation of safety-related heat exchangers in accordance with written procedures was a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it adversely affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of equipment performance to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Additionally, the finding is more than minor because if left uncorrected it could lead to a more significant safety concern, as the failure to perform appropriate performance monitoring testing of the component cooling water heat exchangers could reasonably result in an unrecognized condition of a system failing to fulfill its safety-related function. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not represent a loss of system safety function, nor an actual loss of safety function of a single train, and it did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors determined that this finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance, work practices, because the licensee did not communicate human error prevention techniques, such as self- and peer-checking and proper documentation of activities. |
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000285/2011005 Section 1R07 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2011 (2011Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.07 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Kirkland P Elkmann C Graves L Carson J Clark D Reinert J Wingebach |
| CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
| INPO aspect | QA.4 |
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Finding - Fort Calhoun - IR 05000285/2011005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Fort Calhoun) @ 2011Q4
Self-Identified List (Fort Calhoun)
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