05000285/FIN-2012007-04
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Provide Adequate Alternate Shutdown Capability |
| Description | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.8.1.c for an inadequate fire protection procedure. Specifically, the post-fire safe shutdown procedure had several deficiencies that would have prevented implementation of the alternate shutdown capability for fires in the control/cable spreading rooms. The failure to establish a procedure that could be implemented as written for fires that require operators to abandon the control room was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the protection against external events (fire) attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors evaluated this deficiency using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process. The performance deficiency affected the fire protection defense-in depth strategies involving post-fire safe shutdown systems. Because Appendix F does not address control room fire scenarios, a senior reactor analyst evaluated the significance of this performance deficiency. This finding was evaluated using the process in Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, and was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding was not a design deficiency, confirmed not to result in loss of functionality, did not result in loss of a system safety function, did not result in loss of the safety function for a single train, did not result in loss of safety function for maintenance rule equipment, and did not potentially affect risk significant external initiating events. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with decision making because the licensee did not perform effective interdisciplinary reviews during development of the post-fire safe shutdown procedures. |
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000285/2012007 Section 1R05 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2012 (2012Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.05 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | G Miller G Pick J Mateychick J Watkins S Makor |
| CCA | H.13, Consistent Process |
| INPO aspect | DM.1 |
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Finding - Fort Calhoun - IR 05000285/2012007 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Fort Calhoun) @ 2012Q2
Self-Identified List (Fort Calhoun)
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