05000285/FIN-2012301-03
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 2.3(1)(i) for Safety Injection Tank Operability |
| Description | The team identified a non-cited violation for failing to comply with Technical Specification 2.3(1)(i) in that multiple Safety Injection Tanks were connected together simultaneously for filling operations on at least two occasions, once while sluicing on 01/18/2010 and once where all four tanks were connected together on 03/31/2011. This Limiting Condition for Operation requires that all valves, piping and interlocks associated with the Safety Injection Tanks (that are required to function during accident conditions) are operable to maintain Safety Injection Tank operability. Operability of these fill valves is met when each valve is shut. With multiple fill valves open during normal operations, this technical specification is not met, and there is no remedial action described when more than one Safety Injection Tank is inoperable with the reactor critical, requiring a unit shutdown in accordance with Technical Specification 2.0.1. This action was not performed by the licensee. After identification, the licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Reports 2012-01956 and 2012-04815. Failure to comply with technical specifications was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor and therefore a finding because it adversely impacted the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using the Significance Determination Process Phase 1 and 2 Worksheets, the finding was determined to affect the loss of system safety function and required entry into Appendix A of this process for screening. The senior reactor analyst screened the issue based on a less than one-hour exposure time and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the calculated bounding delta core damage frequency was 1 E-8. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of work control because the licensee failed to plan work activities to support long-term equipment reliability by not limiting safety system unavailability, specifically the Safety Injection Tanks |
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000285/2012301 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2012 (2012Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Larson D Strickland K Clayton M Haire N Hernandez T Buchanan |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Fort Calhoun - IR 05000285/2012301 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Fort Calhoun) @ 2012Q2
Self-Identified List (Fort Calhoun)
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