05000263/FIN-2015002-05
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Inadequate Clearance Order Results in Unplanned OPDRV |
| Description | A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of technical specification (TS) 5.4.1, Procedures, was identified on May 16, 2015, when the licensee failed to implement procedure FP-OP-TAG-01, Fleet Tagging, for equipment control activities associated with the Scram Discharge Volume (SDV). Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that clearance order checklist 58972-03 restored valve I-CRD-R-26, an SDV instrument vent valve, to its normal position prior to returning the SDV system to service. As a result, during subsequent reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure boundary testing, RCS water leaked out onto the reactor building floor through the open vent line, creating an unplanned operation with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRV). This issue was entered into the licensees CAP (CAP 1479307). Immediate corrective actions included termination of the leakage by closing and capping the SDV vent line and resetting the scram. The site initiated an apparent cause evaluation (ACE), which was in progress at the end of the inspection period. The inspectors determined that the failure to adequately restore the SDV system to service in accordance with fleet tagging requirements was a performance deficiency requiring evaluation. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, because it adversely impacted the Initiating Events Cornerstone attributes of Configuration Control and Procedure Quality, and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, which required an analysis using IMC 0609 Appendix G, the Shutdown Operations significance determination process (SDP) since the reactor was in Mode 4 (cold shutdown). The finding was assessed in accordance with IMC 0609 Appendix G, Attachment 1, Exhibit 2 for Initiating Events. Using IMC 0609 Appendix G, Attachment 3, for a Phase 2 analysis, the inspectors determined it to have very low safety significance. The inspectors concluded that this finding was cross-cutting in the Human Performance, Challenge the Unknown aspect because of the failure of individuals to stop when faced with uncertain conditions and the failure to ensure that risks are evaluated and managed before proceeding [H.11]. |
| Site: | Monticello  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000263/2015002 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2015 (2015Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | K Riemer M Ziolkowski N Mcmurray P Voss P Zurawski R Elliott S Bell T Bilik |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.11, Challenge the Unknown |
| INPO aspect | QA.2 |
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Finding - Monticello - IR 05000263/2015002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Monticello) @ 2015Q2
Self-Identified List (Monticello)
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