Text

Denial of Non-Cited Violation 05000260/2016002-03, Failure to Report a Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function
	ML18124A089
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	05/04/2018
From:	Hughes D; Tennessee Valley Authority
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC/RGN-II
References
	IR 2016002
	Download: ML18124A089 (6)
	v • d • e

Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Decatur, Alabama 35609-2000 May 4 , 2018 10 CFR 50.4 ATTN : Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington , D.C. 20555-0001 Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-52 NRC Docket No. 50-260

Subject:

Denial of Non-Cited Violation 05000260/2016002-03, Failure to Report a Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function

Reference:

Letter from A. Blarney (NRC) to J. W. Shea (TVA), "Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant -

NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2016002, 05000260/2016002, and 05000296/2016002 ," dated August 11 , 2016 (ML16225A208)

In the above reference, the Tennessee Valley Authority received the inspection report for the second quarter of 2016 completed on June 30, 2016 documenting two findings of very low significance (Green) and one Severity Level IV violation .

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.4 and the NRC Enforcement Manual, this letter requests the NRC withdraw the Severity Level IV Non-cited Violation (NCV 05000260/2016002-03) of 10 CFR

50. 72(b)(3)(v) and 10 CFR 50 .73(a)(2)(v) for failure to notify the NRC within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months and submit a Licensee Event Report within 60 days of discovery of a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function . Additional details are contained in the enclosure to this letter.

This denial is being communicated beyond 30 days of receipt of the inspection report due to the identification of a change in the NRC's position on the violation during disposition of Reactor Oversight Process Task Force (ROP TF) Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) 16-04 and follow-on discussions with the NRC regarding required process documentation to manage the position change.

There are no new regulatory commitments contained in this letter. Should you have any questions concerning this submittal, please contact Jamie L. Paul, Nuclear Site Licensing Manager, at (256) 729-2636.

D. L. Hughes Site Vice President

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 May 4, 2018

Enclosure:

Denial of Non-Cited Violation 05000260/2016002-03, Failure to Report a Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function cc (w/ Enclosure):

NRC Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation NRC Director, Office of Enforcement NRC Regional Administrator - Region II NRC Senior Resident Inspector- Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant NRC Project Manager- Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

Enclosure Denial of Non-Cited Violation 05000260/2016002-03, Failure to Report a Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function

Background

The second quarter 2016 NRC integrated inspection report 05000259, 260, 296/2016002 dated August 11, 2016 (Reference 1), documented Severity Level IV non-cited violation 05000260/2016002-03, in part as follows:

"On March 17, 2016 the licensee conducted planned maintenance on the Unit 2 [High Pressure Coolant Injection] HPCI system to replace the valve packing material in the steam admission valve . The maintenance required the system to be depressurized and be taken out of service, which made the system inoperable. After the valve packing was installed, the licensee performed diagnostic testing of the motor operated valve on March 18, [2016] which required stroking of the valve. The diagnostic tests were completed satisfactorily and HPCI was returned to service on March 19, [2016] at 7:38 a.m. A final operability surveillance stroke time test per 2-SR-3.6.1 .3.5(HPCI) was to be performed prior to declaring the system operable. When operators attempted to perform the surveillance at 10:24 a.m., the valve would not open. The inability of the valve to open would prevent steam from being admitted to the HPCI turbine , which would have rendered the system inoperable. Troubleshooting later revealed that the breaker thermal overloads had tripped and also that a breaker contactor in the valve closing circuit had become hot enough to fuse its contacts together, which prevented the valve from opening. The cause of the equipment failure was determined to be due to excessive valve stroking during the earlier diagnostic testing.

"On March 22, 201 [6], the inspectors identified to the Operations Shift Manager that the valve failure met the three conditions listed in section 3.2.7 of NUREG-1022 which described when an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months and 60 day report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v) are required .

Specifically, the inspectors identified that the discovery of the unexpected breaker failure was a condition that would have resulted in the single train HPCI system being declared inoperable.

On March 24, [2016] [Condition Report] CR 1153334 was generated to evaluate the reportability of the condition; however, the licensee's evaluation incorrectly determined that the condition was not reportable."

Description of Non-Cited Violation 05000260/2016002-03 The inspection report, continues, in part:

"An NRC identified Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50.72(b)(3)(v) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v) was identified for the licensee's failure to notify the NRC within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months and submit an LER within 60 days of discovery of a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. Specifically, the licensee failed to notify the NRC that the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system had been rendered inoperable due to an equipment failure.

"The inspectors determined the failure to notify the NRC within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months and submit a LER within 60 days of discovery of a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function ,

was a performance deficiency. The licensee's failure to provide the required notifications constitutes a traditional enforcement violation because it impacts the NRC's ability to carry out its regulatory function. The traditional enforcement violation was determined to be Severity Level IV because it matched example 6.9.d.9 of the NRC Enforcement Policy."

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Enclosure Denial of Non-Cited Violation 05000260/2016002-03, Failure to Report a Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function Enforcement The inspection report, states, in part:

"10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), require, in part, that licensees shall notify the NRC within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months and submit a LER within 60 days of discovery of any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; (B) Remove residual heat; (C) Control the release of radioactive material; or (D)

Mitigate the consequences of an accident. Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to notify the NRC within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months on March 19, 2016 and report by May 18, 2016 when they discovered the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system had been rendered inoperable due to an equipment failure which met the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b )(3)(v) and 10 CFR

50. 73(a)(2)(v) . This violation is being treated as an NCV consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. (NCV 05000260/2016002-03, Failure to Report a Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function)."

TV A Response In accordance with 10 CFR 50.4 and guidance from the NRC Enforcement Manual, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) hereby contests NCV 05000260/2016002-03 and provides its basis for denial.

Basis for Denial On March 17, 2016, Browns Ferry Operations personnel declared Unit 2 HPCI inoperable for planned maintenance. During the maintenance period on March 19, 2016, Operations personnel received a ground alarm during performance of valve diagnostic (MOVATS) testing on the Unit 2 HPCI Steam Admission Valve. The valve motor breaker was opened and the alarm cleared. The thermal overload relay was found tripped, which resulted in the alarm , and was reset. Later on March 19, 2016, Operations attempted to stroke the valve from the Control Room for post maintenance testing (PMT) using a hand switch and the valve failed to stroke due to a stuck contactor in the breaker.

Troubleshooting later revealed that the breaker thermal overloads had tripped and that a breaker contactor in the valve closing circuit had become hot enough to fuse its contacts together, thereby preventing the valve from opening. The cause of the equipment failure was determined to be due to excessive valve stroking inducing breaker contactor overheating and accelerated cyclic fatigue during the earlier PMT and MOVATS testing on March 19, 2016. There was no vendor specific service life for these contacts.

A Past Operability Evaluation (POE) concluded that the HPCI system was operable until being declared inoperable for scheduled maintenance to repack a valve. The valve was stroked successfully multiple times for packing consolidation and MOVATS testing. The failure of the valve to stroke occurred prior to placing the system back in service and declaring it operable and was induced by the excessive valve stroking during the maintenance testing. Therefore, this excessive valve stroking created a new condition during the maintenance continuing the out of service period.

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Enclosure Denial of Non-Cited Violation 05000260/2016002-03, Failure to Report a Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function BFN evaluated this failure for reportability and determined this failure was not reportable as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the HPCI safety function based on the following guidance from NUREG-1022, Event Report Guidelines, Revision 3.

"Reports are not required when systems are declared inoperable as part of a planned evolution for maintenance or surveillance testing when done in accordance with an approved procedure and the plant's [Technical Specifications] TS (unless a condition is discovered that would have resulted in the system being declared inoperable)."

On November 8, 2016, BFN presented Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) 16-04 to the NRC in regards to how count the above maintenance induced condition in terms of the Safety System Functional Failure (SSFF) Performance Indicator (Pl) within the Reactor Oversight Process Task Force (ROPTF) process for the staff's consideration . BFN's proposal in the FAQ was that the Safety System Functional Failure (SSFF) Performance Indicator (Pl) should only count failures that occur or potentially existed while there was an expectation that a structure, system or component (SSC) was operable. Conditions affecting operability created during a maintenance out of service period that did not exist while the SSC was considered operable and were identified and corrected while still in a maintenance state do not count for purposes of the SSFF Pl.

During the March 23, 2017, ROPTF, the NRC provided the following response .

"The staff reviewed the guidance found in NUREG-1022, Revision 3 to determine if additional exclusions of reported SSFFs should be considered for inclusion in NEI 99-02,[Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline]. NEI 99-02 states that, "reports are not required when systems are declared inoperable as part of a planned evolution for maintenance or surveillance testing when done in accordance with an approved procedure and the plant's TS (unless a condition is discovered that would have resulted in the system being declared inoperable).""

FAQ 16-04 also stated that, "However if the licensee creates a new condition during the maintenance that would have rendered the system inoperable, that is not reportable as long as it is repaired prior to restoration of operability in accordance with Technical Specifications."

On April 13, 2017, FAQ 16-04 was finalized (Reference 2) declaring alignment already existed between NEI 99-02 and NUREG-1022 regarding conditions created during a maintenance out of service period.

This denial is being communicated beyond 30 days of receipt of the inspection report due to the identification of a change in the NRC's position on the violation during disposition of FAQ 16-04 and follow-on discussions with the NRC regarding required process documentation to manage the position change .

Therefore, based on the preventive maintenance and related testing inducing a new condition during the maintenance that continued the out of service period and did not exist to effect operability prior to the maintenance period , BFN's position is that this condition was not reportable as per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) , 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), and NEI 99-02 and requests that the NRC withdraw NCV 05000260/2016002-03 to ensure docketed correspondence reflects the correct application of NUREG-1022 and NEI 99-02.

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Enclosure Denial of Non-Cited Violation 05000260/2016002-03, Failure to Report a Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function References

1. Letter from A. Blarney (NRC) to J . W . Shea (TVA), "Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant - NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2016002, 05000260/2016002, and 05000296/2016002," dated August 11 , 2016 (ML16225A208)

2. Frequently Asked Question 16-04, "Browns Ferry Safety System Functional Failure (Final NRC Response)", finalized April 13, 2017(ML17114A061)

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