Text

Watts Bar, Unit 1 - Response to Request for Additional Information Related to Carbon Dioxide Fire Suppression System
	ML093080377
Person / Time
Site:	Watts Bar
Issue date:	10/30/2009
From:	Krich R M; Tennessee Valley Authority
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	TAC ME0876, TVA-WBN-TS-09-20
	Download: ML093080377 (179)
	v • d • e

{{#Wiki_filter:Tennessee Valley Authority, 1101 Market Street, Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801 October 30, 2009 10 CFR 50.90 TVA-WBN-TS-09-20 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 NRC Docket No. 50-390

Subject:

License Amendment Request and Response to Request for Additional Information Related to Carbon Dioxide Fire Suppression System (TAC No. ME0876)

References:

1. NUREG-0847, Supplement No. 18, "Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-390 and 50-391," dated October 1995 2. Letter from the NRC to TVA, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit I -Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for Correction to NUREG-0847, Supplement 18, Related to Carbon Dioxide Fire Suppression System (TAC NO. ME0876)," dated July 15, 2009 3. Letter from TVA to the NRC, "Withdrawal of Denial of Non-Cited Violation 05000390/2008005-04, 'Carbon Dioxide System in Fire Area 48 Failed to Meet Design Criterion'," dated August 25, 20094. Letter from TVA to the NRC, "Request for Extension Regarding License Amendment Request Submission Date and Response to Request for Additional Information Related to Carbon Dioxide Fire Suppression System (TAC No. ME0876)", dated September 30, 2009 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.90, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) is submitting a license amendment request (WBN-TS-09-20) to Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN). The proposed amendment will Prie o Printed on recycled paper.h Tennessee Valley Authority, 1101 Market Street, Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801 October 30, 2009 10 CFR 50.90 TVA-WBN-TS-09-20 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission AnN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 NRC Docket No. 50-390

Subject:

License Amendment Request and Response to Request for Additional Information Related to Carbon Dioxide Fire Suppression System (TAC No. ME0876)

References:

1. NUREG-0847, Supplement No. 18, "Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-390 and 50-391," dated October 1995 2. Letter from the NRC to TVA, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 -Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for Correction to NUREG-0847, Supplement 18, Related to Carbon Dioxide Fire Suppression System (TAC NO. ME0876)," dated July 15, 2009 3. Letter from TVA to the NRC, "Withdrawal of Denial of Non-Cited Violation 05000390/2008005-04, 'Carbon Dioxide System in Fire Area 48 Failed to Meet Design Criterion'," dated August 25,2009 4. Letter from TVA to the NRC, "Request for Extension Regarding License Amendment Request Submission Date and Response to Request for Additional Information Related to Carbon Dioxide Fire Suppression System (TAC No. ME0876)", dated September 30,2009 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.90, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) is submitting a license amendment request (WBN-TS-09-20) to Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN). The proposed amendment will Printed on recycled paper U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 October 30, 2009 modify the WBN Operating License by adding an exception to Operating License Condition 2.F regarding the provisions of the Fire Protection Program. This change is necessary to resolve a discrepancy between WBN's Fire Protection Report and NUREG-0847, Supplement 18, "Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-390 and 50-391," (Reference 1) related to the carbon dioxide fire suppression system in the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room.Enclosed is TVA's evaluation of the proposed change. Included as part of the technical justification for the change is TVA's response to NRC's request for additional information documented in Reference 2 as previously agreed upon by letters dated August 25, 2009 (Reference

3) and September 30, 2009 (Reference 4).TVA has determined that there are no significant hazards considerations associated with the proposed change and that the license amendment qualifies for a categorical exclusion from environmental review pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).

Additionally, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.91(b)(1), TVA is sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to the Tennessee State Department of Public Health.TVA requests approval of this license amendment by October 30, 2010.Implementation of the amendment will be completed within 30 days of NRC approval.There are no regulatory commitments contained in this letter or its enclosure. Please direct any questions concerning this matter to Kevin Casey at (423) 751-8523.I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.Executed on this L day of October, 2009. Respectfully, 4R. M. r Vice President Nuclear Licensing Enclosure cc: (Enclosure) NRC Regional Administrator -Region II NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Watts Bar Nuclear Plant TN Department of Environment & Conservation -Division of Radiological Health U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2. October 30,2009 modify the WBN Operating License by adding an exception to Operating License Condition 2.F regarding the provisions of the Fire Protection Program. This change is necessary to resolve a discrepancy between WBN's Fire Protection Report and NUREG-0847, Supplement 18, "Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-390 and 50-391," (Reference

1) related to the carbon dioxide fire suppression system in the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room. Enclosed is TVA's evaluation of the proposed change. Included as part of the technical justification for the change is TVA's response to NRC's request for additional information documented in Reference 2 as previously agreed upon by letters dated August 25, 2009 (Reference

3) and September 30, 2009 (Reference 4). TVA has determined that there are no significant hazards considerations associated with the proposed change and that the license amendment qualifies for a categorical exclusion from environmental review pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).

Additionally, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.91(b)(1), TVA is sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to the Tennessee State Department of Public Health. TVA requests approval of this license amendment by October 30, 2010. Implementation of the amendment will be completed within 30 days of NRC approval. There are no regulatory commitments contained in this letter or its enclosure. Please direct any questions concerning this matter to Kevin Casey at (423) 751-8523. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on this 3.1Z day of October, 2009. Vice President Nuclear Licensing Enclosure cc: (Enclosure) NRC Regional Administrator -Region II NRC Senior Resident Inspector -Watts Bar Nuclear Plant TN Department of Environment & Conservation -Division of Radiological Health ENCLOSURE Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 NRC Docket No. 50-390 License Amendment Request and Response to Request for Additional Information Related to Carbon Dioxide Fire Suppression Systems EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED CHANGEENCLOSURE Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 NRC Docket No. 50-390 License Amendment Request and Response to Request for Additional Information Related to Carbon Dioxide Fire Suppression Systems EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED CHANGE EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSTED CHANGE

Subject:

License Amendment Request and Response to Request for Additional Information Related to Carbon Dioxide Fire Suppression System (TAC No. ME0876)1.0

SUMMARY

DESCRIPTION This evaluation supports a license amendment request (LAR) to amend Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 (Reference

1) for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN), Unit 1.The proposed change would revise WBN's Unit 1 license by adding an exception to Operating License Condition 2.F regarding the provisions of the Fire Protection Program.This change is necessary to resolve a discrepancy between WBN's Fire Protection Report (FPR) (Ref. 2) and the NRC's Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER)No. 18 (NUREG-0847), "Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos.

50-390 and 50-391 ," (Ref. 3) related to the carbon dioxide (CO 2) fire suppression system in the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room.The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) requests approval of this license amendment by October 30, 2010. Implementation of the amendment will be completed within 30 days of NRC approval.2.0 DETAILED DESCRIPTION The automatic fire suppression systems at WBN Unit 1, are designed to extinguish a fire or control and minimize the effects of a fire until the fire brigade can respond and extinguish it. For the automatic total-flooding CO 2 suppression systems, a signal from either the fire detection system or a push button station activates the area alarms, CO 2 discharge timer which actuates the master control valve and the area selector valve permitting the CO 2 to be discharged into the selected area. In addition, the system can be manually operated via the electro-manual pilot valve for each hazard protected and the electro-manual valve at the storage tank. Personnel safety is considered by providing the pre-discharge alarm to notify anyone in the area that CO 2 is going to be discharged and by the addition of an odorizer to the CO 2 to warn personnel that CO 2 has been discharged. Actuation of the CO 2 system causes selective closure of dampers. This prevents spread of the fire and ensures that the minimum concentration of CO 2 is maintained. Full discharge tests for representative rooms in conjunction with door fan pressurization tests have been conducted to validate CO 2 concentration and soak times. The duration of the discharge is determined by the area requirements and is controlled by the discharge timer.The WBN Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room contains the Reactor Protection System (RPS) for Unit 1. The Auxiliary Instrument Room is located in the Control Building at elevation 708.0. Alternative safe shutdown was selected for the Auxiliary Instrument Room and a CO 2 suppression system was installed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.3. The CO 2 suppression system was required to be designed in accordance with National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 12, "Standard for Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems," 1973 Edition (NFPA 12 -1973) (Ref. 4); and the Watts Bar FPR as approved in NUREG-0847, Supplement 18.E-2 EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSTED CHANGE

Subject:

License Amendment Request and Response to Request for Additional Information Related to Carbon Dioxide Fire Suppression System (TAC No. ME0876) -1.0

SUMMARY

DESCRIPTION This evaluation supports a license amendment request (LAR) to amend Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 (Reference

1) for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN), Unit 1. The proposed change would revise WBN's Unit 1 license by adding an exception to Operating License Condition 2.F regarding the provisions of the Fire Protection Program. This change is necessary to resolve a discrepancy between WBN's Fire Protection Report (FPR) (Ref. 2) and the NRC's Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER) No. 18 (NUREG-0847), "Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-390 and 50-391," (Ref. 3) related to the carbon dioxide (C0 2) fire suppression system in the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room. The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) requests approval of this license amendment by October 30, 2010. Implementation of the amendment will be completed within 30 days of NRC approval. . 2.0 DETAILED DESCRIPTION The automatic fire suppression systems at WBN Unit 1, are designed to extinguish a fire or control and minimize the effects of a fire until the fire brigade can respond and extinguish it. For the automatic total-flooding CO 2 suppression systems, a signal from either the fire detection system or a push button station activates the area alarms, CO 2 discharge timer which actuates the master control valve and the area selector valve permitting the CO 2 to be discharged into the selected area. In addition, the system can be manually operated via the electro-manual pilot valve for each hazard protected and the electro-manual valve at the storage tank. Personnel safety is considered by providing the pre-discharge alarm to notify anyone in the area that CO 2 is going to be discharged and by the addition of an odorizer to the CO 2 to warn personnel that CO 2 has been discharged.

Actuation of the CO 2 system causes selective closure of dampers. This prevents spread of the fire and ensures that the minimum concentration of CO 2 is maintained. Full discharge tests for representative rooms in conjunction with door fan pressurization tests have been conducted to validate CO 2 concentration and soak times. The duration of the discharge is determined by the area requirements and is controlled by the discharge timer. The WBN Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room contains the Reactor Protection System (RPS) for Unit 1. The Auxiliary Instrument Room is located in the Control Building at . elevation 708.0. Alternative safe shutdown was selected for the Auxiliary Instrument Room and a CO 2 suppression system was installed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.3. The CO 2 suppression system was required to be designed in accordance with National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 12, "Standard for Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems," 1973 Edition (NFPA 12-1973) (Ref. 4); and the Watts Bar FPR as approved in NUREG-0847, Supplement

18. E-2 WBN's FPR describes the design basis for the automatic total-flooding CO 2 suppression systems protecting the Auxiliary Instrument Rooms as follows: "Auxiliary Instrument Rooms -Deep seated fires. Must achieve 30%concentration with 2 minutes, 50% concentration within 7 minutes, and maintain at least 45% concentration for at least 15 minutes." However, NUREG-0847, Supplement 18, describes the design basis for the CO 2 suppression systems protecting the Auxiliary Instrument Rooms as follows: "Auxiliary Instrument Rooms -

the primary fire hazard is cables and is considered a deep-seated fire source; therefore, the system must achieve a 30-percent concentration within 2 minutes and 50-percent concentration within 7 minutes after system discharge. In addition, the leakage from the room must be limited and the system must maintain at least a 50-percent concentration for 15 minutes;" NFPA 12 -1973 (the code of record for WBN), does not specify a definite hold time, or soak time, for CO 2 concentration, but states: "For deep seated fires, the required extinguishing concentration shall be maintained for a sufficient period of time to allow the smoldering to be extinguished and the material to cool to a point at which reignition will not occur when the inert atmosphere is dissipated." By letter dated May 10, 1995 (Ref. 5), the NRC requested additional information regarding the CO 2 fire suppression system design after Inspection Report (IR)50-390/95-16 (Ref. 6) had identified discrepancies in the design and testing of the system. By letter dated May 26, 1995 (Ref. 7), TVA replied to the NRC's request and provided a detailed justification regarding the adequacy of the WBN CO 2 fire suppression systems in the Auxiliary Instrument Rooms. As part of this justification, TVA agreed to: "...revise the design description for the CO 2 system supplying the auxiliary instrument rooms (Units 1 and 2) to include a minimum soak time. The soak time will be to maintain CO 2 concentration greater than 45% for at least 15 minutes." When published in October of 1995, NUREG-0847, Supplement 18, approved the WBN FPR and correctly stated the performance requirements for the CO 2 fire suppression system provided for the Auxiliary Instrument Rooms -except that it specified that the system would maintain a 50% CO 2 concentration for 15 minutes. This discrepancy between the SSER and the WBN FPR was not recognized by TVA until July of 2007, when IR 07-07 (Ref. 8) identified Unresolved Item (URI) 05000390/2007007-01, "C0 2 System in FA [Fire Area] 48 Appears to Deviate From Design Criterion in SSER." In February of 2009, the NRC identified Non-Cited Violation (NCV) 05000390/2008005-04 (Ref. 9) regarding this issue because the CO 2 fire suppression system did not meet the SSER approved concentration for the entire Auxiliary Instrument Room. WBN test records indicate that while a 50% CO 2 concentration is maintained for 15 minutes in the lower half of the room, at three quarters of the room's height, only a 45% CO 2 concentration is maintained for 15 minutes. Although the performance of the WBN Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room CO 2 suppression system meets the requirements of the WBN FPR and NFPA 12 -1973, the system does not provide a 50% CO 2 concentration for the entire room for 15 minutes as specified in Supplement 18 to NUREG-0847. E-3 WBN's FPR describes the design basis for the automatic total-flooding CO 2 suppression systems protecting the Auxiliary Instrument Rooms as follows: "Auxiliary Instrument Rooms -Deep seated fires. Must achieve 30% concentration with 2 minutes, 50% concentration within 7 minutes, and maintain at least 45% concentration for at least 15 minutes." However, NUREG-0847, Supplement 18, describes the design basis for the CO 2 suppression systems protecting the Auxiliary Instrument Rooms as follows: "Auxiliary Instrument Rooms -the primary fire hazard is cables and is considered a deep-seated fire source; therefore, the system must achieve a 30-percent concentration within 2 minutes and 50-percent concentration within 7 minutes after system discharge. In addition, the leakage from the room must be limited and the system must maintain at least a 50-percent concentration for 15 minutes;" NFPA 12 -1973 (the code of record for WBN), does not specify a definite hold time, or soak time, for CO 2 concentration, but states: "For deep seated fires, the required extinguishing concentration shall be maintained for a sufficient period of time to allow the smoldering to be extinguished and the material to cool to a point at which reignition will not occur when the inert atmosphere is dissipated." By letter dated May 10, 1995 (Ref. 5), the NRC requested additional information regarding the CO 2 fire suppression system design after Inspection Report (IR) . 50-390/95-16 (Ref. 6) had identified discrepancies in the design and testing of the system. By letter dated May 26, 1995 (Ref. 7), TVA replied to the NRC's request and provided a detailed justification regarding the adequacy of the WBN CO 2 fire suppression systems in the Auxiliary Instrument Rooms. As part of this justification, TVA agreed to: " ... revise the design description for the CO 2 system supplying the auxiliary instrument rooms (Units 1 and 2) to include a minimum soak time. The soak time will be to maintain CO 2 concentration greater than 45% for at least 15 minutes." When published in October of 1995, NUREG-0847, Supplement 18, approved the WBN FPR and correctly stated the performance requirements for the CO 2 fire suppression system provided for the Auxiliary Instrument Rooms -except that it specified that the system would maintain a 50% CO 2 concentration for 15 minutes. This discrepancy between the SSER and the WBN FPR was not recognized by TVA until July of 2007, when IR 07-07 (Ref. 8) identified Unresolved Item (URI) 05000390/2007007-01, "C0 2 System in FA [Fire Area] 48 Appears to Deviate From Design Criterion in SSER." In February of 2009, the NRC identified Non-Cited Violation (NCV) 05000390/2008005-04 (Ref. 9) regarding this issue because the CO 2 fire suppression system did not meet the SSER approved concentration for the entire Auxiliary Instrument Room. WBN test records indicate that while a 50% CO 2 concentration is maintained for 15 minutes in the lower half of the room, at three quarters of the room's height, only a 45% CO 2 concentration is maintained for 15 minutes. Although the performance of the WBN Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room CO 2 suppression system meets the requirements of the WBN FPR and NFPA 12 -1973, the system does not provide a 50% CO 2 concentration for the entire room for 15 minutes as specified in Supplement 18 to NUREG-0847. E-3 In order to resolve the discrepancy between the WBN FPR, NUREG-0847, and the system performance characteristics, TVA proposes to revise WBN Unit 1 Operating License Condition 2.F to reflect the design bases for the C02 suppression system provided for the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room, which is as follows: Auxiliary Instrument Room -The primary fire hazard is considered a deep-seated fire source; therefore, the system must achieve a 30%concentration within 2 minutes and 50% concentration within 7 minutes after system discharge. In addition, the leakage from the room must be limited and the system must maintain at least a 45% concentration for 15 minutes.As a result of the incorporation by reference of Supplement 18 of the SER, LicenseCondition 2.F currently requires the C02 system to maintain a 50% concentration for 15 minutes. License Condition 2.F currently states: "TVA shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Fire Protection Report for the facility, as approved in Supplements 18 and 19 of the SER (NUREG-0847) subject to the following provision: TVA may make changes to the approved fire protection program without prior approval of the Commission, only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire." TVA proposes that License Condition 2.F be modified to read as follows: TVA shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Fire Protection Report for the facility, as approved in Supplements 18 and 19 of the SER (NUREG-0847), except for carbon dioxide concentration requirements for the low-pressure total-flooding carbon dioxide system provided for the Unit I Auxiliary Instrument Room which are as approved in Safety Evaluation [##], dated [MONTH] [##], 20[##], subject to the following provision: TVA may make changes to the approved fire protection program without prior approval of the Commission, only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.Attachments 1 and 2 provide the marked up Facility Operating License pages and the final, clean Facility Operating License pages, respectively. As indicated in the description of the above proposed license condition, the requested change for a 45%concentration will only be applicable to the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room. The discussion in SSER 18 addressed both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Auxiliary Instrument Rooms and the Unit 2 room does contain equipment required for Unit 1 operation. However, the results of Special Performance Test (SPT) SPT-039-02, "C02 Fire Protection for Unit I and Unit 2 Aux Instrument Rooms," (Attachment 3), which was performed in July 1995, indicates that the Unit 2 Auxiliary Instrument Room will maintain a concentration of>_ 50% for 15 minutes. Therefore, the concentration level stated in SSER 18 remains applicable to the Unit 2 Auxiliary Instrument Room.E-4 In order to resolve the discrepancy between the WBN FPR, NUREG-0847, and the system performance characteristics, TVA proposes to revise WBN Unit 1 Operating License Condition 2.F to reflect the design bases for the CO 2 suppression system provided for the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room, which is as follows: Auxiliary Instrument Room -The primary fire hazard is considered a deep-seated fire source; therefore, the system must achieve a 30% concentration within 2 minutes and 50% concentration within 7 minutes after system discharge. In addition, the leakage from the room must be limited and the system must maintain at least a 45% concentration for 15 minutes. As a result of the incorporation by reference of Supplement 18 of the SER, License Condition 2.F currently requires the CO 2 system to maintain a 50% concentration for 15 minutes. License Condition 2.F currently states: "TVA shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Fire Protection Report for the facility, as approved in Supplements 18 and 19 of the SER (NUREG-0847) subject to the following provision: TVA may make changes to the approved fire protection program without prior approval of the Commission, only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire." TVA proposes that License Condition 2.F be modified to read as follows: TVA shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Fire Protection Report for the facility, as approved in Supplements 18 and 19 of the SER (NUREG-0847), except for carbon dioxide concentration requirements for the low-pressure total-flooding carbon dioxide system provided for the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room which are as approved in Safety Evaluation [##], dated [MONTH] [##], 20[##], subjectto the following provision: TVA may make changes to the approved fire protection program without prior approval of the Commission, only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire. Attachments 1 and 2 provide the marked up Facility Operating License pages and the final, clean Facility Operating License pages, respectively. As indicated in the description of the above proposed license condition, the requested change for a 45% concentration will only be applicable to the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room. The discussion in SSER 18 addressed both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Auxiliary Instrument Rooms and the Unit 2 room does contain equipment required for Unit 1 operation. However, the results of Special Performance Test (SPT) SPT-039-02, "C0 2 Fire Protection for Unit 1 and Unit 2 Aux Instrument Rooms," (Attachment 3), which was performed in July 1995, indicates that the Unit 2 Auxiliary Instrument Room will maintain a concentration of 50% for 15 minutes. Therefore, the concentration level stated in SSER 18 remains applicable to the Unit 2 Auxiliary Instrument Room. E-4 3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION NUREG-1805, "Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs): Quantitative Fire Hazard Analysis Methods for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program," (Ref. 13) states that "...most surface burning and open flame will stop when the concentration of C02 in the air reaches about 20-percent or less by volume." NUREG-1805 also notes that considerable margin is built into the 50% C02 design concentration required in NFPA 12-1973 (Ref. 4). Testing in the WBN Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room has demonstrated that the C02 suppression system provides a 45% C02 concentration in the upper portion of the room for an extended period of time (25 minutes per test data). In the lower portion of the room, where the majority of the combustible loading is located, testing has shown that a 50% C02 concentration is maintained for 25 minutes. TVA has also reviewed C02 suppression system test data from Sandia National Laboratory and concluded that Sandia National Laboratory's test data is consistent with TVA's determination that a 45% C02 concentration for 15 minutes is adequate to extinguish a deep-seated fire.The following subsections provide the detailed technical basis for the proposed change, as well as TVA's response to the NRC's Request for Additional Information (RAI)documented in a letter from the NRC to TVA dated July 15, 2009 (Ref. 10).3.1 Adequacy of 45% CO 2 Concentration Information Notice (IN) 92-28 (Ref. 11) cites Sandia National Laboratory's determination that, for deep seated cable fires, it is necessary to retain a 50% concentration of C02 for a minimum soak time of 15 minutes to extinguish fully developed fires. The results of Sandia's testing was documented in NUREG/CR-3656, "Evaluation of Suppression Methods for Electrical Cable Fires," dated October 1986. (Ref. 12) Although neither of these documents are part of the WBN Unit 1 design or licensing basis, an examination of the Sandia test methodologies and a comparison of the Sandia tests to the C02 suppression system for the WBN Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room, substantiate TVA's position that a 45% C02 concentration for 15 minutes in the WBN Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room, is adequate to provide extinguishment of a deep seated fire. This section also responds to NRC RAI 1.NRC RAI 1: TVA letter, dated March 24, 2009 (ML090840302), Enclosure 1, page E1-1, states that,"Contrary to the above, since receipt of the operating license on February 7, 1996, until the present, the C02 system for the auxiliary instrumentation room was not designed in accordance with the 1973 Edition of the NFPA [National Fire Protection Association] 12 and SSER No. 18, in that, the C02 system was unable to deliver and maintain a minimum gas concentration of 50 percent in the upper portion of the room for 15 minutes..." The NFPA 12 Standard on "Carbon Dioxide Extinguishment Systems," 1973 Edition, the Code of Record (COR) for WBN Unit 1 installation, Section 2421 specifies 50 percent design concentration for deep seated fire. Section 2232 statesi "For deep seated fires, the required extinguishing concentration shall be maintained for a sufficient period of E-5 3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION , NUREG-1805, "Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs): Quantitative Fire Hazard Analysis Methods for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program," (Ref. 13) states that "".most surface burning and open flame will stop when the concentration of CO 2 in the air reaches about 20-percent or less by volume." NUREG-1805 also notes that considerable margin is built into the 50% CO 2 design concentration required in NFPA 12-1973 (Ref. 4). Testing in the WBN Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room has demonstrated that the CO 2 suppression system provides a 45% CO 2 concentration in the upper portion of the room for an extended period of time (25 minutes per test data). In the lower portion of the room, where the majority of the combustible loading is located, testing has shown that a 50% CO 2 concentration is maintained for 25 minutes. TVA has also reviewed CO 2 suppression system test data from Sandia National Laboratory and concluded that Sandia National Laboratory's test data is consistent with TVA's determination that a 45% CO 2 concentration for 15 minutes is adequate to extinguish a deep-seated fire. The following subsections provide the detailed technical basis for the proposed change, as well as TVA's response to the NRC's Request for Additional Information (RAI) documented in a letter from the NRC to TVA dated July 15, 2009 (Ref. 10). 3.1 Adequacy of 45% CO 2 Concentration Information Notice (IN) 92-28 (Ref. 11) cites Sandia National Laboratory's determination that, for deep seated cable fires, it is necessary to retain a 50% concentration of CO 2 for a minimum soak time of 15 minutes to extinguish fully developed fires. The results of Sandia's testing was documented in NUREG/CR-3656, "Evaluation of Suppression Methods for Electrical Cable Fires," dated October 1986. (Ref. 12) Although neither of these documents are part of the WBN Unit 1 design or licensing basis, an examination of the Sandia test methodologies and a comparison of the Sandia tests to the CO 2 suppression system for the WBN Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room, substantiate TVA's position that a 45% CO 2 concentration for 15 minutes in the WBN Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room, is adequate to provide extinguishment of a deep seated fire. This section also responds to NRC RAI 1. NRC RA11: TVA letter, dated March 24, 2009 (ML090840302), Enclosure 1, page E1-1, states that, "Contrary to the above, since receipt of the operating license on February 7, 1996, until the present, the CO 2 system for the auxiliary instrumentation room was not designed in accordance with the 1973 Edition of the NFPA [National Fire Protection Association] 12 and SSER No. 18, in that, the CO 2 system was unable to deliver and maintain a minimum gas concentration of 50 percent in the upper portion of the room for 15 minutes ... " The NFPA12 Standard on "Carbon Dioxide Extinguishment Systems," 1973 Edition, the Code of Record (COR) for WBN Unit 1 installation, Section 2421 specifies 50 percent design concentration for deep seated fire. Section 2232 states; "For deep seated fires, the required extinguishing concentration shall be maintained for a sufficient period of E-5 time to allow the smoldering to be extinguished and material to cool to a point at which re-ignition will not occur when the inert atmosphere is dissipated..." Provide a basis for why you believe it is adequate for the total flooding automatic CO 2 fire suppression system installed in the Auxiliary Instrument Room to achieve a concentration of only 45 percent (rather than at least 50 percent) for 15 minutes in the upper portion.TVA Response: On July 16, 1995, TVA initiated Special Performance Test (SPT) SPT-039-02, "CO 2 Fire Protection for Unit 1 and Unit 2 Aux Instrument Rooms," in order to confirm that the 45%CO 2 concentration could be sustained for greater than 15 minutes in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Auxiliary Instrument Rooms as specified in the CO 2 system design basis.SPT-039-02 (Attachment

3) was completed on July 23, 1995, and confirmed that 45%could in fact be sustained for 15 minutes as agreed upon by letter dated May 26, 1995 (Ref. 7).Sandia National Laboratory's testing of CO 2 fire suppression systems included the 5 tests summarized in TVA Table 1 (Sandia Table 14), below.Carbon Dioxide Fire Suppression Tents. NFPA-12-Number Orientation -Type Durations of Soakt)Test of of of Initiation Time:'mb a -Tray$ C"bl Fire.Expoouxe (min', Test Outcome 83 5 H 0 1 18-min burn 10 Reignited when ventilated 84 5 H Q I 16-min burn 15 Noreignitton.

trays smoking 85 5 H V .5,.5-mmn burn 10 No reignition after ventilation e8 S V ' 1 17-min burn 1i No reignition, trays smoking 91 5 V U I 5-mmn burn L0 No reignition after ventilationw Legend: H -Horizontal cable trays V -Vertical cable trays Q -Qualified IREE-383 cable U -Unqualified cable aLength of time that propane burners were on.bLength. of time that the ventilation system was turned ofl! and the stack cover closed.Table 1 -Sandia C0 2 Fire Suppression Tests Based upon review and comparison of the SPT-039-02 test data and the Sandia National Laboratory's test data, TVA concludes that the extinguishing concentration of 45% for 15 minutes in the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room is sufficient for the total flooding automatic CO 2 fire suppression system for the following reasons: A. The results of Sandia Tests #83 and # 85 demonstrate that concentrations lower than 50% are effective in providing extinguishment for deep-seated cable tray fires.TVA Figures 1 and 2 (Sandia Figures 36 and 37, respectively) show CO 2 concentration as a function of time for Sandia Tests #83 and #85. In Sandia Test #83 (Qualified Cables), the total time that CO 2 concentration was at or E-6 time to allow the smoldering to be extinguished and material to cool to a point at which re-ignition will not occur when the inert atmosphere is dissipated ... " Provide a basis for why you believe it is adequate for the total flooding automatic CO 2 fire suppression system installed in the Auxiliary Instrument Room to achieve a concentration of only 45 percent (rather than at least 50 percent) for 15 minutes in the upper portion. TVA Response: On July 16, 1995, TVA initiated Special Performance Test (SPT) SPT-039-02, "C0 2 Fire Protection for Unit 1 and Unit 2 Aux Instrument Rooms," in order to confirm that the 45% CO 2 concentration could be sustained for greater than 15 minutes in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Auxiliary Instrument Rooms as specified in the CO 2 system design basis. SPT-039-02 (Attachment

3) was completed on July 23,1995, and confirmed that 45% could in fact be sustained for 15 minutes as agreed upon by letter 9ated May 26, 1995 (Ref. 7). Sandia National Laboratory's testing of CO 2 fire suppression systems included the 5 tests summarized in TVA Table 1 (Sandia Table 14), below. Carbon Dioxide Pire suppression Testa. Nl"PA-12 ,Bulllbet Orientation ,Type Duration a of Solik b , Teet oC oC oC 'Initiatioll Timo.' ,IIOal!:1! lllOe,liIl11!ORl!(e

..tm1n:'. " IllS!, Ql!tcome B3 5 H 0 1 19-1IIiD burn 10 Reignited when ventilated 84 5 H 0 1 16-iDiD \Ium 15 No'reignition. trays SMoking 85 5 H U 1. 5,.5""min burn 10 No , relgnitlon aCter ventl1ation 88 S V O* 1 17-lIIiD burn 15 No reignit1on. trays smoking 91 5 V U 1. 5-lIIiD burn 10 No reigni tion-after ventilation' Legend: H -Horizontal cable trays v -Vertical, c,able trays o -Qualified IEEE-3a3 cable U .. cable aLength oC time tllat, propane butllers were bt.ength of time ,that ttie ventUation systelll was tume/! and the etack cover close/!. Table 1 -Sandia CO 2 Fire Suppression Tests Based upon review and comparison of the SPT-039-02 test data and the Sandia National Laboratory's test data, TVA concludes that the extinguishing concentration of 45% for 15 minutes in the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room is sufficient for the total flooding automatic CO 2 fire suppression system for the following reasons: A. The results of Sandia Tests #83 and # 85 demonstrate that concentrations lower than 50% are effective in providing extinguishment for deep-seated cable tray fires. TVA Figures 1 and 2 (Sandia Figures 36 and 37, respectively) show CO 2 concentration as a function of time for Sandia Tests #83 and #85. In Sandia Test #83 (Qualified Cables), the total time that CO 2 concentration was at or E-6 above 50% was approximately 7 minutes -for approximately 3 minutes following the initial discharge and for approximately 4 minutes following the second discharge. The concentration was below 50% for almost 2 minutes before the second discharge returned the concentration to above 50%. For Sandia Test #85 (Unqualified Cables), the total time that the CO 2 concentration was at or above 50% was approximately 8 minutes -for approximately 6 minutes following the initial discharge and for approximately 2 minutes following the second discharge. The concentration was below 50% for slightly less than one minute before the second discharge returned the concentration to above 50%.6s 0 z 0J U 20 TIME (MIN)Figure 1 -Sandia Test #83 CO 2 Concentration Results X.z 0 z 0A U 60 59 40 36 28 18 TEST 0 as IMLNRLIFIED CROLE----TR L --- -- -- -- -- .................

P1-I B8 18 28 TIME (MIN)38 48 Figure 2 -Sandia Test #85 CO 2 Concentration Results E-7 Z 0 1-1 I-a: (t: I-Z W u Z 0 U above 50% was approximately 7 minutes -for approximately 3 minutes following the initial discharge and for approximately 4 minutes following the second discharge. The concentration was below 50% for almost 2 minutes before the second discharge returned the concentration to above 50%. Fo r Sandia Test #85 (Unqualified Cables), the total time that the CO 2 concentration was at or above 50% was approximately 8 minutes -for approximately 6 minutes following the initial discharge and for approximately 2 minutes following the second discharge. The concentration was below 50% for slightly less than one minute before the second d i scharge returned the concentration to above 50%. TEST

83 50 ........ o .... o ...*

.. _ ..*. -**.. -. -.. -.. . 40 30 20 10 OURLIFIED CABLE HORIZONTAL, S-TRAY 20 T IME (MIN) w IE {5 III ... Q N 0 '" Figure 1 -Sandia Test #83 CO 2 Concentration Results 50 TEST

85 .. S0 ......... .... _ ..... !. .........

_.00 ** 0 UNQURLIFIED CABLE : : 40 ....*..... *"ROIUZONTAt.:

-"5: 'TRAY* .. -*1* 0 ***** -***** Z 30 o H I-20 Z W 10 o U ... ... H 3 ... TIME Figure 2 -Sandia Test #85 CO 2 Concentration Results E-7 40 U Li 2: '4 F_For qualified cables (Test

83), re-ignition did occur, but only after ventilation was restored.

TVA Figure 3 (Sandia Figure 34) shows the cable tray temperature against time during Test #83. According to the test report,ventilation during this sequence was reestablished at approximately the 39-minute mark, approximately 10 minutes after initiation of the CO 2 discharge, and approximately 8 minutes after the actual discharge began. TVA Figure 3shows that the cable tray temperatures declined continuously from the time C02was discharged until ventilation was reestablished, and that the rate of decline was not appreciably affected by the reduction in C02 concentration to 45%before ventilation was reestablished. Bea C/ALE TRAY 5RCU 609 TEST / 3.\ ,,- \/I "- /".OQUALIF'IEDB CABLE* I-HORIZONTHL, 5 TARY 498 1.1 31 40 50 B TIME (MIN)Figure 3 -Sandia Test #83 Cable Temperature Results For horizontal and vertical fully developed cable tray fires with IEEE 383-qualified cables, NUREG/CR-3656 specifies a required soak time of 15 minutes. While 15 minutes at 50% concentration will clearly be sufficient, as discussed above, the actual test data indicates that lower concentrations for at least part of the timecan be effective. For unqualified cables (Test # 85), no re-ignition occurred when ventilation was restored after 10 minutes, while the C02 concentration was only at or above 50%for a total of 8 minutes. The temperature results for Test #85 also support the conclusion that a concentration less than 50% will be effective in extinguishing deep-seated cable tray fires. TVA Figure 4 (Sandia Figure 35) shows cable temperatures for unqualified cables (Test #85) as a function of time.E-8 U W Ir w a. x: w For qualified cables (Test # 83), re-ignition did occur, but only after ventilation was restored. TVA Figure 3 (Sandia Figure 34) shows the cable tray temperature against time during Test #83. According to the test report, ventilation during this sequence was reestablished at approximately the 39-minute mark, approximately 10 minutes after initiation of the CO 2 discharge, and approximately 8 minutes after the actual discharge began. TVA Figure 3 shows that the cable tray temperatures declined continuously from the time CO 2 was discharged until ventilation was reestablished, and that the rate of decline was not appreciably affected by the reduction in CO 2 concentration to 45% before ventilation was reestablished. -BBB ... SBB ... 4BB ... Z 1:11 ... 2BB B B 1B 2B SB TIME Figure 3 -Sandia Test #83 Cable Temperature Results For horizontal and vertical fully developed cable tray fires with IEEE 383-qualified cables, NUREG/CR-3656 specifies a required soak time of 15 minutes. While 15 minutes at 50% concentration will clearly be sufficient, as discussed above, the actual test data indicates that lower concentrations for at least part of the time can be effective. For unqualified cables (Test # 85), no re-ignition occurred when ventilation was restored after 10 minutes, while the CO 2 concentration was only at or above 50% for a total of 8 minutes. The temperature results for Test #85 also support the conclusion that a concentration less than 50% will be effective in extinguishing deep-seated cable tray fires. TVA Figure 4 (Sandia Figure 35) shows cable temperatures for unqualified cables (Test #85) as a function of time. E-8 5U0 400 I UNOURLIFIED CRBLE 300 / /HORIZONTRL. 5-TRqN'300 zCENTERED w B6 / I a-::3 00 I Li] I oN .-- -o I- u 6 J 1 ---. --i 1 L 1 ._ _ , " IL_ ,, , , 0 10 20 3a 40 TIME (MIN)Figure 4 -Sandia Test #85 Cable Temperature Results Note that temperatures continued to decrease after the 27th minute of the test when ventilation had already been restored and CO 2 concentration was below 50%. C02 concentration was below 45% just prior to the 29th minute of the test, and the rate of temperature decline was again not appreciably affected. It can also be seen that the sudden drop in C02 concentration, to approximately 47%around the 25th minute of the test, did not appreciably affect the rate of temperature decline.NFPA 12 -1973 does specify a 50% design concentration for deep seated fires;however, it does not specify an extinguishing concentration nor a soak time for the design concentration. NFPA 12 -1973 specifies that the C02 concentration shall reach 30% in 2 minutes and the design concentration of 50% within 7 minutes. SPT-039-02 demonstrated that the C02 fire suppression system for the Watts Bar Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room meets and exceeds the requirements of NFPA 12 -1973.TVA Figure 5 is an enhanced version of the strip chart from SPT-039-02 for the C02 concentrations in the upper portion of the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room (14.75 ft.). Figure 5 and Data Sheet 8.2 of SPT-039-02 (see Attachment

3) showthat the C02 concentrations in the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room exceeded the test acceptance criteria of reaching 32% within 2 minutes (reached 44%), 52% within 7 minutes (reached 56%), and holding _> 47% for 15 minutes (maintained 47% for 15 minutes). (The additional 2% compensated for instrument accuracy of plus or minus 2%.)E-9 4BB TEST. as CARBON DIOXIDE UNQURLIFIED CRBLE HORIZONTAL.

5-TRAY u 3BB z o .. .... .. CENTERED " /1111 W Q: " TRAY :J 21313 ..... H a: r:r w HIB w ..... e __ ...L-__L_---' B 113 2B 38 48 TIME (MIN) Figure 4 -Sandia Test #85 Cable Temperature Results Note that temperatures continued to decrease after the 27th minute of the test when ventilation had already been restored and CO 2 concentration was below 50%. CO 2 concentration was below 45% just prior to the 29th minute of the test, and the rate of temperature decline was again not appreciably affected. It can also be seen that the sudden drop in CO 2 concentration, to approximately 47% around the 25th minute of the test, did not appreciably affect the rate of temperature decline. NFPA 12 -1973 does specify a 50% design concentration for deep seated fires; however, it does not specify an extinguishing concentration nor a soak time for the design concentration. NFPA 12 -1973 specifies that the CO 2 concentration shall reach 30% in 2 minutes and the design concentration of 50% within 7 minutes. SPT -039-02 demonstrated that the CO 2 fire suppression system for the Watts Bar Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room meets and exceeds the requirements of NFPA 12 -1973. TVA Figure 5 is an enhanced version of the strip chart from SPT-039-02 for the CO 2 concentrations in the upper portion of the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room (14.75 ft.). Figure 5 and Data Sheet 8.2 of SPT-039-02 (see Attachment

3) show that the CO 2 concentrations in the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room exceeded the test acceptance criteria of reaching 32% within 2 minutes (reached 44%), 52% within 7 minutes (reached 56%), and holding 47% for 15 minutes (maintained 47% for 15 minutes). (The additional 2% compensated for instrument accuracy of plus or minus 2%.) E-9

........-. r ~P~M* "- .:- = ::_-. .: -, --:- ..PM' ::.". ... -t- .. ..-.r.... _--._...... .... ., Figure 5 -Enhanced Strip Chart Recording from SPT-039-02 TVA also finds it compelling that while the total time CO 2 concentration remained above 50% for Sandia Tests #83 and #85 was 7 minutes and 8 minutes, respectively, the performance characteristics of the WBN Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room CO 2 suppression system are such that CO 2 concentration is maintained above 50% for almost 9 minutes (from approximately 2.5 minutes to 11.5 minutes after discharge) without a second discharge. It is also important to note that, during SPT-039-02, a 45% CO 2 concentration was maintained for almost 25 minutes in the Unit I Auxiliary Instrument Room (see Figure 5).Furthermore, maintaining a CO 2 concentration greater than 45% in the upper portion of the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room means that the overall volumetric room concentration is higher than 45%, since CO 2 is approximately 50% heavier than air. The strip charts from SPT-039-02 for the CO 2 concentrations at 2 ft.and 8.67 ft. above the floor show that the CO 2 concentrations at these heights remained greater than 50% for the duration of the test (approximately 25 minutes).B. The WBN Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room is tighter than those in Sandia Tests #83 and #85.NFPA 12 -1973, Section 222, "Leakage and Ventilation," states: "Since the efficiency of carbon dioxide systems depends upon the maintenance of an extinguishing concentration of carbon dioxide, leakage of gas from the space shall be kept to a minimum and compensated for by applying extra gas." NUREG-1805 (Ref. 13) also notes the significance of the room tightness and states, "The integrity of the enclosure is a very important part of total flooding, particularly if the hazard has a potential for deep-seated fire." However, it can be seen from the rapid decay of CO 2 concentration shown in TVA Figures 1 and 2 that the Sandia test room was not an airtight room. For Sandia Test #83, the CO 2 concentration decreased approximately 13% in 2 minutes (from an initial peak of 58% to approximately 45%); and for Sandia Test #85, the CO 2 concentration decrease approximately 10% in less than 1 minute (from an initial E-1 0(I "1 '1'-;' '-1 ..J -:-. '-:-iQ:'Ii 1 ' -:-: 'J' ... _; ***'t: I:.. .. -. -., '11"1';$"1-----. -:UB -***-1F-m .... i,--*. '. 1 l' J' , I . ., Ie' \ .. . . .. Figure 5 -Enhanced Strip Chart Recording from SPT -039-02 TVA also finds it compelling that while the total time CO 2 concentration remained above 50% for Sandia Tests #83 and #85 was 7 minutes and 8 minutes, respectively, the performance characteristics of the WBN Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room CO 2 suppression system are such that CO 2 concentrat i on is maintained above 50% for almost 9 minutes (from approximately 2.5 minutes to 11.5 minutes after discharge) without a second discharge. It is also important to note that, during SPT-039-02, a 45% CO 2 concentration was mainta i ned for almost 25 minutes in the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room (see Figure 5). Furthermore, maintaining a CO 2 concentration greater than 45% in the upper portion of the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room means that the overall volumetric room concentration is higher than 45%, since CO 2 is approximately 50% heavier than air. The strip charts from SPT-039-02 for the CO 2 concentrations at 2 ft. and 8.67 ft. above the floor show that the CO 2 concentrations at these heights remained greater than 50% for the duration of the test (approximately 25 minutes). B. The WBN Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room is tighter than those in Sandia Tests #83 and #85. NFPA 12 -1973, Section 222, " Leakage and Ventilation," states: "Since the efficiency of carbon dioxide systems depends upon the maintenance of an extinguishing concentration of carbon dioxide , leakage of gas from the space shall be kept to a minimum and compensated for by applying extra gas." NUREG-1805 (Ref. 13) also notes the significance of the room tightness and states, "The integrity of the enclosure is a very important part of total flooding, particularly if the hazard has a potential for deep-seated fire." However, it can be seen from the rapid decay of CO 2 concentration shown in TVA Figures 1 and 2 that the Sandia test room was not an airtight room. For Sandia Test #83, the CO 2 concentration decreased approximately 13% in 2 minutes (from an initial peak of 58% to approximately 45%); and for Sandia Test #85, the CO 2 concentration decrease approximately 10% in less than 1 minute (from an initial E-10 peak of 58% to approximately 48%). Note that these decreases did occur before ventilation was restored in both Sandia tests. In comparison, the WBN C02 concentration tests demonstrated the tightness of the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room since the concentration only decreased approximately 10% in 11 minutes (from an initial peak of 57% at the 4-minute mark to 47% at the 15-minute mark).WBN door fan pressurization tests (Attachment

4) have also demonstrated that the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room is capable of maintaining tightness for an extended period of time.C. The WBN Unit I Auxiliary Instrument Room ventilation is restored later than in Sandia Tests #83 and #85; and, actual soak times for the WBN Auxiliary Instrument Room are calculated differently and more conservatively.

In Sandia Tests #83 and #85, ventilation was restored to the test room after 10 minutes. Only the cables in Test #83 reignited after ventilation was restored.The 10 minutes of soak time for the test, and the recommended 15 minutes of soak time, began when the demand for CO 2 was initiated and the ventilation system was turned off -approximately 2 minutes before the actual C02 discharge. The soak time ended when ventilation was restored.Ventilation for the WBN Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room is restored by site personnel manually resetting the CO 2 blow-off clips for each damper. These actions do not occur until the fire has been determined to be extinguished. Because of this process, the cables in the WBN Auxiliary Instrument Room will have more time to cool than those in the Sandia tests. Delaying ventilation restoration also contributes to the tightness of the room and the ability to maintain higher concentration levels of C02.The initial discharge of C02 for the WBN Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room begins 20-30 seconds after one detector from each detection zone has activated. Further discussion of the detection system is provided in TVA's response to NRC RAI 10. In Sandia Tests #83 and #85, the fire was fully developed and had beenallowed to burn for another minute before the suppression system was actuated.Again, although the soak time had begun, the actual C02 discharge did not occur for another 2 minutes. In comparison, the C02 system for the WBN Auxiliary Instrument Room discharges 20-30 seconds after actuation. This results in significant C02 concentration levels in the room for a greater portion of what NUREG/CR-3656 considers "soak time." Moreover, NUREG-1 805 (Ref. 13) provides additional guidance regarding the capabilities of C02 suppression systems. Section B.14.3, "Carbon Dioxide Fire Extinguishing Systems," states: "For deep-seated hazards, the minimum concentration is 50-percent of C02 by volume. This 50-percent design concentration is used for hazards involving electrical gear, wiring insulation, motors, and the like[.. .] It should be noted that most surface burning and open flaming will stop when the concentration of CO 2 in the air reaches about 20-percent or less by volume. Thus, it should be apparent that a considerable margin of safety is built into these minimum C0 2 concentrations E-11 peak of 58% to approximately 48%). Note that these decreases did occur before ventilation was restored in both Sandia tests. In comparison, the WBN CO 2 concentration tests demonstrated the tightness of the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room since the concentration only decreased approximately 10% in 11 minutes (from an initial peak of 57% at the 4-minute mark to 47% at the 15-minute mark). WBN door fan pressurization tests (Attachment

4) have also demonstrated that the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room is capable of maintaining tightness for an extended period of time. C. The WBN Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room ventilation is restored later than in Sandia Tests #83 and #85; and, actual soak times for the WBN Auxiliary Instrument Room are calculated differently and more conservatively.

In Sandia Tests #83 and #85, ventilation was restored to the test room after 10 minutes. Only the cables in Test #83 reignited after ventilation was restored. The 10 minutes of soak time for the test, and the recommended 15 minutes of soak time, began when the demand for CO 2 was initiated and the ventilation system was turned off -approximately 2 minutes before the actual CO 2 discharge. The soak time ended when ventilation was restored . . Ventilation for the WBN Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room is restored by site personnel manually resetting the CO 2 blow-off clips for each damper. These actions do not occur until the fire has been determined to be extinguished. Because of this process, the cables in the WBN Auxiliary Instrument Room will have more time to cool than those in the Sandia tests. Delaying ventilation restoration also contributes to the tightness of the room and the ability to maintain higher concentration levels of CO 2* The initial discharge of CO 2 for the WBN Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room begins 20-30 seconds after one detector from each detection zone has activated. Further discussion of the detection system is provided in TVA's response to NRC RA110. In Sandia Tests #83 and #85, the fire was fully developed and had been allowed to burn for another minute before the suppression system was actuated. Again, although the soak time had begun, the actual CO 2 discharge did not occur for another 2 minutes. In comparison, the CO 2 system for the WBN Auxiliary Instrument Room discharges 20-30 seconds after actuation. This results in significant CO 2 concentration levels in the room for a greater portion of what NUREG/CR-3656 considers "soak time." Moreover, NUREG-1805 (Ref. 13) provides additional guidance regarding the capabilities of CO 2 suppression systems. Section B.14.3, "Carbon Dioxide Fire Extinguishing Systems," states: "For deep-seated hazards, the minimum concentration is 50-percent of CO 2 by volume. This 50-percent design concentration is used for hazards involving electrical gear, wiring insulation, motors, and the like[ ... ] It should be noted that most surface burning and open flaming will stop when the concentration of CO 2 in the air reaches about 20-percent or less by volume. Thus, it should be apparent that a considerable margin of safety is built into these minimum CO 2 concentrations E-11 required by the standard [NFPA 12]. This is because those who developed the CO 2 standard never considered it sufficient to extinguish the flame. By contrast, the guidelines given in some of the standards for other gaseous extinguishing agents merely mandate concentrations that are sufficient to extinguish open flame but will not produce a truly inert atmosphere." [emphasis added]TVA's establishment of an extinguishing concentration of 45% is greater than double the 20% concentration for surface fires indicated in NUREG-1805. Extinguishing surface flames will also contribute to removal of heat from the fire.Considering all these factors, TVA has concluded that the 1978 designed automatic total-flooding CO 2 suppression system provided for the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room at WBN is adequately designed (with upgrades and as verified by tests in 1995) to extinguish a deep seated fire.Although TVA has considered the Sandia test results that were promulgated in NUREG/CR-3656, that NUREG is not part of TVA's design or licensing basis. Similarly, TVA evaluated IN 92-28, and concluded that it need not be incorporated into the WBN design or licensing basis.3.2 Safe Shutdown Implications NRC RAI 2: TVA letter, dated March 24, 2009, Enclosure 1, page E1-1, states that,"This section of Appendix R requires a fixed fire suppression system for the auxiliary instrumentation room area since it contains safe shutdown equipment and alternative safe shutdown was selected for this area..." WVA evaluation in a letter, dated March 24, 2009, did not discuss effects of fire damage on equipment required for safe-shutdown. Discuss the effects that fire damage would have on the equipment that is associated with cables likely to sustain damage, and provide a basis for adequacy of damage (i.e., provide a basis for determining that, in spite of damage, adequate safe-shutdown will be maintained). TVA Response: The Unit 1 and Unit 2 Auxiliary Instrument Rooms are located in the Control Building at elevation 708.0. An Appendix R fire in WBN's Control Building may require that the Control Building, including the Main Control Room (MCR), be abandoned. When this occurs, the plant will be shutdown from the Auxiliary Control Room (ACR). The Control Building is separated from the ACR and adjacent plant areas by 3-hour fire-rated barriers. WBN's Abnormal Operating Instructions (AOIs) direct the operator actions to isolate the ACR from the MCR, abandon the MCR, and implement the Fire Safe Shutdown actions once the MCR is abandoned. Additional information regarding the functions of the ACR may be found in Part IV,"Alternate Shutdown Capability," of the FPR. Provided below is information contained in E-1 2 required by the standard [NFPA 12]. This is because those who developed the CO 2 standard never considered it sufficient to extinguish the flame. By contrast, the guidelines given in some of the standards for other gaseous extinguishing agents merely mandate concentrations that are sufficient to extinguish open flame but will not produce a truly inert atmosphere." [emphasis added} . TVA's establishment of an extinguishing concentration of 45% is greater than double the 20% concentration for surface fires indicated in NUREG-1805. Extinguishing surface flames will also contribute to removal of heat from the fire. Considering all these factors, TVA has concluded that the 1978 designed automatic total-flooding CO 2 suppression system provided for the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room at WBN is adequately designed (with upgrades and as verified by tests in 1995) to extinguish a deep seated fire. Although TVA has considered the Sandia test results that were promulgated in NUREG/CR-3656, that NUREG is not part of TVA's design or licensing basis. Similarly, TVA evaluated IN 92-28, and concluded that it need not be incorporated into the WBN design or licensing basis. 3.2 Safe Shutdown Implications NRC RA12: TVA letter, dated March 24, 2009, Enclosure 1, page E1-1, states that, "This section of Appendix R requires a fixed fire suppression system for the auxiliary instrumentation room area since it contains safe shutdown equipment and alternative safe shutdown was selected for this area ... " TVA evaluation in a letter, dated March 24, 2009, did not discuss effects of fire damage on equipment required for safe-shutdown. Discuss the effects that fire damage would have on the equipment that is associated with cables likely to sustain damage, and provide a basis for adequacy of damage (Le., provide a basis for determining that, in spite of damage, adequate safe-shutdown will be maintained). TVA Response: The Unit 1 and Unit 2 Auxiliary Instrument Rooms are located in the Control Building at elevation 708.0. An Appendix R fire in WBN's Control Building may require that the Control Building, including the Main Control Room (MCR), be abandoned. When this occurs, the plant will be shutdown from the Auxiliary Control Room (ACR). The Control Building is separated from the ACR and adjacent plant areas by 3-hour fire-rated barriers. WBN's Abnormal Operating Instructions (AOls) direct the operator actions to isolate the ACR from the MCR, abandon the MCR, and implement the Fire Safe Shutdown actions once the MCR is abandoned. Additional information regarding the functions of the ACR may be found in Part IV, "Alternate Shutdown Capability," of the FPR. Provided below is information contained in E-12 Section 2.0, "Discussion," from Part IV of the FPR which summarizes the compliance ofthe design with applicable regulations and independence of the ACR (both physically and electrically) from the Control Building."In order to address situations requiring main control room abandonment, WBN's original design provided for an auxiliary control system. This system is located outside of the control building and is physically independent of the control building (control room, auxiliary instrument rooms, cable spreading room, etc.). The design provides appropriate means to isolate the necessary safe shutdown equipment and control features from the control building. The system is provided to satisfy General Design Criteria (GDC) 19 in Appendix A to 1 OCFR50 and 10CFR50 Appendix R Section III.G.3 and I1.1L criteria.In order to meet GDC 19 requirements, the auxiliary control system instrumentation and controls are physically remote from, and their circuits are electrically separated from, their counterparts in the main control room. In order to meet Appendix R requirements, the auxiliary control system is both physically and electrically independent of the control building. Redundant auxiliary control system capability is not required to meet either GDC 19 or Appendix R requirements." Based on the preceding, fire damage may occur to the equipment and cables located in the Auxiliary Instrument Room. However, the design of the plant separates the Control Building and therefore, the Auxiliary Instrument Room, from the ACR both physically and electrically. Consequently, a fire in the Auxiliary Instrument Room will not affect thecapability to safely shutdown WBN Unit 1.3.3 Previous NRC Review of 45% CO 2 Concentration NRC RAI 3: TVA letter, dated March 24, 2009, Enclosure 1, page E1-2, states that,"TVA will revise the system design description for the CO 2 system supplying the Auxiliary Instrument Rooms (Units 1 and 2) to include a minimum soak time. The soak time will be to maintain CO 2 concentration greater than 45% for at least 15 minutes. The revision will be completed by June 30,1995 ....." If the above commitment was incorporated in the WBN Unit 1 Fire Protection Report (FPR), the NRC staff requests that the TVA to provide copy of revised FPR pages with docketed date and revision number.TVA Response: Revision 3 of the FPR was approved on June 15, 1995. This revision revised Section 12.3.3, "Carbon Dioxide Suppression Systems," to add the following statement: "The design basis for the areas protected by C0 2 are as follows: E-1 3 Section 2.0, "Discussion," from Part IV of the FPR which summarizes the compliance of the design with applicable regulations and independence of the ACR (both physically and electrically) from the Control Building. "In order to address situations requiring main control room abandonment, WBN's original design provided for an auxiliary control system. This system is located outside of the control building and is physically independent of the control building (control room, auxiliary instrument rooms, cable spreading room, etc.). The design provides appropriate means to isolate the necessary safe shutdown equipment and control features from the control building. The system is provided to satisfy General Design Criteria (GDC) 19 in Appendix A to 10CFR50 and 10CFR50 Appendix R Section III.G.3 and III.L criteria. In order to meet GDC 19 requirements, the auxiliary control system instrumentation and controls are physically remote from, and their circuits are electrically separated from, their counterparts in the main control room. In order to meet Appendix R requirements, the auxiliary control system is both physically and electrically independent of the control building. Redundant auxiliary control system capability is not required to meet either GDC 19 or Appendix R requirements." Based on the preceding, fire damage may occur to the equipment and cables located in the Auxiliary Instrument Room. However, the design of the plant separates the Control Building and therefore, the Auxiliary Instrument Room, from the ACR both physically and electrically. Consequently, a fire in the Auxiliary Instrument Room will not affect the capability to safely shutdown WBN Unit 1. 3.3 Previous NRC Review of 45% CO 2 Concentration NRC RA13: TVA letter, dated March 24, 2009, Enclosure 1, page E1-2, states that, "TVA will revise the system design description for the CO 2 system supplying the Auxiliary Instrument Rooms (Units 1 and 2) to include a minimum soak time. The soak time will be to maintain CO 2 concentration greater than 45% for at least 15 minutes. The revision will be completed by June 30, 1995 .... " If the above commitment was incorporated in the WBN Unit 1 Fire Protection Report (FPR), the NRC staff requests that the TVA to provide copy of revised FPR pages with docketed date and revision number. TVA Response: Revision 3 of the FPR was approved on June 15, 1995. This revision revised Section 12.3.3, "Carbon Dioxide Suppression Systems," to add the following statement: "The design basis for the areas protected by CO 2 are as follows: E-13 Auxiliary Instrument Rooms -Deep seated fires. Must achieve 30% concentration within 2 minutes, 50% concentration within 7 minutes, and maintain at least 45% concentration for at least 15 minutes..." Revision 3 also revised Part X, "NFPA Code Evaluation," of the FPR to add the following statement: "2232 Comply Deep seated fire extinguishment does not specify the soak time and concentration levels required to be maintained. Where required, soak time of 15 minutes at 45% concentration is maintained." TVA's letter dated June 15, 1995 (Ref. 14), submitted Revision 3 of the FPR to NRC.This letter is listed in the Introduction Section of Appendix FF, "Safety Evaluation Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Program, Docket Nos. 50-390/391 ," of SSER 18.TVA's letter dated June 15, 1995, and the sections of Revision 3 of the FPR discussed above are provided in Attachment 5 to this enclosure. 3.4 Modifications and Inspections NRC RAI 4: TVA letter, dated March 24, 2009, Enclosure 1, page E1-2, states that,"The fact remains, however, that WBN's CO 2 gas suppression system was designed for and can achieve a 50% concentration after discharge in accordance with NFPA 12, 1973 Edition. It will also, as committed, maintain a concentration greater than 45% for at least 15 minutes..." Have any CO 2 system or other plant modifications, subsequent to the original discharge tests of the CO 2 fire suppression system, been made in the Auxiliary Instrument Room that could potentially affect CO 2 concentrations, such as CO 2 piping changes or timer adjustments or new room dampers or penetrations that might leak? If such modifications have been made, what subsequent testing or evaluation was performed to ensure that proper concentrations were maintained for the required soak time? If concentration decreased due to leakage, where does the CO 2 gas migrate and describe your evaluation on the effects to plant operation and operator actions.TVA Response: The configuration of the C0 2 piping and discharge outlets have not been modified sincethe discharge test discussed in TVA's response to NRC RAI 1 above was performed in July 1995. In addition, the detection system has not been modified from the tested configuration. In order to address the overall impact design changes and plant modifications made to equipment located in the Auxiliary Instrument Room may have had on the ability of the CO 2 system to suppress a deep seated fire, the following factorsshould be considered: E-14 Auxiliary Instrument Rooms -Deep seated fires. Must achieve 30% concentration within 2 minutes, 50% concentration within 7 minutes, and maintain at least 45% concentration for at least 15 minutes ... " Revision 3 also revised Part X, "NFPA Code Evaluation," of the FPR to add the following statement: "2232 Comply Deep seated fire extinguishment does not specify the soak time and concentration levels required to be maintained. Where required, soak time of 15 minutes at 45% concentration is maintained." TVA's letter dated June 15, 1995 (Ref. 14), submitted Revision 3 of the FPR to NRC. This letter is listed in the Introduction Section of Appendix FF, "Safety Evaluation Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Program, Docket Nos. 50-390/391," of SSER 18. TVA's letter dated June 15, 1995, and the sections of Revision 3 of the FPR discussed above are provided in Attachment 5 to this enclosure. 3.4 Modifications and Inspections NRC RA14: TVA letter, dated March 24, 2009, Enclosure 1, page E 1-2, states that, "The fact remains, however, that WBN's CO 2 gas suppression system was designed for and can achieve a 50% concentration after discharge in accordance with NFPA 12, 1973 Edition. It will also, as committed, maintain a concentration greater than 45% for at least 15 minutes ... " Have any CO 2 system or other plant modifications, subsequent to the original discharge tests of the CO 2 fire suppression system, been made in the Auxiliary Instrument Room that could potentially affect CO 2 concentrations, such as CO 2 piping changes or timer adjustm!3nts or new room dampers or penetrations that might leak? If such modifications have been made, what subsequent testing or evaluation was performed to ensure that proper concentrations were maintained for the required soak time? If concentration decreased due to leakage, where does the CO 2 gas migrate and describe your evaluation on the effects to plant operation and operator actions. TVA Response: The configuration of the CO 2 piping and discharge outlets have not been modified since the discharge test discussed in TVA's response to NRC RAI 1 above was performed in July 1995. In addition, the detection system has not been modified from the tested configuration. In order to address the overall impact design changes and plant modifications made to equipment located in the Auxiliary Instrument Room may have had on the ability of the CO 2 system to suppress a deep seated fire, the following factors should be considered: E-14 A. As stated previously in Section 2.0, "Detailed Description," WBN's test records indicate that a 50% C02 concentration is maintained for 15 minutes in the lowerhalf of the room.B. The following factors were discussed in Inspection Report 05000390/2008005 (Ref. 9) regarding the low safety significance of the Non-Cited Violation for this C02 concentration issue: Most of the ignition sources were located in the lower portion of the room where the required concentration was maintained. The only ignition sources in the upper portion of the room were thermoplastic cables capable of self-igniting. However, their failure would not affect the credited SSD strategy of alternative shutdown which used equipment powered by other cables not located in this room.Based on the preceding, the key ignition sources are in the lower portion of the room which will receive a 50% concentration for 15 minutes. This and the lack of potential for a fire to the spread into the higher regions of the room, minimize the impact of plant modifications on the C02 systems ability to suppress a fire.Identification of all design changes that have affected the Auxiliary Instrument Room willbe an extensive effort. A review of this type will require a review of all design changes initiated since the performance of the last discharge test (July 1995) until the present.However, the design changes were controlled by WBN's design change process under Standard Programs and Processes (SPP) 9.3, "Plant Modifications and Engineering Change Control." Maintenance activities at WBN are controlled by Standard Department Procedure MMDP-1, "Maintenance Management System." Both of these processes contain controls to ensure that work involving the breaching of any penetration returns the penetration to its revised design configuration or the as-found configuration. Figure 11-33 of the FPR is provided in Attachment 6 to this enclosure and depicts the layout of the Auxiliary Instrument Room. This figure is annotated and provided with notes to clarify which walls are considered regulatory fire barriers. Based on Figure 11-33, the walls of the Auxiliary Instrument Room that are regulatory fire barriers are inspected once every 5 years in accordance with 0-FOR-304-1, "Fire Barrier/Mechanical, Conduit, Cable Tray, and Fire Damper (External) Penetration Visual Inspection-Auxiliary, Control, Diesel Generator Buildings and Intake Pumping Station" include: " North wall* South wall" East wall" West wall" Labyrinth ceiling The north and east walls of the stairs in the Auxiliary Instrument Room along with the floor and ceiling are non-regulatory fire barriers. These areas are inspected once every 5 years in accordance with TI- 304.001, "Non-Regulatory Fire Barriers." E-1 5 A. As stated previously in Section 2.0, "Detailed Description," WBN's test records indicate that a 50% CO 2 concentration is maintained for 15 minutes in the lower half of the room. B. The following factors were discussed in Inspection Report 05000390/2008005 (Ref. 9) regarding the low safety significance of the Non-Cited Violation for this CO 2 concentration issue:

Most of the ignition sources were located in the lower portion of the room where the required concentration was maintained.
The only ignition sources in the upper portion of the room were thermoplastic cables capable of self-igniting.

However, their failure would not affect the credited SSD strategy of alternative shutdown which used equipment powered by other cables not located in this room. Based on the preceding, the key ignition sources are in the lower portion of the room which will receive a 50% concentration for 15 minutes. This and the lack of potential for a fire to the spread into the higher regions of the room, minimize the impact of plant modifications on the CO 2 systems ability to suppress a fire. Identification of all design changes that have affected the Auxiliary Instrument Room will be an extensive effort. A review of this type will require a review of all design changes initiated since the performance of the last discharge test (July 1995) until the present. However, the design changes were controlled by WBN's design change process under Standard Programs and Processes (SPP) 9.3, "Plant Modifications and Engineering Change Control." Maintenance activities at WBN are controlled by Standard Department Procedure MMDP-1, "Maintenance Management System." Both of these processes contain controls to ensure that work involving the breaching of any penetration returns the penetration to its revised design configuration or the as-found configuration. Figure 11-33 of the FPR is provided in Attachment 6 to this enclosure and depicts the layout of the Auxiliary Instrument Room. This figure is annotated and provided with notes to clarify which walls are considered regulatory fire barriers. Based on Figure 11-33, the walls of the Auxiliary Instrument Room that are regulatory fire barriers are inspected once every 5 years in accordance with O-FOR-304-1, "Fire Barrier/Mechanical, Conduit, Cable Tray, and Fire Damper (External) Penetration Visual Inspection-Auxiliary, Control, Diesel Generator Buildings and Intake Pumping Station" include: * * * *

North wall South wall East wall West wall Labyrinth ceiling The north and east walls of the stairs in the Auxiliary Instrument Room along with the floor and ceiling are non-regulatory fire barriers.

These areas are inspected once every 5 years in accordance with TI-304.001, "Non-Regulatory Fire Barriers." E-15 The physical CO 2 barriers (e.g., walls, floor, and ceiling) of the Auxiliary Instrument Room are also inspected in accordance with 0-FOR-39-2, "18 Month CO 2 Fire Protection Inspection and Test for Powerhouse Areas." This inspection is conducted every 18 months and verifies that there are no cracked, missing or degraded seals (including floor seals), or other penetrations that may allow CO 2 to escape. TVA reviewed the documentation from inspections conducted between 2001 and 2009 and did not identify any issues with the physical CO 2 barriers.TVA's response to NRC RAI 1 contained a discussion on tightness of the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room and the time periods the concentration levels in the room were maintained. Leakage from the room will principally be from door seals or through the seals for the various room penetrations. The CO 2 will migrate to Elevation 692, the elevation below the Auxiliary Instrument Room. Each CO 2 system on Elevation 708 has a remote alarm installed on Elevation 692 that provides a pre-discharge alarm to alert the personnel that occupy Elevation 692 to evacuate should there be a CO 2 discharge. The discharge of CO 2 will require the use Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA)by Operations or Fire Operations personnel responding to the fire.3.5 Fire Brigade Response and Training NRC RAI 5: TVA letter, dated March 24, 2009, Enclosure 2, page E2-1, states that,"The primary function of the automatic CO 2 fire suppression systems is to extinguish a fire or control and minimize the effects of a fire until the fire brigade can respond and extinguish it..." Manual fire-fighting of large amounts of burning cables is a considerable challenge even to the most well-trained and equipped fire brigade. Further, many rooms of this nature have cable trays located high above the floor which may be inaccessible to the fire brigade personnel. Describe how the facility fire brigade personnel have been instructed about the potential for deep-seated fire hazards associated with cable re-ignition. Further, discuss the methods to manually extinguish or control and minimize the effects of a deep-seated fire located high above the floor in inaccessible locations (if WBN Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room has any inaccessible locations). TVA Response: WBN's Fire Brigade personnel are periodically trained in accordance with FPT-304.000,"Fires Involving Energized Equipment." The brigade also receives practical training and fire drills are conducted which are directly related to the potential for deep seated firehazards associated with cable tray fires.During the Fire Brigade's training and exercises, emphasis is placed on fighting an energized equipment (e.g., cable) fire using the rules for "Fires Involving Energized Equipment" which includes the use of a fog pattern when applying water, staying out ofthe water runoff, and maintaining the minimum distance for energized equipment. Once the cables are deenergized the fire is considered a normal Class A fire and a straight stream water pattern can be applied.E-1 6 The physical CO 2 barriers (e.g., walls, floor, and ceiling) of the Auxiliary Instrument Room are also inspected in accordance with 0-FOR-39-2, "18 Month CO 2 Fire Protection Inspection and Test for Powerhouse Areas." This inspection is conducted every 18 months and verifies that there are no cracked, missing or degraded seals (including floor seals), or other penetrations that may allow CO 2 to escape. TVA reviewed the documentation from inspections conducted between 2001 and 2009 and did not identify any issues with the physical CO 2 barriers. TVA's response to NRC RAI1 contained a discussion on tightness of the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room and the time periods the concentration levels in the room were maintained. Leakage from the room will principally be from door seals or through the seals for the various room penetrations. The CO 2 will migrate to Elevation 692, elevation below the Auxiliary Instrument Room. Each CO 2 system on Elevation 708 has a remote alarm installed on Elevation 692 that provides a pre-discharge alarm to alert the personnel that occupy Elevation 692 to evacuate should there be a CO 2 discharge. The discharge of CO 2 will require the use Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) by Operations or Fire Operations personnel responding to the fire. 3.5 Fire Brigade Response and Training NRC RA15: TVA letter, dated March 24, 2009, Enclosure 2, page E2-1, states that, "The primary function of the automatic CO 2 fire suppression systems is to extinguish a fire or control and minimize the effects of a fire until the fire brigade can respond and extinguish it ... " Manual fire-fighting of large amounts of burning cables is a considerable challenge even to the most well-trained and equipped fire brigade. Further, many rooms of this nature have cable trays located high above the floor which may be inaccessible to the fire brigade personnel. Describe how the facility fire brigade personnel have been instructed about the potential for deep-seated fire hazards associated with cable re-ignition. Further, discuss the methods to manually extinguish or control and minimize the effects of a deep-seated fire located high above the floor in inaccessible locations (if WBN Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room has any inaccessible locations). TVA Response: WBN's Fire Brigade personnel are periodically trained in accordance with FPT-304.000, "Fires Involving Energized Equipment." The brigade also receives practical training and fire drills are conducted which are directly related to the potential for deep seated fire hazards associated with cable tray fires. During the Fire Brigade's training and exercises, emphasis is placed on fighting an energized equipment (e.g., cable) fire using the rules for "Fires Involving Energized Equipment" which includes the use of a fog pattern when applying water, staying out of the water runoff, and maintaining the minimum distance for energized equipment. Once the cables are deenergized the fire is considered a normal Class A fire and a straight stream water pattern can be applied. E-16 For a fire suppressed by C02, the fire brigade will enter affected area wearing self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA). A key objective of the brigade is to identify any remaining hot spots and apply the appropriate agent to ensure complete extinguishment.To aid in this effort, the fire brigade is provided with a thermal imaging camera for identification of the hot spots. Any remaining hot spots will be individually extinguished using an appropriate agent, such as water applied by a fire hose, instead of a general agent application such as a second CO 2 discharge. However, if deemed necessary, an additional discharge of CO 2 may be initiated manually. Ventilation for the WBN Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room is restored by site personnel manually resetting the C02 blow-off clips for each damper. These actions do not occur until the fire brigade has determined that the fire is completely extinguished. There are no inaccessible areas in the Unit 1 and 2 Auxiliary Instrument Rooms. The access to high locations (e.g., cable trays) shall be by mechanical means in which the fire brigade is trained. For the required access, the Fire Brigade will use ladders and lifts which can be safely used to investigate and apply extinguishing agents if required.3.6 Full Discharge Test Results NRC RAI 6: TVA letter, dated March 24, 2009, Enclosure 2, page E2-1, states that,"Full discharge tests for representative rooms in conjunction with door fan pressurization tests have been conducted to validate C02 concentration and soak times. The duration of the discharge is determined by the area requirements and is controlled by the discharge timer..." Provide the most recent full discharge test results of the C02 fire suppression system installed in the Auxiliary Instrument Room, including the following: " Concentration levels" Soak time* Number, location, and height of sensors in room Also, provide copies of the original discharge test results for review.TVA Response: The most recent full discharge test of the 002 fire suppression system installed in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Auxiliary Instrument Rooms was conducted by and documented in Revision 0 of Special Performance Test, SPT-039-02., This test was initiated on July 16, 1995, and completed on July 23, 1995. A copy of the test is provided in Attachment 3.The data in TVA Table 2 was taken from Data Sheet 8.2 of SPT-039-02, "U1 Aux Instrument Room C02 Concentration," and provides the concentration levels for the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room at specified time intervals after C02 discharge. The acceptance criteria in Table 2 account for instrument accuracy of plus or minus 2%. In E-1 7 For a fire suppressed by CO 2 , the fire brigade will enter affected area wearing contained breathing apparatus (SCBA). A key objective of the brigade is to identify any remaining hot spots and apply the appropriate agent to ensure complete extinguishment. To aid in this effort, the fire brigade is provided with a thermal imaging camera for identification of the hot spots. Any remaining hot spots will be individually extinguished using an appropriate agent, such as water applied by a fire hose, instead of a general agent application such as a second CO 2 discharge. However, if deemed necessary, an additional discharge of CO 2 may be initiated manually.' Ventilation for the WBN Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room is restored by site personnel manually resetting the CO 2 blow-off clips for each damper. These actions do not occur until the fire brigade has determined that the fire is completely extinguished. There are no inaccessible areas in the Unit 1 and 2 Auxiliary Instrument Rooms. The access to high locations (e.g., cable trays) shall be by mechanical means in which the fire brigade is trained. For the access, the Fire Brigade will use ladders and lifts which can be safely used to investigate and apply extinguishing agents if required. 3.6 Full Discharge Test Results NRC RA16: TVA letter, dated March 24, 2009, Enclosure 2, page E2-1, states that, "Full discharge tests for representative rooms in conjunction with door fan pressurization tests have been conducted to validate CO 2 concentration and soak times. The duration of the discharge is determined by the area requirements and is controlled by the discharge timer ... " Provide the most recent full discharge test results of the CO 2 fire suppression system installed in the Auxiliary Instrument Room, including the following:

Concentration levels Soak time
Number, location, and height of sensors in room Also, provide copies of the original discharge test results for review. TVA Response:

The most recent full discharge test of the CO 2 fire suppression system installed in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Auxiliary Instrument Rooms was conducted by and documented in Revision 0 of Special Performance Test, SPT-039-02.c This test was initiated on July 16, 1995, and completed on July 23, 1995. A copy of the test is provided in Attachment

3. The data in TVA Table 2 was taken from Data Sheet 8.2 of SPT-039-02, "U1 Aux Instrument Room CO 2 Concentration," and provides the concentration levels for the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room at specified time intervals after CO 2 discharge.

The acceptance criteria in Table 2 account for instrument accuracy of plus or minus 2%. In E-17 each case, the C0 2 suppression system for the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room met or exceeded the acceptance criteria.Elapsed Time (min) 2,\ 4 6 7 8 15 C0 2 Concentration (%) 44 57 56 56 52 47 Acceptance Criteria (%) -32 N/A N/A -a 52 N/A -47 Table 2 -Unit I Auxiliary Instrument Room CO 2 Concentrations for SPT-039-02 There were three sample points in the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room at which C02 concentration levels were recorded: " Sample Point #1 was located at 14.75 ft. above the finished floor* Sample Point #2 was located at 8.67 ft. above the finished floor" Sample Point #3 was located at 2.0 ft. above the finished floor The horizontal location of the sensor pickups (sample points) inside the room was not recorded. The horizontal location would have not been of any consequence to the test results as the ventilation to the room was isolated; no stirring of the C02 (which is approximately 50% heavier than air) would result in relatively uniform C02 concentration layers in the room. Section 6.1.3 of SPT-039-02 provided the steps for installing the C02 concentration meters and specified that the highest recorder probe be installed "...at 75% of the room height or the top of the protected equipment (excluding cable trays)whichever is higher...." The total soak time for SPT-039-02 as shown in TVA Figure 5 was approximately 25 minutes. As discussed in TVA's response to NRC RAI 1, this soak time starts when the C02 system actually discharges and is defined differently than the soak times as specified in NUREG/CR-3656. At 14.75 ft. (Sample Point #1), the C02 concentration after 25 minutes was approximately 45%. For Sample Points #2 and #3, the C02 concentration remained above 50% after 25 minutes. The strip charts from the test are provided in Attachment 3 and show the C02 concentration versus time for each of the 3 sample points.3.7 Area Ignition Sources NRC RAI 7: TVA letter, dated March 24, 2009, Enclosure 2, page E2-3, states that,"TVA calculation WBN-IPE-004, "Zone of Influence" determined that the only ignition source is two air handling units in the Corridor on Elevation 708.0..." E-18 each case, the CO 2 suppression system for the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room met or exceeded the acceptance criteria. Elapsed Time (min) 2; \ 4 6 7 8 15 CO 2 Concentration (%) 44 57 56 56 52 47 Acceptance Criteria (%) 32 N/A N/A 52 N/A Table 2 -Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room CO 2 Concentrations for SPT-039-02 There were three sample points in the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room at which CO 2 concentration levels were recorded:

Sample Point #1 was located at 14.75 ft. above the finished floor
Sample Point #2 was located at 8.67 ft. above the finished floor Sample Point #3 was located at 2.0 ft. above the finished floor The horizontal location of the sensor pickups (sample points) inside the room was not recorded.

The horizontal location would have not been of any consequence to the test results as the ventilation to the room was isolated; no stirring of the CO 2 (which is approximately 50% heavier than air) would result in relatively uniform CO 2 concentration layers in the room. Section 6.1.3 of SPT-039-02 provided the steps for installing the CO 2 concentration meters and specified that the highest recorder probe be installed" ... at 75% of the room height or the top of the protected equipment (excluding cable trays) whichever is higher .... " The total soak time for SPT-039-02 as shown in TVA Figure 5 was approximately 25 minutes. As discussed in TVA's response to NRC RAI 1, this soak time starts when the CO 2 system actually discharges and is defined differently than the soak times as specified in NUREG/CR-3656. At 14.75 ft. (Sample Point #1), the CO 2 concentration after 25 minutes was approximately 45%. For Sample Points #2 and #3, the CO 2 concentration remained above 50% after 25 minutes. The strip charts from the test are provided in Attachment 3 and show the CO 2 concentration versus time for each of the 3 sample points. 3.7 Area Ignition Sources NRC RA17: TVA letter, dated March 24, 2009, Enclosure 2, page E2-3, states that, "TVA calculation WBN-IPE-004, "Zone of Influence" determined that the only ignition source is two air handling units in the Corridor on Elevation 70B.0 ... " E-18 "TVA calculation EPM-DOM-012990, "Combustible Loading Data (CLD)" establishes the Fire Severity Index for...""TVA calculation WBN-IPE-004, "Zone of Influence," determine that the only ignition source..."Based upon this evaluation, all these areas were screened out from the detail review, and were screened out due to a lack of significant fire ignition source and/or the presence of automatic detection and suppression ability... " Confirm that there are no ignition sources other than two air handling units in this fire area. Provide a summary and the results of the "Zone of Influence" calculations. TVA Response: As stated previously, Figure 11-33 is provided as Attachment 6 to this enclosure. The figure has been annotated to clearly designate the following rooms: " 708.0-Cl -Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room" 708.0-C2 -Corridor" 708.0-C4 -Unit 2 Auxiliary Instrument Room An evaluation of the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room on Elevation 708.0-Cl and thesurrounding rooms, 708.0-C2 and 708.0-C4, was conducted on July 16, 2009 by WBN's Engineering staff to confirm there are no other ignition sources other than the two airhandling units located in the Corridor (708.0-C2). The evaluation confirmed the two airhandling units in the Corridor remain the only ignition sources for the Auxiliary Instrument Room. WBN's design includes a two hour Regulatory Fire Barrier that separates Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room from the Corridor.Revision 0 of Calculation WBN-IPE-004, "Zone of Influence" is the calculation that determines the Zone of Influence (ZOI) for credible fire sources in compartments that were not previously screened by calculations WBN-IPE-001, 002, and 003. This calculation also documents the area walkdowns to identify the fire ignition sources or targets within the ZOI that could be impacted by the fire source. For the Auxiliary Instrument Room area, the walkdown conducted on July 16, 2009, re-verified the conclusions of Calculation WBN-IPE-004. 3.8 Auxiliary Instrument Room Cabling NRC RAI 8: TVA letter, dated March 24, 2009, Enclosure 2, page E2-3, states that,"TVA detection and suppression systems would detect and suppress any fire with the potential of severity needed to include a deep seated fire..." TVA evaluation did not specify cable construction information (i.e., insulation and jacket material, such as cross-linked polyethylene (XLPE)/polyvinyl chloride (PVC) for all E-19"TVA calculation EPM-OOM-012990, "Combustible Loading Data (CLO)" establishes the Fire Severity Index for ... " "TVA calculation WBN-IPE-004, "Zone of Influence, " determine that the only ignition source ... "Based upon this evaluation, all these areas were screened out from the detail review, and were screened out due to a lack of significant fire ignition source and/or the presence of automatic detection and suppression ability ... " Confirm that there are no ignition sources other than two air handling units in this fire area. Provide a summary and the results of the "Zone of Influence" calculations. TVA Response: As stated previously, Figure 11-33 is provided as Attachment 6 to this enclosure. The figure has been annotated to clearly designate the following rooms:

70B.0-C1 -Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room 70B.0-C2 -Corridor 70B.0-C4 -Unit 2 Auxiliary Instrument Room An evaluation of the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room on Elevation 70B.0-C1 and the surrounding rooms, 70B.0-C2 and 70B.0-C4, was conducted on July 16, 2009 by WBN's Engineering staff to confirm there are no other ignition sources other than the two air handling units located in the Corridor (70B.0-C2).

The evaluation confirmed the two air handling units in the Corridor remain the only ignition sources for the Auxiliary Instrument Room. WBN's design includes a two hour Regulatory Fire Barrier that separates Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room from the Corridor. Revision 0 of Calculation WBN-IPE-004, "Zone of Influence" is the calculation that determines the Zone of Influence (ZOI) for credible fire sources in compartments that were not previously screened by calculations WBN-IPE-001 , 002, and 003. This calculation also documents the area walkdowns to identify the fire ignition sources or targets within the ZOI that could be impacted by the fire source. For the Auxiliary Instrument Room area, the walkdown conducted on July 16, 2009, re-verified the conclusions of Calculation WBN-IPE-004. 3.8 Auxiliary Instrument Room Cabling NRC RA18: TVA letter, dated March 24, 2009, Enclosure 2, page E2-3, states that, "TVA detection and suppression systems would detect and suppress any fire with the potential of severity needed to include a deep seated fire ... " TVA evaluation did not specify cable construction information (Le., insulation and jacket material, such as cross-linked polyethylene (XLPE)/polyvinyl chloride (PVC) for all E-19 cables installed in cable trays and conduits or exposed (such as air drops). Identify the types of cable insulation and jacket materials within the Auxiliary Instrument Room.TVA Response: Several different cable materials are used within the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room.Greater than 96% of the qualified cables within the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room have a thermosetting polymer jacket. Tabulated below is a list of the insulation and jacket materials of qualified cables used within the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room: Unit I Auxiliary Instrument Room Insulation Material Jacket Material Cross Linked Polyethylene (XLPE) Chlorinated Polyethylene (CPE) Ethylene Propylene Rubber (EPR) Chlorosulfonated Polyethylene (CSPE)Flame-Retardant Cross Linked Polyethylene Cross Linked Polyethylene (XLPE)(FRXLPE)Flame-Retardant Cross Linked Polyethylene Fluorinated Ethylene Propylene (FEP) (FRXLPE)Polyolefin Fluorinated Ethylene Propylene (FEP)Polyvinyl Chloride (PVC) Nylon Thermoplastic Polyethylene Polyethylene (PE)Polyvinyl Chloride (PVC)Table 3 -Cable Insulation and Jacket Material The installation of non-qualified cables in the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room conform to the following statement made in Section 8.3.1.4.3, "Sharing of Cable Trays and Routing of Non-Safety Related Cables," of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report: "In all cable coating applications, up to 10 cables not qualified to the IEEE 383 flame test or equivalent may remain uncoated on cable trays, unless small gaps or cracks in the coating exist in the tray segment. In such cases, up to 9 cables not qualified to the IEEE 383 flame test or equivalent may remain uncoated." To maintain compliance with the above statement, a fire-retardant such as Vimasco© is applied where required. Approximately 0.5% of the cables located within the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room are of unknown material composition. Cables of this type include cables supplied by vendors of the components installed in the instrument room.3.9 Defense-in-Depth NRC RAI 9: TVA letter, dated March 24, 2009, Enclosure 2, page E2-3, states that,"The defense in depth fire protection at Watts Bar ensures that the fire protection provided for the Unit I Auxiliary Instrument Room is in E-20 cables installed in cable trays and conduits or exposed (such as air drops). Identify the types of cable insulation and jacket materials within the Auxiliary Instrument Room. TVA Response: Several different cable materials are used within the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room. Greater than 96% of the qualified cables within the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room have a thermosetting polymer jacket. Tabulated below is a list of the insulation and jacket materials of qualified cables used within the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room: Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room Insulation Material Jacket Material Cross Linked Polyethylene (XLPE) Chlorinated Polyethylene (CPE) Ethylene Propylene Rubber (EPR) Chlorosulfonated Polyethylene (CSPE) Flame-Retardant Cross Linked Polyethylene Cross Linked Polyethylene (XLPE) (FRXLPE) Fluorinated Ethylene Propylene (FEP) Flame-Retardant Cross Linked Polyethylene (FRXLPE) Polyolefin Fluorinated Ethylene Propylene (FEP) Polyvinyl Chloride (PVC) Nylon Thermoplastic Polyethylene Polyethylene (PE) Polyvinyl Chloride (PVC) Table 3 -Cable Insulation and Jacket Material The installation of non-qualified cables in the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room conform to the following statement made in Section 8.3.1.4.3, "Sharing of Cable Trays and Routing of Non-Safety Related Cables," of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report: "In all cable coating applications, up to 10 cables not qualified to the IEEE 383 flame test or equivalent may remain uncoated on cable trays, unless small gaps or cracks in the coating exist in the tray segment. In such cases, up to 9 cables not qualified to the IEEE 383 flame test or equivalent may remain uncoated." To maintain compliance with the above statement, a fire-retardant such as Vimasco© is applied where required. Approximately 0.5% of the cables located within the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room are of unknown material composition. Cables of this type include cables supplied by vendors of the components installed in the instrument room. 3.9 Defense-in-Depth NRC RA19: TVA letter, dated March 24, 2009, Enclosure 2, page E2-3, states that, "The defense in depth fire protection at Watts Bar ensures that the fire protection provided for the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room is in E-20 compliance with the applicable sections of NFPA 12-1973 and therefore meet the regulatory requirements found in Branch Technical Position (BTP) 9-5.1, Appendix A, paragraph F. 6 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, paragraph Ill. G. 3..." The NRC staff requests that the TVA provide a description of the defense-in-depth features in the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room.TVA Response: The defense-in-depth features provided for the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room (EL. 708.0-C.1) are as follows: 1. Transient combustibles are controlled by site procedures.

2. Ignition source work is controlled by site procedures.

3. Access to vital areas of the plant, including the Auxiliary Instrument Room, is restricted to authorized personnel.

4. Ionization smoke detectors cross zoned with thermal detectors.

More information on the detection system is provided in TVA's response to NRC RAI 10.5. The Main Control Room (MCR) dispatch of personnel to investigate upon the annunciation of one zone of a cross-zone.

6. Automatic 002 suppression system which actuates upon a cross-zoned signal from the detection system or may be manually actuated.7. Abandonment of the MCR in the event of a fire in the Control Building (previously discussed in TVA's response to NRC RAI 2).8. Isolation of the Auxiliary Control Room (ACR) from the Control Building so that safe shutdown is achieved (previously discussed in TVA's response to NRC RAI 2).9. The onsite fire brigade previously discussed in TVA's response to NRC RAI 5. The CO 2 system for the Auxiliary Instrument Room is designed to mitigate the consequences of a fire until it can be extinguished by WBN's Fire Brigade. The fire brigade may also initiate a second discharge to ensure complete extinguishment of the fire. Such actions are consistent with the second sentence of Section 2232 of NFPA 12 -1973: "In any event, it is necessary to inspect the hazard immediately thereafter to make certain that extinguishment is complete and to remove any material involved in the fire." E-21 compliance with the applicable sections of NFPA 12-1973 and therefore meet the regulatory requirements found in Branch Technical Position (BTP) 9-5.1, Appendix A, paragraph F.6 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, paragraph III.G.3 ... " The NRC staff requests that the TVA provide a description of the defense-in-depth features in the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room. TVA Response:

The defense-in-depth features provided for the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room (EL. 708.0-C.1) are as follows: 1. Transient combustibles are controlled by site procedures.

2. Ignition source work is controlled by site procedures.

3. Access to vital areas of the plant, including the Auxiliary Instrument Room, is restricted to authorized personnel.

4. Ionization smoke detectors cross zoned with thermal detectors.

More information on the detection system is provided in TVA's response to NRC RA110. 5. The Main Control Room (MCR) dispatch of personnel to investigate upon the annunciation of one zone of a cross-zone.

6. Automatic CO 2 suppression system which actuates upon a cross-zoned signal from the detection system or may be manually actuated.

7. Abandonment of the MCR in the event of a fire in the Control Building (previously discussed in TVA's response to NRC RAI 2). 8. Isolation of the Auxiliary Control Room (ACR) from the Control Building so that safe shutdown is achieved (previously discussed in TVA's response to NRC RAI 2). 9. The onsite fire brigade previously discussed in TVA's response to NRC RAI 5. The CO 2 system for the Auxiliary Instrument Room is designed to mitigate the consequences of a fire until it can be extinguished by WBN's Fire Brigade. The fire brigade may also initiate a second discharge to ensure complete extinguishment of the fire. Such actions are consistent with the second sentence of Section 2232 of NFPA 12 -1973: "In any event, it is necessary to inspect the hazard immediately thereafter to make certain that extinguishment is complete and to remove any material involved in the fire." . E-21 This philosophy is also consistent with the discussion provided below from Section 12.3, "Automatic Fire Suppression Systems" of the FPR: "The automatic fire suppression systems are designed to extinguish a fire or control and minimize the effects of a fire until the fire brigade can respond and extinguish it." 10. The volume of CO 2 maintained available for suppression of a fire in the Auxiliary Instrument Room is large enough for an initial discharge and a second discharge of equal volume if needed.One other defense-in-depth factor regarding the abandonment of the MCR was previously discussed in TVA's response to NRC RAI 2. This discussion indicated that an Appendix R fire in WBN's Control Building may require that the Control Building, including the Main Control Room (MCR), be abandoned.

The Unit 1 and Unit 2 AuxiliaryInstrument Rooms are located in the Control Building at elevation 708.0. When the MCR is abandoned, the plant will be shut down from the Auxiliary Control Room (ACR).The Control Building is separated from the ACR and adjacent plant areas by 3-hour fire-rated barriers. WBN's Abnormal Operating Instructions (AOIs) direct the operator actions to isolate the ACR from the MCR, abandon the MCR, and implement the Fire Safe Shutdown actions once the MCR is abandoned. This element and the other defense-in-depth aspects of WBN's FPR provide confidence that the proper action will be taken to ensure a fire in the Auxiliary Instrument Room is mitigated. 3.10 CO, System Actuation NRC RAI 10: TVA letter, dated March 24, 2009, Enclosure 2, page E2-4, states that,"The automatic CO 2 suppression system provided for the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room is adequately designed for a deep seated fire. The detection system and suppression system would detect and suppress any fire with the potential of the severity needed to induce a deep seated fire..." Provide a description of the detection system currently installed in the Auxiliary Instrument Room. Discuss how the CO 2 fire suppression system actuation occurs in the Auxiliary Instrument Room.TVA Response: Fire detection is installed to provide for prompt detection of a fire in its incipient stage and provide early warning capability. The fire detection systems at WBN are designed to be operable with or without offsite power. The Auxiliary Instrument Room is equipped with Ionization Smoke Detectors and Thermal Detectors. Provided below are excerpts from two sections of System Description N3-13-4002, "Fire Detection System," that describe the Ionization Smoke Detectors and Thermal Detectors. E-22 This philosophy is also consistent with the discussion provided below from Section 12.3, "Automatic Fire Suppression Systems" of the FPR: "The automatic fire suppression systems are designed to extinguish a fire or control and minimize the effects of a fire until the fire brigade can respond and extinguish it." 10. The volume of CO 2 maintained available for suppression of a fire in the Auxiliary Instrument Room is large enough for an initial discharge and a second discharge of equal volume if needed. One other defense-in-depth factor regarding the abandonment of the MCR was previously discussed in TVA'sresponse to NRC RAI 2. This discussion indicated that an Appendix R fire in WBN's Control Building may require that the Control Building, including the Main Control Room (MCR), be abandoned. The Unit 1 and Unit 2 Auxiliary Instrument Rooms are located in the Control Building at elevation 708.0. When the MCR is abandoned, the plant will be shut down from the Auxiliary Control Room (ACR). The Control Building is separated from the ACR and adjacent plant areas by 3-hour rated barriers. WBN's Abnormal Operating Instructions (AOls) direct the operator actions to isolate the ACR from the MCR, abandon the MCR, and implement the Fire Safe Shutdown actions once the MCR is abandoned. This element and the other defense-in-depth aspects of WBN's FPR provide confidence that the proper action will be taken to ensure a fire in the Auxiliary Instrument Room is mitigated. 3.10 COl System Actuation NRC RA110: TVA letter, dated March 24, 2009, Enclosure 2, page E2-4, states that, "The automatic CO 2 suppression system provided for the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room is adequately designed for a deep seated fire. The detection system and suppression system would detect and suppress any fire with the potential of the severity needed to induce a deep seated fire ... " Provide a description of the detection system currently installed in the Auxiliary Instrument Room. Discuss how the CO 2 fire suppression system actuation occurs in the Auxiliary Instrument Room. TVA Response: Fire detection is installed to provide for prompt detection of a fire in its incipient stage and provide early warning capability. The fire detection systems at WBN are designed to be operable with or without offsite power. The Auxiliary Instrument Room is equipped with Ionization Smoke Detectors and Thermal Detectors. Provided below are excerpts from two sections of System Description N3-13-4002, "Fire Detection System," that describe the Ionization Smoke Detectors and Thermal Detectors. E-22 "3.2.1.1 Ionization Smoke Detectors These units are Pyrotronics model DI series surface-mounted low voltage ionization smoke detectors manufactured by Pyrotronics, Incorporated. They operate on a patented ionization principle and are actuated by a trace of visible smoke or invisible products of combustion present during the early stages of a fire. The detectorsoperate at a line voltage of nominal 24V dc which is provided from the LDP [local detection panel]. Visual flame is not required to operatethe detector. The detector contains a radioactive source, two ionization chambers and a semiconductor amplifier-switching circuit. The radioactive source ionizes air in the two chambers allowing a small current to flow through the two chambers. The sensing chamber is open to the atmosphere and detects the presence of combustion products. The reference chamber is effectively closed to the atmosphere and serves as a reference to stabilize the detectors sensitivity for changes in environmental temperature, humidity, and pressure.When smoke particles enter the sensing chamber, it causes a reduction in the sensing chamber's current relative to the reference chamber. This change in current causes the amplifier switching circuit to trigger an alarm. Upon actuation, the detector will lock into an alarm state.""3.2.1.3 Thermal Detectors The thermal detectors are of the rate compensation/fixed temperaturetype. The detector element is self-restoring. The detectors are supplied in temperature ratings of 1350 F, 2000 F and 2250 F.The detector consists of tubular metal shell containing two curved expansion struts under compression fitted with a pair of normally open, opposed contact points which are insulated from the shell. The tubular shell and struts have a different coefficient of expansion. When subjected to a rapid heat rise, the tubular shell expands and lengthens slightly. At the same time, the interior struts lengthen but at a slower rate than the shell. The rapid lengthening of the shell causes the struts to come together and thus initiate an alarm.When subject to a very slow heat rise, the tubular shell and the interior struts lengthen at approximately the same rate. At the detector's set point, the interior struts are fully extended, thereby closing the contact points and initiating the alarm signal." The temperature rating of the thermal detectors installed in the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room is 1350 F.E-23"3.2.1.1 Ionization Smoke Detectors These units are Pyrotronics model DI series surface-mounted low voltage ionization smoke detectors manufactured by Pyrotronics, Incorporated. They operate on a patented ionization principle and are actuated by a trace of visible smoke or invisible products of combustion present during the early stages of a fire. The detectors operate at a line voltage of nominal 24V dc which is provided from the LDP [local detection panel]. Visual flame is not required to operate the detector. The detector contains a radioactive source, two ionization chambers and a semiconductor amplifier-switching circuit. The radioactive source ionizes air in the two chambers allowing a small current to flow through the two chambers. The sensing chamber is open to the atmosphere and detects the presence of combustion products. The reference chamber is effectively closed to the atmosphere and serves as a reference to stabilize the detectors sensitivity for changes in environmental temperature, humidity, and pressure. When smoke particles enter the sensing chamber, it causes a reduction in the sensing chamber's current relative to the reference chamber. This change in current causes the amplifier switching circuit to trigger an alarm. Upon actuation, the detector will lock into an alarm state." "3.2.1.3 Thermal Detectors The thermal detectors are of the rate compensation/fixed temperature type. The detector element is self-restoring. The detectors are supplied in temperature ratings of 135 0 F, 200 0 F and 225 0 F. The detector consists of tubular metal shell containing two curved expansion struts under compression fitted with a pair of normally open, opposed contact points which are insulated from the shell. The tubular shell and struts have a different coefficient of expansion. When subjected to a rapid heat rise, the tubular shell expands and lengthens slightly. At the same time, the interior struts lengthen but at a slower rate than the shell. The rapid lengthening of the shell causes the struts to come together and thus initiate an alarm. When subject to a very slow heat rise, the tubular shell and the interior struts lengthen at approximately the same rate. At the detector's set point, the interior struts are fully extended, thereby closing the contact points and initiating the alarm signal." The temperature rating of the thermal detectors installed in the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room is 135 0 F. E-23 System Description N3-39-4002, "C02 Storage, Fire Protection, and Purging," provides a general description for the actuation of the C02 suppression system and is applicable to the suppression system in the Auxiliary Instrument Room. The following is stated in Section 3.1.1, "C02 Fire Protection System" of N3-39-4002: "Upon occurrence of a fire, a signal from the fire detection system activates area alarms and starts the C02 discharge timer motor. The timer can also be activated from a manual push-button station. The timer actuates the predischarge alarms (warns personnel to clear the area) and subsequently actuates the pilot valve. The master pilot valve which is nearest to the storage tank serves to open the MCV [master control valve]. As soon as the signal activates this master pilot valve, upstream pressure from the C02 in the pilot line which is connected to the tank, is transmitted to the piston operator on the MCV.At this time the MCV opens letting C02 flow through the header to the ASV [area selector valve] valve. At the same time that the signal activates the MCV, the particular area pilot valve is also activated. This area pilot valve receives the pressure from the C02 in the header and transmits it to the piston operator on the ASV which opens and lets the C02 flow through the header into the affected hazard area pipe network and discharge through open nozzles to extinguish the fire. At the same time, the pressure activates the odorizer which releases its chemical to the discharge piping to allow personnel to detect the C02 discharge." The Auxiliary Instrument Room's smoke detectors compose one zone of fire detection and the thermal detectors compose the other zone of fire detection. When a single detector in either zone activates, an annunciation is sent to a constantly attended location (e.g., the Main Control Room) alerting site personnel of the zone's alarm condition. When a single detector of the other zone activates, the C02 discharge timer motor starts and an annunciation is sent to the constantly attended location of the second zone's alarm condition. When the C02 discharges to the Auxiliary Instrument Room, a pressure switch is activated which annunciates the C02 discharge to the constantly attended location.3.11 NFPA 12, 1973 Edition, Code Compliance NRC RAI 11: Part X -NFPA Code Evaluation of the Fire Protection Report, Revision 29 (ML052780278), September 30, 2005, provides point-by-point comparison of the conformance with NFPA codes. Page X-19 cross-references the applicable section of NFPA 12, 1973 Edition and provides additional information for compliance with code.NFPA 12-1973 "Carbon Dioxide Systems" TVA System 39 Compliance Summary Matrix Code Section Summary Topic/Remarks 2421 Comply Flooding factor for specific hazards (50% for deep seated fire locations such as board rooms, instrument rooms, etc.)E-24 System Description N3-39-4002, "C0 2 Storage, Fire Protection, and Purging," provides a general description for the actuation of the CO 2 suppression system and is applicable to the suppression system in the Auxiliary Instrument Room. The following is stated in Section 3.1.1, "C0 2 Fire Protection System" of N3-39-4002: "Upon occurrence of a fire, a signal from the fire detection system activates area alarms and starts the CO 2 discharge timer motor. The timer can also be activated from a manual push-button station. The timer actuates the predischarge alarms (warns personnel to clear the area) and subsequently actuates the pilot valve. The master pilot valve which is nearest to the storage tank serves to open the MCV [master control valve]. As soon as the signal activates this master pilot valve, upstream pressure from the CO 2 in the pilot line which is connected to the tank, is transmitted to the piston operator on the MCV. At this time the MCV opens letting CO 2 flow through the header to the ASV [area selector valve] valve. At the same time that the signal activates the MCV, the particular area pilot valve is also activated. This area pilot valve receives the pressure from the CO 2 in the header and transmits it to the piston operator on the ASV which opens and lets the CO 2 flow through the header into the affected hazard area pipe network and discharge through open nozzles to extinguish the fire. At the same time, the pressure activates the odorizer which releases its chemical to the discharge piping to allow personnel to detect the CO 2 discharge." The Auxiliary Instrument Room's smoke detectors compose one zone of fire detection and the thermal detectors compose the other zone of fire detection. When a single detector in either zone activates, an annunciation is sent to a constantly attended location (e.g., the Main Control Room) alerting site personnel of the zone's alarm condition. When a single detector of the other zone activates, the CO 2 discharge timer motor starts and an annunciation is sent to the constantly attended location of the second zone's alarm condition. When the C02 discharges to the Auxiliary Instrument Room, a pressure switch is activated which annunciates the CO 2 discharge to the constantly attended location. 3.11 NFPA 12.1973 Edition. Code Compliance NRC RA111: Part X -NFPA Code Evaluation of the Fire Protection Report, Revision 29 (ML052780278), September 30, 2005, provides point-by-point comparison of the conformance with NFPA codes. Page X-19 cross-references the applicable section of NFPA 12, 1973 Edition and provides additional information for compliance with code. Code Section 2421 NFPA 12-1973 "Carbon Dioxide Systems" TVA System 39 Compliance Summary Matrix Summary Topic/Remarks Comply Flooding factor for specific hazards (50% for deep seated fire locations such as board rooms, instrument rooms, etc.) E-24 However, TVA letters, dated March 13, and 24, 2009, are not consistent with the above code compliance evaluation documented in Unit 1 WBN FPR. Discuss and provide a basis for this discrepancy. TVA Response: Section 2421 of NFPA 12 -1973 specifies that the design concentration for general dry electrical, wiring insulation hazards is 50% for CO 2 suppression systems. As specified in Revision 29 of the Fire Protection Report referenced in NRC RAI 11 above, TVA complies with Section 2421 of NFPA 12 -1973. The CO 2 suppression system in the WBN Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room provides a 50% concentration as designed and as required by NFPA 12 -1973. Furthermore, TVA maintains that the TVA letters dated March 13, 2009 (Ref. 15) and March 24, 2009 (Ref. 16) are consistent with the point-by-point comparison as provided in Part X, "NFPA Code Evaluation," of the WBN FPR.Section 2232 of NFPA 12 -1973 states the following: "For deep seated fires, the required extinguishing concentration shall be maintained for a sufficient period of time to allow the smoldering to be extinguished and the material to cool to a point at which re-ignition will not occur when the inert atmosphere is dissipated." For systems designed to suppress deep-seated fires, Section 2523 of NFPA 12 -1973 states the following: "For deep-seated fires the design concentration shall be achieved within seven minutes but the rate shall no be less than that required to developa concentration of 30 percent in 2 minutes." NFPA 12 -1973 does not specify a required soak time, but states that,"...the required extinguishing concentration shall be maintained for a sufficient period of time to allow the smoldering to be extinguished and the material to cool to a point at which re-ignition will not occur when the inert atmosphere is dissipated." The distinction is made between "design concentration" and "extinguishing concentration." The CO 2 suppression system provided for the WBN Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room meets the requirements of NFPA 12 -1973, Section 2523, by achieving 30% CO 2 concentration in 2 minutes and 50% CO 2 concentration (the design concentration as provided in NFPA 12 -1973, Section 2421) in 7 minutes. The WBN CO 2 suppression system provided for the Auxiliary Instrument Room also meets the requirements of NFPA 12 -1973, Section 2232, by maintaining a 45% CO 2 concentration (the extinguishing concentration) for 15 minutes. TVA's response to NRC RAI 1 provides the justification for the sufficiency of 45%-CO 2 concentration as the extinguishing concentration for the WBN Unit I Auxiliary Instrument Room as well as data from SPT-039-02 which demonstrated the CO 2 suppression system's capabilities. E-25 However, TVA letters, dated March 13, and 24, 2009, are not consistent with the above code compliance evaluation documented in Unit 1 WBN FPR. Discuss and provide a basis for this discrepancy. TVA Response: Section 2421 of NFPA 12 -1973 specifies that the design concentration for general dry electrical, wiring insulation hazards is 50% for CO 2 suppression systems. As specified in Revision 29 of the Fire Protection Report referenced in NRC RAI 11 above, TVA complies with Section 2421 of NFPA 12 -1973. The CO 2 suppression system in the WBN Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room provides a 50% concentration as designed and as required by NFPA 12 -1973. Furthermore, TVA maintains that the TVA letters dated March 13, 2009 (Ref. 15) and March 24, 2009 (Ref. 16) are consistent with the point comparison as provided in Part X, "NFPA Code Evaluation," of the WBN FPR. Section 2232 of NFPA 12 -1973 states the following: "For deep seated fires, the required extinguishing concentration shall be maintained for a sufficient period of time to allow the smoldering to be extinguished and the material to cool to a pointat which re-ignition will not occur when the inert atmosphere is dissipated." For systems designed to suppress deep-seated fires, Section 2523 of NFPA 12 -1973 states the following: "For deep-seated fires the design concentration shall be achieved within seven minutes but the rate shall no be less than that required to develop a concentration of 30 percent in 2 minutes." NFPA 12 -1973 does not specify a required soak time, but states that, " ... the required extinguishing concentration shall be maintained for a sufficient period of time to allow the smoldering to be extinguished and the material to cool to a point at which re-ignition will not occur when the inert atmosphere is dissipated." The distinction is made between "design concentration" and "extinguishing concentration." The CO 2 suppression system provided for the WBN Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room meets the requirements of NFPA 12 -1973, Section 2523, by achieving 30% CO 2 concentration in 2 minutes and 50% CO 2 concentration (the design concentration as provided in NFPA 12 -1973, Section 2421) in 7 minutes. The WBN CO 2 suppression system provided for the Auxiliary Instrument Room also meets the requirements of NFPA 12 -1973, Section 2232, by maintaining a 45% CO 2 concentration (the extinguishing concentration) for 15 minutes. TVA's response to NRC RAI1 provides the justification for the sufficiency of 45%-C0 2 concentration as the extinguishing concentration for the WBN Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room as well as data from SPT-039-02 which demonstrated the CO 2 suppression system's capabilities. E-25 The TVA letters dated March 13, 2009 and March 24, 2009 echoed the NUREG-0847, Supplement 18, conclusion which stated in Section 9.5.1, "Fire Protection," that,"On the basis of its review of the applicant's Fire Protection Report through Revision 4, and the applicant's supplemental information as referenced by this safety evaluation, the staff concludes that the fire protection program for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant conforms to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.48 and, except for (1) fire barrier penetration seal program (refer to Appendix FF, Section 3.1.4) and (2) emergency lighting inside the reactor building (refer to Appendix FF, Section 6.7), is acceptable." TVA submitted Revision 3 of the Fire Protection Report by letter dated June 15, 1995 (Ref. 14) (prior to the issuance of NUREG-0847, Supplement 18, in October 1995) which indicated TVA's compliance with NFPA 12 -1973, Section 2421 using the 50%concentration requirement and Section 2232 using the agreed upon 45% concentration for 15 minutes (see Attachment 5). Adequacy of the 45% concentration had been previously addressed at length in TVA's May 26, 1995 response (Ref. 7) to the NRC's May 10, 1995 request for additional information (Ref. 5). By incorporation in the NUREG supplement, the 45% CO 2 concentration as specified in Revision 3 of the FPR regarding the Auxiliary Instrument Room appeared to have received NRC approval.For these reasons, TVA concludes there is not a discrepancy in the code compliance evaluation. The CO 2 suppression system provided for the WBN Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room continues to comply with the requirements of NFPA 12 -1973 as specified in the WBN FPR.3.12 Conclusions Based on the considerations discussed above, TVA concludes that a 45% CO 2 concentration for 15 minutes is sufficient to extinguish a deep-seated fire in the WBN Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room. In the event of a fire in the WBN Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room, the CO 2 suppression system and other defense-in-depth features ensure the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown.

4.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

4.1 Applicable Requlatory Requirements/CriteriaThe applicable regulations and requirements are as follows:* 10 CFR 50.48, "Fire Protection," requires that Watts Bar Nuclear Plant have a Fire Protection Plan that satisfies 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, Criterion 3.10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) 3, "Fire Protection," specifies that structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed and located to minimize the probability and effect of fires and explosions. E-26 The TVA letters dated March 13,2009 and March 24,2009 echoed the NUREG-0847, Supplement 18, conclusion which stated in Section 9.5.1, "Fire Protection," that, "On the basis of its review of the applicant's Fire Protection Report through Revision 4, and the applicant's supplemental information as referenced by this safety evaluation, the staff concludes that the fire protection program for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant conforms to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.48 and, except for (1) fire barrier penetration seal program (refer to Appendix FF, Section 3.1.4) and (2) emergency lighting inside the reactor building (refer to Appendix FF, Section 6.7), is acceptable." TVA submitted Revision 3 of the Fire Protection Report by letter dated June 15, 1995 (Ref. 14) (prior to the issuance of NUREG-0847, Supplement 18, in October 1995) which indicated TVA's compliance with NFPA 12 -1973, Section 2421 using the 50% concentration requirement and Section 2232 using the agreed upon 45% concentration for 15 minutes (see Attachment 5). Adequacy of the 45% concentration had been previously addressed at length in TVA's May 26,1995 response (Ref. 7) to the NRC's May 10, 1995 request for additional information (Ref. 5). By incorporation in the NUREG supplement, the 45% CO 2 concentration as speCified in Revision 3 of the FPR regarding the Auxiliary Instrument Room appeared to have received NRC approval. For these reasons, TVA concludes there is not a discrepancy in the code compliance evaluation. The CO 2 suppression system provided for the WBN Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room continues to comply with the requirements of NFPA 12 -1973 as specified in the WBN FPR. 3.12 Conclusions Based on the considerations discussed above, TVA concludes that a 45% CO 2 concentration for 15 minutes is sufficient to extinguish a deep-seated fire in the WBN Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room. In the event of a fire in the WBN Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room, the CO 2 suppression system and other defense-in-depth features ensure the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown.

4.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

4.1 Applicable Requlatory Requirements/Criteria The applicable regulations and requirements are as follows: e_ 10 CFR 50.48, "Fire Protection," requires that Watts Bar Nuclear Plant have a Fire Protection Plan that satisfies 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, Criterion

3. e 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) 3, "Fire Protection," specifies that structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed and located to minimize the probability and effect of fires and explosions.

E-26 .10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section II.C.4 requires that fire barriers or automatic suppression systems or both shall be installed as necessary to protect redundant systems or components necessary for safe shutdown.* 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G, describes the requirements for the protection of safe shutdown capability.

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section Ill.L, describes the requirements for alternative and dedicated shutdown capability.
NFPA 12, "Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems," 1973 Edition, provides guidance for purchasing, designing, installing, testing, inspecting, approving, listing, operating, and maintaining carbon dioxide fire extinguishing systems.* NFPA 72E, "Automatic Fire Detectors," 1974 Edition, provides the minimum requirements via a consensus code for the performance of automatic fire detectors to ensure the timely warning of a fire for the protection of personnel and property." Branch Technical Position (Auxiliary Power and Control Systems Branch)9.5-1, Appendix A, provides guidelines on the preferred and acceptable alternatives to fire protection design for nuclear power plants for which applications for construction permits were docketed prior to July 1, 1976." NRC Generic Letter 77-02, dated August 29, 1977, "Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance," which provides supplementary guidance on fire protection defense in depth features of fire protection organization, fire brigade training, control of combustibles, control of ignition sources, and fire fighting procedures.

With the implementation of the proposed change, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant continues tomeet the applicable design criteria, regulatory requirements, and commitments. 4.2 Precedent No previous precedent was identified for a similar license amendment request. A search was conducted using the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) database and other similar industry databases. 4.3 Silgnificant Hazards Consideration TVA has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92,"Issuance of amendment," as discussed below: A. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? E-27 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section II.C.4 requires that fire barriers or automatic suppression systems or both shall be installed as necessary to protect redundant systems or components necessary for safe shutdown.

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G, describes the requirements for the protection of safe shutdown capability.

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.L, describes the requirements for alternative and dedicated shutdown capability.

NFPA 12, "Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems," 1973 Edition, provides guidance for purchasing, designing, installing, testing, inspecting, approving, listing, operating, and maintaining carbon dioxide fire extinguishing systems.
NFPA 72E, "Automatic Fire Detectors," 1974 Edition, provides the minimum requirements via a consensus code for the performance of automatic fire detectors to ensure the timely warning of a fire for the protection of personnel and property.
Branch Technical Position (Auxiliary Power and Control Systems Branch) 9.5-1, Appendix A, provides guidelines on the preferred and acceptable alternatives to fire protection design for nuclear power plants for which applications for construction permits were docketed prior to July 1, 1976. NRC Generic Letter 77-02, dated August 29, 1977, "Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance," which provides supplementary guidance on fire protection defense in depth features of fire protection organization, fire brigade training, control of combustibles, control of ignition sources, and fire fighting procedures.

With the implementation of the proposed change, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant continues to meet the applicable design criteria, regulatory requirements, and commitments. 4.2 Precedent No previous precedent was identified for a similar license amendment request. A search was conducted using the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) database and other similar industry databases. 4.3 Significant Hazards Consideration TVA has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, "Issuance of amendment," as discussed below: A. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? E-27 Response: No.The proposed change does not affect the design of the automatic total-flooding C02 suppression system, the operational characteristics or function of the CO 2 suppression system, the interfaces between the C02 suppression system and other plant systems, or the reliability of the C02 suppression system. The C02 suppression system is not considered an initiator of any Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) accident or transient previously evaluated. The CO 2 suppression system is designed to extinguish a fire or control and minimize the effects of a fire until the fire brigade can respond and extinguish it.The consequences of previously evaluated accidents and transients will not be significantly affected by the revised requirements for C02 concentration in the Auxiliary Instrument Room because the C02 suppression system is not credited in the accident analyses. Although the function of the system is to extinguish a fire or control and minimize the effects of a fire until the fire brigade can respond and extinguish it, this function does not mitigate accidents or transients. Thus, the consequences of accidents or transients previously evaluated are not affected by the proposed change in the required C02 concentration for the Auxiliary Instrument Room.Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. B. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated? Response: No.The proposed change does not involve a change in the design, configuration, or method of operation of the plant. The proposed change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is initiated, nor will the functional demands on credited equipment be changed. The capability for fire suppression and extinguishment will not be changed. The proposed change does not affect the interaction of the C02 suppression system with any system whose failure or malfunction can initiate an accident. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced. Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. C. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?Response: No.The proposed change does not alter the plant design, including instrument setpoints, nor does it alter the assumptions contained in the safety analyses.The C02 suppression system is designed for fire suppression and extinguishment and is not assumed or credited for accident mitigation. Although the change does reduce a parameter (C02 concentration) specified in the E-28 Response: No. The proposed change does not affect the design of the automatic total-flooding CO 2 suppression system, the operational characteristics or function of the CO 2 suppression system, the interfaces between the CO 2 suppression system and other plant systems, or the reliability of the CO 2 suppression system. The CO 2 suppression system is not considered an initiator of any Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) accident or transient previously evaluated. The CO 2 suppression system is designed to extinguish a fire or control and minimize the effects of a fire until the fire brigade can respond and extinguish it. The consequences of previously evaluated accidents and transients will not be significantly affected by the revised requirements for CO 2 concentration in the Auxiliary Instrument Room because the CO 2 suppression system is not credited in the accident analyses. Although the function of the system is to extinguish a fire or control and minimize the effects of a fire until the fire brigade can respond and extinguish it, this function does not mitigate accidents or transients. Thus, the consequences of accidents or transients previously evaluated are not affected by the proposed change in the required CO 2 concentration for the Auxiliary Instrument Room. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. B. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated? Response: No. The proposed change does not involve a change in the design, configuration, or method of operation of the plant. The proposed change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is initiated, nor will the functional demands on credited equipment be changed. The capability for fire suppression and extinguishment will not be changed. The proposed change does not affect the interaction of the CO 2 suppression system with any system whose failure or malfunction can initiate an accident. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced. Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. C. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety? Response: No. The proposed change does not alter the plant design, including instrument setpoints, nor does it alter the assumptions contained in the safety analyses. The CO 2 suppression system is designed for fire suppression and extinguishment and is not assumed or credited for accident mitigation. Although the change does reduce a parameter (C0 2 concentration) specified in the E-28 license, the proposed change does not impact the redundancy or availability of equipment required for accident mitigation, or the ability of the plant to cope with design basis accident events.Therefore, the change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.Based on the above, TVA concludes that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideration" is justified.

4.4 Conclusions

In conclusion, based on the considerations discussed above, (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will no be endangered by operation inthe proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION A review has determined that the proposed amendment would change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, or would change an inspection or surveillance requirement. However, the proposed amendment does not involve (1) a significant hazards consideration, (2) a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite, or (3) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the proposedamendment meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed amendment.

6.0 REFERENCES

1. Facility Operating License No. NPF-90, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 2. "Fire Protection Report," Revision 38, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 3. NUREG-0847, Supplement No. 18, "Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-390 and 50-391 ," dated October 1995.4. National Fire Protection Association Standard 12, "Standard for Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems," 1973 Edition.E-29 license, the proposed change does not impact the redundancy or availability of equipment required for accident mitigation, or the ability of the plant to cope with design basis accident events. Therefore, the change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Based on the above, TVA concludes that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideration" is justified.

4.4 Conclusions In conclusion, based on the considerations discussed above, (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will no be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public. 5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION A review has determined that the proposed amendment would change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, or would change an inspection or surveillance requirement. However, the proposed amendment does not involve (1) a significant hazards consideration, (2) a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite, or (3) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the proposed amendment meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed amendment.

6.0 REFERENCES

1. Facility Operating License No. NPF-90, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 2. "Fire Protection Report," Revision 38, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 3. NUREG-0847, Supplement No. 18, "Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-390 and 50-391," dated October 1995. 4. National Fire Protection Association Standard 12, "Standard for Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems," 1973 Edition. E-29

5. Letter from NRC to TVA, "Watts Bar Unit 1 -Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding Carbon Dioxide Automatic Fire Suppression Systems (TAC No.M63648)," dated May 10, 1995.6. Inspection Report 50000390/1995-16, dated April 6, 1995.7. Letter from TVA to NRC, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) -Reply to Request for Additional Information Regarding Carbon Dioxide Automatic Fire Suppression Systems (TAC No. M63648)," dated May 26,1995.8. Inspection Report 05000390/2007007 and 05000391/2007007, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant -NRC Triennial Fire Protection," dated July 30, 2007.9. Integrated Inspection Report 05000390/2008005, 05000391/2008005, and 05000390/2008501, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant -Exercise of Enforcement Discretion," dated February 12, 2009.10. Letter from NRC to TVA, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 -Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for Correction to NUREG-0847, Supplement 18, Related to Carbon Dioxide Fire Suppression System (TAC No.ME0876)," dated July 15, 2009.11. NRC Information Notice 92-28, "Inadequate Fire Suppression System Testing," dated April 8, 1992.12. NUREG/CR-3656, "Evaluation of Suppression Methods for Electrical Cable Fires," dated October 1986.13. NUREG-1805, "Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs): Quantitative Fire Hazard Analysis Methods for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program," dated December 2004.14. Letter from TVA to NRC, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) -Fire Protection Report (FPR) Revision (TAC M63648)," dated June 15,1995.15. Letter from TVA to NRC, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 1 -Request for Correction to NUREG-0847, Supplement 18, Related to WBN Carbon Dioxide Fire Suppression System," dated March 13, 2009.16. Letter from TVA to NRC, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 1 -Denial of Non-Cited Violation (NCV) 05000390/2008005-04, Carbon Dioxide System in Fire Area 48 Failed to Meet Design Criterion," dated March 24, 2009.E-30 5. Letter from NRC to TVA, "Watts Bar Unit 1 -Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding Carbon Dioxide Automatic Fire Suppression Systems (TAC No. M63648)," dated May 10,1995. 6. Inspection Report 50000390/1995-16, dated April 6, 1995. 7. Letter from TVA to NRC, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN)-Reply to Request for Additional Information Regarding Carbon Dioxide Automatic Fire Suppression Systems (TAC No. M63648)," dated May 26,1995. 8. Inspection Report 05000390/2007007 and 05000391/2007007, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant -NRC Triennial Fire Protection," dated July 30,2007. 9. Integrated Inspection Report 05000390/2008005, 05000391/2008005, and 05000390/2008501, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant -Exercise of Enforcement Discretion," dated February 12, 2009. 10. Letter from NRC to TVA, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 -Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for Correction to NUREG-0847, Supplement 18, Related to Carbon Dioxide Fire Suppression System (TAC No. ME0876)," dated July 15, 2009. 11. NRC Information Notice 92-28, "Inadequate Fire Suppression System Testing," dated April 8, 1992. 12. NUREG/CR-3656, "Evaluation of Suppression Methods for Electrical Cable Fires," dated October 1986. 13. NUREG-1805, "Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs): Quantitative Fire Hazard Analysis Methods for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program," dated December 2004. 14. Letter from TVA to NRC, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) -Fire Protection Report (FPR) Revision (TAC M63648)," dated June 15,1995. 15. Letter from TVA to NRC, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 1 -Request for Correction to NUREG-0847, Supplement 18, Related to WBN Carbon Dioxide Fire Suppression System," dated March 13, 2009. 16. Letter from TVA to NRC, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 1 -Denial of Cited Violation (NCV) 05000390/2008005-04, Carbon Dioxide System in Fire Area 48 Failed to Meet Design Criterion," dated March 24, 2009. E-30

7.0 ATTACHMENTS

1. Mark-up of Affected License Pages 2. Final Copy of Affected License Pages 3. Special Performance Test SPT-039-02, "C02 Fire Protection for Unit 1 and Unit 2 Aux Instrument Rooms," Revision 0.4. Special Performance Test Procedure SPT -039-01, "C02 Enclosure Door Fan Testing," Revision 1 (selected sections).

5. Letter from TVA to NRC dated June 15, 1995 and selected sections from the WBN Fire Protection Report, Revision 3.6. WBN Fire Protection Report, Figure 11-33, TVA DWG No. 47W240-6 R8.E-31 7.0 ATTACHMENTS

1. Mark-up of Affected License Pages 2. Final Copy of Affected License Pages 3. Special Performance Test SPT-039-02, "C0 2 Fire Protection for Unit 1 and Unit 2 Aux Instrument Rooms," Revision O. 4. Special Performance Test Procedure SPT -039-01, "C0 2 Enclosure Door Fan Testing," Revision 1 (selected sections).

5. Letter from TVA to NRC dated June 15, 1995 and selected sections from the WBN Fire Protection Report, Revision 3. 6. WBN Fire Protection Report, Figure 11-33, TVA DWG No. 47W240-6 R8. E-31 ATTACHMENT 1 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 NRC Docket No. 50-390 Mark-Up of Affected License Pages ATTACHMENT 1 Watts BarNuclear Plant, Unit 1 Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 NRC Docket No. 50-390 Mark-Up of Affected License Pages 5 (2) The facility was previously granted an exemption from the criticality monitoring requirements of 10 CFR 70.24 (see Special Nuclear Material License No. SNM-1861 dated September 5, 1979). The technical justification is contained in Section 9.1 of Supplement 5 to the Safety Evaluation Report, and the staffs environmental assessment was published on April 18, 1985 (50 FR 15516). The facility is hereby exempted from the criticality alarm system provisions of 10 CFR 70.24 so far as this section applies to the storage of fuel assemblies held underthis license.

(3) The facility requires an exemption from 10 CFR 73.55(c)(10). The justification for this exemption is contained in Section 13.6.9 of Supplement 15 and 20 to the Safety Evaluation Report. The staffs environmental assessment was published on April 25, 1995 (60 FR 20291). Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.5, the facility is exempted from the stated implementation schedule of the surface vehicle bomb rule, and may implement the same as late as February 17, 1996.(4) The facility was previously granted an exemption from certain requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) relating to the returning of picture badges upon exit from the protected areas, such that individuals not employed by TVA who are authorized unescorted access into protected areas can take their badges offsite (see 59 FR 66061, December 22, 1994). The granting of this exemption is hereby affirmed.(5) The facility was previously granted an exemption from certain requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, such that the State of Tennessee, which is within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone, need not participate in the November 1995 full-participation exercise (see 60 FR 54526, October 24, 1995). The granting of this exemption is hereby affirmed.E. TVA shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission approved physical security, training and qualification, and safeguards contingency plans including amendments made pursuant to-- provisions of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements RE-ALIGN revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and 27822) and to the authority SUBSECTIONS of 10 CFR 50.54(p). The combined set of plans, which contains"E"AND"F" Safeguards Information protected under 10 CFR 73.21, is entitled: "Watts-------- --Bar Nuclear Plant Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revision 3," submitted by letter dated May 16, 2006.F. TVA shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Fire Protection Report for the facility, as approved in Supplements 18 and 19 of the SER (NUREG-0847 subject to the following provision: 0 m TVA may make changes to the approved fire protection program 0 without prior approval of the Commission, only if those changes z would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe m shutdown in the event of a fire.except for carbon dioxide concentration requirements for the low-pressure total-> carbon dioxide system provided for the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room m as approved in Safety Evaluation [##] dated [MONTH] [##], 20[##], Revised by letter dated August 9, 2007 and Correction letter dated September 18, 2007 (2) (3) (4) (5) E. , 5 The facility was previously granted an exemption from the criticality monitoring requirements of 10 CF:R 70.24 (see Special Nuclear Material License No. SNM-1861 dated September 5,1979). The technical justification is contained in Section 9.1 of Supplement 5 to the Safety Evaluation Report, and the staffs environmental assessment was published on April 18, 1985 (50 FR 15516). The facility is hereby exempted from the criticality alarm system provisions of 10 CFR 70.24 so far as this section applies to the storage of fuel assemblies held under this license. The facility requires an exemption from 10 CFR 73.55(c)(1 0). The justification for this exemption is contained in Section 13.6.9 of Supplement 15 and 20 to the Safety Evaluation Report. The staffs environmental assessment was published on April 25, 1995 (60 FR 20291). Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.5, the facility is exempted from the stated implementation schedule of the surface vehicle bomb rule, and may implement the same as late as February 17, 1996. The facility was previously granted an exemption from certain requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) relating to the returning of picture badges upon exit from the protected areas, such that individuals not employed by TVA who are authorized unescorted access into protected areas can take their badges offsite (see 59 FR 66061, December 22, 1994). The granting of this exemption is hereby affirmed. The facility was previously granted an exemption from certain requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, such that the State of Tennessee, which is within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone, need not participate in the November 1995 participation exercise (see 60 FR 54526, October 24, 1995). The granting of this exemption is hereby affirmed. , TVA shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission approved physical security, training and qualification, and safeguards contingency plans including amendments made pursuant to provisions of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and 27822) and to the authority of 10 CFR 50.54(p). The combined set of plans, which contains Safeguards Information protected under 10 CFR 73.21, is entitled: "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revision 3," submitted by letter dated : RE-ALIGN : : SUBSECTIONS

: "E" AND "F" : , ,

______ I s:: o < m -I o z m X -I "'0 e; m , , , May 16, 2006. F. TVA shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Fire Protection Report for the facility, as approved in Supplements 18 and 19 of the SER (NUREG-0847. subject to the following provision: r--------' TVA may make changes to the approved fire protection program without prior approval of the Commission, only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire. , except for carbon dioxide concentration requirements for the low-pressure _ flooding carbon dioxide system provided for the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room . as approved in Safety Evaluation [##] dated [MONTH] [##], 20[##], Revised by letter dated August 9,2007 and Correction letter dated September 18, 2007 5a G. Except as otherwise provided in the Technical Specifications (Appendix A to this license) or Environmental Protection Plan (Appendix B to this license), TVA shall report any violations of the requirements contained in Section 2.C of this license in the following manner: initial notification shall be made within twenty-four (24)hours to the NRC Operations Center via the Emergency Notification System with written follow-up within 30 days in accordance with the procedures described in 10 CFR 50.73 (b), (c), and (e).H. The licensee shall have and maintain financial protection of such types and in such amounts as the Commission shall require in accordance with Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to cover public liability claims.Revised by letter dated August 9, 2007 5a G. Except as otherwise provided in the Technical Specifications (Appendix A to this license) or Environmental Protection Plan (Appendix B to this license), TVA shall report any violations of the requirements contained in Section 2.C of this license in the following manner: initial notification shall be made within twenty-four (24) hours to the NRC Operations Center via the Emergency Notification System with written follow-up within 30 days in accordance with the procedures described in 10 CFR 50.73 (b), (c), and (e). H. The licensee shall have and maintain financial protection of such types and in such amounts as the Commission shall require in accordance with Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to cover public liability claims. Revised by letter dated August 9, 2007 ATTACHMENT 2 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 NRC Docket No. 50-390 Final Copy of Affected License Pages ATTACHMENT 2 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 NRC Docket No. 50-390 Final Copy of Affected License Pages 5 (2) The facility was previously granted an exemption from the criticality monitoring requirements of 10 CFR 70.24 (see Special Nuclear Material License No. SNM-1861 dated September 5, 1979). The technical justification is contained in Section 9.1 of Supplement 5 to the Safety Evaluation Report, and the staff's environmental assessment was published on April 18, 1985 (50 FR 15516). The facility is hereby exempted from the criticality alarm system provisions of 10 CFR 70.24 so far as this section applies to the storage of fuel assemblies held under this license.(3) The facility requires an exemption from 10 CFR 73.55(c)(1 0). The justification for this exemption is contained in Section 13.6.9 of Supplement 15 and 20 to the Safety Evaluation Report. The staff's environmental assessment was published on April 25, 1995 (60 FR 20291). Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.5, the facility is exempted from the stated implementation schedule of the surface vehicle bomb rule, and may implement the same as late as February 17, 1996.(4) The facility was previously granted an exemption from certain requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) relating to the returning of picture badges upon exit from the protected areas, such that individuals not employed by TVA who are authorized unescorted access into protected areas can take their badges offsite (see 59 FR 66061, December 22, 1994). The granting of this exemption is hereby affirmed.(5) The facility was previously granted an exemption from certain requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, such that the State of Tennessee, which is within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone, need not participate in the November 1995 full-participation exercise (see 60 FR 54526, October 24, 1995). The granting of this exemption is hereby affirmed.E. TVA shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission approved physical security, training and qualification, and safeguards contingency plans including amendments made pursuant to provisions of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and 27822) and to the authority of 10 CFR 50.54(p). The combined set of plans, which contains Safeguards Information protected under 10 CFR 73.21, is entitled: "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revision 3," submitted by letter dated May 16, 2006.Revised by letter dated August 9, 2007 and Correction letter dated September 18, 2007 Amendment No. [##]5 (2) The facility was previously granted an exemption from the criticality monitoring requirements of 10 CFR 70.24 (see Special Nuclear Material License No. SNM-1861 dated September 5, 1979). The technical justification is contained in Section 9.1 of Supplement 5 to the Safety Evaluation Report, and the staff's environmental assessment was published on April 18, 1985 (50 FR 15516). The facility is hereby exempted from the criticality alarm system provisions of 10 CFR 70.24 so far as this section applies to the storage of fuel assemblies held under this license. (3) The facility requires an exemption from 10 CFR 73.55(c)(10). The justification for this exemption is contained in Section 13.6.9 of Supplement 15 and 20 to the Safety Evaluation Report. The staff's environmental assessment was published on April 25, 1995 (60 FR 20291). Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.5, the facility is exempted from the stated implementation schedule of the surface vehicle bomb rule, and may implement the same as late as February 17,1996. (4) The facility was previously granted an exemption from certain requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) relating to the returning of picture badges upon exit from the protected areas, such that individuals not employed by TVA who are authorized unescorted access into protected areas can take their badges offsite (see 59 FR 66061, December 22, 1994). The granting of this exemption is hereby affirmed. (5) The facility was previously granted an exemption from certain requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, such that the State of Tennessee, which is within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone, need not participate in the November 1995 participation exercise (see 60 FR 54526, October 24, 1995). The granting of this exemption is hereby affirmed. E. TVA shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission approved physical security, training and qualification, and safeguards contingency plans including amendments made pursuant to provisions of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and 27822) and to the authority of 10 CFR 50.54(p). The combined set of plans, which contains Safeguards Information protected under 10 CFR 73.21, is entitled: "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revision 3," submitted by letter dated May 16, 2006. Revised by letter dated August 9, 2007 and Correction letter dated September 18, 2007 Amendment No. [##] 5a F. TVA shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Fire Protection Report for the facility, as approved in Supplements 18 and 19 of the SER (NUREG-0847), except for carbon dioxide concentration requirements for the low-pressure total-flooding carbon dioxide system provided for the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room which are as approved in Safety Evaluation [##] dated [MONTH] [##], 20[##], subject to the following provision: TVA may make changes to the approved fire protection program without prior approval of the Commission, only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.G. Except as otherwise provided in the Technical Specifications (Appendix A to this license) or Environmental Protection Plan (Appendix B to this license), TVA shall report any violations of the requirements contained in Section 2.C of this license in the following manner: initial notification shall be made within twenty-four (24)hours to the NRC Operations Center via the Emergency Notification System with written follow-up within 30 days in accordance with the procedures described in 10 CFR 50.73 (b), (c), and (e).H. The licensee shall have and maintain financial protection of such types and in such amounts as the Commission shall require in accordance with Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to cover public liability claims.Revised by letter dated August 9, 2007 Amendment No. [##]5a F . TVA shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Fire Protection Report for the facility, as approved in Supplements 18 and 19 of the SER (NUREG-0847), except for carbon dioxide concentration requirements for the low-pressure total-flooding carbon dioxide system provided for the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room which are as approved in Safety Evaluation [##] dated [MONTH] [##], 20[##], subject to the following provision: TVA may make changes to the approved fire protection program without prior approval of the Commission, only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire. G. Except as otherwise provided in the Technical Specifications (Appendix A to this license) or Environmental Protection Plan (Appendix B to this license), TVA shall . report any violations of the requirements contained in Section 2.C of this license in the following manner: initial notification shall be made within twenty-four (24) hours to the NRC Operations Center via the Emergency Notification System with written follow-up within 30 days in accordance with the procedures described in 10 CFR 50.73 (b), (c), and (e). H. The licensee shall have and maintain financial protection of such types and in such amounts as the Commission shall require in accordance with Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to cover public liability claims. Revised by letter dated August 9, 2007 Amendment No. [##] ATTACHMENT 3 Special Performance Test"CO 2 Fire Protection for Unit 1 and Unit 2 Aux Instrument Rooms" SPT-039-02 Revision 0 ATTACHMENT 3 Special Performance Test "C0 2 Fire Protection for Unit 1 and Unit 2 Aux Instrument Rooms" SPT-039-02 Revision 0 Page 1 of TEST

SUMMARY

REPORT Test Number: SPT-039-02, Rev 0 Title: CO, Fire Protection for Unit 1 and Unit 2 Aux Instrument Rooms Startup Test Engineer: Wayne Bichlmeir TEST SUMMALRY This Special Performance Test (SPT) was started on 07/16/95 and was field completed on 07/23/95. Three (3) deficiencies and five (5) change notices were written during the performance of this SPT. All TDNs have been addressed and closed.This test was performed utilizing plant equipment under normal and simulated conditions. This test was performed as a follow-up to PTI-039-01. OBJECTIVES 1.1 The specific objective of this Special Performance Test was as follows: 1.1.1 Demonstrate that discharge of CO 2 into the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Aux Instrument Rooms will provide the required CO 2 concentration for fire control.TEST DATA COMPARISON All required acceptance criteria of this test were met as delineated below: 2.1 Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room attained !32% C0 2 concentration within 2 minutes, :52% CO 2 within 7 minutes and maintained

47k CO 2 after 15 minutes (includes

+/- 2%M&TE accuracy). 2.2 Unit 2 Auxiliary Instrument Room attained a32% CO 2 concentration within 2 minutes, CO 2 within 7 minutes and maintained

47% CO 2 after 15 minutes (includes

+/- 2%M&TE accuracy). A3-1 I Test Number: Title: TEST

SUMMARY

REPORT SPT-039-02, Rev 0 CO 2 Fire Protection for Unit 1 and Unit :2 Aux Instrument Rooms Page 3f9 Startup Test Engineer: Wayne Bichlmeir TEST

SUMMARY

This Special Performance Test (SPT) was started on 07/16/95 and was field completed on 07/23/95. Three (3) deficiencies and five (5) change notices were written during the performance of this SPT. All TDNs have been addressed and closed. This test was performed utilizing plant equipment under normal and simulated conditions. This test was performed as a follow-up to PTI-039-01. OBJECTIVES 1.1 The specific of this Special Performance Test was as follows: 1.1.1 Demonstrate that discharge of CO 2 into the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Aux Instrument Rooms will provide the required CO 2 concentration for fire control. TEST DATA COMPARISON All required acceptance criteria of this test were met as delineated below: 2.1 unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room attained CO 2 concentration within 2 minutes, CO 2 within 7 minutes and maintained CO 2 after 15 minutes (includes +/-2% M&TE accuracy) . 2.2 Unit 2 Auxiliary Instrument Room attained CO 2 concentration within 2 minutes, CO 2 within 7 minutes and maintained CO 2 after 15 minutes (includes +/-2% M&TE accuracy) . A3-1 TEST

SUMMARY

REPORT SPT-039-02, Rev 0 Page 2 of 5 TEST DEFICIENCY NOTICES TDN #95-0778 Status: Closed TDN #95-0779 Status: Closed This TDN was written at Step 6.1.15 due to Unit 1 Aux Instrument Room pressure rising toward the maximum allowable limit of 27" w.c.Due to terminating the test earlier than anticipated, Restoration Steps 6.1.15 through 6.1.31 could not be performed as written. The CO 2 System was subsequently safely restored.Since the CO 2 concentrations were acceptable, I-IC-39-14 will be reset by WO 95-17680-00 to a lower time setting noted during the discharge test and specified in DCN S37610.No retesting was required.This TDN was written due to two occurrences noted during the Unit 1 Aux Instrument Room discharge test.Item 1 -Multiple alarms occurred in the Main Control Room. During the Unit 2 Aux Instrument Room C02 Discharge Test, temperature in the Aux Instrument Room reached-23 degrees F. Electronic equipment such as Eagle-21 and the Solid State ProtectQin System (SSPS) are designed to operate at temperatures between 40 and 120 degrees F.A review of the Annunciator System alarm printout during the Unit 1 Aux Instrument Room C02 Discharge Test showed only one Eagle-21 trouble alarm (Rack 3) and no Eagle-21 failure alarms. The trouble alarm was attributed to an input out-of-range, a condition probably not caused by the C02 test. Therefore, even though the Eagle-21 equipment was subjected to environmental conditions outside its design limits, the equipment continued to function as designed.A review of the Annunciator alarm printout did show that one train of SSPS was affected by the C02 test. The affect was limited tomultiplexer functions as no ESF actuations occurred. Therefore, even though the SSPS equipment was subjected to environmental conditions outside its design limits the equipment continued to function as designed.No retesting was required.0 A3-2 21, , TEST

SUMMARY

REPORT SPT-039-02, Rev 0 Page 2 of 5 TEST DEFICIENCY NOTICES TDN #95-0778 Status: Closed TDN #95-0779 Status: Closed This TDN was written at Step 6.1.15 due to Unit 1 Aux Instrument Room pressure rising toward the maximum allowable limit of 27" w.c. Due to terminating the test earlier than anticipated, Restoration Steps 6.1.15 through 6.1.31 could not be performed as written. The COl System was subsequently safely restored. Since the CO 2 concentrations were acceptable, l-IC-39-14 will be reset by WO 95-17680-00 to a lower time setting noted during the discharge test and specified in DCN 837610. No retesting was required. This TDN was written due to two occurrences noted during the Unit 1 Aux Instrument Room discharge test. Item 1 -Multiple alarms occurred in the Main Control Room. During the Unit 2 Aux Instrument Room C02 Discharge Test, temperature in theAux Instrument Room reached -23 degrees F. Electronic equipment such as Eagle-21 and the Solid State Syetem (SSPS) are designed to operate at temperatures between 40 and 120 degrees F. A review of the Annunciator System alarm printout during the Unit 1 Aux Instrument Room C02 Discharge Test showed only one Eagle-21 trouble alarm (Rack 3) and no Eagle-21 failure alarms. The trouble alarm was attributed to an input out-of-range, a condition probably not caused by the C02 test. Therefore, even though the Eagle-21 equipment was subjected to environmental conditions outside its design limits, the equipment continued to function as designed. A review of the Annunciator alarm printout did show that one train of SSPS was affected by the C02 test. The affect was limited to mUltiplexer functions as no ESF actuations occurred. Therefore, even though the SSPS equipment was subjected to environmental conditions outside its design limits the equipment continued to function as designed. No retesting was required. A3-2 TEST

SUMMARY

REPORT SPT-039-02, Rev 0 Page 3 of 5 Item 2 -Wintergreen odor was detected in the Main Control Room. The Site Engineering evaluation is as follows;During the recent CO 2 test in the Control Building Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room, the wintergreen odor was detected in the Main Control Room (MCR). This is evidence that CO 2 leaked into the room. Since there was no indication of leakage into the MCR during the testing of the Unit 2 Auxiliary Instrument Room, the primary leak path appears to be the Battery Room exhaust duct which passes through the Main Control Room Habitability Zone (MCRHZ). A pressure relief damper was previously added in this duct where it passes through the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room, on DCN W-35595-A. This damper opens at 8-inches w.c. to allow air in the room to escape and let the CO 2 concentration build up to the proper level and protects the walls from overpressurization. The Battery Room duct in the MCRHZ was recently tested for leakage at 2.0 inches w.c. Most of the duct is welded and the primary source of leakage is around the isolation damper shafts in the portion of the duct near the roof. The measured leakage was 1.835 cfm at 2.0 inches w.c. At 25-inches w.c. the leakage can be estimated as follows: leakage @ 25-inches w.c. leakage at 2.0 inches w.c. x[25/2.0]' = 1.835 x 3.536 6.49 cfm This estimate is conservative because the compressibility factor will be lower at the higher pressure, the reynolds number will be higher, and the actual pressure in the duct will be lower than 25 inches w.c. This quantity of CO 2 is not high enough to create an unsuitable environment in the MCRHZ.Another possible source of leakage would be through the floor drains in the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room which are connected to the floor and equipment drains in the MCRHZ. These drains are trapped and refilled periodically. There is a possibility that CO 2 could leak past the water seals, but the leakage would be small with respect to the volume of the MCRHZ and the normal ventilation air (approximately 3200 cfm), so that an unacceptable concentration of CO2 would not occur in the MCRHZ.A3-3 TEST

SUMMARY

REPORT SPT-039-02, Rev 0 Page 3 of 5 Item 2 -Wintergreen odor was detected in the Main Control Room. The Site Engineering evaluation is as follows: During the recent CO 2 test in the Control Building Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room, the wintergreen odor was detected in the Main Control Room (MCR). This is evidence that CO 2 leaked into the room. Since there was no indication of leakage into the MCR during the testing of the Unit 2 Auxiliary Instrument Room, the primary leak path appears to be the Battery Room exhaust duct which passes through the Main Control Room Habitability Zone (MCRHZ). A pressure relief damper was previously added in this duct where it passes through the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room, on DCN W-35595-A. This damper opens at a-inches W.c. to allow air in the room to escape and let the CO 2 concentration build up to the proper level and protects the walls from overpressurization. The Battery Room duct in the MCRHZ was recently tested for leakage at 2.0 inches w.c. Most of the duct is and the primary source of leakage is around the isolation 'damper shafts in the portion of the duct near the roof. The measured leakage was 1.835 cfm at 2.0 inches w.c. At 25-inches w.e. the leakage can be estimated as follows: leakage @ 25-inches W.c. = leakage at 2.0 inches W.c. x = 1.835 x 3.536 = 6.49 cfm This estimate is conservative because the compressibility factor will be lower at the higher pressure, the reynolds number will be higher, and the actual pressure in the duct will be lower than 25 inches W.c. This quantity of CO 2 is not high enough to create an unsuitable environment in the MCRHZ. Another possible source of leakage would be through the floor drains in the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room which are connected to the floor and equipment drains in the MCRHZ. These drains are trapped and refilled periodically. There is a possibility that CO 2 could leak past the water seals, but the leakage would be small with respect to the volume of the MCRHZ and the normal ventilation air (approximately 3200 cfm), so that an unacceptable concentration of CO 2 would not occur in the MCRHZ. A3-3 TEST

SUMMARY

REPORT SPT-039-02, Rev 0 Page 4 of 5 The CO 2 air mixture, exhausted through the Battery Room duct, is released on the roof approximately 50 feet from the fresh air intake. Even if the prevailing wind carried the mixture into the intake it would be diluted with approximately 3200 cfm outside air being drawn into the intake for exhaust makeup and for MCRHZ pressurization. CO 2 which leaks into the stairway near the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room and the lower floors of the Control Building will not enter the MCRHZ because these areas are maintained at a negative 1/8-inch w.c. with respect to the MCRHZ. Alarms will activate if the pressure in one of these areas becomes too high.Based on this system evaluation, sufficient levels of CO 2 will not leak into the MCRHZ during a CO 2 release to have an adverse affect on the MCRHZ environment. No retesting was required.SITE ENGINEERING DATV This TDN was written at Step 6.2.15 due to Unit 2 Aux Instrument Room pressure rising toward the maximum allowable limit of 27" w.c.Due to terminating the test earlier than anticipated, Restoration Steps 6.2.15 through 6.2.26 could not be performed as written. The C0 2 System was subsequently safely restored.Since the CO 2 concentrations were acceptable, 2-IC-39-16 will be reset by WO 95-17680-00 to a lower time setting noted during the discharge test and specified in DCN S37610.No retesting was required.TDN #95-0791 Status: Closed 0 Ut'A3-4"\ TDN #95-0791 Status: Closed TEST

SUMMARY

REPORT SPT-039-02, Rev 0 Page 4 of 5 The CO 2 air mixture, exhausted through the Battery Room duct, is released on the roof approximately 50 feet from the fresh air intake. Even if the prevailing wind carried the mixture into the intake it would be diluted with approximately 3200 cfm outside air being drawn into the intake for exhaust makeup and for MCRHZ pressurization. CO 2 which leaks into the stairway near the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room and the lower floors of the Control Building will not enter the MCRHZ because these areas are maintained at a negative liS-inch w.c. with respect to the MCRHZ. Alarms will activate if the pressure in one of these areas becomes too high. Based on this system evaluation, sufficient levels of CO 2 will not leak into the MCRHZ during a CO 2 release to have an adverse affect on the MCRHZ environment. No retesting was required. !' J (.t{II£';I.W I SITE ENGINEERING This TDN was written at Step 6.2.15 due to Unit 2 Aux Instrument Room pressure r1s1ng toward the maximum allowable limit of 27" w.c. Que to terminating the test earlier than ant,icipated, Restoration Steps 6.2.15 through 6.2.26 could not be performed as written. The CO 2 System was subsequently safely restored. Since the CO 2 concentrations were acceptable, 2-IC-39-16 will be reset by WO 95-17680-00 to a lower time setting noted during the discharge test and specified in DCN S37610. No retesting was required. A3-4 TEST

SUMMARY

-REPORT SPT-039-02, Rev 0 Page 5 of 5 CHANGE NOTICES CN-01 Type: Non-Intent CN-02 Type: CN-03 Type: CN-04 Type: CN-05 Type: Non-Intent Non-Intent Non-Intent Non-Intent Changes incorporated NRC comments to ensure puff test was completed as a prerequisite and timers have been reset. Also, added details of maximum allowable room pressure, a step to monitor and record room pressure, and personnel are positioned to monitor pressure with a digital pressure gauge. Changed PM frequency from monthly to quarterly and deleted requirement for CO 2 cal gas certification papers.Change added Note that intent of test is to determine time of discharge of CO 2.Change incorporated steps to prevent overpressurization of CO 2 header by opening area selector valve after discharge is completed. Change made to measure CO 2 discharge time by chart recorder and change sequence of removing CO 2 from header after concentration testing is completed. Change made to close Valve 0-ISV-39-522 due to Operations' preference. JUSTIFICATION FOR ACCEPTANCE All components within the scope of this test successfully operated per design and all acceptance criteria were met.CONCLUSIONS Based on the successful completion of testing on all components contained within this Special Performance Test, SPT-039-02, Rev 0, is recommended for approval.CAartup and Test Engineer Test Group Supervisor Date Date.4 A3-5*1~, , CHANGE NOTICES CN-Ol Type: Non-Intent CN-02 Type: Non-Intent CN-03 Type: Non-Intent CN-04 Type: Non-Intent CN-OS Type: Non-Intent TEST

SUMMARY

'REPORT SPT-039-02, Rev 0 Page 5 of 5 Changes incorporated NRC comments to ensure puff test was completed as a prerequisite and timers have been reset. Also, added details of maximum allowable room pressure, a step to monitor and record room pressure, and personnel are positioned to monitor pressure with a digital pressure gauge. Changed PM frequency from monthly to quarterly and deleted requirement for CO 2 cal gas certification papers. Change added Note that intent of test is to determine time of discharge of CO 2 , Change incorporated steps to prevent overpressurization of CO 2 header by opening area selector valve after discharge is completed. Change made to measure CO 2 discharge time by chart recorder and change sequence of removing CO 2 from header after concentration testing is completed. Change made to close Valve O-ISV-39-S22 due to Operations' preference. JUSTIFICATION FOR ACCEPTANCE All components within the scope of this test successfully operated per design and all acceptance criteria were met. CONCLUSIONS Based on the successful completion of testing on all components contained within this Special Performance Test, SPT-039-02, Rev 0, is recommended for approval. W and Test Engineer 8 'f 5 Date Test Group Supervisor 7 Date A3-5 l~III a a ISIIII 1 u991-I0IM I I I)0 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 STARTUP TITLE: CO2 FIRE PROTECTION FOR UNIT 1& UNIT 2 AUX INSTRUMENT ROOMS Procedure No: Revision No: SPT-039-02 0 PREPARED BY: REVIEWED BY: Wayne Bichlmeir DATE:_________ k'O~PROCEDURE APPROVAL JTG MEETING NO: Al A JTG CHAIRMAN: APPROVED BY:/5ý- Fosk -DATE: DATE: l-11-"r STARTUP MANAGER TEST RESULTS APPROVAL i%'Lf~JTG MEETING NO: JTG CHAIRMAN: APPROVED BY: 1 DATE: DATE: 2.S V OFFICIAL TEST COPY A3-6 U-WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 STARTUP TITLE: C02 FIRE PROTECTION FOR UNIT 1 & UNIT 2 AUX INSTRUMENT ROOMS Procedure No: SPT-039-02 Revision No: 0 PREPARED BY: Bichlmeir ,.,--REVIEWED BY: DATE: -::/.//,Q

, r PROCEDURE APPROVAL JTG MEETING NO: Al A-JTG CHAIRMAN:
J: l&-F .. DATE: AJA APPROVED BY: DATE: *1-II-C,r STARTUP MANAGER TEST RESULTS APPROVAL JTG MEETING NO: tv/r. I lJ JTG CHAIRMAN:

N/A DATE: NLA APPROVED BY: ).4, {fA _ MB i1./Q ( I ' :;'1'7!UP r V OFFICIAL TEST COpy A3-6 SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 2 of 33 TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE 1.0 TEST OBJECTIVES ..... .......... .... ....... 3

2.0 REFERENCES

....... ................ ............... 4 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND NOTES ............... ................ 5 4.0 PREREQUISITE ACTIONS ................ .............. 74.1 Test Equipment .................. .................... 7 4.2 Preliminary Actions ............... ................. 8 4.3 Approvals and Notifications ........... ............. 11 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ........... ................. 12 6.0 TEST INSTRUCTIONS ............. .................. 13 6.1 Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room CO 2 Concentration Test ............................... 13 6.2 Unit 2 Auxiliary Instrument Room CO 2 Concentration Test .................. ......................... 20 7.0 POST-PERFORMANCE ACTIVITIES ....... ............. .. 27 8.0 SUPPORTING MATERIAL ........... ................. 29 OFFICIAL TEST COPY A3-7 SECTION 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 5.0 6.0 6.1 6.2 7.0 9.0 TABLE OF CONTENTS SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 2 of 33 PAGE TEST OBJECTIVES " REFERENCES , . . PRECAUTIONS AND NOTES PREREQUISITE ACTIONS Test Equipment , . , Preliminary Ac tiona ,. Approvals and Notifications ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA TEST INSTRUCTIONS Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room COl Concentration Test .,. ................... . Unit 2 Auxiliary Instrument Room COl Concentration Test POST-PERFORMANCE ACTIVITIES SUPPORTING MATERIAL OFFICIAL TEST COpy A3-7 3 4 5 7 7 8 11 12 13 13 20 27 29 SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 3 of 33 1.0 TEST OBJECTIVES 1.1 Demonstrate that discharge of CO 2 into the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Aux Instrument Rooms will provide the required CO 2 concentration for fire control.OFFICIAL TEST COPY A3-8 1.0 TEST OBJECTIVES SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision a Page 3 of 33 1.1 Demonstrate that discharge of CO 2 into the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Aux Instrument Rooms will provide the required CO 2 concentration for fire control. OFFICIAL TEST COpy A3-8 SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 4 of 33

2.0 REFERENCES

2.1 Final Safety Analysis Report -Amendment 89 2.1.1 Table 14.2-1, Sheets 13 and 14 of 90 Fire Protection System Test Summary 2.2 Drawings 2.2.1 Flow Diagrams 2.2.1.1 1-45W600-39-1, (CC)Wiring Diagram CO. Fire Protection System Schematic Diagrams 2.2.1.2 1-47W843-1, (CC)Flow Diagram CO 2 Storage, Fire Protection & Purging System 2.3 Vendor Manuals 2.3.1 WBN-VTM-AS06-0300, Vendor Technical Manual for ASCOA Fire Systems Chemetron 24-Ton CO 2 Fire Protection System, TVA Contract No. 76K71-83208, Rev 3 2.4 Documents 2.4.1 FPI-0102, Fire Protection Instruction, Administrative Controls, Rev 4 2.4.2 TVA Nuclear Power Safety and Health Manual, Section VI, Part B, Confined Space Entry Requirements, Rev 10 2.4.3 N3-39-4002, System Description for CO 2 Storage, Fire Protection and Purging 2.4.4 SOI-39.01, Powerhouse C0 2 System OFFICIAL TEST COPY A3-9 SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 4 of 33

2.0 REFERENCES

2.1 Final.Sa£ety Analysis Report -Amendment 89 2.1.1 Table 14.2-1, Sheets 13 14 of 90 Fire Protection System Test Summary 2.2 Drawings 2.2.1 Flow Diagrams 2.2.1.1 1-4SW600-39-1, (CC) Wiring Diagram CO 2 Fire Protection System Schematic Diagrams 2.2.1.2 1-47WB43-1, (CC) Flow Diagram CO 2 Storage, Fire Protection & Purging System 2.3 Vendor Manuals 2.3.1 WBN-VTM-AS06-0300, Vendor Technical Manual for ASCOA Fire Systems Chemetron 24-Ton CO 2 Fire Protection System, TVA Contract No. 76K71-83208, Rev 3 2.4 Documents 2.4.1 2.4.2 2.4.3 2.4.4 FPI-OI02, Fire Protection Instruction, Administrative Controls, Rev 4 TVA Nuclear Power Safety and Health Manual, Section VI, Part B, Confined Space Entry Requirements, Rev 10 N3-39-4002, System Description for CO 2 Storage, Fire Protection and Purging SOI-39.01, Powerhouse CO 2 System OFFICIAL TEST COpy A3-9 q SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 5 of 33 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND NOTES 3.1 Portions of this test will be conducted in or around electrically energized equipment. 3.2 TVA prescribed safety practices regarding working in or around electrically energized equipment shall be followed for protection of personnel and equipment. 3.3 Maintain communications between an Operator stationed at the C0 2 Tank Shutoff Valve (when person is stationed at valve), the Control Room and the Test Director.3.4 Do not activate Fire Protection System alarms without the On-Duty. Shift Operation's Supervisor's (SOS's) prior knowledge. This is to avoid confusion in case there is a valid fire alarm.3.5 All fire doors without CO 2 release devices must be closed, and associated latches and flush bolts must be functional and securely engaged or fastened prior to CO 2 discharge in a hazard area.3.6 The CO 2 Storage Tank level shall be maintained above 25 inches H 2 0, as read on 0-LI-39-2, and 300 +/-15 psig, as read on 0-PI-39-3A, with the refrigeration unit in service at all times. If CO 2 Tank level drops below 43 inches H 2 0, notify the SOS.3.7 Pipe walls should be allowed to warm to ambient temperatures between pressurization and discharges during CO 2 concentration test.3.8 Sufficient Ventilation System fans and dampers must be operable and available to ensure CO 2 can be removed from the CO 2 test areas. Temporary fans and ventilation equipment should be available to aid in purging CO 2 from tested areas, as necessary. 3.9 A minimum of two SCBA qualified persons are required to enter a hazard area prior to verification that oxygen levels are a19.5% after CO 2 has been discharged. Additionally, two (2) extra SCBA units are to be stationed near the hazard area. Personnel must wear air breathing apparatus when entering a hazard area where CO 2 has been discharged. OFFICIAL TEST COPY A3-1 0\ 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND NOTES SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 5 of 33 3.1 Portions of this test will be conducted in or around electrically energized equipment. 3.2 TVA prescribed safety practices regarding working in or around electrically energized equipment shall be followed for protection of personnel and equipment. 3.3 Maintain communications between an Operator stationed at the CO 2 Tank Shutoff Valve (when person is stationed at valve) I the Control Room and the Test Director. 3.4 Do not activate Fire Protection System alarms without the On-Duty, Shift Operation's Supervisor's (SOS's) prior knowledge. This is to avoid confusion in ,case there is a valid fire alarm. 3.5 All fire doors without CO 2 release devices must be closed, and associated latches and flush bolts must be functional and engaged or fastened prior to CO 2 discharge in a hazard area. 3.6 The CO 2 storage Tank level shall be maintained above 25 inches H 2 0, as read on O-LI-39-2, and 300 +/-lS psig, as read on 0-PI-39-3A, with the refrigeration unit in service at all times. If CO 2 Tank level drops below 43 inches H 2 0, notify the SOS. 3.7 Pipe walls should be allowed to warm to ambient temperatures between pressurization and discharges during CO 2 concentration test. 3.8 Sufficient Ventilation System fans and dampers must be operable and available to ensure CO 2 can be removed from the CO 2 test areas. Temporary fans and ventilation equipment should be available to aid in purging CO 2 from tested areas, as necessary. 3.9 A minimum of two SCBA qualified persons are required to enter a hazard area prior to verification that oxygen levels are after CO 2 has been discharged. Additionally, two (2) extra SCBA units are to be stationed near the hazard area. Personnel must wear air breathing apparatus when entering a hazard area where CO 2 has been discharged. OFFICIAL TeST COpy A3-10 SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 6 of 33 3.10 This test should be performed with ambient temperatures between 32 0 F and 120 0 F. There are no special environmental conditions necessary. 3.11 A Confined Space Entry Permit will be required to access the Cardox CO 2 Central Unit, 0-TANK-39-3, located in the Yard area vault.3.12 Equipment tested in this procedure is connected to a refrigerated pressure vessel containing carbon dioxide.The agent container is under pressure and presents physical and health hazards. Valves may be under pressure. Bodily injury and/or property damage could occur if testing is performed improperly. 3.13 When discharged, carbon dioxide is at a very low temperature and may cause frostbite. Avoid skin and eye contact.3.14 Inhalation of carbon dioxide, upon a discharge that results in low concentrations, may produce increased respiration, headache, nausea, and vomiting leading to unconsciousness. 3.15 Inhalation of carbon dioxide, upon a discharge that Wresults in high concentrations, may produce rapid circulation, insufficiency and paralysis of breathing, leading to coma and death.3.16 Prior to discharging C0 2 , personnel shall be evacuated from the areas being tested and signs posted to prevent unauthorized entry into the test area.3.17 If closure of any valve does not stop discharge of C0 2 , 0-ISV-39-522 is to be closed.3.18 Test personnel should remain clear of doors subjected to CO 2 discharge testing as door failure can occur.OFFICIAL TEST COPY A3-11 3.10 3.11 3.12 3.13 3.14 3.15 3.16 3.17 3.18 \, .\ SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 6 of 33 This test should be performed with ambient temperatures between 32°F and 120°F. There are no special environmental conditions necessary. A Confined Space Entry Permit will be required to access the Cardox CO 2 Central Unit, O-TANK-39-3, located in the Yard area vault. Equipment tested in this procedure is connected to a refrigerated pressure vessel containing carbon dioxide. The agent container is under pressure and presents physical and health hazards. Valves may be under pressure. Bodily injury and/or property damage could occur if testing is performed improperly. When discharged, carbon dioxide is at a very low temperature and may cause frostbite. Avoid skin and eye contact. Inhalation of carbon dioxide, upon a discharge that results in low concentrations, may produce increased respiration, headache, nausea, and vomiting. leading to unconsciousness. Inhalation of carbon dioxide, upon a discharge that results in high concentrations, may produce rapid circulation, insufficiency and paralysis of breathing, leading to coma and death. , Prior to discharging CO 2 , personnel shall be evacuated from the areas being tested and signs posted to prevent unauthorized entry into the test area. If closure of any valve does not stop discharge of CO 2 , O-ISV-39-S22 is to be closed. Test personnel should remain clear of doors subjected to CO 2 discharge testing as door failure can occur. OFFICIAL TEST COpy A3-11 SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 7 of 33 4.0 PREREQUISITE ACTIONS 4.1 Test Equipment 4.1.1 The following M&TE or equivalent is available: A. 0-25% 02 Oxygen Monitor/Indicator (+/-12% STD. Gas)B. 0-100% CO 2 Carbon Dioxide Concentration Meter with three (3) sensor points minimum (+/-2% F.S.)C. 0-120OF Hand Held Thermometer (+/-2%)D. 0- o"Ht 1420IG'iTAL FftSSRE G.AGE+/-v7 0) A)-.'(-.&LS 7-13-15,1 4.1.2 The following are available: A. Key to Cardox relay and timer compartments (same key as System 13 Field Panels)B. Extension Ladder(s) or equivalent C. CO 2 Odorizer Cartridges D. Temporary fans and air moving equipment E. SCBA Units (4 required)4.1.3 Additional CO 2 is available to refill the Storage Tank, as necessary. OFFICIAL TEST COPY A3-12*1 SPT-039-02 unit 1 Revision 0 Page 7 of 33 4.0 ACTIONS 4.1 Test Equipment 4.1.1 A. B. C. D. 4.1.2 A. B. C. D. E. 4.1.3 The following M&TE or equivalent is available: 0-25% O 2 Oxygen Monitor/Indicator (+/-12% STD. Gas) 0-100% CO 2 Carbon Dioxide Concentration Meter with three (3) sensor points minimum (+/-2% F.S.) 0-1200F Hand Held Thermometer (+/-2%) 0-so" H'1o [)lGITAI... """a 7-13*'U* The following are available: Key to Cardox relay and timer compartments (same key as System 13 Field Panels) Extension Ladder(s) or equivalent CO 2 Odorizer Cartridges Temporary fans and air moving equipment SCBA Units (4 required) Additional CO 2 is available to refill the Storage Tank, as necessary. OFFICIAL TEST COpy A3-12 11]; \ SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 8 of 33 4.2 Preliminary Actions 4.2.1 Communications have been established in areas where testing is to be conducted: Aux Instr Rooms area, Control Room, and CO 2 Tank Outlet Isolation Valve (when FPU Operator is stationed there).616..9 ,, /,7-14 -q --INITIAL DATE 4.2.2 Plant instruments required for test performance, have been verified to be filled, vented, (as required) placed in service, and within their calibration interval as shown on Data Sheet 8.4. INITIAL DATE 4.2.3 Measuring and Test Equipment (M&TE) required for test performance has been filled, vented, (as required) placed in service, and recorded on Measuring and Test Equipment (M&TE Log), Attachment 9.2.INITIAL DATE 4'2.4 CONDUCT a pretest briefing with Test and Operations personnel. INITIAL DATE 4.2.5 PERFORM a pretest walkdown to verify that interferences such as Work Requests, Hold Orders, and scaffolding will not adversely affect this test.(ALR ./7-(5--INITIAL DATE 4.2.6 POST warning signs to prevent entry into the test areas as necessary, and EVACUATE all non-essential personnel. INITIAL DATE OFFICIAL TEST COPY A3-13 SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision a Page B of 33 4.2 Preliminary Actions 4.2.1 4.2.2 4.2.3 4.2.5 4.2.6 Communications have been established in areas where testing is to be conducted: Aux Instr Rooms area, Control Room, and CO 2 Tank Outlet Isolation Valve (when FPU operator is stationed there) . w L$ / 7-/-6-q INITIAL DATE Plant instruments required for test performance, have been verified to be filled, vented, (as required) placed in service, and within their calibration interval as shown on Data Sheet 8.4. Wl..B INITIAL DATE Measuring and Test Equipment (M&TE) required for test performance has been filled, vented, (as required) placed in service, and recorded on Measuring and Test Equipment (M&TE Log) , Attachment 9.2. wL8 INITIAL DATE CONDUCT a pretest briefing with Test and Operations personnel. PERFORM a pretest walkdown to verify that interferences such as Work Requests, Hold Orders, and scaffolding will not adversely affect this test. wt'& /7-f 5"-9.s-DATE POST warning signs to prevent entry into the test areas as necessary, and EVACUATE all non-essential personnel. OFFICIAL TeST COpy A3-13 SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 9 of 33 4.2.7 Outstanding TACFs do not adversely impact testing.INITIAL DATE 4.2.8 ENSURE blowout panels are installed by DCN W-35595 in Battery Room exhaust duct to prevent overpressurization.( .1 /C-'-S INITIAL DATE 4.2.9 ENSURE 0-TANK-39-3, C02 CENTRAL UNIT STORAGE TANK,is filled to at least 43" H20 level, as read from 0-LI-39-2, at 0-L-83, in Yard.(-j ( /17- I-9 5-INITIAL DATE 4.2.10 ENSURE a Confined Space Entry Permit and qualified personnel are available for entry into the Cardox CO 2 Central Unit Vault.INITIAL DATE 4.2.11 ENSURE that menthly PM WBN-0-PKG-39-3 (PMUG 1097F) , was performed by Maintenance within days of date 0,C test is performed. o%.,., Io INITIAL DATE 4.2.12 ENSURE a Fire Protection Impairment Form (FPI-0102 Appendix C) is in place for valve 0-ISV-39-522, CO 2 STOR TANK OUT ISOL, if valve is to be in the closed position for periods greater than 1 hour.Q(LLF / 7-I'-75 INITIAL DATE 4.2.13 ENSURE proper alignment of SOI-39.01 has been performed to support this test.(6jL B / 7-16-9s" INITIAL DATE OFFICIAL TEST COPY A3-14 4.2.7 4.2.8 4.2.9 4.2.10 4.2.11 4.2.12 4.2.13 SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 9 of 33 Outstanding TACFs do not adversely impact testing. Wi-8 / INITIAL DATE ENSURE blowout panels are installed by DCN W-35595 in Battery Room exhaust duct to prevent overpressurization. tJt g I ]-I3-'1S" INITIAL DATE ENSURE 0-TANK-39-3, C02 CENTRAL UNIT STORAGE TANK, is filled to at least 43" H 2 0 level, as read from 0-LI-39-2, at 0-L-83, in Yard. 14 -Gf 5 INITIAL DATE ENSURE a Confined Space Entry Permit and qualified personnel are available for entry into the Cardox CO 2 Central Unit Vault. r..di 7 ** "'" -t"'Ql'fe,,'y ENSURE that monthl¥ PM WBN-0-PKG-39-3 (PMUG l097F) III ...... 3," -, was performed by Maintenance within & days of date test is performed. 1J1:,!.1-'iG Cfo 7 "1 S INITIAL DATE ENSURE a Fire Protection Impairment Form (FPI-OI02 Appendix C) is in place for valve O-ISV-39-522, CO 2 STOR TANK OUT ISOL, if valve is to be in the closed position for periods greater than 1 hour. 7 -IS -1 5 INITIAL DATE ENSURE proper alignment of SOI-39.01 has been performed to support this test. tNL B / 7-16-"IS' INITIAL DATE OFFICIAL TEST COpy \ tV . A3-14 SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 10 of 33 4.2.14 ENSURE DIXIE FIRE PROTECTION (or other Company)representative is available to support CO 2 concentration testing.INITIAL DATE 4.2.15 ENSURE the odorizer cartridges 1-PURF-39-14, Ul AUX INSTR RM C02 LEAK DET, and 2-PURF-39-16, U2 AUX INSTR RM C02 LEAK DET, are installed. INITIAL DATE 4.2.16 VERIFY ambient temperature is between 320 and 120OF in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Aux Instrument Rooms, as read from thermometer (M&TE), and RECORD temperatures. M&TE ID# E 19 SOZ Ol a i.s -F M&TE ID# £19SoZ U2 .2-. _ F (- 4Lt ./ 7-15-'75 INITIAL DATE 4.2.17 PERFORM a field calibration check of the vendor's CO 2 concentration recorder/recorders with samples of ambient air and 1001% (+/-2%) CO 2 test gas. ATTACH reference calibration strip charts to this test package.M&TE ID# 231"7 M&TE ID# /(N/A if only one recorder used) / 7S- 9 INITIAL DATE OFFICIAL TEST COPY A3-15 4.2.14 4.2.15 4.2.16 4.2.17 SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 10 of 33 ENSURE DIXIE FIRE PROTECTION (or other Company) representat,ive is available to support CO 2 concentration testing. 0(. B /7-IS*'lS INITIAL DATE ENSURE the odorizer cartridges 1-PURF-39-14, U1 AUX INSTR RM C02 LEAK DET, and 2-PURF-39-16, U2 AUX INSTR RM C02 LEAK DET, are installed. 6('13 /7-1S'-1L INITIAL DATE VERIFY ambient temperature is between 32° and 120°F in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Aux Instrument Rooms, as read from thermometer (M&TE), and RECORD temperatures. M&TE ID# £ I" 502 M&TE ID# E I t} S 0 Z Ul U2 Bl.e 80.'2.. ---::. 7 -( s -'5 INITIAL DATE PERFORM a field calibration check of the vendor's CO 2 concentration recorder/recorders with samples of ambient air and 100% (+/-2%) CO 2 test gas. ATTACH reference calibration strip charts to this test package. M&TE ID# 2 '3 I I f, M&TE ID# NIA (N/A if used) OFFICIAL TeST COpy A3-15 W(B /7-15-9S INITIAL DATE .. . SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 11 of 33 ATTACH copies of CO 2 Test Gas certification sheet-P (10 CFretdtpakge. a INITIAL -21, 4.2.19 System 55, Annunciator and Sequential Events Recording System, FTA switch (in Panel I-M-21)associated with the following annunciator window inputs has been verified to be in the ON position: A. I-XA-55-15B/172E 6JLg /7-14--99 INITIAL DATE 4.2.20 ENSURE Operations is aware that alarms on 0-M-29 will be energized during this test.6 4-X13 17-1S5-1.5 INITIAL DATE 4.3 Approvals and Notifications4.3.1 Prior to the start of the test, OBTAIN the Shift Operations Supervisor's (SOS) authorization. ~ -/ 7 SOS DATE4.3.2 Prior to the start of the test, OBTAIN t Startup and Test Manager's authorization. TIELE~aw AlRziVAL 71L STARTUP & TEST GER DATE 4.2. Zl ENSURE T-STII, .iJ 0- FoR 39-2. (UFF TeST) r W L8 7-13 -9S 5'M~TAL VT4.'.?qS. EtSfC. Tl RA1 HAVE: aElJw Rser P W.o. 9Sg--74SO-OO.(AIP.imOF OfiCHARGEOF 'c.e 17./g. 7 L 0.OFFICIAL TEST COPY A3-16 , 4.2.19 A. 4.2.20 SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 11 of 33 of CO 2 Test Gas certification sheet data package. iSl-liTe , ,,:-* System 55, Annunciator and Sequential Events Recording System, FTA switch (in Panel l-M-21) associated with the following annunciator window inputs has been verified to be in the ON position: 1-XA-SS-1SB/172E 7 -, 'f -Cj INITIAL DATE ENSURE Operations is aware that alarms on O-M-29 will be energized during this test. 7 -, -'f S' INITIAL DATE 4.3 Approvals and Notifications 4.3.1 4.3.2 !of.l..ZI L.f * ,'2.. 'l.? Prior to the start of the test, OBTAIN the Shift Operations Supervisor's (SOS) authorization. / 80S DATE Prior to and Test E:tJSIJRE. "TIMERS HAVe: 'R*S*T 0 o. (TIM EO t DISCHARG(OF WlJ3 C0'l. ). wt.$ ,.1.10.'\$

rI'JITu\t.

OFFICIAL TEST COpy A3-16 w. 0, /7 .. /S'-'fE 'DA.,.e: 011 oJ 3 SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 12 of 33 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room attains ;321 CO2 concentration within 2 minutes, CO 2 within 7 minutes and maintains

47% CO 2 after 15 minutes (includes

+/-2%M&TE accuracy). (Steps 6.1.14.1, 6.1.14.2, 6.1.14.3)5.2 Unit 2 Auxiliary Instrument Room attains a32% CO 2 concentration within 2 minutes, ;52% CO 2 within 7 minutes and maintains a47% CO 2 after 15 minutes (includes +/-20 M&TE accuracy). (Steps 6.2.14.1, 6.2.14.2, 6.2.14.3)OFFICIAL TEST COPY A3-17 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 12 of 33 5.1 Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room attains CO 2 concentration within 2 minutes, CO 2 within 7 minutes and maintains CO 2 after 15 minutes (includes +/-2% M&TE accuracy). (Steps 6.1.14.1, 6.1.14.2, 6.1.14.3) 5.2 Unit 2 Auxiliary Instrument Room attains CO 2 concentration within 2 minutes, CO 2 within 7 minutes and maintains CO 2 after 15 minutes (includes +/-2% M&TE accuracy). (Steps 6.2.14.1, 6.2.14.2, 6.2.14.3) OFFICIAL TEST COpy A3-17 SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 13 of 33 6.0 TEST INSTRUCTIONS 6.1 Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room CO 2 Concentration Test NOTE A C0 2 Concentration Test will be performed during this section, with a full duration C0 2 discharge. 6.1.1 VERIFY prerequisites listed in Section 4.0 for Subsection 6.1 have been completed. INITIAL DATE 6.1.2 ENSURE a CO2 Concentration Meter has been calibrated, and has a M&TE No. assigned (if meter is supplied by Vendor). M&,TE ID# _'7(D .jL- /7-1C-9-" INITIAL DATE 6.1.3 INSTALL a CO 2 Concentration Meter to measure CO 2 concentration in the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room with the highest recorder probe installed at 75% of room height or the top of the protected equipment (excluding cable trays) whichever is higher, and RECORD elevation above the floor on the associated recorder channel strip chart.M&TE ID# 23l1& 6. INITIAL DATE 6.1.4 RECORD CO 2 Storage Tank level at 0-LIS-39-2, C02 STOR TANK LEVEL, and pressure at 0-PI-39-3, C02 STR VAULT TANK PRESS.0-LIS-39-2 0 O 0-PI-39-3 3 00 psig INITIAL DATE G.I.4.I INSTALL THE MANOMETER (OR A? MEASIRIG bCVicE ) NEAP -, THE vtNIt :. AuX TNST9UMCNT RaooM To /bAEASuRu. PRESSuVRC f DIFFEREtIJIAL. (WITH 1-1 SVIDE "TNStDe Room')Mk+Tt- T-b$* -CISi7% -____ 7-14( 9 ýý I Wt'8 X,1T IT I A L DA-rc z OFFICIAL TEST COPY AS3-18 SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 13 of 33 6.0 TEST INSTRUCTIONS 6.1 Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room COl Concentration Test 6.1.1 6.1.2 6.1.3 6.1.4 G.I.'f.1 NOTE A CO 2 Concentration Test will be performed during this section, with a full duration CO 2 discharge. VERIFY prerequisites listed in Section 4.0 for Subsection 6.1 have been completed. w(.E /7-1 INITIAL DATE ENSURE a COl Concentration Meter has been calibrated, and has a M&TE No. assigned (if meter is supplied by Vendor) . M&TE ID# '2 '3 11 G:, WL8 / INITIAL DATE INSTALL a CO 2 Concentration Meter to measure CO 2 concentration in the Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room with the highest recorder probe installed at 75% of room height or the top of the protected equipment (excluding cable trays) whichever is higher, and RECORD elevation above the floor on the associated recorder channel strip chart. M&TE ID# '2311" we-8 /7-!'-9r;;- INITIAL DATE. RECORD CO 2 Storage Tank level at O-LIS-39-2, C02 STaR TANK LEVEL, and pressure at O-PI-39-3, C02 STR VAULT TANK PRESS. O-LIS-39-2 I 0 0 % O-PI-39-3 --....;;;3;;.....;..o_o __ -&psig 10 J: tJ STAL.l. TH E MANO METeR (OR A P MEASVRING bE.V,IC E) NEAR 311) THE VNIT :1. Aux RooM To PRESSU'R.E: 0-OIt=F*REtJTIAL. (WITH I-\:t SI1>£ :I.NSli)E: WL8 /7-/(,'1) wl-8 .:LtJt1'IAl. DATE: 7-11' 'IS' V OFFICIAL TeST COpy A3*18 SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 14 of 33 6.1.5 6.1.6 6.1.7 VERIFY/RESET I-ISD-31-3958, 1-ISD-31-3959, and 1-ISD-31-3961, AUX INSTR ROOM EXHAUST ISOL.&/( ' /7-16-7s, INITIAL DATE VERIFY/RESET I-ISD-31-3960, AUX INSTR ROOM SUPPLY ISOL.9 1_7-_6-INITIAL DATE VERIFY/RESET Pressure Switch I-PS-39-65, U1 AUX INSTR RM C02 DISCH PRESS, by pushing up on the plunger on the bottom of the switch housing.8t, 08 /.7-/6 -INITIAL DATE VERIFY Zone 279, AUX INSTR RM U1 C02 INITIATED Alarm, on Fire Detector Panel 0-M-29, is CLEAR (not IN).i INITIAL DATE ENSURE the following Unit 1 Aux Instrument Room doors are CLOSED and LATCHED: 6.1.8 6.1.9 A. Door C22 to Main Corridor B. Door C21 to Stairwell C. Door at C20 Airlock (A/L DA1T E INITIAL DATE (,L 3 / 7 iS INITIAL DATE (A' L (- I. / ?-16-17S INITIAL DATE OFFICIAL TEST COPY A3-19 6.1.5 6.1. 6 6.1.7 6.1.8 6.1. 9 A. B. c. , SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 14 of 33 VERIFY/RESET 1-ISD-31-3958, 1-ISD-31-3959, and 1-ISD-31-3961, AUX INSTR ROOM EXHAUST ISOL. /7"/'-1S" INITIAL DATE VERIFY/RESET 1-1SD-31-3960, AUX INSTR ROOM SUPPLY ISOL. /"'(8 / 7-1 ,-'1)-INITIAL DATE VERIFY/RESET Pressure Switch 1-PS-39-65, U1 AUX INSTR RM C02 DISCH PRESS, by pushing up on the plunger on the bottom of the switch housing. WL8 /1-/6-7::r INITIAL DATE VERIFY Zone 279, AUX INSTR RM U1 C02 INITIATED Alarm, on Fire Detector Panel O-M-29, is CLEAR (not IN) . / 7-/6-'f INITIAL DATE ENSURE the following Unit 1 Aux Instrument Room doors are CLOSED and LATCHED: Door C22 to Main Corridor wLB /7-1'-CJS INITIAL DATE Door C21 to Stairwell WL$ /7-1'-'15 INITIAL DATE Door at C20 Airlock WLE / 2 ... 1 6*'S INITIAL DATE OFFICIAL TEST COpy A3-19 SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 15 of 33 6.1.10 VERIFY the Red Light at 1-IC-39-14, Ul AUX INSTR RM C02 TIME, is ON.INITIAL DATE 6.1.11 VERIFY/OPEN 0-ISV-39-522, C02 STOR TANK OUT ISOL, and ENSURE a FPU Operator is stationed at 0-ISV-39-522.(AJLI / 7- INITIAL DATE CAUTION CO. will be discharged in subsequent steps.Personnel shall be evacuated from areas being tested and adjacent areas (Control Bldg 692', 708', and 729', as appropriate) and prohibited from unauthorized entry to test area.6.1.12 REQUEST Control Room to announce that the CO 2 System is about to be tested and all persnl should stay--y clear of the test areas. t^L PATE-.'l.l.I71 F_.suRF.. Oa ASV. PoRESioSVE iE__AtoP ISP, IN AVX Z TPA1.VMCJW-Roo/m. INITIAL DATE IUf CAUTION The following emergency action will be taken to discontinue CO, discharqe, if necessar-, To PREV6NT~jt A~X XNSTRUMfIej¶ RoOtA Fit*A exI'r4btwa 1.iF MA K ANV ALLOWJa~ ~7-I3pq IER~tI1AL PRSUP OF 2701 Ho, Switch I-SW-39-14, Ul AUX INSTR RM C02 DISC, located inside 0-ARB-39-14 (708/C3N), is to be placed to OFF, then close 0-ISV-39-522, C02 STOR TANK OUT ISOL.6.1.13 REMOVE cover (using screwdriver) on I-IC-39-14, Ul AUX INSTR RM C02 TIMER, then MOMENTARILY DEPRESS the pushbutton l-HS-39-14A, Ul AUX INSTR RM C02 MAN TRIP.INITIAL DATE oFFICIAL-ES'r COP 6.1.10 6.1.11 6.1.12 cO.l.Il..\ 6.1.13 SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 15 of 33 VERIFY the Red Light at l-IC-39-14, U1 AUX INSTR RM C02 TIME, is ON. VERIFY/OPEN O-ISV-39-S22, C02STOR TANK OUT ISOL, and ENSURE a FPU Operator is stationed at O-ISV-39-S22. 7-J INITIAL DATE CAUTION COl will be discharged in subsequent steps. Personnel shall be evacuated from areas being tested and adjacent areas (Control Bldg 692',708', and 729', as appropriate) and prohibited from unauthorized entry to test area. REQUEST Control Room to announce that the CO 2 System is about to be tested and all stay clear of the test areas. L I II" E.t\lSURE. PoSITIOtJE)) _ To oS DI?fSReIJTIAI Wt.. IS /7-I "5 2l' :Ltv AI) X :I 'RvM E'IJ 'i ROOM. . INITIAL DATE I" CAUTION The following emergency action will be taken to _III discontinue CO, discharqe if necessary TO PREVENT A \J)( :t.N eo W'I" ll.ooM F RoN\. InN G 1"HIt "",.,';,N\VfI\ ALI..O""I'\QL£

tf-! l) I f'F e \l t: "'1' 'A L to (\E Ii,. v 1\ fa 0 F 1. 7" ,..,. O.

Switch1-SW-39-14, U1 AUX INSTR RM C02 DISC, located inside O-ARB-39-14 (708/C3N), is to be placed to OFF, then close 0-ISV-39-522,C02 STOR TANK OUT ISOL. REMOVE cover (using screwdriver) on l-IC-39-14, U1 AUX INSTR RM C02 TIMER, then MOMENTARILY DEPRESS the pushbutton 1-HS-39-14A, U1 AUX INSTR RM C02 MAN TRIP. .:::..,.'8_/ 7 ... 1',1 S INITIAL DATE . OfflCIM.-IESl SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 16 of 33 NOTE The acceptance criteria values in the following two (2) steps have been corrected for +/-2.0% M&TE inaccuracy. 6.1.14 RECORD the CO 2 concentration in the Unit .Aux Instrument Room, at timed intervals, for a minimum of 15 minutes on Data Sheet 8.2.6ae-, __17 _-INITIAL DATE 6.1.14.1 VERIFY Unit 1 Aux Instrument Room atmosphere reaches a32% CO 2 concentration within 2 minutes.[AC] ('sL8 / 7-1 C- 15'INITIAL DATE 6.1.14.2 VERIFY Unit 1 Aux Instrument Room atmosphere reaches z52% CO0 concentration within 7 minutes.[AC] (LL8 / 7-16-g1 INITIAL DATE 6.1.14.3 VERIFY Unit 1 Aux Instr Rm atmosphere maintains

47% CO 2 concentration after 15 minutes.[AC] C.Ll / 74I-1X INITIAL DATE 6.1.15 VERIFY the Red Light at 1-IC-39-14 has illuminated.

0 INITIAL DATE 6.1.16 REPLACE cover on 1-IC-39-14, U1 AUX INSTR RM C02 TIME.-TDI JS-O077g / LA 8 7 4S*INITIAL DATE 2ND PARTY DATE L GI.I.4. MAXIftWM PRESSURE 'RJG TDS3CS I o FuNr -~LT AUX ZTmVRvAiewur tooM. 0~,l .. .. 1 A I PATE: OFFICIAL TEST COPY A3-21 6.1.14 NOTE SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 16 of 33 The acceptance criteria values in the following two (2) steps have been corrected for +/-2.0% M&TE inaccuracy. RECORD the CO 2 concentration in the Unit 1 Aux Instrument Room, at timed intervals, for a minimum of 15 minutes on Data Sheet 8.2. w<..8 /7-H-'}S INITIAL DATE 6.1.14.1 VERIFY Unit 1 Aux Instrument Room atmosphere reaches CO 2 concentration within 2 minutes. [AC] wt.B / 7-1'-15" INITIAL DATE 6.1.14.2 VERIFY Unit 1 Aux Instrument Room atmosphere reaches CO 2 concentration within 7 minutes. [AC] (Nt 8 / INITIAL DATE 6.1.14.3 VERIFY Unit 1 Aux Instr Rm atmosphere maintains CO 2 concentration after 15 minutes. 6.1.15 6.1.16 [Ae] tNt. B / 7 .. INITIAL DATE VERIFY the Red Light at 1-IC-39-14 has illuminated. J'J}N 0178 /W(8 INITIAL DATE REPLACE cover on l-IC-39-14, U1 AUX INSTR RM C02 TIME. 1S-077& INITIAL DATE 'T 1)", "IS' -077S / t.J t B 7 -'Z.'-' S" 2ND PARTY DATE OFFICIAL TEST COpy A3-21 6.1.17 DEPRESS the RESET Pushbutton 1 INSTR RM C02 RESET in O-ARB-35 C02 RELAY CAB.SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 17 of 33.-HS-39-14R, Ul AUX 9-14, Ul AUX INST RM-rD04S-b77B ./41(9 -G-INITIAL DATE.e SILENT.INITS-I77%/( DAT E7-Z-¶INIT-IAL DATE 6.1.18 VERIFY that the alarm horns ar 6.1.19 VERIFY that 1-PURF-39-14, U1 AUX INSTR RM C02 LEAK DET, odorizer is broken by the presence of wintergreen odor.Tblu 9S-o779 /CaB 7-26-qg INITIAL DATE 6.1.20 ENSURE that the Oxygen content is a19.5% in all Control Bldg Elevation 692', 708', and 729' Rooms adjacent to and including test area, before allowing personnel to enter without the use of SCBA.TINIT IAL7/b,4 7-2A-T S INITIAL DATE 6.1.21 VERIFY the Unit I Aux Instrument Room Dampers are CLOSED: A. 1-ISD-31-3958, AUX INSTR ROOM EXHAUST ISOL TPS 1!-0-779/ &/? 7-7-4-9S'INITIAL DATE B. 1-ISD-31-3959, AUX INSTR ROOM EXHAUST ISOL INITIAL DATE C. 1-ISD-31-3961, AUX INSTR ROOM EXHAUST ISOL-11WJ IS*O77-9 /48 -O ?INITIAL DATE D. I-ISD-31-3960 AUX INSTR ROOM SUPPLY ISOL 10d ITI-A77/ft-AT8 7-26-9-r INITIAL DATE cc I-OFFICIAL TEST COPY A3-22'-' -6.1.17 6.1.18 6.1.19 6.1. 20 SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 17 of 33 DEPRESS the RESET Pushbutton 1-H8-39-14R, U1 AUX INSTR RM C02 RESET in O-ARB-39-14, U1 AUX IN8T RM C02 RELAY CAB. j!)IJ'tS-b77f> /w<(3 7 INITIAL DATE VERIFY that the alarm horns are SILENT. TPtJ INITIAL DATE VERIFY that 1-PURF-39-14, U1 AUX INSTR RM C02 LEAK DET, odorizer is broken by the presence of wintergreen odor. IbN 'Is-ons /L.JLB 7-2."-'S'" INITIAL DATE ENSURE that the Oxygen content is in all Control Bldg Elevation 692', 708', and 729' Rooms adjacent to and including test area, before allowing personnel to enter without the use of SCBA. TI)N 'S-0"'7S/ 7-'2&-'1 S" INITIAL DATE 6.1.21 VERIFY the Unit 1 Aux Instrument Room Dampers 'are CLOSED: A. 1-ISD-31-3958, AUX INSTR ROOM EXHAUST I80L TPIV 1S'-0118/ 7-2('-'IS INITIAL DATE B. 1-I8D-31-3959, AUX INSTR ROOM EXHAUST I80L ... ilHt 7-U*'iS" INITIAL DATE , " C. 1-I8D-31-3961, AUX INSTR ROOM EXHAUST I80L '1;,"'-"I7S /(,.1.8 1-'2'*'1s CII INITIAL DATE o D. 1-18D-31-3960 AUX INSTR ROOM SUPPLY ISOL .... '10tJ 'S"-077S/ wt.B 7-Z';o,s 2-INITIAL DATE OFFICIAL TEST COpy

A3-22 SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 18 of 33 6.1.22 RESET Pressure Switch 1-PS-39-65, Ul AUX INSTR RM C02 DISCH PRESS, by pushing the plunger back into the switch housing.TPIS;- 0776/CU-L&

7-2(.-1:;INITIAL DATE 6.1.23 RESET and VERIFY Zone 279, AUX INSTR RM Ul C02 INITIATED Alarm, on 0-M-29, is OUT.Tbtj qgS- 0-17/&/ c,. 7-U-.1" INITIAL DATE 6.1.24 RESET the following dampers: A. 1-ISD-31-3958, AUX INSTR ROOM EXHAUST ISOL TDW q5s-0776/1A 4/ 7-2'-15 INITIAL DATE T' qS-O778/1.jeg 6 -9 S 2ND PARTY DATE B. 1-ISD-31-3959, AUX INSTR ROOM EXHAUST ISOL Trvo IS.-077 S/1s(.g 2c75 INITIAL DATE-rD tj9, 77 & / .jG 7-u -Is-2ND PARTY DATE C. I-ISD-31-3961, AUX INSTR ROOM EXHAUST ISOL 71W 79- 0778/ L/A 7-z -Z(" INITIAL DATE"TAN 19.-077 / (jt,8 7-?..-qr2ND PARTY DATE D. 1-ISD-31-3960 AUX INSTR ROOM SUPPLY ISOL INITIAL DATE-rij Is-o771/4v,L-7-Z4-.75'2ND PARTY DATE e OFFICIAL TEST COPY A3-23 6.1.22 6.1.23 SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 18 of 33 RESET Pressure Switch 1-PS-39-65, U1 AUX INSTR RM C02 DISCH PRESS, by pushing the plunger back into the switch housing. 'TbtJ 'IS.;. o71fO/'(JII.:a INITIAL DATE RESET and VERIFY Zone 279, AUX INSTR RM U1 C02 INITIATED Alarm, on 0-M-29, is OUT. T>>tJ CiS'-OTIS/ wi..' 7-2.'*H-INITIAL DATE 6.1.24 RESET the following dampers: A. 1-ISD-31-3958, AUX INSTR ROOM EXHAUST ISOL IDtJ flS-077 sf wl.g 7 .. '2 c.."S" INITIAL DATE 'T D '" QS-07781 l.It,g 7 -Z(.*':;S 2ND PARTY DATE B. l-ISD-31-3959, AUX INSTR ROOM EXHAUST ISOL TI>t.J I 7 -lee,S INITIAL DATE "j()(\J CfS-077&1 WC.& 7-'2<.*liS"" 2ND PARTY DATE c. 1-ISD-31-3961, AUX INSTR ROOM EXHAUST ISOL 1DtJ 0778/ WI-8 7-l'-'i5 INITIAL DATE 'II) N 1S -onsl w(,8 7-"Z,*Qs-2ND PARTY DATE D. 1-ISD-31-3960 AUX INSTR ROOM SUPPLY ISOL '1IH/ ,s-7-"U. -9S" INITIAL DATE --ri>ttJ ifS-077S/wf...'B 7-2'*'S 2ND PARTY DATE OFFICIAL TEST COpy A3-23 .", II" I t I CIQ ..J J .,., r-l' 0 I II) 9" 2 4-I-SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 19 of 33 6.1.25 REMOVE the CO 2 Concentration meter and associated sensing lines from the Unit 1 Aux Instrument Room.T1"NjqS-o77'/LLC 7-z',-" INITIAL DATE'TON 9S-0178/(.LS 7-zC-9 2ND PARTY DATE 6.1.26 RECORD CO 2 Tank level at 0-LIS-39-2, C02 STOR TANK LEVEL, and pressure at 0-PI-39-3, C02 STR VAULT TANK PRESS.O-LIS-39-2 14,.8 9-3-1; !k TrDt 1,T- 0'77%0-PI-39-3 (.4- 8-3-'7S psig"Tb 15 S"-o0778/ C,,t z 7-Z&-95" INITIAL DATE tJLB '8-3-9!6.1.27 UJNLOCK aind C-LOSE 0 ISV3.9-2522, C-O2 ST-OR TANK OUT 4--S ?,GP/0VF GLASS Covue FP, I-Fr-39-1 W4'a 7-Uh-99 1k,)J 'q~T-01-7I1L8 74/s -95*INITIAL DATE 6.1.28 1- ENSURE 0.BY. 39 S2., CO. STOP. TAN'K UT BYPASS.CAt N~o Lop GER 2E H&ARD-t.INITIAL DATE 6.1.29 .,OPEN 0, ,"" r55.C STOR TANK OUT'm HD-R DIN, tEc 1~ 11w lodicr ofO fo cc--~~ c.Se t- FSV 14 W1.8 5,-3-1lr 6.1.30 CLOSE a ISV 39 555 RePLACE GLASS tvted -jZ0L-q'1 I TPtJ jS-0-orSA,/L/7- ?-Z4-15-INITIAL DATE CQZ STOR. TANK OTTT lIDR DRAIDT?.CoVeR FOP, I-FSV 1+.-TbW 9'15- 0778 A/vi 7-Z-is INITIAL DATE (Is 00..1 j.,.S S-3-qls" 6.1.31 OPEN 0 ITs__9 5) '0T2W nTT'TA T0.11 T, F-t& FE I- FSV- 3-Iq 1 S CL oSe u,,..S 7.r,,-m$ n ,99-o778/1,.0 7-139C-DATE 7464S bu6LCT£G -/DPS-LTC, 2ND PARTY DATH~'1 g.I.-r,.N a'4 (.4 C/OFFICIAL TEST COPY A3-24 6.1.25 6.1.26 6.1.27 6.1. 28 SPT-039-02 unit 1 Revision 0 Page 19 of 33 REMOVE the CO 2 Concentration meter and associated sensing lines from the unit 1 Aux Instrument Room. INITIAL DATE 'IS' 0116/ (,J<<.8 7 -l' -'I S" 2ND PARTY DATE RECORD CO 2 Tank level at O-LIS-39-2, C02 STOR TANK LEVEL, and pressure at O-PI-39-3, C02 STR VAULT TANK PRESS. 'TDtJ qS-O-LIS-39-2 /.1(.8 9-3 -H' % -rON 'I S"-0'17$ O-PI-39-3 wt.B B-1-4lIS'" psig t./c.B 'a-'S.,,!> ibN'S -o17S/wL'i!> 7 -7.,. ';> INITIAL DATE UNLOCK and CLOSE 0 ISV 522, STOR TANK OUT ISOL. R*fW\oVE GLASS I-Fsv-'3Cj-/'f r,.,c.8 "IHI '1S'-OT18/WL8 7 .z." -fig INITIAL DATE WI.'j ENSURE 0 Bin: 39 523, CO 2 STOR OUT BypnSS, is .. ,!:' CLOSEC. C PEN I-Fsv-S"l-1'+ GoA S C.A t-J tJ 0 1..0 fJ G e g E Ii e-A F. I) wl.e.

IbN QS-017S/tJt'B 7-1.(,*Q!O" INITIAL DATE IIJLV 6.1.29 OPEN 0 ISV ]9 aaa, CO 2 STOR TANK OUT HDR DR}\ .. IN, to .. 1S" allofJ.' bleeding of COl f:r:om Header c se 6.1.30 6.1.31 l -P S;V-3 ., -1 4"t.B

-'IS WLiS PI-3-1S' IPrJ 'tS-077S/lJt& INITIAL DATE CLOSE 0 ISV 39 . 5§!3, CO 2 £'1'OR TWK OUT aDR DRAIN. RePLAce GLASS' CoV*R FOR \-FSV-'39-14. wt.13 1*l.C,-,\S" '.l'IN 2S-0778 /wt,B 7-'U.41s INITIAL DATE t..I.B 8 -'3 * 'IS' OPEN g ISll J9 522, CO 2 STOR Tl\NK OUT ISOT. CLoS61'l Tl> tJ 7-7.'-'i!;' INITIAL DATE "-ti :r tJ I) e PI; "'I)

7-'t'-fS be LETE / D*LETe 2ND PAR'il DNFE OFFICIAL TEST COpy A3-24 IJI \ 4 "'; -,.. I ... t'r. I!!I .J oJ J ..\

6.2 SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 20 of 33 Unit 2 Auxiliary Instrument Room CO. Concentration Test NOTE A C0 2 Concentration Test will be performed during this section, with a full duration CO 2 discharge. 6.2.1 VERIFY prerequisites listed in Section 4.0 for Subsection 6.2 have been completed. 1A'C 7- 2 2- qr INITIAL DATE ENSURE a C0 2 Concentration Meter has been calibrated, and has a M&TE No. assigned (if meter is supplied by Vendor). 6.2.2 M&TE ID# INITIAL DATE 6.2.3 INSTALL a CO 2 Concentration Meter to measure CO 2 concentration in the Unit 2 Auxiliary Instrument Room with the highest recorder probe installed at 75% of room height or the top of the protected equipment (excluding cable trays) whichever is higher, and RECORD elevation above the floor on the associated recorder channel strip chart.M&TE ID# 4 9o0T7o 6V' 6 C /7 9qz INITIAL DATE 6.2.4 RECORD C0 2 Storage Tank level at 0-LIS-39-2, C02 STOR TANK LEVEL, and pressure at O-PI-39-3, C02 STR VAULT TANK PRESS.0-LIS-39-2 ( 0 0 ?O-PI-39-3 '30o psig jj13/ /7-22-9S-INITIAL DATE (.Z.t.+ I T-WJ'TALL 'He MANOME,-"r? (oP AP MFEASVRING lbC, EVcE) ', NE.AR THE UtiT 2. AJX INS Q/ACNT ROO/VM To t MEASVRE PREStSRs DIFFSReTITAL (wITlT 1I4 I.PSiIDF RooA&~) -M iF-T*D# 5 1"q7 7 1~c 72 -'s-&J8La 7.13-.95 INITI AL DATe Q ENSURE / INSTALL STRIP C eR a N a, 1-TIC-1-I146 AS DETAILED. TN 0- FOR-(1 G o2. orýS.U I1IA L bATE A. 5 OFFICIAL TEST COPY A3-25 SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 20 of 33 6.2 Unit 2 Auxiliary Instrument Room COl Concentration Test 6.2.1 6.2.2 6.2.3 6.2.4 b. 'l.tf.1 NOTE A CO 2 Concentration Test will be performed during this section, with a full duration CO 2 discharge. VERIFY prerequisites listed in Section 4.0 for Subsection 6.2 have been completed. (,.vc..8 I 7-'22 -q s:" INITIAL DATE a CO 2 Concentration Meter has been calibrated, and has a M&TE No. assigned (if meter is supplied by Vendor) . M&TE ID# Y.qo't10 ----",W"",=,"""(.. ,..,..,..g,......-/7 .. "2 7. -'f S INITIAL DATE INSTALL a CO 2 Concentration Meter to measure CO 2 concentration in the Unit 2 Auxiliary Instrument Room with the highest recorder probe installed at 75% of room height or the top of the protected equipment (excluding cable trays) whichever is higher, and RECORD elevation above the floor on the associated recorder channel strip chart. M&TE ID# 490 lflo Wc..f5 /7 .. 1.7-'15. ... INITIAL DATE RECORD CO 2 storage Tank level at 0-LIS-39-2, C02 STOR TANK LEVEL, and pressure at 0-PI-39-3, C02 STR VAULT TANK PRESS. 0-LIS-39-2 lo 0 % O-PI-39-3 _3=-o....;o=--_-t-psig (u,B 17-'2'2-qS" INITIAL DATE :I.tJSiALLTHE. (oR At' Me.ASVRIN6 1>E:.VICe:.) NE.AR THE UNI" '2. AIJX 7,tJSiRv/V\ENT RO()M To MEASVRE PRt.'SSVRE. j)lt:Fe.RENTIAL (WITH H:t. S\1)E I.tJSIOe.. ROOM) /VI+T* :tD;P 51 477 :I:NITIAL lNlB ENSURE I INSTALL SiRtP CHART R.E:C:ORt>ER. 0 N "2.-'!.C-'1't-IC. AS [)ETAII..e:!) 'I:N O-FoR,"I:' -'0'2.. w( R 17-2L,.t:t::r

x.UITIAl.

l>JI\TE OFFICIAL rEST COpy A3-25 6.2.5 6.2.6 SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 21.of 33 VERIFY/RESET 2-ISD-31-2058, AUX INSTRUMENT ROOM 2 EXHAUST ISOL.(A1 /7C%-INITIAL DATE VERIFY/RESET 2-ISD-31-3955, AUX INST RM 2 SUP.INITIAL DATE VERIFY/RESET Pressure Switch 2-PS-39-71, U2 AUX INSTR RM C02 DISCH PRESS, by pushing up on the plunger on the bottom of the switch housing./ 7-z2z.INITIAL DATE VERIFY Zone 281, AUX INSTR RM Ul C02 INITIATED Alarm, on Fire Detector Panel 0-M-29, is CLEAR (not IN).INITIAL/ D-ZAT INITIAL 'DATE 6.2.7 6.2.8 6.2.9 ENSURE the following Unit doors are CLOSED: A. Door C24 at Main Corridor B. Door C25 at Stairwell 2 Aux Instrument Room INITIAL DATE-tS /7-22-is INITIAL DATE OFFICIAL TEST COPY A3-26 6.2.5 6.2.6 6.2.7 6.2.8 6.2.9 \ I SJ?T-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 210f 33 VERIFY/RESET 2-ISO-31-2058, AUX INSTRUMENT ROOM 2 EXHAUST 1SOL. W( g 17 ... <':t-CJ> INITIAL DATE VERIFY/RESET 2-1SO-31-3955, AUX INST RM 2 SUP. W c$ 17 .. 'IS INITIAL DATE VERIFY/RESET Pressure Switch 2-PS-39-71, U2 AUX INSTR RM C02 DISCH PRESS, by pushing up on the plunger on the bottom of the switch housing. wt..$ / 7 -2.2.-r-INITIAL DATE VERIFY Zone 281, AUX INSTR RM U1 C02 INITIATED Alarm, on Fire Detector Panel O-M-29, is CLEAR (not IN)

IN Cal> 1 ?-2:Z .. '15 INITIAL I DATE ENSURE the following Unit 2 Aux Instrument Room doors are CLOSED: A. Door C24 at Main Corridor lv( B 1 7-21.-q I" INITIAL DATE B. Door C25 at Stairwell wLB /7-2'2-tfr INITIAL DATE OFFICIAL TEST COpy A3-26 SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 22 of 33 6.2.10 VERIFY the Red Light at 2-IC-39-16, U2 AUX INSTR RM C02 TIMER, is ON.6d/e /Bl--.c INITIAL DATE 6.2.11 VERIFY/OPEN 0-ISV-39-522, C02 STOR TANK OUT ISOL, and ENSURE a FPU Operator is stationed at 0-ISV-39-522.

INITIAL DATE CAUTION CO 2 will be discharged in subsequent steps.Personnel shall be evacuated from areas being tested and adjacent areas (Control Bldg 692', 708', and 729', as appropriate) and prohibited from unauthorized entry to test area.6.2.12 REQUEST Control Room to announce that the CO 2 System is about to be tested and all personnel should stay clear of the test areas. C-v 4 ----7 D-Z?- _.s To O S RVe ?ReSsURC DIFF-e.RENTIAL -_.1-7 ___9 _L, I- a p AUXK T.N.TfVM49N1 RaoMI INITIAL DATE CAUTION The following emergency action will be taken to discontinue discharqe, if necessary, To PREVENT- jo;WL, AUX ZXNSTrRVN9NTR 2,0" FROM 1-HE ALLOWABLE' JLA 7-13-qS DIFFV 'RE-SWURC OF2.7" H.O. U r Switch 2-SW-39-16, U2 AUX INSTR RM C02 DISC, located inside 0-ARB-39-16 (708/C3N), is to be placed to OFF, then close 0-ISV-39-522, C02 STOR TAM OUT ISOL.Ft~j5URF/ W.Le 7.1-4.TS 6.2.13 REMOVE cover (using screwdriver) on 2-IC-39-16, U2 ,u-AUX INSTR RM C02 TIMER, then MOMENTARILY DEPRESS the pushbutton 2-HS-39-16A, U2 AUX INSTR RM C02 MAN TRIP.INITIAL DATE OFFICIAL TEST COPY A3-27 6.2.10 6.2.11 6.2.12 WI.B '7 -1'3.'1 S' SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 22 of 33 VERIFY the Red Light at 2-IC-39-16, U2 AUX INSTR RM C02 TIMER, is ON. -----",W=' -22" 'f r INITIAL DATE VERIFY/OPEN O-ISV-39-S22, C02 STOR TANK OUT ISOL, and ENSURE a FPU Operator is stationed at O-ISV-39-S22. CAUTION CO 2 will be discharged in subsequent steps. Personnel shall be evacuated from areas being tested and adjacent areas (Control Bldg 692', 708', and 729', as appropriate) and prohibited from unauthorized entry to test area. REQUEST Control Room to announce that the CO 2 System is about to be tested and all personnel should 1 of th te t w t !is 17* qJ c ear e s areas. :J:.N If A'-DATt CAUTION The following emergency action will be taken to discontinue CO discharae if necessary To PRE:V£I'J'T loCI": (.oiLS AUK INSTRVMf;NT 1\looN\ RoN-IWG THE ALLOWA Blot:' 7'13-QS DIHEIU'NTIAL. PRE'S'l;ul\e OF '1.," Ha,.O. Switch 2-SW-39-16, U2 AUX INSTR RM C02 DISC, located inside O-ARB-39-16 (708/C3N), is to be placed to OFF, then close O-ISV-39-S22, C02 STOR TANK OUT ISOL. Et-JSURE/ ",.67.'2I-U* 6.2.13 REMOVE cover (using screwdriver) on 2-IC-39-16, U2 u .... AUK INSTR RM C02 TIMER, then MOMENTARILY DEPRESS the pushbutton 2-HS-39-16A, U2.AUX INSTR RM C02 MAN TRIP. =-=1.,...-/ 7*" 1. -'I 5 INITIAL DATE OFFICIAL TEST COpy A3-27 0 SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 23 of 33 NOTE The acceptance criteria values in the following two (2) steps have been corrected for +/-2.0k M&TE inaccuracy. 6.2.14 RECORD the C02 concentration in the Unit 2 Aux Instrument Room, at timed intervals, for a minimum of 15 minutes on Data Sheet 8.3.INITIAL DATE 6.2.14.1 VERIFY Unit 2 Aux Instrument Room atmosphere reaches :32% CO 2 concentration within 2 minutes.[AC] &-, &B / 7-23-"q5 INITIAL DATE 6.2.14.2 VERIFY Unit 2 Aux Instrument Room atmosphere reaches :52%k C02 concentration within 7 minutes.[AC] (-/.Lf / 7-Z3-IS INITIAL DATE 6.2.14.3 VERIFY Unit 2 Aux Instr Rm atmosphere maintains a47; C02 concentration after 15 minutes.(AC] (j L( / 7-23 " 9 INITIAL DATE 6.2.15 VERIFY the Red Light at 2-IC-39-16 has illuminated.-TkN ¶'-o791 //4c(87-24 PL6i-z,.qs INITIAL DATE REMOvE SIftIP CHART eCaR~~OM 02-ZC-39-1( AND~6.2.16 REPLACE cover on 2-IC-39-16, U2 AUX INSTR RM C02 TIMER.-rpm79-07-91 / DATE7-26-INITIAL DATE 5-N~1 0~0 I~E, NOTE; Go TO STE? (62.14,,t ON 0 AGE 2.2ND PARTY DATE.2.14. f4 RECORD MAXtiUM ?fRessuvR o~selkVel DuRiJG TESTINGF OF UViT 2- AUX LfNET'VU/AeNT 'ROOM.29. ,CHz .LB / 7.13- 1 FIMIAL INITIAL b A[-OFFICIAL' STE COPY qIr too 9.ý0a A3-28 6.2.14 NOTE SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 23 of 33 The acceptance criteria values in the following two (2) steps have been corrected for +/-2.0% M&TE inaccuracy. RECORD the CO 2 concentration in the Unit 2 Aux Instrument Room, at timed intervals, for a minimum of 15 minutes on Data Sheet 8.3. 7 2 3 -1 5" INITIAL DATE 6.2.14.1 VERIFY unit 2 Aux Instrument Room atmosphere reaches CO 2 concentration within 2 minutes. [AC] ,...".-1 7* '2 '$, 'I 5 INITIAL DATE 6.2.14.2 VERIFY Unit 2 Aux Instrument Room atmosphere reaches CO 2 concentration within 7 minutes. [AC] _..,....w __ I.....,.:S""--,o_1 7*23 -, 5" INITIAL DATE 6.2.14.3 VERIFY Unit 2 Aux Instr Rm atmosphere maintains CO 2 concentration after lS minutes. 6.2.15 6.2.16 .'l..1'f.4 (AC] --::=:,:w==-.=::L

=;:B:-=-I 7 -'2. '3 Cf INITIAL DATE VERIFY the Red Light at 2-IC-39-16 has illuminated.

11\ I 111\ l't>tJ 'fS-D7'l1 Il)(!S 7-2b-'1S" c-: "'1.8 INITIAL DATE \n r--REMOVE S'T'nr C:HAR.T Recol\lItR 2-'tC-3'-I" AND REPLACE cover on 2-IC-39-16,* U2 AUX INSTR RM C02 IJ'!.r!-..) TIMER. NoTE: Go TO S"TE? ON OFFICIAL rEST COpy A3-28 -rPIJ INITIAL DATE ,ctJ C}s-07Cj I It.JvB 2ND PARTY DATE SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 24 of 33 6.2.17 DEPRESS the RESET Pushbutton 2-HS-39-16R, U2 AUX INSTR RM C02 RESET in 0-ARB-39-16, U2 AUX INST RM C02 RELAY CAB.qwTbJ9-0,79 /tyu 7-Z'-1ýINITIAL DATE 6.2.18 VERIFY that the alarm horns are SILENT.-rPg 'j5-079J_ /Itg 7-ZG-¶;INITIAL DATE 6.2.19 VERIFY that 2-PURF-39-16, U2 AUX INSTR RM C02 LEAK DET, odorizer is broken by the presence of wintergreen odor.-""DN 'S- 079 / .(_R 7-26-4'INITIAL DATE 6.2.20 ENSURE that the Oxygen content is z19.5% in all Control Bldg Elevation 6921, 708', and 729' Rooms adjacent to and including test area, before allowing personnel to enter without the use of SCBA.INITIAL DATE 6.2.21 VERIFY the Unit 2 Aux Instrument Room Dampers are CLOSED: A. 2-ISD-31-2058, AUX INSTRUMENT ROOM 2 EXHAUST INITIAL DATE B. 2-ISD-31-3955, AUX INST RM 2 SUP ISOLa INITIAL DATE -6.2.22 RESET Pressure Switch 2-PS-39-71, U2 AUX INSTR RM C02 DISCH PRESS, by pushing the plunger back into the switch housing. 0--fDN IS- 07,7/ 4/4 8 7-Z'-7 .INITIAL DATE OFFICIAL TEST COPY A3-29 6.2.17 6.2.19 6.2.19 6.2.20 6.2.21 A. B. 6.2.22 SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 24 of 33 DEPRESS the RESET Pushbutton 2-HS-39-16R, U2 AUX INSTR RM C02 RESET in O-ARB-39-16, U2 AUX INST RM C02 RELAY CAB. ct I 1&<.8 INITIAL DATE VERIFY that the alarm horns are SILENT. iPlI '}$-O,ql Iwl.'A 7-2(.*'5" INITIAL DATE VERIFY that 2-PURF-39-16, U2 AUX INSTR RM C02 LEAK DET, odorizer is broken by the presence of wintergreen odor. TJ)tJ qS* 01'1 /lfAJ(,'H 7*"U.-IJS"' INITIAL DATE ENSURE that the Oxygen content is in all Control Bldg Elevation 692', 708', and 729' Rooms adjacent to and including test area, before allowing personnel to enter without the use of SCBA. jS *OI'l/ 1 ""B 7 -'?-G-'1S INITIAL DATE VERIFY the unit 2 Aux Instrument Room Dampers are CLOSED: 2-ISD-31-2058, AUX INSTRUMENT ROOM 2 EXHAUST :Ira') 'tS INITIAL DATE 2-ISD-31-3955, AUX INST RM 2 SUP ISOL ,M') 1$ -07tfl 1 W{6 INITIAL DATE RESET Pressure Switch 2-PS-39-71, U2 AUX INSTR RM C02 DISCH PRESS, by pushing the plunger back into the switch housing. 7i>N 9S-0711 11.11..8 7-1.'*,';,- INITIAL DATE OFFICIAL TEST COpy A3-29 SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 25 of 33 B 6.2.23 RESET and VERIFY Zone 281, AUX INSTR RM U2 C02 INITIATED Alarm, on 0-M-29, is OUT.INITIAL DATE 6.2.24 RESET the following dampers: A. 2-ISD-31-2058, AUX INSTRUMENT ROOM 2 EXHAUST-TbNr1.-0/i/CJ 7-Z.&15 INITIAL DATE-rbM qS-"- o'q /j-A& 7-2 6-?S 2ND PARTY DATE B. 2-ISD-31-3955, AUX INST RM 2 SUP ISOL INITIAL DATE 2ND PARTY DATE 6.2.25 REMOVE the CO 2 Concentration meter and associated sensing lines from the Unit 2 Aux Instrument Room.-r*b 1 -0o*qt/4, .7-2C..qs INITIAL DATE 2ND PARTY DATE 3 6.2.26 RECORD CO 2 Tank level at O-LIS-39-2, C02 STOR TANK LEVEL, and pressure at 0-PI-39-3, C02 STR VAULT TANK PRESS.TDiJ ' 5"-o7¶j 0-LIS-39-2 ;INITIAL DATE OFFICIAL TEST COPY A3-30 6.2.23 SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 25 of 33 RESET and VERIFY Zone 281, AUX INSTR RM U2 C02 INITIATED Alarm, on 0-M-29, is OUT. "'T1>fJ ctS-01CfI INITIAL DATE 6.2.24 RESET the following dampers: A. 2-ISD-31-2058, AUX INSTRUMENT ROOM 2 EXHAUST 1"'l>N 1 S -OIQ \/GJtB 7 INITIAL DATE ;1> 'f S-OOH ,It.A & 7 -? E.-' S" 2ND PARTY DATE B. 2-ISD-31-3955, AUX INST RM 2 SUP ISOL 6.2.25 6.2.26 Ti)tJ If S" -01"111 wL8 7 -2. ,-INITIAL DATE 'T\)tJ Q$'-o111/Wtg 1-"(.*'5 2ND PARTY DATE ' REMOVE the CO 2 Concentration meter and associated sensing lines from the Unit 2 Aux Instrument Room. U" '1S-07'1 IIINt-a 7-lVIS" INITIAL DATE I l' -rbtJ 7-'lt.-lfS-en 2ND PARTY DATE .3 RECORD CO 2 Tank level at 0-LIS-39-2, C02 STOR TANK LEVEL, and pressure at O-PI-39-3, C02 STR VAULT TANK PRESS. ,1>'" o O-LIS-39-2 WI'S Q-3-1S" % ,1>/01 .,s-0., 'i, 0-PI-39-3 "'(.8 9-3-'15" psig OFFICIAL tesT COpy A3-30 SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 26 of 33 6.2 .-224 CG and CLOSE 0 18V 29 522, COL ST-OR !RA.NK GUT 4 .REOvs GL.ASS Cove .r-am .S/-~ f&~i~ 7 top S$- 0-71 'j LC 7t-INITIAL DATE 14.1 6. 2 .-Z& wtL ENSURE 0 13YV 39 523, C07, ST-OR TANK OUT BYPASS, Is 9-3e~e33DOC-2.- PSV-3Rt.if. UN1T GAS PtSCHARGe CAN No L4.oGeR ag- I4G/AR* *ev(d3 7-I -a-qS p J IS- 079) /(,'8 INITIAL DATE L a.9i V 6.2.*9 -PoHN 0 1I8V 39 55, CO 2 STOIZ TANY'K OUT "IDR to"-allciw blcding of C.0 from Header. CLo SE 2Z- FSv I(, (.,-LB 7-14-'1 rcq-oi g.272-IA 7-zl-qci INITIAL DATE!I 6. 2.-6'GLI.OSE 0 18V 39 9555 GA 2 REOR TA~NK OUT IIDR DRArIN.r CIA+ -e RePLACC GltASS CoVeR F~OR*Z 2- F % -1I -1(0 Tb ¶ S'- 07 /I JjL&7 -14 2 -(bq s-1141J'lJ..L.Lkkm IGS , -5L-3 -1i 6.2.-3-3 OPEN a -52 c_.suRe ._ FSv- % 9- 16 s 16-r5-STOR TANK OUT iZOL.Z!S CLOSED 7-21-.q 7T(>' qo-o7q I /1.a 7-?-Z-?S-DATE T. Ne" /e p6e06e.2ND PARTY DATE'I.3 U-I..0 0-0 1-0 a OFFICIAL TEST COPY 51 A3-31 I r., I 6.2.* w(.B I!. -3 .n-SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 26 of 33 UNLOGK and CLOSE 9 I SV 39 5 d d i CO z STOR TANK OYT R*ft'\Ov!:. GL.ASS CoVG.R. Fat' 2-£=S"--S,-I C. WI./i 7 -/ , -<t S' '" IIS-01' I /f..If.f> 7-1.<'-1S INITIAL DATE 6

2 * ..ki .. '8
ENSURE 0 BYV 39 523 I COl STOR TANK OUT BYPASS I i 8" B" ... CLOSED, OPis"" '2,..

UN'-IL GAS CAN No LONGeR ali. e..,.t.S 7-1 ,-.qS' TDtJ "lS-07't1 /£"(8 INITIAL DATE \ ".3 , 6

2 * .z.9-"';

--t:te-e '1-alIa'", bleeding of from Ueader. C L.o 'So*. _'1$' , . v '2..-FSv-3"1-1<", w(.B 7-1'-<tS' \l"' T()fJ 01'1 I /bJt.J 7-2"-<t> J, INITIAL DATE 6. 2 .. GLOSE 0 ISV 39 555, COl S':POR TANK OU':P !IDR DRAIN. Co I LAc I' Q-E R e 'f' L. ACE: G LAS S C 0 ve. Po FoR "., _'h" '2.- il>/J 1S'-07,{' /l.Jt..8 w (.B 7 -I (,-'i S" INITIAL DATE I Co,S 6.2.,,* w<.S &-3-H OPEN 9 lSV 39 522, CO 2 2.- wl.8 7 -I ,-CiS' S':POR*TANK OUT IDOL. z. S C.LO SeD Ti>\'" QS-07Q 1 /Wi.8 7 -1..(,-'tS INI'£IAL DATE ::Z:t-IDS pe/Jllc /liT c."c..t . / E -.-r--'7-lIdf DeLeTe e> Lt: II:. I>,AR'l'Y DATE OFFICIAL TEST COpy A3-31 SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 27 of 33 7.0 POST-PERFORMANCE ACTIVITIES CAUTION Oxygen concentrations in CO 2 dump areas must be checked to be greater than 20% before personnel are allowed to enter without SCBA.7.1 REMOVE barricades and/or signs restricting access to test areas.CIL- I 7-/23-k 1 S-INITIAL DATE 7.2 NOTIFY SOS to ANNOUNCE over PA System that CO 2 System testing is complete.CQC3 /7-23-95-INITIAL DATE 7.3 REQUEST the calibration of the M&TE used to verify quantitative acceptance criteria, and RECORD the results on Measuring and Test Equipment Log (M&TE), Attachment 9.2. (Post-test calibration check of vendor supplied C02 concentration recorders is completed by Step 7.7)INITIAL DATE 7.4 ENSURE the CO 2 Central Unit 0-TANK-039-3 is filled, per SOI-39.01, to a level greater than 4011 H 2 0 as read on 0-LI-39-2, C02 STOR TANK LEVEL, at O-L-83, in Yard near CO 2 Vault.INITIAL DATE CLOSeD.7.4.1 ENSURE 0-ISV-39-522 is OPEN and LOCe 0eiv 39 s222.INITIAL DATE.3 OFFCIA TATHO OFFICIAL TEST COPY A3-32SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 27 of 33 7.0 POST-PERFORMANCE ACTIVITIES CAUTION Oxygen concentrations in COl dump areas must be checked to be greater than 20% before personnel are allowed to enter without SCBA. 7.1 REMOVE barricades and/or signs restricting access to test areas. ---:=W=L.:::::B:-=--/ 7* '1. '3 .. 't 5" INITIAL DATE 7.2 NOTIFY SOS to ANNOUNCE over PA System that COl System testing is complete. 7 -2 3 -CJ S-INITIAL DATE 7.3 REQUEST the calibration of the M&TE used to verify quantitative acceptance criteria, and RECORD the results on Measuring and Test Equipment Log (M&TE), Attachment 9.2. (Post-test calibration check of vendor supplied CO 2 concentration recorders is completed by Step 7.7) 7.4 ENSURE the CO 2 Central Unit 0-TANK-039-3 is filled, per 801-39.01, to a level greater than 40" H 2 0 as read on O-LI-39-2, C02 STOR TANK LEVEL, at O-L-83, Yard near CO 2 Vault. 7.4.1 W l t / 7 .. '/.1. .. , 'S INITIAL DATE CLOSED. ENSURE O-ISV-39-S22 is OPEN and LOCK 0 ISV 39 522. tJta 7 -?. 'f -'1 S' INITIAL DATE OFFICIAL TeST COpy A3-32 SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 28 of 33 B 7.5 ENSURE all Fire Protection System Impairment forms (FPI-0102, Attachment C) have been returned to FPU for closure.INITIAL DATE 7.6 VERIFY the following odorizers have been REPLACED: A. I-PURF-39-14, U1 AUX INSTR RM C02 LEAK DET (A5 ./ 7-2Z-75 INITIAL DATE-4--- / 7" zz1..2ND PARTY DATE B. 2-PURF-39-16, U2 AUX INSTR RM C02 LEAK DET INITIAL DATE PARTY DATE 7.7 PERFORM a post-test calibration check of the vendor's C02 concentration recorder/recorders with samples of ambient air and 100% (+/-21) CO 2 test gas.M&TE ID# S3 17TG M&TE ID#7.ni",-*_qo 47 (N/A if only one recorder used)INITIAL DATE 7.8 NOTIFY SOS of the test completion and system alignment. (-B /7-Z9-'7s INITIAL DATE OFFICIAL TEST COPY A3-33 SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 28 of 33 7.5 ENSURE all Fire Protection System Impairment forms (FPI-0102, Attachment C) have been returned to FPU for closure. WLB /7-2'f-'1S INITIAL DATE 7.6 VERIFY the following odorizers have been REPLACED: A. l-PURF-39-14, U1 AUX INSTR RM C02 LEAK DET W(. 'B / 7-'2'1. ... ,:5 INITIAL DATE Q * / 7* -t. 'Z-<fS 2ND PARTY DATE B. 2-PURF-39-16, U2 AUX INSTR RM C02 LEAK DET W(B / 7*'2Z-'1!> INITIAL DATE r PARTY DATE 7.7 PERFORM a post-test calibration check of the vendor's CO 2 concentration recorder/recorders with samples of ambient air and 100% (+/-2%) CO 2 test gas. M&TE ID# '2. '3 I 1 C::. M&TE (N/A if only one recorder used) wl...$ / 7-2.'-'5 INITIAL DATE 7.8 NOTIFY SOS of the test completion system alignment. 7-24*' s INITIAL DATE OFFICIAL TEST COpy A3-33 0 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 SPT-039-02 Unit I Revision 0 Page 29 of 33 SUPPORTING MATERIAL Test Procedure Reference Review (1 sheet)Data Sheet 8.2, U1 Aux Instrument Room CO 2 Concentration (1 sheet)Data Sheet 8.3, U2 Aux Instrument Room CO 2 Concentration (1 sheet)Data Sheet 8.4, Permanent Plant Instrumentation Log (1 sheet)0 OFFICIAL TEST COPY A3-34 8.0 SUPPORTING MATERIAL 8.1 Test Procedure Reference Review (1 sheet) SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 29 of 33 8.2 Data Sheet 8.2, U1 Aux Instrument Room CO 2 Concentration (l sheet) 8.3 Data Sheet 8.3, U2 Aux Instrument Room CO 2 Concentration (1 sheet) 8.4 Data Sheet 8.4, Permanent Plant Instrumentation Log (1 sheet) OFFICIAL TeST COpy A3-34 SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 30 of 33 Table 8.1 TEST PROCEDURE REFERENCE REVIEW Sheet I of IDOCUMENT NUMBER REVISION CHANGES-LIST DCAs, CNs, ETC.(N/A for no changes)FSAR Table 14.2.1 Sht 13 and 14 e /e N/A WBN-VTM-AS06-0300 3 N/A FPI-0102 0 N/A TVA NPSHM I2 WIA SOI-39.01 12 2ZA ...WBN-0-PKG-39-0003 (PKG)FILE NO. 01 PMUG 1097F 5" WA OFFICIAL TEST COPY'I A3-35 DOCUMENT NUMBER FSAR Table 14.2.1 Sht 13 and 14 WBN-VTM-AS06-0300 FPI-OIOZ TVA NPSHM 501-39.01 Table 8.1 SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 30 of 33 TEST PROCEDURE REFERENCE REVIEW Sheet 1 of 1 REVISION CHANGES-LIST DCAs, eNs, ETC. (N/A for no changes) B'"IIB9 N/A 3 N/A 0 NIA 12-NIl' 12 tv/A WBN-O-PKG-39-0003 (PKG) FILE NO. 01 PMUG 1097F 5 Nt", OFFICIAL TEST COpy A3-35 SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 31 of 33 DATA SHEET 8.2 Ul AUX INSTRUMENT ROOM CO 2 CONCENTRATION Page I of 1 CO 2 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM 39 (Step 6.1.14)Elapsed Time (min) CO 2 Concentration (%) Initial/Date(Performer and 2nd Party)2 (ACC CRIT ;32%) / 7 -I -%)LS71 -a 7 IS--34 % -7 If6" z:- Y 5 4 %I '7 1 S" 6 % .jB I-7 (ACCCRIT '52%) 3 16- " S /L. "7-j6 -sIg Sz 7.8q 15 (ACC CRIT >47%) (--L 7-I1,- 15-_ _ _ _ _,%L 7-t.95 DR.. .-CO 2 Concentration Meter -M&TE ID#2317C OFFIC IAL TEST COPY/Il,,, uplrt 90 A3-36 , I (Step 6.1.14) Elapsed Time (min) 2 4 6 7 8 15 DATA SHEET 8.2 SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 31 of 33 Ul AUX INSTRUMENT ROOM CO 2 CONCENTRATION Page 1 of 1 COz FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM 39 CO 2 Concentration (%) Initial/Date (Performer and 2nd Party) (ACC CRIT ""La1-' t-Wf..JS 7-"-'1S' % 57 Wl."B 7-1'-CfS" % .. GPf wLB i-I,-qS-% j)/tI5 7-13 7-) (ACC CRIT (,...J( 8 7-1(,-'f) Sf;; % 0eIJ 7-1!---<tr 52 /.J l. 8 7-16-'1S" % [)/!}$ 7-li .. 9l (ACC CRIT "L.B 'S-. 44 DRJ? 7 .. 1&* C;s % C0 1 Concentration Meter -M&TE lOll --"2::...;3:::::....;..1...,;;.7_"..:::;..... ____ _ OFFICIAL rEST COpy A3-36 SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 32. of 33 DATA SHEET 8.3 U2 AUX INSTRUMENT ROOM CO 2 CONCENTRATION Page 1 of 1 CO 2 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM 39 (Step 6.2.14)Elapsed Time (rain) C02 Concentration ()Initial/Date (Performer and 2nd Party)2 (ACC CRIT Z32%) ,L.L 7-Z3 5-_______Lj % 6& % 6 5q % -8 8 __ 15 (ACCCRIT !47%) 7-*-jS___________________S___ % ~ ~ 5_.'CO 2 Concentration Meter -M&TE ID# '4504- 0 OFFICIAL TEST COPY A3-37 1_, __ .*** (Step 6.2.14) Elapsed Time (min) 2 4 6 7 8 15 DATA SHEET 8.3 SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 32. of 33 U2 AUX INSTRUMENT ROOM CO 2 CONCENTRATION Page 1 of 1 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM 39 CC?2 Concentration (%) InitiallDate (Performer and 2nd Party) (ACC CRIT l./LB Lfl % dJpf ,. 21/. 9-r-5<0 tv'" 8 7-23 is-% BIU'J 7* -;4. e; ')""" 51 /.J (., 8 7-'2.3 -if S" % 1-z,o/ -'1) (ACC CRIT w<.8 7*23-'1 5 1 % f}J(($ 5 1 wt,,8 % J3lU5-1* 21/-95 (ACC CRIT wl-B 53 % 7.')1.9) CO 2 Concentration Meter -M&TE lDlI _l{...;.q o_c.f.._'-'-o-'-- _____ _ OFFlC1AL TEST COpy A3-37 0 SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 33 of 33 DATA SHEET 8.4 PERMANENT PLANT INSTRUMENTATION LOG Sheet I of I--I Cl)MD FILLED

UE O INSTRUMENT AND PLACED IN USED FOR POST-TEST**

OR CAL DUE VENTED SERVICE

QUANTITATIVE POST-TEST**

CALIBRATION INSTRUMENT DATE CAL DATE ACCEPTABLE LOOP # INIT/DATE INIT/DATE YES NO INITIALIDATE O-LI-39-0002 Lf-Zc-.q -- L( /3-31-156/LB /-3-31-19 X WA VA 0-LIS-39-002 4-1Z1 -17 G -* /x MIAI L X f )JA L8c7- 1345 W.4f.0 O-PI-39-M03 2-S- ( I N6 / / -IZ-' X (A 7/---qr h 7 wr U-PI-39-W003A 4j( 1 2 -I -____ 1_ ___ CA 4A 2it- I.2-PS-39-0071 2 -5*- '1 / 2 8 'L/ i -___- X 7-(1-,r // "-, i-i I-PS-39-0065 7-va- m/6 .// 7- A-9't X N/ 7-t'- 7-19-These items may be initialed and dated by personnel performing the task.Instrumentation not required to be filled and vented may be identified as Not Applicable (NA)* May be identified as Not Applicable (NA) if instnrment was not used to verify/record quantitative acceptance criteria data.INSTRUMENT DATA SHEET 8.4 SPT-039-02 Unit 1 Revision 0 Page 33 of 33 PERMANENT PLANT INSTRUMENTATION LOG Sheet 1 of 1 FILLED

PLACED IN USED FOR AND QUANTITATIVE OR CAL DUE VENTED SERVICE
ACC CRIT POST-TEST** INSTRUMENT DATE CAL DATE LOOP I IN IT/DATE lNIT/DATE YES NO w l. B /3 -3 1 -'15 WLB I '3-31."IS'

..... If O-LI-39-OOO2 't-l. , -'t " X N/A 7-1"*') IWLB I {,.jLB / 3.-31-'5'" I\I/A '.IL. O-LIS-39-OOO2 1f-2'" -OJ '-s-sl-1S X 7-1'1-'fr Fo"',-IJ4S I/Jf..B N/A O-PJ-39-OOO3 NIA x Wl.. B / 12-ll-"ct """il O-PI-39-OO03A '2.-' S" -'J f, MA x tvlA 2-P5-39-OO71 '2-S-CH. N/A wi 8 / I -I ,.n*B X IV/A 7-(I'I-'r Wl8 /7-S-Cl'f N/A r..""B I-P5-39-OO65 7-'l1.-'If, N/A X 7-11-7r

These items may be initialed and dated by penonnel performing

!he task. Instrumcntllion not n:quired to be filled and vented may be identified as Not Applicable (NA) ** May be idauif"Icd as Not Applicable (NA) ifinsuument was not used to verify/record quantitative acceptance criteria dala. POST -TEST** CALIBRA nON ACCEPTABLE INITIALIDATE '" 40 Jr uP. ? *ff-'S'" "" ... $ wit\. "1-1 '-fr-41 .. 8 11.1"-7-I'I-'K-""c.e NA i -1f-'s"" " N/A "'7 -I cr-'i tJ/A 7-1t:;-'ir Page I of 2 TEST CHANGE NOTICE* M12DUE TITLE: PRO CEDURE NO. /REZ CHX.REAS01FOuR CHANGE:c A 1 > At tIT AbrI N AL Pi¶teTc-qutstre r-e MID Abs-rePs-ro mb Pt~roI MAK4lm/A% ALL.OWA5LE ROCot~ bi tF UT-(AL- ?Ell" UR tj1 1EL~TE PREREq STrEp L'4.Zj Smc cpiN~AL-0A G §-R MS CA-1BRATPED 9Y CENJTRAL LUAGS.~ PMCH-AW6EAD -ro QRVARTe'RLY AFFECTED STEPS:0LfZ2.,4'... (.) 1-3 1. 4 2~ : .1. C.2A-2. 1 ..~ 2.212.1 (a .1. 1 4.4 2 14 tj CHANGE DESCRXPTION: ADD S-EF-4.2.7-1 ENSU'R TeTTIJQ-,TN 0-r;-R-%9-2

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M + 'T E :r. '[) . _____ _ :J: N 1 TI ",,-' , ' I j) ATE -1\ SiE"Ps C;.I.,"LI . . PERSoNNEL ARe f'oSI'-loNE"b

- . 1\ DURING T*STIN(2 0 F UNIT 'l-Aux "I:.MSTRIJME{VT R.ooM. " .. 0-50 DE: LE'T* ST.&:'P 't.2, IS .". \ \ " AI S1"E'P "".2.11 CHANGE MoNTH'L)" To QUABTER'L'( A IJD \I' "\' .11 30 DAYS To qo t>A'I'S J:NTEm CHANGE 0 . JTG MEETJ:NG NO. P MANAGER A3-40 . _ DAT,E .' . DATE. __ ---

Page 1 of I TEST CHANGE NOTICE ICEDURE TITLE: PROCEDURE NO./REV.: CN O.: CoIOVojt ~t+?- ACJX NSTR-ROc/AS SPT- o-O ../fo 0 ..REASON FOR CHANGE:G IFJTEIN F T" ISTo TE S T D I- CHAR GE0 F.AFFECTED STEPS: (DL.2.Z2 CHANGE DESCRIPTION:(DAD)b XT L&.2,2 (TIME/> I StECHA RGE OF o "~~.............................. .,., ..':'.'.".".-...... .-S...:: .' .:. ................................ t....~:........%.....,,~.....-.-.--.

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~ -...~.....INTENT CHANGE 0] .3TG MEETING NO.NON-INTENT CHANGE 11 LNGIEER DATE 7-1_ -_ 9" DATE _______-A'l I l ,,, 5 TEST ENGINEER APPROVED BY:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _'OFFICIAL TEST-COPY\ .1. ___ .* Page 1 of TEST CHANGE NOTICE 1CEDURE TJ:TLE: PROCEDURE NO. IREV' * : CN NO. : ('01-I+'? Aux IrJSTR' RO,,;t\'s: S,PT-0 '2: REASON FOR CBANGE:CD X./oJTe/>lT of -rES IS To TES:T \)ISCJ.lARGf' 0 F., C'oz.. TIM'S, AFFECTED STEPS: CD 4,'2,,1.'2. I'f\ lIe CID.NGE A () AT S' ,T e. p 't, '2. 2'Z T I/VI E c:>f DISCI-/ARGE o F C 0'1. )' . . -.. . .. :: : ' ... ..:: ....... ':--:" -.. : ": .. : : -0' ****** ,0 , ' , ': '""0' ':r','

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Page I of TEST CHANGE NOTICE ICEDURE TITLE: PROCEDURE NO./REV.,:

CN NO.cIi PRo UNRITI+.Z AUX :[S-rR.RooM's 0-SPT-o9.o2 REASON FOR CHANGE: (D) iPaTE NTIAL -QUIPMCIVt'? FAl LURE) 6 WN ST R GAA, 0F .0-1 V-211-.-Ss-OF I~i" AFFECTED STEPS: 0 1 -r H -~L3 1 .2- 7HR'CHANGE DECITIN( GLA S~ c-u ER Io -. F~-S'V-I a -1 CH-4JG~ e STE? C.,1Z8 To .0 PE~N J- PSV- 3 17 14 _UtqTIL 6A_D I S C4A RGE-- CzAv~ I'Jo LOrJGEF, 13E )4. APD., :ZJl'tAL. DATrQ C.4 N Y~ G FIS. G To C LO _I mSV9 1 7FA A 4 ~ ~~~fi ARE2G'1oý -a ýF6VP GLASS 'CD\IEL'Eao QZ-FSV-3;-1 -~I4'T1 G __z 2mmit I C ý4AivJG G S T R? 4. 2. 2- To Df E 0 2. -ps V- 3 9 -I( U W'TI r, A S,-pi sc.,p CAN~) No -L-O[GE R~E 14E 0R -mir L DIP Ct4APJ G E STEP C rZ.Zq To "Clio.SE ZS SV -3il 9J~ 1 1 r 2Z-Fsv-3ci-Ir. xj,1TSL DAT-E Ct+AtwGE STS? G.Z31i 71-o EoJSLE &P1-9i. CL-D.S&P. -~INTENT CHANGE Li ITG MEETING NO.NON-INTENT C E PREPARED BY: 6(1DATE 7-1 (a- S-U iPPT ENGINYEER EVIEWED BY: a , ,^ DATE 7 /X I Y TEST ENGINEER ,'STARTUP MANAGER I "" ... f, 7!w !.rt OFFICIAL TEST COPY LI'\ Page of TEST CHANGE NOTICE 'CEDURE TITLB: PROCEDURE NO. IREV' * : UNIT \+.2 AcJ)( I(\,I5TR'Roo",,'s: 'S.PT-03C},,*0"'2 !t;>. REASON FOR CHANGB: CD PoT NT lA-I. 8 C¥ IJ I P/I1 *fV T' FA' Lul\

0 F 'p, PI f.J c;. t> b IN tv S'I REAm 0 F . 0 -7 s: V -"1 'I -S'S s AFFECTED STEPS: CD ,. I * 'Z 7 '1\-1 R,'" b. l. "3 I eN NO.: .0 "3 : II , C.l4A N G
S TG P {" I. '2. Cf To C LOS*. ./ E SV-'3 q -/ 'I ::tIJII\4r1.

DATe: C;H'ArJG"E'

S:1G:'P'

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-=-_____ _ TEST DATE DATE 7 /1 05-* EVIEWED

___ TEST ENGINEER FICIAl TEST COpy Page I of I TEST CHANGE NOTICEý 'EDUR TIL:%r*XQ W ZJ.C C)? R U-1 AND V AL'X :rpm-R PRoOms-SI &T- (339-W 0Z /,0I*Qf.I RASON FOR CHANGE: (A I ST ISPSTo RE co RD U A VX' T.l'ST R. ?oa um P FEscau RE. Q2 SIELS re.2.27 T "u C 11 CA fai1lE FERPO2,viRA 1~AA~ORF 1CiEi~JTL'i~ APTE~ 6.2.1(0 i*'~tJ ~ To RFI i~ ~ ,~-.-- -1 ~ '.~MORE GPV,2,,E ,Z C, .FTER ,.2.1f 1" r0 RU32 P~t~-AYECTE 'REPAIRED, AFFECTED STEPS: 0 (D *,4Z 1,2 CHANGE DESCRIPTION: (DADDt STEP 6.2. 4.Z o' e Q SU1r: IMPSTALL S7~?, IPZHiART Rec~re~ON 21c2~ 'i) GAS ~r~i~.i-rh. o .Po- ~~ " J I /WTIAL* T S&TIP ro2.G ADD REmvOVE ST-RIP CHART RE~ogbER: A'TI2 i UE. 1- *.F r 1' 42 1,. Oe0E 2~Ii* II .:.....Cf-AN~GST~'Z7 1~2.T~2T~'

~'~.....-~

CHANGE, TE~ 'Z. z To a .1 ItIt .tt W -A NG E S TEI ~.2. Zo To ~..16.3 II' 114 It CI4AIIGE Srl P.3 'To 6.2, 1 6.4 C W & PG-C STE P 6.2.3 1 To 0 2US.INTENT CHANGE El

JTG MEETING NO.NON- INTENT CHANGEI PREPA ED oY TEST ENGINEER .~'EWED BY:_________________

DATE 7-Zi~W -TEST ENGINEER APPROVED BY: DATE 7-6)Page J. of TEST CHANGE NOTICE .......... ,..,...,'" TITLE: PROCEDURE NO./REV.: CN NO.: Co2,. Fo R U-I AtJ'D V-2. Avx 'S 02 I .0 tr, .... REASON FOR CHANGE: CD A>> 1> T e: ? S ToR E: CoR'\> LJ -2. A V >< :t N S T R. R Q 0/\,\ . PR£\;S.URE.

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"':. '0.... "':-... .. . ." * .* :... ** '_:'. t. . INTENT CHANGE 0 . J"rG MEETING NO. ________ _ NON-J:NTENT CHANGE 7-24-Cf S" ... .-... ATTACHMENT 9.0 ATrACHMENT INDEX Revision No. O Procedure No. S ? T -0 39 -0 2 Pageý. -IOLLI Attachment Attachment Description No. of No. Pages L. t A4-, TE LOG ,.3 C14RoO LO GI CAL TEST LoG 7 1,4r TEST DGFtICIEljcY LoG I 9__, T-_ b mM 9S' C773 C?"t. Z TDN) 9S ll -, 0 7 7 I 7 3 9.q.3 TD61 9S-o07 1 7T-. SS uE TIcKWETS s 2,.( AA+T.E POST- 'ES-T CAL REO'RT! ?_It M+TE -T ET CA-L REIORTS 4r S CHART Rec.-o0 G .-,CO, TCOP M ..T ýL. AVX XJSTR RM ICHART RLECOR ING _. UN17r 2 AUXTISTR RAI I-T.10 C bART- RECORbIIUG --.TI* f R IIE J IN RKI 1.11 IRECo( 1 IG-P GPltE SSU RIUN UJIT2 RA IL_____ (o'/ I~ ~Je,-Y A3-45 0 SMP-9.0 ATrACBMENT 9.0 ATIACHMENT INDEX Procedure No. S PT -03 C) -02 Revision Page I of I . --Attachment Attachment Description No. of No *. Pages 'i. I LOG I ' . . .. 9.2-M + TE: LOG 2 Cf.3 C.I-\-RorvOLOG\CAL "TEST LoG 7 c:r:t.t T E. ST Lo G I q If. J T 1) I\J QS-077S '1 TDtv t:tS"-077C, 1 "I. '-/" 3 T Df-J 'tS-O"'7Q I .. .-.' .. .' , . Gf.£ . E. ISSUE S OJ.b M+TE: poST-lEST C*AL 2-'1.7 *M-\oTE. PRE. - CA-L RE.?oR'TS 4-Cf'B CHART Re.c.oRDlrJ G -CO 2 I.f\I U 1\)1 T 1... AV X .I. NSTR R,ft I 'f <t CHAR. T' \) I N G -. CO-z. I.I\) UN IT '2 AIJX RM J. 'f. /0 C IiA RT R l=CO Ri) IrJ G IN V ITZ AtJx RM I 'I. I I ettA R T E CORl) I fJ G 4-P'R*SSIJRE. I N UN RAt I tJ.o-!of> J ""-/-;. .. .f . 5" A3-45 . , SMP-9.0 ATTACHMENT 9.1 SIGNATURE LOG Revision No. 0 icedure No. s Plr- 0 3 9 -0 2.Page _L of _L NAME (Print) SIGNATURE ITITLE/ORG. I INITIALS DATE______, (,.._ .,LB 7?-/f-;.&L4 p s Bj'e- -r F- , D-~V /c d ) ______ec_ pý 7-y ý5 Ii i i U-4 + 4 4.ATMACME' T qI._PAGjE__ -1 A3-46 S 1P- 9.0 ,

ATTACHl'vIENT 9.1 SIGNATURE LOG No. $ PI' 03 c:r -0 '2.. Revision No. 0 Ni\ME (print) . SIGNATURE gPO.' -.3. 7)Q!'L 80 c c.; &vc.'CtA . ....... J"n t1J,Pc. f. Wi fL.J j'" f 1/ fLh 5' J'b'u4 t?,A.)

... , . TITLE/ORG. 1": E.. I S"T rc/svr / fj, kC? 1.:')7"111. Frn. F £) nn"',.. ... "' ... r .. ."O ,.. AlTAI' WI A, .. ; II cr. I PAGE. I A3-46 Page..L of ...L lNlTIALS DATE WL8 7-!?-ClS' dJ1U5 V'a4-- /fr Itj;jq( Si'1P-9.0 ATTADT NT 9.2 MEASURING AND TEST EQUIPMENT (M%&TE) LOG Procedure No. S PT-o016- 02 Revision No. n Page._ of 2 M&TE DESCRIPTION CAL

FILLED &
PLACED USED FOR **POST-TEST
- POST-TEST ID # DUE VENTED IN-SERVICE QUANTITATIVE CAL DATE CAL ACCEPT DATE ACC. CRIT.RANGE/ACCURACY

_ ....INIT/DATE INITIDATE YESj NO INITIDATý0-"0 ]DiGtTA.L S"i 8 'F-T7 8 --2?o-7S- WA N/r/A WA N/4A GAGe oFrow)E 9so?-DIGITAL ThER'flm iE1 7-7l-H G N/A WA. I/A AtzF z , CoJTAT M TF..R 231-7, o- NC^TRATIoM? Mo-16R, e-10-1(, N/A I/A ./ ,7- -a-M /A &. ET[S1 S -+1 50DIGITAL ?REAS& V.9-S-_5% NI/A VW P/A t,/A 1T1 G bIETA L_ -TJ Rt# V1 tAG 0-.1 s~ '. ...c*..E.q3q7. St r--} N,/A IA V/ P V/,,.o. NSIC. " _. _* This item may be signed by the person performing the task. This may be N/A'd if M&TE does not require to be filled and vented or placed in-service.

- May be identified as not applicable (N/A) if M&TE was not used to verify/record quantitative acceptance criteria.ATTACHMENT_

9.2.PAGE _ __SMl?-9.O ATT 9.2 MEASURING AND TEST EQUIPMENT (M&TE) LOG =t Procedure No. 5 f T -03 " -02 Revision No. Page..L of.£ M&TE DESCRIPTION CAL

FILLED &
PLACED USED FOR **POST -TEST ** POST-TEST 10# I DUE VENTED IN-SERVICE QUANTITATIVE CAL DATE CAL ACCEPT DATE ACC. CRIT. RANGE/ACCURACY INITIDATE INIT/DATE YES NO INlTIDAT9 O-SO " 518 'f-78 DIGITAL neSS. f'fA N/A v NA GAGE OF'RAtJGE)

Cf-? 0_' S E let So'Z. DI G ITA I. TH E N/A t{A. ./ I'I/A tJA . ..... of -'2-t' *COz. weB wc..8 2317b CotJCeNTR.ATIOt.) Me.1'*R , ... (0 -ct b N/A 0_100'10 (: 2'10) N/A 0/ 7-( 8-'1S" CJ 0 '2. 'f-'t S I NlAJ.Iu/\\

T* R o -'3 III 0 '" *t-J/A IV/A ./ 1Ifp.. N/A 0-50 II 1>1 GITAL f>RESS 9-13.-<;s ftJ/A MA v tJ/A GAGE (!. 10 RAf,lGE) t..\'ittq, 1> I G I T A '-TH-E. RhlM1ETS \-19-'1' Nile "'Ie V , !Z:f 'I &'l. S'J'I /TINtER b I GITAl lID -,0 -'J S t-(A "Y'A ./ N/A )I/A ! O.IS£C. q033 8" SIoPvA.-rcH blGi/Al..

tf-'2..0 " IV/A ./ fII/A N/It t: O.l So e,c . . '" This item may be signed by the person performing the task. This may be N/A'd if M&TE does not require to be filled and vented or placed in-service. "*. May be identified as not applicable (N/A) if M&TE was not used to verify/record quantitative acceptance criteria. PRO\';. t; .... , 3 '7 -O'Z. Ri;'I._o=--_ ATTACHMENT.-...:'l:...:.,. __ _ \ PAGE I SMp'-9.0 . . ATTA kT 9.2 JIPMENT (M&TE) LOG MEASURING AND.1 Procedure No.. S PT- O'S -o2-Revision No. 0 Page.2 of 2 M&TE DESCRIPTION CAL

FILLED &
PLACED USED FOR **POST-TEST
- POST-TEST ID # DUE VENTED IN-SERVICE QUANTITATIVE CAL DATE CAL ACCEPT DATE ACC. CRIT.RANGE/ACCURACY INIT/DATE INIT/DATE YES NO__ INIT/DATý_

41o4 Co /E- 1-2-c r/A WA16/ 7-2.6-IS o____________ 2%-* This item may be signed by the person performing the task. This may be N/A'd if M&TE does not require to be filled and vented or placed in-service.

- May be identified as not applicable (N/A) if M&TE was not used to verify/record quantitative acceptance criteria.IpROC-Sp 3 17" -l02 REV. _° .-ATTACHMENT

'.2.PAGE-1 SMz-9.0c * :t Procedure No. SeT -0"'3 -0 z. M&TE DESCRIPTION !D# . RANGE/ACCURACY CO ... ME'icR tfCfo Lil 0 O";loo"7o ( "!: ... . . . . ATT MEASURING AND Revision No. CAL

FILLED & DUE VENTED DATE INIT/DATE NIp.. (M&TE) LOG of...,g .. PLACED USED FOR **POST-TEST
- POST-TEST IN-SERVICE QUANTITATIVE CAL DATE CAL ACCEPT ACC. CRIT. INIT/DATE YES NO INIT/DATi Gvc..g

,.,yA v 7-23-15 7-2..'-'S -This item may be signed by the person performing the task. This may be N/A'd if M&TE does not require to be filled and vented or placed in-service. .** May be identified as not applicable (N/A) if M&TE was not used to verify/record quantitative acceptance criteria. '3'1-02 REV

ATTACHMEIiT----:'f:.:..,.

'2=--__ PAGE,-f:,l _____ _ . . ATTACHBMENT 9.3 CHRONOLOGICAL TEST LOG Procedure No. S F-T- 63 ' -0o Revision 0 Page I .of 1 LOGGED BY IATErTIME-I3- z.q 0730 S Ld...-7-Q3-95 (.JR S36' S tZI.J 7,x .9 &t.0 " 13-qC/0735 ~ -:t 2.~ce 71 -1A~ SAS/ Go___________ -' ~ .1 ____________ ...... ... ...0, r : ....w -%1 4 1 P f-,-~ A-dJJ.Cl 7 -2b 7..~~c,ý 1+~sI7o 1ih 4~ 4 Oe'C ,~\A.-. _ _ _ _9 oo.' .0 " A L-"i44 T L / S .ý-, I .__-_ .F_, ) 'R.. L. 4 ",,,. s .C ______,dr,.- ..o A A.A* G fQS-7_-_ i -_/0_I"_". .. -' _II U ,J-t tr%-A&I OpROC;. sp 9-'wýAT4I'IIOMF.IT3 9.3 ~ -SMP-9.9ol PAGE_- ....A3-49* tt. ". ATrACHMENT 9.3 CHRONOLOGICAL TEST LOG .1 Procedure No: S 0-3,,,, 0'2.. Revision A3-49 Page _""-_ of -, LOGGED BY ATTACBVtENT 9.3 CBRONOLOGICAL TEST LOG',ATE/TI ME Procedure No. S P-T -o 3 '--o 2 Revision 0 Page 2- of..7 LOGGED BY.6L LA -., --o ._ __F .,. ..v .3 t.........o-oo S- , JA ,._,___..-o 1 9-. Ca- ,,t.,2.,--,.J/ f-,-.-44. ap-,4 Y4AV-.Lk-0 -ZS /i.~ALA..2-X1,,,:.Z.L. L.j.5'. 1. ....2, 1 .LfZ. , L. 2 .13.,4 .I .,1 ." 2* -./u 0____ TA_ S oýLA.-7-/- 1~ S-0 .ýs "sA~ 'L, 1, ; t. _____el I____________________________ I 7-14-qsiZI Co~LAQ QA cajm,ý7-/6- 1 h 10-U---*F II ATTACHMEN-T -A3-50.. *0. 0, -' ..... ATtACHMENT 9.3 CBRONOLOGICAL TEST LOG .: Procedure No: S?-T 0'3 C'f--o'2 Revision-.Q.... A3-50 Page . 1. of -.1.1 __ LOGGED BY ,--...:::=.----- ff ATTACHEMXT 9.3 CHRONOLOGICAL TEST LOG.S7PT-:.0.9-c. Revision 2__, A T E -" " " Page 3 a of -L..LOGGED BY 0 fs 7 A 2i. .... T'a M c f? 4-T A; % , ,-,. 1.,_1 51 1 A__ -&5Vo.. '_____lo,_ t9 -I L c t V ZiFMiZOI2 UI V., -2, Za .(. :... c L."C .,,, A L -_ _ _ _, 7-17-- -/'c i+/- 0 FS4 _- L 13..-, , L 6'Q,-Q"- SS " & "....... *j~ , -~ , __.._.,__-m 6 l -;,LS gs e. L 4 p-S 31- 13~J t.-I I. -K22.Q~..0 CJ PL, 11 2L~23~. a p.sv&~I V1,KUt;.f by S-UL M V A1TACHMENT T M-.A3-51in A- U .- -A3-51., ," ". "f ATTACHMENT 9.3 CHRONOLOGICAL TEST LOG .: Procedure No: S* P T ...: "0 -"z. Revision Page 3 of __ -.'-7_ LOGGED BY wtB w l.,B : ulB A3-51 SMP-.9 ** 0 tt...\ PAGE 3 jI .f ATTACBMEUNT 9.3 CHXRONOLOGICAL TEST LOG Procedure No. S 03 9 -0 2. Revision 0 Page .of 7 LOGGED ]By.s ,S~ETE M 7A1-15ý /ooV 2t 0-7--9 -15 ...30 Co .L ._"-.._,.... ..9 S .°. ... .... .' .~C 0~ ~ ~ ~ ~ .L" --j-,-.3 7.. ...21 /5 3oo .. '__.. ..7-2I-'q 5/ifo ' A. L T. f. _____, _I T. .,_ _741-19/ / -x-T. '. 6- -___7- VZ -15 3 U{: c, ::/ " 7 -27.-JS/A 24 L4, ,j.9L A.-' , J *1,, .ý -_ "* 180 _ýP ", A, ...~*r)JL 2*Y 4 A4'ArLJ4 i~. ~Ae-~A So 0.ZJV~ ?ffi~ ~' PS U? fVLd~LQ~ ?~k~+/-~ ~II Y 1 L &~i~A~L PeW'. ~4 J ~.~4 1 z.~sJ~L2 I1 ATTACHMENT 9C3 .-9.0 A3-52 ' PAGE- -* --... _.. ... .. ATIACBMENT 9.3 CHRONOLOGICAL TEST LOG .1 Procedure No: S ?:r-6"3 9 -0"2.. Revision Page :t of 7 -"----LOGGED BY A3-52 ...... '1"O--__ .:ioISMlI,l:p-* 0 .' PAGE 't . f; ')- ATTACBMN'TJE 9.3 CHRONOLOGICAL TEST LOG Procedure No." &'-- 019 -0 2 Revision ()Page 5- of-~ ., A.TEFrIMB 77-->q!-,zo 2, T -. a , .-..7.'Z.-j /Zoo Co. g ...... .. ------Co GbJL J ,-,I aj a.v-~K ~ M2A.o&i~c~ ____z-~-t0J t-M- _2_______,3

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.I#II a C6 ~- ~ .7. _____________ I-II&QL. 0_o* v 11 I V.ATrACHMENT 93 ,ms-9, o PAGE -" ---A3-53* ..... AT!' ACBM:ENT 9.3 CF.I:RONOLOGICAL TEST LOG .: ProcOOure No: Sr:j'-o'Sq -J!) 2 Revision Page S-of _---...7 __ LOGGED BY PFlUC. l ... A3-53 t ATIACHMENT_Cf:..:,,;. 9* 0 19 PAGE S . 6 ATTACMEENT 9.3 CHRONOLOGICAL TEST LOG Procedure No.' S -IT- '0 S T 0 Revision 0 Page o otf7 LOGGED riY TEMTME I0 CONJ T~ -4 , Is I ,>Sd W ZJ L_-A_-_-_ 13- '1-H- t.-0 0o 7 o £4& A- 6co 2 t M_.L~at-*t 6 c*Ll -r ij> o s- -o 7' _7 PC, 2L 47 /O2- co. A4 A-r o.. ,0 Co.,"_ c U I, P__. _3 I .W .&F.--I 0o40b " .Ao T. E_S#7-21.9,r/17-0,.týu_ .. .-.,ý 4.11. T .RE 7-Vt-95/123o l~~tC --ON-S-A.&E ,,,ýU AT'ACHMENT 9 -.SP 9.0-"PAGE , A3-54* -.. ". ATIACHMENT .9.3 CHRONOLOGICAL TEST LOG .: Procedure No: S fT *0 '}-O'Z.. Revision A3-54 Page b of ( ---LOGGED BY ATTACEWMENT 9.3 CERONOLOGICAL TEST LOG Procedure No. $ E-T- 0 S 9 -0?- Revision 0 Page 7 2. of --LOGGED BY~LTE/TIME 17-'Z6-qS/1O51 1., -7. E LsB~~~~I osl a-.ni- -A A __________- La-E~ L~ __ _______ et "L D1 2 "( AR-l-4 L -SriQ~ 1/54021.CAA3 rnVVI4.~rT-39...Oz Revo ATTACHMENT qA Smp-9. 0 PAGE -- 7 A3-55'0 *** ..... , .. TElTIME 5/1515 'IS! 0000 1-?.f,.<iS'l /ISoo _. . -. : : -. ., ; ATTACHMENT 9.3 CBRONOLOGICAL TEST LOG .: Procedure No: S P-T-0 " -o?' Revision S ...... . TE -. , ,d .U ,-S ............ ...... tIA.. Ie S. (J '.,.. Q 1.;. ..,:;;b.."", -L-rr\Y. 2J .\)"" "* 4.2. ?7 .. _..,1 M .... 4E . Page 7 of _ 7 LOGGED BY wLS wCB AL,.;. l.Jt1!. J".o. A 2 M+'IE A .... P.l.. ... 8 ...e....eR A , \I (' 0 'Z. 1!.iO,.t&. o-Wt cw Wl'B (j 0 . . . . .. /.' . -. . . ... .. . .. . . -. . . . . .. .. , . .. ' .. -,,-. . .; . . . '. .. ..... .. -. .. . . . .. . . .. .. " . . ' , .... -, . . .' : . -. . . ' .. ._. . . . -. ":.-:: -,. , . , .' , " -. . .-.. ... , ... ., -.: .-. . , . , -IlhOC. Fr*

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..... ,_3 __

9. 0 -i PAGE,_' ______ _

TEST LOG Procedure No. &T-.E Revision 0 Page _of I__TDN#/DCN# PROCEDURE STEP DEFICIENCY DESCRIPTION RETEST CLOSURE NOs DATE REQUIRED (Y/N) NO.(s)--9S- 0778 b.IIS' -Co2 D Co.S RER4o N NA 7-_-" Ge- 07T ,tLzsECrJal "ODO t.N C(.0., " R- 9.a/, J~r- 0-779 GeIJ6IGA-L Z~ I b i- D tJ'Tr 0 RA-T A S gxrc1E ____7-3__-__S IS- 0 -9 ______ Cox~ 1>sc)4Agrp- ~4t NS1o~- __'7e CA PROC. SPT 3 9-02-REV. 0......MAflHMENT 'PAGELI SMP-9.0, Rl9.CN-3 TEST LOG procedure No. .s? 'T -., 3 11-0 '-Revision 0 Page _I of _,_ TDN#/DCN# PROCEDURE STEP DEFICIENCY DESCRIPTION RETEST CLOSURE NOs DATE REQUIRED (YIN) NO.(s) Cf _'i -0778 '.I.IS \-llG/-I PRE SSvR*@ Roo,N'l N tVA 7-31 '9S" , Gelll ERI\-L. "T£sr LtJ/j\rTe"GftEt:N up OR J;.I\I CO N 'T"R<H. Oil"' N tJA 7-3J-'1S >.1o'*. 'Z-I {)I N'T G ... S 0791 '.2.IS ('02-t+\ R():)PI N tVA 7-3d-'S .--. , PROC. SPT 3 <f -02. REV . ....;;O __ ___ _ ________ __ SMP-9.0,R19,CN-3 APPENDIX A (Sbeet I of 2)TEST DEFICIENCY NOTICE 1. TDN No. 91S 7- 0 7 Page I of __j 2. TEST NO. 3. CSI NOl, 4. TREND CODE T-03'.-Z IA 7 s -Q 5. EQUIPMENT NAME: 6. EQUIPMENT NO.: 7. SYSTEM NO.: A.,y .-RM. I.. .- : r--a I-I- 1401ý8. SAFETY-RELATED

9. ORIGINATO0JDATEVEXT.

10. REP DWG/DOCUMENT(S):

w. 1-8 7-17-1 S IKYES /No 6JAYP6

?116I 1 7w %,13 -I 1I. DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: XHARDWARE 0 SOFTWARE 0 CONTINUED UJt-T I AuX .VST_/TUIEJT Room PRIFFSSvRE WAS RI!% OJGG STENDILY TowARD MAtv AU.LOWA1aLC Rao/A t P 0 F 2-7"H.zO; DE~CI Siotw \MAS MADEb"To AvolRT TEST BY FLACItNiC. To OFF AMD 4L0I&JChG MIANUAL XSO-LATI oN VA LV--. 0--X SV-. C PRE SSVR RE.LEEF PA^ PER 0- Pm?- o-3-v 4 4' WAH F- D CU Wd-aSS015 TO FIZEvebj 0vR?%~su~ jz.A-Tiow I-la HI0)Potental Reponablity Screening complete. She Licensing Evaluation Yes 11 No TEST ENGINEER (LEVEL III) DATE 12. CORRECTIVE ACTION (S) 03 CONTINUED bCN 37GIO LoWERS THE TIME- S £TTItJG, OF I--.C-3i.-P+ FRoM Dp REWORK 21'5StCotDS jqo SeCOfJbS. TjI-S " TIA4E, o REPAIR WILL. FLSitItAT. OVER(rR.kSSURIZATIDI..J CONCERINS BY o ACCEPT-AS-IS LIMITING T"ie. AMOUNT OF CO? FLOWIIG I..JTo TIE UNIT o OTHER I AQ'e. zgEJSTfpuvm' JT RooA .EI, SPECIFIEDBY: -(, OTEST ENGINEER DATE 13. RETEST (S) REQUIREMENTS 0 CONTINUED

14. ASSOCIATED WORK DOCUMENTS YES 0 CONTINUED[ NO 95-17G90-oo JUSTIFICATION:

bCN 37Grio LOWERS TIwIE Se-TrIIN G, FROM "lZG 'To k9o0 SECONDS, SPECIFIEDBY: ) ."7-2 o _- __ DATE APPROVED B y ._..,.TEST GROUP SUPERVISOR DATE 15. CORRECTIVE ACTION COMPLETE:

16. RETEST COMPLETE: U62__ I'J 7-195 ýA726-5___"T ENGINEER DATE TEST ENGINEER DATE 17. REPORTABIUTY EVALUATION COMPLETE:

18. FINAL APPROVAL:

TEST GROUP SUPERVISOR DATE TEST GROUP SUPERVISOR DATE PROC. SPT.j.- 028: EV___._SMP-14,0. R3 ATTACHMENT1J. J. I A3-57 PAGE I .APPENDIX A (Sheet 1 of 2) TEST DEFICIENCY NOTICE 1. TDN No. CfS 077e Page 1 o( tt 2. TEST NO. 3. CSI N0l.. 4. TREND CODE Sf'T-0'3'1-0'2.. tS Ql /VIA 7-17-'15 . . S. EQUIPMENT NAME: 6. EQUIPMENT NO.: 7. SYSTEM NO.: Av}( 'RM. l-:r. Co-3 CJ -Ltt "S'l 8. SAFETY*RELATED . 9.0RIGINATOI!./DATElEXT. 10.. REF DWGIDOCUMENT(S): Col" 8 7-17-'i S" 1-'l."*c;S' WA'r'fIIG BLCHlI\1elR Lf7W lifYES NO 7.,5 I 11. DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: o SOFTWARE o CONTINUED UNt.,.. I Au)< :LI,/ST ROOM 'WAS STEIlti)IL'r' TOVVARt> MAXI,MvM ALl.OWASt..G: R':'OM \).f>. 0 f ZH-zO; WAS """A!)E \0 ABoR" TEST 'BY To OFF A"'J> c:::. ... as'j.,/(:. MAIVUAL.. VAt.VG. 1O-:tSV.3"1-S2l... PRESS.URE RELIEF O-PM'P-O'31-S"l-'-t '¢ \JJA \l, '( J) eN W -3_55 5' 1'0 TI-\8. .DURIIVGo TEST wA\; Z}:. 1-1'2,.:::0. l1a lOCFR50.SS(e Potential ReponabiJit)' Screening complete.' Site Licensing Evaluation Yes o No 17/t(Jr TEST ENGINEER (LEVEL Ill) DA E 12. CORRECTIVE ACTION (S) o CONTINUED DCN '31GIO L.OWEfl.S TIME'.' s e'TTIN G OF I -'I. <: q.-I If REWORK 2ISS*COIVDS To IqO S*COI'J!)S. THIS

eN TIME' o REPAIR WILl. e L ,,....,'NA1'E COtJCE"tJS BY 0 ACCEPT-AS-IS LIMI-rINOo THe. AMOV(\.IT OF cO-z.. FL.OW'/oJG

I.tJTO TItE UNIT 0 OTHER :1. AV)(.

RooM. SPECIFIED BY: W 7-?fo-QS %TENGINEER DATE 13. RETEST (S) REQumEMENTS o CONTINUED

14. ASSOCIATED WORK DOCUMENTS 0 YES 0 CONTINUED

.. NO JUSTIFICATION: !)CN '37<;"0 1..0WERS T,.m* W.O. ttS-11"SO-OO EROM '2.16' 1"0 I qo Se:COI'J I) S, SPECIFIED BY: CJ 4..-£ I 1-'2'-CfS" ff Y ENGINEER DATE ",/ ... , ,"it ,-APPROVED I /, /tt,1i!.I, .. \ TEST GROUP SUPERVISOR DATE IS. CORRECTIVE ACTION COMPLETE:

16. RETEST COMPLETE:

W ,7*31-Cf5 """ 8 tv/A 7-2'*<iS I DATE

TEST ENGINEER DATE 17. REPORTABlLlTY EVALUATION COMPLETE:

18. PINAL APPROVAL: I TEST GROUP SUPERVISOR DATE TEST GROUP SUPERVISOR 01\ /?IhJ t¥ 7'0:1-'7J-eV7Z,1*

1J?,;). PROC. R3 A3-57 ATTACHMENT_1_. l/.w., *.... , ____ = PAGE---.' _____ :_: APPENDIX H 10CFR50.55(e) POTENTIAL REPORTABILITY SCREENING FORM (TO BE USED FOR TEST DEFICIENCY NOTICES ONLY)Page I of 2 PLANT/UNIT ' 2A) ) TDN Number .BR IEFDESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: 4'" 1-/ k e I WýL*z'" "4- k ",h -J, '@'// '-.I. Is the deficiency associated with a safety-related component or any support structure? J ES D NO 0 INDETERMINATE If the above answer is NO, the deficiency is not potentially reportable. Stop the screening at this point. If the above answer, is either YES or INDETERMINATE, continue with the screening process.II. Can the deficiency be clearly called corrective maintenance for a correctly designed and constructed installation: o YES AkNO [0 INDETERMINATE .Basis for YES answer: III. Is the deficiency related only to test performance activities, such as procedure problems, test equipment or incorrect system lineups?o YES ...CNO 0 INDETERMINATE Basis for YES answer: If the answer to either Question II or Question III is YES, the deficiency is not potentially reportable.Stop the screening at this point. Otherwise, continue with the screening process.PROC. SPT.1-02~REV._Q ATTACHMENT. 9.. I PAGE, A3-58 SMP-14.0,R3,CN-2 , . . APPENDIX H lOCFR50.55(e) POTENTIAL REPORTABILlTY SCREENING FORM (TO BE USED FOR TEST DEFICIENCY NOTICES ONLY) Page 1 of 2 PLANT/UNIT iJ Ai... ) TDN Number '} -b77( BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: {;AN,'/-/ A,4kJ'"u-lIZ{(P41l1-/' h"" t/leJ.Jt/tz?; ((,'(?-WI'.t IV/tAa -11.",1 C' 't?2 ikn&:-b-J2,I.) I. Is the deficiency associated with a safety-related component or nny support structure? .JS.t1'ES o NO o INDETERMINATE If the above answer is NO, the deficiency is not potentially reportable. Stop the screening at this point. If the above answer: is either YES or INDETERMINATE, continue with the screening process. , II. Can the deficiency be clearly called corrective maintenance for a correctly and constructed installation: , DYES 1\ 0 INDETERMINATE Basis for YES answer: --------------------------------------------------- III. Is the deficiency related only to test performance activities. such as procedure problems, test equipment or incorrect system lineups? ' DYES .-a:-NO 0 INDETERMINATE Basis for YES answer: _____________________________________________ _ If the answer to either Question II or Question III is YES, the deficiency is not potentially reportable. Stop the scr:eening at this point. Otherwise, continue wtth the screening process. A3-58 PRoe. SPt 3 CJ* o2REV._O __ ATIACHMENT

2. 'I. I PAGE ........ 2. _______ _ SMP":'14.0,R3,CN-2 . .... :

I APPENDIX H 10CFR50.55(e)

POTENTIAL REPORTABILITY SCREENING FORM (TO BE USED FOR TEST DEFICIENCY NOTICES ONLY) Page 2 of 2 PLANT/UNIT tdgL -)TDN Numberqr -79 9 IV. Can you confirm that the affected system or component could have performed its required safety function without reliance on other components, future tests, or operator actions, if left uncorrected? D YES C3 NO XINDETERMINATE Basis for YES answer: NOTE: You should consider the following attributes when answering Question IV: (1) environmental qualifications, (2) seismicity, (3) flood analyses, (4) loss of onsite power, (5)materials application, (6) effect on operator information, and (7) any other attributes which miy have an impact on operability. If the answer to Question IV is YES, the deficiency is'not potentially reportable. If the aniwer to Question IV is either NO or INDETERMINATE, a copy of' the TDN and the completed copy of this form shall be submitted to Site Licensing for evaluation. Signarure Date: PROC. PPT 3,9 -Z _REV. 0 ATTACHMENT- .Lq,..PAGE 3 A3-59 , ....:... .... . . APPENDIX H lOCFR50.55(e) POTENTIAL REPORTABILITY SCREENING FORM (TO BE USED FOR TEST DEFICIENCY NOTICES ONLy) Page 20f2 :' PLANT/UNIT __ _ TON Number?!'

1/1 J g tv. Can you confirm that the affected system or component could have performed its required safety function without reliance on other components, future tests, or operator actions, if left uncorrected?

NOTE: DYES D NO ,.)(INDETERMINATE Basis for YES answer: _'--________________________ _ You should consider the following attributes when answering Question IV; (1) environmental qualifications, (2) seismicity, (3) flood analyses, (4) loss of onsite power, (5) . materials application, (6) effect on operator information. and (1) any other attributes which may have an impact on operability. If the anSWer to Question IV is YES, the deficiency is 'not potential1y' reportable. 'If the answer to Question TV is either NO or INDETERlVIINATE, a copy of the TDN and the completed copy of this form shall be submitted to Site Licensing fot* e,:aluatioll. " .. : A3-5Q Date: _7......L.1-.:..-1-+1 )......;...9==-:;' __ PRoe. SP1' 3 'J. oz REV ..... O ..... _ ATTACHMENT

2. 'f. I . PAGE '?> . '.-" .. ..... .... : .. .... -..

JUL 2, 8 1999 5.0 7 2,8 Corrective Action/ACP Manager, M. Baiestani, STC 1A-WBN WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN) -DETERMINATION OF REPORTABILITY FOR TDN Nos. 95-0778, 95-0779, & 95-0791 La -The subject document has been evaluated by Site Licensing in accorda ce with Site Standard Practice (SSP)-4.05. The reportability determinat on is as follows: Reportable under 10 CFR 50.55(e): Yes 0 No 0 Additional remarks: See attached worksheet. S IL The reportability worksheets are attached.P.'i7a ce Compliance Licensing Supervisor FSB 2,K-WBN DAJ Attachment (s)cc (Attachment[s]): R. T. Purcell, MOB 2R-WBN-- (if reportable)D. E. Nunn, FSB IA-WBN-- (if reportable)B. S. Schofield, FSB 2K-WBN-- (if reportable) J. E. Sanders, FSB 2K-WBN NRC Resident Inspector, FS8 IJ-'WBN--(if reportable) Responsible-Organization Mgr., N/A RIMS, QAC 1G-WBN 0'U-'PROC. 5PT3-o REV. 0 ATTACHMENT1 L.....PAGE ID A3-60 JUl 28 \995 T.O.S 95.072*8 800i Corrective Manager, M. Ba;estani S'l'C lA-WBN WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN) -DeTERMINATION or REFORTABILITY FOR ; 'rON Nos. 95-0778, 95-0779, & 95-0791 '!he subject document has been evaluated by Site Licensing in acc:o.r:da ce with site Standard I?t'actice (SS£') -4.05. The reportability cl.eterrninat on is as follows: Reportable under 10 eFR 50.55(e): Yes 0 No

Additional remarks: See attached worksheet.

I .-The reportability worksheets are attached. i . ace , Compliance Licensing Supervisor FSB 2K-WBN DAJ Attachment(s)

co (Attachment(s])

R. T. Purcell, Moa 2R-WBN--(if D. E. Nunn, FSB lA-WBN--(1f reportable) B. S. Schofield, FSB 2K-WBN--(if J. E. Sanders, FSS 2K-WBN NRC Resident Inspector, E'se lJ"7BN--(if reportable) Responsible 'Organization Mgr., lit/A ; RIMS, QAC lG-WBW . *PROC. SPt31-0 z. REV. 0 i ATTACHMENT cr. ¥. J I I '. PAGE' . t-. A3 I APPENZXX V-3 FORMS FOR RMPORTABILITY DETERMINATION OF REPORTABILITY WORKHET VOR 10 CfM 50.55(e)Page 1 of 5 PLANT/UNIT WBN/1I&2 Iteui Number TDN Nos. 95-(95- 779, & 788 1U-~TITLE:Manual actions required to prevent room overpresscrization dt rina I lJl I CO 2 testing. I DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: During performance of CO 2 system tesa ng, action was taken to manually terminate the CO injection to pr( lent overPressurization of the auxiliary instrument rooms. The action to manually terminate the CO 2 injection were prescribed in the procedt e.I. Does the deficiency involve the construction of a facilit activity, or a basic component supplied for such facilit.activity? A. Construction means the analysis, design, manufacture, YE fabrication, quality assurance, placement, erection, installation, modification, inspection, or testing of a facility or activity and consulting services related to the facility or activity that are safety related.or or 0 Explain: The deficiency involves safety related structures. i I. -B. Basic Compc NOTE: onent In all cases, basic component includes sa related design (as approved and released construction), analysis, inspection, test fabrication, replacement parts, or consul services that are associated with -the compc hardware, whether these services are performe the component supplier or other supplier.:ety for.ng,.inq ient I by Any plant structure, system, or component, or any thereof, necessary to assure;1. The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.PROC. cPT. _ -0REV ATTACHMENT, -7 I.PAGE.A3-61 20'd SOM8& 0..E NO V-I , 20'd AJilPENOlX FORMS FOR EVALUA'l'ING REPOR'l'AB:tL:t'l'Y Q? WORKSHEET 10 50.55(e) I ..

Page 1 of 5 I?:LAN'I'

/UN:.cT _W;.;.:B;;.;.N.,/.;:.l.;;..;li 2;;..-. ___ _ Item Number TON Nos. 95-1 788, 95-IT779, & 95=0 TITLE!:Manual actions requited to prevent room ove:rllressurization dt \.oina £22 testinq, OF DEfICIENCY: During performance sj[stem tes nq, :. action was taken to manually terminate the CO 2 injection to prE t/ent overpressurization of the auxiliary instrument rooms. 'l'he actior: 'to manually tezminate the CO 2 injection Were prescribed in theJ1rocedt II-e. I, Does the deficiency involve the construction of a facili t or activity, or a basic coroponen't supplied for such facilit or ,activit'y? A. Explain: B. St;>81. construction means the analysis, manufact:ure, fabricat;;i.on, quality assurance; placement, el:ection, installation, modification, inspection, or testing of a facility or activity and con$ulting services related to the facility or activity that are safety related. o The deficiency involves safety related structures. Basic component NOTE: In all cases, basic component includes sa ety related design (as approved and l;eleased' for construction), analysis, inspection l ng, fabrication l 'replacement parts, or consul inq services that are associated with the compo ent hardware, whether these services are perforll'le II by ,the component supplier or other supplier. Any, plant structure, system, or component, thereof, necessary to assure; or any 8:ct The integrity of the reactor coolan'c pressure boundary, ' 01 PROC. SPT3Cf -02;iREV, __ O_ ATTACHMENT",,-q.!.!

..!.:l.:-I_--

PAGE IS: A3-61 n':f NO C * , '. o.,E-3 FOoMs FOR ZVALt7ATXNG RZPORTTABLXTY OV RPORTASMLI WOMISTr FOR 10 cm o 5O5 (e)Page 2 of 5 2. The capability to shut down the react0c and YES FlO maintain it in a safe shutdown condition. 9 C 3. The capability to mitigate the consequences of YES NO accidents which could result in potential 0 offsite exposures comparable to those referred to in 10 CFR 100,11', 0 Sxplain: The walls of the auxiliary instrument zooms are safety relatjd.If all questions under items I.A and I.8 are marked NO, he deficiency is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.55(e). Go too I1. Did the construction of a facility or activity or a basic component supplied for such facility or activity: A. Fail to comply with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, YES 0O as amended, or any applicable rule, regUlation, 0 1 order, or'license of the Cotmnission? (1OCFRSO*55 (e) (2])Explain: No failure to comply is involved, Concern is being addr as in accordance with programs developed to implement the Act B. Contain a defect? (10CERS0.55(e)f3]) NOTE: Deviation means a departure from the technica3 or quality assurance requirements defined in procurement documents, safety analysis report, construction permit or other documents provided for installed basic components.

1. A deviation in a basic component delivered YES 10 to a purchaser for use in a facility or 0 B activity subject to a construction permit?PROC , oPT I- '_0_ .ATTACHMENT' Df A IX-r A3-62 2. 3, FORMS VOR DETERMINATION WORKSflEtT 10 CFR 50,55(e) J 9 ... l?age 2 of 5 '1'he capability to shut down the reactol and ¥f.iS

flO maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.

.: Cl The capability to lnitigate the consequences of YES' NO accidents which could result in potential .' 0 offsite exposures comparable to those refe:r::red to in 10 ef'R 100.11', Explain: The walls of the auxiliary instxurnent rooms are safety relet' d. If all questions Ilnder itelns I.A and I. a are marked NO, he deficiency is not reportable under 10 eFR 50,55 (e). Go to II. Did the construction of a facilit¥ or activit¥ or a basic component supplied for such facil1ty or activlty: A. rail to comply wi,th the Atomic Ener9Y Act of 1954, as amended, ot" any applicable

rule, order, Qt'license of the eO/omission? (lOcrnSo:S5 (e) (2]) NO a I Explain: No failure to comply is involved.

Concern is being addr ss in accordance withproqrarns developed to implement the Act e. Contain a defect? (lOCrRSO.S5(e) (3]) NO'l'E: Deviation means a departure frota the technicaJ or quality assurance requirements defined in procureznent documents, safety analy'sis report, construction permit or other documents provided 1. f,or installed basic components. " A deviation in a basic component delivered to a purchaser for use in a facility or . activity subjec't: to a construction permit? A3-62 PROC .. SPt'!' -0 2.. ATTACHMENT' Cf. 'f. I PAGE 6 . yes o * ." APPENDIX Z-3 FORMS FOR EVALUATING REPORTABILITYDETERMINATION OF REPORTASILXTY WORKSHEET FOR 10 CFR SO.S5(e)Page 3 of 5 2. The installation, *use, or operation of a basic component containing a defect as defined in Item No. I above.3. A deviation in a portion of a facility subject to the construction permit?YES YES 90 N Explain: No deviation was involved. Auxiliary instrument zoom press re was maintained below acceptable limits. Also, the potent, 1l for room overpressurization was a recognized consequence of the test and appropriate instructions were included to ensi e that room desicn Pressure was not e;ceeded. Actions taken o terminate the test were in accordance with the test: M I I I instructions. C. Undergo any significant breakdown in any portion of YES the quality assurance program conducted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, which could have produced a defect in a basic component? (1OCFR50.55(e) [4])in: No significant QA breakdown is involved. Deficiency was 40 X EXpla documented per the QA program.r JI -If all questions under Items II.A, II.B, and 11.C are marked NO, the deficiency is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.55(e). Go to IV.If any question under Items M.A, II.B, or 11.C is marked Y1 then continue with Item III, PROC. 8PT3-oz REV. 0 ATTACHMENT 'r,.A. A PDAr.r 7;J 0.~ -,,, 6(p A3-63

c. E:<plain:

APPENDIX FORMS FOR EVALUATING REPORTABILITY DETERMINATION OF lU:POl\TMJILXTY WORKSHEET FOR 10 CFR 50.SS(e) i Page 3 of 5 2. The installati()n, 'use, or operation of a basic YES component containing a defect as defined in [J. Item No. 1 above. 3. A deviation in a portion of a facility subjec'l: YES' iNO to the construction permit: a I liIo deviation was involved. AuxiliarY instrument room press re was maintained below acceptCible litni'l:s. Also the potent lal for room overoressurization was a recognized conseauence bf the test and appropriate instructions were included to ens ire that. room desicrn 'Oressure was not exceeded. Actions taken "0 terminate the test were in accordance with the test he;! instructions. Undergo any significant breakdown in any portion of YES' the quality assUrance program conducted pursqfJrrt to a I the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix 8, which could have produced a defect in a basic component? (lOCE'R50.55 (e) (4]) No significant OA breakdown is involved. Deficiencv was documented per the QA 'Oroq:r:am. It all questions under Items IliA, II.B, and II.e are marked the defici"enc:y is not reportable under 10 erR 50.55(e). Go to IV. lfany question under Items !J:.A, II.B, o:r: I:CC is marked Yi I then continue with Item III. : PROe. SPT3 q -0 2. REV. 0 i ATTACHMENT f l*'/-. J PAGE 7 , . A3-63 .. -lJ" APPENDIX E-3 FORMS FOR EVAL4UATZNG RPORTABXLXTY DETERMZNATION OF REPORTABILITY WORKSHEET FOR 10 CFR 50.55(e)Page 4 of 5 III. Could the deficiency create a substantial safety hazard, were t to remain uncorrected? Not A substantial safety hazard is a loss of safety' funct to the extent that there is a major reduction in ti degree of protection provided to public health safety for any facility or activity authorized by nstruction pe it.A. Moderate e osure to, or release of, licensed material.1. Exposur in excess of 25 rem whole body YES (10 CFR 2 .2202(a) (1)).2. Release of r ioactive material to an YES unrestricted ea (10 CFR 20.2202(a)(2)). a 3. Exposure of any dividual in an unrestricted YES area to' a total e ective dose equivalent 0 in any period of on calendar year in excess of 0. 1 rem (10 CFR 2 1301(c)).Explain: on nd he No NO 0 NO 0'I_________ ___F B. Major degradation of essential safety- lated equipment.

1. A loss ot redundancy if, in conjunct on YES with a single failure, a required saf ty function could not be performed.

\in: I1 901 Expla IU--N PROC. SPT 3-.02REV.- o ATTACHMENT

q. V. I DAPr 7 A3-64 Sold S0~86.0 0J.1 SH1 T,1 C -1% In .... ..

\ ; APPENDIX 1:-3 FORMS FOR RSPORTABILITY DETERMINATION OF WORKSHEET FOR 10 eva 50.SS(e} ..

4 of 5 Could the deficiency create a substantial safety hazard, were A. Explain: , B. Explain: S0'd remain uncorrected?

1. 2. 3. A substantial safety haza.t'd is a loss of safety' funct on to the that there is a major reduction in .t: deg:ree of protection provided to public health nd safety for any facility or activity authorized by ,he nstx-uction pe it. or ralease of, licensed material.

Exposur in excess of 2S rem whole body (10 eFR 2 .220Z'(a) (l>>. Release of r dioactive material to'an unrestricted ea (10 erR 20,2202(a) (2>>. EYoposu:re of any 1 dividual in an unrestricted area to' a total e active dose equivalent ' in any period of on calendar year in excess of 0.1 rem (10 erR 2 1301(c)). , YES, NO a t:l NO o 0 NO a 0 Major degradation of essential equipment.

1. A loss of redundancy if, in conjunct on with a single failure, a required saf ty function could not be performed.

YES 0 o CJ PROC;SPt 3, .. ... _0_ ATIACHMENT--:,.lf.;,..::' 41 ..... ,.;.-.1 __ PAGE g A3-64 01 I 90"d 1ULO1 APPENDZX" Z-3 FORMS" FOR EVALUATING REPORTABILITY DETERMINATION OF REPORTABILITY WORKSHEET FOR 10 CMS 50.55(e)Ill I i .... .. ' ...... .Page 5 of 5 C. Major deficiencies in design, construction, inspection, test or operation. .1. A condition or circumstances which, under YES normal operating conditions or anticipated 0 transient could contribute to exceeding a-safety limit as defined in the facility technical specifications.

2. A ndition or'circumstance which, under YES norm operating conditions or anticipated transi t, could cause an accident or, in the even of an accident due to other causes could, con dering an independent single failure, res t in a loss of safety function necessary to m .igate the consequences of the accident.3. A deficiency which se 'ously compromised the YES ability of a confinemen system to perform its 0 designated function, Explain;NO NO!I[90 0 IL If all questions under Items III.A, XII.B, and .C marked NO, the deficiency is not reportable under 1 50.55(e).

Go to IV. If any of the questions in III.A, "i" or 1II.C are marked YES, the condition is reportable under CFR 50.55(e). Go to XV.re IV.XTE14 IS: REPORT __ _ __LE EVALUATION PERPOPMED BY DATE DETERMINATION APPROVED BY DATEDATE NRC NOTIFIED I INS____CTOR NOTIFICATION MADE BY 7/15~UL _.2-- REV. a ATTACHMENT '?. I PAGE I VJ 98'd 11:l101 APPENtlXX'!!-3 FORMS'FOR EVALUATING REPORTABILITY DETERMINATION OF REPORTABILITY WORKSHEET FOR 10 50.55(e) i ... .Page 5 of 5 C. Major deficiencies in design, construction, inspection, test or operation.

2. 3. A condition or circumstances which, under normal operating conditions or anticipated transient could contribute to exceeding safety limit as defined in the facility technical specifications.

tion Which, under operating conditions or anticipated tra t, coula cause an accident or, in the of an accident due to other causes could,' lng an independent single failure, re in a loss of safety function necessary to ate the consequences of the accident. A deficiency which ously compromised the ability of a confineme system to perform its designated function. YES NO o 0 YES a YES o c* [J IV. If all questions under Items III.'A, XU. B, and . C marked NO, the deficiency is not :reportable under 50.55 (e). Go to IV. J:f any of the questions in III.A, I ox IX:C.C are marked YES, the condition is reportable llnder CFR 50.55(e). Go to IV. :.c'l'El'i IS: xxx E:VALC111.'l'1 ON __ APPROVED DATE NRC NO'.1'lE'ICATION _____________ lI--.. PROC. Spy 3 '1-o"t REV * ...;o=---_ ATTACHMENT ":'1. J PAGE .., U APPENDIX A (Sheet I of 2)TEST DEFICIENCY NOTICE 1. TDN No.)2q -.Li Page L of~2. TEST NO. 9 -.Z.__ 33. CSI NO. A)/n Li e 4. TREND CODE 5. EQUIPMENT NAME: 6. EQUIPMENT NO.: 7. SYSTEM NO.:

8. SAFETY-RELATED

9. ORIGINATORJ4ATEEXT.A.?&.f?

10, REF DWG/DOCUMENT(S): ,V&ES 0ONO 7__174S,_____ t/7ti r -3)II DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: .J04ARDWARE 0 SOFTWARE , 0 CONTINUED.S~sN " ,o AS, AS ePed4JZJA.j. + )e- .. C% ,4Nli, I la 10CFR50.55(e) Potential Reportability Screening complete. Site Licensing Evaluation Required 'Yes 0 NoTEST ENGINEER (LEVEL 111) DATE 12. CORRECTIVE ACTION (S) 0 CONTINUED (NUjCtLeh eV-G1INtG. (!VALUATION TTA1'T%! 7T-IS UJItL.14FLY T4jA-o REWORK 1EM.OUG- CO0 WILL LAk( ZNrTO T1I4- f Cft 14Z D'RJIWG A C07. ReLGA!%C 0 REPAIR To HAVC- AN ADV'eRS AIrFFECT 00 OPeTRAAroRs. 0 TIOUGH "I"4 ssS wAA sBUT6CT-1e To EPV6faow-/M cJT'AL OUT ,IOS '1"rs PEXIG.iJ LI-MITS THIS EQtUpIPMENT OTHER CONt'INiJ6) TO VuJeiirT,0j At DP.£ij ao 0 SPECIFIED BY: ('j a,1-4-- 9 NEER DATE 7 13. RETEST (S) REQUIREMENTS 0 CONTINUED 0 YES" NO AUSTtFIC 'TAIONReUPOtJeb A.6sxpETc--eo. A1LT)V, NOC.ENG e-VALAT~t v-ATe% LehK Ul.JI-teLY Ire 9IAV6 AOVGRSC- A~rFECT 14. ASSOCIATED WORK DOCUMENTS 0 CONTINUED SPECIFIED BY: ('ý}fA..A 8 ýTE50NGINEER APPROVED BY-DATE TEST GROUP SUPERVISOR I 'DATE 15. CORRECTIVE ACTION COMPLETE:

16. RETEST COMPLETE:

_____ _____ _____ _____NIA 7-26-1S TEST ENGINEER DATE TEST ENGINEER DATE 17. REPORTABILITY EVALUATION COMPLETE: TEST GROUP SUPERVISOR 2ý3 gos -DA'tE 18. FINAL APPROVAL: ,I/J///," ,, r. i TEST GROUP SUPERVISOR DATE PROC. .. SMP_14.0 R ATTACHMENT -<. Y.. 1 PAGE t..A3-66* ". APPENDIX A (Sheet 1 of2) TEST DEFICIENCY NOTICE 2. TEST NO. JI t;:.PT-'3 q -62 R.b 3. CSI NO. Nk :t:;/ij? -5. NAMEA', 6. EQUIPMENT NO.: ,"" (-} /Pom NaAJe.-B. SAFETY-RELATED 9, ORlGlNATOlUDATEJEXT.A.1 oJ? . aNO

1. TDN Noq.:) -011 Q Page ) QC..:i 4. TREND CODE 0) _ ) 7, SYSTEM NO,: 03'3 10-. REF DWGIDOCUMENT(S):

'/JtI t<-J3 . ) 11 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: ..Jl'SARDWARE (] SOFTWARE , (] CONTINUED 1\ CDJ)t.tA!i-J- .... ,J /e.rr q/IAe U -J Aux wiN+t::".ejlf!duJ

0.

Dd.Jt:"de-£ Ii- /JfA.',J teoolJ.l. AIJ()/I/P,J fJ.e E'Afl4' A.r DUlL/I.,/- tk-lla 10CFRSO.55(e) Potential Repoltlbility Screening complete. . Site Licensing Yes o No ,7!n/7{ TEST ENGINEER (LEVEL Ill) DATE , 12. CORRECTIVE ACTION (S) (] CONTINUED <Dl\luCl..c;,,-R I!V,Atl.U .... ,.'oN ST .... U"JI,.\I.(El.'( a REWORK EtJ<"JGH COl WIl.L l.£AIo< :tt-lTo THe MeR wz. D\JRltJG A C0'Z, a REPAIR ,..:) HAV* AN Al>V\Si\S* AFFEC.T ot-' a Ii:S?S EQ"'IPI\II*IJT WAS SIJB':TeCT*'P To OnIER eJ-,lTAL.. COrJl)I"T\o,,",S OUTS'OS: ':toTS I..IMITS THIl: e:GI"If"Ik*NT C;O/llTINbI';P TO \=LlfoJe'l"."'" AS: SPECIFIED BY: W -.L 8udo...........:. DATE 13. RETEST (S) REQUIREMENTS (] CONTINUED

14. ASSOCIATED WORK DOCUMENTS a YES a CONTINUED

)! NO up.. JUSTIFICATION: SS PS A $ eXrE(;TE 11. (-\1.. Ii: 0) NOc .*NCio t:VALUATIQ'" LEM<. UNI..IKel.'l' 1'0 !+/-!!Ive SPECIFIED BY: B I , DATE fi-dA. *t--,7/z6/;J APPROVED BY' __ 1;/l.r--t/O TEST GROUP SUPERVISOR ' 'DATE " IS. CORRECTIVE ACTION COMPLETE:

16. RETEST COMPLETE:

{,J. wc..8 17-'31-"S' NIA 7.'H-1S' I DATE TEST ENGINEER DATE 17. REPORTABll..ITY EVALUATION COMPLETE:

18. FINAL APPROVAL: I TEST GROUP SUPERVISOR DA: TEST GROUP SUPERVISOR DATE

/03 'j c;77-P", f>,c> PROC. 5PT 31-02. REV., --,-SMP-14.0, R3 A3-66 ATTACHMENT.-..!.lCf -1.:..1'%10...- __ PAGE I APPENDIX H IOCFR5O.55(0) POTENTIAL REPORTABILITY SCREENING FORM (TO BE USED FOR TEST DEFICIENCY NOTICES ONLY)Page 1 of 2 PLANT/UNIT t,.IL4L -)TDN ________0y~ BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: D flc,(-- 7ýXL esa, 1 "aIL /cu 7%, d-1~ -~. ~ ~A~j,&~.A ,110 ,.-- Ol 1,0 A C'pjz4a.k. AX oeed.iC I. Is the deficiency associated with a safety-related component or any support structure?-sq:YES 0 NO 0 INDETERMINATE If the above answer Is NO, the deficiency is not potentially reportable. Stop the screening at this point. If the above answer, is either YES or INDETERMINATE, continue with the screening process.II. Can the deficiency be clearly called corrective maintenance for a correctly designed and constructed installation: 0l YES 0 INDETERMINATE Basis for YES answer:[II. Is the deficiency related only to test performance activities. such as procedure problems, test equipment or incorrect system lineups?0 YES Z 20 Basis for YES answer: El INDETERMINATE If the answer to either Question II or Question III is YES, the deficiency Is not potentially reportable. Stop the screening at this point. Otherwise, continue with the screening process.PROC. SP S-0R2aV. ..__..ATTACHMENT PAGE 2 ..(A A3-67 SMP- 14.0,R3,CN-2'

APPENDIX H lOCFR50.55(e)

POTENTIAL REPORTABtLtTY SCREENING FORM (TO BE USED FOR TEST DEFICIENCY NOTrCES ONLY) Page 1 of 2 PLANT/UNIT ___ _ TON NumberC\5-011Q I. Is the deficiency associated with n safety-relmed component or any support structure? jQ::YES o NO o INDETERMINATE If the above answer is NO, the deficiency is not potentially reportable. Stop the screening at this point. If the above answer: is either YES or INDETERMINATE, continue with the screening process. II. Can the deficiency be clearly called corrective maintenance for a correctly and constructed installation: . DYES o INDETERMINATE Basis for YES answer: ___________________________ _ III. Is the deficiency related only to test performance activities. sllch as procedure problems, test equipment or incorrect system lineups? . o YES 0 INDETERMINATE Basis for YES answer: ___________________________ _ If the answer to either Question II or Question III is YES, the deficiency is not potentially reportable. Stop the scr:eening at this point. Otherwise, continue w,th the process. PROC. SPT 3, .0 2 ATTACHMENT_qu.,. __ _ PAGE,---!2.=-- ____ _ A3-67 SMP-14.0.R3,CN-2 . **u t APPENDIX H IOCFR50.55(e) POTENTIAL REPORTABILITY SCREENING FORM (TO BE USED FOR TEST DEFICIENCY NOTICES ONLY)Page 2 or 2 I PLANT/UNIT 4e/1<?.V ý/TDN Number( -IV. Can you confirm that the affected system or component could have performed its required safety function without reliance on other components, future tests, or operator actions, if left uncorrected? 0 YES N_, I INDETERMINATE Basis for YES answer: NOTE: You should consider the following attributes when answering Question IV: (1) environmental qualifications, (2) seismicity, (3) flood analyses, (4) loss of onsite power, (5)materials application, (6) effect on operator information, and (7) any other attributes which may have an impact on operability. If the answer to Question IV is YES, the deficiency isnot potentially reportable. 'If the aniwer to Question IV is either NO or INDETERMINATE, a copy of the TDN and the completed copy of this form shall be submitted to Site Licensing for evaluation. Signature Date: PROC. sPx o? 02 ATTACHMEN,1' _,.2 PAGE 3* ...,;, A3-P8&I1" . APPENDIX H lOCFRSO.S5(e) POTENTIAL REPORTABILITY SCREENING FORM (TO BE USED FOR TEST DEFICIENCY N,9-TICES ONLy) Page2of2 _-PLANT/UNIT 4/t(?/1/ ./ TON Number 96-0J1 q IV. NOTE: Can you confinn that the affected system or component CQuid have performed its required safety function without reliance on "er components, future tests, or operator actions, if left uncorrected? DYES MtQ--":y, INDETERMINATE . /' '/ldJ" . Basis for YES answer: __________________________ _ You should consider the following attributes when answering Question IV: (1) environmental qualifications, (2) seismicity, (3) flood analyses, (4) loss of onsite power, (5) , materials application, (6) effect on operator information, and (7) any other attributes which may have an impact on operability. If the answer to Question IV is YES, the defiCiency is 'not potentially' reportable. 'If the to Question IV is either NO or INDETERMINATE, a copy of the TDN and the completed copy Or this form soalI be submitted to Site Licensing for e,:aluntloll. ... "':..:.. : A3-p8 PRoe. SPT 3 0 z A1:V, 0 ATTACHMENT . fI-;-lf. PAGE 3 ..... ...... : ..-.. JUL 2 8 1995 TO.3 95,072.8 8.00, Corrective Action/ACP Manager, M. Bajestani, STC IA-WBN WATTS BAR NOCLEAR PLANT (WBN) -DETERMINATION OF REPORTABILITY FOR TDN Nos. 95-0778, 95-0779t & 95-0791 The subject document has been evaluated by Site Licensing in accorda ce with Site Standard Practice (SSP)-4.05. The reportability determninat on is as follows: Reportable under 10 CFR 50.55(e): Yes 0 No I Additional remarks: See attached worksheet, 4.-I..-The reportability worksheets are attached.Compliance Licensing Supervisor FSB 2K-WBN DAJ Attachment(a) cc (Attachment[s]): R. T. Purcell, MOB 2R-WBN--(if reportable) D. E. Nunn, FSB 1A-WBN--(if reportable) B. S. Schofield, FSB 2K-WBN--(if reportable) J. E. Sanders, FSB 2K-WBNNRC Resident Inspector, FSB 1J-W81N--(if reportable) Responsible Organization Mgr., N/A RIMS, QAC 1G-WBtN 0 S. -..., O pRO0C.S9 3 1 " ... .- PAGE- !ý --A3-69 I -4 I JUL 2 8 1995 TO.S 95.012*8 800i Corrective Action/ACP Manager, M. Baiestani, STC lA-WBN WA1 1'.1'S BAR NOCLEAR. PLANT (WBN) -DeTERMINATION Of FOR., 'rON Nos. 95-0778, 95-0779, & 95-0791 'L'he subject document has been evaluated by Site Licensing in 21cco.rda oe with Site Standard Practice (SSP) -4.05. '.the reportab:i.lity deterrninat on is as follows: Reportable under 10 eFR 50.55(e): 0 No I Additional remarks: See attached worksheet. The reportability worksheets are attached. f?

ace Compliance Licensing Supervisor FSB 2K-WSN DAJ Attachment(s) co (Attachrnent[sJ):

R. T. furcell, MOS 2R-WBN--(if reportable} i D. E. Nunn, FSB lA-WBN--(if reportable} B. S. Schofield, FSB 2K-WBN--(if J. E. Sanders, FSB 2K-WBN NRC Residen't Inspector, FSB (if reportable) Responsibleorqanization Mgr., N/A RIMS, QAC lG-WBN . PROC. SPT. 3 '1-0 2. REV. 0 , -I ATTACHMENT C:Y. 'I. "1. I : I '. PAGE' £ , , A3-69 -. , T0'd n. APPENDXX Z-3 FORMs FOR EVALUATZNG RMPORTAWZLITY DETERMINATXON OF REPORTABILITY WORMSHJET FOR 10 CPR 50.55(e)Page I of 5 PLANT/UN.T WBN/1&2 Item Number TDN Nos. 95-(95-0179, & 95::M 188 9*-TITLS:Manual actions reguired to prevent room overpressurization dc min C2)2 testing.DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY; During performance of CO 2 system test tnq,, action was taken to manually terminate the CO 2 injection -to 12rE /ent overpressurization of the auxiliary instrument rooms. The actioa to manually terminate the CO, injection were prescribed in the procedt e.I. Does the deficiency involve the construction of a facilitj activity, or a basic component supplied for such facilit activity?A. Construction means the analysis, design, manufacture, YE fabrication, quality assurance, placement, erection, installation, modification, inspection, or testing of a facility or activity and consulting services related to the -facility or activity that are safety related.Explain: The deficiency involves safety related structures. B. Basic Component or No'a I*-NOTE o In all cases, basic component includes sa related design (as approved and released construction), analysis, inspection, test fabrication, replacement parts, or consul services that are associated with the compc hardware, whether these services are performe the component supplier or other supplier..ety for Si ng ient I by ,art: NO X Any plant structure, system, or component, or any thereof, necessary to assure: 1. The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure YE!boundary.PROC. SPT 3ff° q ' ATTACHMjNyT4? .,, i PAGE___________ A3-70 2!0d S084 01 L \ ze'd , APPENDIX i:-3 FORMS FOR EVALUATrNG REPORTABILITY DETeRMINATION OF WORKSHEET voa 10 CPR 50,5S{e) I . I"

usA_ Page 1 of 5 IUNIT

___ _ Xtem Number TON Nos, 95-( 768, 95-0119, & T1TL.e: :Manual actions required to prevent room overRressurit.ation dl £Q2 testing. DESCRII?'l'ION OF DEFICIENCY; During eerformance CO 2 test nq, action was taken to manually terminate the CO 2 injection* to lent overpressurization of the auxiliary instrument rooms. The actiol'l to manually terminate the CO 2 injection fNere prescribed in the proceclt e. :r. Does the deficiency involve the construction of a facil:1.'c or activity, or a basic component supplied for 5uch facilit Qr activity? A. Construction Ineans the analysis, design, manufacture, YE fabrication, quality assurance, placement, erection, 0 installation, modification, inspection, or testing of a facility or activity and conaulting services related to the facility or activity that are safety related. Explain: The deficiency involves safety related structures. B. Basic NOTE: In all cases, basic component includes sa ety related design (as approved and released for construction) t analysis, inspection, test' ng, fabrication, replacement patts, or consul inq services that are associated with the compo ent hardware, whether these services are perforll'l* by the component supplier or other supplier. ' Any plant structure, system, thereof, necessary to assure: or component, or any a:r;t; 1. The inte9rity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. PROC. SPT 3'1 -o'Z REV * ..,;;O ____ _ ATTACHMENT ,. Lt, 'Z. . PAGE 5 A3-70 01 NO C

APPENDIX E-3 FORMS FOR EVALUATING REPORTABILXTY DETERMINATION OF REPORTABILITY WORKSHUET FOR 10 CPR 50,55(e)Page 2 of 5 2, The capability to shut down the reactor and YES NO maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.

9 0 3. The capability to mitigate the consequences of YES No accidents which could result in potential a D off site exposures comparable to those referred to in 10 CER 100.11.Explain: The walls of the auxiliary instrument rooms are safety rela-t d.If all questions under items I.A and I.8 are marked NO, he deficiency is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.55(e). Go to I1. Did the construction of a facility or activity or a basic component supplied for such facility or activity: A. Fail to comply with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, YES TO as amended, or any applicable rule, regulation, 0 1 order, or license of the Commission? (1OCYR50.55 (21)Explain: No failure to comply is involved, Concern is being addr is in accordance with programs developed to implemnent the Act a. Contain a defect? (10CFRS0.55 (e) (3])NOTE:, Deviation means a departure from the technica!or quality assurance requirements defined in procurement documents, safety analysis report, construction permit or other documents provided for installed basic components.

1. A deviation in a basic component delivered YES 10 to a purchaser for use in a facility or 3 I activity subject to a construction permit?PROC.

RV ..z _PAGE_ _ _______A3-71q CO'd st'8A. ,.f" .', . , APPENDIX E-3 FORMS FOR RaPORTABILXTY DETERMINATION OF FOR 10 CFR 50,55(8) T ...... I?age 2 of 5 2. 'rhes capability to shut down the reacto.r and YlCS . main'tain it in a safe shutdown condition.

. a 3. The capability to mitigate the consequences of YES NO accidents which could result in potential
. 0 off site exposures comparable to those referted to in 10 eFR Explain: The walls of the auxiliary instrument rooms are safety relat: d. If ill11 questions under items :LA and I. a are marked NO, he deficiency is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.55 (e}. Go to V. :U, Oid the construction of a facility or or a basic cornponent supplied for such facility or activl.ty: . A. Fail to comply with the A*tornic £ne:r:9'Y Act of 1954, as amended, or any applicable rule, regulation, order I or' license of the COltlloission? (lOCE'"R50, 55 [e) (21) '.CES ,t'Jo o I 'k .elY-plain:

No failure to comply is involved. Concern is being addr §is \ in accordance with programs developed to implement the Act B. Contain a defec*t7 (10CFRSO, S5 (e) [3] ) NO'L'S:: Deviation means a departure from the technica or quality assurance defined in procurement docllments, safety analysis report, construction permit or other documents provided f.or installed basic components.

1. A deviation in a basic component delivered to a purchaser for use in a facility or activity subjec*t to a construction permit? PROC.SPt'3 REV._O __ _ AlTACHMENT_

Gf.l.t..,...t.t.f..:..;.2=.--- PAGE .t;, A3-71 ..... YES CJ

APPENDIX E-3 FORMS FOR EVALUATING REPORTABILITY DETERMINATION OF REPORTABILITY WORKSHEET FOR 10 CFR 50.55(e)a Page 3 of 5 2. The installation, 'use, or operation of a basic YES component containing a defect as defined in 3 Item No. 1 above.3. A deviation in a portion of a facility subject YES to the construction permit? a No deviation was involved.

Auxiliary instrumnent room nress 9o I go Z Explain: Ire was maintained below acceptable limits. Also, the potenttl for room overpressurization was a recoqnized conseguence the test and appropriate instructions were included to ens I=-that room design pressure was not exceeded. Actions taken to terminate the test were in accordance with the test E*Cia instructions.-m~.C, Explain: Undergo any significant breakdown in any portion of YES 0 the quality assurance program conducted pursuant to 1 U the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, which could have produced a defect in a basic component?(I0CFR50.55 (e)[(4] )No significant QA breakdown is involved. Deficiency was documented per the OA program.-- ...If all questions under Items II.A, II.B, and !X.C are marked NO, the deficiency is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.55(e). Go to IV.If any question under Items MI.A, II.B or II.C is marked YL'then continue with Item I11.PROC. SPT 2 -ATrACHMEi':;/. L. -PAGE , A3-72 Explain: APPENDIX }'!-3 FORMS FOR EVALUATING DETERMINATION OF REPORTABILITY WORKSHEET FOR 10 CFR SO.SS(e) I Page 3 of 5 2. The installation, 'use, or operation of a basic YES NO cornponent containing a defect as defined in [j. Item No. 1 above. 3. A deviation in a portion of a facility subj ect 'tES to the construction permit? [j I No deviation involved. Auxiliary instrurnen'c room Eress re was maintained below accepti:tble limits. Also, the potent al for room over pressurization was a recoqnized conseauence of the test and appropriate instructions were included to ens re that room design pressure was not eiceeded. Actions taken ro terminate the test were in accordance with the test nq instructions. C, Undergo any significant breakdoVin in any portion of YES' the quality assurance program conducted pursuant to o. the requirements of 10 eFR 50, a, which Explain; I __ I . .-I-M. could have produced a defect in a basic component? (lOCE'R50.55(e) (4]) 1'10 significant QA breakdowrl is involved. Deficiency was documented per the QA proqram. If all questions under IX.A, II.B, and lI.e are marked NO, the deficiency is not reportable under 10 erR 50.55(e). Go to IV. If any question under Items II.A, II.8, or II.C is marked then continue with Item Ill. A3-72 PROC. SPi 3'2 -REV. 0 ATTACHMENT . 1 . '-I. '2.' PAGE ? APPENDIX E-3 FORMS FOR EVALUATING MVORTABXLITY DETERMINATION OF REPORTABILITY WORXSHE.ET FOR 10 CFR 50.55(e)Page 4 of 5 in. Could the deficiency create a substantial safety hazard, were tto remain uncorrected? Not A substantial safety hazard is a loss of safety funct on to the extent that there is a major reduction in tU degree of protection provided to public health nd safety for any facility or activity authorized by he nstruction pe it.A. Moderate e osure to, or release of, licensed material.1. Exposur in excess of 25 rem whole body YES NO (10 CETR 2 .2202(a) (1)). -C 2. Release of r dioactive material to an YES NO unrestricted ea (10 CER 20,2202 (a) (2)). 0 0 3. Exposure of any idividual in an unrestricted YES 0O area to a 'total eective dose equivalent (3 0 in any period of on calendar year in excess of 0.1 rem (10 C 2 101(c)).Explain: __ ___.1~~~~~B. Major degradation of essential safety- lated equipment. I. A loss of redundancy if, in conjunct 6n YES '1O with a single failure, a required saf ty a 0 function could not be performed. Explain: PRO0C. S V)T-1 0-T R EV.PAGE A3-73 S~ld sI'eL 0. ON I SNa3I" 1 a -1 ......... -A. Explain: APPENDIX E-3 FORMS FOR M1?ORTABII.I'.t"f DETERMINATION OF WORl<SHEET FOR 10 ern sa. 55 (e,>, Page 4 of 5 the deficiency create a SUbstantial safety were remain uncorrected? A substantial safety hazaJ:d is a loss of safety fUnct on to the extent that there is a major reduction in tl degree of pJ:'otection provided to public health nd safety for any facility or activity authorized by he nstruc"tion pe it. or release of, licensed material.

1. Exposur in excess of 25 rem whole body n:s . NO (10 CE'R 2 .2202*{a) (l}). 0 Cl 2. Release of r dioacti va material to an NO unrestricted sa (10 CFR 20.2202(a)

(2>>. 0 0 3. Ey.posure of any 1 dividual in an unrestricted n:s 1'10 area to a total e ective dose equivalent* a 0 in any period of on calendar year in excess of 0.1 :tem (10 eFR 2 1301(c}). B. Major degradation of essential safety-equipment. eXplain: S0'd 1. A loss of redundancy if, in conjunct on YES 0 with a single failure, a required" saf ty 0 0 function could not be perfOl':lned. 01 PRoe.6PT) '} .01. ATTACKMEttT _ Gf. q. '1. PAGE-A3-73 ":II Te" ......... -. 90°,3 i1l01 AXPPINDXX -,-3 FO6Rs FoR EVALUATING PZPORTAZLXDETERMINATION OF REFORTABZZ 1 ZTY WORXSHEET FOR 10 CM 50.55(e)Page 5 of 5 C. M'Iajor deficiencies in design, construction, inspect: test or operation,.1. A condition or circumstances which, under normal operating conditions or anticipated transient could contribute to exceeding a-safety limit as defined in the facilitytechnical specifications.2. A ndition or=circumstance which, under norimn operating conditions or anticipated transi t, could cause an accident or, in the even of an accident due -to other causes could, con 'dering an independent single failure, es~ t in a loss of safety function necessary to rn igate the consequences of the accident. ' .3. A deficiency which se 'ously compromised the ability of a confinemen system to perform its designated function.Explain; -2 Lon, YES 03 YES 0 NO 01 NO YE If all questions under Items III.A, I11.B, and C .marked NO, the deficiency is not reportable under (50.55(e). Go to IV. If any of the questions in III.A, IC or 1XI.C are marked YES, the condition is reportable under CER 50.55(e). Go to IV.ce IV.ITEM IS: EOTU EVALUATIOtR PERF'ORME~D BY DTEE DETERMINKNTON~ APPROVED B -A DATE NRC NOTrIFIEDI_____________ NO'fFICATION MADE gy 71wq)7, Z M, iS -I, -PROC. -SPT3_4 -REV._ATTACHMENT

t. "1. Z PAGEf A3-74 913

d lI;J10l APPENDIX P!-3 FORMS* FOR Ev.ALUATING DETERMINATION OF REPORTABILITY WORKSHEET FOR 10 50.5S(e) i Page 5 of 5 C.

deficiencies in design, construction, inspection, test or operation . . 1. A condition or circuInstances which, under YES NO normal operating conditions or anticipated 0 0 transient could contribute to a-safety limit as defined in the facility technlcal specifications.

2. ndition or :circumstance which, under YES NO norm operating conditions or anticipated 0 O* trans! t, could cause an accident or, in the even of an accident due to other causes could, can 'dering an independent single failure, res t in a loss of safety function necessary to m . igate the of the accident.

3. A deficiency which se .' ously compromised the YES 0 ability of a confinemen system to perforIR its tJ tJ designated function.

explain: IV. If all questions under Items lI1:.A, III. B, and . ',C . marked NO, the deficiency is not reportable under 50.55 (e). Go to IV. If any of the questions in III.A, II' or tII.e are marked the condition is reportable under 0 CFR SO.55(e). Go to IV. lTEM :rS: xxx PERFORMeD BY' OETERMlijNflON AefROVED W DATE NRC No-rIFIED OR _________ 1!t-liIO'!'! E'ICATION MAOe--,S='i':.-::.:.:.-=--=--=--=--=- ___________ -iI-PROC. SPT3 q -o'Z. REV.,_o __ .:s-:'i..;....

2. __ _ PAGE ." q A3-74 APPENDIX A (Sheet I of 2)TEST DEFICIENCY NOTICE 1. TDN No, Page of 2. TEST NO. 3. CSI NO. 4. TREND CODE 5. EQUIPMENT NAME: 6. EQUIPMENT NO.: 7. SYSTEM NO.: 8. SFEToKATE

9. IGINATPJDAT

.2-0.- 31-'FDWG_ OCUT 8. SAFETY-RELATED

9. ORIGINATO TIXT. 10. REF DWG/DOCUMENT(S):

I i. DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: )'HARDWARE O'SOFTWARE 0 CONTINUED4it .L ,,,/, i,4 -7.JAA4A X:% 10R 0 ?P VeV. 0.1 , ,, IIla IOCFR50.55(e) Potential Reporability Screening complete. lib Operability Determination H F T" Site Licensing Evaluation Required .Yes 0 No LCO 0 Yes E No } NIA 7 -S -R5 TEST ENGI/EER (LE L Y .D A/ DT 12. CORRECTIVE ACTION (S) 0 CONTINUED D(70J 3761g L-WR THE T1*te SETTINtG OF 2.i1PRO(.SFIT 3 1-0 4$CVja s'V REWORK 1f. F:Roff 1-6 ZEC0aO Ta Zai SEArCc MENOSREPAIR THis R~eUCTION ZN TNime. WILL F-L IMINtATCE 0 E ....Rp 2 u gi-LA',TtC0N CONCERNS Jay LlMITIG PAGE .0 ACCEPT-AS-IS AffOUtJT Or CO 1 F.LwgJC-, Zw-ro T14. vtJI-r 7.0 OTHER Atil. tmuNr¢ RooM.SPECIFIED BY: d TEST ENGINEER 7D-2-99 DATE 13. RETEST (S) REQUIREMENTS 0 CONTINUED 0 YES W NO JUSTIFICATION: 0CN S3"fta Lowegs TIMe 1 FIP.e,nA 1-4O -ro 2Z01 S&~ieowTbI

14. ASSOCIATED WORK DOCUMENTS 0 CONTINUED 6J.0. q5--760-ooo SPECIFIED BY: APPROVED 15. CORRECTIVE ACTION COMPLETE:

16. RETEST COMPLETE: eTEST ENGINEER DATE TEST ENGINEER DATE 17. REPORTABILITY EVALUATION COMPLETE:

18. FINVAPPRVAL:

TEST GROUP SUPERVISOR A-TEST GROUP SUPERVISOR DZTE A3-75-6mr- 14'.U,K1 xvA-1 APPENDIX A (Sheet 1 of 2) TEST DEFICIENCY NOTICE 2. TEST NO. .5 PI -039 -02.- A ?J-tl/'J 5. A t.lx £' "-)11

/),/A., 6. EQUlPMENT N0'1 '2 -.fc-J'/-) I. TON No. (J J Page -J-of -.1 4 . TREND CODE ... )' 7. SYSTEM NO.

11 8. SAFETY-RELATED

9.

,-j".,gt) 10. REF DWGIDOCUMENT(S): XYES ONO w,t()}tJr; l1it:N/""e'I/!-

11. DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY:

lCHARDWARE 0 SOFI'WARE 0 CONTINUED

{',!,IlJt.1I.£ tJA./ ;e:r ..... ' /J.t; z.""'41 (;> I f.)e'euJo?'" WAJ F'1110rr! IH!pt7*+ 1"-eJf ""I I"t"d ... 'tr 51P-:1'1 i7/',{' A.c.1> .. .:. .. L. '&.I",,,,,,;,.:7-.) VAt*"e .l)A"'1'oIIt t>-O,.,,.-Oli-J"7'Yo /-J""" 8../ .,c-u-I4I-3.r.rS{-,.t nJlJ 0 I! .(}vlJ,/ ... r.,JI-AJAJ' .tZ/ b ", NO"r 11 a lOCFRSO.SS(e) Potential Repol1abilily Screening complelc. lib 0pcl1Ibility Detenninadon HFi2. wt.a Site Licensing Evaluation Required X Yes o No LCO DYes o No l8( NIA I 7).1,:>/.9.f. /VIA I TEST ENGINEER (LEVEL In) DATE 'OS .. DATB 12. CORRECTIVE ACTION (S) 0 'CONTINUED PRO(; spr 3 "1 I)c/ll '37"0 THE Tlklf: SETTING OF 2.Ie 1 '_. Q 'IJ\ REWORK -Ifo FRo,NI '2.E>0 S ECON()S 1'Q SeCQNilS. ATrACHMENT q, 'I. '3 [] THIS R*1)UCilO", 1:.N wH.L.ELllllltJA1'* oveR-REPAIR u RI7. ATIO", c: Ollie; E 8'( l..,," ITltJe'. THe PAGE I [] ACCEPT-AS-IS Ai\'IoUNT (IF COt 1:1\11'0 '1'1-+6: VI-II"r 'Z.. (] ornER Au/(. 1l0QII'I. SPECIFIED BY: W7* 'B .:J.!! .... TEST ENGINEER DATE 13. RETEST (S) REQUIREMENTS a CONTINUED

14. ASSOCIATED WORK DOCUMENTS a YES 0 CONTINUED NO W.O. "5*/7(,&0.00 JUSTIFICATION:

peN 37,,,0 tow EftS TIME SETTltJ G) '2.,"0 :[0 'Z. 0 \ SE..<:oNl)S SPECIFIED BY: CJ 7"" I 7-2G-'1S" DATE APPROVED 1 '3L1hl1. r TEST GROUP SUPERVISOR DATE 15. CORRECTrvE ACTION COMPLETE: IIi. RETEST COMPLETE: W n * .-.L B,*.('10. 17-'3 I S' (,JLS NIA Z*2'-jS" 1 IJTEST ENGINEER DATE , TEST ENGINEER DATE 17. REPORTABlLlTY EVALUATION COMPLETE: ?B¢I TEST GROUP SUPERVISOR TEST GROUP SUPERVISOR D T8 .' A3-75 SMf-14.U,lG,CtHI I B* °,. ,*APPENDIX H 10CFR.50.55(e) POTENTIAL REPORTABILITY SCREENING FORM (TO BE USED FOR TEST DEFICIENCY NOTICES ONLY)Page I of 2 PLANT/UNIT Wj'A) -)TDN Number ___-__ ) )BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: 3z"J'V/ t-. W"i /A'u, E'4tO k pkaa~I. Is the deficiency associated with a safety-related component or any support structure? AYES I- NO 0 INDETERMINATE If the above answer is NO, the deficiency is not potentially reportable. Stop the screening at this point. If the above answer, is either YES or INDETERMINATE, continue with the screening process.II. Can the deficiency be clearly called corrective maintenance for a correctly designed and constructed installation: Dl YES 0 NO ,)-N DETERMINATE Basis for YES answer: 11. Is the deficiency related only to test performance activities, such as procedure problems. test equipment or incorrect system lineups?0 YES El INDETERMINATE Basis for YES answer: If the answer to either Question H or Question III is YES, the deficiency is not potentially reportable. Stop the screening at this point. Otherwise, continue witth the screening process.PROC.SPT31-o_0R EV.0 ATTACHMENT q1 2.3 PAGE I I A3-76 SMP- 14;O,R3,CN-i* ' .. . APPENDIX H lOCFR50.55(e) POTENTIAL REPORTABILITY SCREENING FORM (TO BE USED FOR TEST DEFICIENCY NOTICES ONLY) Page I of 2 PLANT/UNIT ____ _ TON Number ,S:u'} , ) ------BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: /?S-L. wJ:U e-i?t. .-r'.rl u-t. At/> jA .. "rll kfl1:, I. Is the deficiency associated with II safety-related componell! or noy support structure? o NO o INDETERMINATE If the abov.e answer is NO, the deficiency is not potentiully reportable. Stop the screening at this point. If the above answer. is either YES or INDETERMINATE, continue with the screening process. n. Can the deficiency be clearly called corrective maintenance for a correctly and constructed installation: o YES o NO Basis for YES answer: ---------------------------------- III. Is the deficiency related only to teSt performance activities. stich as procedure problems. test equipment or incorrect system lineups? . DYES --etN O o INDETERMINATE Basis for YES answer: _________________________________ _ If the answer to either Question n or Question III is YES, the deficiency is not potentially reportable. Stop the at this point. Otherwise, continue wi.th the screening process. A3-76 PROC.SPT'31 -01. Rl:V._O_ __ PAGE '2.. SMP-l4.0.R3.CN-2* . ... : I, APPENDIX H IOCFR50.55(e) POTENTIAL REPORTABILITY SCREENING FORM (TO BE USED FOR TEST DEFICIENCY NOTICES ONLY)Page 2 of 2 PLANT/UNIT VX'2?" -)TDN Number 9 r _ _ y /IV. Can you confirm that the affected system or component could have performed its required safety function without reliance on other components, future tests, or operator actions, if left uncorrected? 0 YES O NO SINDETERMINATE Basis for YES answer: NOTE: You should consider the following attributes when answering Question IV: (1) environmental qualifications, (2) seismicity, (3) flood analyses, (4) loss of onsite power, (5)materials application, (6) effect on operator information, and (7) any other attributes which miy have an impact on operability. If the answer to Question IV is YES, the deficiency is 'not potentially reportable. 'If the aniwer to Question IV is either NO or INDETERMINATE, a copy of the TDN and the completed copy of this form shall be submitted to Site Liceusing for evaluation.. Signature Date:.PR0C. PLVV.ATTACHMENT _ 3..PAGE I".,-A3-77 0q 2. . " .. APPENDIX H 10CFRSO.S5(e) POTENTIAL REPORTABILITY SCREENING FORM (TO BE USED FOR TEST DEFICIENCY NOTreES ONLy) Page 2 0[2 -PLANT/UNIT W 11 IV -) TON Number J Cf) 7 / ;ir-IV, Can you confirm that the affected system or component could have performed its required safety function without reliance on other components, future tests, or operator actions, if left uncorrected? NOTE: o YES DNa Basis for YES answer: __________________________ _ You should consider the following attributes when answering Question IV: (1) environmental qualifications. (2) seismicity. (3) flood analyses, (4) loss of onsite power, (5) , materials application. (6) effect on operator information, and (7) any other attributes which may have an impact on operability, If the answer to Question IV is YES, the deficiency is 'not potentially' reportable. 'If the to Question IV is either NO or INDETERIvIINATE, a copy of the TDN and the completed copy of this form shall be submUted to Site Licensing for e,:a)uatlon.* SIgnature Date: PROC. SPf 3Cf ATIACHMENT ,. ':t, 3 PAGE 3 .. .. ... ;.:. . ....... ' .. A3-77 .... : '--.. ' JUL 2 8 1995.TQ .3 95.072.8 8 00;Corrective Action/ACP Manager, M. Bajestani, STC IA-WBN WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN) -DETERMINATION OF REFORTABILITY FOR TON Nos. 95-0778, 95-0779, & 95-0791 The subject document has been evaluated by Site Licensing in accorda ce with Site Standard Practice (SSF)-4.05. The reportability detexminat on is as follows: Reportable under 10 CFR 50.55(e): Yes 0 No x Additional remarks: See attached worksheet,19 -I I. -a I. -The reportability worksheets are attached.ace Compliance Licensing Supervisor FSB 2K-WBN DAJ Attachment(s) cc (Attachment(s]): R. T. Purcell, MOB 2R-WBN-- (if reportable) D. E. Nunn, FSB IA-WBN-- (if reportable) B. S. Schofield, FSB 2K-WBN--(if reportable) J. E. Sanders, FSB 2K-WBN NRC Resident Inspector, FS8 1J-WBN--(if reportable) Responsible-Organization Mgr., N/A RIMS, QAC 1G-W8N .. ..PR0C. PT4T '/*- t'* ._ATTACHMEýiT 21 %Yg PAGE_-T-- '1 -A3-78 IS"%-L.JUL 2 8 1995 .T.O.S 95.012*8 8 00; corrective Action/ACP Manager, M. Baiestani STC lA-WBN WATTS BAR NOCLEAR PLANT (WBN) -DeTERMINATION OF FOR : 'fON Nos. , 95-0779, & 95-0791 'L'he subject document has been evaluated by Site Licensing in acco.rda ce with 51 te Standaz:d P'tactice (S5!?) -4.05. The reportabili ty deterrninat on is as follows: Reportable under 10 CFR 50.55(e): Yes 0 No

Additional relCLarks:

See attached worksheet. , The reportability worksheets are attached. f! *

ace Compliance Licensing supervisor FSa 2K-WBN DAJ : Attachment(s)

cc (Attachrnent[s])

R. T. purcell, MOB 2R-WBN--(if reportable) i D. E. Nunn, FSB reportable} I B. S. Schofield, FSB 2K-WBN--(if reportable) J. E. Sanders, FSB 2K-WB.t-1 NRC Resident Inspector, FS& reportable) Responsible 'Organization Mgr. I N/A RtMS, QAC lG-WBN PROC.Sp'[3,-o2 REV. Q I 9. £I. '3 I , I " . I PAGE A3-78 '. - APE=DXX Z-3 oms FoR EVALUATZiG REPORTABILITY DETERMINATION OF REPORTADZLXTY WORMS)ET FM 10 CFM. 50.55(e)Page I of 5 PLANT/UMIT WBN/1&2 Item Number TDN Nos. 95- 188, 9S- 779, 0 9 -d --TITLE:ManUal actions required to prevent room everpressurization d :in CO 2 testin. I DESCRIPTION OF DEEICIENCY: During performance of C02 system tesi lng, action was taken to manually terminate the CO 2 injection to Pr 1 ent overpressurization of the auxiliary instrument rooms. The actioo to manually terminate the C0 2 injection were prescribed in the procedt e.4'.-I. Does the deficiency involve the construction of a facilit' or activity, or a basic component supplied for such facilit or activity?A. Construction means the analysis, design, manufacture, YE NO fabrication, quality assurance, placement, erection, 0 installation, modification, inspection, or testing of a facility or activity and consulting services related to the facility or activity that are safety related.Explain: The deficiency involves safety related structures. B. Basic Component NOTE: In all cases, basic component includes sal ety related design (as approved and releasedi forconstruction), analysis, inspection, test ng, fabrication, replacement parts, or consu ing services that are associated with the compc ,ent hardware, whether these services are performae by the component supplier or other supplier.Any plant structure, system, or component, or any art thereof, necessary to assure: 1. The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure YE, NO boundary.PROC. SPT3 7- ZEV. .-__.) ~~ATTACHMENT e ..PAGE 'A349.-1 Z0'd APPENDIX i!-3 FOR EVALUATING REPORTABILITY OF WORKSHEET 10 CFR 50.55(e)

i" ** Page 1 of 5 I?LANT !UNIT

___ _ Item Number TON Nos. 95-( 788, 95-rr779, & TITLE:Manual actions required to prevent room overpressurization dl dnQ £22 testing'. DESCRIPTION OF DEH'ICIENCY; During performance of CO 2 system tesl nq, .' action was taken to manually terminate the CO 2 injection to prE lent overpressurization of the auxiliary instrument rooms. 'the actioZ'l '1:0 manually te:minate the CO 2 injection l-Iere prescribed in the procedt 1-8. I. Does the deficiency involve the construction of a facilit' or activity, or a basic component supplied fox slJch facili t or activity? A. Construction means the design, manufacture, YE' fabrication, quality assurance, placement, erection, D installation, modification, inspection, or testin9 of a facility or activity and consulting related to the facility or activity that are safety related. .: Explain: The deficiency involves safety related structures. B. Basic Component NOTE: In all cases, basic component includes sa ety related design (as approved and released' for construction), analysis, inspection, nq, fabricat.ion, replacernent parts, or consul iog services that are associated with the compc ent hardware, whether these services are by the component supplier or other supplier. Any plant structure, system, or component, or any thereof, necessary to assure: art 1. The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. . 01' ... -PROC.SPT.3 ,-oz REV., __ ATTACHMENT

9.

,. PAGE 5 , .. )l.II;' tE:f NO C * . . APPENDIX E-3 WORMS FOR VALUATING PZPORTABILXTY DETE1RMINATION OF RZORTABILITY~ WORXSHEBT FOR 10 dWP. 50.55(o)l~Page 2 of 5 2. The capability to shut down the reactor and YUS NO maintain it in a safe shutdown condition. i 3. The capability to mitigate the consequences of YES No accidents which could result in potential a E offsi'te exposures comparable to those referred to in 10 CER 100.11'.Explain: The walls of the auxiliary instrument rooms are safety relat d.If all questions under items LA and I.B are marked NO, he deficiency is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.55(e). Go to 1I. Did the construction of a facility or activity or a basic component supplied for such facility or activity: A. Fail to comply with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, YES 0O as amended, or any applicable rule, regulation, 3 1 order, or"license of the Commission?(IOCR5O,55(e) (2])Explain: No failure to comp!ly is involved, Concern is beinq addr is in accordance with programs developed to implement the Act B. Contain a defect? (10CERS0.55(e)[3]) NOTE: Deviation means a departure from the technical or quality assurance requirements defined in procurement documents, safety analysis report, construction permit or other documents provided f.or installed basic components.

1. A deviation in a basic component delivered YES M0 to a purchaser for use in a facility or a a activity subject to a construction permit?PROC. -SPT27/- 0 REV- -0~~~ATTACHMENT.

,'2-,'PAG E_ , , A3-80:,f. .. \, U!' '-' f .. ' I . 2

3. APPENDIX £ ... 3 FOruwtS FOR.

IU:POR'l'ABILX'l"! DETERMINATION OF R!POR'l'AaILXT1 WORKSaEET FOR 10 CFR 50.55(e) P b toll I?age 2 of 5 The capability to shut down the reactci.r and YES; NO maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.

0 The capability to mitigate the conseque'nces of YE!S MO accidents which could result in potential,.

.: 0 offsite exposures cosnpaX'able to those :referred to in 10 erR Explain: The walls of the auxiliary instrument rOOlns are safety relat d., If all questions under item$ I.A and I.B are marked NO, he deficiency is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.55 (e). Go to V. II. Did the construction of a facility or activity oX' a basic component supplied for such facility or activity: A. Fail to comply with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, aa amended, or any applicable

rule, reqllla"tion, order, or'license of the COlnrnission? (lOCFR50 ,55 (e) (2J ) YES t-lO CI * '. EY-plain:

No failure to comply is involved. Concern is beinCl addr S5 in accordance with .grqgratns developed to imj>lernent the Act 8. Contain a defect? (lOCS'R50.55 (e) (3]) C:V'*d CbO' NO're: Deviation means a departure from the technica.l or quality assurance defined in ' 1. pX'ocuretllent documents, safety analysis report, const:ruction permit OJ: other doouments provided for installed basic components. ' A deviation in a basic component delivered to a purchaser for use in a facility or ,activity subject to a construction pennit? PROC. SPl' 3, "2 REV

ATTACHMENT_"I!..L.'

'.J...'f .!..='3:..- __ PAGE' .t; A3-80 . YES o * .' p I APP .hNDIX Z-3 FORMS rOk EVALUATXNG REPORTAB7LITY DETERMINATION OF REPORTABILITY WORKSHEET FOR 10 CT"R 50.55(e)Page 3 of 5 2. The installation, 'use, or operation of a basic Y.S component containing a defect as defined in 0 Item No. I above.3. A deviation in a portion of a facility subject YSS to the construction permit?No deviation was involved. Auxiliary instrumnent room press No NO[re Explain: I was maintained below acceapthble limits. Also, the potent 1 for room overpressurization was a recognized conse juence. f the test and appropriate instructions were included to ens e that room design pressure was not exceeded. Actions taken o terminate the test were in accordance with the test" w .-i9, instructions. C. Undergo any significant breakdown in any portion of Y0S the quality assurance program conducted pursuant to .0 the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, which could have produced a defect in a basic component? (10CFRS0.55 (e) (4)in: No sionificant QA breakdown is involved. Deficiency was';'10 X Expla l d documented per the QA oroqram.in -If all questions under Items II.A, II.B, and II.C are marked NO, the deficiency is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.55(e). Go to IV.If any question under Items M-.A, II.B, or U.C is marked YE then continue with Item IXX.PROC. SPT3 1- o REV. 0....ATTACHMENT , .DaU .0 7 3,@ ýftvft A3-81 , j ,'t .Y i I Elxplain:

c.

APPENDIX :&-3 FORMS FOR EVALUATING OE'l'ERMINA'l'ION OF REPOR'l'ABILI'l'Y WORKSHEE'l' FOR 10 CFR SO.SS(e) Page 3 of 5 2. The installation, 'use, or operation of a basic YSS NO component containing a defect as defined in a I Itelll No. 1 above. 3. A deviation in a portion of a facility subj ect 'tES lNo to the construction permit? a I liIo deviation was involved. Auxiliary instrurnent xoom press re I Was maintained below acce'Ptdble 1it"its. Also, the "Ootent for room overpressurization was a recoqnized conseanence the test and appropriate instructions were included to ens that room des'!qn pressure was not exceeded. Actions taken 0 terrninate the test were in accordance with the test hcr instructions. Undergo any significant breakdown in any portion of the quality assurance program conducted pursuant to 'the requil:"ements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix 5, which could ha"9'e produced a defect in a basic component'? (lOCFRSO.55(e) [4]) yes : o I No sianificant OA breakdown is involved. Deficiencv was documented per the QA 'Oroqram. Ii all questions undez Items II.A, II.B, and lI.e axe rnarked NO, the deficiency is not reportable under 10 50.55(e). Go to IV. If any question under Items 11. A, II. B, or II. e is marked YE then continue with Item III. A3-81 PRoe. SPI 3,*0 2. ATTACHMENT 'J. 't, 3, PAGE 7 APPENDZX E-3FOR EVALUATZNG ZPQORTABILZTY DETERMINATION OF REPOR'rABLITX FOR 10 CFR 50.55(e)Page 4 of 5 X1I. Cotild the deficiency create a substantial safety hazard, were to remain uncorrected? Not A substantial safety hazard is a loss of safety funct on to the extent that there is a major reduction in ti degree of protection provided to public health nd safety or any facility or activity authorized by he nstructlon pe it.A. Moderate e osure to, or release of, licensed material.1. Exposur in excess of 25 rem whole body YES NO (10 CFR 2 .2202(a) (1)). 0 0 2. Release of r dioactive material to an YES NO unrestricted ea (10 CFR 20.2202 (a) (2)). 0 0 3. 9%posure of any i dividu~l in an unrestricted YES NO area to a total e active dose equivalent -a 0 in any period of on calendar year in excess of 0.1 rem (10 CFR 2 1301(c)).Explain:, __....__lA I.Expla a. Major degradation of essential safety- ated equipment, 1. A loss of redundancy if, in conjunct n YES 10 with a single failure, a required saf t 0 0 function could not be performed.I in: in I ,,,,-$ Cp -o'Z PAGE A3-82 GoldI st;I& 0. O .=1 I T ...AP1?ENDJ:X E--:3 FORMS FOR EVALUATING DETERMINATION OF WORKSHEET FOR 10 CFR 50.55($) , Page 4 of 5 Could the deficiency create a substantial safety were A. Explain: . B. Explain: remain uncorrected?

1. 2. 3. A substantial safety hazard is a loss of safety' funct on to the extent that there is a major reduction in tl degree of protection provided to public health nd safety , for any facility or activity by

he nstruction pe it. to, or release of, licensed material.

Exposur in eY-cess of 25 rem whole body (10 CE'R 2 .2202'(a) (l}). Release of r dioactive.rnaterial to an unrestricted ea (10 CE'R 20.2202(a) (2>>). Eloposure of any 1 dividual in an area to a total e ectil1e dose equivalent . 1n any period of on calendar year in excess of 0.1 rem (10 erR 2 1301(c). , YES NO a a YES NO o 0 n:s NO a 0 Major degradation of essential equipment.

1. A loss of redundancy if, in conjunct On with a single failure, a required sa! ty function could not be performed.

PROC. SPT 't __ ..-.O_ '1 . .3 -PAGE-f) -A3-82 YES W o 0 90'.- J1.OJ APPENDME* -3 Jr6RMS'rR EVALUATING RZPORTABXLITY tDETERMINATION or RZpoRTABZLITY W~ORMSHEET FOR 10 CVR 50.55(e), Page 5 of 5C. Major deficiencies in design, construction, test or operation. .1. A condition or circumstances which, under normal operating conditions or anticipated transient could contribute to exceeding a-safety limit as defined in the facility technical specifications.

2. A ndition or:Circumstance which, under norm operating conditions or anticipated transi t, could cause an accident or, in the even of an accident due to other causes could, con dering an independent single failure, res t in a loss of safety function necessary to m igate the consequences of the accident.3. A deficiency which se ously compromised the ability of a confinemnen system to perform its Ex*an designated function.Explain; IeintdLnto. ....Lon, YES'0 YES YES NO 0 0*II'U If all questions under Items III.A, XII.5, and 4 marked NO, the deficiency is not reportable under 50.55(e).

Go to IV. If any of the questions in III.A, "'i or IIX.C are marked YES, the condition is reportable under CFR 50.55(e). Go to IV.LO IV.XTEM IS: __REPORTL_ EVALO FATION PEROM ED BY .DETERMItNATION APP~ROVEDBYDT -7 DATE HRC NOTIFIED_ ______ _____________ NOTIFICXL'XON MADE7BY PROC. SPT3 OZ RiV. .EVQ-ATPAC.GEKT q "Y_PAGE q A3-83 913'd 'l1:!!O! FORMS'FOR Ev.ALUATING DE'l'ElWINA'l'ION OF REPORTABILIT:t' WORKSHEET FOR 10 C?R 50.55(e) i Page 5 of 5 C. Major deficiencies in design, construction, inspection, test or operation. ,1. A condition or circulnstances which, under YES normal operating conditions or anticipated 0 a transient could contribute to a-safety limit as defined in the facility technical specifications.

2. A ndition or Which, under YES NO norm operating condltions or anticipated 0 0' trans! t, could cause an accident or, in the even of an accident due to other causes could,' con de ring an independent single failure, res t in a loss of safety function necessary to m iqate the consequences of the accident. . 3. A deficiency which se 'oualy compromised the YES 0 ability of a coofinemen system to perform its a a designated function.

IV. If all questions under Items III.A , III. a, and' ,C' marked NO, the deficiency is not reportable under , 50.55 (9). Go to IV. If any of the questions in III.A, II or II!.C are marked YES, the condition is reportable under erR 50',55 (e). Go to IV. l'l'EM IS: xxx EVAtt/ATION E'ERE'ORl4ED DE1 1 ERMINATIOfi AfPROVED DATE NRC NOTIFIED OR ________ jl--NOT! E'I o.'L'I ON MAOE'-al':'1'l:..:.-:.:.:.-:-:.-:.-:.= ____________ 1I-A3-83 PROC.SPT"3 ATI'ACHMENT

q. y. '3 PAGE q

' I 0 f3 :2 ': -.4 9 W -. 1I03902 20 L DE5C R' I P ION /M I'L LIMI TAT IONC L8 I34-7a PRFSS;URE GAUGE, DIGITAL.NONE E 19502 DIGITAL THERMONETER NONE'};'9 MVANOMI.UEIN Ii.PLO ISSUE TICKET YEL -B 6096' WAYNE BICHLMEIR DUE TO LAST NEXT RETURN CALIB CALIB 07/17/95 -06/20/95 09/20/95 07/17/95 07/11/95 07/11/96 07/17/95 11/26/91 PAGE I.ISSUED -07/14/9 ACCURACY/CON P/P*1,/-.048" RANGE N N'/--2 DEG F.N N N PROC. ~ ¶ORE1L.2.R ATTACHMENT-I-. PAGE--A3-84 , *

I E*SUE TICI<ET

_. 20 EMPLOYEE -B8096 WAYNE SrCHlMEIR . ISSUED -07/14/9 DESCF;IPTIClNI DUE TO 1'1::< 1"L LIMl GAUGE, DIGITAl. 07/17/95 NONe:: DIGITAL THERHONETER 07/17/95 NONE 07/17/9.5 A3-84 lAST NEXT CALIS CALIS *06/20/95 09/20195 07 07/11/96 11/26/91 ACCURACY/ CON PIP . '1'/- RANGE N N . +/-2 DEG F. N N PRoe. SPt3' .. ot* REv.,_o ___ _ ATTACHMENT_2 .... _ ..... S' __ _ PAGE l' ',: " 0 M&TE USAGE HISTORY FROM 07/16/95 TO 07/16/95 FOR SELECTED M&TE 16:17:53 07-19-95PAGE: I M&TE NUMBER M&TE DESCRIPTION WR OUETI WORK DOCUMENT ID------------------------ ISSUE DATE ORGANIZATION EMPLOYEE NAME E23176 C02 ANALYZER One record listed.00 SPT-039-02 07/16/95 FIRE STERCHI Ci P= W 2C mb m ý--l 0127 ra.C 1 0 10:17:53 07-19-95 M&TE NUMBER E23176 M&TE DESCRIPTION C02 ANALYZER One record listed. M&TE USAGE HISTORY FROM 07/16/95 TO 07/16/95 FOR SELECTED M&TE WORK DOCUMENT 10 SPT-039-02 ISSUE DATE 07/16/95 PAGE: l ORGANIZATION EMPLOYEE NAME FIRE STERCHI 14:09:14 07-21-95 40 4 7 9ISSUE TICKET PAGE I WID# -/95 SPT03902/Rd EMPLOYEE -B8096 WAYNE BICHLMEIR ISSUED -07/21 DESCRIPTION/ LIMITATIONS DUE TO LAST NEXT ACCURACY/RETURN CALIB CALIS CON P/P M&TE 902594 D TIMER,DIGITAL-NONE 903386 STOPWATCHDIGITAL NOLR 902498 MANOMETER 07/24/95 10/20/94 1'0/20/95 07/24/95 04/20/95 04/20/96 07/24/95 11/26/91 07/24/95 06/13/95 09/13/95 07/24/95 01/19/95 01/19/96+\-0.1 SECON N N+/-.1 SEC.N N, N'+)- .048%* RANG 518477 E E19497 PRESSURE. GAUGE','DIGITAL NONE DIGITAL THERMONETER' NONE N+N-N N.2 DEG FN v PROC.~3r' 0 ZRs'AITACHMENT t f A3-6... ........... ,* , *. .. ..* ..A. : -14:09:14 07-21-95 WID# -SPT03902/Rd /95 M&TE DESCRIPTION/ LIMITATIONS 902594 D ',' " \ '. , ' " . .ISSUE TICKET -88096 WAYNE BICHLMEIR '" DUE TO RETURN LAST CALIS NEXT CALIS 07/24/95 10/20/94 10/20/95 07/24/95 04/20/95 04/20/96 07/24/95 11/26/91 07/24/95 06/13/95 0,9/13/95 07/24/95 01/19/95 01/19/96 " PAGE 1 ISSUED -07/21 ACCURACY/ CON PIP +\";:0.1 SECON N N +/-.1 SEC. N N, N" +/-.048% RANG N N +/-2 DEG F N N 17:36:15 07-22-95 WID# -SPT-039-.02-RO DESCRIPTION/ M&TE LIMITATIONS 891536 RECORDER NOLR 490470 C02 ANALYZER NONE EMPLOYEE -52852 DUE TO RETURN 09/02/95 07/25/95 SUE TICKET JOHN STERCHI LAST NEXT CALIB CALIS 06/12/95 06/12/96 07/20/95 10/20/95PAGE 1 ISSUED -07/22/95 ACCURACY/CON P/P SEE REPORT.N N SEE REPORT N PROC. sPT.73-!2 REV. 0 ATrACHMENT PAGE- I., 43/'A3-87 , . 17:36:15 07.-22-95 ISSUE TICKET PAGE 1 WI ott -SPT --039-.02-RO EMPLOYEE -S2852 JOHN STERCHI ISSUED -07/22/95 DESCRIPTION/ DUE TO LAST NEXT ACCURACY/ M&TE LIMITATIONS RETURN CALIB CALIS CON PIP 891536 RECORDER 09/02/95 06/12/95 06/12/96 SEE REPORT NOLR N N 490470 C02 ANALYZER 07/25/95 07/20/95 10/20/95 SEE REPORT NONE N . PROC;SP131-0 2. REV.---.O_ __ _ PAGE ..,. A3-87 L-___ ...: ______ ._ 12:34:42 07-21-95 WID# -SPT03902/RO.DESCRIPTION/ M&TE LIMITATIONS 891513 PRESSURE GAUGE, DIGITW NONE 557886 DIGITAL MULTIMETER NONE 512752 RECORDER NONE 458944 DIGITAL CALIBRATOR. NONE 416651 DECADE RES BOX NONE 557886 DIGITAL MULTIMETER Ag.. NONE ISSUE TICKET EMPLOYEE -E0199 DOUGLAS ELYDUE TO LAST RETURN CALIB kL 07/24/95 05/18/95 09, 08/04/95 06/29/95 12, 08/20/95 03/15/95 03, 07/24/95 06/30/95 12.08/20/95 03/02/95 03 08/04/95 06/29/95 12.NEXT:ALIB/18/95/29/95/15/96/30/95/02/96/29/95 PAGE 1 ISSUED -07/21/9 ACCURACY/CON P/P SEE CAL REPORT SEE CAL REPORT SEE REPORTN N SEE CAL REPORT SEE N SEE N CAL N CAL N REPORT REPORT 1-*PROC, SPTi,"Ot REV. ..+/-.ATTACHMENT 11.. -, PAGE " A3-88 12:34:42 07-21-95 ISSUE TICKET* PAGE 1 WID# -SPT03902/RO EMPLOYEE -E0199 DOUGLAS ELY ISSUED -07/21/9 M&TE .DESCRIPTIONI LIMITATIONS 891513 PRESSURE GAUGE, DIGITAL NONE 557886 DIGITAL MULTIMETER NONE 512752 NONE 458944 DIGITAL CALIBRATOR. NONE 416651 DECADE RES BOX NONE 557886 DIGITAL MULTI METER NONE , ,-----_. DUE TO RETURN LAST CALIB NEXT CALIB . ACCURACYI CON PIP .. 07/24/95 05/18/95 09/18/95 SEE CAL REPORT 08/04/95 06/29/95 12/29/95 SEE CAL REPORT 06/20/95 03/15/95 03/15/96 SEE REPORT N N 06/30/95 12/30/95 SEE CAL REPORT 08/20/95 0.3/02/9.5 03102196 SEE CAL REPORT N N 08/04/95 06/29/95 12/29/95 SEE CAL REPORT N N PROC. SPt! cr .. ot REY. ...... o __ _ AnACHMENT:--J'.a.:;.5 ____ _ PAGE s: A3-88 JUL-i9-1995 16:15 TVAl CENTRAL LASS 615 697 4137 P.02/02 Tennesasee Valley Authority i CENTRAL,-LABORATORIES SERWICES Chattanooga, Tennessee IDNO. 6Z 0 L, REPORT OF CALIBRATION DATE: 7"- (7- 9.Instrument: C L 9-eI- PLANTw:V -r 0" .,..Manufacturer: " e.. I s,, CAL DATES: LAST: 0- / -Model: C A.4f NEXT! AA.)-, Instruction No.: 1 .0 9 ... .INTERVAL; _Disposition to: pcr t- .Standard(s) Used: -,VA Instrument Accuracy: +/.;S04,1d% /*/Vuia.j-e' Fprwd 4tS, AS FOUND WITHIN TOLERANCE OUT OF TOLERANO9 13 NOT REQUIRED .As LOTi' WITHIN TOLIRA14U0 0 TQSM INCOMPLETE 0 NOT ftEIUIR1o Agp--Tvo Pý (iT14 (Ord% eile Rhlj9A/ WAi.5 nJt~e7'0U14fL-YLr7 TTP RJco09P ER( Wf4) 27IQeP F (OzL WA 71E10 APPOF0 Fi-ADTI4E~QLL C BYf DeF~i.(~PL CAeoz EC-'A. -Jo 7H C L A 5'l.~~gi~\iWE.D

7. 99.,{L~L 1ý Ti' ,,L-S FC4LL SJt44 TI"E Ce~~ o+ Cb-. A'T CIL5 I-s A;JoD7CTC i r7AwOI 4 A-5 A~ :fj0trkr-)

plz--A$'1' A) ý 1? IF ~TU RJ'PQ G D L j:ZpC p?-rIzoTt0?%k Co. OeCF,17h47t60~ PROC. SP31-0ZREV~.C ATTACIIMEIT7 T --PAGE A3-89 TOTAL P.02 I JUL-19-1995 16:15 TVA CENTRAL LABS 615 697 4137 P.02/02 Tennessee Valley Autharlly CENTRALlASORA TORIES SERVICES I. Chattanooga, TenMssee 10 NO. E 2. 3 J 7 c.. REPORT OF CALIBRATION DATE: 17 ... '75 Instrument: [' t)., A114t. " J; ,!!'6 -. --: 1.:1. PLANT: r-. A ,':. VJ. IlItJ P .. . / ... Manufacturer: Tt)()RF: JAr s T. CD. CAL OATES: LAST: i-i () 95 Model: CH,f NEXT: IJ ... ft Instruction No.: ttl 0 t;; ).. t./ INTERVAL: -' ::Z,.tt,Ir Disposition to: FACTOY" V I Standard(s) Used: -/ll'A Instrument Accuracy: I;" jc(. 1:111 d { / N CJ .... . e SPfI-....J -F "{;u. +1 d '" L J ASfQUNb WITHIN TOLellANCI! I(' OUT OP TOLEMNoe c HOT REQUIReD [J AS L£PT WITHIN TOl..RAHoll a TIlST INCOMI'LIITII [J NoT .K Ch'fl.ft-,,\ 5 pe eo,. f'fI'l<.T1 O'-'lll\.(.. . A P 1'-'-" ;V#A/(;Y04 (, /. z.. Ii v .. .,s --TU f CtJ t nAN (I.e' WAS F't..JJ'tIt:. iIDNt4 £.. L Y resTSD ,u6 A /JatJ ... ("eflTIFJ () ('/;"vCtFiJ7TZr:fTto rJ 0 f (0 o'Z (Ot. ffFTE(2 iH E R IE (,0 fZ. D err. WA} 1f/Z"ff), E COl. wA> T1-\ E fV ;4 PPC lEO A-{I}D TH e S CI1Lt: De fL rEcTi (J,J /l () rr... f.,v /4-' ,vDle D

R. G PEA-'!f8d.,i'}

tv A's By I'kIA.L-h C:l-\eCK.S. TNt L i M.\.LL Soc At. f 1.' f 7.. &J.I t') n. t.\ C I-\-A 1tJ.v tE. L, .' ,A .. ... -Lory Th E (QI'\' e,u1"rvfl of CD 'L AI; C.l S I> tJ CIT C *= R.T.* r i E [) Pt f\/O T/J E. S pr+tJ (I+E(K 5\.-\CHJtD 8 E. As A c F'\ E. 0 f.-1 Ji3 A )()I2. i!: fA.:1 r:: Nt. I J\) )T {( Ie TUR rJ Ef)1'o 0 1")( IE I" ( "E: f' JZ 0 T fZ C1l 0 i'\ CO. 0 C £/2 T'rIt I {: D

PROC.

I"" AITACHMENT ..... :-. PAGE I -========== ac:e __ -L. All measurement raUcol belWaan the elandarda rtltertlnced In thla Im.\rt.Iet!an anc1lhQ M&TE oallbratad arc greater than or to 4:1. This Instrument was tOlltod and c:aUbratsd 10 prllsc:rlbed test procodutils and tha condl A3-89' . TOTAL P.02 TUA FNT~L LBS iS 69? 413'? P.02/02 JUL-26-1995 oe:5e rinesseep Valleyu Authority TUA CENTRAL LABS 11 CENTRAL LABORATORIES SERVICES Chattanooga, Tennessee ID NO. '9oe/7o DATE: 7- 2 -z -g-i r REPORT OF CALIBRATION Intrmet PLANT: 6. fe,, Manufacturer: CAL DATES: LAST: ..7-Model: NEXT: -Instruction No.: el 3- ..INTERVAL: .Dispositlon to: p Standard(s) Used. : F 7- ay"y Instrument Accuracy: AS F13UNO WITHIN TOLERANCE k OUT OF TOLGRANCE E3 NOT RGOUIRMSB i AS LEFT WITHIN TOLERANCE a TEST WIICOMPLETE C NOT REOuIlED i-AX-E,ý5, ooe hbT LA A Ceý-Tfitej ( vC6 , jqj Ynq d k ? 3L -N JOIWvta L r- 7 SQlAeJ I aIdýk XF, A,L, PROC. 8IPT.3i20-L REV.._ATTACHMENT

1. C PAGE I_An measurement ratios between the otandards referenced In this Instruetion and the M&YM calibrated are greater than or eqI.=l to 4:1 This inStrumenL was tested and eallIted to orescribed test procedures and the condition of the Insrument Is indiratd.Calibrated y:____ ____ ___

____ _ UPage I ofI=9 TOTAL P.82 Qo0 A3-90 JUL-26-1995 08:58 TUA CENTRAL LABS 615 69? 4137 P.02/02 Tennessee Va CENTRAL LASORA TORIES SERVICES ChattanoDga, Tennessee 10 NO. 4-'Ja'l7o REPORT OF CALIBRATION DATE: 7-2..:3-'1 Instrument: PLANi: Manufacturer: CAL DATES: LAST: 7-Model: NEXT: Instruction No.! INTERVAL: Disposition to: Standard(s) Used: A AJpn C'n*1l1ce.r:I L'O"lo1(.e.'"11-Wl-}'O," 6+ Jb A-C( 3 r..t""'JI'\.Y$J(f fI Ffe r CMIf"..YI-cG'> M¢ .... f2 I /1.dJu.rleJ Po to ". PS!Jl J,:"'., , f /00 COl.. OM A c.c... d I MuLTlp/..Q. Tesl.s r..V.(l-oe jJefr>I"wt.(!"/ 7U . .s,':"c-f' Ct.> Doe!) I'lliT iA4CA. A -rhd lesT(s .... (J,c)""c...[ 'v"\ + CI. {( 0 n: I\J 0 t>. L r \ S(UeJ $II'J(ltv. A .t. PRoe. 3 '1_4'2. REV. 0 ---ATTACHMENT----\,'i..:.,.:. ,=--__ PAGE 'Z.. Ah measurement nJli05 between IhlOl utundardB referenced In thiS Inslruclion and IhQ 'l'S C:3l1bratsd are gregler Ihan or 4: 1 ThiS ..... ""m"n. cAllbJ:ated 10 prtserlbed lUI procedures and the conditlDn of Ihe Instn.lment hi Calibrated by: Approved "by: TOTAL P.02 A3-90 Tennessee Valley Authority CENTRAL LABORATORIES SERVICES Chaltanooga,. Tennessee IDNO. = 7L REPORT OF CALIBRATION DATE: --/ o-9 Instrument: C .A/A .Z. PLANT: .-rop Manufacturer: -TrUu e J %-rJMEHT .CAL DATES: LAST: / I-J I'rA A Model: C .__F NEXT: .-" '-9/Instruction No.: z 9j 3 9 ..4_ INTERVAL: & , MI /h Disposition to: VA-TT S A SJ P Standard(s) Used: .jSTVA- qý V 2-.I-- ......Instrument Accuracy:-

s. I -,O. 1o PAP/ -FL)A.e"rt0cJAL..

AS FOUND WITHIN TOLERANCE 0 OUT OF TOLERANCE 0 NOT REQUIRED AS LEFT WITHIN TOLERANCE TEST INCOMPLETE 13 NOT REQUIRED E C k A 9 I'e: F TI -1 FOL'j" AkS LEFT o ItO ,,) AJL-cRARFT SPtal i)... //HP, "___o PeP.AT71OA)J Fo 0 E 100V7. Co-.ý RZAjC,E WA-5&t2TI)e-r#0JAL1-j-rE 5 ej -'US IJJ A NO0- CLEP9.TIF'6I3_..1-r00.A-,IOA O= /DTo 6-. ArF-mE-P-r --I t_.ae .o x o F z. W A S z O, " H c.., .w A -r-.4E-,/A ppL E, pc 'j. -r4-1.E FUL L s --. LE tEFLEc.--roAO , O,, WA- 1\OT~]. z~CVTAlL~iY WASA VEP-IF"FZ I".,IS N0,!-T tED Ff:P 0 'A. El -T Yp. I EU -L .s cAI- C'tv Ait) r PL*,".7: IA.) A-A/v Cri ANP'~Y,/,+ vv5 1 VOTE1 a(~ i~-C-,-- CorJEJ-/--PRATIOA) C9F CO:,- jFT C_.L_-_ 1 j\,t_ tTL -i.-p-EFOR-E3 T-FH4 p, A. %/_ --p t E, EH.L. 4 t N" 0 -_rE~pT 8I "a' AU F:F:I' : 3'/ , REV. ..ATTACHMENT cf. 7 PAGE iuiinasuemni aloSoecee mestnorosreerece i CrISInsruito a~ e M IEcalbrle ar geetr ha oreqal c :1 All measurement ratios between th~e standards referenced In this Instruction and the M&TE; calibrated are igreater than or equal to 4:1.This Instrument was tested and calibrated to prescribed test procedures and the Is Indicated. m m ,,a, l--7Calibrated by: IOA.5da4& -A ~2-i , I Approved by: Page 1 of A3-91 Tennessee Vallev Authority CENTRAL LASORA TORIES SERVICES Chaltanooga

. Tennessee ID NO. 1::. REPORT OF CALISRA TION DATE: 95 Instrument:

PLANT: Manufacturer: -:r.tJ CO CAL DATES: LAST: tV/7fA'-Model: C NEXT: _,0-91.. Instruction No.: INTERVAL: to f<-'\ (),J Disposition to: AS FOUND AS LEFT WITHIN TOLERANCE TEST INCOMPLETE . Cl NOT REQUIRED Cl C /-\ ;1.J2.:-( s ve12... I F I c.AT' 0 IV /'10M I/VAL.. e 1-\ A 12.. T 5 I J... I tV / H R... PRoe. SPl31*0'Z. __ _ _____ -I All measurement ralios between the standards referenced In thIs Instruction and the M&TE calibrated are to 4:1. libraled by: Page 1 of A3-91 aONCENTR~A~TI ON 'rEST 2~f 6 ~ Sg~44~ 644e A A A e!ne ofto eg , -Tc f 't (205) 956-2325 TEST DATE -/O9'- TEST NO.Q...THIS HAZARD TEST .CUSTOMER-' I /,2C-'- .c,, HAZARD IDENTIFICATION C dLI(-MTKr.-J cmýI CONCENTRATION TEST Pwtedaut, efl.. eS' 16 Stj<<4M Eeue 85210 :?el (ea5) 956-e825 R:f I '1I040Gi'f!- TEST DATE 7-lo-9S-TEST NO.(Z2THIS HAZARD TEST TIME /490 CUSTOMER** HAZARD' I DENT I F I CAT I ON cIJLt F Tb-;§)/IJ 'SAMPLE PO I NT # 1 SAMPLE POINT #2 PHoe. ATIACHMENT...!.Q.:...!'1-+-_.i.o--- Tennessee Valley Authority 4 CENT"' L LAEBORATORIES SERVICES Chattanooga, Tennessee REPORT OF CALIBRATION ID NO. C, L "70 (* I DATE: "-7 Zo-- 59-Instrument: C &3 .L 1 Z.. P.?,L.4 PLANT: ....Manufacturer: .. .I?. .0 CAL DATES: LAST: 3-2'--9 Model: 11 NEXT: /O-Zo-95S Instruction No.: 4 0 9, 3 -- iNTERVAL: A 6 Disposition to: ...k.) '- Standard(s) Used: z .q Instrument Accuracy: & .... , Co U..-AS FOUNO WITHIN TOLERANCE OUT OF TOLERANCE 0 NOT REQUIRED a AS LEFT WITHIN TOLERANCE ay TEST INCOMPLETE a NOT REQUIRED 0 tafbV"tL 4J ?WAV4A1f-Co 7 .0 ajopJ 4va#- 3 c4jj r.4 S 4 4Lo~ ~t- j ZtfLA )0Y4%, W. (Av 4 060 A -/1" A AeIW i oo' Cv coý CA2-C d-,de)%Xd6 Were 721 J-- 414 r.1SOas 4 7 1 0 / / arJ.S~ovA"4`PROC. SPTI39-o? REV. 0 ATTACHMENT 1.-PAGE 3 All measurement ratios between the standards referenced In this Instruction and the M&TE calibrated are greater than or equal to 4:1.This Instrument was te and calibrated to prescribed test procedures and the conditlpn of the instrument is Indicated. ....I , .3iibrated by: ~k& 1 d .AK ~A Appro W':An4l -:A~Pagel of A3-93" LABORATORIES SERVICES Chaltanooga, Tennessee REPORT OF CALIBRATION

.. . }t.

____ U ).:;jr Instrument: PLANT: Manufacturer: Model: It"} NEXT: ID-20-9 ft Instruction No.: INTERVAL: "5 M /) Disposition to: Standard(s) Used: Instrument Accuracy: AS WITHIN TOLERANCE AS WITH1>> TOLERANce TEST I>>COMPLeTE ,4-(COl-fv dP J LJ* .. w.vu. t JlyuJ-W(MI A-. L 0 1(1 C t::> l. (}f1 11 d (...h(,l.1\ r..t. (J , t In ,J,;t,Jit We r e /tJ c.tJ 0,,&5 ,voT a up (0 '-"fI.,..; -lo:J i.. IN Ce --ll. f L.U\. t-L*\t\.-A fflX. e. D

c 'rT 5 (1 f f Pies)" 1'2. ,rJ PROC. SPT 3 't 02 REV * ...;;O:....-_

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1. e, PAGE I PROPERTY.

OF DIXIE ENGINEERING CO. FORM #D40049 TEST DATE 7- TEST NO._..THIS HAZARD TEST TIME 9/36 CUSTOMER- -V- 50.......e!--- C / Ur .. 7.7J HAZARD IDENTIFICATION- L. -V u r,,r4oJ W, 770'SAMPLE POINT #1 SAMPLE POINT #2 SAMPLE POINT #3.., I": 'J,I , I .:i '. I "'r". " ! .I ' ' ' " '! , I-,~ ... .'1,., ., i:.. 3.. .i f:,. , , I : I :I: I : ' L ... ..{. '. -:" : " " -I-;.., I:I 1 l,! .i.JiI...:' 'ih;!'-Ex!', a~!: .. .U : .,, V ; .6.1- ' .1! 4T .I, CONCENTRATION TEST PRGe. 51",,-03 " -0:4. ATTActlMENT '1. @, PAGE __ -'-___ _ PROPERTY. OF DIXIE ENGINEERING CO. FORM #040049 TEST TEST NO. TH I S HAZARD --5 'GIN C Y TEST T I ME t!J 130 HAZARD' IOENTIFICATION /JL))."/LI ArZ*Y j:l\Yjf,{./J !l-1tN TJ1 o/J UN 11:# 1 'SAMPLE POINT #1 @!. 147)' pr SAMPLE POINT #2 @. 8, [,7 p( SAMPLE POINT #3 (t '1.0 p.,- ... .. ... .......... 71TA10(........ -~...... -....2__ 202.5,~=~ 7__2,-~~~~~r --- 7' ' ---- 0 _ _ _ _ _ _ _/ 1 17 CA No 15t;6 m -rl.A r lj Jk R~7/ t7/~~~~~7 ........V ~ ..____, 0..2 .-- -.--------- -- -: ..... -A.2COMM a~~~~~;))~~~~~ 02=- I c-. .i.4 L .. E Rj' .CAT~~ ~ X, -ZC'0CRZ0 a ..... (', i-I , -\ .. .. -;::..-: .... , I DOCUMENT LOCATION NOTICE IlOLL ANI FAME NUMflER: 7< 'IDOC'UMENT O01 RECORDiTYP, : WIT-.: .2 " 5 i I*Oc:UMI~H: 8/oc'. '" 79-1)2- /?e Are5 ,¢r. 9,1P IOC:IJMIJH' IANI'TE: 1-/- 9 " NIJMI1ER1 OF PAGES REMOVEI)D: _4*REMOVED ITEM INFORMATION Dl Jrawivng Apcelurc Cnrd El Non-D)rawing Aperture CardI lird Copy Slorage A3-97* DOCUMENT l.lOCATION NOTICE HOLLAND fltAME NUMnEn.: F f3 ¥O Pr--D 3?-Oz... . 7lMe,e 7(1* !)ClClJMENTJ/}: 39-02. I?e.v-/) IJrr .. C/./I) J)()CUMENT /lATE: b-/J.,. ... 9 t.,. NtJMIlEH OP"I'A(JES HEMOVr!/): / ,. REMOVED ITEM INFORMATION I o Drawing Aperlure Cord o Nun-Drawing Aperture Cord --------------------------------------- __ ______ __ ________ ________ COMMENTS:

A3-97 DOCUMENT LOCATION NOTICE IRO0.IANI) FRAME NUMnEIR: .I)OCUIvIF!NTOR IlECOIlI) TYI'Ei: C ,,<C:UMENTID: Z 7 ./IOC)CJIiNFI" DATE: I)IltCI, I VION:.D -NIlJMllrl [)F PAGES IREMOVPA): /I-, S- F -3 9 -/jr w REMOVED ITEM INFORMATION E] I)raiwing Apcrlurc Card 0l Non-1)rawing Aporlure Cnrd I[ Ilnrd Copy Storagc CO(M M INTS: A3-98" . . .. .' .: . , . DOCUMENT L,OCA'rION NOTICE HOLl,AND rHAME NUMnEIl: £1:31--0

IJOC':UM!!NTOIt n'ECOIlD TYPH: l/2.P 6f>T . 3 J)()CIJMI!NTID:

--Ill/.' .9-/1 z-FS'V-31-1(, ?evo .-. DOClJMENT DATE: _---...----: ___ _ ____ __ __ NUMIH!H or PAOES rtEMOVEJ): ___ .;....I ___ -'-__________ ___ _ " REMOVED ITEM INFORMATION I o J)rnwing Aperture C':nrtl ________ ______________ _ " o Non-Drnwing Aperture Cord ___ _________________ ___ C:OMMf:NTS: __________________________ _ A3-98 ; .' , PAGE 1 OF 5 PROCEDURE I TOP MATRIX PRPC. SPT9.39-o 01REVt. 0 ATT.1.CHITIVIENT... .i PAGE , PROCEDURE TITLE 7117195 PROCEDURE TITLE PROCEDURE TITLE TOP # REV TRANS# TOP # REV TRANS# TOP # REV TRANS#ATIo-001-5 0 Secondary Hydro-Test Sequence ATI.055-01 0 Operations Recording & Annunciation System ATI-251-01 0 Health Physics, DG & Maintenance Sound Powered Telephone System NONE NONE NONE AT1-005-01 0 Extraction Steam System ATI-055-01 0 Operations Recording & Annunciation System ATI-280-01 0 Condenser Tube Cleaning ATNONE 1 Er oSupplement I NONE NONE NONE ATI-006-01 0 Heater Drains & Vents ATI-058-01 0 24KV Main Generator Buss Cooling System PTI-00l-01 0 Main Steam Isolation Valves NONE NONE NONE ATI-01-01 0 Fuel Oil PTI-0l102 0 Steam Generator PORVs & Turbine Bypass 0ATI-077-05 0 Wet Active Waste Handling VLVTS TOP 018-01 332904332934332780NONE TOP 001-02 332898 ATI-020-01 0 Lube Oil System ATI-200-0I 0 6.9KV Common Boards A and B PTI-001-03 0 Main Steam Safety Valve Lift Point NONE NONE NONE ATI-024-01 0 Raw Cooling Water System ATI-201-01 0 Unit Boards 1A, 1B, 1C, & 1D Transformers 1A & PTI-002-01 0 Condensate System TOP 024-01 332904 1B NONE ATI-024-01 0 Raw Cooling Water System NONE Supplement I ATI-202-01 0 6.9KV Reactor Coolant Pump Boards PTI-002-02 0 Condensate Vacuum PROCEDURE NOT WRITTEN 0 NONE 8TI-035-01 0 Generator Cooling -Hydrogen Seal Oil System ATI-203-01 0 480V Unit Boards 1A & 1B Functional PTI-003A-0l 0 Feedwater Isolation & Bypass Valves NONE NONE NONE ATI-035-02 I Generator Cooling -Hydrogen Gas & C02 ATI-204-01 0 Swhd Power PTI-003A-02 1 Feedwater & Steam Generator Level System TOP 002-02 332898 TOP 035-06 332889 332911 332918 332930 332780 NONE TOP 05-02 332904 328444 ATI-035-03 0 Generator Cooling .Stator Cooling System ATI-205-01 0 480V Turbinte Bldg. Common Boards PTI-003A-03 0 Main Feedwater System Functional Test NON.NONE TOP 002-02 33289B ATI-043.03 0 Secondary Plant Sampling ATI-206-01 0 480V Auxiliary Bldg. Common Power PTI-003B-04 0 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps & Valves Logic Test NONE NONE NONE ATI-047-02 2 EH Fluid System ATI-221-01 0 480V Service Bldg Power PTI-003B-05 0 Aux Feedwater Pumps & Valves Dynamic Test NONE NONE NONE ATI-047-02 1 EH Fluid System ATI-225-01 1 CCW Pump Station Power PTI-003B-06 0 ATWS Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry NONE NONE (AMSAC) Test ATI-047-05 2 NONE ATI-047-07 0 TOP 047-07 RO ATI-047-08 0 NONE ATI-065-01 I TOP 055-08 RO Main Turbine Turning Gear & Lube Oil Pumps Initial Turbine Roll Test 332916 Turbine Trips & Protections Operations Recording & Annunciation System REV I NOT PERFORMED 332916 ATI-226-01 NONE ATI-238-01 NONE AT1-239-01 NONE ATI-244-01 NONE ATI-244-02 NONE a 0 0 0 0 0 480V Intake Pump Station Power 120V AC Preferred Power 250 Volt DC Power Unit I Main Step-up Transformers Unit 2 Main Step-up Transformers NONE PTI-013.O1TOP 013-01 PTI-015-01 TOP 015-02 PTI-026-01 TOP 026-01 TOP 026-01 PTI-027-01 NONE II 0 Fire Detection 332901 332930 332907 0 Steam Generator Blowdown 332904 328444 0 High Pressure Fire Protection 332906 332918 332945 333021 332793 328409 328432 0 Condenser Circulating Water ,.' PAGE 10F5 Pf10C. 5PT&:13t; Z-REV. 0 iI17/!f.) PROCEDURE I TOP MATRIX 9* l;;-PAGE I PROCEDURE TITLE PROCEDURE TITLE PROCEDURE TITLE TOPtI REV TRANStl TOP # REV TRANStl TOPtI REV TRANStl ATI-001-OS 0 Secondary Hydro-Test Sequence ATI-055-01 0 Operations Recording & Annunciation System ATI-2S1-01 0 Health Physics, DG & Maintenance Sound Powered Telephone System NONE NONE NONE ATI-005-01 0 Extraction Steam System ATI-OS5-01 0 Operations Recording & Annunciation System ATI-2BO-01 0 Condenser Tube Cleaning NONE Supplement 1 NONE NONE ATI-006-01 0 Heater Drains & Vents ATI-05B-01 0 PTI-001-01 0 Main Steam Isolation Valves 24KV Main Generator Buss Cooling System NONE NONE NONE ATI-018-01 0 Fuel Oil ATI-077-05 0 PTI-001-02 0 Steam Generator PORVs & Turbine Bypass TOP01S-01 332904332934 332780 Wet Active Waste Handling VLVTS , NONE TOP 001-02 332698 ATI-D20.{J1 0 Lube Oil System ATI-200.{J1 0 6.9KV Common Boards A and 8 PTI-D01-03 0 Main Steam Safety Valve Uft Point NONE NONE NONE A T1-024.{J1 0 Raw Cooling Water System ATI-20 1-0 1 0 Unit Boards 1A, 1B, 1C, & 1D Transformers 1A & PTI-002-D1 0 Condensate System TOP 024-01 332904 18 ATI-024.{J1 NONE NONE 0 Raw Cooling Water System Supplement 1 PTI-002-02 0 Condensate Vacuum ATI-202-01 0 6.9KV Reactor Coolant Pump Boards PROCEDURE NOT WRITTEN NONE NONE 0 Generator Cooling. Hydrogen Seal Oil system ATI-203-01 0 PTI-003A-01 0 Feedwater Isolation & Bypass ValVes 4BOV Unit Boards 1A & 1B Functional NONE NONE ATI-035-02 1 Generator Cooling -Hydrogen Gas & CO2 ATI-204-01 0 PTI-003A-02 1 Feedwater & Steam Generator Level System Switchyard Power System TOP 002-02 332898 TOP 035-06 332889 332911 332918 332930 332780 NONE TOP01S-02 332904 328444 ATI-035-03 0 Generator Coonng

Stator Cooling System ATI-205-01 0 480V Turbinle Bldg. Common Boards PTI-003A-03 0 Main Feedwater System Functional Test NONE NONE TOP 002-02 332898 ATI.Q43.Q3 0 Secondary Plant Sampling ATI-206-01 0 480V Auxiliary Bldg. Common Power PTI-D03B-04 0 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps & Valves Logic Test NONE NONE NONE ATI-047-02 2 EH Fluid System ATI*221-01 0 480V Service Bldg Power PTI-003B-05 0 Aux Feedwater Pumps & Valves Dynamic Test NONE NONE NONE ATI-047-02 1 EH Fluid System ATI-225-01 1 CCW Pump Station Power PTI-003B-06 0 ATWS Mitigation System Actual/on Circuitry NONE NONE (AM SAC) Test ATI-047-D5 2 Main Turbine Turning Gear & Lube Oil Pumps ATI-226-01 0 4BOV Intake Pump Station Power NONE NONE NONE PTI-013-01 0 Fire Detection ATl.Q47-07 0 Initial Turbine Roll Test ATI-238-01 0 120V AC Preferred Power TOP 013-01 332901 332930 332907 TOP 047-07 RO 332916 NONE PTI-015-01 0 Steam Generator Blowdown ATI-047-OB 0 TUrbine Trips & Protections ATI*239-D1 0 250 Volt DC Power TOP 015-02 332904 328444 NONE NONE PTI-OZ6-D1 0 High Pressure Fire Protection ATI-055-01 1 Operations Recording

& Annunciation System ATI-244-D1 0 Unit 1 Main Step-up Transronners TOP 026-01 332906332918332945 333021 332793 REV 1 NOT PERFORMED NONE TOP 026-01 328409 328432 TOP 055-08 RO 332916 ATI*244-02 0 Unit 2 Main Step-up Transformers PTI-027-01 0 Condenser Circulating Water ? NONE NONE 7117j95 PAGE 2 OF 5 PROCEDURE/ TOP MATRIX 0 AYIrA:HiENT _9'. "-PAGE _PROCEDURE TITLE PROCEDURE TITLE PROCEDURE TITLE TOP# REV TRANS# TOP# REV TRANS# TOP# REV TRANS#PTI-030-01 0 HFT Temperature Survey PTI-031A-01 0 Auxiliary Blldg Chiller Water PTI-052-01 0 Loose Parts Monitoring NONE TOP 031A-01 332908 328444 NONE PTI-030A-01 1 Diesel Bldg HVAC Electrical TOP 032-01 332911 332916 332918 332797 333021 332780 PTI-061-01 0 Ice Condenser System NONE TOP 024-01NONE 43nnd -PTI-030B-01 I Auxiliary/Fuel Bldg Exhaust & Supp NONE 332904 PTI-031C-01 0 Shutdown Board Room HVAC System kIflkIC PTI-03OC-01 I Auxiliary Bldg Room/Area Cooler NONE PTI-031E-01 NONE PTI-030D-01 0 Auxiliary Bldg. Gas Treatment Elect -N O NEPTI,.3 1 NONENONE PTI-0300-02 0 Auxiliary Bldg Gas Treatment Filter PTI-03I PROC NOT PERF 0 480V Board Room HVAC Electrical 0 PASS Ventilation Electrical Test PTI-061-02 TOP 061-01 TOP 061-01 TOP 061-02 TOP 030-04 PTI-062-01 NONE 0 Ice Condenser Ice Loading 332916 332917 332946 332980 328432 328444 332917 332793 332907 328420 1F-02 0 CVCS Charging & Letdown IG-01 1 Incore Instr Rm Ventilation & Chill 0-05 332907 PRlC NO II F TOP03 PTI-0300-03 I Aux Bldg Gas Treatment Negative Pressure TOP 030-01 332907 332793 332797 328399 328432 TOP 030-03 333010 332793 328399 328409 328432 TOP 030-07 332907 332934 333010 332780 332797 328399 2OP 031-02 332908 332918 332980 332797 333021 328420 jOP 031 C-02 332908 332780 TOP 031E-01 332911 328420 328432 PTI-031M-01 I Main Control Room Chilled Water PTI-062-02 0 Chemical and Volume Control -Subsystem Logic Test'TOP 077-02 332922 332946 328399 328420 TOP 062-04 332918 333021 328409 328432 328444 F 1 r 0 Board Room Chilled Water Electrical 332908 332918 332946 332797 333021 328399 328409 328420 328432 328444 TO TOF-062-03 0 HFT Charging & Letdown P 062-02 R0 332917 333021 328444 P 062-03 RO 332917 333021 ,,, ,J ,m=. , , .'PT 1I-iii .PTI-030D-03 0 Aux Bldg Gas Treatment Negative Pressure TOP 030-01 332907 332793 332797 328399 328432 TOP 030-07 332907 332934 332780 332797 328399 TOP 031-02 332908 332918 332980 332797 333021 032840 TOP 031 C-02 332908 332780 PTI-031P-01 NONE PTI-031P-03 TOP 031-01 TOP 031-01 0 Main Control Room HVAC Electrical....... 2==== ........ ........ __, ....... =,= -0 Main Control Room HVAC Pressure 332908 332918 332946 332797 333021 328399 328409 328420 328432 328444 TOP06 TOP06 TOP 07 TOP 07 TOP 07 TOP 071-01 2 Saftey Injection Sytem Integrated Test 2-02 332917 333021 328444 3-0 R2 332918 0-01 332921 332934 332946 333021 328409 2-01 R0 332922 4-02 R2 332922 332780 0-01 328432 PTI-03OF-01 NONE 0 Battery Exhaust Fans/Damper Test PTI.032-01 NONE PTI-032-02 TOPO03-01 0 Control Air PTI-0301-01 I Containment Purge Electrical Test 0 Loss of Air Test 332911 332916 332918 332797 333021 332780 PTI-063-02 1 TOP 077-02 TOP 236-01 TOP 236-02 Safety Injection System Acumulator Test 332922 332946 328399 328420 332930 332930 NONE TOP 032-01 328399 PTI-030J-01 I Lower Containment Coolers TOP 032-03 332925 332980 332797 328399 328420 328444 NONE PTI-039-01 1 C02 Fire Protection for WBNP Powerhouse PTI-030J-02 1 Upper Containment Cooler TOP 039-01 332911 332916 332946 NONE TOP 039-03 332911 332948 PTI-03OK-01 0 CRDM Cooling Unit Electrical Test PTI-039-02 1 C02 Fire Poirtection for WBNP Diesel Generator II I ll J IIIII I I iii I PTI-063-03 4 Safety Injection, Charging & RHR Flow Balance TOP 062-02 332917 333021 328444 TOP 063-02 332918 TOP 074-02 332922 332780 TOP 236-01 332930 TOP 23"-02 332930 TOP 070-01 332921 332934 332946 333021 328409 TOP 070-01 328432 NONE PTI-030L-01 NONE rnoT Building 332911 332946 332980 332780 332911 332918332930333021 332946 I Containment Air Return Fan TOP 039-04 PTI-043-01 III I I I I I Il l I I I I PTI-063-05 0 Safety Injection, Charging & RHR.Flow Balance Post-Accident Sampling NONE NONE PTI-043-02 0 Primary Plant Sampling PTI.063.06 0 Safety Injection System Check Valve Tests NONE TOP 063-02 RO 332918 PRee: .. 0 7/17195 PAGE 20F5 PROCEDURE I TOP MATRIX Ali"j;.';:-iMENT PAGE ;;t.. PROCEDURE nTLE PROCEDURE TITLE PROCEDURE TITLE TOP # REV TRANS # TOP # REV TRANS # TOPtl REV TRANS # PTI-43D-01 0 HFT Temperature Survey PTI-031A-01 0 Auxiliary Blldg Chiller Water PTI-052-01 0 Loose Parts Monitoring NONE TOP 031A-01 332908 328444 NONE PTI-03DA-01 1 Diesel Bldg HVAC Electrh:al TOP 032-01 332911 332916332918332797333021 332780 PTI-061-01 0 Ice Condenser System NONE TOP 032-01 328399 NONE PTI-43DB-01 TOP 024-01 332904 PTI-061-42 0 Ice Condenser Ice Loading 1 AuxiliarylFuel Bldg Exhaust & Supp PTI-031C-01 0 Shutdown Board Room HVAC System NONE TOP 061-01 332916332917332946 332980328432 NONE TOP 061-01 328444 PTI-030C-01 1 Auxiliary Bldg RoomiArea Cooler PTI-031E-01 0 480V Board! Room HVAC Electrical TOP061-Q2 332917 332793 NONE TOP 030-(]4 332907 328420 NONE PTI..o30D-01 0 Auxiliary Bldg. Gas Treatment Elect PTI-062-01 0 PTI-031F-02 0 PASS Ventilation Electrical Test evcs Charging & Letdown NONE NONE NONE PTI-030D-02 0 AuxiDary Bldg Gas Treatment Filter PTI-062-02 0 Chemical and Volume Control -Subsystem PTI-031G-01 1 Incore Instr Rm Ventilation & Chill PROC NOT PERF TOP 030-05 332907 Logic Test PTI-03DO..o3 1 Aux Bldg Gas Treatment Negative Pressure TOPDn-02 332922 332946 328399 328420 PTI-031M-01 1 Main Control Room Chilled Water TOP 062-04 332918 333021 328409328432328444 TOP 030-01 332907 332793 332797 328399 328432 TOP 030-03 333010332793328399328409328432 NONE PTI..G62-03 0 HFT Charging & Letdown TOP 030-07 332907332934 333010 332780 332797 328399 PTI-031N-01 0 Board Room Chilled Water Electrical TOP 062-02 RO 332917 333021 328444 fOp 031-02 332908 332918 332980 332797 333021 328420 TOP 031-01 332908 332918 332946 332797 333021 TOP 062-03 RO 332917 333021 332908 332780 TOP 031-01 328399 328409 328420 328432 328444 PTI-063-01 2 Saftey Injection Sytem Integrated Test TOP031E-01 332911328420328432 PTI-031P-Ol 0 Main Control Room HVAC Electrical 332917 333021 328444 TOP 062-02 PTI-03DD-03 0 Aux Bldg Gas Treatment Negative Pressure NONE TOP 063-02 R2 332918 TOP 030-01 332907 332793 332797 328399 328432 PTI-031P-03 0 Main Control Room HVAC pressure TOP 070-01 332921 332934 332946 333021 328409 TOP 030-07 332907332934 332780 332797 328399 TOP 031-01 332908332918332946 332797 333021 TOPOn-01 RO 332922 TOP 031-02 332908 332918 332980 332797 333021 032840 TOP 031-01 328399 32B4109 328420 328432 328444 TOP 074-02 R2 332922 332780 TOP031C-02 332908332780 PTl-032-01 0 Control Air TOP 070-01 328432 PTI-030F-01 0 Battery Exhaust FanslDamper Test NONE PTI-063-OZ 1 Safety Injection System Acumulator Test NONE PTI-032-02 0 Loss of ATrTest TOP 077-02 332922 332946 328399 328420 PTI..o30l..o1 1 Containment Purge Electrical Test TOP 032-01 332911 332916332918332797333021 332780 TOP 236-01 332930 NONE TOP 032-01 328399 TOP 236-02 332930 PTt-030J-01 1 Lower Containment Coolers TOP 032-03 332925 332950 332797 328399 328420 328444 PTI-063-03 4 Safety Injection, Charging & RHR Flow Balance NONE PTI-039-01 1 C02 Fire Protection for WBNP Powemouse TOP 062-02 332917 333021 328444 PTt-030J-02 1 Upper Contairunent Cooler TOP 039-01 332911 332916 332946 TOP 063-02 332918 332922 332780 TOP 039-03 332911 332946 TOP 074-02 NONE TOP 236-01 332930 PTt-03DK-01 0 CRDM Cooling Unit Electrical Test PTl-039-02 1 C02 Fire poatection for WBNP Diesel Generator TOP 236-02 332930 NONE Building TOP 070-01 332921 332934 332946 333021 328409 TOP 039-02 332911 332946 332880 332780 TOP 070-01 328432 PTl-030 L-O1 1 Containment Air Return Fan 332911 332918332930333021 332946 TOP 039-04 PTI-063-05 Safety Injection, Charging & RHR NONE 0 PTI..G43..G1 1 Post-Accident Sampling Flow Balance NONE NONE PTI-043-02 0 Primary Plant Sampling PTI-063-06 0 Safety Injection System Check Valve Tests NONE TOP 063-02 RO 332918 ý11 7/17/95 PAGE 3 OF 5 PROCEDURE I TOP MATRIX PROC. £P22.--')RaV. 0 !? PAGE 2=DURE TITLE PROCEDURE TITLE PROCEDURE TITLE PROCE TOP # REV TRANS# TOP # REV TRANS# TOP # REV TRANS#PTI-064-0 I Local Leak Rate Testing PTI-068-12 0 Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage PTI-082-01 0 Diesel Generator 1A NONE NONE TOP 082-01 332925 332934 332980 PT1-064-2 0 Integrated Leak Rate Test PTI-068-13 0 Shutdown From Outside Control Room PTI-082-02 0 Diesel Generator 1B NONE TOP 068.01 332920 TOP-082-02 332925 PTI-065-01 1 Emergency Gas Treatment TOP 062-02 332917 333021 328444 PTI-082-03 0 Diesel Generator 2A NONE TOP 003-01 332898 332780 332797 328399 TOP 082-03 332930 332934..... ..TOP 068-03 332920 PTI-065-02 1 EGTS Annulus Negative Pressure Test TOP... ... ...... .. PTI-082-04 0 Diesel Generator 2B PROC NOT PERF PTI-06845 0 Pressurizer Pressure and Level TOP 082.04 332930 332934 PTI.067-01 0 ERCW System Test TOP 068-02 332920 332780 TOP 062-02 332917 333021 328444 PTI-083-01 0 Hydrogen Recombiner NONE 7NONE PNN-067-02 0 ERCW Flow Balance PTI-070-01 .1 Component Cooling Water PumpNVLV Logic Test -01 0 -PT.6.2 0EC lwBlneNONE PTIl-094-Ul 0 Flood Mode Boration 9328420328444 NONE TOP 067-01 332920 328399 328409 PTI-070-02 2 Component Cooling System Flow Balance NONE TOP 067-03 332920 TOP 070-01 332921 332934 332848333021 328409 PTI-085-01 0 Rod Control Sys Functional Test P1-067-3 0 ERCW VLV Logic Test TOP 070-01 328432 TOP 085-01 332930 TOP 067-01 332920328399328409328420328444 PTI-072-01 0 Containment Spray PumpNVLV PTI-085-02 0 Rod Control -Non HFT PTI-06841 I HFT Heatup & Cooldown Logic Test TOP 085-02 332930 TOP 068-05 332921 TOP 072-01 332922 PTI-090-01 I Radiation Monitors (A) Area. (B) Process Liquid,"bP 068-06 332921 PTI-072-02 0 Containment Spray System Air Test (D) Gas TOP 074-02 332922 332780 NONE NONE TOP 068-02 332920 332780 .PTI-090-02 0 Radiation Monitors (E) Particulate, Iodine, and TOP 062-02 332917 333021 328444 GaPs,7410 R (F) Continuous Air Monitor TOP 068-03 332920 NONE NRC REVIEW PTI-068-02 0 Reactor Coolant System Flow Measurement PTI-074-02 I RHR HOT PTI-090-09 0 Process Radiation Monitoring System -HFT TOP 068-03 332920 TOP 068-06 332921 NONE PT ... ..... .P e s i eTOP 062-02 332917 333021 328444 PTI.068-03 0 Pressurizer Heater and Spray Control TOP 074-02 332922 332780 P11-092-01 0 Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation TOP 062-03 332917 333021 -TOP 068-02 332920 332780 NONE PT1.068-04 0 Pressurizer Relief Tank PTI-TT7-01 0 Liquid Waste Processing System PTI-092-02 0 Source I Intermediate Range Nuclear Instr.TOP 068-02 332920 332780 TOP 077-13 332925 332946 333021 328399 332780 NONE TOP 077-02 332922 332946 328399 328420 TOP 077-13 328409 328420 328432 328444 PTI-099-01 0 Reactor Protection Sensor Response Time TOP 081-01 332925 TOP 077-01 332922 PTI-077-02 0 Gaseous Waste Disposal System NONE PT-468-07 0Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Logic Test TOP 062-02 332917 333021 328444 PTI-099-03 0 Reactor Protection System Operational Test NONE PTI-077-03 0 Liquid Waste Collection NONE PTI-068-09 I Reactor Vessel Head Vent System TOP 077-11 332922 332946 332980 333021 332780 PTI-099-04 0 Safeguards System Operational Test NONE PlI-079-01 0 Fuel Transfer System NONE-NONE ________________________ PTI-099-05 0 Turbine Runback PTI.068-10 I Inadequate Core Cooling Monitoring -RVLIS NONE 0 PTI-pu9ato C NONE TOP 058-02 332920 332780 P h-03 0 Manipulator Crane NONE PTI-068-11 0 RTD Cross Calibration NONE PTI-099-06 0 Reactor Protection Setpoint Verification NONE PTI-081-041 2 Primary Water NONE NONE PRce. 0 7117/95 PAGE 30F5 PROCEDURE I TOP MATRIX A-r-:"Ar>' '-'-"--..£ I I * . I PAGE PROCEDURE TITLE PROCEDURE TITLE PROCEDURE TITLE TOP# REV TRANS # TOP # REV TRANS # TOP # REV TRANS # PTI-064-01 1 Local Leak Rate Testing PTI-068-12 0 Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage PTI-082-01 0 Diesel Generator 1A NONE NONE TOP 082-01 332925 332934 332980 . PTI-064-01 0 Integrated Leak Rate Test PTI-068-13 0 Shutdown From Outside Control Room PTI-082-02 0 Diesel Generator 1B NONE TOP 068*01 332920 TOP-082-02 332925 PTI-OS5-01 1 Emergency Gas Treatment TOP062.()2 332917333021 328444 PTI-082-03 0 Diesel Generator 2A NONE TOP (J()3.()1 332898 332780 332797 328399 TOP 082-03 332930 332934 TOP 068-03 332920 PTI-082-04 0 Diesel Generator 2B PTI-065-02 1 EGTS Annulus Negative Pressure Test PTI-068-15 0 Pressurizer

Pressure and Level PROe NOT PERF TOP 082-04 332930 332934 PTI-OS7 -01 TOP 068-02 332920 332780 PTI-083-01 0 Hydrogen Recombiner 0 ERCW System Test TOP Q62-02 332917333021 328444 NONE PTI-070-Dl

.1 _ NONE Component Cooling Water PurnplVLV LogIC Test PTI-067-02 0 ERCW Row Balance NONE PTI-084-01 0 Flood Mode 8aration TOP 067-01 332920 328399 328409 328420 328444 PTI-070-02 2 NONE TOP 067'()3 332920 Component 'Cooling System Flow Balance PTI-085-01 0 Rod Control Sys Functional Test TOP 070-01 332921 332934 332946 333021 328409 PTI-067-03 0 ERCW VLV Logic Test TOP 070-01 328432 332930 TOP067'()1 332920 328399 328409 328420 328444 PTI-072-01 0 Containment Spray PumplVLV PTI-085-02 0 Rod Control -Non HFT Ipl-OS8-111 1 HFT Heatup & Cooldown Logic Test 332930 w TOP 072-01 332922 Radiation Monitors (AI Area. (B) Process Uquid, 'WP068-05 332921 PTI-OSO-01 1 332921 PTI-072-11Z 0 ContaInment Spray System Air Test (O) Gas TOP 074-02 332922 332780 NONE NONE TOP 068-02 332920 332780 PTI-074-01 0 Residual Heat Removal System PTI-090-62 0 Radiation Monitors (E) Particulate, Iodine, ami TOP 062-02 332917333021 328444 Gas, (F) Continuous AIr MonItor TOP 068-03 332920 NONE NRC REVIEW PTI-068-02 0 Reactor Coolant System Flow Measurement PTI-074-02 1 RHRHOT PTI-090-09 0 Process Radiation Monitoring System -HFT TOP068-OJ 332920 TOP 068-06 332921 NONE PTI-068-03 TOP 062-02 0 Pressurizer Heater and Spray Control TOP 074-02 332917 333021 328444 PTI-092..(11 332922 332780 0 Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation TOP 062..(13 332917333021 TOP 068-02 332920 332780 NONE PTI-OS8-04 0 Pressurizer Relief Tank PTI-077-111 0 Liquid Waste Processing System PTI-092-02 0 Source f Intermediate Range Nuclear Instr. TOP 068-02 332920 332780 TOPOn-13 332925 332946 333021 328399 332780 NONE TOP rJl7-02 332922 332946 328399 328420 TOPOn-13 328409 328420 328432 328444 PTI-099-01 0 Reactor Protection Sensor Response Time TOP 081-01 332925 PTI-077 -02 0 Gaseous Waste Disposal System NONE TOPOn-OB 332922 TOP062'()2 332917333021 328444 PTI-09S-03 0 Reactor Protection System Operational Test PTI-OSS-07 0 Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Logic Test NONE NONE PTI-077-03 0 Liquid Waste Collection TOPOn-11 332922 332946 332980 333021 332780 PTI-IISS..{I4 0 Safeguards System Operational Test PTJ-OS8-09 1 Reactor Vessel Head Vent system NONE PTI-079-01 0 Fuel Transfer System NONE NONE PTI-099-05 0 Turbine Runback pn-068-10 1 Inadequate Core Cooling Monitoring -RVUS NONE PTI-079-113 0 Manipulator Crane TOP 068-02 332920 332780 NONE PTI-099-OS 0 Reactor Protection Setpolnt Verification PTI-OS8-i1 0 RTD Cross Calibration NONE PTI-II81-01 2 Primary Water NONE /0/ NONE 7/17195 PAGE 4 OF 5 PROCEDURE I TOP MATRIX PROC. SZPT031' -RE0V, .ATTACEENT -2 PAGE- ,_ _PROCEDURE TITLE PROCEDURE TITLE PROCEDURE TITLE TOP # REV TRANS# TOP# REV TRANS# TOP # REV TRANS#PTI-099-08 0 SSPS Block and Go Test P71-261-04 0 Temperature Monitoring System Hardware PTI-999-02 0 Thermal Expansion NONE NONE NONE PTI-200-01 1 NONE PTI-200-02 0 NONE PTI-211-01 1 NONE PTI-212-01 0 NONE PTI-212-02 I NONE PTI-212-03 I NONE PTI-212-04 1ýONE ,.Irg-213-01 0 ftNE PTI-2141 0 NONE PT1-215-01 1 NONE PTI-215-02 1 NONE PTI-228-01 0 NONE PTI-232-01 0 NONE PTI-23541 0 NONE PTI-236.-01 0 NONE PTI-261-01 1 NONE PTI-261-02 1 NONE PTI-261403 0 NONE Preferred Offsite Power System AC Aux Power Sys Survey 6.8KV Shutdown Boards 480V Shutdown Power Unit 1 "A" Train 480V Shutdown Power Unit I "B" Train 480V Shutdown Power Unit 2 "A" Train 480V Shutdown Power Unit 2 "B" Train 480V Reactor MOV Boards 480V Control & Aux Building Vent Boards Diesel Generator Batteries & Chargers Standby Power Motor Control Centers Emergency Lighting 480V Reactor Vent Boards Vital 120V AC Power System Vital 125V DC Power System Process Computer Hardware Process Computer Data Input Process Computer Software PTI-261-05 0 PPC Application Software NONE PTI-262-01 0 Integrated Safeguards Actuation TOP 030-01 332907 332793 332797 328399 328432 TOP 030-03 332907 332793 328399 328409 328432 TOP 030-04 332907 328420 TOP 030-05 332907 TOP 031-01 332908 332918 332948 332797 333021 TOP 031-02 332908 332918 332980 332797 333021 328420 TOP 003-01 332898 3332780 332797 328399 TOP 015-02 332904 328444 TOP 025-01 332906 332946 TOP 031C-01 332908 332780 328444 TOP 032-02 332917 332980 328420 TOP 062-02 332917 333021 328444 TOP 063-02 332918 TOP 065-01 332918 332793 332797 328399 328409 328444 TOP 067-01 332920 328399 328409 328420 328444 TOP 070-01 332921 332934 332946 328409 333021 TOP 072-01 332922 TOP 074-02 332922 332780 TOP 081-01 332925 TOP 215-01 332930 TOP 032-03 332925 332980 332797 328399 328420 328444 TOP 082-01 332925 332934 332980 TOP 082-02 332925 TOP 082-03 332930 332934 TOP 082-04 332930 332934 TOP 236-01 332930 TOP 236-02 332930 TOP 236-03 332930 TOP 23"-04 332930 TOP 030-07 332907 332934 3327B0 332797 328399 TOP 030-08 332907 TOP 031-01 328399 328409 328420 32432 328444 TOP 070-01 328432 PTI-268-01 0 Permanent Hydrogen Mitigation System NONE PTI-999-01 0 Operation Vibration Testing NONE SPT-013-01 0 Fire Detection NONE SPT-014-01 0 Condensate Polisher Demin System FCV NONE SPT-014-02 0 Condensate Polisher Demineralizer Air Operated Valve Test NONESPT-014-03 0 Conden Polishing Denim Resin Transfer/Regeneration NONE SPT-014-04 0 High Crud Filter NONE SPT-039-01 I C02 Enclosure Door Fan Testing NONE SPT-047-01 0 EHC SYSTEM FLUSH NONE SPT-055-01 I Annunciator Return to Service Performance Test REV 1 NOT PERFORMED NONE SPT-0SS-02 I Main Control Room Annun System Software Functional Test NONE SPT-055-02 0 Main Control Room Annun System Software Functional Test NONE SPT-064-01 I Local Leak Rate Testing NONE SPT-0"4-02 I Containment Isolation Valve (LLRT)NONE SPT-068-02 1 1 Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Uncoupled Run la NONE SPT-068-02 1 1 Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Uncoupled Run IS NONESPT-068-02 1 1 Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Uncoupled Run IC NONE SPT-068,02 I I Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Uncoupled Run ID NONE I y PAGE 40F5 7117195 PROCEDURE I TOP MATRIX PROC. SPT0.37 '02..RE\f. 0 9* I : PAGE 'j::. PROCEDURE TITLE PROCEDURE TITLE PROCEDURE TITLE TOP # REV TRANS # TOP # REV TRANS # TOP # REV TRANS # PTI-499-OB 0 SSPS Block and Go Test PTI-261-04 0 Temperature Monitoring System Hardware PTI-999-02 0 Thermal Expansion NONE NONE NONE PTI'200-01 1 Preferred Offsite Power System PTI-261-05 0 PPC Application Software SPT-013-01 0 Fire Detection ,NONE NONE NONE PTI*200-02 0 AC Aux Power Sys Survey PTI-262-01 0 Integrated Safeguards Actuation 0 Conderisate Polisher Demln System FCV NONE TOP03Cl-01 332907 332793 332797 328399 328432 NONE PTI-211-01 1 6.9KV Shutdown Boards . TOP 03Cl-03 332907 332793 328399 328409 328432 SPT-014-02 0 Condensate Polisher Demineralizer Air Operated NONE TOP03Cl-04 332907 328420 Valve Test PTI*212-01 0 TOP03Cl-OS 332907 NONE 480V Shutdown Power Unit 1 "A" Train TOP 031-01 332908 332918 332946 332797 333021 SPT-O 14-0 3 0 Conden Polishing Denim Resin NONE TOP 031-02 332908 3329*18 332980 332797 333021 328420 TransferlRegeneration PTI-212-02 1 4BOV Shutdown Power Unit 1 "8" Train TOP 003-01 332898 3332780 332797 328399 NONE NONE TOP 015-02 332904 3284<14 SPT-014-04 0 High Crud Filter I PTI-212-03 1 4BOV Shutdown Power UnH 2 "An Train TOP 025-01 332906 332946 NONE NONE TOP 031C-01 332908 332780 328444 TOP 032-02 332917 332980328420 SPT-039-01 1 C02 Enclosure Door F'ln Testing PTI-212-04 1 480V Shutdown Power Unit.2 "B" Train TOP 062-02 332917333021328444 NONE TOP 063-02 332918 SPT-047-01 0 EHC SYSTEM FLUSH 0 4BOV Reactor MOV Boards TOP 065-01 332918 332793 332797 328399 328409 328444 NONE TO? 067-01 332920328399 328409 328420 328444 SPT-055-01 1 Annunciator Return to Service Performance Test PTI-214-01 0 4BOV Control & Aux Building Vent Boards TOP 070-01 332921 332934 332946 328409 333021 REV 1 NOT PERFORMED NONE TOP 072-01 332922 NONE TOP 074-02 332922 332750

PTI-215-01 1 Diesel Generator Batteries

& Chargers TOP 081-01 332925 SPT-055-02 1 Main Control Room Annun System Software Functional Test NONE TOP 215-01 332930 NONE 332925 332980 332797 328399 328420328444 PTI-215-02 1 Standby Power Motor Control Centers TOP 032-03 Main Control Room Annun System Software TOP 082-01 332925 332934 332980 SPT-055-02 0 NONE Functional Test PTI-228-01 0 Emergency Ughtlng TOPOB2-02 332925 NONE TOP 082*03 332930 332934 NONE TOP 082-04 332930 332934 1 Local Leak Rate Testing PTI-232-01 0 480V Reactor Vent Boards TOP 236-01 332930 NONE NONE TOP 236-02 332930 SPT-OS4-02 1 Containment Isolation Valve (LLRT) PTI-235-01 0 Vllal120V AC Power System TOP236-Q3 332930 NONE NONE TOP 236-04 332930 SPT -06B-02 1 1 Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Uncoupled RUn 1a TOP 030-07 332907332934 332780 332797328399 PTI-236:-01 0 Vital 125V DC Power System TOP03Cl-08 332907 NONE NONE TOP 031-01 328399 32840S 328420 328432 328444 SPT -058-02 1 Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Uncoupled Run 18 PTI*261-01 1 Process Computer Hardware TOP 070-01 328432 NONE NONE PT1*25B-01 0 Permanent H)'drogen Mitigation System SPT -068-02 1 1 Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Uncoupled Run 1C PTI-261-02 1 Process Computer Data Input NONE NONE NONE PTI-999-01 0 Operation Vibration Testing SPT-05B-021 1 Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Uncoupled Run 10 Pn-261-03 0 Process Computer Software NONE NONE NONE /O..;L 7117195 PAGE 5 OF 5 PROCEDURE I TOP MATRIX TITLE TRANS #PROCEDURE TOP #TITLE TRANS #PROCEDURE TOP# REV PROCEDURE TOP #TITLE 'TRANS#REV REV SPT-077-02 0 Gross Leakage Rate of the Waste Gas System SPT-252-01 0 Non-4E Low Voltage CAP Battery Discharge Test PROC IN DRAFT NONE SPT-077-03 0 Liquid Process Tank Recirculation Test SPT-252-02 0 Code-Call, Paging, Evacuation Alarm NONE NONE SPT-078-01 0 Refueling Water Purification Test SPT-253-01 0 VHF Radio TOP 078-01 332780 332793 332797 328399 328409 PROC NOT PERF TOP 078-01 325432 SPT-256-01 1 Emergency Shutdown Sound Powered Phone SPT-082-01 3 Emergency Diesel Generation IA-A NONE TOP 082-01 332925 332934 332980 SPT-257-01 0 Security Diesels SPT-082-02 0 DG-1B Initial DIG C/O & Tests TOP 257-01 332930 TOP 082-02 332925 SPT-261-01 1 Functional Testing of Plant Process Computer SPT-082-03 0 Initial DIG-2A Initial DIG C/O & Tests Hardware TOP 082-03 332930 332934 NONE SPT-082-04 0 DG-2B Initial DIG C/O & Tests SPT-262-01 0 Plant Normalization TOP 082-04 332930 332934 NONE 6PT-082-05 1 HFT Automatic Diesel Generator 1A Loading SPT-264-01 0 Emergency Response Data Acquisition PR0C. SpT-l0 7;RE1. 0__A1TACH,,ENT ,-PAGE .S MOP 082-01 SPT-092-01 NONE SPT-099-02 NONE Test 332925 332934 332980 0 Source Range NIS PROC NOT PERF SPT-264-02 0 TSC Power System Functional Test TOP 264-01 328432 328444 SPT-264-03 0 ERFDS Software Functional Test PROC NOT PERF 0 Slave Relay to End Device Test SPT-099-07 0 SSPS Operational Check NONE SPT-099-09 0 Response Time Test of Turbine Trip &Pressurizer Level Generated Reactor Trips NONE SPT-099-10 0 Response Time Test of Nuclear Instrumentation System Generated Reactor Trips NONE SPT-240-01 0 Non IE Low Voltage Discharge NONE SPT-250-01 0 Non IE Telephone Battery Discharge Test NONE SPT-251-01 0 Maintenance & Operations Sound Powered Phone NONE SPT-251-02 0 Sound Powered Phone Functional Test NONE PAGE 50F5 PROCEDURE TITLE TOP # REV TRANS # SPT-077-02 0 Gross Leakage Rate ofthe Waste Gas System PROC IN DRAFT SPT-077-03 0 Uquid Process Tank Recirculation Test NONE SPT-078-01 0 Refueling Water Purification Test TOP 078-01 332780 332793 33Z797328399 328409 TOP 078-01 328432 SPT.o8l.o1 3 Emergency Diesel Generation 1A-A TOP 082-01 332925 332934 332980 SPT.oS2-02 0 DG-1B Initial DIG CIO & Tests TOPOB2-02 332925 SPT-IIS2-113 0 Initial D/G-2A Initial DIG CIO & Tests TOPOB2-03 332930 332934 SPT-IIS2-114 0 DG-2B Initial DIG CIO & Tests TOP 082-04 332930 332934 1 HFT Automatic Diesel Generator 1A loading Test tiPP 082-01 332925 332934 332980 SPT-IIS2-01 0 Source Range NIS NONE SPT-oS9-02 0 Slave Relay to End Device Test NONE SPT-IIS9-01 0 SSPS Operational Check NONE SPT-IIS9-09 0 Response TIme Test of Turbine Trip & Pressurizer Level Generated Reactor Trips NONE SPT-09S-10 0 Response Time Test of Nuclear Instrumentation System Generated Reactor Trips NONE SPT-l40-ll1 0 Non 1E Low Voltage Discharge NONE SPT-250-01 0 Non 1E Telephone Battery Discharge Test NONE SPT-251-01 0 Maintenance & Operations Sound Powered Phone NONE SPT-251-02 0 Sound Powered Phone Functional Test NONE PROCEDURE I TOP MATRIX PROCEDURE TOP # REV TITLE TRANS # SPT -252-111 0 Non-lE low Voltage CAP Battery Discharge Test NONE SPT -252-112 0 Code-Call. Paging. Evacuation Alann NONE SPT -253-01 0 VHF Radio PRoe NOT PERF SPT-25S-II1 1 Emergency Shutdown Sound Powered Phone NONE SPT-257-111 0 Security Diesels TOP 257-01 332930 SPT-261-111 1 Functional Testing of Plant Process Computer Hardware NONE SPT-262-111 0 Plant Normalization NONE SPT-264-01 0 Emergency Response Data Acquisition PROC NOT PERF SPT-264-112 TOP 264-01 o TSC Power System Functional Test 328432 328444 0 ERFDS Software Functional Test PROC NOT PERF PROCEDURE TOP # REV TlTI.E

TRANS # PRce. S?TD?7-1>

'2/REV

ATIACHMENT 9* ,,,, PAGE .s 7117/95 ATTACHMENT 4 Special Performance Test"CO 2 Enclosure Door Fan Testing" SPT-039-01 Revision 1 (Selected Sections)

\ ATTACHMENT 4 Special Performance Test "C0 2 Enclosure Door Fan Testing" SPT-039-01 Revision 1 (Selected Sections) WATTS BAR NUCLEAR SPECIAL PERFORMANCE TEST PROCEDURE SPT-039-01 REVISION 1 CO 2 ENCLOSURE DOOR FAN TESTING SPT-039-01 /R1 Pr ared by Date/a-Z-te Date Date INFORMATION ONGc,, ir,, A4-1""ST O0PYI" WATTS BAR NUCLEAR SPECIAL PERFORMANCE TEST PROCEDURE SPT-039-01 REVISION 1 CO 2 ENCLOSURE DOOR FAN TESTING SPT-039-01 /Rl by Date ONhltflC1AL TEST COpy A4-1 /z-2-9f. Date _,/2--1--'1 i Date SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page 11 of 66-- 'INITIALS/DATE CO 2 Protected Enclosure, U-i Auxiliary Instrument Room DETERMINE the dimensions of the enclosure by measurement of the following: 6.1 Height iq Ft.Length 9, Ft.Width 4 Ft.______ in.____ _ in.-2 .in.K_/ 12-1ve 6.1.2 6.1.3 CALCULATE the room volume in Cubic Ft. as follows: H N'S 4"X L z +/-x W _=7iL Cu.Ft.RECORD vendor calculations of the maximum developed head (in. W.C.) of the C0 2/air mixture column. (Using the measured room height, CO 2 System Design information, and previous concentration test results)..078 in. W.C.INSTALL the Door Fan Apparatus in the door which provides the most favorable relief area (i.e., Leaks which leave the room during pressurization can be readily returned to the Fan Apparatus through a return air path).SEAL the Fan Apparatus completely in the door opening.67W //Z-,O.)6.1.4 6.1.5//,'J/,d O Afl,.&. 9s/.1 f'y"'.9 Z,- ' , -;6.1.6 MANIPULATE the Zc'loing Io c'-imu"1P .... , 7o,,I;J 4b condition immediately following CO 2 discharge into the protected area.:and R.ECO.D i --A. i Ven , v-,ef_ 4 ninthe Chroncloaic-_! A. Yzcnt fas 0C- --2L/V 1 24--4.rtr.~4'!a Aparatus.Ve .B )Crs .C7in "'- TE h-4-------/---SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page 11 of 66 INITIALS/DATE 6.1 COl Protected Enclosure, U-1 Auxiliary Instrument Room 6.1.1 DETERMINE the dimensions of the enclosure measurement of the following: Height J Ft. sYz-Length __ Ft. 'Z '/z,. by Width 12... Ft. 0 in. in. in. /2-10-9; 6.1. 2 CALCULATE the room volume in Cubic Ft. as follows: H -lq l s1,." x L x W 41..' == 1b1(,U .... eu. Ft. f2JL/ /2-,47-9: G.1. 3 G .1.4 G.1. 5 RECORD vendor calculations of the maximum developed head (in. W.C.> of* the COl/air mixture column. (Using the measured room height, CO 2 System Design information, and previous concentration test results) .

078 in. W.C. ----'---'-.;....;:;--

INSTALL the Door Fan Apparatus in the door which provides the most favorable relief area (i.e., Leaks which leave the room during pressurization can be readily returned to the Fan Apparatu,s through a return air path) . SEAL the Fan Apparatus

completely in the door opening. 01 /

/iJIJ Oh 9'. / .tpo,:lis;, ,to !.at;. ,/ . 6 1 6 MANlp T'TT "'TE h ..,D " * .. ., ",\..: * /lip 1l1"" * " u.un t e ... Qwl:ns ",0 cne ,os;h;..,J .to J', .. condition immediately following COl discharge into the protected area. ana RECORD specific act-ions ver:i fj catj ons in the Log * *. ,,. L!!L !tZ*tJ*,'/ 3, Dac::s CLOS::3 or doc:." opening SEALt:."'&-with aOOI --=cm Apparatus. e, _ .* It?'?ER DISC::;'.HG:: position _per aes!.gr:. I i I i ( '-- SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page 12 of 66 INITIALS/DATE 6.1.7 RECORD the measured Pressure Differential across fan.the door in. W.C..006 1~~L 2-MD-91 6.1.8 6.1.9 IF the pressure measurement in Step 6.1.7 is 25k or more of the previously calculated column pressure using absolute values, DETERMINE the cause of the excessive static pressure and REDUCE to less than 25*.OPEN Doors, Ventilation openings, etc. in the adjacent areas on each side, above and below the enclosure being tested to the maximum extent possible to provide a return air path for all leakage leaving the enclosure. Any adjacent areas in which a return air path cannot be established are to be evaluated by the Contractor. I2~AL?9 I2~Sf 6.1.10 UNSEAL Fan Apparatus and OPERATE fan in the De-pressurization mode. (CONTROL fan speed such that.the absolute value of the pressure' developed matches the calculated column pressure.adjust-dfd- t' h-epfeviblusly measured static pressure, per the NFPA-procedure). NOTE: IF it is not possible to achieve sufficient pressure due to excessive leakage, either find the source of the leakage and seal, or, in the case of ventilation openings in the wall or ceiling slab, measure the opening (in 2) and temporarily seal. When sufficient pressure is achieved continue to next step.j*~.U r i.~ AL U '1" -asL h 4'I ~Aj 1~ J%1I, 6.1. 7 6.1. 8 6.1. 9 6.1.10 NOTE: SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page 12 of 66 INITIALS/DATE RECORD the measured Pressure Differential across the door fan. in. w.e. *006 IF the pressure measurement in Step 6.1.7 is 25% or more of the previously calculated column pressure using absolute values, DETERMINE the cause of the excessive static pressure and REDUCE to less than 25%. OPEN Doors, Ventilation openings, etc. in the adjacent areas on each side, above and below the enclosure being tested to the maximum extent possible to provide a return air path for all leakage leaving the enclosure. Any adjacent areas in which a return air path cannot be established are to be evaluated by the Contractor. UNSEAL Fan Apparatus and OPERATE fan in the mode. (CONTROL fan speed such that.the absolute value of the pressure the calculated column '.; p.r/?,ssure*;-::.a:djusted

fo*r.::cne

.:*previously '. measured static pressure, per the NFPA . procedure) . IF it is not possible to achieve sufficient pressure due to excessive leakage, either find the source of the leakage and seal, or, in the case of ventilation openings in the wall or ceiling slab, measure the opening (in 2) and temporarily seal. When sufficient pressure is achieved continue to next step . . ' .. . -' SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page 13 of 66 INITIALS/DATE 6.1.11 RECORD under DE-PRESSURIZATION mode the following; A. Diff. Press. Across Fan Opening (in. W.C.)B. Flow through Fan(s) CFM 138/. 8?.C. Inside temperature 0 F.D. Outside Temperature 70.0 OF.6.1.12 REVERSE Fan position and PRESSURIZE enclosure. (CONTROL fan speed such that the absolute value of the pressure developed matches the calculated column pressure, adjusted for the previously measured static pressure, per NFPA Procedure). 6.1.13 RECORD the following Data while pressurizing the Enclosure. A. Diff. Press. "Across Fan Opening. (in.. W.C.).Q90 *B. Flow through Fan(s). CFM 140 C. Inside temperature O8.S 0 F.D. Outside temperature 6 .28 OF.NOTE: Steps 6.1.5 through 6.1.13 may be reperformed as necessary until acceptable results are obtained.NOTE: IF the Retention time predicted for the minimum protected Height is less than the desired hold time, use the fan apparatus and a smoke pencil to find the leakage, and seal as necessary. Orr""') "80TC' P.' 6.1.11 A. RECORD under DE-PRESSURIZATION mode the following; SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page 13 of 66 INITIALS/DATE Diff. Press. Across Fan opening (in. W.C.) ,020 B. Flow through Fan (s) CFM /3 al. 8 z.. c. D. 6.1.12 6.1.13 A. Inside temperature __ __ Outside Temperature 70.0 OF. REVERSE Fan position and PRESSURIZE enclosure. (CONTROL fan speed such that the absolute value of the pressure developed matches the calculated column pressure, adjusted for the previously measured static pressure, per NFPA Procedure). RECORD the following Data while pressurizing the

Enclosure:

Diff. Press.*'Across Fan opening. (in .. W.C.) ,090 .. B. ?low through Fan(s). CFM 1440 c. Inside temperature 60.8 OF. D. NOTE: NOTE: Outside temperature 67.8 Steps 6.1.5 through 6.1.13 may be reperformed as necessary until acceptable results are obtained. IF the Retention time predicted for the minimum protected Height is less than the desired hold time, use the fan apparatus and a smoke pencil to find the leakage, and seal as necessary. I' ** TEST COpy OIl / /2 -/0' 'J? SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page 14 of 66 INITIALS/DATE 6.1.14 RECORD vendor calculation results of the equivalent leakage area (Sq.'in.) using recorded data, and the retention time through use of the fan apparatus testing software,. using the previously determined hold time and the minimum protected height.Walt- RoSq in 77.2 S-4 ,A.8C.LA A3G. -' Sq. in. I C.17..jRetention Time (P 20 minutes)6.1.15 REMOVE Door Fan Apparatus from doorway.6.1.16 RETURN doors, fans, and dampers to NORM.ý5 w q 6.1.17 NOTIFY SOS that Door Fan Test in U-1 Auxiliary Instrument Room is COMPLETE.Tar)Orni ;ALTi -0ey[&V / 12-,VýSPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page 14 of 66 6.1.14 RECORD vendor calculation results of the equivalent leakage area (Sq.' in.) using recorded data, and the retention time through use of the fan apparatus testing software,. using the previously determined hold time and the minimum protected height.

i?aOM

?-77.Z Sf. ,;... :BCoLA \38.(,', . .37.1' Retention Time 20 minutes) -"' .........

.....:-_-. INITIALS/DATE

c. Ott Ilz . ..b'2j 6 .1.15 6.1.16 6.1.17 REMOVE Door Fan Apparatus from doorway. . .J.ef-1IZ-/P-9'1 . ('I RETURN doors, fans, and dampers to 1

0t11 /2OP'?! NOTIFY SOS that Door Fan Test in U-1 Auxiliary Instrument Room is COMPLETE. 0' ** &1 112.t>?f .. .' SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page 15 of 66 INITIALS/DATE CO 2 Protected Enclosure, U-2 Auxiliary Instrument Room DETERMINE the dimensions of the enclosure by measurement of the following: 6.2 6.2.1 Height 1_ Ft.Length 5?.. Ft.Width 4?t Ft.&____ _ in.(. in.in."ý_/ 140/tp 6.2.2 CALCULATE the room volume in Cubic Ft. as follows:____(AL X __ L ,"x w At =1Y2io. Cu.Ft.As:-6.2.3 RECORD vendor calculations of the maximum developed head (in. W.C.) of the C0 2/air mixture column. (Using the measured room height, CO 2 System Design information, and previous concentration test results).(D. () 7 -in. W. C.'11:ý / 1/h17 f 6.2.4 6.2.5 6.2.6 f.2 .%A1otA--.INSTALL the Door Fan Apparatus in the door which provides the most favorable relief area (i.e., Leaks which leave the room during pressurization can be readily returned to the Fan Apparatus through a return air path).SEAL the Fan Apparatus completely in the door M1,194 Irý61 opening.MANIPUTLATE.-the

P t-A q IQuate condition immediately following CO discharge into the protected area, ..nd ......D .pe.f.i.ifte. in i~n t~ he B Peers CLOGSD erder penin S....LSB wirth d-.ý.Lil Alppct.Latub.

~AFE pe'- f-- --..a -._GuWIaA g cop 6.2 6.2.1 6.2.2 6.2.3 6.2.4 .... '. 6.2.5 6.2.6 -h s"I',o\IAI

... ti.. SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page lS of 66 INITIALS/DATE COl Protected Enclosure, U-2 Auxiliary Instrument Room DETERMINE the dimensions of the enclosure by measurement of the following: , , Height 1<:> Length __ ____ _ Width 41.. Ft. Ft. Ft. Q in. in. in. CALCULATE the room volume in cubic Ft. as follows: I I I II HI'? Cuit II X L X W 4z. = 7S2I1 *. ' Cu. Ft * ) RECORD vendor calculations of the maximum developed head (in. W.C.) of the COl/air mixture column. (Using the measured room height, COl System Design information, and previous concentration test results) . () . 0 7 in. 1'1. C * . INSTALL the Door Fan Apparatus in the door . whicp provides the most* favorable relief area (i. e ., Leaks which leave the room during . pressurization can be readily returned to the Fan Apparatus through a return air path) . SEAL the Fan Apparatus completely in the door opening, , /'i../'t C jAr!--.:J;'K. -h Hu. MANIPULATE* the £.er3:*ewing to s_I'fHilate ... ,,,. condition immediately following COl discharge

I' . into the protected area/and RECORD specific ,actions orve_ifieations in the Chronological Log. exhaust fans OFF .: 11-/, /

___ l ____ _ B. Doors CLOSED or deor opening S=l&ED with deor ' lall .M.ppaldLas. I l l c. des':"gll ..... . .' I r SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page 16 of 66 INITIALS/DATE RECORD the measured Pressure Differential across the door fan.6.2.7-I,*- 10,1-v-QD--a,,T '0. 0 18 in. W.C.6.2.8 IF the pressure measurement in Step 6.2.7 is 25% or more of the previously calculated column pressure using absolute values, DETERMINE the cause of the excessive static pressure and REDUCE to less than 25%.6.2.9 OPEN Doors, Ventilation openings, etc. in the adjacent areas on each side, above and below the enclosure being tested to the maximum extent possible to provide a return air path for all leakage leaving the enclosure. Any adjacent areas in which a return air path cannot be established are to be evaluated by the Contractor. 6.2.10 UNSEAL Fan Apparatus and OPERATE fan in the De-pressurization mode. (CONTROL fan speed such that the absolute value of the pressure developed matches the calculated column pressure, adjusted for the previously measured static pressure, per the NFPA procedure). NOTE: IF it is not possible to achieve sufficient pressure due to excessive leakage, either find the source of the leakage and seal, or, in the case of ventilation openings in the wall or ceiling slab, measure the opening Ain 2) and temporarily seal. When sufficient pressure is achieved continue to next step.11~--9 O~4~C~u U 6.2.7 6.2.8 6.2.9 6.2.10 NOTE: SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page 16 of 66 RECORD the measured Pressure Differential across the door fan. f . _ ....Ar-I"' in. W.C. IF the pressure measurement in Step 6.2.7 is 25% or more of the previously calculated column pressure using absolute values, DETERMINE the cause of the excessive static pressure and REDUCE to less than 25%. OPEN Doors, Ventilation openings, etc. in the adjacent areas on each side, above and below the enclosure being tested to the maximum extent possible to provide a return air path for all leakage leaving the enclosure. adjacent areas in which a return air path cannot be established are to be evaluated by the Contractor. UNSEAL Fan Apparatus and OPERATE fan in the De-pressurization mode. (CONTROL fan speed such that the absolute value of the pressure developed matches the calculated column adjusted foi , measured static pressure, per the NFPA procedure) . IF it "is not possible to achieve sufficient pressure due excessive leakage, either find the source of the leakage and seal, or, in the case of ventilation openings in the wall or ceiling slab, measure the opening '(in 2) and temporarily seal. When sufficient pressure is achieved continue to next step. INITIALS/DATE . -' SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page 17 of 66 INITIALS/DATE 6.2.11 RECORD under DE-PRESSURIZATION mode the following; A. Diff. Press. Across Fan Opening (in. W.C.),oboZ.B. Flow through Fan(s) CFM 5T.73 C. Inside temperature 44--4.% 0 F.D. Outside Temperature O4.4 0 F.6.2.12 REVERSE Fan position and PRESSURIZE enclosure. (CONTROL fan speed such that the absolute value of the pressure developed matches the calculated column pressure, adjusted for the previously measured static pressure, per NFPA Procedure). 6.2.13 RECORD the following Data while pressurizing the Enclosure.' A. Diff. Press. Across Fan Opening. (in. W.C.)0,.15 B.C.:...Flow through Fan(s) .CFM IZ It3 Inside temperature ,4. F.D. Outside temperature .6.0 OF.NOTE: NOTE: Steps 6.2.5 through 6.2.13 may be reperformed as necessary until acceptable results are obtained.IF the Retention time predicted for the minimum protected Height is less than the desired hold time, use the fan apparatus and a smoke pencil to find the leakage, and seal as necessary. Of ALTEST CP 6.2.11 A. B. c. D. 6.2.12 6.2.13 A. c. D. NOTE: NOTE: SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page 17 of 66 INITIALS/DATE

RECORD under DE-PRESSURIZATION mode the following; Diff. Press. Across Fan Opening (in. W.c.) 0,082. Flow through Fan(s) CFM 1512....73 Inside temperature Outside Temperature

{,{p,4 OF. REVERSE Fan position and PRESSURIZE @nclosur@. (CONTROL fan sp@@d such that the absolute value of the pressure developed matches the calculated column pressure, adjusted for the previously measured static pressure, per NFPA Procedure) . RECORD the following Data while pressurizing the

Enclosure:

Diff. Press. Across Fan Opening. (in. W.C.) O,I1S .. . ....* : ' .. , . -',' .. , .... -Inside temperature . (, G" 4: Outside temperature C. 0 OF. Steps 6.2.5 through 6.2.13 may be reperformed as necessary until acceptable results are obtained. IF the Retention time predicted for the minimum protected Height is less than the desired hold time, use the fan apparatus and a smoke pencil to find the leakage, and seal as necessary. " .. Q r"--rl'"k""\1'"\I' f't ... *-\ 'i 'R/" .. ,;!., i i', (g.,! , <= I I . .' .... f_. . .; SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page 18 of 66 INITIALS/DATE 6.2.14 RECORD vendor calculation results of the equivalent leakage area (Sq.'in.) using recorded data, and the retention time through use of the fan apparatus testing software, using the previously determined hold time and the minimum protected height.CJRo/ a Leek-,oi Arta- -in 4z xVA.SCL.A 110,12- Sq. in. 0 32.7 Retention Time (z 20 minutes)6.2.15 REMOVE Door Fan Apparatus from doorway.AZ 6.2.16 RETURN doors, fans, and dampers to NOM 7 1 A{ A9.1.6.2.17 NOTIFY SOS that Door Fan Test in U-2 Auxiliary Instrument Room is COMPLETE..', r~.",A4, 9.~ ~ I SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page 18 of 66 6.2.14 RECORD vendor calculation results of the equivalent leakage area (Sq.'in.) using recorded data, and the retention time through use of the fan apparatus testing software, using the previously determined hold time and the minimum protected height. UI,.,/e, L&.I:."1'- A-I'ta. * '2.(..1. .!'?-;,... . .B C LA I'>Q,J2. Sq. lon, 0 37.{ Retention Time (:2: 20 minutes) 6.2.15 REMOVE Door Fan Apparatus from doorway. INITIALS/DATE 4c ;1..194 . 6.2.16 6.2.17 RETURN doors, fans, and dampers to

9. \ . 1 /1'1,.,* NOTIFY SOS that Door Fan Test in U-2 Auxiliary Instrument Room is COMPLETE . **** *** _I '.'

SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page 47 of 66 INITIALS/DATE 6.10 CO 2 Protected Enclosure, Diesel Generator'Room IA-A 6.10.1 DETERMINE the dimensions of the enclosure by measurement of the following: Height 1m Ft.Length 29 Ft.Width Z9 Ft.0 in.0 in.J2. in.6.10.2 CALCULATE the room volume in Cubic Ft. as follows: H 1- x L 78 xW 15. =3B44 Cu.Ft.0141- I/ 164 6.10.3 RECORD vendor calculations of the maximum developed head (in. W.C.) of the C0 2/air mixture column. (Using the measured room height, CO 1 System Design information, and previous concentration test results).0.O4S" in' W.C.6.10.4 ""NSTALL~the Door Fan-Apparatus in the door* which'*provides the- most favorable relief area (i.e., Leaks which leave the room during pressurization can be readily returned to the Fan Apparatus through a return air path).6.10.5 SEAL the Fan Apparatus completely in the door opening.AS~~~I/.A.1L- ~f 6.10.6 S;.tL 4L'J#,4 MANIPULATE the ..l... to-,.* si-, t4-b ..)... 4 ,-(.i. j condition immediately following CO 2 discharge into the protected area.&d- RECGRD ifi"-:-;-A--A V .t .... .e..!. e-m'-"-B. _rs _ _-B_ o _w t A4-10 r. -, -% .. .,-4 ;a-1 , .ID 6.10 6.10.1 6.10.2 6.10.3 6.10.4 6.10.5 SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page 47 of 66 INITIALS/DATE COl Protected Enclosure, Diesel Generator ,Room 1A-A DETERMINE the dimensions of the enclosure by measurement of the following: Height Ft. 0 in. Length Ft. 0 in. £ Width 2.9 Ft. a in. / CALCULATE the room volume in Cubic Ft. as follows: H 11 x L 78 x W '2.', =38,45"4 Cu.Ft. ) RECORD vendor calculations of the maximum developed head (in. W.C.) of the COl/air mixture column. (Using the measured room height, COl System Design information, and previous concentration test results) . O.olos'" in: W.C . .... INSTALL the Door Fan 'Apparatus 'in the door . which "provides the' most favorable relief area (i.e., the ,room during pressurization can be readily returned to the Fan Apparatus through a return air path) . SEAL the Fan Apparatus completely in the door opening. ;(,/94-.-. ...... :-. ..,L..., r-I eN b1 /'J/11-9:) 4. 1"-,-;i'"'""O-(v--t6 6 .10.6 ,MANIPULATE the fo.lowOLfi9 to :9:l:m\:llate -l4-condition immediately following COl discharge into the protected area. and RECORD specif':'CV=,,,,,1'

o: ct':'", .. 03 or in the 1;1, 1.0: i * / ')1;,. ".. Vent or e:thaust fans GPO v-::" .. *e*"* B. Doo.!. 5 CLOSED or duo. ope ** i.15 SElili:::3

... .:.tL doo:. fan ]*,pp;;r ..... *.u; , e. Da ... pe.!.s.l..! .:'.?TBR DISE:!ARS: pos':'t':'on pe_=--:r..-/l.*H.+ I I .1 I SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page 48 of 66 INITIAL S/DATE 6.10.7 RECORD the measured Pressure Differential across the door fan.in. W.C.O.0oo?I Iec/ '~/4 6.10.8 IF thepressure measurement in Step 6.10.7 is 25k or more of the previously calculated column pressure using absolute values, DETERMINE the cause of the excessive static pressure and REDUCE to less than 25%.6.10.9 OPEN Doors, Ventilation openings, etc. in the adjacent areas on each side, above and below the enclosure being tested to the maximum extent possible to provide a return air path for all leakage leaving the enclosure. Any adjacent areas in which a return air path cannot be established are to be evaluated by the Contractor. 6.10.10 UNSEAL Fan Apparatus and*OPERATE fan in the De-pressurization mode. (CONTROL fan~speed such that the absolute value of the pressure* developed matches the'calculated column piessure>adjusted for-the previously... measured static pressure, per the NFPA procedure). NOTE: IF it is not possible to achieve sufficient pressure due to excessive leakage, either find the source of the leakage and seal, or, in the case of ventilation openihgs in the wall or ceiling slab, measure the opening (in 2) and temporarily. seal. When sufficient pressure is achieved continue to next step.A..It 7~__/YY /,,ý:ý11 111/04-6.10.7 6.10.8 6.10.9 6.10.10 NOTE: SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page 48 of 66 RECORD the measured Pressure Differential across the door fan. in. w.e. 0.002.. IF the pressure measurement in Step 6.10.7 is 25% or more of the previously calculated column pressure using absolute values, DETERMINE the cause of the excessive static INITIALS/DATE pressure and REDUCE to less than 25%. . OPEN Doors, ,Ventilation openings, etc. in the adjacent areas on each side, above and below the enclosure being tested to the maximum extent possible to provide a return air path for all leakage leaving the enclosure. Any adjacent areas in which a return air path cannot be established are to be evaluated by the Contractor. UNSEAL Fan Apparatus and OPERATE fan in the De-pressurization mode'. (CONTROL fan, speed such that the absolute value of the pressure developed matches the'calculated column . adjusted for .. the previously ,-, measured static pressure, per the NFPA procedure) . IF it is not possible to achieve sufficient pressure due excessive leakage, either find the source of the leakage and seal, or, in the case of ventilation openings in the wall or ceiling slab, measure the opening (inl) and temporarily seal. When sufficient pressure is achieved continue to next step . ..... /o/,/Jf --- SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page 49 of 66 INITIALS/DATE 6.10.11 RECORD under DE-PRESSURIZATION mode the following; 6 A. Diff. Press. Across Fan Opening (in. W.C.),O.O o2.B. Flow through Fan(s) CFM ._______, _C. Inside temperature -Z.4 OF.D. Outside Temperature

69. OF.6.10.12 REVERSE Fan position and PRESSURIZE enclosure. (CONTROL fan speed such that the absolute value of the pressure developed matches the calculated column pressure, adjusted for the previouslymeasured static pressure, per NFPA Procedure).

6.10.13 RECORD the following Data while pressurizing the Enclosure. A. Diff. Press. Across Fan Opening. (in. W.C.)B. Flow through Fan (s) .CFM

59. .C. Inside temperature 13.t OF.D. Outside temperature (o4A OF./_____NOTE: NOTE: Steps 6.10.5 through 6.10.13 may be reperformed as necessary until acceptable results are obtained.IF the Retention time predicted for the minimum protected Height is less than the desired hold time, use the fan apparatus and a smoke pencil to find the leakage, and seal as necessary.
*all 6.10.11 A. B. c. D. 6.10.12 6.10.13 A. SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page 49 of 66 RECORD under DE-PRESSURIZATION mode the following; Diff. Press. Across Fan opening (in. w.e.) 0.0(.,'2...

Flow through Fan(s) CFM w-v __ o __ __ ___ Inside temperature 12.4 Outside Temperature Co<}. Fan position and PRESSURIZE enclosure. (CONTROL fan speed such that the absolute value of the pressure developed matches the calculated column pressure, adjusted for the previously measured static pressure, per NFPA Procedure). RECORD the following Data while pressurizing the Enclosure. , Diff. Press. Across' Fan Opening. (in. W. c. ) Q.041 INITIALS/DATE' B. Flow through Fan (s). CFM' 55':3. C. c. D. NOTE: NOTE: Inside temperature, 13.-z... Outside temperature G,4. Steps 6.10.5 through 6.10.13 may be reperformed as necessary until acceptable results are obtained. IF the Retention time predicted for the minimum protected Height is less than the desired hold time, use the fan apparatus and a smoke pencil to find the leakage, and seal as necessary . .... . .' SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page 50 of 66 INIITIALS/DATE 6.10.14 RECORD vendor calculation results of the equivalent leakage area (Sq. in.) using recorded data, and the retention time through use of the fan apparatus testing software, using the previously determined hold time and the minimum protected height.,cL..A, /,6-07 Sq./8.4 Time (k 10 minutes)6.10.15 REMOVE Door Fan Apparatus from doorway.6.10.16 RETURN doors, fans, and dampers to NORMAL7--.- 6.10.17 NOTIFY SOS that Door Fan Test in Diesel Generator Room lA-A is COMPLETE..... icj"L A4-134~¶"~jIj '7j~"j~Vv~ -~* .1 SPT-039-01 Revision J. Page 50 of 66 6.10.14 RECORD vendor calculation of the equivalent leakage area (Sq. in.) using recorded data, and the retention time through use of the fan apparatus testing software, using the previously hold time and the minimum protected height. Wh.-h.

..If.12/1 S,... 1 .

/1r.07 Sq. in. 6.10.15 6.10.16 5.10.17 . ' IB.4 Retention Time 10 minutes) REMOVE Door Apparatus from doorway. NOTIFY SOS that Door Fan Test in Diesel Generator Room 1A-A is COMPLETE .

INITIALS/DATE SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page 51 of 66 INITIALS/DATE 6.11 CO2 Protected Enclosure, Diesel Generator Room IB-B 6.11.1 DETERMINE the dimensions of the enclosure by measurement of the following:

Height Length Width 11 Ft.-0 Ft.j9-9 Ft.O in.0 in.Q in.6.11.2 CALCULATE the room volume in Cubic Ft. as follows:-117 xL 78 xW 2+ Cu.Ft.6.11.3 RECORD vendor calculations of the maximum developed head (in. W.C.) of the C02/air mixture- column. (Using the measured room height, CO System Design information, and previous concentration test results)...O. 57 in. .W.C.6.11.4 INSTALL the' Door Fan Apparatus in the door which provides the most favorable relief area..(i.e., Leaks which leave the room during pressurization can be readily returned to the Fan Apparatus through a return.air path).6.11.5 SEAL the Fan Apparatus completely in the door Al / ~1/4/~4 6.11.6:Mii~~i2t opening. k MANIPULATE the oL.Luwiij Lo .... th k-, condition immediately following CO 1 discharge into the protected area..and-K RD RECXP.." 'a~'ill 2 Vxic~in i h /a A. Vent er- eýEhat:ýst IL.% .1 ~a. Bo~ eheseB o. ao. SPA 3~LEDY2.l A4-14 SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page 51 of 66 INITIALS/DATE 6.11 COl Protected Enclosure, Diesel Generator Room IB-B 6.11.1 6.11. 2 6.11.3 , 6.'11.4 6.11.5' DETERMINE the dimensions of the enclosure measurement of the following: Height 11 Ft. 0 in. Length JS Ft. a in. Width Ft. D in. CALCULATE the room volume in Cubic Ft. as follows: H *17 x L 78 x W 2,} = eU.Ft. RECORD vendor calculations of the maximum developed head (in. W.C.) of the COl/air mixture* column. (Using the measured room height, COl System Design information, and previous concentration test results) . ... . O.OCoS-in. ,w',c. ,., by INSTALL .the' Door Fan Apparatus in the door which provides the most favorable relief, area ' . -, ., *(-i. e., Leaks which leave the ,room during pressurization can be readily returned to the Fan Apparatus through a return,air path) . . " SEAn' the Fan Apparatus completely in the door opening. /'1/91 0 fiffel Arr"".Ji>., 9.\ ""I, 4k.. 1'0/.t:'J 1-. 6 .11. 6 MANIPULATE the to slOmulate the' .r; ... +k.-condition immediately following COl discharge into the protected sPecific ........ A. or .erH+/-c"Ho

.* i .. eh.

Ven:' or e3thaust fans IL.t'1r fan Apparatus. ( I ---'-e. Dahlpe!."k)' in io\:F'i"BR DiSCHARS::: posiL':'o

It.!':1t design. A4-14 SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page 52 of 66 INITIALS/DATE 6.11.7 RECORD the measured Pressure-Differential across the door fan.in. W.C. 0.OOy-6.11.8 IF the pressure measurement in Step 6.11.7 is 25V or more of the previously calculated column pressure using absolute values, DETERMINE the cause of the excessive static pressure and REDUCE to less than 25k.6.11.9 OPEN Doors, Ventilation openings, etc. in the adjacent areas on each side, above and below the enclosure being tested to the maximum extent possible to provide a return air path for all leakage leaving the enclosure. Any adjacent areas in which a return air path cannot be established are to be evaluated by the Contractor. 6.11.10 UNSEAL.Fan Apparatus and OPERATE fan in the De-pressurization mode. (CONTROL fan speed such that the absolute value of the pressure developed matches the calculated column pressure, adjusted for the previously measured static pressure,.per the NFPA procedure).,Azi ~Aj- / ~ ~~NOTE:IF it is not possible to achieve sufficient pressure due to excessive leakage, either find the source of the leakage and seal, or, in the case of ventilation openings in the wall or ceiling slab, measure the opening (in') and temporarily seal. When sufficient pressure is achieved continue to next step.'~II 6.11. 7 6.11.8 6.11. 9 6.11.10 NOTE: SP'I'-039-01 Revision 1 Page 52 of 66 RECORD the measured Pressure-Differential across the door fan. in. W.C. O.OD:) IF the pressure measurement in Step 6.11.7 is 25% or more of the previously calculated column pressure using absolute values, DETERMINE the cause of the excessive static pressure and REDUCE to less than 25%. OPEN Doors, Ventilation openings, etc. in the adjacent. areas on each side, above and below the enclosure being tested to the maximum extent to provide a return air path for all leakage leaving the enclosure. Any adjacent areas in which a return air path cannot be established are to be evaluated by the Contractor. arid OPERATE fan in the De-pressurization mode. (CONTROL fan speed such that the absolute value 'of the pressure developed matches'the calculated column pres'sure, adjusted for the previously measured static pressure"per the NFPA. procedure) . IF it is not possible to achieve sufficient pressure due to excessive leakage, either find the source of the leakage and seal, or, in the case of ventilation ppenings in the wall or ceiling slab, measure the opening (inl) and temporarily seal. When sufficient pressure is achieved continue to next step. -.. INITIALS/DATE / [1..1 . SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page 53 of 66 INITIALS/DATE 6.11.11 RECORD under DE-PRESSURIZATION mode the following; A. Diff. Press. Across Fan Opening (in. W.C.)S.o 0 .B. Flow through CFM __. _C. Inside temperature

70. 4 OF.D. Outside Temperature i.g &OF.6.11.12 REVERSE Fan position and PRESSURIZE enclosure. (CONTROL fan speed such that the absolute value of the pressure developed matches the calculated column pressure, adjusted for the previously measured static pressure, per NFPA Procedure).

6.11.13 RECORD the following Data while pressurizing the Enclosure."A Diff-w"'Press':"Across Fan Opening. (in. W.C.)B. Flow through Fan (s). CFM 0O3.9,/~k C. Inside teipertirie -7Z..OF.D. Outside temperatur OF.NOTE: NOTE: Steps 6.11.5 through 6.11.13 may be reperformed as necessary until acceptable results are obtained.IF the Retention time predicted for the minimum protected Height is less than the desired hold time, use the fan apparatus and a smoke pencil to find the leakage, and seal as necessary. U AV SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page 53 of GG 6.ll.l1 A. B. c. D. 6.11.12 RECORD under DE-PRESSURIZATION mode the followingi Diff. Press. Across Fan Opening (in. W.C.) Q.O{o Flow through F:an (s) CFM 552.0 Inside temperature 10.4 OF. Outside Temperature

11. S OF.

Fan position and PRESSURIZE enclosure. (CONTROL*fan speed such that the absolute value of the pressure developed matches the calculated column pressure, adjusted for the previously measured static pressure, per NFPA Procedure) . G.11.l3 RECORD the following Data while pressurizing the Enclosure. 'A': -Diff';"'Press':"Across' Fan opening. (in. W.C.) 0.07' NOTE: NOTE: B.' Flow through Fan(s). CFM 00 3.9S C. Inside temperature 7Z.0 OF. D. Steps 6.11.5 through 6.11.13 may be reperformed as necessary until acceptable results are obtained. IF the Retention time predicted' for the minimum protected Height is less than the desired hold time, use the fan apparatus and a smoke pencil to find the leakage, and seal as necessary . ..* . INITIALS/DATE &-1&112+ SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page 54 of 66 INITIALS/DATE 6.11.14 RECORD vendor calculation results of the equivalent leakage area (Sq. in.) using recorded data, and the retention time through use of the fan apparatus testing software, using the previously determined hold time and the minimum protected height.SC k /53.cz? Sq. in.T.0 Retention Time (k 10 minutes)r4~0 6.11.15 REMOVE DoQr Fan Apparatus from doorway. ,, 6.11-16 RETUN doors-, fans, and dampers to NORMAL A5 .6.11.17 NOTIFY SOS that Door Fan Test in Diesel Generator Room IB-B is COMPLETE.f1Kjk SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page S4 of 66 INITIALS/DATE 6.11.14 RECORD vendor calculation results of the equivalent leakage area (Sq. in.) using recorded data, and the retention time through use of the fan apparatus testing software, using the previously determined hold time and the minimum protected height. L.cWu..y Asrt.o.. 6'95.3'l,.Jq 61.. Sq. J.n. U It<< 0 Retention Time 10 minutes)

c. o REMOVE OQQ;r ran Apparatus from doorway. ' U. A '/N ell* 6.ll.1S 6.11.16 6.11.17 RETURN doors*, fans, and dampers to 'j'V"Arr-I" 9.\. ',,/.1 ! '1lt NOTIFY sos that Door Fan Test in Diesel Generator Room 1B-B is COMPLETE.

", .' .. , -' SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page 55 of 66 INITIALS/DATE 6.12 CO2 Protected Enclosure, Diesel Generator Room 2A-A 6.12.1 DETERMINE the dimensions of the enclosure by measurement of the following: Height 1l Ft. in.Length -_B Ft. -in.Width Ft. .in.6.12.2 CALCULATE the room volume in Cubic Ft. as follows: H 17 x L 18 xW 29 Cu.,t.7-6.12.3 RECORD vendor calculations of the maximum developed head (in. W.C.) of the C02/air mixture column. (Using the measured room height, CO 2 System Design information, and previous concentration test results).'in. W.C.6.12.4 INSTALL .the Door Fan Apparatus in the door which provides the most favorable relief area (i.e., Leaks which leave the room during .pressurization can be readily returned to the Fan Apparatus through a return air path).6.12.5 SEAL the Fan Apparatus completely in the door opening.5 74 6.12.6 j;-,t .4, MANIPULATE the .bll...ing tc s'imulte thz " condition immediately following CO 2 discharge into the protected area.- ....."o"- ' actions.t" ver!4"eatiz in the Chrenelgiz1 Leg.~~o~t &ýl :L /A .Vent or eXiLcLaSt-A--C. D .s GES-- D ". .d .ep..n. g G.AL9D ....h deer-JQ.L-r 6.12 6.12.1 6.12.2 6.12.3 6.12.4 6.12.5 6.12.6 J j""w.",-u. -iL A. SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page 55 of 66 INITIALS/DATE COl Protected Enclosure, Diesel Generator Room 2A-A DETERMINE the dimensions of the enclosure by measurement of the following: Height 11 Ft. n in. Length 18 Ft. 0 in. width 20, Ft. a in. , in Cubic CALCULATE the room volume Ft. as follows: H 17 x L 18 xW eu.Ft. ) RECORD vendor calculations of the maximum developed head (in. W.C.) of the COl/air mixture column. (Using the measured room height, CO 2 System Design information, and previous concentration test results). / ""',.,t O,QG,S'" .. W *. #-. /1V?-,.f INSTALL .the Door, Fan Apparatus in the door which provides the most favorable relief area (i.e., Leaks which leave the room during pressurization can be readily returned to the Fan Apparatus through a return air path) . " .. " [1.114-SEAL the Fan Apparatus completely in the door opening. ;'1,,# \,rU. 0"- 9.\ .... k MANIPULATE the ft>llo\\'!.ng to s::"ffiulate ' condition immediately following CO 2 discharge into the protected area. and RBCORD .... " e" "e"'; E'; e"""; a'A'" ; .. ""e e'-... efle'e"..; e",,1 11../ -. UC_ ::i _r. C..il_ /11 1';* l1el1L ox e>.haas:.. fans I C=. CLOS=D or doer opening SEALED with door C. * -I .. a.l p.ppalawC:3. 3errroe_s=:r:: d::'91£::-" I { I SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page 56 of 66 INITIALS /DATE 6.12.7 RECORD the measured Pressure Differential across the door fan.in. W.c. o.OO3 6.12.8 IF the pressure measurement in Step 6.12.7 is 25V or more of the previously calculated column pressure using absolute values, DETERMINE the cause of the excessive static pressure and REDUCE to less than 25k.6.12.9 OPEN Doors, Ventilation openings, etc. in the adjacent areas on each side, above and below the enclosure being tested to the maximum extent possible to provide a return air path for all leakage leaving the enclosure. Any adjacent areas in which a return air path cannot be established are to be evaluated bythe Contractor. 6.12.10 UNSEAL Fan Apparatus and OPERATE fan in the De-pressurization mode. (CONTROL fan:speed such that the absolute value of the pressure developed matches the calculated column pressure, adjusted for the previously measured static pressure, per the NFPA procedure). Z-~~j7jj b,,~1 NOTE:IF it is not possible to achieve sufficient pressure due to excessive leakage, either find the source of the leakage and seal, or, in the case of ventilation openings in the wall or ceiling slab, measure the opening (in') and temporarily seal. When sufficient pressure is achieved continue to next step.i M A 'j Irp , 6.12.7 6.12.8 6.12.9 6.12 .* l0 NOTE: SPT-039-0l. Revision l. Page 56 of 66

RECORD the measured Pressure pifferential across the door fan. in. W.C. 0.003 IF the pressure measurement in Step 6.l2.7 is or more of the previously calculated column pressure using absolute values, DETERMINE the cause of the excessive static pressure and REDUCE to less than 25%. OPEN Doors, Ventilation openings, etc. in the adjacent areas on each side, above and the enclosure being tested to the maximum extent possible to provide a return air path for all leakage leaving the enclosure.

Any adjacent areas in which a return air path cannot be established are to be evaluated by the Contractor. UNSEAL Fan Apparatus and OPERATE fan in the De-pressurization mode.. (CONTROL fan :,speed such that, the absolute value of the pressure developed matches'the calculated column . pressure, 'adjusted for the previously measured static pressure, per the NFPA procedure) . IF it is not possible to achieve sufficient pressure due to excessive leakage, either find the source of the leakage and seal, or, in the case of ventilation openings in the wall or ceiling slab, measur'e the opening (in 2) and temporarily seal. When sufficient pressure is achieved continue to next step * . " ..

'-1." f.' """"' ... k J ,t ... .. q I ,{ n'r '1 J"Io, I \ I ! I. ,. , ,. -:-", !

4P J * * ", II J_ '-

Ii' I I -I. 1_
6'" '" o..J' . .' INITIALS/DATE SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page 57 of 66 INITIALS/DATE 6.12.11 RECORD under DE-PRESSURIZATION mode the following; A. Diff. Press. Across Fan Opening (in. W.C.)B. Flow through Fan(s) CFM 481.7 C. Inside temperature

.7 OF..D. Outside Temperature 73.& OF.6.12.12 REVERSE Fan pQsition and PRESSURIZE enclosure. (CONTROL fan speed such that the absolute value of the pressure developed matches the calculated column pressure, adjusted for the previously measured static pressure, per NFPA Procedure). 6.12.13 RECORD the following Data while pressurizing the Enclosure. A. Diff. Press. Across Fan Opening. (in. W.C.)B. Flow through'Fan(s). CFM " C. Inside temperature 7O. °F.D. Outside temperature

p. O 0 F.NOTE: Steps 6.12.5 through 6.12.13 may be reperformed as necessary until acceptable results are obtained.NOTE: IF the Retention time predicted for the minimum protected Height is less than the desired hold time, use the fan apparatus and a smoke pencil to find the leakage, and seal as necessary.

A ,Jj v/6.12.11 A. B. C. D. 6.12.12 6.12.13 A. B. c. D. NOTE: SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page 57 of 66 RECORD under DE-PRESSURIZATION mode the following; Diff. Press. Across Fan Opening (in. W.C.> Q .0(0 'Z..

Flow through Fan (s) CFM _4...:-.,8_\_.7.:.......-_

Inside temperature 79*0 Outside Temperature 1-:;. & REVERSE Fan and PRESSURIZE enclosure. (CONTROL fan speed such that the absolute value of the pressure developed matches the calculated column pressure, for the previously measured static pressure, per NFPA Procedure) . RECORD the following Data while pressurizing the Enclosure. Diff. Press. Across Fan Opening. (in. W.C.) 0.0(06 Flow through'Fan(s) . CFM ,530.7 Inside temperature 79.S OF. Outside tempera'ture 4. Ct; OF. . Steps 6.12.5 through 6.12.13 may be reperformed as necessary until acceptable results are obtained. IF the Retention time predicted for the minimum protected Height is less than the desired hold time, use the fan apparatus and a smoke pencil to find the leakage, and seal as . . ' .. INITIALS/DATE SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page 58 of 66 INITIALS/DATE 6.12.14 RECORD vendor calculation results of the equivalent leakage area (Sq. in.) using recorded data, and the retention time through use of the fan apparatus testing software, using the previously determined hold time and the minimum protected height.L ./17.3 I Sq. in.(j Retention Time (% 10 minutes)6.12-15 RMQVE DQQr Fan Apparatus from doorway.6.12.16 RETURN doors, fans, and dampers to 6.12.17 NOTIFY SOS that Door Fan Test in Diesel Generator Room 2A-A is COMPLETE./L / I i/-." A4-21 r 77% V --ý t t.4i-,J**-I .Z4 1-SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page 58 of 66 6.12.14 RECORD vendor calculation results of the equivalent legkage area (Sq. in.) using recorded data, and the retention time through use of the fan apparatus testing software, using the previously determined hold time and the minimum protected height. c.,Jhok. l..e.Ab..,.. Aru... 03 .54. t3u.A /37 . Sq. l.n. (9.\ Retention Time 10 minutes) INITIALS/DATE 6.12.15 Fan Apparatus from doorway. RETURN doors, fans, and dampers to Ap/wJ. ... 6.12.16 6.12.17 NOTIFY SOS that Door Fan Test in Diesel Generator Room 2A-A is COMPLETE. A4-21 t * . .... \" ,1

r'
_. ..... I I f l ... ...... " to J:'. l' '::.1.1...

0 ,-.. 0.'

1
t" --r \ _ 1 .. '-"11 ';r.. '_..I "=-, ,

SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page 59 of 66 INITIALS/DATE 6.13 CO 2 Protected Enclosure, Diesel Generator Room 2B-B 6.13.1 DETERMINE the dimensions of the enclosure by measurement of the following: Height 17 Ft.Length -1 Ft.Width 10 Ft.0 in.o in.0 in.6.13.2 CALCULATE the room volume in Cubic Ft. as follows: H 17 x L x W 2- =384S4 Cu.Pt./~-6.13.3 RECORD vendor calculations of the maximum developed head (in.' W.C.) of the C0 2/air mixture column. (Using the measured room height, CO1 System Design information, and previous concentration test.results). O.0 6s- in. W.C.6.13.4 INSTALL the Door Fan Apparatus in the door which provides.the'most favorable relief area (i.e., Leaks which leave the room during pressurization can be readily returned to the Fan Apparatus through a return air path).6.13.5 SEAL the Fan Apparatus completely in the door ,4 .6.13.6opening.MANIPULATE the Q , !condition immediately following CO 2 discharge V~r into the protected area.tnd REC3e specifir act ens er- 24 ---" -QJZ Ca --A. Vent er- ex-st Eans-Or-E f-en App at'u-.-..ýee_-tien pet"-4--A----A----~J!I ..v 4~JJ'¶tJ 6.13 6.13.1 6.13.2 6.13.3 6.13.4 6.13.5 SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page S9 of 66 INITIALS/DATE COl Protected Enclosure, Diesel Generator Room 2B-B DETERMINE the dimensions of the enclosure by measurement of the following: Height 11 Ft. 0 in. Length 1t} Ft. 0 in. Width 1..9 Ft. D in. CALCULATE the room volume in Cubic Ft. as follows: . H /7 x L 1B x W 2.5 =38 1 4S2j-cu.. Pt. * /, ... ,,!,(. RECORD vendor calculations 6f the maximum developed head (in.' W.C.> of the COdair mixture column. (Using the measured room height, COl System Design information, and previous concentration test, results). , o.oc,!,-in. W.C. INSTALL the Door Fan Apparatus in the door which provides.the'most favorable relief area (i.e., Leaks which leave the room during pressurization can be readily returned to the Fan Apparatus through a return air path) . SEAL the Fan Apparatus completely in the door MANIPULATE the condition immediately following COl into the protected area. Cold RECORD specific opening. actions or ' .. erifications in the Log. ' J, 1..']*94 Vent or exhaust 13 . Dom: s CLOSED 01 doo. ope ** Lig sm'6ED wi th door :e!'! r.p:i,5a!:'att::;s-. 'C. D:al .. pe ... S'L. p.?TER n:SCF_t._=W: posit-ior. pe_ .... . .' I I J r_ I '- SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page 60 of 66 INITIALS/DATE 6.13.7 RECORD the measured Pressure-Differential across the door fan.in. w.c. 0.002 6.13.8 IF the pressure measurement in Step 6.13.7 is 25t or more of the previously calculated column pressure using absolute values, DETERMINE the cause of the excessive static pressure and REDUCE to less than 25%.6.13.9 OPEN DoQrs, Ventilation openings, etc. in the adjacent areas on each side, above and below the enclosure being tested to the maximum extent possible to provide a return air path for all leakage leaving the enclosure. Any adjacent areas in which a return air path cannot be established are to be evaluated by the Contractor. 6.13.10 UNSEAL Fan Apparatus and OPERATE fan in the De-pressurization mode. (CONTROL fan speed such that the absolute value of the pressure.'developed matdhegsthe Calculated column pressure, adjusted for the previously measured static pressure, per the NFPA procedure).it ~ *74.4- /it.,. ~4 NOTE:IF it is not possible to achieve sufficient pressure due to excessive leakage, either find the source of the leakage and seal, or, in the case of ventilation openings in the wall or ceiling slab', measure the opening (in') and temporarily seal. When sufficient pressure is achieved continue to next step.A4-23! !::-> !,.,... r 6.13.7 6.13.8 6.13.9 6.13.10 NOTE: SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page 60 of 66 RECORD the measured Pressure* Differential across the door fan. INITIALS/DATE IF the pressure measurement in Step 6.13.7 is in. W.C. O.{)QZ 25% or more of the previously calculated column pressure using absolute values, DETERMINE the cause of the excessive static pressure and REDUCE to less than 25%. OPEN Ventilation openings, etc. in the adjacent areas on each side, above and below the enclosure being tested to the maximum extent possible to provide a return air path for all leakage leaving the enclosure. Any adjacent areas in which a return air path cannot be established to be evaluated by the Contractor. UNSEAL Fan Apparatus and OPERATE fan in the De-pressurization mode. (CONTROL fan speed 'such that the absolute value of the pressure .. : deye.lopec:I. calculated column pressure, adjusted for the previously measured static pressure, per the NFPA procedure) . IF it is not possible to achieve sufficient pressure due to excessive leakage, either find the source of the leakage and seal, or, in the case of ventilation openings in the wall or ceiling slab', measure the opening (in 1) and temporarily seal. When sufficient pressure is achieved continue to next step. SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page 61 of 66 INITIALS/DATE 6.13.11 RECORD under DE-PRESSURIZATION mode the following; A. Diff. Press. Across Fan Opening (in. W.C.)B. Flow through Fan(s) CFM (8,O C. Inside temperature °F.D. Outside Temperature 9(.Q -F.6.13.12 REVERSE Fan position and PRESSUMIZE enclosure. (CONTROL fan speed such that the absolute value of the pressure developed matches the calculated column pressure, adjusted for the previously measured static pressure, per NFPA Procedure). 6.13.13 RECORD the following Data while pressurizing the Enclosure. A. Diff. Press. Across Fan Opening. (in. W.C.)B. Flow through Fanf(s). CFM 09 C. Inside. temperature Ol 0 F.D. Outside temperature (OcJ OF.NOTE: Steps 6.13.5 through 6.13.13 may bereperformed as necessary until acceptable results are obtained.NOTE: IF the Retentkon time predicted for the minimum protected Height is less than the desired hold time, use the fan apparatus and a smoke pencil to find the leakage, and seal as necessary. A4-24 0 :43'&1 -qq'v1'44 --/t I~..2f p4ý-l 6.13.11 A. RECORD under DE-PRESSURIZATION mode the following; SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page 61 of 66 INITIALS/DATE Diff. Press. Across Fan Opening (in. w.e.) e.ato!> B. Flow through Fan (s) CFM ____ _ C. Inside temperature 80.G, OF. D. 6.13.12 . 6.13.13 A. B. C. D. NOTE: NOTE: Outside Temperature ] ( .0 REVERSE Fan position and PRESSUR;J:ZE enclosure. (CONTROL fan speed such that the absolute value of the pressure developed matches the calculated column pressure, adjusted for the previously measured static pressure, per NFPA Procedure) . RECORD the following Data while pressurizing the Enclosure. Diff. Press. Across Fan Opening. (in. W.C. ) ' .. ", Flow through Fan(s) . CFM IJ9() .. Inside. temperature Bel 0 OF. 0" ._ ' .. " .-Outside temperature OF. Steps 6.13.5 through 6.13.13 may be reperformed as necessary until acceptable results are obtained. IF the time predicted for the minimum protected Height is less than the desired hold time, use the fan apparatus and a smoke pencil to find the leakage, and seal as necessary. A4-24 O';'PO"'l 1";) 'i.' ..-v, ..... C' "='V' ... I I -. 4 '--*1 tp i ! it'i,'::..I.L. t I ..,. '\ ". ,;)0:. .* ,.. " , .' SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page 62 of 66 INITIALS/DATE 6.13.14 RECORD vendor calculation res.ults of the equivalent leakage area (Sq. in.) using recorded data, and the retention time through use of the fan apparatus testing software, using the previously determined hold time and the minimum protected height....... Sq. in./7. 0 Retention Time (z 10 minutes)03-om9.3.6 RETURN doors, fans, and dampers to NORA 9.1. %6.13.16 6.13.17 NOTIFY SOS that Door Fan Test in Generator Room 2B-B is COMPLETE./ I,. I. 9,f, K 14 %JJi A.7 F.' '- -- f% il , 1ýVd:j SPT-039-01 Revision 1 Page 62 of 66 INITIALS/DATE 6.13.14 RECORD vendor calculation results of the equivalent leakage area (Sq. in.) using recorded data, and the retention time through use of the fan apparatus testing software, using the previously hold time and the minimum protected height. l.u4 Af'"v... * .IS; f ,.:." . 1 Sq. lon

17.0 Retention Time 10 minutes) 5.13.15.

Door Fan Apparatus from . eN 03 /J-a.H?Ctl 6.l3.16 RETURN doors, fans, and dampers to 9.1, I . h *. 6.13.17 NOTIFY SOS that Door Fan Test in Generator Room 2B-B is COMPLETE. ..."",_.,..,.,.., ... U n"""r" {. 1 ;', i .. : (', ,0' ';'1"'1 i " . I >. I * * \'

II l-""'Irl., ** 1h'.,.J' t ,

ATTACHMENT 5 Letter from TVA to NRC dated June 15, 1995 and WBN Fire Protection Report Revision 3 (selected sections) ATTACHMENT 5 Letter from TVA to NRC dated June 15, 1995 and WBN Fire Protection Report Revision 3 (selected sections) T04 950615 150, Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Spring Ciy. Tennessee 37381 JUN 1 5 1995 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen: In the Matter of the Application of ) Docket Nos. 50-390 Tennessee Valley Authority ) 50-391 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN) -FIRE PROTECTION REPORT (FPR)REVISION (TAC M63648)The purpose of this letter is to submit the latest FPR revision to support the Staff's review and inspection of the WBN Fire Protection Program. The FPR now consists of 3 volumes. Volumes 1 and 2 provide the overall description of the WBN Fire Protection Program and safe shutdown strategy. Volume 3 contains WBN Fire Protection Program implementing procedures and is available onsite for review.TVA has completed revising the FPR to address Staff comments or questions, and requests for information. To address Staff comments received in a TVA/NRC meeting on December 14, 1994, TVA extensively revised the FPR to include additional information and submitted Revision 1 on April 27, 1995. A safe shutdown strategy summary description requested by NRC in the December 14, 1994, meeting was included in FPR Revision 2, which was approved by TVA on May 24, 1995. The safe shutdown summary description included in the FPR is based on "as-designed" information. Final verification and validation of the safe shutdown actions is ongoing as part of TVA's efforts to develop the safe shutdown implementing procedures. Revision 2 also addressed NRC inspector comments received during NRC inspections and incorporated changes resulting from TVA initiatives to reduce the amount of Thermo-Lag used at WBN.Revision 2 was made available to NRC Staff personnel during a site review of the WBN FPR on May 31, 1995. During the site review, TVA A5-1 T04 950615 Tennessee Valley Authority. Post Office Box 2000. Spring City. Tennessee 3738 t JUN 1 5 1995 u.s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen: In the Matter of the Application of Tennessee Valley Authority ) , ) 16G Docket Nos. 50-390 50-391 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN) -FIRE PROTECTION REPORT (FPR) REVISION (TAC M63648) . The purpose of this letter is to submit the latest FPR to support the Staff's review and inspection of the WBN Fire Protection Program. The FPR now consists of 3 volumes. Volumes 1 and 2 provide the overall description of the WBN Fire Protection Program and safe shutdown strategy. Volume 3 contains WBN Fire Protection Program implementing procedures and is available onsite for review. . TVA has completed revising the FPR to address*Staff comments or questions, and requests for information. To address Staff comments received in a TVA/NRC meeting on December 14, 1994, TVA extensively revised the FPR to include additional information and submitted Revision 1 on April 27, 1995. A safe shutdown strategy summary description requested by NRC in the December 14, 1994, meeting was included in FPR Revision 2, which was approved by TVA on May 24, 1995. The safe shutdown summary description included in the FPR is based on "as-designed" information. Final verification and validation of the safe shutdown actions is ongoing as part of TVA's efforts to develop the safe shutdown implementing procedures. Revision 2 also addressed NRC inspector comments received during NRC inspections and incorporated changes resulting from TVA initiatives to reduce the amount of Thermo-Lag used at WBN. Revision 2 was made available to NRC Staff personnel during a site review of the WBN FPR on May 31, 1995. During the site review, TVA AS-1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 JUN 1 5 1995 and NRC staff agreed upon additional changes to address NRC comments/questions. In order to incorporate the changes, the commitment date for submitting an updated FPR by May 31, 1995, was extended to June 15, 1995.FPR Revision 3, Volumes 1 and 2, incorporates the changes agreed upon during the site review. Complete copies of FPR Volumes 1 and 2 are being submitted (Enclosure) to facilitate the Staff's review.Except where extensive revisions were required to incorporate the safe shutdown summary description, change bars indicate where information has been revised. The summary description of the WBN safe shutdown strategy was added to Part VI, "Fire Hazards Analysis." TVA staff personnel are available to meet with NRC or hold a telephone conversation to discuss the changes at the Staff's convenience. There are no new commitments made in this submittal. If you should have any questions, please contact Mr. P. L. Pace at (615) 365-1824.Sincerely, R ul R. Baron Ntclear Assurance and Licensing Manager (Acting)Enclosure cc (Enclosure): NRC Resident Inspector Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Rt. 2, Box 700 Spring City, Tennessee 37381 Mr. P. S. Tam, Senior Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 A5-2u.s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 JUN I 5 1995 and NRC staff agreed upon additional changes to address NRC comments/questions. In order to incorporate the changes, the commitment date for submitting an updated FPR by May 31, 1995, was extended to June 15, 1995. FPR Revision 3, Volumes 1 and 2, incorporates the changes agreed upon during the site review. Complete copies of FPR Volumes 1 and 2 are being submitted (Enclosure) to facilitate the Staff's review. Except where extensive revisions were required to incorporate the safe shutdown summary description, change bars indicate where information has been revised. The summary description of the WBN safe shutdown strategy was added to Part VI, "Fire Hazards Analysis." TVA staff personnel are available to meet with NRC or hold a telephone conversation to discuss the changes at the Staff's convenience. There are no new commitments made in this submittal. If you should have any questions, please contact Mr. P. L. Pace at (615) , Sinc¢rely, r .I** l' ' .. -*.. -i (tUd . C": and Licensing Manager (Acting) Enclosure cc (Enclosure): NRC Resident Inspector Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Rt. 2, Box 700 . Spring City, Tennessee 37381 Mr. P. S. Tam, Senior Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 AS-2 ENCLOSURE WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE PROTECTION REPORT VOLUMES 1 ANM 2 REVISION 3 A5-3 r [' r ENCLOSURE WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE PROTECTION REPORT VOLOMES 1 AND 2 REVISION 3 A5-3 FIRE PROTECTION REPORT Revision 3 Technical Review By:_________ Technical Review By: rL/).__i'Submitted By: Approved Approved By: Plant Manager/IleA A5-4 Approved FIRE PROTECTION REPORT Revision 3 A5-4 Rev. 3 PART Ii -FIRE PROTECTION PLAN 12.3.3 Carbton Dioxide Suppression Syslenis Automatic total flooding CO 2 suppression systems have been provided for the Auxiliary Instrument Rooms and Computer Room in the Control Building; and the Lube Oil Storage Room. each Diesel Engine Room (4), Fuel Oil Transfer Room, and each 480-V Board Rooms (4) in the Diesel Generator Building.. The design basis for the areas protected by CO 2 are as follows: Auxiliary Instrument Rooms -Deep seated fires. Must achieve 30% concentration within2 minutes, 50% concentration within 7 minutes, and maintain at least 45% concentration for at least 15 minutes.Computer Room -Deep seated fire. Must achieve 30% concentration within 2 minutes and 50% concentration within 7 minuttes.Diesel Generator Engine Rooms -Surface fire (diesel fuel) and rotating electrical equipment. Must achieve 34% concentration within i minute and maintain at least 30%concentration for at least 20 minutes.Diesel Generator Electrical Board Rooms -Deep seated fires. Must achieve 30%concentration within 2 mintites and 50% concentration within 7 minutes.Lube Oil Storage and Fuel Oil Transfer Rooms -Surface fire. Must achieve 34%concentration within I minute.A signal from either the fire detection system or a push button station activates the area alarms, CO, discharge timer which actuates the master control valve and the area selector valve permitting the CO, to be discharged into the selected area. In addition, the system can be manually operated via the electro-manual pilot valve for each hazard protected. Personnel safety is considered by providing the prediseharge alarm to notify anyone in the area that CO, is going to be discharged and by the addition of an odorizer to the CO, to warn personnel that CO, has been discharged. Actuation of the CO, system causes selective closure of dampers and doors to the area protected and shuts down HVAC fans to the protected area. This prevents spread of the fire and ensures that the minimum concentration of CO 2 is maintained. Full discharge tests for representative rooms in conjunction with door fan pressurization tests have been conducted to validate CO, concentration and soak times. The duration of the discharge is 11-33 I A5-5 Rev. 3 PART II -FIRE PROTECTION PLAN J 2.3.3 Dinxid(' Suppression Sl'lIlcms Automatic total flooding CO 2 suppression systems have been provided for the Auxiliary Instrument Rooms and Computer Room in the Control Building: and the Lube Oil Storage Room. each Diesel Engine Room (4), Fuel Oil Transfer Room. and each 480-V Board Rooms (4) in the Diesel Generator Building. The design basis for the areas protected by CO 2 are as follows: Auxiliary Instrument Rooms -Deep seated fires. Must achieve 30% concentration within 2 minutes, 50% concentration within 7 minutes, and maintain at least 45 % concentration for at least 15 minllles. Computer Room -Deep seated fire. Must achieve 30% concentration within 2 minutes and 50% concentration within 7 minutes. Diesel Generator Engine Rooms -Surface fire (diesel fuel) and !'Otating electrical equipment. Must achieve 34% concentl'ation within I minute and maintain at least 30% concentration for at least 20 minutes. Diesel Generator Electrical Board Rooms -Deep seated fires. Must achieve 30% concentration within 2 mimites and 50% concentration within 7 minutes. Lube Oil Storage and Fuel Oil Transfer Rooms -Surface fire. Must achieve 34% concentration within I minute. A signal from either the fire detection system or a push button station activates the area alarms, CO 2 discharge timer which actuates the master control valve and the area selector valve permitting the CO 2 to be discharged into the selected arca. In .. ddition. the system can be manually operated via the electro-manual pilot valve for each hazard protected. Personnel safety is considered by providing the predischarge alnrm to notify anyone in area that CO 2 is going to be discharged and by the addition of an odorizer to the CO 2 to warn personnel that CO:! has been discharged. Actuation of the CO 2 system causes selective closure of dampers and doors to the area protected and shms down HVAC fans to the protected aren. This prevents spread of the fire and ensures that the minimum concentration of CO 2 is maintained. Full discharge tests for representative rooms in conjunction with door fan pressurization tests have been conducted to validate CO 2 concentration and soak times. The duration of the discharge is 11-33 AS-S Rev. 3 2211 2212 2213 2214 222 2221 2222 223 2231'A 'I" -(Comply Comply Comply N/A Comply See Note I Comply Comply N/A N/A NMrA C(O))I. [VALIUA.ION' Linclosa1)le opening carea fOr flash or sunrlace-type fires exceed either 3% 9of the cihic lf0ol vollume or 10% of the square otol room surfatce area. If exceeded, the system shall te tested to assure proper peirformance Unclosable opening area ftbr deep seated fires exceeds small openings in or near the ceiling unless the system is tested to assure proper performance Prevention of fire spread Process and storage tank with flammable vapors are not applicable to WB3N.Leakage and ventilalion is not compensated by extended discharge of CO, agent.Autmlaltic closure of openings (see 235 1 for diesel engine rooms)Shut dtMwn or Ventlihlion Types of fires -general informalion Surface tire exti nguishment -General Infbrmation 2232 Comply Deep sealed fire extingtwishment dloes not specify the soak time and concentralion levels required to be maintained. Where required. time or 15 minutes at 45%concentration is miaintained. 23 231 232 2321 2322 233 2331 2332 2333 2334 N/A N/A Comply Comply N/A Comply Comply Comply Comply Comply Title. CO, Requirements for Surface Fires General in formatlion Flammable maierial design concentration Table 4 carbon dioxide concent'rations Calculation of design concentration if not on Table 4 Volume factor Calculating volume to protect Table 5 Volume Factors Comment on Column B Table 5 lIntercolnnected volumes X- 17 A5-6 Rc\,. J :;111 2212 2213 2214 222 2221 2222 223 2231 2232 23 231 132 2321 2322 233 2331 2332 2333 2334 PAltT

1\'FI\ CO))E EVALUATIO:\ ( 'olllply Comply Comply N/A Comply See NOie Comply Comply N/A N/A Comply N/A N/A Comply Comply N/A Comply Comply' Comply Comply Comply linclo)iahle upl.!ning area for flash slirfaCtHype tires cxcl!ed J% of Ihl! cuhic fuOI volume or 10% of the square foul room SII rfat:1! urea. J r I!xceeded.

the system shall bl! 10 aSSlIrl! prop!.!r performance Unclus:lbh.: opcning :l1'l!U for deep sc:llCci lires exceeds smnH openings in or ncar Ihe ceiling unless the system is tesled 10 assure proper pcrforl11:tnce Prevelllioll of lire spread Process und storage tank with tlammabJe vapors are not applicahle to WIlN. Leakage and ventilation is not compensated by extended discharge of CO: agt!1l1. AUlomatic: closure of opcnings (SCI! 2J51 for dit!sel enginc rooms) Shul clown of vel1lil:llion TYPl!s of fires - illformalion Surface tirt! l!xlinguishll1l!11\

General Information Deep sealed lire eXlingliishlllt!1ll dut!s not specify the sonk lime and cnncenlrminll Icvds required It) he m:lintaincd.

Wherl! reqllirt!d. soak timt: of 15 milllltl!S al 45% is m:liIlHlilll!d. Titll!. CO Rt!qll il't!I1lt!llls fur SUl'fact! Fi I't!S (II! 1lt!l'al in formal inn FI:lI11mahh! m:llt!ri:1I design concl!t1lr:llion Tnhk 4 carbon clioxiclt: CnlclIl:lliull of design concenlration if nOl Oil Table 4 Volume: factor Calculnting voilime to protect T:lble :; Volume Factors Comment 011 Column B Tahle 5 J merconnected volullles X-I? AS-6 Rev. 3 234 235 2351 NIA N/A Corn See Corn PART X -NlI"A CODE, EVAL;AION N~acrid cive'sion I'ictor Special Conditions require alddititoall agent iply Compensating for op;enings thait Canllt close (i.e., ceiling Note I grills in diesel engine rooms) by addlition of I pound of agent per square ftoot of opeing.ply Ventilation fans are shtl off or taken into account.2352 2353 2354 2355 24 241 242 2421 See Note I N/A N/A Comply N/A Comply See Note I Comply Cornmprly 2422 243 244 2441 25 251 252 N/A Comply N/A Comnply See Note I N/A Comply Comply See Note I ComplySee Note I N/A Elevated temperature of the enclosure is not anticipated. Low temperature of the enclosure is not anticipated. Surface fire extinguishment Title. CO, Requtirements for Deep Seated Fires General -Soak times are specified where required. Soak time is 15 minutes at 45% concentrafion. Combustible materials Flooding iactiors for specific hazards (50W% for deep seated fire locations such as board roomiis. instrument rooms, etc.)Flooding f'actors for other deep seated fires Volume o1' space protected The discharge timers are adjusted for the hazard protected. Comupensatilng for openings thai cannot close Title, Distribution Systems General Rale of Application Time to reach design concentration for surface fires High pressure systems are not used at WUBN.X-18 A5-7 2521 2522 Rcv, 3 235 2351 2352 2353 2354 2355 24 241 242 2421 2422 243 244 2441 251 252 2521 2522 PAil'!' X - COnE E\',\Ll;,\TIO:,\ N/A Comply St!t! Nute Comply See Note N/A N/A Comply N/A Comply Sec Note Comply Comply N/A Comply N/A Comply See Note N/A Comply Comply See NOle I Comply See Nntc N/A tv\atcrial cUllVcrsilll1 factor Spec ial cond it ions rellu i re add it inn:!1 agcnt Compensating for openings that cannot c10sc (i.e .. ceiling grills in dil.:sd engine rooms) hy addition of I pOllnd or agent per square fOll! of opcning. arc shut otT or taken into :lccounl. 1t!lllpermurc of the t!llcloslire is not anticipated. Lowtcmpermurc of the enclosure is not amicipated. Surface tire eXlingllishmt!nl Title. CO] Rt!qllircments for Deep FiJ'cs General -Soak limes arc speciliecl where required. Soak time is 15 mimllcs m 45% concentrmion. Combustible Illaterials Flooding factors f<l!' spt!cilic hazards (50'J'r, for dt!t!p scated lire locat iuns such llS hoard rooms. instrument rooms, etc.) Flooding facllll's for other <h:t:p se:llt:d lirt:s Voluml! of space prott!ctl!d Thl! dischargt: timers arc acljuslt:c1 for the prott:ctccl. Compcnsating for openings that cannm close Tillc, Distribution Systems Rate of Applic;uion Time to rench design cOllct:l1tration for slIrfnce tires High prt:ssure systt:ms arc nnt lIsed ;u WUN. A5-7 ATTACHMENT 6 WBN Fire Protection Report Figure 11-33 TVA DWG No. 47W240-6 R8 ATTACHMENT 6 WBN Fire Protection Report Figure 11-33 TVA DWG No. 47W240-6 R8 I PLAN EL 692.0~* %L~ F~m.c -'] -I-"teUttaUV ,,ES.f]

c-"m,,-EXOTmIWATTS BAR FIRE PROTECTION REPORT POWERHOUSE CONTROL BUILDING -UNITS 1 AND 2 FIRE PROTECTION COMPARTMENTATION

-FIRE CELLS PLAN EL 692.0 & 708.0 FIRE PROTECTION REPORT TVA DWG NO. 47W240-6 R8 FIGURE 11-33 A6-1 AS-AS rr PLAN-EL 706.0 ----I::9--.--m-----t:I:T------+ --_ .. ++.-!-.- 60UIPM'Nr PLAN -EL G;9<?.O A6-1 tIIOI'lS, I. 'CIIClICIW.lions oVCIU'.DlCJSl:IHU1, z. gh\Um AID J.

t. = *,_UCUUrtllT'LOCIII -S_IItGII.UCII'

..... IU m -,--IIC11.AflMT .-'U ......... CII. ... Jl;II' ...... IU ___ tlItAIIUlCUlDiIoII' IHOIIICIHSU fllOlll US'OIIQ.MITr WATTS BAR FIRE PROTECTION REPORT POWERHOUSE CONTROL BUILDING -UNITS 1 AND 2 F IRE PROTECTION COMPARTMENTATION -FIRE CELLS PLAN EL 692.0 708.0 FIRE PROTECTION REPORT TVA DWG NO. 47W240-6 RB FIGURE 11-33}}

v t e Letter Sequence Response to RAI
TAC:ME0876, (Open)
Initiation Request Acceptance... Supplement Administration Questions Answers 30 September 2009 30 October 2009 Results Approval... Other: ML091170535
MONTHYEAR2009-07-15 [Table View]

ML093080377

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4.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

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4.4 Conclusions

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2.0 REFERENCES

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