05000247/FIN-2016001-05
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Provide Adequate Procedural Guidance in Order to Prevent an Overcurrent Condition |
Description | A self-revealing NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1, Procedures, was identified for Entergys failure to provide adequate guidance in procedure 2-PT-R084C, 23 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Eight-Hour Load Test. Specifically, Entergy failed to provide adequate procedural guidance in order to prevent an overcurrent condition on the 52/3A 480 volt (V) bus normal feeder breaker. As a result, the plant experienced a loss of normal power to their four 480V vital buses and a momentary loss of residual heat removal (RHR) cooling. Entergy wrote condition report (CR)-IP2-2016-01256 and revised the test procedure to add a specific amperage restriction on the vital buses and designate the control indication to be used. The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown. The performance deficiency caused a loss of normal power to the vital 480V buses, which also resulted in a loss of RHR event. The Region I Senior Risk Analyst (SRA) used IMC 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, to assess the safety significance of this event. The SRA determined that Worksheet 3 in Plant Operating State 1 [reactor coolant system (RCS) closed with steam generators available for decay heat removal], best represents the actual event and associated mitigation system available. Throughout the event, the RCS was intact with steam generators available and 24 reactor coolant pump (RCP) running; therefore, it was determined that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green). This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Challenge the Unknown, because personnel did not stop when faced with uncertain conditions. Risks were not adequately evaluated and managed before proceeding. |
Site: | Indian Point ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000247/2016001 Section 4OA2 |
Date counted | Mar 31, 2016 (2016Q1) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Initiating Events |
Identified by: | Self-revealing |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
Inspectors (proximate) | B Haagensen G Dentel G Newman H Gray J Furia J Patel P Ott S Rich |
Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures |
CCA | H.11, Challenge the Unknown |
INPO aspect | QA.2 |
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Finding - Indian Point - IR 05000247/2016001 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Indian Point) @ 2016Q1
Self-Identified List (Indian Point)
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