ML14142A010

LER 14-003-00 for Columbia Generating Station Regarding Degraded Tornado Missile Barrier

ML14142A010
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	05/12/2014
From:	Javorik A L Energy Northwest
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
GO2-14-077 LER 14-003-00
Download: ML14142A010 (4)

Text

ENERGYNORTHWESTAlex L .iavorCokirbi GwnerV SiamoP.O. Box 968 PE04RlchlmA WA 9MJ2-090Ph. 509.377.85M5" F. 509.377.4150a*sk*oflh s oonMMay 12, 2014G02-14-07710 CFR 50.73U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionATTN: Document Control DeskWashington, D.C. 20555-0001

Subject:

COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 2014-00$.00

Dear Sir or Madam:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 2014-003-00 for Columbia GeneratingStation. This report is submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).There are no commitments being made to the NRC by this letter. If you have anyquestions or require additional information, please contact Mr. J. R. Trautvetter,Regulatory Compliance Supervisor, at (509) 377-4337.Respectfully,'51// LfA '. JfrjVj4'-JA. L. JavorikVice President, Engineering

Attachment:

Licensee Event Report 2013-005-00cc: NRC Region IV AdministratorNRC NRR Project ManagerNRC Senior Resident Inspector/988CMA Jones -BPA/1 399WA Hoion -Winston & StrewnI..9 6:. -9 lift FOAM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OilS: NO. 3150.104 -EXIRES M1/312017k1-2014) E.M, bmaude i rpr,o m to cor" uwk Ifs unlndaoMy l-kI A' request: W hours.Reported 'es leas wned , ino; oruud -ito li byaft proom and fed back to indusmtSend ouonwwa regendig burden mknre lo to FOIA, Puiiy end hmornJon CobotioniUCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) Sn( ", U u R WMMn,., DC 2(50001 or byWer40MM ID Inm"l t " kto*oi un*0n~m~e , and lof Os ekl Ofter, Mole of hfnoWmk en(See Page 2 for required number of NEi:-,0M tMS.toy4), Oi of Mou and ci Mim I ow DCdigits/characters for each block). mm. Iyp,. s en us6WMson lo. kion oes not a auiy vAM* O0NOmu nunra, On NAC may rel ooiiud or sponor, end a person is ra re mld to rsqpnd to,1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET N 3. PAGEColumbia Generating Station 05000 397 1 OF 34. TITLEDegraded Tornado Missile Barrier5. EVENT DATE 6.LEA NtXMIER 7. REPORT DATE S.OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVEDMOT DY YER YERSEGUENTIAL REV +.FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBERMONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SNO.ENTIAL ý MONTH DAY YEAR 05000,FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER3 12 2014 2014 -003 -0 5 12 2014 05=19. OPERATIN MODE 11. THIS REPORT Is 5U~TDPRUN TO TH4E REURMNTWSM OF 10 CPA 1: (C kAVca AWi Opp*)o 20.2201(b) oo202203(a)(3)(1) 0 50.73(a)(2)()(C) 0 50.73(a)(2)(0)vio 20.2201(d) r3 20.2203(aX3)(ii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)0 20.2203 (a)(1) 0 20.2203(a)(4) 03 50.73(a)(2)(il)(B) [3 50.73(aX2)(vtii)(B)_ _ _ 20.2203(a)(2)(1) 0 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) [I 50.73(a)(2)(0i) [3 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)10. POWER LEVEL 0 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 0 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 13 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) [I 50.73(a)(2)(x)oI 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 0 60.36(c)(2) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 0' 73.71(a)(4)o0 [ 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 0 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 0] 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 0 73.71 (a)(.5)100.. .o 20.2203(a)(2)(v) [3 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 0 50.73(aX2)(v)(C) [3 OTHERSpecif In Abstract below or inI"0I 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) NRC Fonm 30rA12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LEERFACILITY NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Cod.)M. Hedges 509-377-8277113. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT____CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU- REPORTABLE MANU- REPORTABLEC FACTURER TO EPIX CAUS SSTEM COMPENT FACTURER TO EPIX0 YES 2.es, coniplft 15. EXECTED, SUOWSSI DATE) N~jO I14. ~~~~ ~ ~ M LU!EMNA REOTEXETD 1MNT0A *YAABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spa ewen knw)On March 12, 2014, it was Identified that three manhole covers (E10, El1, and E 15) for vaults containing 4160volt electric cables were missing the hold down bolts. The hold down bolts are required as part of the tornadomissile barrier for the manhole cover for the underground electric vault. It was later determined that the holddown bolts for manhole cover E 11 (Division 2 Service Water) had been identified as missing since September 6,2013. When the bolts were identified as missing on September 6, 2013, the manhole cover and bolts were notrecognized as a tornado missile barrier; because this information was not available in routinely used databasesand procedures. No compensatory action was taken until March 12, 2014, when large concrete blocks wereplaced on top of the manholes to prevent the covers from potential removal in the event of a tornado. Thedegraded missile barrier is considered to have rendered the Division 2 Service Water system inoperable fromSeptember 6, 2013, to March 12, 2014. This Is reportable as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.26158 R6 NRC Form 366 (01-2014)

NRC FORM 306A U.& NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMUWIO)N APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. SIUO104 EXPIRES: 0=1/1M07(01-2014) Eubmd bsuin PK moupowe Io ooCn* i& ft cohtilu rsquwa: 0 )hon.Itopwd isim m weq kwraWd ko hato n pioc*aemd Wed bad to Wtoy.%Wand umur mguft kWon u"tmoo to to FOIA, PR~waynd Wormato CdeohooLICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) &mct F63), Mmiew Rep&" Cw aisu Wwn, DC 20001, ofCONTINUATION SHEET NW N A W-oI, MWo-o), of M &M &Wg.Wu*1000. DC 20603.uN* wa-- dto knpuswan kwrmulA x cahi n d des n aG ipmm*wid vsi OMB cw"a mwAske I* NRC may not oWidc or spowo, and a puruo a na1.FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LEN NUMBER f3PAGEColmboia Geertng Stlon YEA R S REV05000 397 ' N 2 OF 32014 -003 -0NARRATIVEPLANT CONDITIONSColumbia was operating at 100% power. There were no Inoperable plant systems at the time of discovery thatcontributed to this event.EVENT DESCRIPTIONOn March 12, 2014, it was identified that three manhole covers (E10, Eli, and E 15) for vaults containing 4160 voltelectric cables [CBL] were missing the hold down bolts. The electric cables in vaults El0 and El I support the Division 2Service Water (BI] system. The electric cables In vaults E16 support the Division 3 Service Water system. The holddown bolts are required as part of the tornado missile barrier for the manhole cover for the underground electric vault. Itwas later determined that the hold down bolts for manhole cover E 11 (Division 2 Service Water) had been identified asmissing in two condition reports on September 6, 2013, and again on December 3, 2013. When Operations performed animmediate operability determination for the September and December 2013 condition reports, the manhole cover andbolts were not recognized as a tornado missile barrier; therefore, no compensatory action was taken until March 12, 2014.The degraded missile barrier is considered to have rendered the Division 2 Service Water system Inoperable fromSeptember 6, 2013, to March 12, 2014. This is reportable as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONIt was verified through the Weather Service that no tornados were predicted for our area in the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Largeconcrete blocks were placed over the manhole covers on March 12, 2014, to prevent the cover from lifting in the event ofa tornado.The information fields in the master equipment list for the applicable manhole covers were completed Identifying them asa tornado missile barrier.CAUSEThe information in this section is based on the preliminary results of a root cause evaluation. If any significant changes inthe cause or corrective actions are made in the final evaluation, a supplement will be submitted for this report.The direct cause for the missing hold down bolts was not determined.The root cause of the failure to recognize the manhole cover as a tornado barrier was that station procedures thatImplement the process to establish quality classifications for safety-related systems, structures, and components (SSCs)did not ensure accurate information was available in a timely manner for these components.There are multiple methods available for determining the safety significance of a degraded component; however, thecomputerized master equipment list is typically the preferred method. The equipment plant numbers (EPNs) for themanhole covers had been entered Into master equipment list in 2012, but no action was taken to complete the remainingdata fields for the components to identify that the manhole covers fulfilled a tornado barrier function, and have theinformation verified and approved. The master equipment list that station personnel used identified these manhole coversas nonsafety-related.26158A R3 NRC FORM 366A (01-2014)

NRC FOAM USA LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) u. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONCONTINUATION SHEETCoIUIbI Geati S ItIon 1 _YEA.. SEQUENTIAL REVOWNj 37 N R NO. 3 OF 32014- 003 -0NARRATIVEIn the immediate operability determination process for the two Condition Reports in 2013, Operations personnel did nothave information readily available to them to determine that the manhole cover was a tornado missile barrier. Most plantpersonnel, including Operations, did not recognize that the information in the computer master equipment list for themanhole covers was not at an approved status and should not be used. The manhole covers did not have any labelindicating that It was a tornado missile barrier. Plant drawings did not identify the manhole covers as tornado missilebarriers. Additionally, the station barrier Impairment procedure did not list the manhole covers as a tornado missilebarrier.FURTHER CORRECTIVE ACTIONWork requests were initiated to repair/replace the missing bolts for the manhole covers.Revise Engineering procedures to provide clear direction to establish Quality Classifications for safety-related SSCs withinthe Master Equipment List within a specific time frame. Ensure that procedures include timeliness requirements forestablishing and upgrading/downgrading EPNs for installed plant equipment.Apply a marking on the manhole covers that identify these covers as a tornado missile barrier.Revise the station barrier impairment procedure to identify manhole covers as a tornado missile barrier.ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CONSEQUENCESNo actual tornados occurred during the time of interest. The Division 2 Service Water system remained capable of fulfillingits safety function during this time period. Additionally, at least one other division of Service Water was available duringthis time period (September 6, 2013 to March 12, 2014) to be able to fulfill the safety function; therefore, the actual safetyconsequence of this issue was minimal.SIMILAR EVENTSThere have been no similar events at Columbia Generating Station in the last three years.ENERGY INDUSTRY IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (EllS) INFORMATION CODESENIS codes are bracketd [ where applicable in the narrative.26158A R3 NRC FORM 366A (01-2014)