05000382/FIN-2012004-03

Finding

Title

Failure to Identify and Correct a Torn Diaphragm of a SAFETY-RELATED Air Operated Valve Associated with the Emergency Feedwater System

Description

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI because the licensee did not promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality associated with the B emergency feedwater backup control valve EFW-223B. Specifically, the licensee did not promptly identify and correct internal leakage from tears in the EFW-223B actuator diaphragm. As a result, these internal tears in the diaphragm caused excessive leakage that affected two nitrogen accumulators used to operate EFW-223B and other safety related valves. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR-WF3-2012-0860. The immediate corrective actions taken to restore compliance included the replacement of the diaphragm and to determine the extent of condition for other air-operated valves with the same type, make, and model diaphragm. The planned corrective action included the revision of the air operated valve program post maintenance tests to identify similar problems. The failure to promptly identify and correct tears in the internal actuator diaphragm of the B emergency feedwater backup control valve EFW-223B was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating System Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the internal leakage of EFW-223B affected two safety-related nitrogen accumulators and their ability to provide nitrogen gas to other connected safety related valves following a loss of offsite power event. The inspector used the NRC Inspection Manual 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, to evaluate this issue. The finding required a detailed analysis because it involved a potential loss of one train of safety related equipment for longer than the technical specification allowed outage time. Therefore, a senior reactor analyst performed a bounding detailed risk evaluation. The analyst determined that the finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the bounding change to the core damage frequency is less than 1E-9 per year. The inspectors concluded that the finding reflected current licensee performance and involved a cross-cutting aspect in the corrective action program component of the problem identification and resolution area in that the licensee did not thoroughly evaluate problems such that the resolutions address causes and extent of conditions, as necessary

03
Site:	Waterford
Report	IR 05000382/2012004 Section 1R12
Date counted	Sep 30, 2012 (2012Q3)
Type:	NCV: Green
cornerstone	Mitigating Systems
Identified by:	NRC identified
Inspection Procedure:	IP 71111.12
Inspectors (proximate)	P Elkmann M Davis D Allen W Sifre J Laughlin R Cureton R Azua D Overland C Speer
CCA	P.2, Evaluation
INPO aspect	PI.2
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v • d • e

Finding - Waterford - IR 05000382/2012004

1(0)2(2)3(3)4(4)5(5)6(0)7(2)8(6)9(0)10(0)11(0)201(0)202(1)301(0)403(4)404(2)405(0)503(0)801(0)1(0)15(0)

IR 05000382/2012004: 1 2 3 4

Finding List (Waterford) @ 2012Q3

CCA Matrix: 2012Q3

	Q	CCA	Title
05000382/FIN-2011005-01	2011Q4	H.14	Inoperable Train of Containment Cooling System
05000382/FIN-2011005-03	2011Q4		Failure to Periodically Update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
05000382/FIN-2011007-08	2011Q4	P.6	Failure to Adequately Manage the Risk Involved with a Maintenance Window for the Turbine Driven Essential Feedwater Pump
05000382/FIN-2011007-07	2011Q4	H.14	Failure to Provide an Adequate Basis for Temperature Limits of Auxiliary Component Cooling Water Pump Motor Bearings
05000382/FIN-2011007-06	2011Q4		Failure to Establish an Analysis of the Effect of Reverse Rotation of Dry Cooling Tower Fan Motors Resulting from a Tornado Event
05000382/FIN-2011007-05	2011Q4		Failure to Establish an Analysis to Support the Adequacy of the Four Inch Bulkhead Drain to Protect the Ultimate Heat Sink During Flood Events
05000382/FIN-2011007-04	2011Q4		Failure to Provide Adequate Preventive Maintenance Procedures for Aluminum/Copper Electrical Connections to the Ultimate Heat Sink Transformers
05000382/FIN-2011007-03	2011Q4		Failure to Provide an Adequate Basis for Extrapolation of Vendor Supplied Pump Net Positive Suction Head Values
05000382/FIN-2011007-02	2011Q4		Failure to Establish an Adequate Containment Spray Pump Design Basis Verification Surveillance Test
05000382/FIN-2011007-01	2011Q4		Failure to Assure Design Basis Input was Correctly Translated into Design Basis Calculations
05000382/FIN-2011005-05	2011Q4		Failure to Follow Work Order Instructions to Install a Swagelok Fitting on a Main Feedwater Isolation Valve Tube Connection
05000382/FIN-2011005-04	2011Q4	H.7	Failure to Translate Tornado Impact on the Ultimate Heat Sink During a Refueling Outage
05000382/FIN-2011005-02	2011Q4	P.5	Failure to Identify and Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality Associated with the Main Feedwater Isolation Valves
05000382/FIN-2012002-01	2012Q1		Failure to Develop Preventive Maintenance Tasks for Critical Limit Switches on Component Cooling Water Inlet Isolation Valves
05000382/FIN-2012002-02	2012Q1	H.7	Failure to Identify and Perform Testing to Demonstrate Performance of SAFETY-RELATED Valves
05000382/FIN-2012007-02	2012Q1		Failue to Calculate Adequate Cooling Provided to Diesel Generator B within Required Time
05000382/FIN-2012007-01	2012Q1		Failure to Adequately Evaluate the Impact of Fire Damage on the Dry Cooling Tower Fans
05000382/FIN-2012202-01	2012Q2	P.1	Security
05000382/FIN-2012003-02	2012Q2	H.14	Failure to Provide Adequate Design Control Measures for Verifying or Checking the Adequacy of the Ultimate Heat Sink Thermal Performance Analysis
05000382/FIN-2012003-01	2012Q2	H.7	Failure to Establish Adequate Procedural Guidance to Control Feedwater Heater Level Control Valves
05000382/FIN-2012004-03	2012Q3	P.2	Failure to Identify and Correct a Torn Diaphragm of a SAFETY-RELATED Air Operated Valve Associated with the Emergency Feedwater System
05000382/FIN-2012004-04	2012Q3	H.13	Failure to Adequately Access and Manage Risk Before Performing Maintenance Activities Associated with NON-STANDARD Lifts
05000382/FIN-2012004-02	2012Q3	P.2	Failure to Identify and Correct Degraded Conditions Associated with the Auxiliary Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Outlet Temperature Control Valve
05000382/FIN-2012004-01	2012Q3	P.5	Failure to Establish Procedural Controls to Ensure That Licensed Operators Could Perform Immediate and Time Critical Operator Actions Associated with Security and Fire Events
05000382/FIN-2012008-01	2012Q3	P.5	Failure to Promptly Determine the Operability of the Emergency Diesel Generators
05000382/FIN-2012008-02	2012Q3	H.6	Failure to Take Corrective Action Associated with Emergency Feedwater Pump AB
05000382/FIN-2012008-03	2012Q3	H.6	Failure to Take Timely Corrective Action to Establish a Basis for Flood Control Measures
05000382/FIN-2012008-04	2012Q3	H.8	Failue to Ensure Operator Knowledge of Equipment Status
05000382/FIN-2012008-05	2012Q3	H.8	Failure to Develop Effective Corrective Actions to Preclude Repetition
05000382/FIN-2012403-01	2012Q3		Security
05000382/FIN-2012403-02	2012Q3	H.14	Security
05000382/FIN-2012403-03	2012Q3	H.10	Security
05000382/FIN-2012403-04	2012Q3	H.9	Security

Self-Identified List (Waterford)

	Q	Title
05000382/FIN-2011005-06	2011Q4	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000382/FIN-2012003-03	2012Q2	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000382/FIN-2012008-06	2012Q3	Licensee-Identified Violation

[Waterford Findings full list]

05000382/FIN-2012004-03

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