05000382/FIN-2012004-01

Finding

Title

Failure to Establish Procedural Controls to Ensure That Licensed Operators Could Perform Immediate and Time Critical Operator Actions Associated with Security and Fire Events

Description

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, Technical Specification 6.8.1.a because the licensee did not establish procedural controls to ensure that the assigned minimum staff of licensed operators could perform immediate and time critical operator actions associated with a security or fire event. Specifically, the licensee did not establish procedural guidance to restrict licensed operators from leaving the protected area. As a result, the licensee could not ensure that operators would respond in a timely manner to perform immediate and time critical operator actions required by a fire or security event. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR-WF3-2012-3815. The immediate corrective actions taken to restore compliance included the issuing of a standing instruction to instruct the assigned minimum staff of licensed operators to remain in the protected area unless officially relieved of their duties. The failure to establish procedural controls to ensure that licensed operators could perform immediate and time critical steps associated with security and fire events was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating System Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee would have been challenged to complete immediate and time critical steps with licensed operators being outside the protected area. The inspectors used NRC Inspection Manual 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, to evaluate this issue. The finding required a detailed analysis because it could be risk significant for external events. Therefore, the senior reactor analyst performed a bounding detailed risk evaluation. The analyst determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the bounding change to the core damage frequency was less than 4.0 E-7/year. The risk important sequences included control room fires that required a control room evacuation. The short duration of the operator being outside the protected area reduced the risk significance. The inspectors concluded that the finding reflected current licensee performance and involved a cross-cutting aspect in the operating experience component of the problem identification and resolution area in that the licensee did not implement and institutionalize operating experience through changes to station processes and procedures

01
Site:	Waterford
Report	IR 05000382/2012004 Section 1R11
Date counted	Sep 30, 2012 (2012Q3)
Type:	NCV: Green
cornerstone	Mitigating Systems
Identified by:	NRC identified
Inspection Procedure:	IP 71111.11
Inspectors (proximate)	P Elkmann M Davis D Allen W Sifre J Laughlin R Cureton R Azua D Overland C Speer
CCA	P.5, Operating Experience
INPO aspect	CL.1
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v • d • e

Finding - Waterford - IR 05000382/2012004

1(0)2(2)3(3)4(4)5(5)6(0)7(2)8(6)9(0)10(0)11(0)201(0)202(1)301(0)403(4)404(2)405(0)503(0)801(0)1(0)15(0)

IR 05000382/2012004: 1 2 3 4

Finding List (Waterford) @ 2012Q3

CCA Matrix: 2012Q3

	Q	CCA	Title
05000382/FIN-2011005-01	2011Q4	H.14	Inoperable Train of Containment Cooling System
05000382/FIN-2011005-03	2011Q4		Failure to Periodically Update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
05000382/FIN-2011007-08	2011Q4	P.6	Failure to Adequately Manage the Risk Involved with a Maintenance Window for the Turbine Driven Essential Feedwater Pump
05000382/FIN-2011007-07	2011Q4	H.14	Failure to Provide an Adequate Basis for Temperature Limits of Auxiliary Component Cooling Water Pump Motor Bearings
05000382/FIN-2011007-06	2011Q4		Failure to Establish an Analysis of the Effect of Reverse Rotation of Dry Cooling Tower Fan Motors Resulting from a Tornado Event
05000382/FIN-2011007-05	2011Q4		Failure to Establish an Analysis to Support the Adequacy of the Four Inch Bulkhead Drain to Protect the Ultimate Heat Sink During Flood Events
05000382/FIN-2011007-04	2011Q4		Failure to Provide Adequate Preventive Maintenance Procedures for Aluminum/Copper Electrical Connections to the Ultimate Heat Sink Transformers
05000382/FIN-2011007-03	2011Q4		Failure to Provide an Adequate Basis for Extrapolation of Vendor Supplied Pump Net Positive Suction Head Values
05000382/FIN-2011007-02	2011Q4		Failure to Establish an Adequate Containment Spray Pump Design Basis Verification Surveillance Test
05000382/FIN-2011007-01	2011Q4		Failure to Assure Design Basis Input was Correctly Translated into Design Basis Calculations
05000382/FIN-2011005-05	2011Q4		Failure to Follow Work Order Instructions to Install a Swagelok Fitting on a Main Feedwater Isolation Valve Tube Connection
05000382/FIN-2011005-04	2011Q4	H.7	Failure to Translate Tornado Impact on the Ultimate Heat Sink During a Refueling Outage
05000382/FIN-2011005-02	2011Q4	P.5	Failure to Identify and Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality Associated with the Main Feedwater Isolation Valves
05000382/FIN-2012002-01	2012Q1		Failure to Develop Preventive Maintenance Tasks for Critical Limit Switches on Component Cooling Water Inlet Isolation Valves
05000382/FIN-2012002-02	2012Q1	H.7	Failure to Identify and Perform Testing to Demonstrate Performance of SAFETY-RELATED Valves
05000382/FIN-2012007-02	2012Q1		Failue to Calculate Adequate Cooling Provided to Diesel Generator B within Required Time
05000382/FIN-2012007-01	2012Q1		Failure to Adequately Evaluate the Impact of Fire Damage on the Dry Cooling Tower Fans
05000382/FIN-2012202-01	2012Q2	P.1	Security
05000382/FIN-2012003-02	2012Q2	H.14	Failure to Provide Adequate Design Control Measures for Verifying or Checking the Adequacy of the Ultimate Heat Sink Thermal Performance Analysis
05000382/FIN-2012003-01	2012Q2	H.7	Failure to Establish Adequate Procedural Guidance to Control Feedwater Heater Level Control Valves
05000382/FIN-2012004-03	2012Q3	P.2	Failure to Identify and Correct a Torn Diaphragm of a SAFETY-RELATED Air Operated Valve Associated with the Emergency Feedwater System
05000382/FIN-2012004-04	2012Q3	H.13	Failure to Adequately Access and Manage Risk Before Performing Maintenance Activities Associated with NON-STANDARD Lifts
05000382/FIN-2012004-02	2012Q3	P.2	Failure to Identify and Correct Degraded Conditions Associated with the Auxiliary Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Outlet Temperature Control Valve
05000382/FIN-2012004-01	2012Q3	P.5	Failure to Establish Procedural Controls to Ensure That Licensed Operators Could Perform Immediate and Time Critical Operator Actions Associated with Security and Fire Events
05000382/FIN-2012008-01	2012Q3	P.5	Failure to Promptly Determine the Operability of the Emergency Diesel Generators
05000382/FIN-2012008-02	2012Q3	H.6	Failure to Take Corrective Action Associated with Emergency Feedwater Pump AB
05000382/FIN-2012008-03	2012Q3	H.6	Failure to Take Timely Corrective Action to Establish a Basis for Flood Control Measures
05000382/FIN-2012008-04	2012Q3	H.8	Failue to Ensure Operator Knowledge of Equipment Status
05000382/FIN-2012008-05	2012Q3	H.8	Failure to Develop Effective Corrective Actions to Preclude Repetition
05000382/FIN-2012403-01	2012Q3		Security
05000382/FIN-2012403-02	2012Q3	H.14	Security
05000382/FIN-2012403-03	2012Q3	H.10	Security
05000382/FIN-2012403-04	2012Q3	H.9	Security

Self-Identified List (Waterford)

	Q	Title
05000382/FIN-2011005-06	2011Q4	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000382/FIN-2012003-03	2012Q2	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000382/FIN-2012008-06	2012Q3	Licensee-Identified Violation

[Waterford Findings full list]

05000382/FIN-2012004-01

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