05000382/FIN-2012002-02
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Identify and Perform Testing to Demonstrate Performance of SAFETY-RELATED Valves |
Description | The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, because the licensee did not identify and perform testing on a safety-related component to demonstrate that it would perform satisfactorily in service in accordance with requirements contained in applicable design documents. Specifically, the licensee did not identify and perform proper testing for the essential chiller hot gas bypass valves RFR-106A, B, and C. As a result, the licensee could not demonstrate that the safety-related valves would perform satisfactorily in service without performing a test and operability evaluation. The licensee entered this condition into the corrective action program as CR-WF3-2012-0632 and CR-WF3-2012-0659. The immediate corrective action included testing the hot gas bypass valves to demonstrate the proper performance of their safety function. The failure to identify and perform testing to demonstrate that a safety-related component would perform satisfactorily in service in accordance with requirements contained in applicable design documents is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affects the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the hot gas bypass valve closure is required to ensure the essential chiller can perform its safety function during all design basis accident conditions. The inspectors determined the significance of the finding using the NRC Inspection Manual 0609, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings. The inspectors determined that the finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because it is not a design or qualification deficiency, did not represent a loss of a safety function of a system or a single train for greater than its technical specification completion time, and did not screen as potentially risk-significant due to any external initiating events. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the resources component of the human performance area in that the licensee did not ensure that complete, accurate, and up-to-date test procedures were available to demonstrate that equipment performance is adequate to assure nuclear safety |
Site: | Waterford |
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Report | IR 05000382/2012002 Section 1R22 |
Date counted | Mar 31, 2012 (2012Q1) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.22 |
Inspectors (proximate) | M Davis D Allen J Laughlin R Azua D Overland |
CCA | H.7, Documentation |
INPO aspect | WP.3 |
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Finding - Waterford - IR 05000382/2012002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Waterford) @ 2012Q1
Self-Identified List (Waterford)
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