05000382/FIN-2012002-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Develop Preventive Maintenance Tasks for Critical Limit Switches on Component Cooling Water Inlet Isolation Valves |
| Description | A Green self-revealing, non-cited violation of Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, Technical Specification 6.8.1.a occurred because the licensee did not establish procedures for performing preventive maintenance tasks on the dry cooling tower component cooling water inlet isolation valves CC-135A and CC-135B limit switches. Specifically, the licensee had not developed preventive maintenance tasks to lubricate or replace critical limit switches that provide a permissive for the operation of the dry cooling tower fans. As a result, on February 4, 2011, the limit switch on valve CC-135A failed to operate as designed and rendered an entire train of fans inoperable. The licensee entered this condition into their corrective action program as CR-WF3-2011-0679 for resolution. The immediate corrective action included the lubrication of the limit switch and the manual stroking of the valve to obtain free and smooth movement of the degraded equipment. The planned corrective actions included the development of a preventive maintenance task to lubricate and replace the limit switches on a scheduled frequency. The failure to establish procedures for performing preventive maintenance tasks on the dry cooling tower component cooling water inlet isolation valves CC-135A and CC-135B limit switches is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affects the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, since there was no preventive maintenance task for lubrication and replacement of the equipment, the limit switches can become stuck and render an entire train of dry cooling tower fans inoperable. The inspectors determined the significance of the finding using the NRC Inspection Manual 0609, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings. The inspectors determined that the finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because it is not a design or qualification deficiency, did not represent a loss of a safety function of a system or a single train for greater than its technical specification completion time, and did not screen as potentially risk-significant due to an external initiating events. The inspectors also concluded that no cross-cutting aspect is applicable to this finding because the performance deficiency is not reflective of current performance |
| Site: | Waterford  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000382/2012002 Section 1R19 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2012 (2012Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.19 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Davis D Allen J Laughlin R Azua D Overland |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Waterford - IR 05000382/2012002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Waterford) @ 2012Q1
Self-Identified List (Waterford)
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