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Monticello - Revision 33 to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Appendix I, Evaluation of High Energy Line Breaks Outside Containment
	ML16054A440
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Site:	Monticello
Issue date:	01/26/2016
From:	; Northern States Power Co, Xcel Energy
To:	; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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ML16054A376	List: L-MT-16-004, Revision 33 to Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Drawings NF-36058 Through NH-36243-1, Rev. 82 (Public); ML16054A388; ML16054A413; ML16054A414; ML16054A415; ML16054A416; ML16054A417; ML16054A418; ML16054A419; ML16054A420; ML16054A421; ML16054A422; ML16054A423; ML16054A424; ML16054A425; ML16054A426; ML16054A427; ML16054A428; ML16054A429; ML16054A432; ML16054A434; ML16054A435; ML16054A436; ML16054A438; ML16054A439; ML16054A440; ML16054A441; ML16054A442; ML16054A443; ML16054A444; ML16054A445; ML16054A446; ML16054A447; ML16054A448; ML16155A258; ML16155A259;
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APPENDIX IEVALUATION OF HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT

APPENDIX IEVALUATION OF HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT I.1Evaluation Criteria

I.1.1Definition of Terms

I.1.2Assumptions

APPENDIX IEVALUATION OF HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT I.2High Energy Systems and Piping

I.2.1

I.2.2

APPENDIX II.3

I.3.1

I.3.2

I.3.3

I.3.4

Revision 26USAR I.4MONTICELLO UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORTPage 1 of 13APPENDIX IEVALUATION OF HIGH ENERGY LINEBREAKS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENTI/kabI.4Safe Shutdown RequirementsThe systems, components, and structures used to mitigate the consequences of apostulated HELB and bring the unit to safe shutdown condition are the HELBtargets of concern. Identification of these systems was required, so that evaluationof the effects of potential HELBs could be assessed. The basis for determining these systems can be found by defining the safe shutdown performance goals andconservatively assuming a coincident loss of off-site power.The Safe Shutdown performance goals, as identified in Reference 5 are:(1)Insert sufficient negative reactivity to maintain the reactor in a subcriticalcondition.(2)Restore and maintain reactor vessel water level above the active fuel levelprecluding fuel cladding failure.(3)Prevent over pressurization of the reactor vessel.(4)Remove decay heat generated in the core with sufficient capability toallow the reactor to be brought from hot to cold shutdown and maintain thecold shutdown condition.I.4.1Safe Shutdown SystemsBased upon the information provided in the Updated Safety Analysis Report, the previous HELB analysis (Reference 1), and the Fire Protection Safe ShutdownAnalysis Report (Reference 5), the following list identifies those systems, forwhich credit can be taken to satisfy the performance goals above and thus effecta safe shutdown in the event of a postulated HELB.(1)Reactor Protection System (RPS), Control Rod Drive System (CRD) andControl Rods.(2)High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI).(3)Reactor Pressure Relief - Safety/Relief Valves (SRVs)(4)Residual Heat Removal (RHR) including:(a)Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) Mode(b)Shutdown Cooling (SDC) Mode(c)Suppression Pool Cooling (SPC) Mode01196839 Revision 26USAR I.4MONTICELLO UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORTPage 2 of 13I/kab(5)Core Spray (CS).(6)RHR Service Water (7)Shutdown Instrumentation (See Section I.4.1.1)(8)Auxiliary Support(a)On-site Power and Distribution System (b)Emergency Service Water (ESW)(c)Emergency Diesel Generator Auxiliary Systems (d)DC Power Systems(e)Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) SystemsI.4.1.1Shutdown InstrumentationThe minimum required process instrumentation to assure safe shutdown is asfollows:(1)Reactor Vessel Level Indication (2)Reactor Pressure Indication(3)Suppression Pool Temperature Indication(4)Suppression Pool Level IndicationI.4.2Description of Safe Shutdown PathsThe paths to safe shutdown for any postulated HELB coincident with a loss ofoff-site power and a single active failure can be described by identifying theshutdown priority using the performance goals previously described.Safe shutdown can be described as reducing RPV pressure and temperaturefrom the normal operating conditions of approximately 1015 psia and 545°F to aRPV coolant temperature of less than 212°F and the RPV vented with thereactor in a subcritical condition and no fuel damage or breach of Primary Containment. The minimum equipment necessary for safe shutdown includesthe following:(1)The Reactor Protection System and Control Rod Drive System (negativereactivity function)

Revision 26USAR I.4MONTICELLO UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORTPage 3 of 13I/kab(2)3 SRVs (RPV overpressure protection and decay heat removal functions)(3)1 RHR pump (LPCI Mode) or 1 Core Spray pump and 1 RHR pump inSPC Mode (reactor vessel level maintenance and decay heat removalfunctions)(4)1 RHR Service Water pump (decay heat removal function)(5)1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG), EDG auxiliaries, 1 EDGEmergency Service Water pump, 1 Emergency Service Water pump, and1 Division of safety related power distribution (for all functions exceptnegative reactivity)(6)Shutdown Instrumentation (from Reference 5)(a)Reactor Vessel Level(b)Reactor Pressure(c)Suppression Pool Temperature (d)Suppression Pool LevelEvaluations performed to determine acceptable paths to safe shutdown utilizedthe above described minimum necessary equipment.Additional safe shutdown paths can be described depending on the location ofthe postulated HELB and the single active failure taken. The HPCI system canbe used to maintain RPV water level and depressurize the RPV, so that the lowpressure high flow pumps (RHR or CS) can be used. Table I.4-1 identifies thesystems available to support each shutdown performance goal.For any postulated HELB with HPCI available, RCIC is not required, since HPCIcould perform the same function. For any postulated HELB with HPCI notavailable due to a single active failure or HELB related damage, the unit is shutdown using the SRVs (RPV depressurization), Core Spray (RPV water levelmaintenance), and RHR (decay heat removal and RPV water levelmaintenance). No single active failure could affect more than 1 SRV, 1 CS division, or 1 RHR division.The RCIC System is not required for any postulated HELB in any of the identifiedcompartments. However, for most postulated HELBs RCIC is available to support safe shutdown.For any postulated HELB, at least one division of ESW is available to providecooling to one division of RHR and CS systems. Hence, safe shutdown can be accomplished for any postulated HELB without requiring the RCIC System tosupport the safe shutdown.0119683901196839 Revision 26USAR I.4MONTICELLO UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORTPage 4 of 13I/kabI.4.3Safe Shutdown System Component LocationsFor each of the systems identified in Section I.4.1 of this report, the locations ofthe major components, main pipe routings, and power and control cable routings are listed in this section. The information is provided by system and HELBanalysis volume for reference.I.4.3.1Reactor Protection SystemThe Reactor Protection System (RPS) consists of the motor generator setpower supplies, the RPS power distribution panels, sensors and cabling. The two motor-generator sets are located in the Reactor Building on the 935-footelevation in Volumes 14 and 17. The RPS power distribution panels arelocated in the Cable Spreading Room. There are sensors (i.e., high reactorpressure, etc.) included in the protection system that are located in a variety ofsites throughout the plant.I.4.3.2Control Rod Drive SystemThe Control Rod Drive System consists of the control rods and the associated control rod drive hydraulic units. The electrical signals to the scram valves onthe control rod drive hydraulic units are provided by the RPS. The control rodsand Control Rod Drives are located inside of the Primary Containment. Thecontrol rod drive hydraulic units are located in two separate banks on eitherside of the Primary Containment on the 935 foot elevation of the Reactor Building in Volumes 14 and 18.I.4.3.3High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) SystemThe HPCI System consists of a pump with a steam driven turbine andassociated valving. It is located primarily in the HPCI room (Volume 8). TheHPCI steam supply line and the HPCI injection line (PS18-8-ED andTW3-12-ED, respectively) are routed from main the steam chase (Volume 16)to the HPCI room (Volume 8). The valving for the HPCI System is located in the above identified compartments. Power cabling for the HPCI System isrouted from the batteries in the EFT Building into the Turbine Building in theeast corridor on the 931-foot elevation (Volume 20). The cables are then routed into the condenser bay (Volume 15), from there into the CRD pump room(Volume 7), down to equipment and floor drain tank area (Volume 6), and finallyinto the HPCI Room (Volume 8).

Revision 26USAR I.4MONTICELLO UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORTPage 5 of 13I/kabI.4.3.4Reactor Pressure Relief SystemThe eight SRVs and associated piping are located inside of the PrimaryContainment on the main steam lines. There are four control panels and two instrument racks associated with the SRVs. The SRV control panel is locatedin the Cable Spreading Room. The SRV Low-Low Set control panel "A" islocated in the cable spreading area. The "B" control panels are located in themain control room and on the third floor of the EFT Building. The SRV low-lowset instrument rack "A" is located in the northeast corner of the torus area(Volume 9) and the "B" rack is located on the 935-foot elevation of the ReactorBuilding near the west side CRD hydraulic units (Volume 18).I.4.3.5Residual Heat Removal (RHR) SystemThe RHR System is a two divisional system with two motor driven pumps ineach division. The valving for the system consists of a series of suction anddischarge valves, which allow the RHR System to be operated in various modes. Two of the RHR pumps are located in the southeast corner room of theReactor Building (Volume 1) and the other two in the southwest corner room ofthe Reactor Building (Volume 3). The suction valving is located in threeseparate compartments. Most of the RHR pump discharge valves are alsolocated in the corner rooms with the following exceptions:(1)Division I suppression pool cooling (SPC) valves (MO-2006 andMO-2008) and the Division II SPC valve (MO-2009) are located in thetorus area (Volume 9-12).(2)Division II SPC mode outboard valve (MO-2007) is located on the westside of Reactor Building, at the 935-foot elevation in Volume 19.(3)The Division I LPCI injection and SDC containment isolation valves(MO-2014 and MO-2012) and the shutdown cooling line outboard isolation valve (MO-2030) are located in Volume 13 on the 935-foot elevation of theReactor Building.(4)The Division II LPCI Injection and SDC containment isolation valves(MO-2013 and MO-2015) are located in Volume 20 on the 935-footelevation of the Reactor Building.(5)The Division I containment spray isolation valves (MO-2020 andMO-2022) are located in Volume 14 on the 948-foot elevation of the Reactor Building and the Division II valves (MO-2021 and MO-2023) arelocated on the 962-foot 6-inch elevation in Volumes 31 and 33.01196839 Revision 26USAR I.4MONTICELLO UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORTPage 6 of 13I/kabThe power cabling for the RHR Pumps is routed from the respectivesafety-related switchgear room in the Turbine Building Volume 8 (Division I) andVolume 31 (Division II) underground to the Reactor Building. Division I cablesare then routed to RCIC room (Volume 5) and continue underground to thesoutheast corner room (Volume 1). The Division II cables are routed underground to the Reactor Building drain tank room (Volume 6) and thencontinue underground to the southwest corner room (Volume 3). The powercables to the valves are routed from the respective MCCs in the TurbineBuilding Volume 1 (Division I) and Volume 20 (Division II), to the CableSpreading Room, and into the Reactor Building via Volume 14 (Division I) and Volume 17 (Division II). From there the cables are routed to the respectivevalves. The control cables follow the routing of the valves' power cables. Thepower and control cables for Division II RHR valves MO-2007, MO-2009, andMO-2003 are routed from MCCs (Volume 24) to the third floor EFT Building.They then go underground around the south side of the Reactor Building to the 935-foot elevation (Volume 18) of the Reactor Building and then to therespective valves.I.4.3.6Core Spray (CS) SystemThe Core Spray System is a two divisional system capable of takingsuppression pool water and spraying it over the top of the reactor core. Eachdivision has a core spray pump, a valve on the suction line to the suppressionchamber, and inboard and outboard injection valves.The Division I pump (P-208A) is located in the southeast corner room of theReactor Building (Volume 1) in the same room with the Division I RHR pumps.Its suction line, (TW6-12-HE) is routed from the suppression chamber area(Volume 10) to the CS pump. The pool suction valve (MO-1741) is located inthe southeast corner room (Volume 1) with the CS pump. The discharge pipingis routed from the southeast corner room, up through the east side of the935-foot elevation of the Reactor Building (Volume 14) and finally up to the962-foot 6-inch elevation of the Reactor Building on the east side (Volume 22).The inboard and outboard injection valves (MO-1753 and MO-1751,respectively) are located in this area (Volume 22).The Division II Core Spray System is located on the west side of the ReactorBuilding. The Division II core spray pump (P-208B) and the pool suction valve(MO-1742) are located in the southwest corner room (Volume 3). The CS pump suction piping is routed from the suppression chamber area (Volume 11) to thesouthwest corner room. The pump discharge piping is routed from thesouthwest corner room up through the 935-foot elevation of the ReactorBuilding (Volume 19), and up to the 962-foot 6-inch elevation of the ReactorBuilding (Volume 31). The inboard and outboard injection valves (MO-1754 and MO-1752, respectively) are located on the west side of the ReactorBuilding at the 962-foot 6-inch elevation in Volume 31.The cabling for each division of the Core Spray System follows the samerouting as the corresponding division of RHR.

Revision 26USAR I.4MONTICELLO UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORTPage 7 of 13I/kabI.4.3.7RHR Service Water SystemThe RHR Service Water (RHRSW) System supplies water from the ultimateheat sink (river) to the tube side of the RHR heat exchangers and back to the river. The system has 4 pumps with 2 dedicated to each division. The pumpsfor both divisions are located in the Intake Structure pump room (Volume 18).The discharge piping is routed from the Intake Structure (Volume 18) throughthe access tunnel (Volume 16) into the Turbine Building north corridor(Volume 5). From the Turbine Building north corridor they are routed above the931-foot elevation of the Turbine Building through Volumes 20 and 25, and intothe condenser bay area (Volume 15). The lines exit the Turbine Building from the condenser bay and penetrate the Reactor Building in the TIP drive room,Volume 17. From the TIP drive room, the lines are routed to the torus area(Volumes 9-12) and then to the respective corner rooms.Auxiliary air compressors are located on the 935-foot elevation of the ReactorBuilding, Division I in Volume 14 and Division II in Volume 19. Each divisions' heat exchanger discharge pressure control valves (CV-1728 and CV-1729) arealso located in the respective corner rooms.Cabling for the system is routed entirely within the Turbine Building. The powercabling for the pumps is routed from the respective switchgear areas (Volumes8, and 31) to the Intake Structure (Volume 18). Control cabling is routed to the Control Room via the respective divisional routing in the Turbine Building. ForDivision I this would be from the cable spreading room to Volumes 21, 2, 22and 27. For Division II this would be from the cable spreading room to Volume20 and then into the switchgear area.I.4.3.8Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) SystemWhile not required for safe shutdown, the RCIC System may be used if available. A description is included in this section for completeness.The RCIC System, like the HPCI System, consists of a steam driventhe associated valves are located in RCIC room (Volume 5). The steam supplythe RCIC room through the torus area (Volume 9) and up into main steam chase (Volume 16). The valving for the RCIC System is located in either theRCIC room or main steam chase. The RCIC power cables are routed from thebatteries in the Plant Administration Building through the Cable SpreadingRoom into TIP drive room (Volume 17) in the Reactor Building and down to theRCIC room (Volume 5).0119683901196839 Revision 26USAR I.4MONTICELLO UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORTPage 8 of 13I/kabI.4.3.9Shutdown InstrumentationThe Shutdown Instrumentation, like the other safety related equipment isdivisionalized. The locations for the components for each division are given below:DivisionParameterMeasuredEquipmentDesignationCompartmentIReactor Water LevelLT-2-3-112AEast side of ReactorBldg. Elev. 935-footISuppression Pool LevelLT-7338ATorus AreaIReactor PressurePT-6-53AEast side of Reactor Bldg. Elev. 962-foot 6-inchISuppression Pool TemperatureTE-4073A to 4080ATorus AreaIIReactor Water LevelLT-2-3-112BWest side of Reactor Bldg. Elev. 935-footIISuppression Pool LevelLT-7338BTorus AreaIIReactor PressurePT-6-53BWest side of Reactor Bldg. Elev. 962-foot 6-inchIISuppression Pool TemperatureTE-4073B to 4080BTorus AreaThe cabling from these instruments is routed through the same routingschemes back to the cable spreading area as are the other safety-relateddivisional separated cables. The only exceptions are the Division IIsuppression pool temperature cables and Alternate Shutdown System (ASDS)instruments. From the torus area they are routed into the condenser bay (Volume 15) and through Volume 20 on the 931-foot elevation of the TurbineBuilding and into the Emergency Filtration Building from there. ASDSinstruments that have been rerouted are reactor water level LT-2-3-112B andsuppression pool level LT-7338B. The routing is underground around the southside of the Reactor Building to the third floor, EFT.

Revision 26USAR I.4MONTICELLO UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORTPage 9 of 13I/kabI.4.3.10Emergency Service Water SystemsThe two emergency service water systems, consisting of the Emergency DieselGenerator Emergency Service Water (EDG-ESW) System and the EmergencyFiltration Train Emergency Service Water (EFT-ESW) System, are both two divisional systems which collectively supply cooling water to the emergencydiesel generators, the ECCS pump room coolers, the RHR & Core Spraypumps, and the EFT System. The systems, when combined, consist of 4pumps, P-111A, B, C & D, located in the Intake Structure (Volume 18). PumpsP-111A and P-111C are both Division I components, and pumps P-111B and P-111D are both Division II components.I.4.3.10.1Emergency Diesel Generator Emergency Service Water SystemPump P-111A and P-111B are used to supply cooling water to the Division I andDivision II emergency diesel generator, respectively. The discharge piping fromeach EDG-ESW pump tees in the intake structure with separate 4 inch lines routed underground to the respective EDG. The other branch of the tee oneach line has a closed manual valve in the Intake Structure (ESW-61-1 andESW-61-2). The cooling water lines to the EDGs are cross-tied in the IntakeStructure. This allows cooling of either EDG from pump P-111A or P-111B.The power cable for Division I ESW pump P-111A is routed from MCC-134 inthe EFT Building, into the main feedpump area, (Volume 3), along the east corridor at the 911-foot elevation (Volume 3), along the north Turbine Buildingcorridor (Volume 5), through the access tunnel (Volume 16), and into the intakestructure. A control cable for P-111A is routed from the Control Room, throughthe Cable Spreading Room, through Volume 21, into the main feedpump area(Volume 3) and into the EFT Building. Another control cable for P-111A is routed from C-03 in the Control Room, through the Cable Spreading Room,through Volume 21, into the main feedpump area (Volume 3), along the eastcorridor at the 911-foot elevation, along the north Turbine Building corridor(Volume 5), and into the Division I essential switchgear area (Volume 8) beforeentering the Division I EDG compartment (Volume 29).The power cable for Division II ESW pump P-111B is routed from MCC-143located in the southeast corner of the Turbine Building on elevation 931-foot(Volume 20), along the east corridor of the Turbine Building (Volume 20), alongthe north Turbine Building corridor (Volume 26), and into the Division IIessential switchgear area (Volume 31) before entering the Intake Structurethrough an underground duct bank. The control cables for P-111B originate in the EFT Building and are routed into the Turbine Building, southeast corner, atelevation 931-foot. From there, one of the control cables is routed directly intothe Control Room, one is routed to MCC-143 (which is located in Volume 20),and one is routed along the east Turbine Building corridor at the 931-footelevation (Volume 20), along the north Turbine Building corridor (Volume 26),

and into the Division II essential switchgear area (Volume 31) before enteringthe Division II Emergency Diesel Generator compartment (Volume 30).

Revision 26USAR I.4MONTICELLO UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORTPage 10 of 13I/kabI.4.3.10.2Emergency Filtration Train Emergency Service Water SystemPumps P-111C & D supply cooling water to the respective Division I and IIECCS pump room coolers, the RHR and Core Spray pumps, and the EFTSystem. The Division I ESW Line to ECCS room coolers and Division I RHRand Core Spray Pumps (ESW1-3-HF) is routed from the Intake Structure,through the access tunnel (Volume 16), into the Turbine Building north corridoron the 911-foot elevation (Volume 5). From there, it is routed in the northcorridor over into the reactor feed pump area (Volume 3). Within thiscompartment the lines tee again (Reference 18) with the piping lineESW1-3-HBD routed into the Emergency Filtration Building. The line to theECCS pump room coolers and RHR and Core Spray Pumps SW30A-3-HF isrouted from the main feed pump area into the condenser bay area (Volume 15) on the 911-foot elevation. The pipe is routed along the east wall over to thesouth wall of the room. The piping line exits the condenser bay through thesouth wall and into the Reactor Building. This line enters the Reactor Buildingin the TIP drive room (Volume 17) and is routed from there into the torus area(Volume 9). Once in the torus area the line tees again with part of the flow routed to the southeast corner room (Volume 1) and the remainder to the HPCIroom (Volume 8) for the Division I HPCI room cooler.The Division II ESW Line to the ECCS room coolers (ESW5-3-HF) follows aparallel route to its Division I counterpart to the north turbine corridor at the911-foot elevation (Volume 5). From there it is routed to Volume 20 on the931-foot elevation of the Turbine Building. In Volume 20 the line tees(Reference 19) with line SW30B-3-HF routed into Volume 21 and then into thecondenser bay (Volume 15). From the condenser bay, the line enters theReactor Building in the main steam chase (Volume 16) and from there is routedinto the torus area (Volume 12). After entering the torus area, the line teesagain with part of the flow going to the southwest corner room (Volume 3) andthe remainder to the Division II HPCI room cooler in the HPCI room (Volume 8).The cable for the other two ESW pumps (P-111C and P-111D) begins in theEFT Building. The power cable to P-111C is routed from MCC-134 in the EFTBuilding into the main feedpump area, Volume 3, along the east corridor at the911-foot elevation, and then along the north Turbine Building corridor Volume 5 into the access tunnel. One control cable is located entirely in the EFTBuilding. The other enters the Turbine Building in the main feedpump area,then is routed into Volume 21 and into the Cable Spreading Room, beforeentering the Control Room. For pump P-111D, the power cable is routed fromMCC-144 in the EFT Building into the Turbine Building southeast corner on the 931-foot elevation. It is then routed along the east corridor at that elevation intothe Division II cable way (Volume 35), and ending in Division II essentialswitchgear area, Volume 31. From there the cable is routed outsideunderground to the Intake Structure. Three control cables for this pump arelocated entirely within the EFT Building and the other enters the Turbine Building at the 931-foot elevation in Volume 20. From there it is routed up tothe turbine operating floor before entering the Control Room.

Revision 26USAR I.4MONTICELLO UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORTPage 11 of 13I/kabI.4.3.11Emergency Diesel Generators and AuxiliariesThere is one Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) for each essential division atMonticello. The EDGs are located in adjacent compartments with EDG-11located in Volume 29 and EDG-12 located in Volume 30. The local controlpanels and air start systems are also located in the respective compartmentwith the EDG. The oil day tanks are located next to Volume 29 in separate daytank rooms. Cabling for power to the local control and electrical cabinets is routed in the same manner as the control cables for RHRSW pumps. The EDGpower cabling is routed to the respective essential switchgear which are inadjacent compartments in the Turbine Building.I.4.3.12Auxiliary Power Distribution SystemsThe Auxiliary Power Distribution System consists of the 4KV switchgear, the 480Vac load center, motor control centers and the transformers between them.

The system is capable of distributing the electrical power generated by theEDGs under a loss of off-site power condition. For Division I, both the 4KVswitchgear and 480Vac distribution equipment are located in Volume 8 on the911-foot elevation of the Turbine Building in the northwest corner. The DivisionII load centers are located directly above the Division I load centers on the next floor (931-foot elevation) in Volume 31. Essential MCCs - 133A, 142A and143A are located in the southeast corner of the Turbine Building with Division IMCC-133A located on the 911-foot elevation in Volume 1 and Division II MCCs- 142A and 143A located on the 931-foot elevation in Volume 20. EssentialMCCs - 134 and 144 are located in the EFT. The EFT is not assigned a volumenumber because there are no high energy lines within the building.Cabling from load centers to the MCCs is routed in separate compartments.Cables from Division I load centers are routed from Volume 8 through Volumes35 and 26 terminating in Volume 20. Other Division I cables not terminating at the MCC are routed up into Volume 21 and into the cable spreading area. TheDivision II cables are routed from the load centers Volume 31 through Volumes32, 35 and 26 and terminating in Volume 20. Cables going to the cablespreading area are routed through Volume 20.I.4.3.13DC Power SystemsWith the exception of the 125 Vdc distribution panels located in the 4 KVswitchgear rooms, the major DC power components required for safe shutdownare located in the battery rooms of the Administration or Emergency FiltrationBuildings. The cabling is routed from Cable Spreading Room to the respectivecomponents along the divisional routings described previously. The onlyexception is the HPCI power cables, which are routed in a similar route to the Division II SPOTMOS cables. However, once routed into the Reactor Building,the HPCI cables are then routed to the HPCI area (Volume 8).

Revision 26USAR I.4MONTICELLO UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORTPage 12 of 13I/kabI.4.3.14HVAC SystemsThe only HVAC Equipment required for safe shutdown are the ECCS RoomCoolers, V-AC-5 (Division I) and V-AC-4 (Division II), located in respective Reactor Building corner rooms on the 920-foot elevation and the EDG supplyfan, V-SF-9 for EDG No. 12 and V-SF-10 for EDG No. 11. The cooling water forthe ECCS room coolers is supplied from the respective Emergency ServiceWater System pump with V-AC-5 supplied by P-111C, and V-AC-4 by P-111D.Power cabling for the V-AC-4 and V-AC-5 is routed into the Reactor Buildingfrom the cable spreading area in the same manner as the other divisionalcables.The power and control cables for Division I EDG supply fan (V-SF-10) arerouted from MCC-134 in the EFT Building, into the main feedpump area,(Volume 2), along the east corridor at the 911-foot elevation (Volume 3), alongthe north Turbine Building corridor (Volume 27) and into Division I switchgeararea (Volume 7) before entering the Division I EDG compartment (Volume 29).The power and control cables for Division II EDG supply fan (V-SF-9) arerouted from MCC-143 located in the southeast corner of the Turbine Building atthe 931-foot elevation, along the east corridor of the Turbine Building at the931-foot elevation, along the north Turbine Building corridor, and into theDivision II essential switchgear area (Volume 31) before entering the Division II EDG compartment (Volume 30).

Revision 26USAR I.4MONTICELLO UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORTPage 13 of 13I/kabTable I.4-1 Safe Shutdown Components AvailableSAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS AVAILABLE FOR EACH PERFORMANCE GOAL (1)DivisionEquipment Required toAchieve and MaintainSubcriticalityEquipment Required toMaintain RPV Inventory (4)Equipment Required forRPV DepressurizationEquipment Required to Remove DecayHeatIReactor Protection Systemand Control Rods and Control Rod Drives1CS Pump and 2 RHR Pumps Available(5)*1 CS Pump or 1 RHR Pump (LPCI Mode) (2)4 SRVs Available(5)*2 SRVs Needed for LPCI RPV Inventory Recovery or;*2 SRVs Needed for CS Pump RPV Inventory Recovery4 SRVs, 2 RHR Pumps, 1 CS Pump, 1 RHR Heat Exchanger, and 2 RHRSW Pumps Available*1 RHR Pump (SDC Mode), 1 RHR HeatExchanger, and 1 RHRSW PumpNeeded or;*1 CS Pump, 1 SRV, 1 RHR Pump (SPC Mode), 1 RHR Heat Exchanger, and 1RHRSW Pump Needed*1 RHR Pump (LPCI Mode), 1 RHR HeatExchanger, 1 SRV, and 1 RHRSW Pump NeededIIReactor Protection System and Control Rods and Control Rod DrivesHPCI, 1 CS Pump, and 2 RHR Pumps Available*HPCI, 1 CS Pump or RHRPump (LPCI Mode)Needed or;*1 CS Pump or 1 RHRPump (LPCI Mode) (3)HPCI and 4 SRVs Available*HPCI and 1 SRV Neededor;*2 SRVs Needed for LPCIRPV Inventory Recoveryor;*2 SRVs Needed for CS Pump RPV InventoryRecovery4 SRVs, 2 RHR Pump, 1 CS Pump, 1 RHRHeat Exchanger, and 2 RHRSW Pumps Available*1 RHR Pump (SDC Mode), RHR HeatExchanger, and 1 RHRSW PumpNeeded or;*1 CS Pump, 1 SRV, 1 RHR Pump (SPC Mode), 1 RHR Heat Exchanger, and 1RHRSW Pump Needed*1 RHR Pump, 1 SRV, 1 RHR HeatExchanger, and 1 RHRSW Pump Needed1Required Auxiliary Support Systems (i.e., EDG, EDG Auxiliaries, Essential Power Dist. Sys., ESW System, Shutdown Instrumentation) alwaysrequired.2Following RPV depressurization by SRVs and RCIC not available.3Following RPV depressurization by SRVs and HPCI not available.4RHR pump used for RPV Inventory Control cannot be same RHR pump used for Decay Heat Removal, except for the final path described for either division under decay heat removal of this table.5Though not required safe shutdown equipment, RCIC if available, could be used.0119683901196839 APPENDIX IEVALUATION OF HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT I.5HELB and Safe Shutdown Evaluation I.5.1

I.5.2HELB Evaluations by System

I.5.3Table of System Effects

1 1

APPENDIX IEVALUATION OF HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT I.6References

Revision30USAR-I.FIGMONTICELLOUPDATEDSAFETYANALYSISREPORTPage1of11APPENDIXIEVALUATIONOFHIGHENERGYLINEBREAKSOUTSIDECONTAINMENTI/arbFIGURES Revision30USAR-I.FIGMONTICELLOUPDATEDSAFETYANALYSISREPORTPage2of11I/arbFigureI.1-1ReactorBldgEl.896-0 Revision30USAR-I.FIGMONTICELLOUPDATEDSAFETYANALYSISREPORTPage3of11I/arbFigureI.1-2ReactorBldg(Approx923)TopofTorus-UpperLevelsofRHRRooms,HPCI,RCIC Revision30USAR-I.FIGMONTICELLOUPDATEDSAFETYANALYSISREPORTPage4of11I/arbFigureI.1-3ReactorBldg-El.935-0 Revision30USAR-I.FIGMONTICELLOUPDATEDSAFETYANALYSISREPORTPage5of11I/arbFigureI.1-4ReactorBldg-El.962-02425 Revision30USAR-I.FIGMONTICELLOUPDATEDSAFETYANALYSISREPORTPage6of11I/arbFigureI.1-5ReactorBldg-985(DW-983,Vessel-989)

Revision30USAR-I.FIGMONTICELLOUPDATEDSAFETYANALYSISREPORTPage7of11I/arbFigureI.1-6ReactorBldg-1001 Revision30USAR-I.FIGMONTICELLOUPDATEDSAFETYANALYSISREPORTPage8of11I/arbFigureI.1-7ReactorBldg-1027 Revision30USAR-I.FIGMONTICELLOUPDATEDSAFETYANALYSISREPORTPage9of11I/arbFigureI.1-8TurbineBldg.El.911-019 Revision30USAR-I.FIGMONTICELLOUPDATEDSAFETYANALYSISREPORTPage10of11I/arbFigureI.1-9TurbineBldg.El.931-001279956 Revision30USAR-I.FIGMONTICELLOUPDATEDSAFETYANALYSISREPORTPage11of11I/arbFigureI.1-10TurbineBldg.El.951-037 APPENDIX IEVALUATION OF HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT