ML16306A126

From kanterella
Revision as of 20:59, 4 May 2018 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Clinton - Updated Safety Analysis Report (Usar), Revision 18, Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems
ML16306A126
Person / Time
Site: Clinton Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 10/31/2016
From:
Exelon Generation Co
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML16305A350 List: ... further results
References
RS-16-196
Download: ML16306A126 (438)
v • d • e


Text

CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-1 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 9.3 PROCESS AUXILIARIES 9.3.1 Compressed Air Systems The compressed air system is divided into three subsystems, service air (SA), instrument air (IA), and breathing air (RA). The Breathing Air Compressors, Filter Train and associated instrumentation have been abandoned/retired in place. The Control Room Emergency Breathing Air System is still operable. 9.3.1.1 Design Bases 9.3.1.1.1 Safety Design Bases Certain IA system pressure regulators perform a safety-related function. These regulators are non-ASME,Section III. Only the following portions of the compressed air system are designed to the requirements of ASME,Section III. a. Those portions of the SA, IA, and RA systems which penetrate the containment and drywell walls are of Seismic Category I, Safety Class 2 design. These portions are equipped with Seismic Category I, Safety Class 2 designed isolation valves to satisfy single-failure criteria as discussed in Subsection 6.2.4. b. The portion of the IA system from the inside Containment isolation valves to the accumulators which provides air to the automatic depressurization system (ADS) accumulators is classified as Seismic Category I, Safety Class 3. c. The ADS accumulator backup air supply piping from the compressed air tank farm to the outside containment isolation valve is Seismic Cat I, Safety Class 3 except for the compressed air tank farms and air filters which are Seismic Category I, Safety Class Other. d. The portion of RA piping which is connected to the Control Room Emergency Breathing Air Storage System is classified as Seismic Category I, Safety Class Other. Breathing air is purified to grade D standards as listed in ANSI/CGA G-7.1, "Commodity Specification for Air". 9.3.1.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases a. The service air system provides oil free, filtered and dried air for service and maintenance use throughout the plant. The SA system is the source of air for the IA system. Pressure reducing devices are provided where needed. b. The IA system provides oil free, filtered, and dried air to instruments and controls throughout the plant, including ADS function safety/relief valves. 9.3.1.2 System Description a. The service air system is shown in Drawing M05-1048. The SA system consists of three air compressors, two volume tanks for moisture separation, three CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-2 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 heatless air dryers complete with prefilter and after-filter, two air receivers, and necessary piping, valves, and instrumentation. System component performance data are given in Table 9.3-1. Service air is distributed to the plant after compressing to 110 psig, drying to a dew point of -40° F and being filtered to remove all particles 0.9 micron and larger. Two compressors and two dryers are required for normal plant operation. One compressor runs continuously, the second compressor starts automatically when the discharge pressure falls below a preset value. A third compressor and dryer are provided as spares. Each building has a main header. Hose stations are connected to the main header for service and maintenance use. The hose stations are located throughout the plant. Equipment requiring frequent use of service air is connected directly to the service air header. Air receivers are located in the screen house and the makeup water pump house to ensure a supply of air in these buildings in the event that a break occurs in the line to these buildings. b. The instrument air system is shown in Drawing M05-1040. The IA system is used by one unit. Instrument Air receivers are provided in the screenhouse and makeup water pump house. Air receivers are not used in the main plant since a large storage capacity is provided by the piping system. Twelve air amplifiers are provided, for 100% redundancy. Each SRV utilized for automatic depressurization is equipped with an air accumulator and check valve arrangement. Two air bottle tank farms consisting of 8 bottles each are provided as a backup air supply for the ADS function and the low and medium LLS-SRV safety/relief valves. The IA system consists of the above-mentioned equipment and necessary piping, valves, and instrumentation. System component performance data are given in Table 9.3-1. The IA system takes filtered and dried air from the SA system and distributes it to air operated valves and instrumentation throughout the plant. Air for the ADS function and the low and medium LLS-SRV safety/relief valves is required to be between 140 psig (to ensure the ADS valves are capable of two actuations at 70% of drywell design pressure) and 200 psig (valve upper limit).

Air amplifiers are provided to boost the pressure to approximately 160 psig at normal instrument air system operating pressure. The air supply for the ADS and the low and medium LLS-SRV safety relief valves is split into two divisions. One division supplies air to the ADS safety/relief valves and the medium LLS-SRV on the A and C steamlines side of the reactor pressure vessel, and the other division supplies air to the valves (ADS and the low and LLS-SRV) on the B and D side. Each safety/relief valve is provided with a pneumatic accumulator sized to provide sufficient capacity to ensure an adequate supply pressure to the valve actuator. Each air supply line to an accumulator is provided with a check valve to prevent air loss back out of the accumulator. Each ADS safety/relief valve is provided with additional accumulator volume to provide sufficient air to perform the ADS function.

CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-3 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 Two redundant solenoid valves are provided for each ADS safety/relief valve and are arranged so that only one is required to operate to provide pneumatic supply to the actuating cylinder. Storage bottles provide a Seismic Category I backup supply of air for the ADS and the low and medium LLS-SRV safety/relief valves. A filter downstream of the storage bottles provides secondary IA filtration. A filter is also installed upstream on the IA supply to the MSIV's for the same purpose. Additional information on the requirements for the ADS air supply is provided in USAR section 5.2.2.4.1. 9.3.1.3 Safety Evaluation a. The service air system have no safety-related function as discussed in Section 3.2. Failure of the SA system will not compromise any nuclear safety-related system or component and will not prevent the safe shutdown of the reactor. b. The instrument air supply to the ADS and the low and medium LLS-SRV safety/relief valves has been designed such that the failure of any one component will not result in the loss of instrument air to more than one nuclear safety-related division of ADS and LLS-SRV safety/relief valves. The loss of instrument air to one division of ADS and LLS-SRV safety/relief valves will not prevent the safe shutdown of the unit. A component failure analysis of the instrument air system is given in Table 9.3-2. Each accumulator or receiver has a check valve in the inlet line to prevent backflow due to compressor or amplifier failure. Other pneumatic-operated devices are designed for the fail-safe mode and do not require air supply under abnormal or postulated accident conditions.

The compressors are not safety-related and the amplifiers do not require electricity. Therefore, there are no diverse sources of electric power. c. Certain IA system pressure regulators have been designed such that failure of any one regulator will not compromise the redundant capability of the Control Room HVAC Cooling Water System. 9.3.1.4 Test and Inspections During the preoperational test phase, the air dryers were checked to ensure that the equipment was performing properly in every respect, the service air compressors were tested to ensure that the assembled package was properly balanced, and the compressors were also tested to determine equipment rating for flow and pressure. The system is proved operable by its use during normal plant operation. The element in the prefilter to the dryer is to be replaced at least once for every 12 months of operations. The element in the afterfilter is to be replaced every 6 months. The air for the Instrument Air System will be tested, at least annually, at the system filter discharge for a dew point of -40°F and particulate content in excess of 3 microns. In the event of any particulate greater than 3 microns in size at the filter discharge, the need for additional testing at selected test points downstream in the system will be determined. The results of the additional testing will be evaluated to determine the extent of the problem and corrective action CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-4 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 needed. The acceptance criteria for this additional testing at designated test points will be based upon the recommendation of the component vendor for the particulate contamination of the Instrument Air. 9.3.1.5 Instrumentation Application Compressed air for the service air (SA) and instrument air (IA) systems is supplied by three automatically-controlled air compressors. Compressors are equipped with load and unload mode of control. In the load mode of control, system pressure is maintained by modulating or throttling the inlet and/or blowoff valve as necessary. The unload mode is used to start the compressor and to manually unload it if necessary. In the unload mode, the blow-off or bypass valve is fully open, and the inlet valve is in the minimum throttled or modulated position. An adequate supply of compressed air is assured by a pressure switch located in the compressed air discharge header, which will auto start a second compressor if the discharge pressure falls below a preset value. The starting of the third compressor is locked out at the main control board. This arrangement allows the greatest flexibility in the use of the compressors during normal and standby operations. Each compressor has interlocks and/or alarms for important variables, such as high lubricating oil temperature, high interstage air temperature, low cooling water pressure, surge, low lubricating oil pressure, and high vibration. Local pressure indicators are provided to measure the compressor discharge and several building header pressures. The compressor discharge is fed to the air dryers which are equipped with pre and after filters. The filters come equipped with differential pressure indicating switches. These switches are used for local alarm indication and a common trouble alarm in the main control room for high differential pressure. They are also used for local indication of the differential pressure across the filter. The dryer outlets are monitored by moisture elements for alarm on the common trouble alarm and local indication. The dryer chambers have pressure switches which activate the common trouble alarm on increasing chamber pressure. The outlet flow of the air dryers is monitored by pressure switches which give local and common trouble alarms on low outlet pressure. A pressure indicator is also provided in the main control room to indicate air dryer discharge header pressure. Pressure switches in the Service Air ring headers located in the radwaste, turbine, auxiliary, fuel and control buildings isolate the applicable ring headers and provide low header pressure alarms in the main control room when the pressure falls below 70 psig in the applicable header.

Similarly, the pressure switches in the Instrument Air ring headers located in the radwaste and control buildings isolate the applicable ring headers and provide low header pressure alarms in the main control room when the pressure falls below 70 psig in the applicable header. The automatic isolation feature prevents the entire system from being loaded down or lost if a pipe ruptures or excessive air usage occurs in those ring headers. Service Air in the diesel generator building is supplied from the service air ring header in the control building. A pipe rupture or excessive air usage in the diesel generator building would result in automatic isolation of the control building Service Air header and alarm in the main control room in the event that the control building ring header falls below 70 psig.

CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-5 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 Instrument Air in the diesel generator building is supplied from the Instrument Air ring header in the control bulding. A pipe rupture or excessive air usage in the diesel generator building would result in automatic isolation of the control building Instrument Air header and alarm in the main control room in the event that the control building ring header falls below 70 psig. Service Air and Instrument Air in the Makeup Water Pump House and the Screen House is supplied from Service Air ring header in the turbine building. A pipe rupture or excessive air usage in the Makeup Water Pump House or the Screen House would result in automatic isolation of the turbine building Service Air header and alarm in the main control room in the event that the turbine building Service Air ring header falls below 70 psig. Air is supplied to the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) through the Instrument Air ring headers in the turbine and auxiliary building. These ring headers do not have automatic isolation features on low pressure. This precludes the loss of air supply to the ADS from inadvertent actuation of automatic isolation features. Check valves in the Instrument Air supply to the ADS prevent a back flow of air from the ADS into the Instrument Air ring headers in the turbine and auxiliary buildings in the event of low pressure in those headers. Low pressure in the ADS supply lines alarms in the main control room when the pressure falls below its required setpoint. The control room emergency breathing air storage system is monitored and low pressure is alarmed in the main control room. 9.3.2 Process Sampling System 9.3.2.1 Design Bases 9.3.2.1.1 Safety Design Bases The process sampling system is not required to ensure safe shutdown of the plant. The only sample line connected to the reactor pressure boundary is provided with isolation valves which close upon receiving a LOCA signal. 9.3.2.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases The objective of the process sampling system is to monitor station operation and equipment performances and to provide information for making corrections or adjustments to process system operations. Representative liquid and steam samples are obtained through the sampling system either for on-line or laboratory analyses. On-line continuous radiation monitoring of gaseous and liquid processes is provided by equipment described in Section 11.5 and Subsection 12.3.4. The sampling system is designed to minimize contamination of samples, minimize radiation exposure at the sample station and reduce sample line plate-out as much as possible. 9.3.2.2 System Description The systems that require intermittent or continuous analytical sampling are located to permit the drawing of samples during normal station operation or shutdown periods. Sample take-off points are arranged to obtain valid and representative samples. On process lines 2-1/2 inches and larger, sample probes are inserted into the pipe whenever possible without causing a flow CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-6 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 restriction to obtain a representative sample except for liquid radwaste discharge radiation monitor 0PR40S where the sample probe is replaced by 1" diameter pipe. Wherever possible samples are taken at least 10 diameters downstream from the last input to the process line. Where the contents of a tank are recirculated, the sample is taken from the line downstream from the recirculation pump. Sample lines are stainless steel, and are sized to deliver samples at a rate sufficient to maintain turbulent flow. The routing of sample lines will be as short and direct as possible to minimize purge volume but long enough to provide decay time where applicable. Fittings are minimized and bends are at least 15 diameters. Purge and some sample flow rates are read on a flow indicator and manually adjusted with a control valve by the operator at the sample panel. Purge time is determined by the operator to ensure adequate purging for representative samples. As sample lines were installed, a record was made of the length of each. After they were installed, the volume of each sample line was calculated and the required flow and duration were determined to ensure sufficient purge of stagnant lines. This information was incorporated into the CPS sampling procedures. To facilitate proper sample line purging, flow meters are installed in some sample lines at the sample panels. For those sample lines not provided with flow meters, administrative methods will be used to determine appropriate purge flow rates. (Q&R 281.3) Sample lines which are equipped with continuous analyzers are provided with bypass lines for flushing. Those radwaste process lines which have a high particulate content are equipped with flush lines which purge the sample line with cycled condensate from the process connection to the sample panel. A discussion of the post accident sampling and analysis system is contained in Appendix D. (Q&R 281.4) 9.3.2.3 Safety Evaluation The sampling system is classified non-safety-related and non Seismic Category I in accordance with Section 3.2. The process sampling system which does not connect to the reactor coolant pressure boundary is classified as Quality Group D from the sample sink up to the root valve located near the main process line. The root valve and piping upstream up to the connection on the main process line have the same classification as the process line except that process sample lines 3/4 inch NPS and smaller are not classified greater than Class B. The only sample line connected to the primary coolant pressure boundary is the reactor recirculation water sample line. That line is provided with two air-operated isolation valves, one located inside and one outside the drywell which receive an isolation signal. They fail closed on loss of air supply or electric power. For information regarding containment isolation, see Subsection 6.2.4. Other sample lines handling radioactive fluids are connected to nonreactor coolant pressure boundary systems and are provided with manual and/or solenoid operated valves. Air-operated valves will fail closed on loss of air or electric power. Grab sample lines for systems having a nominal pressure rating of 600 psi or higher are provided with two valves in series to reduce the potential for leakage. Radioactive lines are routed to minimize radiation exposure to plant personnel. Where practical lines are routed near ceilings and away from accessible areas. High radiation lines in sample CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-7 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 panels are shielded to reduce radiation exposure to acceptable limits consistent with the plant access requirements including plant operation, shutdown, and maintenance. 9.3.2.4 Tests and Inspections The process sampling system is proved operable by its use during normal plant operation. Grab samples are taken to calibrate and verify the proper operation of the continuous analyzers.

Portions of the system normally closed to flow can be tested to ensure the operability and integrity to the system. Each sample line will be provided with isolation valve to permit testing and maintenance. 9.3.2.5 Instrumentation Application Temperature indicators located after the sample heat exchangers, determine the sample temperature before it is analyzed and drawn in the sample sink. Pressure reducing devices and pressure relief valves are provided for certain high-pressure sample lines in order to protect the equipment and operators. Local pressure indicators are provided after each pressure reducing device. Recorders are provided for on-line analyzers, to monitor fluid sample characteristics. Appropriate annunciators are furnished to indicate and alarm abnormalities in the sampling system. Recorders and annunciators are mounted on their respective local sampling panels for the secondary system sample panels, and on main control room panels for the reactor sample station. The local annunciators transmit alarm signals to the main control room. In order to avoid flashing in sample lines containing saturated water, the lines are routed downward to their respective sample panel. All gaseous samples are taken in accordance with ANSI N13.1-1969 and are explained further in Section 11.5. High-temperature, high-pressure liquid and steam samples pass through primary coolers, pressure reducing and regulating devices (the reactor sample station utilizes two manual valves in series to reduce pressure and adjust flow), secondary coolers, and then to analyzers. Grab samples are taken after the primary coolers. The temperature of the continuously analyzed conductivity samples at the reactor water sample station are maintained at 24°C to 26°C to minimize temperature compensation errors. Gas samples and other liquid process samples are also conditioned at their respective sampling stations. Each sample station is furnished with an exhaust hood, sink, sample coolers, pressure regulators, demineralized water supply, analyzers, and necessary instrumentation. Where practical, most sample drains are recycled to their respective source or routed to the condenser hotwell. The balance of the sample drains are sent to the appropriate equipment or floor drain tanks for processing. Table 9.3-3 lists sample points, sample conditions, and types of analyses. The process sampling system is shown in Drawing M05-1045, Sheets 1 through 11.

CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-8 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 9.3.3 Equipment and Floor Drainage System 9.3.3.1 Design Bases 9.3.3.1.1 Safety Design Bases a. The equipment and floor drainage system (EFDS) is designed to preclude cross-flooding of nuclear safety-related ECCS compartments. b. EFDS sump fill and pumpout rates are utilized for the detection of leakage from safety-related equipment or piping located in the drywell, containment, and the ECCS cubicle areas. This subject is addressed in detail in Subsections 5.2.5 and 7.6.1.4. c. EFDS is not a safety-related system. However, all EFDS pipelines located within the Seismic Category I buildings are seismically supported to preclude potential damage to the safety system. EFDS piping penetrating drywell and containment structures is nuclear safety-related, designed in accordance with the ASME Section III Code, Class 2, and is provided with air-operated valves for containment and drywell isolation. d. EFDS piping is designed to preclude inadvertent transfer of contaminated fluids to noncontaminated drainage systems by elimination of cross-connections of these systems. e. Loop seals/traps are provided in drainage piping between the contaminated and general access areas for maintaining ventilation boundaries, and to prevent cross-contamination of room atmosphere. f. Passive failures, i.e., pump seals and valve stem packing leaks, can be detected by the ECCS equipment room sumps. Leak detection sensitivity and alarm functions are discussed in detail in Subsection 5.2.5. 9.3.3.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases The equipment and floor drainage system is designed to collect radioactive and potentially radioactive waste liquids from their points of origin in the drywell, containment, fuel building, auxiliary building, turbine building, radwaste building, and control building, and to transfer them to the collecting vessels of the radwaste treatment system for processing for reuse or disposal. For evaluation of radiological considerations for normal plant operation and for postulated spills and accidents see Sections 11.2 and 12.3. The nonradioactive chemical waste liquids from the Makeup Demin Area are drained into a separate sump from which they are pumped out of the radwaste building to the reaction (waste neutralization treatment) tanks. The waste chemicals are then pH adjusted and sent to a sediment pond, either directly or via the makeup demineralizer floor drain sump. The waste water in the sediment pond is processed through the sediment pond filter house treatment facility prior to being discharged back into the lake.

CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-9 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 9.3.3.2 System Description 9.3.3.2.1 General Description Generally, all drainage originating from either the equipment or process piping and consisting of chemically clean water, is drained to the equipment drainage system. All waste liquids from the floors that may or may not be contaminated with oil or grease. (such as pump baseplates) are drained into the floor drainage system. Special purpose drainage sumps/tanks are provided for draining chemical waste liquids emanating from high and low conductivity portions of the condensate polishing system, condensate filter, radwaste chemical waste area, laundry area, station laboratories, equipment decontamination, and personnel decontamination areas. All these drainage systems are independent and physically separated. They collect waste liquids by gravity into sumps and/or tanks from where they are pumped to the appropriate liquid radwaste collecting tanks for further processing. The wastes from the demineralizer water makeup system are discharged to the waste sedimentation ponds. From there the wastes are pumped through waste treatment equipment in the demineralizer waste filter house and finally discharged into the cooling lake. The possible spillage from the diesel-generator oil tanks together with other nonradioactive equipment and floor drain waste is discharged into the storm sewer system via an oil separator. The drainage of these two types of nonradioactive wastes is arranged within structural barriers to preclude contamination from neighboring radioactive areas. Roof drainage is generally discharged to the storm sewer. Nonradioactive drains from the Auxiliary Building Ventilation Supply Air Cooling Coil, Containment Building Ventilation Supply Air Cooling Coil and Control Building Area Cooler 0WO08SM are discharged to the lake, via the Sewage Treatment System. 9.3.3.2.2 Component Description a. Sumps and Sump Pumps For general drainage each sump is fitted with two 100% capacity sump pumps. The pumps are designed to operate alternately to ensure their reliability. The initiation and the termination of pump operation is controlled by an alternating device. On "high" sump level, the alternator will start one pump. On high-high sump level, the alternator will start the second pump, boosting the total capacity to approximately 150% or more. On "low" sump level, the operating pump(s) will stop. In general, sumps and sump pumps are sized to handle all anticipated normal and transient draining requirements. The wastes from the floor drainage systems typically pass through the oil separators before entering the sumps. Oil substances are diverted to oil reservoirs. The low conductivity sump is used as a receiver tank for filter backwash contents from the condensate filters in addition to the normal sump collection activities.

The sump is equipped with a float level switch controller and modified level control circuitry for backwash operation. Prior to a filter backwash discharge to the sump, a sump pump down initiation signal is sent from the remote filter system. This starts one of the pumps to pump the sump down to the "low" level setpoint. This pump down allows enough sump capacity to receive the filter backwash discharge volume without exceeding the high-high sump level.

CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-10 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 b. Water Seals Traps are provided in EFDS piping where necessary to prevent airborne radioactive contamination from radioactive areas sharing the same drain piping system. 9.3.3.3 Safety Evaluation The equipment and floor drain system is not required to assure either of the following conditions: a. the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, or b. the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in safe shutdown condition. A failure analysis has not been provided since this system is not nuclear safety-related. 9.3.3.4 Tests and Inspection The station equipment and drainage floor systems are proved operable during normal station operation. Preoperational tests of the systems were made by introducing water into the sumps and collecting tanks and observing the operation. 9.3.3.5 Instrumentation Application Alternators are provided for each sump as described in Subsection 9.3.3.2.2.a. In addition, each sump contains a level detecting device which will actuate an annunciator in the main control room or radwaste operations center at high-high level. For sumps in ECCS and RCIC cubicles, two redundant high-high level switches are provided for the annunciation. Handswitches are provided in the main control room for controlling sump pumps in the containment and drywell. For these sumps, low level switches are provided to stop the pumps on low sump level when in manual control. For sumps in high radiation areas, local handswitches outside the high radiation area are provided for manual control of the sump pumps. For some sumps in general access areas, the alternator may be manually operated. Floor and equipment drain tanks are provided with controls to start and stop the associated transfer pumps. The controls consist of an air bubbler type level sensing system. The system starts the pump on high tank level and stops the pump on low level. A local pump handswitch is provided for manual pump control. Pressure gauges are provided locally at most sump and transfer pumps to monitor pump performance. An elapsed run time meter is provided in the radwaste operations center for each sump pump whose discharge is routed to the liquid radwaste system. The meters are provided for operator information as to which sump(s) are having high inleakage. Pump timers for actuation of alarms are provided for leak detection as described in Subsection 5.2.5.

CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-11 REV. 13, JANUARY 2009 9.3.4 Chemical and Volume Control System The Clinton Power Station is a boiling water reactor and therefore, this section is not applicable. 9.3.5 Standby Liquid Control System 9.3.5.1 Design Bases 9.3.5.1.1 Safety Design Bases The standby liquid control system (SLCS) is an independent backup system for the control rod drive system. The standby liquid control system meets the following safety design bases: a. Backup capability for reactivity control is provided, independent of normal reactivity control provisions in the nuclear reactor, to be able to shut down the reactor if the normal control ever becomes inoperative. b. The backup system has the capacity for controlling the reactivity difference between the steady-state rated operating condition of the reactor with voids and the cold shutdown condition, including shutdown margin, to assure complete shutdown from the most reactive condition at any time in core life. c. The time required to actuate the effect of the backup control is consistent with the nuclear reactivity rate of change predicted between rated operating and cold shutdown conditions. A scram of the reactor or operational control of fast reactivity transients is not specified to be accomplished by this system. d. Means are provided by which the functional performance capability of the backup control system components can be verified periodically under conditions approaching actual use requirements. Demineralized water, rather than the actual neutron absorber solution, can be injected into the reactor to test the operation of all components of the redundant control system. e. The neutron absorber is dispersed within the reactor core in sufficient quantity to provide a reasonable margin for leakage or imperfect mixing. f. The possibility of unintentional or accidental shutdown of the reactor by this system shall be minimized. The system is designed to be a reliable safety system. The SLCS is also credited with buffering the pH of the Suppression Pool following a LOCA involving fuel damage. 9.3.5.2 System Description The standby liquid control system (See Drawing M05-1077, Figure 9.3-6, and Figure 9.3-7) is manually started from the main control room to pump a boron neutron absorber solution into the reactor if the operator believes the reactor cannot be shutdown or kept shut down with the control rods or following a LOCA involving fuel damage for pH control of the Suppression Pool. The system is composed of the standby liquid control storage tank, the test water tank, the two positive displacement injection pumps, the two explosives valves, the two motor-operated pump suction valves, and associated local valves and controls and is located in the containment.

CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-12 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 The preferred flow path of the boron neutron absorber solution to the reactor vessel is by the HPCS sparger. The SLC piping is connected to the HPCS system just downstream of the HPCS manual injection isolation valve. An alternate flow path to the reactor vessel is provided by the SLC sparger near the bottom of the core shroud. This flow path is normally locked out of service by the SLC manual injection valve. The boron neutron absorber solution absorbs thermal neutrons and thereby terminates the nuclear fission chain reaction. The specified neutron absorber solution is sodium pentaborate (Na2B10O16

  • 10H2O). It is prepared by dissolving sodium pentaborate decahydrate crystals in demineralized water. An air sparger is provided in the tank for mixing. To prevent system plugging, the tank outlet is located above the bottom of the tank. The standby liquid control system is able to deliver enough sodium pentaborate solution into the reactor to assure reactor shutdown. This is accomplished by placing sodium pentaborate in the standby liquid control tank and filling the tank with demineralized water to at least the low level alarm point. The solution can be diluted with water up to a minimum concentration of 10.8 wt.% to allow for evaporation losses or to lower the solubility/saturation temperature. The allowable concentration of the sodium pentaborate within the tank is dependent upon the solution volume, per Technical Specification 3.1.7, Figure 3.1.7-1. The minimum temperature of the fluid in the tank and piping (70°F per Technical Specifications) ensures that the sodium pentaborate remains in solution throughout the entire range of concentrations, as seen from Figure 9.3-7. The equipment containing the solution is installed in the containment in which the air temperature is to be maintained within the range of 65°F to 104°F during normal plant operation. An electrical resistance heater system provides a backup heat source which maintains the solution temperature between 75° F and 85° F to prevent precipitation of the sodium pentaborate from the solution during storage. High or low liquid temperature or high or low liquid level cause an alarm to be annunciated in the control room. Each positive displacement pump is sized to inject the solution into the reactor at a rate of 43 gpm. (41.2 gpm. minimum). To prevent bypass flow from one pump in case of relief valve failure in the line from the other pump, a check valve is installed downstream from each relief valve line in the pump discharge pipe. The two explosive-actuated injection valves provide assurance of opening when needed and ensure that boron will not leak into the reactor even when the pumps are being tested. Each explosive valve is closed by a plug in the inlet chamber. The plug is circumscribed with a deep groove so the end will readily shear off when pushed with the valve plunger. This opens the inlet hole through the plug. The sheared end is pushed out of the way in the chamber; it is shaped so it will not block the ports after release. The shearing plunger is actuated by an explosive charge with dual ignition primers inserted in the side chamber of the valve. Ignition circuit continuity is monitored by a trickle current, and an alarm occurs in the control room if either circuit opens. Indicator lights show which primary circuit opened. The standby liquid control system is actuated by both of the two keylocked, spring-return switches on the control room benchboard. The keylocked feature assures that changing the system status is a deliberate act. Changing either switch status to "run" starts an injection CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-13 REV. 13, JANUARY 2009 pump, actuates an explosive valve, opens a tank outlet valve, and closes one reactor cleanup system isolation valve to prevent loss or dilution of boron. A green light in the control room indicates that power is available to the pump motor contactor and that the contactor is deenergized (pump not running). A red light indicates that the contactor is energized (pump running). Instrumentation consisting of solution temperature indication and control, solution level, and heater system status is provided locally at the storage tank. Table 9.3-4 contains the process data for the various modes of operation of the SLC. Storage tank liquid level, tank outlet valve position, pump discharge pressure, and loss of continuity on the explosive valves indicate that the system is functioning. The control room keyswitches may actuate the standby liquid control system, regardless of the position of the control switches on the local panel in the containment. Pump discharge pressure and valve status are indicated in the control room. Should the boron solution ever be injected into the reactor, either intentionally or inadvertently, then after making certain that the normal reactivity controls will keep the reactor subcritical, the boron is removed from the reactor coolant system by flushing for gross dilution followed by operating the reactor clean up system. There is very little effect on reactor operation when the boron concentration has been reduced below approximately 50 ppm, except near end of cycle condition. Equipment drains and tank overflow may be routed to separate drums that can be removed and disposed of independently to prevent any trace of boron from inadvertently reaching the reactor. Alternatively, this drainage and overflow may be routed to the radwaste system where boron is removed and clean effluent returned to the cycled condensate system. 9.3.5.3 Safety Evaluation The standby liquid control system is designed to bring the reactor from rated power to a cold shutdown at any time in core life, with the control rods remaining withdrawn in the rated power pattern. It includes the reactivity gains that result from complete decay of the rated power xenon inventory. It also includes the positive reactivity effects from eliminating steam voids, increasing water density due to cooling, reduced Doppler effect in uranium, reducing neutron leakage, and decreasing control rod worth as the moderator cools. The SLC system is also credited with buffering the pH of the Suppression Pool following a LOCA involving fuel damage. The standby liquid control system is maintained in an operable status whenever the reactor is critical. To assure the availability of the SLC system, two sets of the components required to actuate the system, pumps and explosive valves, are provided. The minimum average concentration of natural boron in the reactor to provide adequate shutdown margin is 1000 ppm. An evaluation of the standby liquid control system capability is performed each cycle utilizing the reload core configuration. The results of this evaluation for the current cycle are provided in Appendix 15D, Reload Analysis. Calculation of the minimum quantity of sodium pentaborate to be injected into the reactor is based on the required CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-14 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 1000 ppm average boron concentration in the reactor coolant including the water volume in the residual heat removal shutdown cooling piping and in the recirculation loop piping, at 68° F and reactor normal water level. The increase in the isotopic concentration of the boron (>30 atom % boron 10) in the SLC tank produces an equivalent 1000 ppm in the reactor vessel at 68°F. The result is increased by 25% to allow for imperfect mixing and leakage. Additional sodium pentaborate is provided to accommodate dilution by the RHR system in the shutdown cooling mode. This concentration is achieved when the solution is prepared as defined in Subsection 9.3.5.2 and maintained above saturation temperature.The specified boron injection rate is limited to the range of 8 to 20 ppm per minute. The lower rate assures that the boron is injected into the reactor in approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. This resulting negative reactivity insertion is considerably greater than positive reactivity caused by the cooldown. The upper limit injection rate assures that there is sufficient mixing so that boron does not recirculate through the core in uneven concentrations that could possibly cause reactor power to rise and fall cyclically. The essential system equipment for injection of neutron absorber solution into the reactor is designed as Seismic Category I to withstand the specified earthquake loadings (see Chapter 3). The system piping and equipment is designed, installed, and tested in accordance with requirements stated in Section 3.7. The system is required to be operable in the event of a plant offsite power failure; therefore the pumps, valves, and controls are connectable to the standby a-c power supply. Heaters are powered by normal non-Class 1E power source. The pumps and valves are powered and controlled from separate buses and circuits so that a single-failure will not prevent system operation. The standby liquid control system and pumps have sufficient pressure margin to assure solution injection up to the system relief valve setting of approximately 1400 psig. The nuclear system relief and safety valves begin to relieve pressure above approximately 1100 psig. Therefore, the standby liquid control system positive displacement pumps cannot overpressurize the nuclear system. 9.3.5.3.1 Evaluation Against General Design Criteria The standby liquid control system is evaluated against the applicable general design criteria as follows: a. Criterion 2 The standby liquid control system is located in the area outside of the drywell in primary containment and below the refueling floor. In this location it is protected by the containment and compartment walls from external natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, and internally from effects of such events and as well as other postulated internal events (e.g., DBA-LOCA). b. Criterion 4 The standby liquid control system is designed for the expected environment in the containment and specifically for the compartment in which it is located. In this compartment, it is not subject to the more violent conditions postulated in this criterion such as missiles, whipping pipes, and discharging fluids.

CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-15 REV. 13, JANUARY 2009 c. Criterion 26 The recirculation flow control system is the second reactivity control system required by this criterion (see Subsection 5.4.1.4.1). d. Criterion 27 This criterion applies no specific requirements to the standby liquid control system, and therefore is not applicable. See the general design criteria section for discussion of combined capability. e. Criterion 29 The standby liquid control system pumps and valves outboard of the isolation valves are redundant. Two suction valves, two pumps, and two injection valves are arranged and crosstied such that operation of either one of each results in successful operation of the system. The standby liquid control system also has test capability. A special test tank is supplied for providing test fluid for the injection test. Pumping capability and suction valve operability may be tested at any time. A trickle current continuously monitors continuity of the firing mechanisms of the injection squib valves. 9.3.5.3.2 Evaluation Against Regulatory Guides The standby liquid control system is evaluated against the applicable regulatory guides as follows: a. Regulatory Guide 1.26 Because the standby liquid control system is a reactivity control system, all mechanical components are at least Quality Group B. Those portions which are part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are Quality Group A. This is shown in Table 3.2-1 Section V. b. Regulatory Guide 1.29 All components of the standby liquid control system which are necessary for injection of neutron absorber into the reactor are Seismic Category I. This is shown in Table 3.2-1. Since the standby liquid control system is located within the primary containment, it is adequately protected from flooding, tornadoes, and internally and externally generated missiles. SLCS equipment is protected from pipe break by providing adequate distance between the seismic and nonseismic SLC system equipment where such protection is necessary. In addition, appropriate distance is provided between the SLCS and other piping systems. This system is used in some special plant capability demonstration events cited in Appendix 15A, specifically Events 51 and 53 which are extremely low probability non-design basis postulated incidents. The analyses given there are to demonstrate additional plant safety consideration far beyond reasonable and conservative assumptions.

CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-16 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 A system level, qualitative-type failure mode and effects analysis relative to this system's ability to meet single failure criterion is discussed in Subsection 7.4.2.2. 9.3.5.4 Testing and Inspection Requirements During a refueling or maintenance outage, the injection portion of the system can be functionally tested by valving the suction line to the test tank and actuating the system from the control room. The test tank contains demineralized water for approximately 3 minutes of pump operation. System operation is indicated in the control room. After functional tests, the injection valve shear plugs and explosive charges must be replaced and all the valves returned to their normal positions as indicated. Testing of the SLC pumps without firing the explosive primers may be accomplished by the use of locally mounted control switches. Operation of a pump in the test mode does not prevent a manual initiation of boron injection from the control room, should it be required. After closing a local locked-open valve to the reactor, leakage through the injection valves can be detected by opening valves at a test connection in the line between the drywell isolation check valves. Leakage from the reactor through the first check valve can be detected by opening the same test connection in the line between the drywell isolation check valves when the reactor is pressurized. The concentration of the sodium pentaborate in the solution tank is determined periodically by chemical analysis. The pump suction piping temperature is checked periodically to verify the temperature is high enough to prevent precipitation. The standby liquid control system preoperational test is described in Subsection 14.2.12.1.3. 9.3.5.5 Instrumentation Requirements The instrumentation and control system for standby liquid control is designed to allow the injection of a boron neutron absorber solution into the reactor and to maintain the solution well above the saturation temperature. A further discussion of the standby liquid control instrumentation may be found in Section 7.4. 9.3.6 Suppression Pool Cleanup System 9.3.6.1 Design Bases 9.3.6.1.1 Safety Design Bases The suppression pool cleanup system (SPCUS) serves no safety function. Failure of the system will not compromise any safety-related systems or prevent safe shutdown of the plant. Containment penetrations, including associated piping and valves up to the isolation valves are designed to Seismic Category I and ASME Code,Section III, Class 2 requirements. The remaining piping and valves, including those common with the fuel pool cooling and cleanup and condensate cleanup systems, are classified non safety.

CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-17 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 9.3.6.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases During normal plant operation, the suppression pool cleanup system is designed to provide continuous cleanup of the suppression pool water at a rate of 1000 gpm through one of three standby fuel pool cleaning and cleanup filter demineralizers. When required, the system is capable of providing cleanup of the suppression pool water at a rate of 3500 gpm. The system is designed to maintain the suppression pool water quality compatible with ECCS vessel makeup and containment spray requirements. The system is designed to remove radioactive iodine from the suppression pool water following a Safety/Relief Valve (SRV) blowdown at a rate sufficient to allow normal access for plant personnel to the containment within a reasonable time after the blowdown. 9.3.6.2 System Description The primary purpose of the SPCU system is to remove radioactive contaminants, including iodine, from the containment suppression pool water and to maintain the suppression pool water quality to meet plant operation requirements. There are two modes of operation for the suppression pool cleanup system, and they are defined by the flow path of the water to be cleaned. Since leakage through the safety/relief valves during normal operation causes radioactive iodine to accumulate in the suppression pool, the system is operated to minimize personnel exposure during containment access. This may be done continuously or on an "as required" basis to maintain airborne radioiodine in the containment below the Derived Air Concentration (DAC). A non-safety related plate heat exchanger, cooled by the WO system, may be placed in service in parallel with the deminerializers to cool the suppression pool. During normal operation, either of the two suppression pool cleanup transfer pumps takes suction from the suppression pool, transferring pool water through the SPCU system piping and then to the inlet of the fuel pool cooling and cleanup filter-demineralizers. The fuel pool cooling and cleanup filter-demineralizers remove iodine and other impurities from the water. The processed water is then returned to the suppression pool. The design-basis transient for the SPCU system is a MSIV isolation event at power. Following a SRV blowdown, both transfer pumps may be operated to process suppression pool water through the fuel pool cooling and cleanup filter-demineralizers. Four filter-demineralizers are installed, one of which will normally be in use in the FPC&C system. Therefore, three filter-demineralizers are available for suppression pool cleanup. This condition allows suppression pool water to be processed at a maximum flow rate of 3000 gpm. The RHR heat exchangers are available for cooling the suppression pool if the pool water exceeds the upper temperature limit of the filter-demineralizers. When the maximum suppression pool cleanup flow rate is desired or when the fuel pool cleanup system is unavailable for suppression pool cleanup, the condensate cleanup system may be used. Both transfer pumps operate to process 3500 gpm through one condensate CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-18 REV. 13, JANUARY 2009 demineralizer vessel and back to the suppression pool. Connections are made to only one condensate polisher to reduce the possibility of mixing suppression pool water with the condensate feedwater. The suppression pool cleanup system consists of piping, valves, equipment and instrumentation as shown in Drawing M05-1060. The suppression pool cleanup transfer pumps are the only unique major components of the SPCU system. Refer to Drawings M05-1037 and M05-1007 for interconnection with the fuel pool cooling and cleanup and condensate cleanup systems. The SPCU system may be used to transfer water from the suppression pool to the upper containment pool in Mode 5. Water is transferred through the SF system piping to the "J" Condensate Polisher. After passing through the polisher, it can be valved into the condensate system to be transferred to the upper containment pool via the condensate feedwater systems and reactor vessel rather than returning to the suppression pool. 9.3.6.3 Safety Evaluation The suppression pool cleanup system has no nuclear safety-related function as defined in Section 3.2. Failure of the system will not compromise any safety-related system or component and will not prevent safe reactor shutdown. The system incorporates features that assure reliable operation over the full range of normal plant operations. These features consist primarily of instrumentation which monitors and/or controls its respective processes. Piping and valves, on both the suction and discharge legs, from the suppression pool to the motor-operated isolation valves outside the containment, form a part of the containment boundary and are classified as Safety Class 2, Seismic Category I. The remaining piping and components of the system are classified as nonsafety. 9.3.6.4 Tests and Inspections NOTE: The following paragraph is historical:

All Class B piping and components, as described in Section 3.2, are hydrostatically tested prior to plant startup. Nondestructive testing is performed in accordance with the ASME Section III Code, Class 2 requirements where applicable. The suppression pool cleanup system is proven operable by its use during normal plant operation. 9.3.6.5 Instrumentation Application The operation of the suppression pool cleanup system valves and pumps is controlled from the main control room by their respective selector and control switches. Locally mounted gauges provide the capability to monitor the differential pressure across the pump suction strainers and to monitor the pump discharge pressure.

CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-18a REV. 13, JANUARY 2009 9.3.7 Post Accident Sample System (PASS) 9.3.7.1 Design Basis 9.3.7.1.1 Safety Design Basis The PASS serves no safety function. Failure of the system will not compromise any safety-related systems or prevent safe shutdown of the plant.

CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-19 REV. 12, JANUARY 2007 Containment penetrations, including associated piping and valves up to and including the isolation valves are designed to safety-related, Seismic Category I and ASME Code,Section III, Class 2 requirements. The remaining piping and valves are classified non-safety. 9.3.7.1.2 Power Generation Design Basis The Post Accident Sampling System may be used to obtain highly radioactive samples of reactor coolant, suppression pool and containment atmosphere. Regulatory Requirements which had been associated with the design basis of the panel (NUREG-0737 and Reg Guide 1.97) have been eliminated per Clinton Power Station License Amendment 155. The PASS is considered a commercial grade sample station. Accident conditions assume a Regulatory Guide 1.3 release of fission products. The sampling system is designed to minimize contamination of samples, minimize personnel radiation exposure at the sample station, minimize volume of fluid removed from containment, and minimize plate-out. 9.3.7.2 System Description The PASS consists of two panels; a sample analysis panel (SAP) and a sample monitor panel (SMP) located in the diesel generator building at El. 737 ft. 0 in. The panels are located close to the containment building to minimize radiation exposure during sampling and purge time. The sample lines are stainless steel. The system is shown in Drawing M05-1045-12. The SAP is divided into two sections, one for liquids and one for gases. The liquid sample routed to the panel consist of: 1. Reactor coolant via a reactor vessel jet pump instrument line 2. RHR Pump 1A or 1B Effluent (Reactor Coolant or Suppression Pool Water) NOTE: Drywell and Containment Equipment and Floor Drain sump sample lines are also supplied but are not normally utilized. The gas samples routed to the panel consist of: 1. Containment Atmosphere (2 sample locations at El. 740 ft. 0 in. and 790 ft. 0 in.)

2. Drywell Atmosphere (2 sample locations at El. 740 ft. 0 in. and 790 ft. 0 in.) Only one gas sample and one liquid sample can be taken and analyzed at a time. Table 9.3-5 lists the sample points, sample conditions and types of analyses. The operator has control and indication of the sampling process at the SMP. This panel is provided with a color coded mimic flow diagram indicating all remote operated valve locations and statuses, analyzer locations, process pressures, and sample flow paths. Isolation valves for sample lines penetrating containment are the only valves with their status indicated but not controlled at the SMP. These valves are controlled by the operator in the Main Control Room.

CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-20 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 The SAP is also provided with a mimic which includes manually operated hand valves used to route sample flows within the SAP. Liquid Sampling When a liquid sample is routed to the SAP, it is cooled and passed near a radiation detector to inform the operator at the SMP of the radiation level. The SAP will provide access to liquid grab samples collected in a portable, lead shielded, sealed vial. The panel is shielded to protect personnel when taking a grab sample such that resulting radiation exposure is below the levels specified in GDC-19. Off-line radionuclide analysis can be performed on liquid samples (at an offsite lab). Liquid sample analysis may be performed to quantify iodines and cesiums which indicate high fuel temperature, and nonvolatile isotopes which indicate fuel melting. A liquid sample may also be analyzed for boron content and chloride concentration. The reactor coolant sample for the PASS may be obtained from a reactor jet pump instrumentation sensing line until the reactor is depressurized. After the reactor is depressurized, the reactor coolant sample may be taken from either RHR A or RHR B pump discharge to assure that a sample representative of the core condition is obtained. During normal operation, a liquid sample may be taken at the sample sink. The sink drain and line pressure relief valve drain to the fuel building floor drain tank. When high level radiation is present, the liquid sample return is directed to the suppression pool. The operator at the SMP selects the valves to open or close to determine the appropriate path, and the control room operator controls the containment isolation valves. A suppression pool sample can be taken when a RHR pump is on and suction is taken from the suppression pool, such as during the suppression pool cooling mode, or low pressure coolant injection mode. The sample lines are flushed with demineralized water (except during loss of offsite power) to minimize plate out and contamination of the next sample. The flushing water is manually routed to the fuel building floor drain tank when radiation levels are low and to the suppression pool when levels are high. Gas Sampling Gas samples are passed near a radiation detector to inform the operator at the SMP of the radiation level. Gases from the drywell and containment are obtained at the gas section of the SAP manually by opening a valve which injects the gas via a hypodermic needle into a vial. The unused gas is returned to containment. After a sample has been taken, the operator purges the system to clear the lines and eliminate contamination of the next gas sample taken. Purging gas is returned to containment. A separate system, the containment monitoring system, will be used for on-line hydrogen and oxygen analysis.

CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-21 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 PASS provides a grab sample capability for offline analysis of the containment and drywell atmosphere. Heat tracing of gas sample lines is provided to minimize condensation and plugging or losing soluble gases. Off-line radionuclide analysis can be performed on drywell atmospheric and containment atmospheric samples. Drywell and containment analysis may be performed to quantify the noble gases which indicate cladding failure. See Table 7.1-13 and Appendix D, Item II.B.3 for additional information on post-accident sampling capabilities. 9.3.7.3 Safety Evaluation The PASS is classified non-safety-related and non-seismic, except for the containment isolation portion of the system. In the event of a containment isolation signal, the containment isolation valves that supply samples to the PASS panel and the return valves to containment from the PASS close automatically. In order for a sample to be taken, the operator in the Main Control Room must open the appropriate containment isolation valves on the sample and return lines by bypassing the containment isolation signal. This bypass switch can only be operated with a key. A main control room annunciator is initiated whenever this switch is in the bypass position. All other control of the PASS is provided at the PASS local panels.

The SAP is provided with shielding. Any gases vented within the panel are removed by the Auxiliary Building HVAC system during normal operation and by the drywell purge system after a LOCA. The latter ventilation system is provided with charcoal absorbers and HEPA filters. The PASS and the HVAC systems are designed to limit radiation exposure to levels specified in GDC-19. The PASS is designed to be supplied with emergency power. Loads in the PASS are electrically isolated from the diesel generator bus in the event of a LOCA through either a shunt trip or two fuses or circuit breakers in series as described in Subsection 8.1.6.1.14. Power is restored to the PASS when the operator, through administrative procedures, manually bypasses the LOCA shunt trip signal. 9.3.7.4 Deleted 9.3.7.5 Deleted 9.3.7.6 Instrumentation Application The PASS is provided with local pressure, temperature, and flow gauges to check the operation of the system. Alarms such as sample cooling water flow, sample effluent temperature from coolers, etc., are annunciated on the local panel. Indicating lights on the local panel are provided for all hand switch controlled valve positions, including the containment isolation valves, and all pump motors. Indicating lights are provided to show the position of the probe which injects high radiation liquid samples into the shielded portable cart.

CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-22 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 The SMP is provided with two annunciators for high radiation level in the liquid and gaseous sampling lines. Heat tracing is provided for the containment and drywell gas samples.

CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-23 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.3-1 COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM COMPONENT DATA SERVICE AIR COMPRESSORS Quantity 3 Capacity, each ICFM 2500 Discharge Pressure, psig 110 Discharge Temperature, °F 120 Efficiency, % 71 Driver Voltage, Volts 4000 Driver, hp 600 Motor Speed (rpm) 3560

Two volume tanks of 660 gallons each are located in the compressor discharge piping for moisture removal upstream of the service air dryer/filter package. SERVICE AIR DRYER/FILTER PACKAGE Quantity 3 Dryer Type Dual Chamber Desiccant Desiccant Type Activated Alumina Vessel Design Pressure 150 psig Rated Inlet Flow 2100 scfm Rated Discharge Flow 1836 scfm Guaranteed Dew Point -40° F at 115 psig Prefilters per Package 1 Prefilter Rated Flow 2772 scfm Number of Prefilter Cartridges 21 Prefilter Removal Rating 98% Removal Rating 0.04 microns 100% Removal Rating 0.6 microns Nominal Rating 0.04 microns Prefilter Vessel Design Pressure 150 psig Afterfilters per Package 1 Afterfilter Rated Flow 2772 scfm Number of Filter Cartridges 21 CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-24 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.3-1 COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM COMPONENT DATA (Continued) Afterfilter Removal Rating 98% Removal Rating 0.07 microns 100% Removal Rating 0.9 microns Nominal Rating 0.07 microns Afterfilter Vessel Design Pressure 150 psig

MAKEUP WATER PUMP HOUSE AIR RECEIVERS Quantity 1 - Service Air 1 - Instrument Air Capacity 11 ft3 Design Temperature 120° F Design Pressure 150 psig SCREEN HOUSE AIR RECEIVERS Quantity 1 - Service Air 1 - Instrument Air Capacity 11 ft3 Design Temperature 120° F Design Pressure 150 psig

IA Storage Bottle Secondary Filters Quantity 2 Capacity 30 SCFM each (min.) Housing Design Pressure 2500 psig (min.) 100% Removal Rating 0.1-50 micron

MSIV Secondary IA Filters Quantity 2 Capacity 3000 SCFM each Housing Design Pressure 150 psig 100% removal rating 23 microns

CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-25 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.3-1 COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM COMPONENT DATA (Continued) ADS AIR AMPLIFIERS Quantity 12 Type Double Acting Capacity, scfm 20 Outlet Pressure, regulated, psig 160

ADS COMPRESSED AIR STORAGE BOTTLES Quantity 16 Type High Pressure Cylinders Capacity 264 scf/cylinder Design Pressure, psig 4000 CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-26 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.3-2 COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS COMPONENT FAILURE COMMENTS Service Air Compressor Loss of Compressor Three service air compressors are installed.

Normally one is running, another in standby to autostart on low air header pressure, and the third in PULL-TO-LOCK, where it may be manually started. Additional protection is provided by utilizing air receiver tanks and equipping nuclear safety-related air component systems with individual accumulators. The air accumulators are of sufficient capacity to safely perform their shutdown function in the event that the air supply system is lost. Instrument Air Amplifier 160 psig, ADS Valve Operation Loss of Compressor Twelve air amplifiers are provided for 100%

redundancy. Also, storage bottles are provided and each ADS valve has its own air accumulator with sufficient capacity to safely shutdown the unit.

CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-27 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.3-3 PROCESS SAMPLE TABULATION OPERATING CONDITIONS Max. Operating Design NO. SAMPLE PANEL SAMPLE IDENTIFICATION Press (psig) Temp (°F) Press (psig) Temp (°F) SAMPLING CAPABILITY Activity (Note 1) REMARKS 1C1 Reactor Water Recirculation 1325 554 1550 575 1. Grab Sample 2. On-line Conductivity 3. On-line Dissolved O2 H 1C2 Reactor Water Cleanup Inlet Header 1208 120 1410 150 1. Grab Sample 2. On-line Conductivity

3. On-line Dissolved O2 H 1C3A 1C3B Reactor Water Cleanup Demineralizer 1A & 1B Outlet 1141 120 1410 150 1. Grab Sample 2. On-line Conductivity L 1C4 1G33-Z020 (Reactor Sample Station) Control Rod Drive 1860 135 2000 140 1. Grab Sample 2. On-line Conductivity
3. On-line Dissolved O2 1T2A thru D Condenser -14 130 014.7 212 1. Grab Sample 2. On-line Conductivity H Eductors required 1T15 Cond. Storage Tank 30 100 50 150 Grab sample only L 1T16 Makeup Cond. Storage Tank 30 90 50 90 Grab sample only L 1T18 1PL22J (Hotwell Process) Circulating Water 30 105 30 105 Grab sample only L 1T19A 1T19B 1T19C 1T19D 1T19E 1T19F Condensate Filter A, B, C, D, E, F Effluent 220 135 275 140 Grab sample only L 1T12A 1T12B Feedwater Heater Drain 2A & 2B 15 175 100 350 Grab sample only M Eductors required 1T13A 1PL32J (Turbine Bldg. Process) Feedwater Heater Drain 1A -8 175 50 300 Grab sample only M Eductors required 1C6A 1C6B Component Cool. Water HX 1A & 1B Outlets 100 105 140 150 Grab sample only L 1C8A 1C8B RHR Heat Exchng. 1A &

1B Outlet 381 300 500 358 Grab sample only H 1C9 1PL33J (Aux. Bldg. Process) RHR System Flush to Radwaste 25 148 125 200 Grab sample only M CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-28 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.3-3 PROCESS SAMPLE TABULATION (Continued) OPERATING CONDITIONS Max. Operating Design NO. SAMPLE PANEL SAMPLE IDENTIFICATION Press (psig) Temp (°F) Press (psig) Temp (°F) SAMPLING CAPABILITY Activity (Note 1) REMARKS 1R4 Unit 1 Flr Drn Surge Tank Recirc Line 130 140 160 180 Grab sample only M 1R3 Unit 1 Flr Drn Collector Tank Recirc Line 130 140 160 180 Grab sample only M 1R5 Unit 1 Flr Drn Evap Feed Tank Recirc. Line 90 140 115 180 Grab sample only M 1R7 2R7 Unit 1 & 2 Chemical Wast Coll. Tank Recirc. 85 140 115 180 Grab sample only H 1R8 2R8 Unit 1 & 2 Chemical Wast Proc Tank Recirc 85 140 115 180 Grab sample only H 1R13 2R13 Unit 1 & 2 FP Demin Sludge Tk Slurry Recirc 100 120 150 150 NONE H Sample lines capped. 1R15 2R15 Unit 1 & 2 Flr Drn Evap Recirc Line 30 227 60 300 Grab sample only H 1R16 2R16 Unit 1 & 2 Flr Drn Evap Distillate 50 130 75 195 Grab sample only L 0R8 Spent Resin Tank Slurry Recirc Line 100 120 140 150 Grab sample only H 0R9A 0R9B Waste Sludge Tank A &

B Slurry Recirc Line 100 120 150 150 NONE H Sample lines capped 0R12 Chem Waste Evap Recirc 7 227 10 300 Grab sample only H 0R2A 0R2B 0R2C Waste Demin A, B, & C Effluent Lines 155 140 233 210 Grab sample only H 0R1A 0R1B 0R1C Waste Filter A, B, & C Effluent Lines 155 120 235 140 Grab sample only H 0PL33JA (Radwaste Bldg. Process) Reboilers A & B 5 95 25 150 Grab sample only L CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-29 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.3-3 PROCESS SAMPLE TABULATION (Continued) OPERATING CONDITIONS Max. Operating Design NO. SAMPLE PANEL SAMPLE IDENTIFICATION Press (psig) Temp (°F) Press (psig) Temp (°F) SAMPLING CAPABILITY Activity (Note 1) REMARKS 0R6A 0R6B Laundry Drain Coll Tank A&B Recirc Line 40 105 60 180 Grab sample only L 0R7A 0R7B Laundry Drain Sample Tank A&B Recirc Line 70 100 105 150 Grab sample only L 2R3 Unit 2 Flr Drn Coll. Tk 130 140 160 180 Grab sample only M 2R4 Unit 2 Flr Drn Surge Tk 130 140 160 180 Grab sample only M 2R5 Unit 2 Flr Drn Evap Feed Tk 90 140 115 180 Grab sample only M 1R1 2R1 Unit 1 & 2 Waste Collector Tank 155 120 235 140 Grab sample only H 1R9 2R9 Unit 1 & 2 Phase Separator Slurry Recirc 100 120 150 150 NONE H Sample lines capped. 0R17A 0R17B Aux Steam Reboiler A &

B Individual Discharge Line 85 328 150 366 Grab sample only L 1R2 2R2 Unit 1 & 2 Waste Surge Tank Recirc 155 120 235 140 Grab sample only H Aux Steam Electrode Boilers 110 345 150 365 Grab sample only L 0R16 Reboiler Discharge Header 85 328 150 366 1. Grab sample 2. On-line Conductivity L On-line conductivity no longer actively in use. 0R18 Auxiliary Steam Deaerator 120 300 200 388 1. Grab sample 2. On-line Dissolved O2 3. On-line pH L On-line oxygen & pH no longer actively in use. 0R19 0PL33JB (Radwaste Bldg Process) Radwaste Return to Cond Storage Tank 1. Grab sample 2. On-line Conductivity L On-line conductivity no longer actively in use.

CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-30 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.3-3 PROCESS SAMPLE TABULATION (Continued) OPERATING CONDITIONS Max. Operating Design NO. SAMPLE PANEL SAMPLE IDENTIFICATION Press (psig) Temp (°F) Press (psig) Temp (°F) SAMPLING CAPABILITY Activity (Note 1) REMARKS 1R6 2R6 Unit 1 & 2 Flr Drn Evap Monitor Tank 85 130 100 195 Grab sample only L 0R3A 0R3B 0R3C Waste Sample Tank A, B,

& C Recirc Line 60 140 90 210 Grab sample only H 0R4A 0R4B Excess Wtr Tank A&B Recirc Line 60 140 90 210 Grab sample only L 0R5 Chem Waste Evap Mon Tank 75 130 100 195 Grab sample only L 0R11A 0R11B Concentrated Waste Tank A & B Recirc Line 110 180 150 250 Grab sample only H 0R13 0PL33JC (Radwaste Bldg Process) Chem Waste Evap Distillate 50 130 75 195 Grab sample only L 1R10A 1R10B Fuel Pool Filter Demin.

Individual Effluent 1A,1B 110 120 155 150 Grab sample only L 2R10A 2R10B Fuel Pool Filter Demin.

Individual Effluent 2A,2B 110 120 155 150 Grab sample only L 1R11 Fuel Pool Filter Demin. Inlet Header 110 120 1550 150 Gram sample only M 1R12 0PL33JD (Radwaste Bldg Process) Supp Pool Inlet Header to Fuel Pool Fltr Demin 101 95 150 150 Grab sample only M 1C7AA Comp. Cool. Wtr Inlet Non. Reg. HX 1A 100 105 140 150 Grab sample only L 1C7AB Comp. Cool. Wtr Outlet Non. Reg. HX 1A 100 120 140 150 Grab sample only L 1C7BA Comp. Cool. Wtr Inlet Non. Reg. HX 1B 100 105 140 150 Grab sample only L 1C7BB 1PL42J (Contain. Bldg Sample Panel) Comp. Cool. Wtr Outlet Non. Reg. HX 1B 100 120 140 150 Grab sample only L 1C5 None Standby Liquid Control System 14.7 100 24 185 Grab sample only L Grab samples from tank and pump suction.

CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-31 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.3-3 PROCESS SAMPLE TABULATION (Continued) OPERATING CONDITIONS Max. Operating Design NO. SAMPLE PANEL SAMPLE IDENTIFICATION Press (psig) Temp (°F) Press (psig) Temp (°F) SAMPLING CAPABILITY Activity (Note 1) REMARKS 1T3 Condensate Pump Discharge Header 210 135 275 140 1. Grab Sample 2. On-line Conductivity 3. On-line Dissolved O2 4. On-line Sodium M On-line sodium no longer actively in use. 1T4 Condensate Demineralizer Inlet Header 210 135 275 140 1. Grab Sample 2. On-line Conductivity L 1T5A thru J Condensate Demineralizer Individual Effluent 1A thru 1J 210 135 275 140 1. Grab Sample 2. On-line Conductivity L 1T6 Condensate Demineralizer Outlet Header 210 135 275 140 1. Grab Sample 2. On-line Conductivity 3. On-line Dissolved O2 4. On-line Sodium L On-line sodium no longer actively in use. 1T7 Feedwater 2100 425 2200 450 1. Grab Sample 2. On-line Conductivity

3. On-line Dissolved O2 L 1T8A 1T8B Feedwater Heater Drain 6A & 6B 350 400 400 450 Grab sample only L 1T9A 1T9B Feedwater Heater Drain 5A & 5B 225 350 300 450 Grab sample only M 1T10A 1T10B Feedwater Heater Drain 4A & 4B 125 315 150 450 Grab sample only M 1T17 1PL88J (Feedwater Sample Panel) Turbine Bldg Closed Cool Wtr 83 105 150 150 Grab sample only L Note: 1. The potential activity levels are as follows: H: Activity >0.1 Ci/ml M: 10-3 Ci/ml<Activity<0.1 Ci/ml L: Activity < 10-3 Ci/ml CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-32 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.3-4 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM NORMAL OPERATING PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE CONDITIONS TEST MODES (a) STANDBY MODE (a) CIRCULATION TEST INJECTION TEST (b) OPERATING MODE (a) PIPING PRESS. PSIG (c) TEMP.°F PRESS. PSIG (c) TEMP.°F PRESS. PSIG (c) TEMP.°F PRESS. PSIG (c) TEMP.°F Pump Suction Inlet to Tank Shutoff Valve Makeup Water Pressure 70/100 (d)Test Tank Static Head (e) 70/100(d)Test Tank Static Head (e) 70/100 (d)Storage Tank Head 70/110(d)Pump Discharge To Explosive Valve Inlet Makeup Water Pressure 70/1000/1220 70/10070 Plus Reactor Static Head 70/100(70 Plus Reactor Static Head) to 122070/110 Explosive Valve Outlet To But Not Including First Isolation Check Valve Reactor Static Head to 1150 (f) 70/100Reactor Static Head to 1150(f) 70/100<70 Plus Reactor Static Head 70/100(<70 Plus Reactor Static Head) to

<1220 70/110 First Isolation Check Valve To The Reactor Reactor Static Head to 1150 (f) 70/560(g)Reactor Static Head to 1150 70/560(g)Reactor Static Head (b) 125 (b)Reactor Static Head to 1150 (f) 70/560(g)

CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-33 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.3-4 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM OPERATING PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE CONDITIONS (Continued) (a) The pump flow rate will be zero (pump not operatinq) during the standby mode and at rated during the test and operating modes. (b) Reactor to be at 0 psig and 125° F before changing from the standby mode to the Injection Test mode. (c) Pressures tabulated represent pressure at the points identified below. To obtain pressure at intermediate points in the system, the pressures tabulated must be adjusted for elevation difference and pressure drop between such intermediate points and the pressure points identified below: Piping Pressure Point Pump Suction: Pump Suction Flange Inlet Pump Discharge To Explosive Valve inlet: Pump Discharge Flange Outlet Explosive Valve Outlet To But Not Including First Isolation Check Valve: Explosive Valve Outlet First Isolation Check Valve To The Reactor: Reactor Sparger Outlet (d) During chemical mixing, the liquid in the storage tank will be at a temperature of 150° F maximum. (e) Pump suction piping will be subject to demineralized water supply pressure during flushing and filling of the piping and during any testing where suction is taken directly from the demineralized water supply line rather than a test tank. (f) Maximum reactor operating pressure is 1150 psig at reactor standby liquid control sparger outlet. (g) 560° F represents maximum sustained operating temperature.

CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-34 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.3-5 POST ACCIDENT SAMPLE SYSTEM Note: Post Accident Sampling System Requirements have been eliminated per License Amendment 155. This table retained for historical purposes. SAMPLE LINE OPERATING CONDITIONS MAX OPER DESIGN SAMPLE ANALYSIS PANEL SAMPLE MONITOR PANEL SAMPLE IDENTIFICATION PressPsig Temp.°F PressPsig Temp°F pH Range BORON RANGE*** CHLORIDERANGE** RADIO- NUCLIDE GRAB SAMPLECAPABILITY 1PS02J 1PS03J Containment Atmos. (Gas) 15 185 150 350 -- -- --

  • Yes 1PS02J 1PS03J Drywell Atmos. (Gas) 30 330 150 350 -- -- --
  • Yes 1PS02J 1PS03J Spare (Gas) -- -- 150 350 -- -- --
  • Yes 1PS02J 1PS03J Reactor Water Clean-Up Effluent 1400 120 1500 700 0-14 500-1500ppm* 0-20ppm*
  • Yes 1PS02J 1PS03J Reactor Coolant 1250 575 1500 700 0-14 500-1500ppm* 0-20ppm*
  • Yes 1PS02J 1PS03J Reactor Sample (RHR Pump 1A Outlet) or Suppression Pool Sample 381 341 500 350 0-14 500-1500ppm* 0-20ppm*
  • Yes 1PS02J 1PS03J Reactor Sample (RHR Pump 1B Outlet) or Suppression Pool Sample 381 341 500 350 0-14 500-1500ppm* 0-20ppm*
  • Yes 1PS02J 1PS03J Spare (Liquid) -- -- 1500 700 0-14 500-1500ppm* 0-20ppm*
  • Yes
  • Off-Line Analysis ** Complies with Regulatory Guide 1.97 *** For a worst case accident NOTE: Drywell and Containment Equipement and Floor Drain sump sample lines are also supplied. Since these samples are not required by NUREG-0737, these lines are not normally utilized.

CPS/USAR FIGURE 9.1-2a FUEL STORAGE RACK ARRANGEMENT FOR THE SPENT FUEL POOL CHAPTER 09 REV. 13, JANUARY 2009

36'-0"

32'-2" NORTH 15 X 10 15 X 1215 X 12 12 X 10 12 X 10 12 X 10 15 X 1015 X 10 11 X 10 15 X 12 15 X 1215 X 12 11 X 12 15 X 12 15 X 1215 X 12 11 X 12 (+12) 15 X 12 15 X 12 11 X 1011 X 10 12 X 10 12 X 1012 X 10 12 X 1011 X 10 11 X 10

CPS/USAR FIGURE 9.1-2c FUEL STORAGE RACK ARRANGEMENT FOR THE CASK STORAGE POOL (AS NEEDED) CHAPTER 09 REV. 13, JANUARY 2009

13'-9"

17'-0"

  • Up to two (2) Racks may be placed in the Fuel Cask Storage Pool, as needed, to extend core offload capacity. 11 X 12* 11 X 12*

CPS/USAR REV. 10, November 2002 Figure 9.1-4 Deleted

CPS/USAR REV. 10, November 2002 Figure 9.1-10 Deleted

CHAPTER 09 CPS/US AR FIGURE 9.1-12 HAS BEEN DELETED REV. 1a, OCTOBER 2016 CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 REV. 12, JAN 2007

FIGURE 9.1-13 HAS BEEN DELETED

CPS/USAR REV. 13, JANUARY 2009 FIGURE 9.1-15 PLANT REFUELING AND SERVICING SEQUENCE CHAPTER 09

NOTES: 1. CONTAINMENT BUILDING CRANE REQUIRED DURING OPERATION

2. ADDITIONAL NON-ROUTINE OPERATION TO BE PERFORMED AS REQUIRED 3. HEAVY LINE BETWEEN OPERATIONS INDICATES ANTICIPATED CRITICAL PATH DURING NORMAL OUTAGE 4. ADDITIONAL TRANSFER OF NEW AND SPENT FUEL BETWEEN FUEL AND CONTAINMENT BUILDINGS IS NECESSARY 5. THESE ACTIONS ARE NOT NECESSARILY REQUIRED TO BE PERFORMED IN THE SPECIFIC ORDER SHOWN SHUTDOWN - TURBINE OFF-LINE INSTALL REACTOR CAVITY GATES REACTOR COOLDOWNREMOVE DRYWELL HEAD COVER DRYWELL SEAL SURFACE INSTALL SEALS & STUD HOLE PROTECTORREMOVE RPV HEAD REMOVE RPV INSULATION & PIPING SRV MAINTENANCEFLOOD REACTOR CAVITY INSTALL STEAM LINE PLUGS REMOVE DRYER FLOOD REACTORWELL REMOVE SEALS & STUD HOLE PROTECTORINSTALL DRYWELL HEAD INSTALL RPV HEAD, STUDS & NUTS REMOVE REACTOR CAVITY GATES REPLACE INCORE DETECTOR REMOVE & REPLACE DRIVES DRAIN REACTOR CAVITY TRANSFER NEW FUEL TO CNMT CRD TESTS SIP FUEL IF REQUIREDREMOVE SEPARATOR& SHROUD HEAD SEAL VENTS DRAIN REACTOR CAVITY INSTALL REACTOR CAVITY GATES CORE VERIFICA-TION REMOVE STEAM LINE PLUGSREMOVE DRYWELL SEAL COVERINGOPEN VENTS INSTALL SEPARATOR& SHROUD HEAD CRD TESTS REACTOR WELL WALL DECONTAM / WETTINGINSTALL DRYER REMOVE LIGHTS & IN-VESSEL RACKS REMOVE SPENT FUEL REPLACE CONTROL BLADES CRD GUIDE TUBE SERVICE ORIFICE SERVICE INSTALL NEW FUEL JET PUMP SERVICE SHUFFLE FUEL INSTALL LIGHTS & IN-VESSEL RACKS START UP -TURBINE OFF-LINE POWER ASCENSIONREMOVE REACTOR CAVITY GATES TESTS FUEL TRANSFER BETWEEN BUILDINGS SRV MAINTENANCEPRESS TEST RPV TRANSFER SPENT FUEL TO FUEL BLDG ACINSTALL RPV HEAD, INSULATION& PIPING ABDDEEBC CPS/USAR REV. 10, November 2002 Figure 9.1-16 Deleted

REVISION 18 OCTOBER 2016 CONTAINMENT BUILDING 90° REACTOR + 180" I 270° I 0{1-, __ FUEL TRANSPORT MECHANISM & FUEL 0 UPPER FUEL POOL 0 NEW FUEL VAULT © FUEL INSPECTION STAND © FUEL PREPARATION MACHINE © FUEL HANDLING PLATFORM (2) FUEL AND CONTROL ROD STORAGE POOLS © BUILDING CRANE 125/10T MAIN/AUX HOOK CASK STORAGE POOL CASK WASHDOWN AREA FUEL CONTAINER STAND EQUIPMENT HATCH CRANE RAIL STOP WHEN FUEL IS STORED FUEL BUILDING 6 © 3 }0 @ @ © @ CLINTON POWER STATION UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FIGURE 9.1-22 FUEL BUNDLE LAYDOWN AREAS

CPS/USAR STACK MATING DEVICE--COLUMNS RAIL BEAMS REVISION 18 OCTOBER 2016 SLIDING RESTRAINTS CROSS BEAMS CLINTON POWER STATION UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT UNRESTRAINED HI-TRAC/HI-STORM STACK-UP CONFIGURATION FIGURE 9.1-24 CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 REV. 12, JAN 2007

FIGURES 9.2-1 THROUGH 9.2-3 HAVE BEEN DELETED

CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 REV. 11, JAN 2005

FIGURES 9.2-8 AND 9.2-9 HAVE BEEN DELETED

CPS/USAR REV. 10, November 2002 Figures 9.3-1 through 9.3-6 Deleted

CPS/USAR REV. 10, November 2002 Figures 9.5-1 through 9.5-6 Deleted

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML16306A126&oldid=631648"