ML20079N419
| ML20079N419 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 01/26/1984 |
| From: | Crane P NORTON, BURKE, BERRY & FRENCH, PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| References | |
| ALAB-756, NUDOCS 8401300214 | |
| Download: ML20079N419 (46) | |
Text
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h UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DOLMETED NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION USNRC BEFORE THE COMMISSION
% yy gg In the Matter of )
) 0FF;CE OF 3LCat ifJ PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC ) DocketOfTdfIS COMPANY ) DocketNo.00f275& 50J523
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Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power ) (Construction Quality Plant, Units 1 and 2 ) Assurance)
)
ANSWER OF PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY TO PETITION FOR REVIEW OF ALAB-756 FILED BY ,
JOINT INTERVENORS I. INTRODUCTION On July 19-21, 1983 an evidentiary hearing was held in San Luis Obispo, California before an Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board to consider materials issued in support of and opposition to motions to reopen the record in this proceeding on construction quality assurance. Following the hearing, on August 4, 1983 the parties filed simultaneous briefs at the invitation of the Appeal Board to discuss the applicable standards ~for reopening closed hearing records (Tr. 916). On Septed.ber 9 the Joint Intervenors filed a document styled a supplement to their motion to reopen the record on construction quality assurance which consisted principally of a report of an audit of Pullman Power Products Corp. (Pullman) conducted by Nuclear Services Corporation (NSC) in 1977 . Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PGandE) filed its answer to the supplement on September 21, 1983. On October 24, 1983 the Appeal Board issued an order denying the motions to reopen the record stating that 8401300214 84d13e PDR ADDCK 05000275
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- an opinion setting forth their views on the motions would be forthcoming. On October 31, 1983 Joint Intervenors filed a Petition for Review of the Appeal Board's order. In an order dated November 8, 1983 (CLI-83-27) the Commission declined to rule on the Joint Intervenors' petition until issuance of the Appeal Board's opinion and the parties' substantive responses thereto (Order at 9). The Appeal Board's opinion (ALAB-756) was issued December 19, 1983.1/ The Governor and Joint Intervenors filed Petitions for Review of the Appeal Board decision dated January 9, 1984.2/ The Secretary of the Commission gave the Staff and PGandE until January 26, 1984 within which to file answers to the petitions (Chandler letter dated January 16, 1984).
II. ARGUMENT PGandE opposes Commission review of ALAB-756 and responds to the Joint Intervenors' Petition For Review as follows:
- 1. The Appeal Board Gave the Testimony of Governor's Witness Hubbard the Weight It Deserved.
In heralding Mr. Hubbard's alleged expertise in the field of quality assurance, Joint Intervenors studiously avoid distin-guishing between construction quality assurance (CQA), the subject l of this proceeding, and other types of quality assurance, scch as l
1[ The opinion also disposes of the Joint Intervenors' l
supplement to their motion to reopen. (Opinion, i footnote 35.)
! 2/ The Governor's petition was mailed January 11, 1984 pursuant to arrangements with the Secretary of the l
Commission.
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t
- procurement, design, and operation. Whatever his expertise in these other fields, the extensive voir dire and cross examination of Mr. Hubbard in this proceeding show that he is not an expert in COA. Thus, as the Board held, his testimony is entitled to little weight.3/
Without listing in detail the results of Mr. Hubbard's extensive examination on voir dire and later cross-examination, (Tr. 15 - 183) it is enough to point out that Mr. Hubbard never read the Diablo Canyon COA Manual or procedures or those of the various contractors (Tr. 39, 40) and he did not know whether implementing CQA and design OA activities ware done by the same personnel (Tr. 40). He did not know what Independent Design Verification Contractor Reedy's opinion was on whether DOA findings applied to COA (Tr. 138), he admitted that he had not reviewed any COA audits of Diablo Canyon (Tr. 14 5 ) , and he further admitted that he had never worked in construction QA or construction at a nuclear power plant site (Tr. 12).A!
~
3/
The Board noted that in finding Mr. Hubbard "at least marginally qualified" to testify his testimony would be subject to the Board's decision as to "...what weight it should be entitled to." (Tr. 74.) Cf. 10 CFR 2.786 (b) (4) (ii) .
4/
~
On page 7 of their petition Joint Intervenors attempt to portray a PGandE witness as testifying that expertise in various narrow, technical fields is " irrelevant" in attempting to assess a COA program. However the witness testified it was irrelevant because he relies upon experts to assist him, that if he had to decide all by himself "in a vacuum" he could not render an opinion and, further, why a person who does not have COA experience is not qualified to evaluate a COA program and procedures (Tr. 379, 380, 519, 521). Joint Intervenors offered no evidence that Mr. Hubbard had any other persons on which to rely to cure the defects in his background.
In their Petition for Review Joint Intervenors quarrel with the Board's distinction between CQA and design quality assurance (Petition at 7) . However, clearly there are substantial and important differences between the two types of QA.b! These differences were covered by PGandE witness C. W. Dick as part of his testimony (Tr. 369-374, 376, 377; see also Tr. 414-420). A comprehensive history of the development of CQA at Diablo Canyon and how it differed from the design quality assurance program is set forth in PGandE's response to intervenors' motions to reopen dated May 31, 1983 at pages 5-8, which is a part of the record in this proceeding. These differences are further explained in PGandE's response to a motion to reopen the record in the low power proceeding dated July 2, 1982 at pages 11 through 19, copies of which are appended to this pleading as Attachment A. None of this evidence was refuted at the hearing or otherwise.
- 2. The NSC Audit Report Does Not Furnish Grounds For Reopening the Record In This Proceeding.
Once again Joint Intervenors seek to use the 1977 NSC l
j Audit Report of Pullman as a basis for reopening the record.
l This matter is covered extensively and disposed of in PGandE's i
Answer To Joint Intervenors' Supplement To Motion To Reopen The
-5/
In footnote 8, page 7 of their petition, Joint Intervenors complain that Mr. Hubbard was denied access to COA documents.
l However, they could have been obtained under subpoena. In l any event CQA documents filed by PGandE with the NRC and
! the various NRC audit reports have been available for years l in the various NRC public document rooms.
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l l _ . _- --
Record On The Issue Of Construction Quality Assurance dated September 21, 1983, a copy of which, less the supporting documente, is appended hereto as Attachment B.b! No further response appears necessary except to emphasize that it is the function of audits to point out deficiencies that must be addressed. That such deficiencies may exist is clearly contemplated in the regulations, which make provision for corrective action, follow up audits, etc. (10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria XVI, XVIII).
Joint Intervenors offer no evidence, old or new, to rebut the affidavits submitted by PGandE and the Staff in response to Joint Intervenors supplement to their motion to reopen. On the other hand Attachment B and the corresponding Staff pleading indicate that considering all the relevant information (i.e.,
the follow up to the NSC audit by both Pullman and PGandE) the NSC Audit presents nothing of safety significance and thus fails to meet a crucial part of the test for reopening closed records.
As provided in South Carolina Electric and Gas Company, et al.
(Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), 16 NRC 1183, (1982),
i "If Intervenor cannot establish any safety significance to the improper practices, there is, of course, no purpose to reopening the record for
- a further hearing." (Id., 1185.)
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-6/
See also the similar pleading filed by the NRC Staff dated October 6, 1983.
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. n .
- 3. The IDVP Review Does Not Provide A Basis For Reopening The Record.
In order to provide additional assurance that there were no safety significant defects in the work and to allay some concerns expressed by NRC Region V,PGandE volunteered a construction quality assurance review of two of its principal contractors, Guy F. Atkinson, which installed the containment, and Wismer and Becker, which installed the reactor coolant system (Tr. 439-441). After a comprehensive review the IDVP concluded that the COA programs of these contractors and PGandE were in place and functioning and that further review was not warranted. They found nothing of safety significance (ITR 36,
- p. 7-1; ITR 38, p. 7-1; Tr. 700-704, 740c). The IDVP and PGandE witnesses testified that based on what was found in the CQA audit of the two contractors it was permissible to extrapolate and assume that the COA programs of the other ten contractors were likewise in place and operating properly (Tr. 473, 474, 721-724).
Thus, the IDVP COA review not only does not support a reopening of the record in this proceeding but, instead, provides affirmative support that such a reopening is not necessary.1/
Next the Joint Intervenors criticize the Appeal Board for
" denigrating" the significance of the items found. However, as outlined above (p. 5) the Board is required to assess
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At page 8 of their petition Joint Intervenors quote Hubbard as stating that 20-40% of the items reviewed by the IDVP contained discrepancies. However, at the hearing it became clear that Mr. Hubbard obtained this figure by misreading the ITR's and basing his number on the raw, unevaluated data. (Tr. 421, 455, 682-685, 693-697, 725, 730, 731.)
the significance of these items because only items of safety significance can support a motion to reopen a closed record.
Simply because the Joint Intervenors may disagree with the Board in this respect is not grounds for challenging the Board's conclusion.
Finally, the Joint Intervenors carp at the scope of the IDVP CQA review. In the first place the entire CQA review proffered by PGandE was volunteered and was not required under the Commission order and Staff letter mandating the IDVP (Tr. 723). Thus the Joint Intervenors have no grounds to complain about the scope of what was offered. Further, the IDVP review was not based solely on a paper review and visual inspection but included measurements, dimensional checks, etc.
It is not considered common to redo non-destructive testing except in a review of a non-destructive testing program (Tr. 739-740c). Thirdly, arguments about the scope of the IDVP CQA review have nothing whatsoever to do with the issue before the Commission in this proceeding which concerns the i
reopening of closed records.
(
I 4. Testimony Concerning the Howard Foley CQA Program Does Not Furnish Grounds To Reopen The Record.
Joint Intervenors attempt to make much from the 1
testimony of the former Howard Foley quality control manager, l Virgil Tennyson, and bits and pieces of the PGandE and NRC Staff l.
l testimony (Petition, pp. 9, 10). However, the picture that i
emerged after extensive cross examination of Mr.#' Tennyson was
, e .
that pressure existed to get the job done but not at the sacrifice of quality, and that Tennyson felt that PGandE was committed to assuring a quality job (Tr. 223, 352). The Staff's witnesses confirmed that they agreed that the construction quality program was average to better than average, and that the Tennyson - Roam allegations did not have generic implications (Tr. 807, 808, 823, 908, 909). Also, they stated that the number and type of discrepancies detected in construction activities and the enforcement history over the lifetime of the project were not unusual or unexpected.
(Tr. 807-808.) Additionally, for the December 1982 to March 1983 timeframe they testified that given the type and amount of work being performed, the deficiencies noted were not unexpected nor
! were they of any safety significance (Tr. 806, 908). Further, !
they did not believe a 60 hour6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> work week was excessive (Tr. 895, 899).
In general Joint Intervenors broadside allegations in Paragraph II.E are contrary to the evidence set forth in the record, as indicated by the notable lack of citations to the record in this and other sections of their petition. The proper general response to this maze of allegations is that the evidence in this proceeding indicates there simply was not a COA breakdown at Foley and Mr. Tennyson's allegations were not substantiated.8/ The best explanation offered was that the job
-8/
As to the alleged 8-14% deficiencies in the welding in the Fuel Handling Building and Containment, the PGandE witness testified that the number referred to welds which did not meet PGandE's very demanding acceptance criteria, and that none of the welds had to be replaced or ground out (Tr. 561,
. o
- simply outgrew Mr. Tennyson's capabilities. (Tr. 609-612, 647-650.)
- 5. Joint Intervenors Misconstrue The Appeal Board Decision on the Application of Appendix A to This Proceeding.
Paragraph II.F of the Joint Intervenors' Petition misconstrues the Appeal Board ruling on the applicability of Appendix A. The Board did not hold that PGandE was not required to implement a QA program for structures, systems and components important to safety but not safety grade. What the Board held was that intervenors had not identified a single structure, system or component important to safety not covered by PGandE's QA program.
The Board went on to note that PGandE published a detailed list of the items covered by its QA program in the FSAR back in 1974 and that any challenge to this listing was grossly out of time (Opinion, Footnote 31).E!
Footnote 8/, cont'd:
567, 568, 655). Althouga the weld defects were minor, they were treated seriously, and PGandE was moving in on the problem when the NRC inspector filed his notice of violation on the welds (Tr. 564-566, 826, 827).
PGandE responded to the notice of violation and, as requested by the Board, the NRC close out on the weldc was circulated to the Board and all parties by Mr. Chandler on October 25, 1983 (Tr. 915, 916).
~9/
In view'of the completeness of the listing in the FSAR Joint Intervenors' complaints about lack of discovery set forth in footnote 11 of their petition are mystifying.
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, Moreover, the cases cited by Joint Intervenors in this section of the petition do not support the Joint Intervenors' position. They hold that the terms "important to safety" and
" safety-grade" are not equivalent, equipment "important to safety" may include both " safety-grade" and "nonsafety-grade" equipment, depending on the function and degree of reliance placed on the equipment, and there is no regulatory requirement for classification and qualification of systems important to safety; i.e. there is no requirement for a list of such systems. ;
(Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island, Unit 1), ALAB-729, 17 NRC 814, 874, 876 (1983); Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-57 at 164-180 (1983). In short the Board's decision is consistent with Commission regulations and decisions. (See also NRC Staff Generic Letter 84-01.)
- 6. The Appeal Board Applied The Proper Standard of Review.
The answer to Joint Intervenors' arguments on the standard of review (Petition, pp. 3, 4) are contained in PGandE's
[
answer to the petition for review filed by Governor Deukmejian
! which is being filed contemporaneously with this pleading and is incorporated herein by this reference.
1 i
- 7. Joint Intervenors Ignore The Requirements For Late-Filed Contentions.
In seeking to litigate construction quality assurance the Joint Intervenors must not only meet the demanding standards for reopening closed records but also the requirements for i
late-filed contentions. (Pacific Gas and Electric Company, 1
. _ . . . _ - . . _ . _ _ . - _- _ ._..___ _. _ _ __ _ ..~. _ . _ _ _
Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2) CLI-82-39, 16 NRC 1712 (1982). Joint Intervenors have totally ignored the latter requirement.
III. CONCLUSION For the above reasons, PGandE cubmits that the Commission should refuse to review ALAB-756.
Respectfully submitted, ROBERT OHLBACH PHILIP A. CRANE, JR.
RICHARD F. LOCKS Pacific Gas and Electric Company P. O. Box 7442 San Francisco CA 94120 (415) 781-4211 ARTHUR C. GEHR Snell & Wilmer 3100 Valley Bank Center Phoenix AZ 85073 (602) 257-7288 BRUCE NORTON Norton, Burke, Berry & French, P.C.
P. O. Box 10569 Phoenix AZ 85064 (602) 955-2446 Attorneys for Pacific Gas and Electric Company B. /
Philip N Crane, I f. '
Dated January 26, 1984 I L
11-
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION J
In the Matter of )
I
- PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-275 I
) Docket No. 50-323 Dichlo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, )
Units 1 and 2 )
I )
i CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The foregoing document (s) of Pacific Gas and Electric Company has (have) been served today on the following by deposit in the United States mail, properly stamped and addressed: i Judge John F. Wolf Mrs. Sandra A. Silver Chairman , 1760 Alisal Street Atomic Safety and Licensing Board San Luis Obispo CA 93401 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Wachington DC 20555 Mr. Gordon Silver '
1760 Alisal Street Judga Glenn O. Bright San Luis Obispo CA 93401 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board US Nuclear Regulatory Commission John Phillips, Esq.
Washington DC 20555 Joel Reynolds, Esq.
Eric Havian Judgo Jerry R. Kline Center for Law in the Public Interest Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 10951 W. Dico Blvd. - Suite 300 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Los Angeles CA 90064 Washington DC 20555 David F. Fleischaker, Esq.
Mrs. Elizabeth Apfelberg
- P. O. Box 1178 c/o Cetsy Umhoffer . Oklahoma City OK 73101 1493 Southwood San Luis Obispo CA 93401 Arthur C. Gehr, Esq.
Snell & Wilmer Janice E. Kerr, Esq. 3100 Valley Bank Center
! Public Utilities Commission Phoenix AZ 85073 Stata of California Bruce Norton, Esq.
50 McA 1 s er Street f# O box 1569 San Francisco CA 94102 Phoenix AZ 85064 l
! Mrs. Raye Fleming 1920 Mattie Road Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Shall Beach CA 93449 Board Panel US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Frederick Eissler Washington DC 20$55 Scanic Shoreline Preservation Conference, Inc.
4623 More Mesa Drive Santa Barbara CA 93105
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. Chairman Judge Thomas S. Moore Atomic Safety and Licensing Chairman Appeal Panel Atomic Safety and Licensing US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Appeal Board W3chington DC 20555 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington DC 20555 Sccretary US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Judge W. Reed Johnson W2chington DC 20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Attn: Docketing and Service US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Section Washington DC 20555 Lawrence J. Chandler, Esq. Judge John H. Buck j N0nry J. McGurren Atomic Safety and Licensing US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Appeal Board '
Office of Executive Legal Director US Nuclear Regulatory Comission Wnchington DC 20555 Washington DC 20555 Mr. Richard B. Hubbard Connaissioner Nunzio J. Palladino MHB Technical Associates Chairman 1723 Hamilton Avenue Suite K US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Scn Jose CA 95125 1717 E Street NW Washington DC 20555 Mr. Carl Neiberger Talegran Tribune Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal.
P. O. Box 112 US Nuclear Regulatory Comission San Luis Obispo CA 93402 1717 H Street NW Washington DC 20555 Michael J. Strumwasser, Esq.
. Susan L. Durbin, Esq. Commissioner Victor Gilinsky Pater H. Kaufman, Esq. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3580 Wilshire Blvd. Suite 800 1717 H Street NW
. Loo Angeles CA 90010 Washington DC 20555 Maurice Axelrad, Esq. Commissioner James K. Asselstine Lowenstein, Newman, Reis, and US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Axelrad, P.C. 1717 H Street NW 1025 Connecticut Avenue NW Washington DC 20555 Washington DC 20036 i Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts
- US Nuclear Regulatory Commission i 1717 H Street NW Washington DC 20555 N
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Date: January 26, 1984 t. , .
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Philip . Crane, Jr .
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.G 1 were covered by the same QA manual as design QA. . . .
2 ( Affidavit at 92. ) Mr. Hubbard asserts that because of QA 3 deficiencies in the area of design that "one (Hubbard) is 4 led to believe" that similar difficultier, exist in the area 5 of construction. PGandE QA reviews and NRC inspections 6 confirm that there is no such evidence. (Diablo Canyon 7 Reverification Study, Transcript February 17, 1982, p. 31.)
e Attachments 1 and 2 to the Bain affidavit show g clearly that in 1968 and 1969 there were quality control and 10 quality assurance requirements placed on manufacturers and 11 contractors. Beginning in 1969, prior to the effective date
! 12 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B (Appendix B), PGandE required 13 that each contractor performing work at Diablo Canyon have a 14 quality assurance program qualified to PGandE and NRC 15 requirements. (Bain affidavit at 5. ) All contractors and 16 subcontractors or suppliers providing work at Diablo Canyon 17 adhered to these procedures in the performance of work at 18 the site or any other location affecting materials or 19 products ultimately destined for Diablo Canyon. (Bain 20 affidavit at 5.)
21 The Bain affidavit establishes unequivocably that 22 site QA/QC activities were, except where deficiencies were 23 noted and corrected, in compliance with Appendix B at all l 24 times material hereto. Quality control at the Diablo Canyon i
25 site was a multi-tiered operation. (Raymond et al.
t 26 affidavit at 14.) As a part of all bid specifications, each l
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- 1 contractor was required to prepare and staff a site quality 2 assurance / quality control organization adequate to inspect 3 the quality of work performed. PGandE field engineers and 4 inspectors reinspected this work for compliance with the 5 applicable design documents and specifications. The General 6 Construction quality control on-site group was then directly 7 involved in the verification of the adequacy and effective-8 ness of the contractors' quality assurance program and the
- 9 Company's following inspections. Finally, Corporate on-site 10 quality assurance engineers verified the adequacy and 11 effectiveness of the entire process. (Bain affidavit at 12 5-6.)
13 PGandE started formal audits of construction
, 14 activities in December, 1969 when the QA Engineering 15 Department was originated. Construction audits were 3
16 conducted on a regular basis in accordance with NRC 17 regulations as described in the PGandE QA Manual. The 18 corporate QA/ construction QC audits from 1969 through 1981 19 exceeded 1500. This total does not include the hundreds of 20 audits conducted by the NRC and contractors in accordance 21 with their QA programs. (Raymond et al. affidavit at 6-7.)
22 There are various reasons why program deficiencies 23 in the area of design QA should not be indicative of the 24 quality of construction or the effectiveness of a construc-25 ' tion QA/QC program. QA programs for design and construction 26 activities function in significantly different ways. In
- .- . .__ =_ _
1 construction, one deals with a product (structures, systems,
^.
2 and components) which permits hands-on type verification, 3 such as inspection and test. In design, one deals with a 4 "P3Per" product and verification must be accomplished by i
5 measures such as checking, design reviews, approvals, and/or 6 limited testing. It is no accident that design quality has 7 historically relied more heavily on professional judgment, g and less on QA/QC controls, than has construction. One 9 important reason for this has been the difficulty of 10 developing methods for design verification as effective as 11 those available for construction verification. (Raymond et 12 al. affidavit at 11.)
13 For example, in applying the relevant criteria of 14 Appendix B there are differences between design and 15 construction in organizational structures and 16 responsibilities, verification approaches for assuring 17 design adequacy and product conformance, knowledge and 18 skills required for QA/QC personnel, appropriate remedial 19 and corrective actions, and, most important, the process of 20 verifying adequacy and detecting deficiencies. Contrary to 21 Hubbard's assertion (Hubbard aff. at 92), PGandE recognized 22 these differences in the organization of the original QA 23 Manual. It was written to specifically address the 24 requirements of the various departments associated with 25 nuclear activities. One section of the QA Manual prescribed l 26 engineering requirements (PRE); another section related to l
l l
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, 1 construction work (PRC); and another section to procurement 2 of materials (PRP). Thus, the PGandE QA manual incorporated 3 a set of separate requirements for engineering, procurement 4 and construction. (Raymond et al. affidavit at 11-12.)
5 The time span covered by formal construction 6 verification programs for DCPP is longer and the programs 7 are more detailed than in design. Construction controls 8 were easier to develop and implement than design controls.
9 For example, it was not until 1971 that ANSI N45.2 was 10 issued, and 1974 for ANSI N45.2.11 (the basis for Regulatory 11 Guide 1.64). These constituted the first industry wide 12 standards for design control QA requirements; and Regulatory 13 Guide 1.64 was the first on design control issued by the 14 NRC. As 1.=.te as June, 1976, Regulatory Guide 1.64, 15 Revision 2, was issued, further evolving the design control 16 guidance issued by the NRC to interpret Appendix B, Criteria 17 III. Previously, other requirements existed in codes and 18 other standards, or drafts thereof, but these were 19 relatively specialized and were not directed toward 20 management programs for quality. (Raymond et al. affidavit 21 at 12-13.)
22 In contrast, for construction activities at Diablo 23 Canyon, " quality assurance" requirements were an integral 24 Part of every contract specification for construction, even 25 those issued prior to the time Appendix B was issued for 26 comment in 1969. (Bain affidavit at 4.) These requirements
\
b 1 covered the areas of testing, material procurement, 2 inspection, reporting, personnel qualification, etc. , either 3 directly or by reference to detailed codes and standards.
4 The requirements were further supplemented by the ASME 'N' 5 Stamp program used by contractors working on the project.
6 When formal QA programs became a requirement for future 7 nuclear work, the changes for construction contractors at 8 DCPP were significantly less than the changes and additions 9 required for design activities. Th.s was not unique to 10 PGandE, but was characteristic of the situation throughout 11 the nuclear industry. (Raymond et al. affidavit at 13.)
12 The Commission order establishing Phase I of the 13 IDVP also included a requirement for an independent review 14 of the QA Programs for PGandE and its design consultants.
15 R. F. Reedy, Inc. ("RFR") performed this review for the IDVP 16 and submitted a Report dated March 8, 1982 (" Reedy Report").
17 The RFR effort had as an objective the identification of 18 design areas where the IDVP could most effectively 19 concentrate its efforts. (Teledyne Interim Technical Report 20 dated June 23, 1982.) To accomplish this objective Reedy 21 used present day interpretations and understandings of 22 Appendix B in place of the differing interpretations and 23 understandings applicable at the time work was done. This 24 iPProach established a low threshold for the reporting of 25 non-conformances or potential areas for investigation.
26 (Raymond et al. affidavit at 9.)
1 The Hubbard Affidavit relies heavily on the 2 findings of the Reedy Report both in his general l
3 condemnation of the PGandE Quality Assurance program and his 4 inference of " breakdowns" in the construction QA/QC program.
5 The Reedy effort was directed at quality assurance in the 6 area of seismic design and did not involve site of 7 construction quality assurance. (Raymond et al. affidavit ,
8 at 9.) The Reedy Report was thoroughly discussed at the NRC 9 meeting of April 1, 1982. The Reedy Report does not address 10 the issue of whether PGandE's quality assurance program met 11 the criteria as interpreted at the time seismic design work 12 was being done. Reedy applied 1982 interpretations of the 13 criteria which were significantly more stringent than 14 earlier interpretations. This is admittedly an unfair 15 standard as Mr. Reedy himself stated that:
16 "I have to agree with you that the strict interpretation that we use[d] was 17 completely unfair. The order to me did not seem to be fair to begin with, and I
! 18 made a comment at the time that the i evaluation should be done to the criter-19 is that was in use at the time this pro-gram was accepted by the NRC and audited 20 by the NRC, but we did not go back and say we will accept what the NRC audited 21 and what they accepted. We will use the criteria in the order. Now I don't 22 think that is fair, but that is what we did." (Tr. pp. 32 & 33.)
23 24 Following that meeting PGandE responded to the Reedy Report 25 on April 15, 1982. That response is attached to the 26 affidavit of Raymond et al. and is incorporated herein by
1 this reference. That verified response evidences, contrary 2 to the conclusions drawn by Mr. Hubbard, that PGandE did i 3 institute QA/QC program control measurer.
4 TES, as program manager of the IDVP, filed its
) 5 " Interim Technical Report: Evaluation of the Quality 6 Assurance Program and Implementation Reviews" dated June 23, 7 1982. ("TES Interim QA Rpt. ") In that report TES states:
8 "The issue to be resolved by the IDVP is to determine whether or not DCNPP-1 is 9 in compliance with the PG&E License Application as it pertains to seismic 10 safety-related contracts prior to June 1978. The initial generic sample and 11 the additional verifications and addi-tional samples identified through the 12 RLCA efforts form a part of the back-ground to be considered in establishing 13 the additional verification to be per-formed in unique response to the QA 14 Findings."' (at 9.)
15 Based upon its review, TES concluded as follows:
16 "a. The RFR Phase I QA Audit and Review Reports satisfactorily evaluate the 17 QA Programs and their implementa-tion to the criteria adopted by 18 RFR.
19 h. The criteria adopted by RFR are conservatively responsive to the 20 Order. The use of more appropriate criteria would have been extremely 21 difficult, if not impossible.
22 c. The RFR conclusions must be consid-ered only with respect to the RFR 23 criteria and scope. The RFR con-clusions are not a complete measure 24 of the design control practices l actually applied to the seismic 25 design efforts. Of equal impor-tance, the RFR conclusions are net 26 intended to apply outside of the
1 scope of the RFR effort, seismic
- ; design by service relative contrac-2 tors and PG&E prior to June 1, 1978.
3
- d. The real interpretative process is 4
4 the effect of the QA related work on the recommendations for addi-5 tional verification or additional l sampling of the design process." '
6 (at 24.) I 7
TES went on to state:
8 "With respect to additional 9 samples, it is important to note that the design efforts of PG&E and of the 10 contractors reviewed by RFR were included in the initial sample. During 11 the April 1, 1982 meeting (TR., p. 75, lines 1-12) Dr. Cloud who originally -
12 developed and implemented the Phase I plan, made the following statement:
13
'But with respect to decisions and 14 impli~ cation of this report, I think -- I think it's very impor-15 tant to recognize that our part of the verification program was
! 16 formulated and designed in such a way that it would not in any way 17 rely on the QA program or practice nor would it rely on any other of 18 the paper trail; and when we are finished with our work, the plant 19 will have been verified for its i seismic adequacy whether or not l 20 there was any QA program or not; and I think it's -- I think the --
21 the -- that Roger's report and it's one of its main values is that it 22 rationalizes or explains why some of the findings are turning up in '
23 the independent calculations that in fact are turning up.'
l 24 The point of Dr. Cloud's remark is that t 25 verification of the design process has been conducted with the basic assumption 26 that there may have been significant i
1 l
l
-, . . , , _ . . . 7-.. . - . - , ..-,.7y__, ,, . , . - , . , _ , ,,__.__,y,.,,,_,_y-,,,,__,,,.o,m-,-,.y_.,_,m,7 ,,,,g,,-, , , _ - , ,m_ -._7, , . - , _ _ , ,,._v-.
. g deficiencies in the formal QA program or in their implementation. TES concurs 2 with this opinion, and in reviewing the RFR reports has sought to determine if 3 there are significant gaps in the initial and expanded (per the first ITR) 4 design process verification program which must be filled in order to 5 complete this work." (at 31. )
6 It cannot be overemphasized how craftily Mr.
7 Hubbard has contrived his affidavit. He has carefully taken 8
selected truths, half-truths, generalizations, unsupported conclusions and mischaracterizations to fashion a damning 9
10 indictment. 3f There is no dispute that certain design 11 discrepancies and errors occurred. (Anderson et al. affi-12 davit at 4-5.) There can be little dispute that certain 13 deficiencies in the implementation of design QA/QC pro-14 cedures may have been the cause of some of those 15 discrepancies and errors. Hyperbole aside, the real 16 question facing this Board in light of the facts, Commission 17 action, and the design verification programs extant, is whetner the record should be reopened. It is respectfully 18 19 submitted that in view of the Commission's action 20 establishing procedures to be followed, this Board has neither sufficient jurisdiction nor reason to do so. What 21 22 we have here is simply a substantial open item which has 23 been mandated by the Commission to be resolved to the satisfaction of the Staff and Commission under a rigorous 24 25 procedure.
26 ///
_7 , _ ,,
1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COOSIISSION 3 '
4 Before The Atomic Safety And Licensing Appeal Board ,
I 5
6
)
7 In the Natter of ) Docket Nos. 50-275 0.L.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company ) 50-323 0.L. i 8 (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power )
Plant, Units No. I and 2) ) (Construction Quality 9 ) Assurance) l 10 11 PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY'S 12 ANSWER TO JOINT INTERVENORS' SUPPLEMENT TO MOTION TO REOPEN THE 13 RECORD ON THE ISSUE OF CONSTRUCTION QUALITY ASSURANCE 14 15 16 On September 9, 1983, Joint Intervenors filed a 17 document styled a supplement to their motion to reopen the 18 record on construction quality assurance which included 19 copies of (1) a proposal by Nuclear Services Corporation 20 (NSC) for an independent audit of one of the Diablo Canyon 21 construction contractors, Pullman Power Products Corp.
22 (" Pullman"), and (2) a report of the audit conducted by NSC 23 of Pullman, dated October 24, 1977.
24 On September 14, 1983, PGandE notified the Board 25 that it would respond to this supplement within the time 26 ///
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1 prescribed by the rules. In accordance with that letter the 2 following response is submitted. ,
3 BACKGROUND f '
+ c, 4 On June 8, 1982, Joint Intervenom, filed a motion to reopen the Diablo Canyon record alleging deficiencies in 5
, , ~ .
6 the quality program. Eter h' earing arguiment on this and 7 other matters on April 14, 1983, the Board issued an order 8 on April 21, 19h3requiringJointIntervenorstopromptly
. y _
- s. ,
9 refile their motion to.' reopen on constructi'o n quality
,, e 10 assurance and further required'that , all evidence that they 11 claimed supported reopening should a'ccompany that motion. lj 12 Notwithstuding that the Board had ordered 1the motien filed 13 promptly, Joint Interveners did not file the ir motion until 14 May 10, 1983. PGandE fiied its response to t. hat motion (and J -
15 Governor Deuknejian's) on May 31',' 1983. 01 Juoie 28, 1983, 16 the Board issued an order setting an evidentiary hearing on 17 the motions to reo' pen fcE July 19, '1983. A mini-hearing was 18 then conducted
- on July 19-22', 1983 onthehuestionof 19 construction quality assurance. ,At the close of i thc. hearing 20 the parties were allowed to fils closing brisis by August 4,-
21 1983 on certain issues limited to the st.andards for J
22 fy 23 24 lj The Board noted that on the e?e of the argument, the Joint Intervenors ,had filed certain documents with tha 25 Boarcl in an improper manner without seeking leave of the Board. (Appeal Board, Memo and Order, April 21, 1983, p. 2-4).
26.l l .
i 1 reopening a closed record. A decision on the motion has r.ot 2 been issued by the Board.
3 .THE SEPTEMBER 9, 1983 SUPPLEMENT 4 As they have many times in the past, Joint Inter-5 venors have completely ignored the established rules of 6 practice by dropping documents out of thin air on the Board 7 without requesting leave to file. Indeed, as noted above, 8 the Board admonished Joint Intervencrs as recently as 9 April 21, 1983 to follow the established rules of practice 10 in filing documents with the Board. Suffice to say, the 11 instant filing falls into the same category and for that 12 reason alone should be ignored.
13 Rowever, there is another and more fundamental 14 reason why the Board should refuse to entertain this sub-15 mittal. With any administrative proceeding there must be a 16 time when the evidentiary record is closed. The practical 17 principle of administrative finality must be applied in a 18 reasoned manner if an administrative matter is to be brought 19 to a logical and timely conclusion. See, ICC v. Jersey 20 City, 322 U.S. 500, 514 (1944).
I 21 In the instant case, J0$nt Intervenors have 22 practiced a fine art of delay by continually filing l
1 l 23 documents out of time or otherwise ignoring the rules of 24 practice. No cogent explanation or affidavit accompanies 25 this " filing" to explain its lateness (the documents are 26 more than five years old) or otherwise explain or sponsor
1 the conclusions contained in this filing. Obviously, this 2 is not "new evidence" which has recently been generated and 3 which might arguably justify this eleventh-hour filing. gf.
4 In The Matter of Metropolitan Edison Company (Three Mile 5 Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1) LBP-82-34A, 15 NRC 914 6 (1982)). Indeed it was a similar filing in April of this 7 year which prompted this Board to requ' ire the filing of new 8 motions and a subsequent " mini-hearing" on the construction 9 quality assurance issue. Manifestly this process takes time 10 to accomplish and the delay which results serves the stated 11 purpose of the Joint Intervenors to delay or stop the 12 operation of Diablo Canyon. If this information had been 13 produced at the July hearing PGandE could have responded to 14 it as appropriate. Therefore, to allow Joint Intervenors to 15 proffer it at this time would be rewarding such conduct.
16 Accordingly, we urge the Board to refuse to consider the 17 Supplement in its deliberations on the motion.
18 Notwithstanding our foregoing arguments in 19 opposition to the receipt and consideration of these 20 materials at this late date, PGandE, in accord with its 21 September 14 letter, conducted an in depth review of the
! 22 events and subsequent actions surrounding the NSC audit.
23 If the Board decides to consider the Supplement 24 filed by Joint Intervenors, PGandE requests leave to file 25 the affidavit of Russell P. Wischow in explanation of, and 26 ///
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1 in rebuttal to, the Joint Intervernors ' filing. 2/ As 2 explained in our September 14, 1983 letter, this additional 3 information places the NSC audit in perspective and confirms 4 that both Pullman and PGandE had acceptable programs in 5 effect for construction quality assurance at Diablo Canyon 6 during the time in question.
- 7 In reviewing this information we believe that it 8 must be kept in mind that audits are by nature documents 9 that portray a negative picture. Their purpose is to point 10 out any possible deficiencies that must be addressed. Over 11 the years, hundreds of audits have been conducted. Many of 12 these audits have generated findings. These findings have 13 then been reviewed and appropriate corrective action taken.
14 Where indicated, program improvements have been 15 incorporated. Obviously it would be totally unreasonable to 16 expect error-free construction at a nuclear plant. Such a 17 result is not mandated by the Atomic Energy Act or the 18 Commission's regulations. Rather you look to see that 19 20 2/ Attached to the Wischow affidavit are the following documents: (1) Statement of Qualifications of 21 Russell P. Wischow; (2) ASME Certificates - M. W.
Kellogg Co., Div. of Pullman, Inc. Diablo Canyon Work, 22 dated December 18, 1972 and October 14, 1977; (3) NSC Audit, dated October 24, 1977; (4) Pullman Review, 23 dated April 11, 1978; (5) PGandE Audit No. 80422 dated Jnine 12, 1978; (6) PGandE Review of Nuclear Services 24 Corporation Audit Findings, dated June 16, 1978; (7) PGandE Non-Conformance Reports DCO-78-RM-004 and 25 005; Minor Variance Reports M-3723, M-3724, M-3725, and M-3726; and (8) NRC Inspection Report 50-275/78-10, 26 50-323/78-10, dated July 26, 1978.
i-1 identified construction errors have been cured in order to 2 give reasonable assurance that the plant can be operated 3 without endangering the public health and safety. Jn the 4 Matter o_f Union Electric . Company (Callaway Plant, Unit 1) 5 ALAB-740, Slip. Opinion pp. 1-3, (Sep. 14, 1983.) Thus, one 6 audit in isolation cannot give an accurate picture of an 7 overall quality program. Rather, it must be looked at as a 8 part of an overall progrNn and a tool for management to use l
9 along with others to assure high quality performance.
10 1971-1977 PULLMAN POWER PRODUCTS SCOPE OF WORK AND QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM 11 12 During the 1971-1977 time period encompassed by 13 the NSC audit, Pullman was the principal piping contractor 14 for Diablo Canyon Power Plant Units 1 and 2. 3f The prime 15 piping contract was written to include power plant piping -
16 and associated supports with the exception of the main 17 reactor coolant loops (which were done by Wismer and 18 Becker), the majority of the fire protection system, and the 19 plant embedded piping. The erection of all rupture 20 ///
21 22 3] Much of the following information has been obtained from PGandE records and is attested to in the attached l 23 affidavit of Russell P. Wischow who was PGandE's Direc-tor of Quality Assurance at the time of the NSC audit.
24 As Mr. Wischow states, the results of the NSC audit were not comunicated to him until early 1978. Accord-l 25 ingly, he could not have testified as to its results in the October 1977 hearings. (Wischow Affidavit, 26 para. 3.)
l
l' 1 restraints was also included. The contract with Pullman 2 included the inspection and documentation necessary to 3 demonstrate compliance with quality requirements.
4 The Quality Assurance Prcgram associated with this ,
5 contract was originally written to accommodate the 6 requirements of the 1968 edition of applicable parts of the 7 ASE Nuclear Pressure Vessel Code (USA B-31.7). This 8 compliance was reviewed by the State of California who l 9 requested that it be modified to incorporate the Quality l
10 Assurance requirements of the ASE Boiler and Pressure 11 Vessel Code, (ASE Section III) 1971 Edition. These 12 commitments are consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR i
13 50, Appendix B and became part of the program manual.
14 The Pullman program was subjected to the review 15 and extensive onsite survey by the ASE who granted Pullman 16 NA and NPT-atamps in 1972. These NA and NPT stamps specific 17 to Diablo Canyon were recertified by ASE in 1977 following W
18 an updating audit. (Wischow Affida ,
Attachment 2) 4f For 19 ASE code certified work, the NRC Regulatory Guides provide 20 that this Quality Assurance Program is a recognized means of 21 meeting the intent of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. Appropriate l
22 quality procedures were provided .for all non-code work 23 performed by Pullman. The Quality Assurance Program was 24 25 4/ Interestingly, this audit survey by ASE was conducted from August 29-31, 1977 during the audit conducted by 26 NSC (August 22 through September 20, 1977).
- - - , - . . . . , - - - - -.-..._.,_--,_,v,_.. . _ - - . . ~ _ . . .
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1 then submitted to PGandE and approved, after review and
< 2 comment, to control Pullman's work in accordance with the 3 requirements of PGandE's specifications. .
4 NSC AUDIT OF PULIMAN POWER PRODUCT QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM S
6 At the request of PGandE to further confirm the 7 quality of the installed materials at Diablo Canyon NSC was 3 contracted by Pullman to perform an independent audit of the
? installed piping components and supports in August 1977.
10 The actual audit was conducted from August 22 to 11 September 20, 1977. Thereafter, a report of the findings 12 was submitted to Pullman on October 24, 1977. This report 13 contained a number of very sweeping and generalized 14 assertions and conclusions. (Wischow Affidavit, 15 Attachment 3.)
16 In areas requiring evaluation and interpretation, 17 the auditors measured the quality of the work effort against 18 then current (August 1977) ANSI Standards, Nuclear 19 Regulatory Commission Regulations, and Regulatory Guides.
20 This approach did not comport with the stated purpose of the 21 audit to evaluate the work effort against the codes, l
22 regulations, and standards in effect at the particular time 23 ///
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t l 26 l
t
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I the work was being performed. Sj The problem apparently 2 arose from the auditors' erroneous interpretation that 3 organizations must "backfit" work done to previous codes and 4 standards to meet current standards. This erroneous 5 interpretation and approach to the audit had the practical 6 effect of invalidating much of the entire NSC effort.
~
7 PULLMAN POWER PRODUCTS RESPONSE TO THE NSC AUDIT 8
l 9 After receipt of the NSC audit report, Pullman 10 determined to conduct their own an in-depth review of the
- findings (Wischow Affidavit, Attachment 4). This review j
12 consisted of a point-by-point evaluation and rebuttal of 13 each of the NSC Report findings. In its response, Pullman 14 15 Sj The NSC proposal defined the scope of the audit as' 16 including a review of (1) the overall adequacy of the I existing quality assurance program against current NRC I 17 requirements, (2) the implementation of the guality assurance program, and (3) the workmanship of 18 field-fabricated and installed items. (NSC Proposal,
- p. 2. ) Where the auditors went astray was in applying 19 current NRC requirements to the installed work rather than to the existing program. The audit report itself 20 provided that the audit scope and purpose was to evaluate the work effort against the codes and 21 standards in effect at the particular time that the work was being performed. However, the Report goes on 22 to state that "in areas requiring interpretation, the quality of the work effort at Diablo Canyon was 23 measured against the current [1977] ANSI Standards and Regulatory Guides, accepted today as valid interpreta-24 tions of regulatory requirements. Moreover, they also cautioned that the long time span and the specific time 25 interval of the work effort had to be considered when reading the report. (Wischow Affidavit, Attachment 3, 26 p. 2. )
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t 1 drew attention to the fact that the audited work took place 2 over a time period spanning 1971 to 1977. Pullman noted f
3 that the audit team did not adhere to their definition of 4 the scope and purpose of the audit which was to evaluate 5 work against those codes and standards in effect at the time 6 the work was performed. (Wischow Affidavit, Attachment 4, 7 p. 2.) Instead, NSC inappropriately applied 1977 8 requirements retrospectively to the prior work, thus 9 producing invalid findings.
10 The Pullman review and analysis, following the 11 format of the NSC report, was organized into the 18 criteria 12 matching 10 CFR 50 Appendix B. Within this framework the 13 NS ' report contained 137 findings of which 58 were 14 favorable. With those 58 favorable findings the Pullman 15 review agreed. As for each of the remaining 79 findings the 16 Pulliaan responses were farmulated in three categories:
17 disagreement with the finding (25); providing additional 18 explanation to clarify program compliance (29); and 19 corrective actions taken as a result of the findings (25).
20 The twenty-five (25) findings with corrective action to be 21 taken were software specific, i.e. paperwork improvements.
22 None required correcting hardware deficiencies.
23 Subsequently, these actions were all documented and 24 dispositioned in accordance with Pullman and PGandE quality l
25 requirements.
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1 The NSC Audit Report and Pullman's Response were ,
2 then formally forwarded to PGandE on April 11, 1978.
3 (Wischow Affidavit, para. 3.)
4 PGandE'S REVIEW OF THE NSC AUDIT AND PULLMAN'S RESPONSES S
6 As the licensee responsible for the overall 7 quality of the plant, PGandE performed a' detailed, 8 finding-by-finding review of the NSC audit findings and 9 Pullman's responses. (Wischow Affidavit, Attachment 6). A 10 PGandE Quality Assurance audit team retraced the steps of 11 the NSC auditors to verify the validity of alleged 12 deficiencies. The following conclusions were reached by the 13 PGandE QA auditors:
14
- Many of NSC's findings resulted from an incorrect l
15 NSC interpretation of requirements. NSC audited 16 to codes and standards that did not apply and to 17 NSC guidelines (opinions).
18
- Many NSC findings were simply incorrect or could 19 not be supported by objective evidence. They l
20 apparently were not adequately researched before 21 conclusions were reached.
22
- Pullman's responses to NSC findings were in 23 general correct. Pullman could have strengthened 24 their responses to many of the findings by 25 addressing the applicable codes, standards, or 26 guidelines involved.
r . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ , . . .
l 4
1
- As a result of this review, PGandE concluded that 2 the NSC audit did not give an accurate measure of i
3 the overall Pullraan quality program.
4 l
5 PGandE AUDIT OF THE PULLMAN POWER PRO-DUCTS QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM 6
7 In order to confirm that no deficiencies had 8 inadvertently occurred in the physical work, PGandE 9 conducted a thorough audit of the Pullman Quality Assurance 10 Program during April and May 1978. (Wischow Affidavit, ,
11 Attachment 5). The audit consisted of an in-depth 12 assessment of Pullman's quality program and a detailed 13 inspection of selected installed hardware. The PGandE audit 14 plan was formulated by utilizing codes and standards that 15 were thoroughly researched and verified to be applicable to 16 the time the work was performed.
17 The PGandE audit concluded that Pullman's program 18 essentially fulfilled contract requirements and complied 19 with requirements of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel 20 code, 1971 edition and, hence, the requirements of Appendix 21 B. Where deficiencies were identified, they were documented 22 in accordance with Quality Assurance procedures and 23 subsequently corrected. (Wischow Affidavit, Attachment 5. )
24 I r. t h i s connection, PGandE initiated two Nonconformance 25 Reports (DCO-78-RM-004 and -005) and four Minor Variation 26 Reports (MVR-M-3723, -3724, -3725, and -3726). These
~' - ~ ~
. . . L .. ..: .
1 problem reports, which were initiated in mid-June 1978, were
.2 all closed by early 1979. All problems which had been 3 identified were promptly corrected and the disposition 4 appropriately documented. (Wischow Affidavit, Attachment 7) 5 NRC INSPECTION EFFORTS 6 Another aspect not to be overlooked with regard to 7 the Pullman work covered by the NSC audit was the ongoing 8 NRC inspection effort.
9 During this period of construction NRC Region V 10 Inspection and Enforcement (I&E) Inspectors were conducting 11 unannounced site inspections on roughly a monthly basis.
12 NRC Inspection Report 50-275/78-10, 50-323/78-10 documents 13 the inspection performed on July 10-13, 1978. (Wischow 14 Affidavit, Attachment 8.) Paragraphs 10 and 11 of the 15 details portion of the NRC Inspection report describe the 16 reviews that NRC inspectors made on a routine basis of i
17 Quality Assurance audits and nonconformance reporting.
18 Paragraph 10 describes an examination of the nine Quality 19 Assurance audits performed during the period from May 25, 20 1978, through July 6, 1978. The NRC Inspection report 21 concludes that fourteen findings were identified and that 22 corrective actions had been initiated.
23 Paragraph 11 describes the review of PGandE Non-24 conformance and Minor Variation Reports generated since 25 June 3, 1978. PGandE Nonconformance and Minor Variation 26 Reports dealing with Quality Assurance Audit No 80422 were
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(,
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1 generated from June 12 to June 15, 1978. The report goes on 2 to say all deficiencies appeared to be properly classified !
3 as either an NCR or MVR and no items of non-compliance with 4 NRC requirements were identified by the inspectors during 5 the review.
6 This process reflects that NRC I&E monitored site 7 auditing and problem-solving actions on a rodtine basis to
(
8 assure that PGandE and its contractors adhered to quality 9 requirements.
! 10 CONCLUSION 11 eh=__ fore;;ing inra_-=H nn ra(Tag $1 -the NSC 12 audit was neither an accurate nor a total assessment of the l
i 13 Pullman Quality Assurance Program.
14 Indeed the NSC audit precipitated other audits, 15 which disclosed that the Pullman quality program was an 16 overall acceptable program needing only minor improvements 17 in some areas. Any identified deficierries were documented 18 in accordance with approved Quality Assurance procedures and 19 promptly corrected.
20 Contrary to Joint Intervenors' assertions, the NSC 21 audit findings were thoroughly analyzed and appropriate 22 action taken. More importantly, the response to the NSC 23 audit by PGandE and Pullman demonstrates a fully functioning 24 ///
25 ///
26 ///
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l i
l 1 and effective quality prograin Therefore, we urge that the 2 Board deny the Motion to Reopen.
3 4 Respectfully submitted, I
5 ROBERT OHLBACH PHILIP A. CRANE, JR.
- 6 RICHARD F. LOCKE Pacific Gas and Electric Company '
7 P. O. Box 7442 San Francisco, CA 94120 8 (415) 781-4211 l
9 ARTHUR C. GEHR Snell & Wilmer 10 3100 Valley Center Phoenix, AZ 85073 11 (602) 257-7288 12 BRUCE NORTON Norton, Burke, Berry & French, P.C.
13 P. O. Box 10569 Phoenix, AZ 85064 14 (602) 955-2446 15 Attorneys for Pacific Gas and Electric Company By '
Richard F. Locke 19 20 DATED: September 21, 1983.
22 23 24 25 26
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UNITED STATES CF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULhTORY COBOGISSION In the Matter of )
)
PACIFIC Gh5 AND ELECTRIC COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-275
~
) Docket No. 50-323 Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, )
Unito 1 and 2 - . )
) ,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The foregoing document (s) of Pacific Gas and Electric Company has (hnva) been served today on the following by deposit in the United States mail, properly stamped and addressed: .
i Judga John F. Wolf "
Mrs. Sandra A. Silver Chairman 1760 Alisal Street I Atomic Safety and Licensing Board San Luis Obispo CA 93401 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Wachington DC 20555 Mr. Gordon Silver
' 1760 Alisal Street Judg3 Glenn O. Bright San Luis Obispo CA 93401 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- John Phillips, Esq.
Cachington DC 20555 Joel Reynolds, Esq.
Center for Law in the Public Interest Judga Jerry R. Kline 10951 W. Pico Blvd. - Suite 300 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Los Angeles CA 90064 UC Nuclear Regulatory Consnission Wachington DC 20555 David F. Fleischaker, Esq.
P. O. Box 1178 Mro. Elizabeth Apfelberg Oklahoma City OK 73101 c/o Betsy Umhoffer 1493 Southwood Arthur C. Gehr, Esq.
San Luis Obispo CA 93401 Snell & Wilmer 3100 Valley Bank Center
, Jcnice E. Kerr, Esq. Phoenix AZ 85073 Public Utilities Consnission
- Bruce Norton, Esq.
Stoto of California 5246 State Building Norton, Burke, Berry & French, P.C.
350 McAllister Street P. O. Box 10569 San Francisco CA 94102 Phoenix AE 85064 Mrc. Raye Fleming Chairman 1920 Mattie Road Atomic Safety and Licensing l
Shall Seach CA 93449 Soard Panel US Nuclear Regulatory Commissian Mr. Frederick Bissler Washington DC 20555 "
Ccanic Shoreline Preservation C:nference, Inc.
4623 More Mesa Drive Santa Barbara CA 93105
- Via Sky Courier
...._..2_.u_... .
Chnirman
- Judge Thomas S. Moore l Atomic Safety and Licensing Chairman ;
Appeal Panel Atomic Safety and Licensing US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Appeal Board l Wnchington DC 20555 US Nuclear Regulatory ComunissicsL !
Washington DC 20555
- S2cretary -
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- Judge W. Reed Johnson W chington DC 20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Attn: Docketing and Service US Nuclear Regulatory Comunission Section Washington DC 20555
'
- Lawrsnee J. Chandler, Esq.
- Judge John H. Buck H3nry J. McGurren Atomic Safety and Licensing US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Appeal Board Office of Executive Legal Director US Nuclear Regulatory Comunission Wachington DC 20555 WPanington DC 20555 Mr. Richard B. Hubbard ' Michael J. Strunwasser, Esq.
MEB Technical Associates Susan L. Durbin, Esq.
1723 Hamilton Avenue Suite K Peter H. Kaufman, Esq.
San Jose CA 95125 3580 Wilshire Blvd. Suite 800 Los Angeles CA 90010 Mr. Carl Neiberger
. Talagram Tribune
- Maurice Axelrad, Esq. '
l P. O. Box 112 Lowenstein, Newman, Reis, and San Luis Obispo CA 93402 Axelrad, P.C.
1025 Connecticut Ave NW Washington DC 20036 I
Dato September 21, 1983 Richard F. Locke
- Via Sky Courier l
l l :
1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY ColetISSION 2
Before The Atomic Safety And Licensing Appeal Board 3
4 5
6 )
In the Matter of Pacific Gas ) Docket Nos. 50-275 0.L.
7 and Electric Company (Diablo ) 50-323 0.L.
Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, ) (Construction Quality 8 Units No. 1 and 2) ) Assurance)
)
9 10 11 AFFIDAVIT OF RUSSELL P. WISCHOW 12 13 14 I, Russell P. Wischow, being duly sworn depose and 15 state as follows:
16 1. I am currently employed by Pacific Gas and 17 Electric Company, 77 Beale Street, Sen Francisco, 18 California; my title is Manager, Geysers Project. During 19 the period from September 1, 1976 through January 31, 1978, 20 I was Director, Quality Assurance Department. A copy of my 21 professional qualifications is attached (Attachment 1). I 22 have read the Joint Intervenors' Supplement dated 23 September 9, 1983, and have the following comments.
24 2. In July 1977.PGandE requested Pullman Power 25 Products Corporation (Pullman) to have an independent audit 26 performed of the work Pullman had done at Diablo Canyon with l
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1 particular attention to the adequacy of installed hardware.
2 Pullman is the principal piping contractor for Diablo Canyca 3 Units 1 and 2. Pullman was issued American Society of 4 'Nechanical Engineers (ASME) Certificates of Authorization 5 (NPT and NA) in December 1972 which were renewed on 6 October 14, 1977 (Attachment 2). Pullman contracted with 7 NSC to have the audit done and PGandE concurred in that 8 selection. The audit was performed by NSC from August 22 9 through September 20, 1977 and the Report submitted to 10 Pullman by letter dated October 24,1977. (Attachment 3. )
11 3. I testified at the October 1977 hearings in 12 San Luis Obispo as to the adequacy and content of the PGandE 13 QA program, procedures, policies, audits, and ig l-z.rz.tc. tion 14 thereof. The NSC audit was not complete at that time and no 15 definitive results were provided for us to review and 16 evaluate prior to early 1978.
'17 4. After receipt of the NSC audit report Pullman 18 conducted an internal review of the Report during the period 19 October 1977 through January 1978. Pullman determined that 20 the NSC had directed the audit primarily toward a review of 21 program, procedures and policies rather than to concentrate 22 on the adequacy of the installed hardware as was intended by 23 PGandE. Pullman also concluded that NSC performed the audit 24 of the 1971-77 Pullman QA program against the 1977 NRC -
25 regulations and interpretive guidelines rather than against
- 26 the regulations and interpretive guidelines that were 1*
I l
1 applicable at the time that the work was done. Furthermore, 2 to some extent, the audit was also performed and evaluated 3 against NSC internal guidelines and opinions rather than 4 what was actually required by the regulations, guidelines, 5 and applicable codes, 6 5. In mid-February 1978, Pullman provided PGandE 7 with a draft of its review together with a copy of the NSC 8 report. Pullman formally forwarded its response and the NSC 9 Audit Report to PGandE on April 11, 1978. (Attachmont 4.)
10 PGandE reviewed these documents in February-March 1978 and 11 held discussions with Pullman concerning the findings.
12 PGandE agreed that the NSC audit was misdirected in that the 13 hardware installed by Pullman had not been audited by NSC as 14 was intended. We concurred with Pullman that many of the 15 NSC opinions were not consistent with the QA requirements at 16 the time that the work was done and, in some instances, the 17 opinions were inconsistent with the then-current 1977 18 regulations and requirements. Regardless of this 19 misunderstanding, we required appropriate corrective acticus 20 to be taken on the results of this audit in accordance with 21 the then current PGandE Corporate QA Program.
22 6. Furthermore, I estal'.ished a special review 23 team, reporting directly to me, to review and evaluate the l 24 NSC audit report and to perform an audit of what NSC was 25 supposed to have done; i.e., audit the Pullman physical work 26 at Diablo Canyon. This audit was specifically designed to:
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1 1
- Determine if the Pullman QA program met the 2 requirements of the applicable regulations, codes and >
3 standards at the time that the work was done; 4
- Determine if the NSC findings were valid; and 5
- Verify if the components and supports installed by 6 Pullman conformed to applicable specifications, 7 drawings, and quality standards.
i 8 7. The PGandE audit was conducted from April 2 9 through June 1, 1978 and a summary report submitted to Mr. .
10 J. D. Worthington, Executive Vice President and the 11 applicable departments on June 13, 1978. In the cover 12 letter of this audit report, I concluded that the Pullman 13 Program met applicable requirements. (Attachment 5.) A 14 separate report which reviewed the NSC audit findings in 15 detail was submitted to Mr. R. S. Bain, Manager, Station 16 Construction, on June 16, 1978. (Attachment 6.)
17 8. Corrective actions as a result of the PGandE l
18 audit and review were identified as either Non-Conformance 19 Reports (NCR) or as Minor Variation Reports (MVR). The 20 PGa:1dE QA department, through continuing on-site 21 surveillance efforts, assured that identified corrective 22 actions were taken, results were evaluated and the 23 deficiencies or non-conformances were closed out in 24 accordance with the PGandE QA Program. (Attachment 7.)
25 9. This documentation was available both on site 26 and in the General Office for NRC inspection. An NRC i
1
, . I r
l I
l 1 inspection was made during the time period after the audit 2 results were reported and while corrective actions were 3 being taken by PGandE and Pullman. (Attachment 8.)
4 10. The foregoing actions taken by both Pullman 5 and PGandE forcefully demonstrate that the PGandE QA program 6 was responsive to the applicable NRC quality requirements 7 and that Pullman had an effective quality program.
8 Deficiencies were identified and corrective actions were 9 taken in a prudent, prompt manner consistent with good 10 quality practices.
11 11. Attachments 2 through 8 to this affidavit are 12 true and correct copies of documents in official PGandE i 13 files, 14 15 Dated: September 21, 1983 16 27 9_ = %;a L . .
( 18 ' RUSSELL P. WISCHOW '
i
! 19 Subscribed and sworn to before me 20 this 21st day of September,1983 C. T. NEAL MADISON 21 t,tii V4D COUNTY OF 22 0-[ ~ kMM
@ Nortf TEUC -CA15 SAN FRANCISCO
., - = u.
C. T. NEAL-MADISON 23 Notary Public in and for the
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24 City and County of San Francisco, State of California.
25 My commission expires 26 December 27, 1985
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