ML20137F998
| ML20137F998 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200003 |
| Issue date: | 03/31/1997 |
| From: | WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20137F917 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9704010282 | |
| Download: ML20137F998 (166) | |
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AP600 MULTIPLE STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE ANALYSIS REPORT March 1997 Westinghouse Electric Corporation b0 100!! o 20$003 E PDR ntU564w.wpf.lb:032097
1 l l e AP600 MULTIPLE STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE ANALYSIS REPORT l l l l March 1997 e Westinghouse Electric Corporation m:\35Mw.wpf.lb:032097
AP600 Multiple Steam Generator Tube Rupture Analysis 1.0 inkoduction This report provides an evaluation of the AP600 plant response to the rupture of multiple d steam generator tubes. The analysis of multiple-steam generator tube ruptures (SGTRs) is prepared in response to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Containment Bypass Issue as , outlined in SECY-93-087, and request for additional information (RAI) numbers 440.27
, (reference 1),440.170 (reference 2) and 440.588 (reference 3). These sequences are beyond 1
the design-basis of the AP600 and are performed with best-estimate MAAP4 evaluations of one through five tube multiple-SGTRs. The objective of the evaluations is to demonstrate that for steam generator tube rupture initiated events:
=
the automatic depressurization system (ADS) is not actuated, e the secondary safety valves do not open to create a potential containment bypass pathway, e the AP600 provices defense-in-depth to unmitigated releases in the event of postulated sticking open of the safety valves. The core remains covered and cooled as the plant achieves a safe, stable condition. The AP600 provides passive safety-related systems to mitigate accidents. The passive systems provide a unique plant response to the SGTR initiating event with respect to conventional plants and mitigate the accident without voiding the reactor coolant system or overfilling the steam generator. The passive residual heat removal heat exchanger (PRHR) acts to reduce the RCS pressure below the pressure of the secondary system and shut off the break flow to the faulted steam generator. The heat is removed from the primary system from the PRHR instead of from the intact steam generator. 'Iherefore, heat is transferred from the secondary system to the primary system to control the leak to the faulted steam generator. The core makeup tanks (CMTs) provide heat removal and coolant inventory makeup for shrinkage in the RCS. The CMTs inject water in recirculation mode, exchanging cold borated water for hot RCS water. The CMTs do not drain during recirculation injection, therefore ADS is not actuated. Additionally, nonsafety-related pumped injection sources are also available to the' operator to mitigate the accident without the operation of the passive systems. The' safety-related j passive systems and the non-safety related active systems provide a multiple layer steam l generator tube rupture mitigation capability (see Figure 1). The automatic depressurization a system is not actuated in either the passive or active responses, but provides accident ; management options for feed and bleed or full depressurization in the event of other system failures (see Figure 1). l l If a secondary system safety valve is arbitrarily postulated to stick open, the system responds to the SGTR-initiated accident as a small loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). The loss of primary system coolant through the tube break and stuck-open valve eventually drains the CMTs, which actuates the ADS and depressunzes the RCS in a controlled, staged manner. Page 1
._ . _ .-_._ _ _ .._ ._. _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ __. _ _ m _. - The safety-related passive injection systems, CMTs, accumulators and IRWST gravity
, injection provide inventory makeup and boration throughout the depressurization. The core remains covered and cooled and achieves a safe, stable configuration. The depressurization mitigates the loss of inventory and the core remains covered and cooled without a release of fission products from the core.
This report provides the bases for the following conclusions: ' The AP600 provides multiple defense-in-depth mitigation for releases of fission products , for the beyond design basis steam generator tube rupture events, including rupture of up to
- five tubes. The operator can mitigate the accident with nonsafety-related systems without overfilling the steam generator or opening the secondary safety valve. In the case with no active systems, the passive systems prevent steam generator overfill and safety valve opening without any operator actions. The leak is terminated and the contamment remains intact. No adverse system interactions between the pumped injection sources and the passive safety systems affect the success of the cooling. In case the PRHR heat exchanger fails, the ADS' provides a third level of defense to mitigate the tube rupture.
If the steam generator safety valve is postulated to be stuck open, defeese-in-depth is achieved by depressurtzmg the RCS and maintammg reactor core cooling. No adverse boron dilution is predicted during or after the depressurization. Although the ~ containment is postulated to be open to the atmosphere through the mptured tubes and stuck-open steam generator safety valve, the fission products remain in the fuel and are not released to the environment. 2.0 Methodology and Approach The Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff has accepted the Westinghouse position on the multiple-SGTR issue documented in reference 4, which states, 'The multiple steam generator tube mpture scenario should not be a design basis event. This event should be explicitly treated only in the risk assessment domain where best-estimate analyses are used to assess plant response to scenarios beyond the design basis events." Toward this end, an analysis of the one- through five-tube multiple-SGTRs is performed using the MAAP 4.0 accident analysis code (reference 5) to model the best-estimate thermal hydraulic response of the AP600 design. The break flow through the tube into the steam generator secondary system is calculated using the Henry-Fauske two-phase flow model, and the reactor coolant system response is modeled using 14 reactor vessel and loop nodes, and a one node 1600 ft 8
- pressurizer. The steam generator secondary system is modeled as a single node and the water level as a function of the secondary system volume is tracked. Best-estimate decay heat based on the ANS 1979 standard is used.
Base cases are performed of the system response including the best-estimate passive RHR heat removal, and secondary power-operated relief system to prevent the opening of the safety valves. One through five tube SGTRs are analyzed to bound the range of break flow. Page 2
Sensitivity analyses are performed on the five tube break to examine the effect of increased and decreased passive RHR capacity, operation of the charging system (CVS), break elevation uncertamty and the failure of the secondary PORV to open. A case with no passive systems - is performed to show the adequacy of the active systems and the time available prior to the need for operator action to cooldown the RCS. Finally, an analysis assuming the opening and , failure to close of the secondary safety valve is performed to demonstrate that the plant response will not uncover the core and release fission products to the environment through the , unisolated secondary system. No operator actions are modeled in any of the passive system mitigation sequences.
= ;
2.1 MAAP4 Benchmarking : For the modeling of the AP600 multiple steam generator tube rupture base cases, the - important thermal-hydraulic phenomena modeled are the decay heat, CMT and passive RHR heat exchanger performance and tube rupture break flow. Since the RCS coolant never saturates or voids, two-phase modeling is not important. ; In the base cases, the PRHR best-estimate natural circulation heat removal is modeled. Sensitivity cases are performed to bound upper and lower estimates of the passive RHR performance. The MAAP4 passive RHR modelis benchmarked against independent design I calculations for the minimum, maximum and best-estimate passive RHR single-phase water natural circulation heat removal within the range of water temperatures expected in the multiple-SGTR cases. The results of this benchmarking are presented in Figures 2,3 and 4. The MAAP4 PRHR modeling shows good agreement with the designer's estimates of the passive RHR performance. The core makeup tanks also provide significant RCS heat removal capacity and inventory ) makeup. The MAAP4 core makeup tank behavior, as well as RCS thermodynamics and l break flow modeling, are benchmarked in the MAAP4/NOTRUMP benchmarking exercise j performed in support of the resolution of the passive system reliability issue. The response of the case with the stuck-open safety valve is a small LOCA which is extensively benchmarked in the passive system reliability issue resolution documentation. Therefore, the overall benchmarking effort is not duplicated here. 2.2 System Actuation and Performance Imponant setpoints for the actuation of systems in this analysis are: core makeup tank injection and reactor coolant pump trip occurs due to low-2 pressurizer level,7 percent of span (1.87 m), reactor scram and turbine trip occur due to the CMT injection signal, passive RHR heat exchanger (PRHR) is actuated on the same signal as the core makeup tank injection, a pressunzer heaters are initiated on low pressunzer pressure, turn off on low pressurizer water level and are tripped by the CMT injection signal, Page 3 I i
l automatic depressurization (ADS) is actuated at core makeup tank level less than 13.1 feet (3.99 meters) from the CMT bottom, secondary system PORVs are fail-closed valves which open at 1046 psia (7.21 MPa) and are reset (closed) when the pressure falls 25 psi below the opening setpoint, e secondary system three safety valves open at 1100,1130, and 1155 psia (7.58,7.79 and t 7.96 MPa), respectively, the secondary system automatic main steam isolation valve (MSIV) is actuated on low
- steamline pressure, 600 psia (4.1 MPa), low-2 RCS temperature,515'F (541 K), hi-1 contamment pressure,19.7 psia (1.4 bar), or low-2 steam generator narrow-range level, 28.5 ft (8.7 m) in the downcomer.
- All cases are assumed to begin from one hundred percent power. The PRHR and all trains of ADS and passive safety injection systems, CMTs, accumulators and gravity injection
)
1 are availabic. Startup feedwater (SFW) provides two hundred gallons per minute flowrate to i cach steam generator with the level controlled. CVS injection flowrate is set to the maximum system flowrate of 170 gpm in cases in which steam generator overfill is an issue. CVS injection flowrate is set to the minimum system flowrate of 100 gpm in the case in which it l provides inventory makeup and core cooling. Steam generator overfill protection j automatically isolates the CVS and the SFW injection when the secondary level exceeds the 79% narrow range steam generator level, l i The MAAP4 code only models the stcondary system to the MSIVs. The code does not couple the secondary system in the two steam generators with the steam header. Because of the MAAP4 modeling, the MSIV closure is assumed at the time of turbine trip in the analyses. The code cannot model the heat removal through the steam condenser, a diverse, redundant alternative to the opening of the secondary PORV. In the SGTR accident, the automatic MSIV closure setpoints are not reached. However, as the heat removal in the AP600 is through the passive RHR and CMTs on the primary system side, the secondary system pressure is essentially equivalent in the two steam generators, regardless of the status ; of the MSIVs, providing the operator significant time to close the MSIV and isolate the ; faulted steam generator. Therefore, this modeling does not limit the applicability of the results. 3.0 MAAP4 Analysis Results This section presents the results of the MAAP4' analyses for the multiple tube rupture cases and the sensitivity and uncertamty analyses. The system availability assumptions for all
- the cases are presented in Table 1. '
3.1 Base Cases This section presents the description of the MAAP4 code results from the analyses of one-through five-tube multiple steam generator tube rupture safety cases. The base case assumes that 2 CMTs,2 accumulators, PRHR heat exchanger, ADS and 2 IRWST injection lines are Page 4 i
avai16 for operation. No other injection sources, such as CVS, are credited. No operator actions are credited. A summary of the base case accident sequence timing is presented in Tables 2 through 6. In each case, the secondary power operated relief valve (PORV) or steam condenser and the RCS heat removal via the PRHR heat exchanger and CMTs maintains the pressure in the secondary system below the minimum safety valve setpoint. The heat removal capability of the passive RHR heat exchanger and the core makeup tanks equilibrates the pressure between the reactor coolant system and the secondary system, shutting off the break flow and terminating the accident without voiding the RCS or CMTs, and without actuating the automatic depressurization system. The plant equilibrates to a safe,
- stable condition without operator actions.
3.1.1 Case SGI - One Tube SGTR The AP600 single tube SGTR case, SG1, is a double-ended guillotine break of one cold-side steam generator tube at the tubesheet elevation. The MAAP4 results for case SGI are presented in Figures 5 through 14. Event timing is summarized in Table 2. At time zero, the tube rupture occurs, relieving primary system water into the broken steam generator (Figure 5). The pressurizer level (Figure 6) and RCS pressure (Figure 7) decrease and the reactor scrams and the turbine trips due to an CMT injection signal on a low-2 pressurizer level. The steam generator main feedwater system is isolated and startup feedwater is initiated on the reactor scram. The faulted steam generator water level (Figure 8) increases due to the break . flow addition, but does not overfill. The faulted steam generator pressure (Figure 9) increases to the setpoint of the secondary PORVs valves which relieve secondary system steam to the environment. The pressure remains below the lowest safety valve opening pressure. The com makeup tank injection line valves are opened to the RCS and the reactor coolant pumps are tripped on the CMT injection signal. The CMT injects (Figure 10) in recirculation mode due to the density difference between the cold CMT water and the hot RCS water. As the cold CMT water injects into the RCS, an equal volume of hot RCS water is drawn into the CMT. The CMT water temperature increases (Figure 11) allowing the CMTs to act as heat sinks for the RCS. Durmg recirculation injection, the CMTs inject without decreasing the water level in the tank (Figure 12). The passive RHR heat exchanger is actuated by the CMT injection signal. The heat removal by the PRHR (Figure 13) and CMT reduces the primary system and faulted steam generator pressure below the =~andary system relief valve setpoints. The two pressures are essentially equalized, stopping the loss of coolant from the primary system. The flow between the primary and secondary systems fluctuates around zero (Figure 3-5), and the primary system water level is maintained throughout the transient (Figure 3-14). The secondary safety valves never open since the pressure in the faulted steam generator remains below the safety valve actuation pressure throughout the entire accident scenario (Figure 8). The water level in the cora makeup tank (Figure 12) does not decrease due to the recirculation mode injection and the RCS remains subcooled throughout the transient (Figure 11). Page 5 l l i
l l i 3.1.2 Case SG2 through SG5 - Two through Five Tube Multiple-SGTRs l The MAAP4 results of cases SG2, SG3, SG4, and SG5 are presented in Figures 15 through 54. The event timing summaries are presented in Tables 3 through 6, respectively. l The results are essentially the same as case SG1 with differences in the timing attributed to j the increasing break sizes. No voiding of the RCS or draming of the CMT is predicted in any case. The ADS is not actuated. The steam generator does not overfill and the safety 4 valves do not open. ) j 3.2 Sensitivity Cases
- The cases presented in this section examme variations in the initial conditions and in the PRHR modeling to demonstrate that the base results of the analysis are robust. The cases examine the sensitivity of the results to break elevation, and variations in the effectiveness of the PRHR heat removal. Each sensitivity case is based on the SG5 base case as it is most challenging for steam generator pressurization and overfill.
Additionally, several cases are examined with various system interactions: the time available prior to the need for operator action to cooldown the primary system with auxiliary sprays in the active system only case, SG50p,
=
failure of the secondary PORV to open is presented in case SG5p, successful CVS injection interaction with passive systems case is presented in case
- SG5cvs.
the case in which the CVS injects, secondary PORV fails to open, and the safety valve is postulated to stick open when it is actuated is presented in case SG5stk. j The final case, SG5stk, demonstrates the AP600 defense-in-depth using the ADS ; mitigation of the accident. 3.2.1 Case SG5b - Break Elevation Sensitivity Case SG5b is the same as base case SGS with the break elevation increased to the top of the tube bundle. In the base case, the break was assumed to occur on the cold side ~at the tubesheet. The results of the MAAP4 analysis are presented in Figures 55 through 64. Event timing is presented in Table 7. As in the base case, the CMTs remain full of water throughout the transient. The CMTs and PRHR heat removal stops the loss of coolant though the break. No ADS actuation is predicted. The pre:sure in the faulted steam generator remains below the safety valve actuation pressure throughout the entire accident scenario. The overall results are not sensitive to break elevation. 3.2.2 Case SG5 max - Maximum PRHR Heat Exchanger Performance Case SG5 max is the same as base esse SGS except the passive RHR heat removal is increased from best-estimate to the maximum performance. The maximum PRHR Page 6
i i i i : i j i 4 i performance is modeled as benchmarked in section 2. The MAAP4 results of the analysis are I l . presented in Figures 65 through 74. Event timing is presented in Table 8. As in the base
- cases, the CMTs remain full of water throughout the transient. The CMTs and the PRHR
!_ heat removal stops the loss of coolant through the break. No ADS actuation is predicted. l The pressure in the faulted steam generator remains below the safety valve actuation pressure
, throughout the entire accident scenario. The overall results are not sensitive to break elevation.
(. l l 3.2.3 Case SG5 min - Minimum PRHR Heat Exchanger Performance Case SG5 min is the same as base case SG5 except the passive RHR heat removal is decreased from best-estimate to the minimum performance. He minimum PRHR i performance is modeled as benchmarked in section 2. The MAAP4 results of the analysis are j presented in Figures 75 through 84. Event tmung is presented in Table 9. As in the base cases, the CMTs remain full of water throughout the transient. The CMTs and the PRHR , ! heat removal stops the loss of coolant through the break. No ADS actuation is predicted. ! The pressure in the faulted steam generator remains. below the safety valve actuation pressure i throughout the entire accident scenario. The overall results are not sensitive to break I elevation. i
- 3.2.4 Case SG50p - Nonsafety Related Injection Systems Only l Case SG5op is a five-tube multiple SGTR with the assumed failure of the passive RHR j and CMTs. The MAAP4 results are presented in Figures 85 through 95. Event tuning is j presented in Table 10. He CVS is assumed to be injecting at 100 gpm at time zero (Figure i 85), the minimum injection flowrate. SFW is available and injection is controlled on the steam generator level. The run is terminated at 1530 =" ands when CVS and SFW are isolated at the steam generator water level of 79 percent of the narrow range span. The analysis demonstrates that at the lowest expected flowrate of the CVS, the RCS does not void i and the core remains covered, allowing the operator sufficient time to cool the RCS with the '
intact steam generator and to align the CVS injection to the pressunzer sprays, depressurize l the RCS to stop the leak. l 3.2.5 Case SG5p - Secondary PORY Failure to Open Case SG5p is the same as the base case SG5 except the secondary system PORV is l assumed to not open when the pressure exceeds the opening setpoint. The MAAP4 results l are presented in Figures 96 through 105. The event sequence timing is presented in Table 11. As in the base case, the CMT remains full of water throughout the transient. The CMTs and PRHR heat removal stops the loss of coolant through the break. No ADS actuation is predicted. The pressure in the faulted steam generator exceeds the PORV setpoint, but remains below the safety valve actuation pressure throughout the entire accident scenario. The overall results are not significantly sensitive to break elevation. Page 7
3.2.6 Case SG5cvs - Operation of the CVS injection with the Passive Systems . Case SG5cvs is the same as base case SGS except the CVS system is assumed to be injecting at the time the break occurs. The CVS injection rate is 170 gpm, the maximum injection allowed by the cavitating venturi in the system. The SFW system injects 200 gpm into the steam generators and is not throttled by the level control system. CVS and SFW inject until the steam generator water level reaches 79% of the narrow range level (total level , of 14.5 meters above the tubesheet) when they are automatically termmated. The MAAP4 results for case SG5cvs are presented in Figures 106 through 116. The sequence timing is presented in Table 12. * ' The tube rupture occurs at time zero and the loss of coolant from the RCS exceeds the CVS injection. The pressunzer heaters actuate on low pressure. The heaters are not effective due to low water level in the pressunzer. CMT actuation occurs due to a drop in pressurizer level. The signal actuates the CMrs and PRHR, and trips the reactor, the turbine, the reactor coolant pumps and the pressunzer heaters. 'Ihe CVS injection maintains the RCS and faulted secondary pressure at the setpomt of the aeaadary system PORV for an extended duration. At 1929 seconds the =~aadary water level excmds the hi-2 steam generator narrow range level and the CVS and SFW are terminated. Shortly after the CVS injection stops, the secondary PORV closes and the primary and faulted secondary system pressures are equilibrated, terminating the break flow. The CMTs do not drain and the RCS is not voided. Therefore, the ADS is not actuated. The plant achieves a safe, stable condition without uncovering the core. However, the results suggest that in the event of the enadaaaar and PORV failure, the secondary system would pressurize to the safety valve opening pressure prior to the isolation of the CVS and SFW. Therefore, either the non-safety turbine bypass or PORV opening function is required to prevent the safety valve from opening in the event of CVS injection or unthrottled SFW injection. 3.2.7 Case SG5stk: Stuck Open Secondary System Safety Valve This section presents the results of case SG5stk in which the CVS injects, SFW is unthrottled, turbine bypass and PORV fail to open and the secondary system safety valve is postulated to stick fully open. The assumption that the safety valve sticks is highly conservative since the plant automatically prevents steam generator overfill and the valve does not relieve water, A five tube double-ended break is assumed to occur at the steam generator tubesheet. The PRHR and all trains of ADS, CMTs, accumulators and gravity injection are available. The CVS system is assumed to be injectmg to the RCS at the time of the break. The secondary system PORV is assumed to not open, thus failing to control the ; pressure on the secondary side. As the accident progresses, the =~aaAary system is pressunzed to the opening pressure of the safety valves by the SFW and CVS injection j through the break, and the valve is assumed to stick open at this time. No operator actions l and no nonsafety-related systems are credited with mitigating the accident. The non-safety CVS and SFW are modeled since they have the adverse effect of overfilling and Page 8 i I
overpressurmng the steam generator. The CVS and SFW injections are automatically isolated on the hi-2 steam generator signal at 79% of the narrow rage span. The MAAP4 results are presented in Figures 117 through 131. The event timing is presented in Table 13. At time zero, the five steam generator tubes are assumed to fail at the steam generator tubesheet, and primary coolant is lost into the w=da'y system (Figure 117). The CVS is injecting 170 gpm at the time the break occurs (Figure 118). The loss of coolant causes the RCS pressure (Figure 119) and the pressurizer level (Figure 120) to fall, and at 81 seconds, CMT injection is initiated due to low level in the pressurizer. On the injection signal, the e' reactor scrams, and the turbines and main feedwater trip. Startup feedwater (Figure 121) and passive RHR (Figure 122) are initiated. The CMT injection (Figure 123) trips the reactor coolant pumps and the pressunzer heaters. The CMT injects in recirculation mode without reducing the water level in the tank (Figure 124). The RCS and faulted steam generator pressure (Figure 119) are essentially equalized, and coolant is lost from the primary side to the secondary side at approximately the injection rate of the CVS. The increase in the steam generator level (Figure 125) due to the CVS and SFW injection compresses the steam bubble in the secondary and increases the system pressure. The turbine bypass to the condenser and.the secondary PORVs are assumed to fail to open, so the pressure continues to increase to the safety valve opening pressure (Figure 126). One safety valve opens and is assumed to stick open. The pressure in the secondary system falls due to the loss through the safety valve.-The break flowrate through the broken tubes increases and the RCS pressure is reduced 'Ihe decrease in pressure allows the accumulators i to inject (Figure 127), temporarily stalling the CMT injection and increasing the pressurizer water level. The water level in the faulted steam generator dips slightly due to flashing at the time that the safety valve sticks open, but continued break flow and SFW injection cause it to increase again. At 2979 =~~de, the hi-2 steam generator narrow range level is reached and the CVS l and SFW injection are isolated. The accumulator water is depleted at 4335 seconds, and the injection of non-condensable nitrogen into the RCS is assumed to fail the PRHR heat removal. The loss of heat removal causes the RCS to begin to saturate (Figure 128), and at 12100 seconds, the CMTs begin to drain. 'Ihe low-1 CMT level is reached at 12629 seconds and ADS is actuated. The RCS pressure is approximately 100 psia at the time ADS is actuated. Stages 1,2 and 3 ADS lines are opened by a timer following ADS system actuation causing water to flood into the pressunzer. w Stage 4 ADS is opened on a low-2 CMT level at 13300 seconds. Stage 4 ADS allows gravity injection of IRWST water (Figure 129) into the reactor vessel. The IRWST water fills the containment (Figure 130) and at 25637 seconds, the gravity recirculation lines are opened by a low IRWST level. The containment water level reaches the maximum elevation in the flooded volumes at the 108 foot elevation. Coolant inventory is lost from the system as steam through the stuck open safety valve at a rate of approximately 5 lbm/sec (Figure 131). As this rate decreases over time with decay heat, long-term cooling can be mamtained Page 9 l l
, _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ . - - - - - - - -.~--- i : )
! for more uan 3 days without addmg makeup water to the containment.
4 The fou.th stage depressurization of the RCS reverses the break flow from the secondary l j into tre pri. nary system. Secondary water flashing in the primary system does not affect the
; passive ;ystem performance. The passive RHR and CMTs have completed their functions j
- i. prior to depressurization, and ADS is designed to depressurize the system from much higher I j pressures and flowrates than predicted at the time of reverse flow in the SGTR. Adverse j
boron dilution from the reverse flow is not expected and is addressed specifically in the next section. { \
- 3.3 Boron Dilution during ADS
- l 1
i The potential dilution of RCS boron during ADS initiated by a multiple-SGTR is an issue j discussed in SECY-93-087. The dilution is postulated to occur due to reverse flow of cold, l unborated secondary system water to the RCS when the pressure drop through the break l reverses. The scenario is postulated to result in positive reactivity insertion in the core. This ' ! section estimates the effect of the reverse flow during depressurization on the boron , i concentration in the RCS. The MAAP4 code does not track the baron concentration, ! L therefore, the boron concentration calculation is perfonned post-process, using water mass and , j ' flow data generated by the MAAP4 code. i j- 3.3.1 Boron Concentration Calculation Method and Assumptions . t { i A five node model is used to track baron in the MAAP4 calculations. 'Ihe nodalization i l and the flow links between them are presented in Figure 132. The nodes are modeled as 1 lumped masses and are assumed to be well mixed. ! l The boron is tracked in the following control volumes: , j
- reactor coolant system !
- faulted secondary system !
- core makeup tank 1
- core makeup tank 2 l
l IRWST and containment sump i L ! Two constant boron concentration injection sources are also modeled: the accumulators i - and the CVS. Best-estimate boron concentrations are assumed for all the water sources. j CMTs have an initial boron concentration of 3400 ppm which changes over the transient as !
- RCS water mixes in the CMT. The IRWST has an initial boron concentration of 2600 ppm
- l l which changes very little as the water mass is so large. The accumulators inject water with a
- constant 2600 ppm baron concentration, and the CVS injects water with a constant boron
. concentration equal to the RCS concentration prior to reactor scram. After scram, the CVS l water boron concentration increases to 4300 ppm. Unborated startup feedwater injects to the l l secondary system. The secondary system water is not initially barated. The RCS water i baron concentration ranges from 1600 ppm at the beginning-of-life to 0 ppm at the end-of- ;
- life. Calculations are performed for both begmning-of-life and end-of-life to bound the range !
c ( i l Page 10 [ 1 l l l . 2
- - - . . - - . . - . . - . - . - - . _ - - - - - - . - - . --.-- ~-
i of RCS boron concentration. ! The water masses in each node and flows between nodes during each time step are ! calculated by MAAP4 and are saved to a file that is input to the boron calculation. The boron ! calculation tracks the boron mass in each of the flows based on the upstream boron : concentration and calculates the boron concentration in control volumes at each time step. In : this calculation it is assumed that: , a baron is carried in water flow at the source concentration, {
# . steam flow does not carry boron, i
- the boron instantaneously mixes in the receiver control volume, !
i The SG5stk case, which activates ADS due to coolant loss through a stuck-open secondary safety valve, is analyzed for the boron dilution after ADS injects until the IRWST j injection is established. 3.3.2 Boron Dilution in Case SG5stk The thermal-hydraulic details of case SG5stk are presented in section 3.2.7 and Figures , 117 through 131. The event timing in the case is presented in Table 13. The boron concentration for the RCS and =ad y systems are presented in Figure 133 for the end-of-life and Figure 134 for the begmnmg-of-life initial conditions. In the end-of-life case, the boron concentration in the RCS and the secondary system begin at 0 ppm. The initiation of the CVS boration and the CMT recirculation injection at , the time of reactor scram increase the concentration in the RCS and decrease the concentration in the CMT as RCS water is mixed in the CMT. The boron concentration in ; the secondary system increases slightly until the time that the safety valve sticks open and the break flow from the RCS increases. The loss of clean secondary water as steam through the : stuck-open valve accelerates the increase in boron concentration in the. secondary water. As ; the RCS water saturates, the RCS boron concentration increases slightly due to the loss of water as steam. The secondary water baration rate increases as there is more boron in the break flow. The CMT boron concentration decreases due to the condensation of untiorated steam from the RCS balance line. At ADS, the RCS and secondary system boron i concentrations are approximately the same. The RCS boron concentration peaks due to l flashing of water during depressurization, and the secondary boron concentration becomes : constant as the break flow reverses from the secondary system to the primary system. As the IRWST water injects, the RCS boron concentration equilibrates to the IRWST boron concentration. The begmning of life boron concentration transient response is approximately the same as . the end-of-life transient, except the overall concentrations are higher prior to gravity injection. l The secondary system concentration is significantly higher than it is in the end-of-life case as i more boron is in the break flow and collected there from the begmning of the transient. After i i Page 11
?
t
^
gravity injection, the boron concentration in the primary system equilibrates with the IRWST
. boron concentration.
l No adverse boron dilution of the RCS water occurs due to the boration of the secondary water to the RCS boron concentration which occurs over the course of the transient. 4.0 Summary and Conclusions . The analysis examines beyond design-basis steam generator tube ruptures. The objective of these beyond design basis analyses is to show that the multiple-SGTR event does not lead ' to unmitigated release of fission products to the environment. This is accomplished in a defense-in-depth manner by demonstrating that: the AP600 provides multiple levels of defense to mitigate single / multiple tube rupture, including active systems with operator actions to cooldown and depressurize the RCS, automatic passive systems response with no ADS, as well as passive systems with ADS.' diverse, redundant systems prevent the opening of the steam generator safety valve during the multiple-SGTR event, and if the safety valve is postulated to be opened and stuck-open during a tube rupture, the plant achieves a safe, stable state in which the reactor core is shutdown and cooled throughout the accident. One- through five-tube multiple steam generator tube rupture cases are analyzed with MAAP4 without crediting any operator actions. These base cases show that the heat removal by the passive RHR and CMTs stops the loss of coolant from the primary and secondary systems, and the CMT level is maintained throughout the transients since there is no cold leg voiding to break the siphon in the balance line. The CMTs inject in recirculation mode due to the density difference between the hot RCS water and cold CMT water. There is no reduction in CMT level, and no automatic ADS signal is generated by a low level in the CMT. In each case, either a turbine bypass valve to the condenser or the secondary system PORV opens, and the pressure in the faulted steam generator remains below the secondary side safety valve opening setpoint. The secondary system safety valve remains closed throughout the analyses. The sensitivity analyses presented in section 4 show that the conclusions are also valid considering high and low variations in passive RHR heat removal capacity and location of the tube rupture. Case SG5p, an accident sequence with the failure of the secondary condenser and PORV
- to open, demonstrates the operation of these systems is not required to prevent the opening of the secondary safety valve. However, case SG5cvs shows that if the nonsafety-related CVS system injects, which is very likely, the secondary PORV or condenser must operate to prevent the safety valve from opening. The steam generator overfill protection isolates the CVS and SFW systems at a water level which prevents the secondary PORV and safety valves from passing two-phase flow.
Page 12
l In case SG5stk, with CVS injection and the failure of the turbine bypass valves and
- PORV to open, the secondary system safety valve opens and is conservatively assumed to i stick fully open, although it does not pass water in the scenario. This case is presented to show that even if the secondary safety valve is postulated to stick open, the plant is able to
, provide defense-in-depth by achieving a safe, stable condition with no fission product release,
, assuming no operator actions and crediting only safety-related systems. The continuous loss of coolant through the stuck-open safety valve eventually leads to the voiding of RCS and CMTs, and the ADS is actuated. The RCS and secondary pressures are significantly reduced i
". and essentially equilibrated at the time of ADS. Some reverse flow is predicted from the i#. secondary side to the primary side. The secondary water is borated to the RCS boron . concentration during the transient through the break and by the loss of clean water inventory
- i as steam through the stuck-open valve. No boron dilution in the RCS is prulicted during or after ADS. Once depressunzed, gravity injection keeps the core cooled. Loss of water 3 inventory through the stuck-open valve is mimmal once the plant is depressurized, and no
- makeup is required for more than 2.5 days. The core is never uncovered, remains cooled, and
- there is no large release of fission products which may be postulated to bypass the containment through the stuck open valve.
1 l Therefore, the AP600 mitigates the potential for unisolatable containment bypass that may , be postulated for steam generator tube rupture events. Diverse, redundant systems are
, provided which isolate the break, prevent the overfilling of the steam generator and prevent the opening of the secondary safety valve. Heat removal from passive systems isolates the ,
l break and prevents voiding of the RCS. Postulated boron dilution from reverse flow from the s secondary to the primary system is prevented as automatic depressurization does not occur. i , In the event of a postulated stuck open safety valve, the AP600 demonstrates defense-in- !
- depth to the contamment bypass by mitigating the accident and achieving a safe, stable l i condition without uncovering the core. Postulated boron dilution does not occur as the secondary water is borated to the RCS baron concentration prior u) ADS by the addition of borated water through the break and loss of clean water as steam through the stuck-open safety valve. I Page 13
5.0 References 1
- 1. Letter, Thomas J. Kenyon (NRC) to Nicholas J. Lipamlo (Westinghouse), Dated September 23,1992. '
1
- 2. Letter, Thomas J. Kenyon (NRC) to Nicholas J. Liparulo (Westinghouse), Dated Jime 1, {
1994. , l I
- 3. Letter, Wilham C. Huffman (NRC) to Nicholas J. Liparulo (Westinghouse), Dated January j 21,1997 '
- 4. Letter ET-NRC-92-3748, N.J. Liparulo to Dr. Ivan Selin dated September 17,1992.
- 5. EPRI Research Project Number 3131-02, "MAAP4 - Modular Accident Analysis Program for LWR Power Plants Computer Code Manual."
i 1 j 1 I I Page 14 i
. . e_ . ,
Table 1 - AP600 Multiple Steam Generator Tube Rupture MAAP4 Case Input Assumptions i Systems Availabi5ty Case Failed CVS SFW PEMR CMTs ADS / Sec PORV/ Comanents Tubes Grav inject Condenser SGI I No 200 gym Best Est Yes Avail / NA Yes Safety Cases SG2 2 No 200 gym Best Est Yes - Avail / NA Yes l SG3 3 No 200 gpm Best Est Yes Avail / NA Yes SG4 4 No 200 gpm Best Est Yes Avail / NA Yes SGS S No 200 gpm Best Est Yes Avail / NA Yes SG5b 5 No 200 gpm Best Est Yes Avail / NA Yes
- SG5 min 5 No 200 gpm Min Yes Avail / NA Yes
. i m SG5 max 5 No 200 gpm Max Yes Avail / NA Yes 4 200 gpm Failed Yes No passive system available SG50p 5 100 gpm Failed Avail / NA j [ un SG5p 5 No 200gpm Best Est Yes Avail / NA Failed SG5cvs 5 170 gpm 200 gpm Best Est Yes Avail / NA Yes SFW unehmttled , l SG5stk 5 170 gpm 200 spm Best Est Yes Yes Failed SFW unthrottled [ Sec SV sticks fully open [ 4 i s
?
t. I t t
I l 1 1 Table 2 i Case SG1 Accident Sequence Timing Time Events ! (seconds) 1 0 rupture of I steam generator tube { l 8 pzr heaters on
]
l 143 pzr heaters uncovered 'a 347 CMT injection signal on low pressurizer level Rx scram, turbine trip, MFW trip PRHR on, SFW on CMT on, RCP trip, pzr heaters trip 550 secondary PORV opens l accumulators begin to inject i hi-2 NR water level in faulted steam generator CVS and SFW isolated accumulator water depleted PRHR heat removal assumed failed by NC gas CMTs begin to drain low-l CMT level ADS actuated
~
stage 1 ADS open stage 2 ADS open stage 3 ADS open low-2 CMT level stage 4 ADS open gravity injection begins , low IRWST water level gravity recirculation valves open 1 Page 16
l l l I Table 3 I Case SG2 Accident Sequence Timing ! l Time Events
, (seconds) .
- O rupture of 2 steam generator tubes -
- , 4 pzr heaters on
- 79 pzr heaters uncovered l 180 CMT injection signal on low pressurizer level '
j Rx scram, turbine trip, MFW trip
- PRHR on, SFW on 1 CMT on, RCP trip, pzr beaters trip j t 274 secondary PORV opens j l
1 - accumulators begin to inject hi-2 NR water level in faulted steam generator !
- { CVS and SFW isolated i l -
accumulator water depleted PRHR beat removal assumed failed by NC gas CMTs begin to drain low-l CMT level ADS actuated *
~
stage 1 ADS Open ! stage 2 ADS open 7 stage 3 ADS open i low-2 CMTlevel stage 4 ADS open gravity injection begins low IRWST water level
; gravity recirculation valves open t
Page 17 -
_ . . _ . _ . _ _ . _ __ . _ .. _ .._.___ . _ _ .___ _ _ _ ~ t I I Table 4 Case SG3 Accident Sequence Timing ' Time Events - (seconds) , l i 0 rupture of 3 steam generator tubes ! t 2 pzr heaters on i 54 pzr heaters uncovered [ 121 CMT injection signal on low pressurizer level Rx scram, turbine trip, MFW trip PRHR on, SFW on CMT on. RCP trip, pzr heaters trip 192 I secondary PORV opens accumn1 stars begin to inject : hi-2 NR water levelin faulted steam generator CVS and SFW isolated : accumulator water depleted PRHR heat removal aanmewi failed by NC gas CMTs begin to drain l low-l CMT level j ADS acena**d l stage 1 ADS open ! t stage 2 ADS open stage 3 ADS open j i low-2 CMTlevel i stage 4 ADS open : gravity injection begins ! low IRWST waterlevel ! gravity recirculation valves open . l l 4 f t Page 18
)
l 1 i I J
l Table 5 Case SG4 Accident Sequence Timing ! Time Events . (seconds) 0 rupture of 4 steam generator tubes , 2 pzr heaters on 41 pzr heats uncovered 94 CMT injection signal on low pressurizer level Rx scram, turbine trip, MFW trip PRHR on, SFW on CMT on, RCP trip, pzr heaters trip 159 secondary PORV opens
- accumulators begin to inject
- hi-2 NR water level in faulted steam generator CVS and SFW isolated accumulator water depleted PRHR heat removal assumed failed by NC gas
- CMTs begin to drain low-l CMT level ADS actuated stage 1 ADS open stage 2 ADS open stage 3 ADS open
- low-2 CMT level stage 4 ADS open gravity injection begins low IRWST water level gravity recirculation valves open Page 19 i
Table 6 Case SG5 Accident Sequence Timing j Time Events
]
(seconds) , ! O rupture of 5 steam generator tubes 2 pzr heaters on w 33 pzr heats uncovered 75 CMT injection signal on low pressunzer level Rx scram, turbine trip, MFW trip PRHR on, SFW on CMT on, RCP trip, pzr heaters trip ; 134 secondary PORV opens accumulators begin to inject hi-2 NR water level in faulted steam generator CVS and SFW isalaterf accumulator water depleted PRHR heat removal assumed failed by NC gas CMTs begin to drain low-1 CMTlevel ADS actuated ~ stage 1 ADS open stage 2 ADS open stage 3 ADS open low-2 CMT level stage 4 ADS Open gravity injection begins low IRWST water level gravity recirculation valves open i 1 Page 20
Table 7 Case SG5b Accident Sequence Timing Time Events , (seconds) - 0 rupture of 5 steam generator tubes 2 pzr heaters on 33 pzr heaters uncovent i I 75 CMT injection signal on low pressurizer level Rx scram, turbine trip, MFW trip ' PRHR on, SFW on CMT on RCP trip, pzr heaters trip 134 sc.:endary PORV opens accumulators begin to inject
- hi-2 NR water level in faulted steam generator CVS and SFW isniatari - accumulator water depleted PRHR heat removal assumed failed by NC gas CMTs begin to drain - low-l CMT level ,
ADS actuated I
~
stage 1 ADS open stage 2 ADS open
- stage 3 ADS open-low-2 CMT level stage 4 ADS open gravity injection begins low IRWST waterlevel gravity recirculation valves open i
l i i l Page 21 l, 1
t J Table 8 i t Case SG5 min Accident Sequence Timing ; Time Events i (seconds) , 0 rupture of 5 steam generator tubes 2 pzr heaters on 33 pzr heaters uncovered 75 CMT injection signal on low pressurizer level I Rx scram, turbine trip, MFW trip
- PRHR on. SFW on !
CMT on, RCP trip, pzr heaters trip > 134 secondary PORV opens i accumulators begin to inject hi-2 NR water level in faulted steam generator ; CVS and SFW isolated 1 accumulator water depleted PRHR heat removal assumed failed by NC gas CMTs begin to drain low-l CMT level ADS actuated
~
stage 1 ADS open stage 2 ADS open stage 3 ADS open low-2 CMT level stage 4 ADS open gravity injection begira low IRWST waterlevel gravity recirculation valves open l
. 1 l
I Page 22 i
Table 9 Case SG5 max Accident Sequence Timing Time Events , (seconds) 0 rupture of 5 steam generator tubes 2 pzr heaters on 33 pzr heaters uncovered 75 CMT injection signal on low pressurtzer level Rx scram, turbine trip, MFW trip PRHR on, SaV o-. CMT on, RCP trip, pzr heaters trip 134 secondary PORV opens accumulators begin to inject hi-2 NR water level in faulted steam generator CVS and SFW isolated accumulator water depleted PRHR heat removal assumed failed by NC gas CMTs begin to drain low-l CMT level ADS actuated
~
stage 1 ADS open stage 2 ADS open stage 3 ADS open low-2 CMT level stage 4 ADS open gravity injection begins low IRWST water level gravity recirculation valves open Page 23
1 l I Table 10 Case SG50p Accident Sequence Timing 1 l Time Events (seconds) , O rupture of 5 steam generator tubes CVS injecting 100 gpm 2 pzr beaters on l i 33 pzr beaters uncovered
]
78 CMT injection signal on low pressurizer level ! Rx scram, turbine trip, MFW trip SFW on RCP trip, pzr heaters trip 133 secondary PORV opens accumulators begin to inject ; 1530 hi 2 NR water level in faulted steam generator l CVS and SFW isolated accumulator water depleted PRHR heat removal assumed failed by NC gas CMTs begin to drain low-l CMT 1evel ADS actuated
~
stage 1 ADS open stage 2 ADS open stage 3 ADS open low-2 CMT level stage 4 ADS open
- I gravity injection begins low IRWST water level gravity recirculation valves open Page 24 l
Table 11 Case SG5p Accident Sequence Timing ; l Time Events
, (seconds) 0 rupture of 5 steam generator tubes 2 pzr heaters on 33 pzr beaters uncovered 75 CMT injection signal on low pressurizer level Rx scram, turbine trip, MFW trip PRER on, SFW on CMT on, RCP trip, pzr heaters trip
- semndary PORV opens
- accumulators begin to inject
- hi-2 NR water level in faulted steam generator CVS and SFW isolated j
- accumularar water depleted PRHR beat removal assumed failed by NC gas
- CMTs begm to drain
- low-l CMTlevel ADS actuated
~
stage 1 ADS open
- stage 2 ADS open
- stage 3 ADS open
- low-2 CMT level stage 4 ADS open
- gravity injection begins low IRWST water level gravity recirculation valves open Page 25
I i i l Table 12 Case SG5cvs Accident Sequence Timing i i i-Time Events 4 (seconds) ' O rupture of 5 steam generator tubes E CVS injectmg 170 gpm I i 2 pzr heaters on - {
- i 35 pzr heaters uncovered )
i i 82 CMT injection signal on low pressurizer level . Rx scram, turbme trip, MFW trip i ,j PRHR on, SFW on CMT on, RCP trip, pzr heaters trip ! i 414 semndary PORV opens 1 accumulators begin to inject 1929 hi-2 NR water levelin fmdtatt steam generator i CVS and SFW isniatesi '
- l accumulator water depleted. j PRHR beat removal assumed failed by NC gas CMTs begin to drain low-l CMT level ADS actuated
~
stage 1 ADS open stage 2 ADS 'open
-' stage 3 ADS open low-2 CMT level stage 4 ADS open
- gravity injection begins
{ low IRWST waterlevel l gravity recirculation valves open
- l i
Page 26 i
Table 13 Case SG5stk Accident Sequence Timing Time Events (seconds) = 0 Rupture of 5 Tubes CVS injectag 170 gpm 2 pzr heaters on e 33 pzr heaters uncovered 81 CMT injection rignal on low pressunzer level Rx scram, turbine trip, MFW trip PRHR on, SFW on CMT on, RCP trip, pzr beaters trip 768 secondary SV Sticks open 825 accumulators begin to inject 2978 hi-2 NR water level in f mited steam generator CVS and SFW isolatec 4335 accumulator water depleted PRHR beat removal assumed failed by NC gas 12100 CMTs begin to drain 12629 low-l CMT level ADS actuated 12694 stage 1 ADS open 12809 stage 2 ADS open 12929 stage 3 ADS open 13299 low-2 CMT level stage 4 ADS open e gravity injection begins 25637 low IRWST ' water level gravity recirculation valves open Page 27
E d . k b c T o O CURRENT PWR AP600 9 g SGTR I I h h SSAR AUTO HHSI AFws AUTO CVCS, SFWS SAFETY MANUAL SG ISOt, W LEAK ISOLATED I ----> LEAK ISOLATED MANUAL SG ISOL. CASE RCS COOL /DEPRES I RCS COOL /DEPRES i I 4 4 AUTO HHSI, I AUTO CMT. PRHR HX, SSAR I CONT SPRAY ---> LEAK NOT ISOL SAFETY CVCS/SFWS ISOL, - - - - > LEAK ISOLATED MAN RCS VENT RCS VENTED CASE SG ISOL, PCS [ l I E i ' I 4 i N CORE DAMAGE AUTO CMT. 00 PARTIAL ADS -----> LEAK NOT ISOL MAN RNS INJECT RCS VENTED i NO CONT FLOOD I i 1 h AUTO CMT. FULL ADS tRwST.PCS i LEAK HOT ISOL RCS VENTED I i CONT FLOOD I I h MAN FULL ADS AUTO ACCUM, RWST. ----> LEAK NOTISOL I PCS RCS VENTED I CONT FLOOD i i FAR.W CORE DAMAGE Figure 1 - AP600 Steam Generator Tube Rupture Multiple Levels of Defense 4
- p
- 4 3
a y MAAP4 Possive RHR Model Best-Estimate Heat Removal Benchmark j MAAP4 Best-Estimate E ----Min PRHR S g --- - - BE PRHR ;
--- Max PRHR m 59 . 50 se : -
M -
,- i v _
40 --
- 40 ,
O
~ #. _._.
- ~'__.
y _
~ __ p ' ' , _ _ _
p y 30 -- -
- 30
~~~___
20 -- 0
. 20 e :
x - 10 -- - 10 x - m -
~
0 'l l 'l '
l ' ' ' '
l 0 530 540 550 560 570 580 590 > PRHR Inlet Woter Temperature (K) Figure 2 ;
- t
_ _.____m____________i>---_.- -
+ -_ - . - _ __y . ..i--. - --%--- ..r- w . . . - - - _ _ . . -w, . . - . - - ,-,,. .... - ,4. . , , - . . , ,
B d f MAAP4 Possive RHR M o d e~l Maximum Heat Removal Benchmark {g MAAP4 Maximum ,
---- Min PRHR- -
l --- - BE PRHR
---Mox PRHR m 50 sa: : -
2 - 40 - _
- 40 -
/ , , .
.- ,,.==="
~_
~~~
E 30 - -
- 30 ye ~
~~~_
m -
- 20 - -
- 20 0 .
e _- x ~ 10 - l x - x - g -
~
0 l '!'i'l l 0 530 540 550 560 570 580 590 PRHR Inlet Wo er Temperature (K) Figure 3 6
- 9 *
, , 's e i
B 6 y MAAP4 Possive RHR Model Minimum Heat Removal' Benchmark j MAAP4 Minimum
?
S Min PRHR - g ------BE PRHR Max PRHR _ 50 _ m -
- 7 1 - :
40 -- -
- 40 O - .
Aa 30 -
~
' _._. ~'_ __
E
~ - 30 we .. ..
x -
-P_ _ - . ~ 20 -- - 20 :
O e : I - x 10 - _
- 10
. 1 I -
x -
~
O- t t t ! I t I t i it i t i I t i i I i t i it 0 i ,i , , t t t 0 530 540 550 560 570 580 590 PRHR inlet Water Temperature (K) Figure 4 i
. _ _ _ . . ~ _ _ . . , ._ __ _- .. . _ . . _ . . _ - ,
B d E AP600 1 Tube Cold Side SGTR at Tubesheet - Base Case j Tube Rupture Break Flow .
? -
8 gm 25 . m m -
- 50 *- .
x - N
&20-- E ,
y -
.D
- 40 ___
- v 15 -- -
e
- 30
~
~
E 10 - o
;u oc -
- 20 e
- I m i o 5-- o
_ 10 _ w : u_ ! M W m 0-- _- O m. 7 m _ m ! O - 0 l
=E - - 10 i i i i i i e i i i i i i i i i i i i E
-5 i i ,
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 ' Time (sec) Figure 5 g a * *
> * > e a @ AP600 1 Tube Cold' Side SGTR at Tubesheet -
Base Case je Pressurizer Woter Level T l 5
- 15 i 4-- -
n n - E 3- } - 10 " , .c - _c d" ~ cn 2 --
._ cn
~
C w -
-5 g ,
_1 - I , I-- 6 6 0 l 0 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Time (SeC)
. Figure 6 ,
E E AP600 1 Tube Cold Side SGTR at Tubesheet Base Case j RCS and Secondary Systems Pr'essures 5 RCS a j Foulted SG Unfcul'ted SG ' 160 - n 140 -5 - 2000 .S o : _o 120 -- m
;F 100_ - 15 0 0 v =
- e 80 - f u ' ' - " ,
- 1000 a 60 - ._._!
w - g m 40 - j
- 500
' 20 --
- a_ '
~ ~
0
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '~ ' ' ' ' ' U-l l l 0 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Time (SeC)
Figure 7
, , . w .
3 d E AP600 1 Tube Cold Side SGTR ot Tubesheet - Base Case j Steam Generator Downcomer W a t~e r L.e v e l -
# Foulted SG j
O
----Unfoulted SG 11.6 _ - 38
~
11.4 --
^ -
- 3 7 -._,
E 11.2 -- -
- m
$ I1-b - 36 ac _
_c 10.8 -- -._, cn - c - 35 " e 10.6 - -- C
, _ __ _s __ _____ ___--__
l e g i _ l ' _I 10.4 - _ i f _ 34
~ 'I" 10.2 i l l O 1000 2000 3000 4000 l Iime (SeC)
Figure 8
a y AP600 1 Tube Cold Side SGTR at 4
- Foulted Steam Generotor Tubesheet --Base Case
$ Foulted SG Pressure Safety Volve Setpoint
-- - - P O R V Setpoint 80
^
1160 A O 78 - - - 1140 ._o _o v m
- 1120 o_
{ 76 - ;__________------------ v g ; ---
- 1100 u -
3 74 -- -
- 1080 u*
m - m a
._._._._._._ _ - -~ - 1060 a3 72 -- - -- --~- -
m
- 1040 e o- _
u 70 ' ' ' ' i i i , 0
- 1020 o_
1000 2000 3000 4000 IIme (SeC) Figure 9 A #
w o + . E E AP600 1 Tube Cold Side SGTR at Tubesheet - Base Case j CMT Water Moss Flowrotes . [ Dischage Line - g ----Balance Line _ 20 _ w m
- 40 x x -
E x -
-Q v 15 -- s v
\l,'gg'hi,,,,
- 30
~
/
d / /g /g' ~ y* -
<\rn e
^ o Q* - Vh r%
t: y 10 - -
%s_ o
- 2 0 oc
* ~
y o - o u- 5- -
- 10 m -
m D - M C _ o 2 ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 2 0 0 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Iime (~SeC) Figure 10
a
@ AP600 l' Tube Cold Side SGTR at Tubesheet -
Base Case
; RCS and CMT Water Temperatures
) RCS Core Woter 0 ----CMT Wo.ter 9
_. _.._.- T s a t - 650 m : - 700 m M ' La._ v 600 - j .' N - 600 " 550 - 5
~~' -~ ~-~ ~---'
---- -~ - - -
e : - 500 e
;? -
2 500 - ' a - 400 3
-.- ". 5 o 450 -i ,_ o u .:
__ -300.' ! o 400 -i ' e i o- : ,-
- 200 E 350 - -
E o ;__ - m - H ' ' ' - 10 0 H 300 ~'l ' l '! ' ' ' , 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Time (Sec) Figure 11
B l d " E AP600 1 Tube Cold Side SGTR ot Tubesheet - Bose Case l CMT Woter Level a i e 7 -
- 20 6- -
- m m
~
E5- -
% 1 v
- - 15 v 4---
ac o _c a -*& ' 3 - -
- 1 0 _._,
1 p : C ' a) 2-- c ,
-5 __; '
1-- l 0 l l l 0 0 1000 2000 3000 4000
/ i T*Ime (SCC) :
Figure 12 ; t I l
i a
$ AP600 l' Tube Cold S i d'e SGTR at Tubesheet -
Base Case ' j PRHR Heat Removal
$ PRHR Decay Heat l
60 t 4 -
\ -
2E+09 ;
- \ m
^
50 -2
\s '
_c ' Es: - s 15E+09 N - OE 40 -2 's -) ! v ~
s '
7 ~
~ :
2~ _
~ ~ _ '
Q g 30 -- 1E+09 v i u- _ e : - se 20 -- u Q_
.5E+08 Se i 10 -- o .
- e t 0 '! l l 0
0 1000 2000 , 3000 4000 i t I.lme S e C >I t i Figure 13 _ . . _ . - . . - - - - _ _ . _ - . ._ __ _-._ - _ _ _ - - _ _ - _ - - _ . _ _ _ _ . - - _ . . - . . . . - . . . . . - - _ . . - - . ~ . , . . . .- . . . _ . . _ . . - . - . - . . --. .
a
$ AP600 1 Tube Cold Side SGTR at Tubesheet -
Bose Case RCS Woter Level 3 5
$ 25
- 80 20 -- m E :
- 60 v _
v 15 -- -
't i!g+c
- 40 _c
~
cn 10 - - C
~
cn C G) - a G)
- 20 5-- ._
0 l l 'l 0 ; O 1000 2000 3000 4000 ' Time (sec) . Figure 14 _ - _ - _ - _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ - - - - - - _ - - - - - - r -_. - - . ,. .- -- e-- - , - - - -
3
$ AP600 2 Tube Cold Side SGTR at Tubesheet -
Base Case j' Tube Rupture Break Flow l r e
.i' i
- n 50 - n ,
m " N
- - 100 N ,
& 40 - -
E i u - _o
- 80 _ -
~
v ; 30 - i :
- 60 e
. o
, y - ,
a
" 20 - -
}
o
- m
* : { 40 o = i 10 -- - 20 o u- : o_ i m
m 0-}_ 4 -O m m > O - O
~
E
-10 ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' - - 2 0 CE l l l O 1000 2000 3000 4000 '
Iime (SeC) i Figure 15 l e a e e
. . .. t R $ AP600 2 Tube C o'i d Side SGTR at Tubesheet Base Case j: Pressurizer Water Level 5 '
g 5 [ - 15
~
4--
~
E - 3- fI - 10 " ?;~.c ~l
~
c
~ '
w2-- - C ~ C e -5 a _ o 1-- 8
~
0 l l l 0 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 f T*Ime (SeC Figure 16 i
s c f AP600 2 Tube Cold S ' te SGTR at Tubesheet - Base Case j RCS and S^ce.1 dory Systems Pr'essures - 5 RCS Foulted SG
----- U n f o u I t e d SG 160 -
m u o 140 -- 2000.S _o 120 -5 * - o_ D' 100_g - 15 0 0 v . W g - o 80 -- '
' ~
- f ---- .
- 1000 a 60 - : _, 3 m
w 40 - m
, : - 500 ' 20 -2 -
o_ : '
~
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' U- ;
0 l l l 0 O 1000 2000 3000 4000 - Time (seC) ; Figure 17
. _ _ . _ _ . _ - _ _ . - - _ _ - _ . . _ . - - _ _ . ~ - _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _- . _ _ _ _ _ .
a j .AP600 2' Tube Cold Sid'e SGTR ot Tubesheet - Base. Case l 8 Steam Generator Downcomer Water Level -
$ F a u l.t e d SG $ ---- Unfoulled SG a .
11.8 11.6 - - 38 m f-
~} ,
v : - 37 o 11.2 -- - 4a -
~
&C 11 -5 - 3 6 _c
~
& 10. 8 - m
- 35 c
- 10. 6 -
] - I
_,,__,_______,______ o> __.1 10.4 -jit _ 34
~
l/ 10.2 l l l 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 IIme (SeC) Figure 18
s c E AP600 2 Tube Cold Side SGTR ot Tubesheet - Bose Case j Foulted Steam Generotor Pressure E F o u l t e'd SG l
----Safety Valve Setpoint PORV Setpoint 80 1160 ^
^
o
- 1140 .__
c- 78 -- m
- - 1120 o_
_ v i 76 -:-------------------------- - 1100 u - e e - u -
- 1080 '
3 74 -- D m - - 1060 m m _._ _ _ _ _ _ _._ _._ _ _ _._ _._._._._._._._._._._._.
*72~~ -
1040 aa s._ - L._ 70
~
1020 1 l i 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Time (sec) Figure 19 p 6 9 4
z
- p
$- AP600 2 Tube Cold Side SGTR at T.u b e s h e e t -
Bose Case CMT Water Moss Flowrote's 5 d Dischage Line : M ----Bolonce L.ine g I.
- ^ 20 m m m x
o'
- 40 x E'
.x -
.a v 15 - -
,A -
- v l#v/g<ts fg s \ t t , ,, , - 30 e i \~~r
*\v i / O
.l 5 10 -- ~~-' s e,_ o
- 20 o:
, o - 8 o u_ 5--
- 1 0 '-
M - t/) O _ O 2 ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 2-0 0 0 1000 2000 -3000 4000 Ilme (sec) i~ngure 20
l s c E AP600 2 Tube Cold' Side SGTR at Tubesheet - Bose Case j RCS and CMT Water Temperatures 9 6 RCS Core Water g ----CMT Woter Tsat 650 -700m x - w 600 - v
- '\ . - 600 "
550 -5 - - ~ - - ~ - ~ - -
~ - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - , e 3 - 500 e ii '
500 - ' A 3 - 400 3
~ -
o 450 -i ___ a u :
,_ - 300 u e 400 -i '
a> o- : ,-
- 200 -
E 350 -: - E a3 ;_ - a> l-- 300 ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' - 100 H l l 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 IIme (SeC) Figure 21 k h
- . _ . , . - , . . - , . , , . . _ . . . - _ _ - . . .-.__ -_.- .- ,- , _ - _ . . _ , _ , _ . - ~ , . _ . . . - - _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
, , s .
3
$ AP600 2 Tube Cold Side SGTR at Tubesheet -
Base Case
- CMT Water Level -
E w 8 g 7 _ 6-- - .
- 20
_~ m m _ !
~
E5-- _ . v -
- 15 v -
i 4- _ 3 _c - 11 C e~3__CD - CD C C S 2-- o
- -5 .-.s 1__ _
~
0
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '~ '
0 i l l 1 1000 2000 3000 4000
~
0 Iime (sec) , Figure 22 i I _-_..--.._ - - --.___.---._ --___-__-.-_. ~_____ ____ _ _.___... - - , _ . . , . . . . _ _ - . . . _ . . - - . . . - - . , , . - - . . - . . .. - - , . - -,
I a ; G E AP600 2 Tube Cold S i d'e SGTR ot Tubesheet - Base Case i
; PRHR Heat Removol )s PRHR '
j
~
- - - - D e c a y_ H e o t '
[ t 60 s .2E+09 x ! n 1
- m 50 -2
- \s -
_c 5c : s s 15E+09 N - lE 40 -- 's 3
, v : '
~
s i : '
~~ _
ca 3 30 -- 1E+09 v i u _ o : i y 12 0 -- u
- .5E+08
- ct _
E - 10 -- o - _ o_ !
~
0 i''l ' l 0 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 , I.lme f 3 . (Sec', r i Figure 23 i e s k ' !
i i P
$ AP600 2 Tube Cold Side SGTR at Tubesheet -
Base Case
; RCS Woter Level 4
w j o i 25
- 80 !
1 20 -- m ' ^ - E
- 60 ~
U _ U
- 15 -- _
m .- gc _
- 40 _c m ~
~
~
m 10 -- _ O I C D - e
- 20 5__ -
0 l l l 0 1000 2000 3000 4000
~
0 f 3 T.Ime (Sec; , Figure 24 ;
. _ , _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ________.____.m___.____-.._._._.__m__-._m..m_. - _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . . _ _ . _ . . - _ _ . _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ ____ _m-____-_m.__ _ . _ _____-_._._____.____._-_.-_m__.___._._______-_______.________.m_ -
3 AP600 3' Tube Cold Side SGTR at Tubesheet - Base Cose j Tube Rupture Break Flo'w c gm 80 w m N - 15 0 N o, - E x 60 -- ' n v - U
- 100
- 40 --
_, o
~
?0 U E&
~
P;
, 20 -- - 50 o _
m O
-o D
o-((l"r w . in O _ O
- s -20 ' ' ' '
l E O 1000 2000 3000 4000 Time (sec) Figure 25
E E AP600 3 Tube Cold Side SGTR ot Tubesheet - Base Case j Pressurizer Water Level 0 8 g 5
- 15 4 -- '
m
~
3__ - 10 " t _
~
r a" - cn 2 -- cn c ._
~
C e -
-5 a>
__] - 1__ __J
~
' ' ' ' ^ ^ ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
0 't' , l 0 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Iime (SeC) ; Figure 26
\
. ~ - . , . .
AP600 3 Tube Cold Side SGTR at Tubesheet - Base Case j RCS and Secondary Systems Pressures RCS
? .
l Faulled SG
- - U n f a u i t e d SG -
160 - n .
' 140 --
a . 2000.S ! I _o 120 -
~
- i o_ !
- P 100 -
- - 1500 v o _
(Jn - o 80 --
' e -- *
- ' - - - 1000 '
a 60 -si B ' m : m
- 40 -2 m 3 : -- 500
' 20 -2
- o_ :
0
~
0 l l l O 1000 2000 3000 4000 f g Ime (SeC) . Figure 27 7 e e y e
s . s . a c
'f ' AP600 3 Tube Cold Side SGTR'ot Tubesheet ' Base Case : 't Steam Generator Downcomer Water Level -
i
? Faulted S G' ^
l ---- Unfoulled SG , i 11.8 _ 11.6 -5 '
- 38
- n m .
f
~
E I14- : - 4 v :: - 37 "
;P
- 1. 2 -- --
i 3: c 11 - -36c
-+> ,
cn 1 0 . 8 - . - c :
- f
- 35 c i 10.6 - :-, , - - - - .- - - - - - - e ;
, : i - -J i 10.4 - - _- if - 34 i
~ ' ' ' I 10.2 ' '
l l 'l ' ' 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Time (sec) F Figure 28 I
l i B l; 'AP600 3 Tube Cold Side SGTR at Tubesheet Foulted Steam Generator Pressure Bose Case ) Faulted SG ' l" Safety Volve Setpoint
------- PORV Setpoint j
80 1160 m o
' : - 1140 ._
o 78 -- m o - v _ - 1120 o_ v { 76 -$______________-.-__________ -1100
- e u -
- 1080 * '
i 3 74 -- ' D m _
- 1060 m _ _._._._ _._ _ _ _._._ _._._._._._._._._._._._._._._.
m o 72 -- - 1040 e u 1 - 70 ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' -1020 o_
- l l 'l O 1000 2000 3000 4000 :
Iime (Sec) Figure 29
3 d E AP600 3 Tube Cold Side SGTR at Tubesheet - Base Case l CMT Water Moss Flowrote:s . g Dischage-Line j
- ---Balance Line m 20 _
m m x -
- 40 x cn -
E x -
.o v 15 -- ' 'i n j s v
* '}ljg r a - 30 N<sb\
m o _ v's" ^ &~ __
*~h s\r " _
5 10 -- '- ,_ o
- 2 0 oc = -
o - g u- 5-- - 10 m _ m m _ m O _ O 2 ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 2 0 0 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Iime (SeC) Figure 30
S s y AP600 3' Tube ~ Cold Side SGTR at Tubesheet -- Bose Case 4 RCS and CMT Water Temperatures 'S RCS Core Water j
----CMT Water
----Tsat t
650 ; 700 m M i k v 600 -[i. - 600 " 5 \ 550 -
- ~ ~~ --~~ ~ -~------- - ---
e : - 500 e $ ' 500 -5 ' W3 i _ 400 3
~ _
o 450 -- '_,,___ o u -
_ - 300 u a> 400 -i '
a>
- o. -
o_
- 200 E 350 - - -
E a> 5,' a> H ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' - 100 H 300 l l l 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 -
.. j y Im0 ( S e C --)
Figure 31 9 9 4 %
e a
$ AP600 3 Tube Cold Side: SGTR at Tubeshee-t -
Bose Case CMT Water Level ' {w - 8 g 7 _ 6_ - 20
- n n
2 ~ ' ' E5-j v - 15 4--- m g _c : . y e~3_: - 1 0 _._,
& : m C
_- C o 2-- a> i -5 a 1-2_ 0 l l l 0 0 1000 2000 3000 4000
. . . . , 3 Ime (SeC)
Figure 32
9 d E AP600 3 Tube Cold- Sid~e SGTR at Tubesheet - Base Case ; j PRHR Heat Removal 3 U PRHR , g ---- Decay Heat 60 -
\
.2E+09
\ ~
^ .
50 -2 s
^ : '
_ 'c : 3C - s 15E+09 N . OE 40 -2 's s a ; e : ' s , i : -
~~ m !
30 -- 8 ' _- .IE+09 v u i o> : m 20 -- u 5E+08
- a- -
y 10 -- o .
- o_ ,
~
0 l l 'l 0 . 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 ! Time (sec) . Figure 33 ,
, o . . :o a
c f AP600 3 Tube Cold Side SGTR at Tubesheet - Base Case i y RCS Water Level . e a g 25 - - 80 20 -- m n - E
- 60 -
- t v _
U 6 15 -- _ m i C 1 - 40 _c g-- - cn 10 -- cn c C o : t
-J -
- 20 ' i 5-- -
i 0 l l 'l ' 0 ' 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 l Iime (Sec)- Figure 34
P
$ AP600 4 Tube Cold Side SGTR at Tubesheet -
Base Case j
?
Tube' Rupture Break Flow a 5m 100 ~ m
* - 200
- N N
. c:n 80 -- E x - . O
- 150 --
60 --
~
G) Q)
- 10 0 ~
aa Q]C 40 -- oc o o -
- 50 o 20 -- o La_ -
w , m 0- k% ff -0 m O [ $ O 2
-20 ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' "
l l l 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Iime (S6C)' Figure 35 r 9 4 4 9
1 E AP600 4 Tube Cold S i d'e SGTR ot Tubesheet - Base Case j P Pressurizer Water Level o j 5
- 15 4-
~
E . m ~ 3 -- - 10 " ac ~ C 1~
~ ~
w 2 -- cn c .-
~
C e -5 S __J 1__ _
~
0 '--" P l -l 0 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Iime (SeC) i Figure 36 - . _ . - - _ _ . . . . _ _ . - . - - - - - . - - . - _ . - _ - - - - . - - - - - _ - - _ _ . - - _ . , - _ . _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - _ - - a---_ - - --,,-m-- - , ~v - .- , - - -- --,e--
AP600 4 Tube C o'I d Side SGTR at Tubesheet - Base Case j RCS and.Se.condary Systems Pressures ?- . RCS l Faulted:SG Unfouited SG - 160 _ m m - g-
' 140 - _
- 2000 ._
o : . m _o 120 -- v - a
- P 100 -- - 15 0 0 v 2
I 80 - a> u 3{-
- 1000 a,
m a 60 -i! : a w m 40 --
- 500 m
* : a3
' 20 -- u 0
0 l l ! 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Time (Sec) Figurc 37
s , s . ' 3 ! g i
- E AP600 4 Tube Cold ~ S i d'e SGTR ot Tubesheet -
Base Case ! j Steam Generator Downcomer Water L.e v e l ; j 5 O FouIted SG I
- y
----Unfaulted SG ,
1 f t 11.8 _ 11.6 -- - 38 '
^
m .
~ '
E I14-: %
- 37 v
11 2 - - v -
;P
'a g _c 11 -- - 3 6 _c
~ .
. y 1
& 10. 8 - -
O C : !
- 10.6 - :
- 35 c
_ _ _ _,_ _ ,_ ,_ s ______________ e ; __j F 10.4 - i il' l - 3 4-10.2 !' ' ' ' l l l O 1000 2000 3000 4000 l Iime (sec-) l i Figure 38 ! l I t
i B l
$ AP600 4 Tube Cold Side SGTR at j Foulted Steam Generator Tubesheet -
Base Case E Pre'ssure Faulted SG l Safety Volve Setpoint
--- P O R V Setpoint
~ 80 m - 1160 - o 78 --
-Q -
- 1140.o ._
m _ m
- 1120 o_
G 76 -- v g
----------~------------- - 1100 g ,_
3 74 -- - 1080 u* m a m - 1060 72 _-! --_._____--~~---- '--- m
- 1040 m o- _
u 70 ; ' ' l
' > i i
; ,,,,,,,,, - 1020 o_
0 ' 1000 2000 3000 4000 IIme (SeC) Figure 39 e . 6 9
I i n l AP600 4 Tube Cold Side SGTR at Tubesheet - Base Case ! j CMT Water Moss Flowrote's
$ Dischage Line .
5 ----Bolonce Line 3 _ 20 _ m N
-40" N cn -
E ' y - Q v 15 -- i' it v 3'g')1 /s ea - 30 N<v)J\ g '~ % 's,y,,, e 1
<m 10 - - "^^- . O
_ -t- -20m
= -
O O u- 5--
- 10 '
m -
. m m _
m ; O _ O 2 ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 2 0 l l 0 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Time / T (sec7 Figure 40
6 9 l AP600 4 Tube Cold S i d~e SGTR at Tubesheet RCS and CMT Water Temperatures Base Case - l ;
) RCS Core-Water E ----CMT Woter 3
600 -
- 600 x 5 -
~
u_. v 550 -- v
- - 500 .
q, 500 - i e yu : - 400 u 2 a - a
& _._, 4 5 0 -- ,,,_ ..
o : ,
--300 o
'a)400 -2' -
a> o_ ,-
- 200 Q-E 350 -2 -
E a> - a> F-- l--
~
00 300 l l 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Time (SeC) Figure 41 t 4 $ D
t e , - o >
- 'i i
s . l
~
l AP600~4 T 'u b'e' Cold-Side SGTR Ot Tubesheet - Bose Case s .CMT Woter.--Le el ( 4 . a 1 g . t i 7- - t l 6_g - 20 t
^
n n _ E 5- - v
} - 15 4-2 g .
s~3_ : - 1 0 _._, : cp - r cn t C , o 2- -
- a3 !
-5 i 1- -
.i i
~
0 l l 'l -0 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 i Iime (SeC) l
^ ] Figure 42 I
i [ _ . . _ _ . . _ _ _ . . _______._m.__ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ - . _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _______ _ _ ___ _ . - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ . - , . - . _ . . . _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ . , - - - , . - , _ . -
3 d E AP600 4 Tube Cold Side SGTR at Tubesheet - Base Case
~
PRHR Heat' Removal . 5 PRHR
----Decay Heat ,
60 - t - 2E+09 . s A _- \ 5 0 --- x
^ : s -
c l 3: -
~
s - 15E+09 N - OE 40 - 's s a
,v : 's ,
ii : ce g 30 -- IE+09 v u _ a)
~
w 20 - u Q_
.5E+08 3
10 -- o ,
- o_ .
~
O l l l 0 , 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Time (sec'l )
. Figure 43
AP600 4 Tube Cold Side SGTR at Tubesheet - ' Base Case l RCS Water Level
? -
l 25 _
. - 80 O
20 -- m
^ '~
- 60 -
E _ _ v 15 -- _ ii C - - 40 _c
~
& 10 -- m c -
C a) ~ J -
- 20 8
, 5-- _ W e 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Time (SeC) Figure 44
e E E AP600 5 Tube Cold Side SGTR at Tubesheet - Base Case j Tube Rupture Break Flow
~
0 a jm 140 -
- 300 ^
w - m Ncn12 0 -- - N 250 E O v 100 --
- - 200 "
a, 80 --
~ 2 150 $
d' Z 60 -- o x 100 O 40 -- -
~~
o
- 50
~ --
u_ 20 - u_
~
(n - (n 0-- ~v m (f 0 m 2
-20
~
l l l 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Time (sec)\ Figure 45 P 4 $ 9
3
.$ AP600 5 Tube Cold-Side SGTR at Tubesheet -
Base Case l Pressurizer Water Level '
"C '
.g j 5 ;
- 15 4I E
i v . 3 -- - 10 " 3' c c
& 2 --
g - O
~
C w ~
-5 D
a 1 -- 0 P' "d l 0 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Time (sec) ' Figure 46 b _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . , _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ .-___.__m_ _.._____,_,m___.__,____m._ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _._______________m_ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _
9 6 s AP600 5 Tube Cold Side SGTR at Tubesheet - Base Case j RCS and Secondary Systems Pressures 5 6 RCS - y Foulted SG i Unfculted SG - 160 n
' 140 - .
- 2000.S o -
~
_o 120 - Q- , 2' 100 -
- 1500 v
" ~ o 80 - ,
- - _ _ _ - 1000 '
60-, 3 m : 3 w 40 -2 m e : - 500 t- 20 -2 ' o_ : 0
~
0 l l l 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 I*lme i SeC) Figure 47
B G E AP600 5 Tube Cold Sidh SGTR a t' Tubesheet - Bose Case l x Steam Generator Downcomer W o t e r. Level
# Foulted SG l ----
Unfoulted SG 12
, - 39
~
I - m 11.5 --
-- 3 8 C E %
v _37v i g_c 11 --
~
~
- 3 6 _c M
c - 35 "
* - ' - ~ ' - ~ - - - - - ' ' - - - - ~
10.5 $
~ -
--I -
___I /
-g/ -34J y ,
- 33
~
10 l l l 0 1000 2000 3000 4000
.. . r 3 s ime (SeCj Figure 48
.. . _ - _ _ -. . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ . . _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ . _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - . . = . . - . . - _ - . - - . . . . . . . - _ . - - - . - . . . . . -
9 d i AP600 5 Tube Cold Side SGTR ot Tubesheet - Base Case j Faulted - Steam Generator Pressure , 5 6 Foulted SG g ----Safety Valve Setpoint-
--- - - P O R V Setpoint -
80 1160 m
- r n
o
- 1140._
o 78 -- m i
" ~
v _ - 1120 o_ U ! (- 76 -- 1100 ; a - e _ u -
- 1080 *-
a 74 -- m
~
a
- 1060 m m _._._._._ _._ _ _._._._._._._ _._._._.___.___._._._._.
t e 72 -- 1040 : u e . y t 020 a 70 l l 'l 0 1000 2000- 3000 4000 : Time (sec) : Figure 49 e t 6
- s .
E d E AP600 5 Tube Cold Side SGTR at Tubesheet - Base Case l CMT Water Moss Flowrote's .
"g., Dischage-Line .
j ----Bolonce Line _ 20 _ m m x -
- 40 x en -
E x - .o
- t'it v
\ll'\ql e sn - 30
,1,,t y *e oo
- - s
,_ ,VJ\^ ~
"O if # -j y, 4
~ g 10 __ _s _
o
- 20 m
* ~
o - g u_ 5-- - 10 m - , M _ m O _ O 2 ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 2 0 l l l 0 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 I*lme T
~S e C i l
Figure 50
a j -AP600 5 Tube Cold. Side SGTR at Tubesheet RCS and CMT Water Temperot'ures Bose Case
- g. '
)8 RCS Core Water . s" CMT Water Tsot
^
659 ~
- 700 m
~
b 600 - s
- 600 "
- i x
~ ' ~ ' ' ~ ^ ^ - ^ - ~ ~ ^ - - - ^ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
550 --
,o :
- 500 a>
ii ' ' 500 -2
=3 :
- - 400 ~a
_, ~ a 450 - : ~~_ o
' _ - 300 m a> 400 -- -
a) o- : - n
- 200 E 350 - :- -
E a3
' ' ' ' ' ' ' i i i i i i i i , , , - 100 i--
300 i i i i 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Time (sec') ) Figure 51 -
~
I
, , t .
R c ~ E AP600 5 Tube Cold Side SGTR of Tubesheet - Bose Case je CMT Woter Level - Q 7 i . 6- 3 _
- 20
- m m
E5-3 ~ v
- 15v ^ l i
4-- - ac : b~3-j cn c cn C a> 2 -- 0
-5 __;
1-.__
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' i 0 l l ! 0 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 ,
i T*ime s e c >' , Figure 52 i
M @ AP600 5 Tube Cold Side SGTR ot Tubesheet - Base Case
- PRHR H e o t- Removal
) PRHR . S ----Decay Heat a 60 - \ 2E+09
- \ m 50 -- s
_ 'c m : s . 3 - s 15E+09 N . OE 40 -- 's s 3 v ~ - s g
- ~
~
m v 5 30 -@ __ -
- .IE+09 w
se 20 -@ u O -
.5E+08
- ct sc 10 -- o
- ct
~
0 l l l 0 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 3 T.ime (sec) Figure 53
$ % $ O
t B d E AP600 5 Tube Cold Side SGTR at Tubesheet - Bose Case RCS Wate'r Level ' { - d! ~ g_ 25 _ , _ 80 _ t
~
20 -- m
^
- - 60 -
15 --
't _
$C
~~
- 40 _c-cn 10 --
c ._ cn C __; - 20 -' 5-- ._ 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Time (sec) Figure 54 , _ .-.- _--._.._..._J
p
& AP600 5 Tube Cold Side'SGTR - Break Elevation Sensitivity i Tube Rupture Break Flow i!.
w lm(n140 -
- - 300 ^
CD N Ncn12 0 - -
- 250 E o a
v 100 -- -
- 200 "
e 80 -{
~ -
- 150 $
2g 60 -- o o m
- 100 S 40 --
m O - o
- 50 u_ 20 - _
u_
~
(n -
.m en 0-- ( '-
^v -0 en s -20 -
l l 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Time (SeC) Figure 55
, . s .
. . e -
a l AP600 5' Tube Cold Side SGTR - Break Elevation Sensitivity Pressurizer Water Level iE. F ' 9 5- ' 8 _
- 15 4 --
~
E % v 3 -- - 10 "
- ?
?; _c
-+ -
~
- C w 2 -- - CP C --
-5 c w
a J 1 -- ._ _ t 0 "P' "d i 0 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 l Iime (SOC) l i Figure 56 y _ _ _ . . - . . . ..=--..__.___.-.__.-....---.--_____-A-_-_--------..+.-~m-e ---- v v e- , ~u--n+e w v, = - - - s '- - v---rm-
a l AP600 5 Tube Cold Side SGTR - Break Elevotion Sensitivity j RCS and Secondary Systems Pre ~ssures , g RCS 'l"
---- Faulted
--- - - Unfculted SG SG 160 -
n u 140 - - 2000 - a -
~
_o 120 - v - . o-
;y 100 -- - 15 0 0 v w :
E a> 80 -2 u : C "--
- - - - _ -- _ _ . _ - 1000 o
60 -;., a m : a m 40 - m e : - 500
' 20 -2 '
o_ :
~
~
0 l 0 0 1000 2000 '3000 4000 Time (SeC)
' Figure 57 b
. . _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ , _ . . . _ . _ _ . . _ .._ _ _ _ _ - . . . - . _ _ - - . . . _ . . . ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . - -
_ .. _ .. _ .. . _ m
, . . e -- ,
a . g AP600 5 Tube Coid Side SGTR - Breok- E1evotion Sensitivity
. Steam' Generator .Downcomer-Water Level
$- Faulted SG - e ---- Unfoulted SG 3 12 ' _ 39 W- _
~
^
-38^ ~
E 11.5 -- ;
-37v i
- P .
=
; _c 1 1 -- l m
a - _ 3 6 _c . a, - c
- 35 "" '
> - ' - ~ - ' - - - - - - ~ - ~ - - - - - -
10.5 --I -
~ -
e a _i - - 3 4 __; t i y
- 33 10 I I I i 0
1000 2000 3000 - 4000 IIme (SeC) Figure 58 6 e
- _ . - . - _ _ - _ _-.m._m ._._____.__,____..._.__.,,,_____..m_.u___________.m_.___ -
_ _m,,_____m_-__________....m,_.,_ , _ _ , . . . . , y,m,- ,,,,v,_,,,_.,w ,,my,,,,my.- -,,,, ,y, . , ,,, , ,_
5 '
$ AP600 5 Tube Cold Side SGTR - Breok Elevation Sensitivity.
;. Faulted Steam Generator Pressure
) Faulted SG l
----Safety
---- PORV Volve Setpoint Setpoint -
80 1160
- m m
' I- - 1140.o _
o 78 -- m v
- - 1120 o_
U g 76 -- - 1100
>g -
u -
- 1080 '* -
3 74 -- m
~
a
- 1060 m m _._._._._._._ _._._._._ _._ _ _._._._._.___._ _._._._.
, 72 __ m <
1040 m u 70 ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' , , , , - 1020 1 l l i 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 i
/ T T*ime (SeCj Figure 59 e = a -
.. . o .
B l* AP600 5 Tube Cold Side SGTR - Break Elevation Sensitivity CMT Water Moss Flowrotes 4 . g Dischage Line s"
----Bolonce Line i
m 20 m m . m x -
- 40 x E
~
cn - x - o v 15 - p11 - 3,,1y fl A 4f t3 s .
- 30 D - '\'^r f" \ /y~,
1 10 - o
<x f tc/ -
- 20 m m -
o - o u- 5--
- 10 '
m ._ m M ._ U3 0 .- o 2 ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 2 0 i 0 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 1 T.ime (sec)
, Figure 60
. _-_ __- _- a
3 d y AP600 5 Tube Cold Side SGTR - Break Elevation Sensitivity j RCS and CMT Water Temperatures
? RCS Core Water l
CMT Water ' Tsat 650 - 700 m : m M C La._ v 600 --s
-\ - 600 v 550 - _
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ - - ~ - ~ ~ ~ - ~ - ' ' - - ~ - ~ ~ ~ - ' ~ - - ~ - - - - - - ~ - - - -
e : - 500 e E, ' '
-500 - :
E 3 3 3
- 400 -._,
a 450 --
~~,___ -
a u : _ - 300 u o 400 -2 ~~_ _ - o o_ - o_
- 200 E 350 -2 -
E i o :- - a) H ' ' ' ' ' - 10 0 H 300 ' ' l l 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Time (sec) Figurc 61
. (
w w E y AP600 5 Tube Cold Side SGTR - Break Elevation Sensitivity j CMT Water Level
~
n - 8 g 7 6-- -
- 20 m
E5-2 ~ v -
- 15v "
4-- Ec b C {y _ e 3-- -10 _, O O c ! C to 7-- - G)
- -5 ->
1-} _ 2
,iii;i,,,i,,,,,, , , '
o o 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 IIme (sec) Figure 62 __.__..____._._..._.m._ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _____._.______m_-__m_ -we _ - . _
s ~ '
.i
$ AP600 5 Tube Cold Side SGTR - Breok Elevation Sensitivity i j PRHR Heat Removal 5 PRHR Decay Heat l i 60 l .2E+09 '
\
\ ^ !
50 --
.s :
s _ 'c . :' 3 s s 15E+09 N OE 40 -- 's 3
, v : ~ ~ ;
s i :
~_ m 8 30 - -
1E+09 v ' 4 u _ o :
- 3 20 -- u
.5E+08 a : * :
10 -: y o
- Q-
~
- i 0 l l l' 0 i 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 '
I.lme 1 SeC # i i Figure 63 l
. .. ., v.
+ e w -
s ll AP600 5 Tube CoId Side SGTR - Breok RCS Woter Level E1evotion Sensitivity
?
8 25 3 -
- 80 20 --
n -
- 60 -
E 15 -- _ f - 40 _c
- ~
w 10 - .. c - w O [ *
- 20 '
5-- . ee i , , , , , , ; , , , , , , , , , o ; ; 0 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Time (SeC) Figurc 64
E E AP600 5 Tube Cold Side SGTR - Max PRHR Heat Removal j= Tube Rupture Break Flo'w -
~
5 5m 140 -
- 300 -
m - c Nc"12 0 -- N
- 250 oE
~ ~
x v 100 -- -
- 200 " '
e 80 --
,Q b - 150 $
$g 60 -- a
- s -
or
- 100 40 - -
- : o u- 20 - g - 50 -
m : r ! o 3 ( a 2 ~
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 2
-20 l l 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 !
Iime (~SeC) Figure 65 !
, A .- -
. .~ o -
E E AP600 5 Tube Cold Side SGTR - Max PRHR Heat Removal { Pressurizer Water Level 5 . ! 5
; - 15 t
4 -.-
~
E - v 3 __ - 10 " m 5 [ p } --
^
C w -5 a _ o 1 -- J m e 0 , "'"l"" i" 0 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Iime (SeC) Figure 66
'l c; E AP600 5 Tube Cold Side SGTR - Max PRHR Heat ~ Removal j RCS and Secondary Systems Pressures ,
& RCS -
l ---- Faulted SG Unfculted SG 160 _. m n - o u 140 - . - 2000 ._ o : m . _a 120 - - o_
- 1500 v 2" 100 -i .
W
^
o 80 - h u .k - -- - _- _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ . _ . _ . _ . _ _ . _ . _ . _ - 1000 a3 m o 60 - ' a m .: m m 40 -: m o - 500
- a3
' 20 -- u o_ -
o_
~
0 l l l 0 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Time (sec) Figure 67
..._ . _ . _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ - . . _ _ _ . ~ . . , . - . - . - _ . . - . _ , . . . . . - . , _ - - . . - - _ - _ . _ ~ , . -
_ . - - . ~ _ . . . - _ . _ - _ . . _ _ _ _ _
- ~ . - . - _ - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ - - - - - _ _ _ - - _ - - _ _ _ _
a
$ AP600 5' Tube Cold Side SGTR -
Max PRHR Heot Removal j Steam Generator Downcomer Woter Level E a - Foulted SG ; 0 ----Unfoulted SG g 12 :
; - 39 i
^
11.5 --
~
38 ~ ^ t
~
E - v N 37 v
;P i a _c 11 - -
- 36 -C
- ~
c
~
- 35 " " '
- 10.5 --I .-
' ' ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - ' - - -
__J -g/
/
- 34 7
~
10 ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 33 l l l 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 . 3 T.ime s e c )' Figure 68 m___.___ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ y._, . _ . - - ,,,...-%..m..,_,,-,_,.,-,.,,_,..r . , , , . . , .--w.w-_, _..-.v.m.,.,.,__,,_,,._,.,,.,___c, .r,._..,
9 d i AP600 5 Tube' Cold Side SGTR - Max PRHR Heat Removal Faulted Steam Generator Pressure
# Faulted SG l
----Safety Valve Setpoint
~
----PORV Setpoint 80 1160 m m
O
- 1140 .__
o 78 -- m v 1120 a_ U { 76 -- - 1100 m -
% y -
u -
- 1080
- 74 -- '
3 m a
- 1060 g m _._._._ _._ _ _._._ _._._ _._._._._._._._._._._._._._-
- 72 -- -
1040 e u
~
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' , , , , - 1020 1 70 l 'l 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Time (SeC)
Figure 69 h _ ___-_ - - -._- _ _ _ _ - _ . _ _ _ _ . - . .-- . - , . - - , , . . _ - - ~ - . . - - . . . - -
, ,, -.. . . _-n.. _._.___ - .
. c . v -
r B d y AP600 5 Tubc Cold Side SGTR - Max PRHR Heat Removal j CMT Water Moss Flowratss .
.{ Dischage Line -
---- Balance .
Line .
^ 20- .
i i m m
- 40 x x -
E u - .
.a v 15 -- t i -
/t v
- 30 t in %/ w
* / st is ~
},
~
* \ r es q ,e s ,. s -
s ,_ c 10- - \^^ s_
,'s-a
- 2 0 a:
s - O ^ o u- 5-- - 10 ' m - M _ m O - 0 2 f 1 l 1 I I I I ! I I I i 1 I i t I i 2 Q -0 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Iime (SBC) e- se
..__._.._._-__.___...__...___...__...__m.._ .____-_._-m__._m ._______._-____.___________2___ . _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ -,2 __ --_----_m__--wv .m <,.e--
-.wv --
.--e---..-- ~ , -
a ~
@ AP600 5 Tube Cold Side SGTR -
Max PRHR Heat Removal j RCS and CMT Water Temperatures
? RCS Core Water l
----CMT Water l Tsat 650 - 700 m x c u_
v 600 --s
- 600 "
_\ - 550 -T ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - - '
- - ^ ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
, e 2 - 500 e i 500 -
- 5
- 400 3
~ . .
o 450 -
___- a t u :
,._ - 300 u 400 -:
a> , ca a -
- 200 E 350 -2 -
E-e 3- as l' H ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' - 100 i-- 300 l l 'l ' ' , i 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 IIme (SeC) , Figurc 71 ;
o . . _ B d E AP600 5 Tube Cold Side SGTR - Max PRHR Heat Removal je CMT Water Level w - 8 y 7 _ 6- - 20
~
m m
~
E5- .
- 15v +
v - 4-- - y .- ga _c - r 8" 3_Z - 1 0 _._, p ._ c m
- C o 2-- -
e
- -5 ._;
_ i 1- _ t 0 l l 0 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Time (SeC) Figure 72 e ---. _.----_._.--.-._____--._.----___._--_-._..--._-.._-.-.-___--.-...._----_-_.-_...a-.-_.- _ . _ - _ . . - _ . - _ _ _ _ - . _ _ . - _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - - _ . - - - . _ . - - - - . - _ _ _ _ . - - - _ - _ . _ . - - _ _ _ _ . - - - . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ . . _ . _ - . _ . - _ - - _ . _ - - . _ _ _ . . _ . - - _ _ ~ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . - - _ _ _ _ . _ - . -
a
$ AP600 5 Tube Cold Side SGTR -
Max PRHR Heat Removal j PRHR Heat Removal
$ PRHR
----Decay Heat l
60 - \ - 2E+09
- \ m 50 -- s -
^ : s c 3: -
s 15E+09 N 2EE 40 -- 's s 3 v ' ~ y : s s ' w :
~
Q g 30 -- - 1E+09 v m .: o : S 20 -- ' 5E+08
- o_ : 3 10 -- o
- Q-
~
0 l l l 0 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 I.lme 3 SeC i 1 Figure 73
. 1 g e 4
- 3 . . . -
I, n t l: AP600 5-Tube Cold Side SGTR RCS Water Level Max PRHR Heot Removo! W O l 25 3 . - 80 20 -- m
^ -
- 60 - I E
~
. i v -
t ' v - 15 -- : i c - 40
~
_C
;E; -
~ - .
cn10-- ~ cn ! C - C i a> ! a -
- 20 '
5-- - i t 0 l l 'l ' 0 I 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 - Iime (Sec) ! Figure 74 I c
3
$ AP600 5 Tube Cold Side SGTR.- Min PRHR Heat Removal j Tube Rupture Break Flow ?
E 3 ^ 140 -
. -300^
m - m N 12 0 - N i a
' ~
- 250 E o v 1 0 0 ----
- 200 "
^
a, 80 --
~
e m o _ - 150 - 60 -- i g o E
- 100 40 -- -
o
- 50 u- 20 -
[ N m _ m ' w 0-- m^ -
-0 f
m o _ o 2 -
' ' ' ''''''''''' 2
-20 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 i Time (sec)
Figure 75
s . . . R
! AP600 5 Tube Cold Side SGTR -
Min PRHR Heat Removal je ! Pressurizer Water Level Z . i
~
5 \ .. l 15 4 .. m ^
~
E - v 3 __ - 10 v m
- ~ g 8 o, 2 - - ~
o, e C
- -5 a>
a _ 1 -- -8 0 -l -l i 0 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 f s i me (SeC) Figurc 76 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ __..__m.._____.______-...______.________.-______m.__._____ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ __ m________ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __m
n G l E AP600 5 Tube Cold Side SGTR - Min PRHR Heat Removal I j RCS and Secondary Systems Pr'essures , S 6 RCS - y Foulted SG
- --- - U n f o u I t e d SG 1
l 160 > m : ^
' 140 - - 2000.S o -
~
o 120 - o- i
;P
% 100 -: -
- 15 0 0 v 2o
~
80 - [ *
- ( -
._._._._._._._._._ - 1000 m 2 60 - a '
m : m 40 -2 o : - 500 m ;
'- 20 -2 -
Q_ 0 0 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Iime (SeC) Figure 77 -
. . . +
. . . o 9
l AP600 5 Tube Cold Side SGTR - Min PRHR Heat Removal j Steam Generator Downcomer Water Level
$ Faulted SG S ----Unfoulted SG 3
12.5 - f - 40
^
m 12 -- '
~ ~
E %
;y 11.5 -- -38" ,
E
~
;5; _c
~
u C ;
& 11 - f - 3 6 ~'O' C - ,
g - C 8 10.5 -f i e
' - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
_I
- 34
_it o j 10 l l l O 1000 2000 3000 4000 Iime (SeC) i Figure 78 l
E E AP600 5 Tube Cold Side SGTR - Min PRHR Heat Removal j Faulted Steam Generator Pressu.re i Faulted SG e g ----Sofety Valve Setpoint
-- P O R V Setpoint 80 1160 m n !
o-
- 1 14 0 ' ._ ;
o 78 -- - m .
" ~
- 1120 o_ .
v W } - u
-7 6 -- ~
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8 a !
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u 74 -- ' . 3 - a m -
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m _._._._._._._._._._._._._._ _ _ _._._._._._._._._._._.
* '2--
- 1040 e u -
u
~
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70 l l l O 1000 2000 3000 4000 I.lme 3 , SeC >1 Figure 79
. . . +
i
. . . +
a t
@ AP600 5-Tube Cold Side SGTR -
Min PRHR Heat Removal ' e CMT Water Mass Flowrotes E Dischage Line.
$ ----Balance Line 3 .
m 20 , m , x -
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. _o .
- t'b v ^
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= -
o - o u- 5-- - 10 m . m _ m o _ o s 0 0 l l l 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 t Time (SeC) Figure 80
a ! c i E AP600 5 Tube Cold Side SGTR - Min PRHR Heoi Removal !
.j RCS and CMT Water. Temperatures i
# RCS Core- Water l j
O +
----CMT Water ;
Tsat n 650 -
- 700 n i.
x c w 600 - v
\
~
- 600 "
2- - ---._. . . . ._. ._._. a3 :
- 500 o>-
1 ' 500 - ' 5' 3 _, - 400 _._., t o 450 -
',,m_ .
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300 u i o 400 -- - e o_ : - o_ !
- 200 E 350 -::-
a3 E a2 ; H ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' , , - 10 0 H 300 l l '! , , l l 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 i IIme (S6C-) l l t
. Figure 81 !
n j AP600 5 Tube Cold Side SGTR - Min PRHR Heat Removal
; CMT Woter Level "e .
5 E 7 6-h - 20
^
^
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~
v
- 15 v
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.~, - - - - - .,v ---.e- . ,- w - o , - - - . - , . .
E E AP600 5 Tube Cold Side SGTR - Min PRHR Heat Removal j PRHR Heat Removof i PRHR S g- ----Decay Heot 60 - t .2E+09
- \ m 50 - s
^ : s c si: -
s 15E+09 N miE 40 -- 's s
-) ;y v : '
s
~
2 :
~_ _ _ _
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0 l l 'l '. 0 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Iime (SeC) , Figure 83 4 4 4 4
B l AP600 5 Tube Cold Side SGTR RCS Woter Level Min.PRHR Heat Removal
~
i r l 25 _ . - 80 20 -- -
^ ~
- 60 E
~
1 v _ W 15 -- _ m - ii~ " c - 40 _C o,10 -- '
~ o, C _
C t G) qy
- 20 "
5-- _ 0 l l 'l 0 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 IIme (sec) Figure 84 t I
g E E AP600 5 Tube SGTR -
'C V S On with no Passive Systems j CVS injection Flowrote E
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- 14 x
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- i iiii i , '
i 0 i i i i i i
.0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 I.lme (Sec; 3
Figure 85 I
I .
. . s -
AP600 5 Tube SGTR - 'C V S On with- no Passive Systems j Tube Rupture Break Flow 5 e g _ 140 -
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N _ \
& 120 - E
- 250 f v
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m 40 -- , m-o OE 20 f
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0 280 4b0 6b0 8b0 1000 1200 1400 1600 Time (sec) Figure 86 !
; i - ', ' L , t e>a '-
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s
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-- U n f o u I t e d SG i 160 -
n , u o 140 -5 -
- 2000.S en
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- 1 i e i i ii i e iiiii ie i i i i e iie i i i i i O-0 i i i i , , i 0 l 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 Time (seC) s i
Figure 88 i
~
h [
. , , . - - - -n,, - - - , - ~ - - - _ - . - - _ _ . - - - - - - - . _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ . _ - _ _ _ - - - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ . - .
l l . a y AP600 5' Tube SGTR - CVS On with no Passive Systems j Steam Generator Downcomer Water Level ,
@ Faulted SG '
S ---- Unfaulled SG a - 15 _ A
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0 2b0 4b0 6b0 8b0 1000 1200 1400 1600 Iime (SeC) i Figure 89 [
. _ _ . _ _ . , _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ . . _ . . . ~ . - . _ . _ _ _ _ - -__ . _ . -
AP600 5 Tube'SGTR - 'CVS On with no Possive Systems j Foulted Steam Generator Pressure j Faulted SG j
---- Sofety Volve Setpoint
- ----- P O R V Setpoint 80 1160
^
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o 78 -- m .
" - 1120
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7 76 -
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- f].
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~
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B 6 y AP600 5 Tube SGTR - 'CVS On with no Passive Systems CMT Water Moss Flowrotes !
%l p D.ischage L.i ne g .
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--2 s 0 2b0 4b0 6b0 8b0 1000 1200 1400 1600 t Time (SeC)
Figure 91
. e e v
- i
n c f AP600 5 Tube SGTR - CVS On with no Passive Systems j RCS and CMT Water Temperatures . Ie RCS Core Water . M u
----CMT Water
_._._.- Tsat 650 - 700 m : - m M c ' v600-I's : \ - 600 v _ q 550 - yo 3 - 500 e 500 - = a
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- 300 '
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- 200 E E
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l''''''''''''iiiiie 200 4b0 6b0 8b0 1000 1200 i i i i 1400 1600
__ . 3 Ime S e c )> Figure 92
n
@ AP600 5 Tube SGTR -
CVS On with no Passive Systems CMT Water Level x g 7 _
^ 6- 5
-20^~
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. . * +
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- PRHR Heat Removal '
4
? . PRHR 6
g ---- Decay Heat 60 _ x - 2E+09 _ s N A
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< s e c >l t
Figure 94 i ____ _..._.-____._____m._m_ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ ._ _ _ _ _ . _ . - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . - _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ - _ _ . e- _ _ _ _ w-- ---.-,_, , _ - - - ,,e. r .-w . . _ . - - - - . , - - - - , , , . . - -
2 B
$ AP600 5 Tube SGTR -
CVS On with no Passive Systems - l RCS Water LeveI > 3w a g 25 - 80 _ t m g v E 20 -- - 60 v i l o 15 -- g y s*_;
- 40 e U
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a> t o
- - 20 ~
0 5-- t
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Bi: - 3!:
~
0 'l l l l l 'l 0 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600
- Iime (SeC)
Figure 95 e 4 9 9
I . . . . h AP600 5 Tube SGTR - SG PORV F.aiIed Closed {w Tube Rupture Break Flow . S E 140 w
-300^
\ - w Ncn12 0 -- N
- 250 oE a
v 100 -- -
- 200 "
~
o, 80 -{- m - 150 - il g 60 -{ o n - a: m 40 -2 m O - o u- 20 -g - 50 -- 0- h/ --
- ~vvy -0 w
- E ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' E
_. 2 0 l l l 0 .1000 2000 3000 4000 Time (sec) Figure %
E ! AP600 5 Tube SGTR - SG PORV F.a i l e d Closed i Pressurizer Water Level w 8 5 5 f - 15 4I m m
~
E v 3 -- - 10 "
- P
% _c Q~ ~ w 2 -- -
-5 C e
y ._ O I -- l
~
0 't" T" ^ "d ' -- ' ' 0 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Time (sec) Figure 97 _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ ._______.___.______________m ___m . . - __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ _
- l E
E AP600 5 Tube SGTR - SG PORV Failed Clos-ed i RCS and Secondary Systems Pre.ssures [ RCS
$ ----Faulted SG
--- - - Unfou1ted SG 160 -
o
' 140 - -
- 2 0 0 0 . __ .
o - o 120 -i o_ 100 _g - 150 0 v d a :
"o 80 -- g
' =- - 1000
- -g _ -- __
m a 60 - g , w : m m 40 -: - 500 m o : , u 20 --
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 1 0 l l l 0 2000 O 1000 3000 4000 f i
- T I me (sec; Figure 98 i
B ' d E. AP600 5 Tube SGTR - SG PORV. Failed Closed i Steam Generator Downcomer W 'a t e r Level FauIted SG ' 5 ----Unfoulted SG , 12
. - 39 n
l m -38 E 11. 5 -- - 7 J -37v w si c 11 -- - 3 6 . _c-
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c -----'-'- --~~~~ S 10.5 -I l -
'- ~~'
a)
-J -i r ' -34 _;
y
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ~5 10 l l 'l 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Time (sec)
Figure 99
t i 9
$ AP600 5 Tube 'SGTR -
SG PORV Failed Closed i 5 Faulted Steam Foulted 'S G Generator Pressure ' n 3 ----Sofety Valve Setpoint PORV Seipoint 80 1160 ^ m _ u - o
- 1 1 4 0 . _.
78 -- m - _a ._ _ - 1120 o_
;y -
v ikJ 76 - -------------------------- - 1100 N g _ u -
- 1080
- 74 -- '
3 -
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72 --
- O
- 104.0 e m
U- ~ 70 ' ' ' l l
' ' ' , , , , , -1020 1 0 1000 2000 3000 4000
/ )
T*meI (S6C) Figure 100 ---m.,,- e v e -v:w .. +-r. - + - - - .. - ,~ =--+~--.e-w- =c-----,m--m----+"vv-- -"w-- w m-7*-- -- ' - - - - ' -* * *~'e* * -- - - * " " - * - - - - - - " ' " - - " - - - - "
a AP600 Tube SGTR
~ $ 5 -
SG PORV F. ailed Closed i CMT Woter Mass Flowrotes . [ Dischoge L-ine 5 ----Bolonce Line 20 m m m x -
- 40x cn -
~
E x -
.o
- ,l -
.i v q, s ,v4I #lli er
_ n - 30 m as '
- t'rr j ~ v\y T ,f e Ee 10 - f ~ " ' - c , __
I
- 20 m o
O $ - B o u- 5- -
~
- 10 '
m _ m M ._ m O O 2 ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
- 0 l l 'l 0 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Iime ('SeC)
Figure 101 6 O S
.-, , - - ------_.,.,-.--~.,-~,,-.,.-.-_...-.~...mi -,_ .-.-- - ---,.. -.r_ . _ _ _ , . . . _ . - . . . - - - - - , . - - ~ . . . . - , _ - - - _ _ _ _-___.__._._______m
9 d E AP600 5 Tube SGTR - SG PORV Failed Closed ' i_ R C S- and CMT Water Temperatures g RCS Core Wo.ter .
$ ----CMT Water
_.- --- Tsat t 650 - 700 m x c : u_ - 600 - v
? -
- 600 "
550 -I: - - - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ - - - ' - ~ - - - - - - - ~ - - - ~ - - - - - - -
- p a3 - 500 a2 500 - 5
~
0 3 3 _400 '
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a 450 -- ,,___ _ a u : - 300 ' o 400 -2 '
' e .
o- 5 -
- 200 E 350 - :- -
E .- a2 e H 300 ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' , , - 10 0 H l l 'l . 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Time (sec) Figure 102 l 6
d J AP600 5 Tube SGTR - SG PORV Failed Closed ii. CMT Water Level w a . 3 7 _ 6-g - 20
~
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, 4-- . a a _c C _, - C o 3- -
- 1 0 _._,
en c : cn a) 2- - a) :
-5 a 1-- .
~
0 l l l 0 O 1000 2000 3000 4000
-- . f y Ime I
( S e C )l t Figure 103 e G g 6
E $ AP600 5 Tube SGTR - SG PORV Failed Closed. j PRHR Heat Removal' ! PRHR $ ----Decay Heat , 60 2E+09 (
- ^
m 50 -- - N s _ 'c 3: s - 15E+09 N OE 40 -- 's s 3
- p v
- ~
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0 l l l 0 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Time (SeC) Figure 104 3
. .~,.ww . . - - , - - . , - . , . , -
- , - . - * - - , - - * * - . . - . , . --e , , - - ., yre<. . , , , , . - , , , - - - . . . . , , , .w-.--w , , _
t B e
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SG PORV Failed Closed. 3 RCS Water LeveI . E n 3 25 '
- 80 20 - m m ._
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. - 60 ~
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o,10 -- 1
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c C
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~
0 0 O 1000 2000 3000 4000 ! Iime (SeC) Figure 105 ; l
E d i E AP600 5 Tube SGTR - CVS with Passive ~ Systems Charging Pump injection F~l o w r o t e e . s 12 - m : - 25 m ; N N cn10- - E u _ _o 8-- a, s; y : - 15 ' 6-- a C; e ta
. CE i
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* ~
m
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B
$ AP600 5 Tube SGTR -
CVS with Passive Systems je Tube Rupture Break Flow i
! _ 140 -
- 300 ^
u, - m N& 12 0 -2 ~ N a
- 250 oE
- 100 -- -
- 200 "
e 80 -- ; e y] - 150 -
; y 60 -- -
o : c" x
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o 50 u- 20 -- .
$ 0- 1 Of 0 [
o - a 2 ~
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 2
-20 l l l l 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 Iime (SeC)
Figure 107 ' O W & $ ______.___.._______m_-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ _ _ __ _----- -- -.
w . 5 d y AP600 5 Tube SGTR - CVS with P a.s s i v e Systems je Pressurizer Water Level . r S E 5
~
- 15 4- -
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~ .
" ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' i i i 0
^l l l j 0 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 IIme (SeC) -
Figure 108 . I
E ~ y AP600 5 Tube SGTR - CVS with Passive Systems f RCS and Secondary Systems Pressures [ RCS . y ----Faulted SG U n f a.u I t e d SG 160 - R R -
' 140 - H o
- 2000 .__
o _o 120 -- . m ' o_ 7 100 -- - 15 0 0 v g t:
- e 80 -
u _w ac=-- g a 60 - r 7
._.__.._._ _._._._.__._._._._._._._._._ _ _ _ - 1000 m
__3 u, y) m 40 -: o : - 500 m i u 20 - - e : u 0
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 1 l l l 0 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 '
Time (sec) Figure 109
5
@ AP600 5 Tube S G T R '- CVS with Possive Systems a l Steam Generator Downcomer Water, Level .
# Faulted SG :
l ----Unfoulted SG 15 - ' i A m 14 - - - E -45 . r v - _ v
,? 13 --
, s - i gc ~ l
~ -
- 40 . _c cn12-- ,
e [ C '
/ C
/ D
_a 11 - - 5 / - 35 i' , i i , , i i i i i I i i i i i i i i i 10 l l l 1 - 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 ' I.ime (SOC) I i Figure 110 ; l I
f ! ' l .. m o _ m o_*v' " m
- e u
. o s 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 4 2 0 8 6 4 2 .
m 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 t 0
- _ - ~- _ - -
s _ - 0 . y - 0 1 Se - ' r - ' eu - vs - ' is 0 se - 0 s ~r - l0 P aP - ' P ' - r ' h o tt - '
) .
0 i a - , 0 C wr - 0 6 e e ' S 1
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( e r i u
. CG o - ig F
p - 0 e
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Re t 4 Tt - I e n GS vi - ' , S Gl o S a p - d Vt - ee
'b t ul d
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- - 8 7 7 7 7 7 A
m ' O a_ eu3mm*u' n@j, g'g ~ p3m
R
$ AP600 5 Tube SGTR -
CVS with Passive Systems { CMT Water Mass F l o w r a't e s , g Dischage'Line - l ----Balonce Line m 30 _
~
_ m x -
- 6 0 x*
& 25 -. -
E a o 8 v n.g .- 5 0 - 20 -- At ,'^^
- F $ . - 40 5" A e
C 15 -- ~ l " . ,. - o
^,s - 3 0 or
= s,"s s ,
o 10 --- ' - s w
~~~~ - 20 _o w
m 5-- m - 10 mm o o 2 ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 2 0 ! l l l ~0 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 Time (-sec) Figure 112 .. , , A
a $ AP600 5 Tube SGTR - CVS with P a.s s i v e Systems j RCS and CMT Water Temperatures
~
g RCS Core Water l ----CMT Water
----Tsat 650 - 700 m x c : u_
v 600 -
] - 600 "
.i..-. . ._. ._._._._._._._._._._._.___._._._._._._ _ ___,_ _:
- p a3 - 5;00 as 5
E ga
' 500 - -
3 g ,______ - 400 o 450 -2 ' a o 400 -- i -
,- - 300 t aa
/ :
- 200 "
E o 350 -5,' E aa H 300
~
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' - 100 H l l 'l l 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 Iime (~SeC) ,
Figure 113 . . ! e 5 e' D
9 d y AP600 5 Tube SGTR - CVS with Passive- Systems CMT Water Level 71 , a t n - 3 7 -
- 6- _
20 m ~
~
E5- ^
~ 15 v
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- P
%c : E~3_:
- 1 0 ~* '
CD - c : cn a> 2- G) __i :- -5 __i 1__-_ , 0 l l 'l l 0 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 Iime (SOC) Figure 114
R $ AP600 5 Tube SGTR - CVS with Passive Systems j PRHR Heat Removal - ! PRHR ! ----Decay Heat 60 . - 2E+09
\
m 50 -- s _' c-Ec s 15E+09 N 2E 40 --- s 3 t yv s - % s co 5 30 -- '
~
' - .IE+09 v u ~~
a>
~~~~~
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- o_ m 10 -- o o_
0 l l 'l l 0 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 Iime (Se~C) Figure 115 _ _ --_ _ _ _ - ._.-________m_
. . . r .. .
M
$ AP600 5 Tube SGTR -
CVS with Possive Systems jc RCS Woter Level - e + s" 25
- 80 j
_ i
- t 20 -- m m -
i E -
- 60 ~ ;
~
15 - ~
;P 2c _
- 40 C t
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cn10-- c cn , e
~
- 20 ;
5-- -
-- I .
~
i 0 l l l l 0 1 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 Time (sec) Figure 116 l i r s _ _ - _ - _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _____.________m_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___._.___.____m _,4.-- m __--,-_.-_-_mm,. - __2 ----2 . - - _ _ _ , , _ =,,m , _v e m__
E E AP600 5 Tube SGTR - Stuck SG Sofety Valve with CVS On j Tube Rupture Break Flow S S Em 140 -
. -300^
m - m N 12 0 -- N
- 250 .o E x .
v 100 - -
- 200 " .
a3 80 - - a>
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3g 60 - l a t
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)
u- 20 - { - 50 -- m , m 0- -- 0 o 2 ~
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l ' ' '
l l
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E O '10000 20000 30000 40000 Time (SeC) Figure 117
, a g .
. , s: ,
AP600 5 Tube SGTR - Stuck SG Sofety~V 9 Ive with CVS On j CVS Injection Flowrote ^ C w 8 g 12 m
-25m m _
- s. N o,10 -- E x - O i v -
v ~ 8-- ' Q)
- 15
?O y g 6-- O u W u _ ,
3 -
- 10 m i o 4__ o j k -
$ LA_
m 2-- -5 m m - m O . O 2 ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 2 0 l ! 'l 0 1 0 10000 20000 30000 40000 Iime (SOC) , Figure 118
9 O E AP600 5 Tube SGTR - Stuck SG Safetv Valve with CVS On j RCS and Secondary Systems' Pressures j RCS j ---- Faulted SG
- --- - UnfauIted SG 160 -
A n - o
' 140 - 5 - 2000 ._
o : m
.o 120 - -
o_ v -
- 1500 v
{x 100_ j
- a) 80 - a>
._._.._._~' - 1000 m o 60 -@ -
3 m -
.________ w m 40 -i 1 - 500 m G) -
CD
' 20 - s m 0
T~ '~ ~' '
l l O. O 10000 20000 30000 40000 Time (SOC) Figure 119 e o e s
. . : s .
E f AP600 5 Tube SGTR - Stuck SG Sofety Volve with CVS On j Pressurizer Water Level . S 8 s" 8
- 25 A
~
E - v 6-- -20" v i
- 15 e 6o 4-- >
U E -- J -
- 10
~
a> ,
~2- - * '
a 0 l ! l 0 0 10000 20000 30000 40000 IIme (SeC) Figure 120
I 4 a y AP600 5 Tube SGTR - Stuck SG Sofety Valve with CVS On j Startup Feedwater Flowrote
? .
5 a ^m 20 _ m m x -
- 40 x E
a -
.a v 15 - -
v
- 30 a>
~ v
~
~
m o qg 10 -- a r
=
- 2 0 cr o - 3 O
u_ 5--
- 10 '
m - m _ m o - 0 2 ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' i i s 0 l l l o 0 10000 20000 30000 40000 f T-T*Ime (SeC) Figure 121 e 4 e
- _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ - _ - _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ - _ - - _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - . - - < ~ . , - ._ ---
s , 4 < AP600 5 Tube SGTR - Stuck SG Sofety Valve with CVS On l PRHR Heat Removol
) -
PRHR
----Decay Heat 60 '
2E+09 L
.s 7
50 - t . n
. c sc -g - .I5E+09 N -
3
~
JE 40 - 71
;p v -g .
. g _
CD s' 30 - _ s .1E+09 v L._ _ \ - o : 's ' a:: 20 - : ' s_ _~~_~~~ O
- g -_____ .5E+08 10 - : o
- Q-0 l l l 0 0 10000 20000 30000 40000
/ i Ime (SeCf Figure 122 .
l
1 I l AP600 5 Tube SGTR - Stuck SG Safety Volve with CVS On j j CMT Woter Moss Flowrates l 3 Dischoge Line S E ' _ 50 _ i w w x : ,
- 10 0 x o, .-
E u 40 -- o
~ ~
~
\
- 80
~
- 30 -- o.
2" o -
- 60 ~
w - a Cr
, 20 - I O - l
- 40 $
0 u- - w 10 - - 5, - 20 m - m m - V - m o -
~
o 2 ' ' ' ' ' ' ' " ' '''' 2 0- i 0 0 10000 20000 30000 40000 Time (SeC) Figure 123 - e a s
- e +
B c E AP600 5 Tube SGTR - Stuck SG Safety Volve with CVS On i CMT Water Level Iw 8 g 7 ._
, ^6- % -20^ _._,
E - . v ~ 5- _
- 1 5 __
;P
>4_-: ~
k e
% D
-J - w E 3- - 1 0 _; t u -
~
t
- 2-e o -5 ~
g sc 1 - - g 0 ' ' ' ' ' l' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' l l 0 0 10000 20000 30000 40000 3 T+ime s e c )r Figure 124 t' _m______ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -- - _ m_ - . . . --_ ,-_--e ~ --, - - - - . - - -
AP600 5 Tube SGTR - Stuck SG Safety Valve with CVS On j Steam Generator Downcomer Wat6r level . 5 Faulted SG E ---- Unfoulled SG H . 18
^
_ - + , E - 55 16 -- v
~
* ~
7 o c~ a> 14 -- o _- 4 5 u _ ,___,______________ _________
- 12 -/ /
- 40 ,
/ .s .o a
3?: - 35 g 10 l l 'l ! 0 10000 20000 30000 40000 ; Iime (sec) Figure 125 j e 2 s *
. - _ = _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ - - - _ - - - - . . . - .
- . -i
- s. s e .. >
l i B G f AP600 5 Tube SGTR'- Stuck SG Sofety Valve with CVS On j e. Faulted Steam. Generator Pressure t f-
# Faulted'SG l j
O '
----Safety Volve Setpoint :
- --- ~- P O R V Setpoint :
80 1160 R
- n <
i o
' I - 1 1 4 0 , __
o 78 -- - m , _O i 4 _ -1120 a. < m - w .
?} 76 - ----------------------------- - 1100 m !:
W g - u -
- 1080
- a 7 4 -- '
m 3
- 1060 m i
m ._._._._._._ _._._._._._._._._ _._._._._.._._._._._._._._._ o 7 2 -" * ! u
- 1040 e .
L l ci_ t 70 ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' , , , , 10 2 0 ci_- . l l l O 10000 20000 30000 40000 IIme (SeC) , Figure 126 ! [ t __.._..,_...__.___......_.___f
i!l1 l1 l !ii\I iill =
^ m xEo C - o$*O
- g ,mo2 n 0 0 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 0 0
- 5 4 3 2 1 0 0 S - - - - -
0 V 0 C 0 s
' 4 h
' t i w ' e te v o ' 0 l 0 r a l 0 V w 0 o ' 3 l y - t F e n
)
f C o o S i e 7 2 t 1 c 0 S e r G e 0( u g S j 0 i F 0 n k i 2 e c u r ' m t I S o t ' I a l ' 0 R u 0 J Tmu l0 G 0 S c ' 1 c e eA ' b u i ' T ! 5 f _ _f - - : :- - - - ~ 0 0 - - - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 5 0 5 0 5 P 2 2 1 1 A n _ wxcu" .* o* 30_L mmOs a n@;3:g- , W lIl
i a l c s AP600 5 Tube SGTR - Stuck SG Sofety Volve with CVS On i j RCS and CMT Water Temperatures i l 5 RCS Core Woter ~ l- ----CMT Woter Tsat 650
- 700 m x .:
u_ v 600 - g .
- 600 "
550 - i e : y
~
- 500 e 1 ' 500 - '
a' -- :
- 400 "
a 450 -- , %_ u : o l
- 300 u
a> 400 - e a_ il _- - - - - - = - - = = - - - = = = - - - a E 350 -f o _ ,0 0 E , r: o H ' ' 300 ' ' l l 'l ' , , , - 10 0 H 0 10000 20000 30000 40000 IIme (S6C) Figure 128 l
s l AP600 5 Tube SGTR -
~
Stuck SG Safety Valve with CVS On je Gravity injection Flowrote r 200
~ -
N _400 N cn - y - E
.O v 150 -- P -
v
- - 300 .
a2
, L 7_ 7 - - ._ ---__-_
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- 2 0 0 oc o
m - o - o. u_ 50 -- --
- 100 '
m - m
- to o -
a 2 ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' s 0 l l l o 0 10000 20000 30000 40000 ime (SeC Figure 129 e J > a
o , - s
! AP600 5 Tube SGTR -
Stuck SG Sofety Valve with CVS On Containment Water L e v e'l
)e (measured from 83' elevation.) '
5 8
- 25 m -
^
~ \
E -
"6-- - 20 C y > -
- 15 o
% e 4__ >
bJ - u
- 10
_, 2 -- e
~
o -
-5 g _ o 0 0 0 10000 20000 30000 40000 Iime (SOC)
Figure 130
l a
$ AP600 5 Tube SGTR'- Stuck SG Sofety Valve with CVS On j__
Long-Term Steam Loss through Open Safety Valve b g _ 1 0 -- y , m N - 20 \
~
v ~ o, - u 8- - E _o v . v
- 15
- 6- -
o 2? O ~
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c;
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- o
' ~
2- -
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m . W m (O O _ o 2 ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 0 l i
' ' ' ' ' ' 2 l 0 0 10000 20000 30000 40000 Iime (SOC)
Figure 131
- A > b
l1ll! IIi , n 9 i o t l a u e V r o c R mta l a
/ " ar S ee o C
Sen t G = n i o t k a r
~
a t e r n B e c n
= yo n o t t i
vc i C ae rj Gin n a r o t o n e B m r n i a o
" en t n F i S 4 o
'L C S C k R D r A / o p T S t w
T W R e U M U y I N C n o 3 m Ti t l
)
Mc C,j e l S a 2 n D d f i A o 6 o N O = = 2 3 1 n o r o e i t t r c u e la j n un g io I mt uc i F S cej V c ,n C Ai 0 2 7 5gp456N e
?he o
c
' l l1! ;
B e E AP600 5 Tube SGTR Stuck SG Sofety Volve with CVS j On Estimated AP600 Boron Concentrations
? End-of-Life Initial Conditions E RCS s"
Foulted SG _._._.- CMT _ 4000 4000 E -
- n. -
CL v c 3000 _\
- 3000 7o og -
_. \ a / N . gg : '
._._.__.____.___ N _. ' y 2000 -- 2' ~
e
,- - 2000 O ' ~
p C y o - o 1000 -- /
- 1000
- /
C
/
? /
o /
= ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
0 l l 0 0 5000 10000 15000 20000 Time (sec) Figure 133
w ,
, t o 9
l* AP600 5 Tube SGTR Estimated S't u c k AP600 SG Sofety Volve with CVS On Boron Concentrations i Beginning-of-Life Initial Conditions 5 RCS 3 ---- Faulted SG __.--CMT , 5000 5000 E Q.
- o. -
4000 -- ~
- 4000 C /
- U . V /
3000 - . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ , , _ ___ __ _ _ ._._._._._ - 3000 c : ' 2000 -_- ,
.2000 O /
o _- < - 1000 -- ' c o I
- 1000
" J
~
O #
~
CD ' f f I f I I i 1 f I i f f f I f I f f 0 5000 10000 15000 20000 T*ime (sec; i Figure 134 '
t J i Enclosure 2 to Westinghouse Letter NSD-NRC-97-5035 March 24,1997 ? 4 l 3 24A
2 i NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Re: AP600 MULTIPLE SGTR - CONTAINMENT BYPASS ISSUE l Question: 440.588 (OITS #4525) SECY-93-087 required the design certification applicant to assess design features to mitigate containment bypass due to SGTR events. In a previous submittal, Westinghouse performed realistic SGTR analysis of up to 5 ruptured tubes with the results showing that the secondary pressure never reached the main steam safety valve setpoint. This analysis included an analysis of 5-tube rupture assuming the PORVs fail to open, and the result also showed that the secondary pressure did not exceed the MSSV setpoint. Westinghouse, in August 22,1995, letter, provided new SGTR analysis using the pressurizer volume of 1600 ft3, which is consistent with the AP600 design. The result showed that, if the PORVs fail to open, the secondary pressure exceeds the main steam safety valve setpoints at various times for different number of tubes ruptured. The main concern of the SECY-93-087 is that once an MSSV lifts, there is a possibility of its failure to rescat, resulting in an unisolable LOCA outside containment. For this situation, the SECY paper recommended remedial actions. The Westinghouse analysis result of MSSV opening is based on the assumption of PORV failure to open in the event of an SGTR. Westinghouse should examine the probability of the PORV failure to open, especially since the PORV , is a non-safety design. l Westinghouse should address what actions are necessary to conform with SECY-93-087. In addition, the staff l l requests justification for the use of MAAP4 in analyzing this event. l t
RESPONSE
i In response to SECY-93-087 multiple steam generator tube rupture issues, as well as to several RAls, Westinghouse l l has prepared a best-estimate MAAP4 analysis of the multiple tube rupture event which shows that the AP600 i provides multiple layer mitigation capability without opening the MSSV. The first layer consists of non-safety related CVS injection with operator actions. The CVS injection can be realigned to the auxiliary pressurizer spray to cool and depressurize the RCS and isolate the break flow to the secondary system. An alternative operator action i to terminate the break, such as isolating the faulted steam generator and cooling with the unfaulted steam generator l may also be performed. The next layer of mitigation consists of cooling the RCS with passive systems. The CMTs l and PRHR cool the RCS and isolate the break with no operator actions. In each of these cases, the PORV and the steam condenser provide a brief period of secondary pressure relief to assure that the safety valves do not open. The l secondary system is isolated once the relief is terminated. The RCS never voias significantly, sc the CMTs do not drain and the ADS is not actuated to depressurize the RCS. In the event that the PORV or condenser d(es nei provide secondary pressure relief, the MAAP4 code results show that the secondary safe'v valve does not open. However,in the very likely event that CVS is injecting in conjunction i with the secondary relief failure, the safety valve will open. Steam generator overfill protection will prevent the ingestion of water into the safety valve and the valve will most likely rescat. In the unlikely event that the MSSV does not rescat, MAAP4 analyses show that the plant responds to the event as it is a small loss of coolant accident. The loss of primary coolant to the environment through the unisolated secondary system eventually voids the system enough that the CMTs begin to drain. The ADS is actuated and the RCS depressurizes to allow gravity injection from the IRWST and eventually gravity recirculation. Boron dilution due to back-Oow from the secondary system during W-Westinghouse
i NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IN the depressurization does not occur. The system achieves a safe, stable configuration while maintaining the core in a shutdown, cool state. Makeup water to the containment is not required for over 3 days. Extensive benchmarking for the MAAP4 code break flow, CMT recirculation injection, and thermodynamic modeling in this analysis is provided by the MAAP4 to NOTRUMP comparison to be provided to the NRC as part of the resolution of thermal-hydraulic uncertainty in the passive system reliability issue. The range of break flow is bounded by the analysis of I through 5 tube breaks. Passive RIIR benchmarking is provided in the multiple tube rupture analysis report and sensitivity analysis demonstrate that the uncertamty in the heat removal has no effect on the results of the analyses. The integrated systems response to the stuck-open MSSV case is covered by the M AAP4 to NOTRUMP comparisons. PRA/SSAR Revision: None. 440.588-2 3 Westinghouse
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