ML20138N746
| ML20138N746 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 10/28/1985 |
| From: | NRC |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20138N741 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8511060010 | |
| Download: ML20138N746 (60) | |
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SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT TRANSAMERICA DELAVAL DIESEL GENERATORS PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT I. INTRODUCTION Concerns regarding the reliability of large bore, medium speed diesel engines manufactured by Transamerica Delaval, Inc. (TDI), for application at domestic nuclear plants, including Perry, were first prompted by a crankshaft failure that occurred at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant (Shoreham)inAugust1983. However, a broad pattern of deficiencies in
, critical engine components became evident at Shoreham and other nuclear and non-nuclear facilities employing the TDI engines. These deficiencies were found to stem from inadequacies in design, manufacture and the quality assurance / quality control at TDI. As a result, the staff introduced, in Section 9.6.3.1 of SSER No. 4, the need to verify the reliability of the TDI diesel engines at Perry as an outstanding unresolved issue. Two TDI diesel generators are installed in each Perry unit for use in providing emergency electrical power in the event of the loss of offsite power. As such, the proven reliability of the TDI engines is essential from a safety-related standpoint.
m In a letter dated December 10, 1984 (B. J. Youngblood (NRC) to M. R.
Edelman (CEI)), the applicant was advised of the TDI diesel generator design verifications required by the staff to determine the acceptability of the engine design at Perry. By letter dated January 17, 1985
- (M. R. Edelman to B. J. Youngblood), the applicant submitted the Perry TDI Diesel Generator Program Plan (the Program Plan) which describes the approach being followed at Perry to resolve this outstanding issue.
The Perry Program Plan consists of an extensive plant-specific application of the TDI Diesel Generator Owners Group (TDI Owners Group) program, a l
8511060010 851028 PDR ADDCK 05000440 S PDR
J group participated in by CEI for Perry. The Perry Program Plan parallels that of the TDI Owners Group program involving the following phases of effort: (1) Resolution of known generic problems; (2) design review of important attributes for selected engine components; (3) expanded engine I testing and inspection; and (4) a maintenance and surveillance program.
Copies of the TDI Owners Group Phase 2 design review / quality revalidation (DR/QR) reports for Perry were included as an attachment to the Perry Program Plan. The staff, with the assistance of its consultant, Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL), reviewed the information provided with the applicant's January 17, 1985 letter, and from other nuclear plant owners of TDI diesel engines, and found that although some actions remained to be performed on the Perry diesels prior to licensing, significant progress has been made by the TDI Owners' Group and by the applicant in verifying the reliability of their TDI diesel engine designs. The staff concluded that actions already taken by the applicant and those proposed to be -
performed prior to licensing are adequate to ensure that tha TDI diesel generators at Perry Unit I can reliably generate on-site emergency power.
The staff, however, required in SSER No. 6 that the applicant complete certain actions prior to licensing and that the maximum load be limited 3
to 5740 KW until concerns about the crankshaft are resolved. In a letter dated June 28, 1985 (M. R. Edelman to B. J. Youngblood), the applicant provided information to address these outstanding concerns. The results of the staff's review of this information is presented below.
- II. EVALUATION Upon completion of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) hearing held on the reliability of the Perry engines, the ASLS concluded that the Perry diesel engines have met regulatory standards and that emergency power will be available when needed and that the engines comply with GDC 1 and 17. The Board also concluded that the applicant must complete the items described in the staff's SER.
Given below are the actions described in SSER No. 6 which the staff concluded need to be completed prior to licensing, the applicant's response to each item, and the staff's evaluation of that response.
- 1. Staff Concern Submit the maintenance and surveillance program that CEI intends to use on the Perry engines for staff approval. The staff will review this program to the same extent it has those on other engines (e.g., Comanche Peak, Grand Gulf, and Catawba).
Applicant Response PNPP will utilize the maintenance and surveillance program developed by the TDI Owners Group. This program is included as Appendix II to the Design Review and Quality Revalidation (DR/QR report) which was submitted to the staff on January 17,1985(PY-CEI/NRR-0156L)and revised March 18,1985(PY-CEI/NRR-0203L).
Staff Evaluation The staff, with assistance from PNL, has performed an audit review of the Shoreham and Comanche Peak DR/QR reports and has concluded that the
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reports were complete and had adequately addressed the design and/or
':6 quality aspects of the components. Additionally, the maintenance and surveillance requirements given in Appendix II of the DR/QR were reviewed for the audited components and it was concluded that they were adequate. Some recommendations were made; however, these recommendations were not of sufficient concern to be the subject of an NRC requirement. Thus, it was concluded that the plant specific DR/QR efforts, including the maintenance and surveillance plans, have been effective and comprehensive and, as a result, no further detailed reviews of DR/QR reports need to be performed.
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Consequently, the staff concludes that the maintenance and sur-veillance requirements presented in Appendix II of the Perry DR/QR are acceptable. The staff is currently finalizing the maintenance and surveillance requirements for the Phase I components and will document these results in a forthcoming SER on the adequacy of the generic Phase 1 components. Until this SER is published, the maintenance and surveillance requirements presented by the staff at a meeting with the NRC Advisory Comittee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS)asMarch 20, 1985 (Enclosure 1) should be used; no major changes to these requirements are anticipated.
The applicant will be required to follow any additional maintenance requirements for Phase 1 components when these are finalized.
The applicant has not proposed any operational or standby surveillance -
requirements. As a minimum, the applicant will be required to perform the operational and standby surveillances given in Tables 1 and 2 (attached).
It is reasonable to expect that certain changes to the M/S program may
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become appropriate in the future based on operating experience. The staff will require that any changes to the M/S program be subject to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59. In addition, the NRC staff /PNL conclusions relating to the adequacy of the crankshafts, engine blocks, and cylinder heads are particularly dependent on certain periodic inspections and/or surveillance checks. Thus, inspections of these components will be subject to the license conditions given in the conclusions.
283 Staff Concern Perform a torsiograph test that includes both variable speed tests and variable load tests and a subsequent stress analysis that conf.rms that stresses in the crankshaft are acceptable.
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Address the effects of engine imbalance on crankshaft adequacy as part of the torsiograph test report to be submitted to the staff.
Applicant Response A torsiograph testing program which included variable speed and variable load tests was performed on each Unit 1 engine. The test report, submitted to the staff on June 14, 1985, concludes that the crankshafts are adequate for their intended use at Perry.
A special engine imbalance torsiograph test was conducted on each Unit 1 engine. The test results are addressed in the addendum to
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the torsiograph test report submitted on June 14, 1985.
Staff Evaluation The staff, with assistance from PNL, has completed its review of the Phase 1, V-16 crankshaft review as it applies to the Perry engine.
This Phase 1 report, currently in draft form, concludes that the V-16 crankshaft at Perry is adequate for its intended full-rated load of 7000 KW and its rated overload of 7700 KW for the 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> out of every 24 as specified by the manufacturer. These conclusions are based on analyses performed by the Owners Group and PNL, the results of torsiograph test including a torsiograph test with cylinder imbalance, and satisfactory performance of the cranksh:ft during operational tests supported by the absence of any fatigue crack initiation in the crankshaft during post-test inspection. The staff, however, will require that:
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a) To avoid the effects of the 4th order resonance, operating and emergency procedures should be revised so that steady operation at speeds more than a few rpm below the rated speed of 450 rpm are avoided, b) Operating and emergency procedures should be modified to incorporate precautions to prevent sustained engine operation with a cylinder imbalance or misfiring. These precautions should include monitoring exhaust gas temperatures to assure that the differences between individual cylinder temperatures and the average temperature for all cylinders remain in the range recommended by TDI and measuring cylinder firing pressures according to intervals recommended by TDI.
c) The oil holes and fillets of the three main bearing journals subject to the highest torsional stresses (Nos. 4, 5, 8) should be examined with fluorescent liquid penetrant and, as necessary, eddy current techniques during each 5-year disassembly. The same inspections on oil holes and fillets should be performed on at least three crankpin journals between 3 and 8.
d)
Hot and cold crankshaft deflections should be measured at each refueling outage to assure that the crankshaft alignment remains within TDI recommendations. (This item will be included as a generic NRC position in the forthcoming generic SER addressing resolution of the Phase 1 issues.)
Although the staff concluded that the V-16 crankshaft at Perr'y is adequate for its rated overload capacity of 7700 KW for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> out of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> allowed by the manufacturer, the staff finds the applicant's request to perform month by surveillance testing at loads less than 7000 KW to be acceptable. Modifications to Technical 1
Specifications regarding surveillance testing which the staff i considers acceptable as a result of this review are provided as
an enclosure to this SER. This conclusion regarding surveillance testing at loads less than 7000 KW is documented in PNL report entitled "A Review and Evaluation of TDI, Inc., Diesel Engine Reliability and Operability - Final Report" which is in preparation.
The enclosed Technical Specifications include limited surveillance testing at 7000 KW to be performed at 18-month intervals. Such tests need not be performed as part of preoperational testing since test loads during preoperational testing were conservative relative to the maximum emergency service loads the engines are required to handle.
- 4. Staff Concern Confirm that Owners Group recommendations have been followed regarding:
(a) random sample testing of pushrods (b) proper torquing of the jacket water pump shafts Applicant Response (a) Destructive random sample testing to verify the weld quality of future friction welded pushrods is recoimnended by the TDI Owners Group. This will be done. The pushrods that are presently
, ,w installed have been subjected to the inspections required by the DR/QR including:
' Verification that the main and connector pushrods are friction welded.
Performance of a liquid penetrant test on all friction welded main and connector pushrods, or, as an alternative, visual i
inspection. No surface cracks were found along the bond line'between the rod end and the tube.
(b) The Owners Group recomends torquing the castle nut on the engine drive jacket water pump shaft to a value between 120 and 660 ft-1bs. The Division 2 pump was disassembled and reassembled onsite with the castle nut torqued to 120 ft-lbs.
A rebuilt jacket water pump assembled at the factory was installed on the Division 1 engine. Castle nut torque was not verified during the Division 1 engine revalidation effort.
It will be verified during the post operation (approx 100 hrs.)
inspection.
Staff Evaluation The staff concludes that the actions taken by the applicant and those proposed to be per.ormed on the pushrods and the jacket water pump adequately address the staff concerns regarding the abi.11ty of these ,
components to perform their intended functions.
- 4. Staff Concern Demonstrate the adequacy of control panel assembly / panel system.
Applicant Response The control panel assembly / panel system for PNPP has been found to be acceptable per the requirements of the DR/QR. Inspection results were submitted to the staff by letter PY-CEI/NRR-0188L dated February 8, 1985. Inspections were performed in accordance with the Component Quality Revalidation Checklist prepared for Perry by the Owners Group.
Original issue of the PNPP DR/QR contained the Component Design Review Checklist for the Vogtle Plant. This was in error. Subsequent revision to the DR/QR on March 18, 1985 (PY-CEI/NRP-0203L) corrected this error.
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Staff Evaluation _
The corrected DR/QR report for the control panel assembly / panel system concludes that this component is acceptable. The staff and PNL have performed an audit review of the DR/QR report for Shoreham and Comanche Peak and concluded that the reports were complete and had adequately addressed the design and/or quality aspects of the components. As a result, no further detailed reviews of DR/QR reports need to be perfonned.
Thus, this component was not specifically reviewed far Perry.
Rather, the review of this component was accomplished through the overall audit review approach used on the Comanche Peak DR/QR.
- 5. Staff Concern Demonstrate the adequacy of the bearing stresses on the chock plates.
Applicant Response Minimum load surfaces for the chock plates used on the PNPP engines
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have been calculated, and in all cases, the actual field measurements of the bearing surfaces exceed the calculated minimum requirements.
, Additionally, hot and cold crankshaft deflection measuren.ents have
. also been taken. These measurer.cnts show that deflection is well within the acceptable limits established by the manufacturer. This indicates that the engine is properly supported.
Staff Evaluation The response by the applicant and successful operation of the engines l for approximately 200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br /> on each engine with no visible signs of support deficiencies are adequate to address the staff concern.
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- 6. Staff Concern Replace the 4R cylinder head with one that does not contain a through-wall weld repair where the repair was performed from one side only, or' demonstrate that the present cylinder head does not contain such a repair.
Applicant Response Cylinder head 4R (serial #A76) does not conta n a through-wall weld repair perfonned from one side only. Details were provided to the ,
staff by letter dated February 21,1985(PY-CEI/NRR-0198L).
Transcripts from the ASLB hearing on the PNPP diesel generators (Issue 16), also address this issue (pages 2428 and 2429),
s All PNPP TDI engine cylinder heads were returned to Transamerica Delaval Inc. (TDI) to be reconditioned in accordance with the latest recommendations established by the TDI Owners Group. This included reworking the valve seats, water discharge ports, steam vent hole, and injector hole. Additionally, each head was stress relieved and pickled. Upon completion of the rework, cylinder head
' 4R (serial #A76) was inspected by a CEI representative and rejected because of combustion face (fire deck wall) pitting and weld indi-cations. These ' indications were excavated (not through-wall), and built up with weld material per accepted procedures. The CEI representative reinspected the head and found it acceptable.
l Staff Evaluation i
As a result of reviewing the inspection results, PNL found that the l
4R cylinder head on the Division 2 engine contains a weld repair in the firedeck area. The staff has not accepted through-wall weld i
1 repairs in the firedeck area of the cylinder heads where the repair was performed from one side only. The applicant's response demon-strates, to the staff's satisfaction, that no cylinder heads currently in use contain weld repair where the repair was performed from one side only. As part of the maintenance and surveillance program recommended by the Owners Group for Perry, the staff has strongly relied upon the Owners Group recomended procedure of barring over of the engines with the stopcocks open prior to planned starts and after engine shutdowns. The staff believes that this procedure, perfomed 4-8 hours after engine shutdown and again after 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and before any planned starts, is an effective way to detect cylinder head defects which would allow water to enter the cylinder.
1 III. CONCLUSION This SSER precedes final completion of the NRC/PNL review of the generic
} resolution of all Phase 1 components by the Owners Group and of the final SER on Perry. The NRC staff and PNL conclude that the generic Phase 1 reviews and Comanche Peak DR/QR review upon which the Perry DR/QR review is based have progressed sufficiently such that all significant issues warranting priority attention as a basis for issuance of an operating license have been adequately resolved. Consequently, the NRC staff concludes that the diesel generators will provide a reliable standby source of onsite power in accordance with General Design Criteria 17.
This conclusion is subject to the following:
A. License Conditions I
1.
As a result of a major crankshaft failure that occurred at Shoreham (DSR-8) and lesser cracking that was evidenced around the crankshaft oil holes at San Onofre (DSRV-20) and because of the criticality of the crankshaft to successful engine operation, t 1 the crankshaft should be inspected as follows:
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The oil holes and fillets of the three main bearing journals subject to the highest torsional stresses (Nos. 4, 6, 8) should be examined with fluorescent liquid penetrant and, as necessary, eddy current, during each 5-year major disassembly. The same inspections on oil holes and fillets should be performed on at least three crankpin journals between journals 3 and 8.
2.
Cylinder blocks should be inspected at intervals calculated using the cumulative damage index (CDI) model and using inspection methodologies described by Failure Analysis Associates, Inc.,
(FaAA) in report entitled " Design Review of TDI R-4 Series Emergency Diesel Generator Cylinder Blocks" (FaAA-84-9-11) dated December 1984. Liquid penetrant inspection of the cylinder liner landing area should be performed any time liners are removed.
3.
The engines should be rolled over with the airstart system and the cylinder stopcocks open prior to any planned starts, unless that start occurs within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of a shutdown. The engines j
should also be rolled over with the airstar!. system and the cylinder stopcocks open after 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, but no more than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> after engine shutdown and then rolled over once again approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after each shutdown. In the event an engine is removed from service for any reason other than the rolling over procedure prior to expiration of the 8-hour or 24-hour periods noted above,
! that engine need not be rolled over while it is out of service.
The licensee should air-roll the engine over with the stop-cocks open at the time it is returned to service. The origin of any water detected in the cylinders must be determined and any cylinder head which leaks due to a crack shall be replaced.
' No cylinder heads that contain a through-wall weld repair where the repair was performed from one side only shall be used on the engines.
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- 4. Except as noted below, the staff is not imposing additional reporting requirements pertaining to the TDI diesels at Perry l beyond that already required in the regulations (Parts 21, 50.72, 4
and 50.73) and by the plant Technical Specifications. The exceptions involve any cracks which may be found in the crank-shafts or in the engine blocks between stud holes of adjacent cylinders. Either of these unexpected situations would constitute a potentially serious concern regarding the future operability i of the engine. In these cases, the staff will require by license i
condition that any proposed resolution to either of these conditions be approved by the NRC staff prior to returning the the engine to an " operable" status.
- 5. Operation beyond the first refueling outage shall require staff approval based on the staff's final review of the Owners Group generic findings and of the overall implementation status of Owners Group recomendations at Perry. These conclusions will j be documented in a final SER on Perry.
} 6. Any changes to the maintenance and surveillance requirements I
identified in Section B below not governed by these license t conditions should be subject to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59.
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i B. Maintenance and Surveillance Requirements P m The applicant should utilize the. maintenance and surveillance require-ments given in Appendix II of the Perry DR/QR as committed to.
Maintenance and surveillance requirements for Phase 1 components should encompass the requirements presented to the NRC Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) by the staff on March 20, 1985 (Enclosure 1)
The staff will finalize these requirements in an SER on the generic Phase 1 components and although no major changes are expected, any modifications to these requirements will have to be adhered to by the applicant. The applicant will also be required to perform the operational and stand-by surveillances given in Tables 1 and 2-(enclosed).
- - - . = - - . - _ . _ _ - _ _ - . . _ , .. -. .
C. Other
- 1. Operating and emergency procedures should be revised to address engine operation below 450 rpm and cylinder imbalance / misfiring as described in Section II.
2.
Technical Specifications regarding surveillance testing should be revised using the enclosure as a guide.
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TABLE 1 Diesel Engine Operating Surveillance Parameters and Frequency Component Frequency tube Oil Inlet Pressure to Engine Log every 60 minutes Turbocharger Oil Pressure Pump Fuel Oil Filter /StrainerAP Lube Oil Filter / Strainer AP Jacket Water Pressure Crankcase Vacuum Engine Speed Stack Temperature (RB, LB)
Lube Oil Temperature JacketWaterTemperature(In,Out)
Lube Oil Sump Level Room Temperature EngineCylinderTemperature(all)
. Kilowatt Load i..
Exhaust Temperature Inlet to Turbo (RB, LB) 7 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Strainer AP Log every 60 minutes unless pump is auto / duplexed and alarmed Starting Air Pressure (RB, LB) Check hourly Fuel Oil Day Tank Level Check hourly Manifold Air Pressure (RB, LB) Log every 60 minutes Manifold Air Temperature (RB, LB) Log every 60 minutes Visual Inspection for Leaks, etc. Check hourly
TABLE 2 Diesel Engine Standby Surveillance Parameters and Frequency Component Frequency Starting Air Pressure Log every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Lube Oil Temperature (In, Out)
, Jacket Water Temperature (In, Out)
Lube Oil Sump Level Fuel -011 Day Tank Level Room Temperature Y Test Annunciators Log every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Check Alarm Clear Check daily Check Operation of Comp. Air Traps Governor Oil Level Inspect for Leaks y
Air Butterfly Valve and Cylinder Check monthly
. Operation of Fuel Rack Check daily; lube monthly Check Internals of Block and Base At each refueling outage for Leaks Keepwarm 011 Filter 4 P Weekly Test Jacket Water for pH, Conductivity, After adding makeup water, Corresion Inhibitor or monthly
{ Cylinder Compression / Peak Pressure At each refueling outage j Air Start Distributor Filter Monthly Air Start Admission Valve Strainer Every 3 months Lube 011 Analyze monthly l
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Enclosure 1
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l NRR STAFF PRESENTATION TO THE ACRS X
SUBJECT.
STATUS OF NRC TASK FORCE EVALUATION OF TDI DIESEL GENERATOR RELIABILITY
-s DATE: MARCH 20,1985 i PRESENTER: CARL H. BERLINGER PRESENTER'S TITLE / BRANCH /DIV: BRANCH CHIEF TDI PROJECT GROUP DIVISION OF LICENSING PRESENTER'S NRC TEL. NO.: 492-9794 SUBCOMMITTEE: ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS SUBCOMMITTEE 1
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. Summary of i
Conclusions and Recommendations
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on Resolution of Known Problems l ;_ :-
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TDI Diesel Generator Compone'nts
' Phase I of Owners' Group Program?
- Pacific Northwest Laboratory [
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Partic i pants in Revie. ws u ,
i Consultants
! e S.H. Bush a e A.J. Henriksen i
j e B.J. Kirkwood '
l e P.J. Louzecky l
e Ridardo Consulting Engineers plc, Wes~t Sussex, j England '
e A. Sarsten PNL Technical Coordinators e F.R. Zdioudek, Task Leader '
l e J.M. Alzheimer e J.F. Nesbitt i
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Information Considered by PNL in Reviews of Resolution of Known Probisms -
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i e Owners' Group reports on known problems l e Operating experience in nuclear and non-nuclear applications e Plant-shecific reviews
!' - Grand Gulf iJuly;l j - Catawba I August;i j - Comanche Peak i: September;i
! - San Onofre I: November;i -
l - Shoreham I: December;i a
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Air Start Valve Capscrew Type Failures:
- 1) Loosened capscrew at Shoreham and Grand Gulf due to bottoming-out during i
' torquing l 2? No failures have occurred .
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e Air Start Valve Capscrew
Conclusions:
t Capscrew design is adequate, provideci ~that
- sampling procedure.is established to ensure
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capscrews are of sp6cified length
- installation is made according to SWEC recommendations 1
l M/S Recommendations:
Capscrews should be torqued to Owners' Group recommendations and retorqued following first l period of engine operation whenever an air-start valve is removed / replaced i
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Auxiliary Module Wiring and Terminations .
i l Concern:
i Suitability of all class IE auxiliary module wiring and terminations -
- - Flame retardancy l - Qualification to industry standards .
- Routing in conduit j - Compatibility with circuit requirements i
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Conclusions:
j PNL concurs with OG that wiring and terminations are adequate j
with indicated modifications -
j - Shoreham l - Replace crankcase ventilating fan wiring I
- Inspect sliding link terminal block
! - Catawba .
' - Replace wiring of questionable integrity
- Inspect sliding link terminal blocks
- San Onofre
- Replace wiring of questionable integrity i
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I l Connecting Rods
! {DSR-48 Engines?
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Conclusions:
j PNL concurs with OG that j - Rods adequate for intended service
- Indications in rod eye bushing within i 15 of bottom center are not acceptable
- Rod eye cracks more than 0.04 inch deep are not acceptable j
- No detectable cracks allowed at root of rod bolt threads
) Recommendation:
l Connecting rod bolts 'shouid i5e~ torqued to OG/TDI recommendations at each major engine disassembly (approx. every 5 years)
l Connecting Rods I
(DSRV-4 Engines;'
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- i Type Failures:
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- 1) None in nuclear service i
- 2) Fatigue cracking of connecting rod bolts, link rod box, and fretting of serrations (non-nuclear serviced I
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Connecting Rods -
{DSRV-4 Engines)
Conclusions:
- 1) Analytical evidence alone does not provide a sufficient basis for concluding that connecting rods '
are adequate l 2) Service history provides confidence that, with J suitable M/S, continued use is justified l
- Recommendations
l 1) Implement OG recommendations i
- Inspect and measure every 5 years
) - Measure clearance between link pin and link rod i every 5 years
!. - Visually inspect rack teeth; verify minimum j specified contact surface 4
- Inspect 17/8-inch bolts and bolt holes each '
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270 hours0.00313 days <br />0.075 hours <br />4.464286e-4 weeks <br />1.02735e-4 months <br /> above 50% load i 2) Bolt torque (both 1 1/2 and 17/8-inch bolt sizes)
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l should be checked every 270 hours0.00313 days <br />0.075 hours <br />4.464286e-4 weeks <br />1.02735e-4 months <br /> of operation above 50% load or every 5 years
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! Connecting Rod Bearing Shells
- Type Failures: .
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- 1) Cracked bearing shells at Shoreham
! after only 600-800 hours of operation 2? No other reported failures in nuclear '
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4 service l
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l Connecting Rod Bearing Shells 1 -
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Conclusion:
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] Bearing shells are suitable for continued use with i
enhanced M/S l
M/S Recommendations of Owners' Group:
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- Inspect and measure every 5 years
- Bump test at each refueling cycle
! - X-ray new bearing shells per OG criteria j !
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Crankshaft
! 'R-48, Shoreham}
Type Failures:
1
- 1) Fracture of Shoreham EDG 102 11-inch crankshaft 4
- 2) Cracks in EDG 101 and 103 .
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! Crankshaft l s'R-48, Shoreham?
j Conclusions regarding replacement 12-inch crankshafts:
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l 1) Test to 10 stress cycles proves adequacy of i Shoreham crankshafts for " qualified" load (3300 kW) ,
- 2) Portion of test at higher loads provides basis for l
concludi6g loads to 3430 kW are acceptable for j limited period in emergency
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- 3) Momentary ( <1 minute) loads to 3900 kW in emergency would not compromise operability 1
Mfp_ _Recommbndation:. _ . _ . . _ _ . . . _ _ . . . _ _ -
- 1) NDT fillets and oil holes of crankpin journals 5,6, and 7 and main journals between them in EDG '
101 and 102 engines at first refueling outage I 2) NDT of fillets and oil holes of two most heavily l .. .. . -- _
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i Crankshaft l
i (DSRV-16-4, Grand Gulf?
i Type Failures:
i None reported in nuclear service l
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l Crankshaft 3 (DSRV-16-4, Grand Gulf) i
Conclusions:
- 1) Comply with DEMA recommendations for torsional stresses at rated speed I 2) System has 4th order critical at 432 rpm (within 5% DEMA i range)
- Engine should not be operated below 440 rpm
- Cylinder load balance is important
- Misfiring especially undesirable 1
M/S Recommendations:
i
- 1) Measure hot and cold deflections at 270 hours0.00313 days <br />0.075 hours <br />4.464286e-4 weeks <br />1.02735e-4 months <br /> or each refueling (OG)
- 2) Inspect journals 4, 6, 8 (OG) i
[ 3) Determine adequacy of TDI cylinder balance /governer speed l variations by torsiograph (OG) l 4) Following major maintenance, balance cylinders carefully per TDI procedures (PNL)
- 5) Monitor for misfiring via exhaust temperatures (PNL)
k l
Crankshaft l
l
{DSRV-20-4, San Onofre?
Type Failures:
Linear crack discovered'in both
! crankshafts
- Torsional vibration during rapid startup
, likely cause '
} - Cracks removed by remachining oil I
holes '
l l
i
j Crankshaft '
(DSRV-20-4, San Onofre) .
)
Conclusions:
- 1) At rated load and speed, torsional stresses within DEMA limits
, 2) Engines conservatively rated
- - Vibratory stresses low at 450 rpm i
- 3) Crankshafts are adequate for their intended function, provided
{ that: '
j - requirement for rapid start testing is removed i
- M/S is-implemented to detect future cracking M/S Recommendations:
- 1) Hot and cold deflection checks at 270 hours0.00313 days <br />0.075 hours <br />4.464286e-4 weeks <br />1.02735e-4 months <br /> or each refueling (OG) ~ '
- 2) Inspection of oil hole regions of journals 9,10 and 11 at refuelings i
l (OG) l 3) Following major maintenance, balance cylinders carefully per TDI l procedures (PNL) i
- 4) Monitor for misfiring via exhaust temperatures (PNL) 1 .. - .. -
I
! Cylinder Block l Type Failures:
1 l 1) Camshaft gallery cracks (8-cylinder
! engine)
I
! 2) Circumferential cracks in cylinder liner i
counterbore
)
j 3) Cracks in ligament between liner j . counterbore and stud l 4) Stud-to-stud cracks I _ _ _ _ _
Cylinder Blo.ck y 9
l
Conclusions:
- 1) Camshaft gallery cracks
- - Hot tears j - - Not expected to propagate
, 2) Circumferential cracks -
- Caused by liner proudness
! - Not detrimental to engine performance ,
1 j 3) Ligament cracks i - Not detrimental to engine performance
- Increase probability of stud-to-stud cracks l
j 4) Stud-to-stud cracks
- - Potential threat to engine integrity i - Must be evaluated on case-by-case basis i
- Recommendations
l
- 1) Camshaft cracks should be monitored l 2) Circumferential cracks need not be monitored i
- 3) Where ligament cracks exist, check for stud-to-stud cracks 3
after each operation at >50% load
) 4) Blocks with known stud-to-stud cracks should be analyzed for
- suitability for further service
1 -
i i
i
) i i
{ Cylinder Heads 1
i i
l Type Failures:
t j Crack originating at stellite valve seal i
i allowing entrance of water into cylinder j
j Failures have involved principally " Group i I" heads (of the three groups in serviced l
l l
l
\
Cylinder Hbads
Conclusions:
Heads from all three groups are suitable for intended service, provided that:
- - firedeck has no plug welds j
- engine is rolled over 4 to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> after shutdown, again at 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, to detect water leaks. Engine is rolled again before i planned starts 1
l Recommendations:
~ ~ - . . - . . . . . - -_ _
i l - Liquid penetrant inspection of firedeck j
- Record cold compression and maximum firing pressures at ,
l each refueling ,
- Roll over engine per PNL recommendations after shutdowns
- Visually inspect fuel injection ports during surveillance tests
{ - Return leaking heads to vendor for repair
! 2) Inspections prior to nuclear service j
j
- Ultrasonic inspection of firedeck to verify thickness is at least 0.400 inch
- Surface inspection of firedeck and valve seats to verify absence of unacceptable defects. Any heads with plug welds in firedeck should be rejected
P i Cylinder Head Studs (Straight and Necked Designs? .
l
! Type Failure:
l i.
- 1) None in nuclear service
- 2) Isolated failures in non-nuclear service from insufficient preload
) .
l i
J
p e 1
Cylinder Head Studs j { Straight and Necked Designs;'
Conclusion:
l PNL concurs with OG that both designs are suitable i for intended service M/S Recommendation:
Torque per Owners' Group /TDI recommendations i
whenever a head is removed / replaced
l r 1
Engine Base and Bearing Caps 4
l Type Failures:
1;l Cracks in main bearing saddles of DSR-3 48 engines (at Shoreham;I from l improper stud removal 2;i Cracks in main bearing saddles from insufficient stud preload (marine service)
) 3;l Nut pocket failure due to defective l ,
casting (non-nuclear) l
l -
i l Engine Bdse and Bearing Caps I
Conclusions:
PNL concurs with OG that base and caps are adequate, provided that: 1
- LP examination of saddles is performed at ,
j alternate fuel cycles (DSR-48)
- main bearing saddle stud torque is checked at i
alternate cycles
- OG recommendations on removal of oil from l mating surfaces before assembly are implemented i
Recommendation:
I -
Additional inspection of cap and base mating surfaces to ensure absence of imperfections preventing tight bolt-up i . . _.
h 4
i i
l Jacket Water Pump i
l l Type Failures:
i Fatigue failure of pump shaft initiating at j keyway (Saudi Arabia and Shoreham?
l l
l I
i 3
I _ _ _ _ _ _
i .
l Jacket Water Pump 1
]
Conclusions:
- 1D Concur with latest Shoreham redesign and proposed l River Bend and Rancho Seco redesign l
! 2) Concur with OG that V-12, V-16 and V-20 designs are j adequate with addition of torque values and limits to assembly procedures M/S Recommendations: ,
None -
i f
[
/
s-r *
- e d
1 1
e'
/'
Types AF and AE Piston ;
i Skirts i
i i
l Type Failure:
l Fatigue cracks in skirt-to crown attachment i bosses i ,
I l
l r
e
- Types AF and AE Piston Skirts
Conclusions:
- 1) Type AF skirts suitable l - Up to 130 BMEP with initial inspection only -
- Over 130 BMEP i
Initial inspection i 100% boss area inspection at each refue!ir.g '
l 1
- 2) Type AE skirts suitable to normal TDI ratings '
l
- M/S Recommendations:
- 1) Inspection as above l 2) Inspection, measurement of pin and skirt per TDI recommendations
)
j . .
Types AN and AH Piston Skirts 4
i Type i ailures.:
l l 1) AN - Numerous reports of cracks in ,
4 nuclear and non-nuclear applications i
l 2) AH - No reports l
e I
T -
i I
i i W L - _ _ _ _ --
- q. ,
~
e Type AN and AH Piston Skirts i
Conclusions.
i 1;l AN skirts not suitable l
l 2;i AH skirts suitable
) -
Normal TDI ratings Subject to 10 7 cycle test on lead engine h
4 M/S Recommendation:
l .
i t Inspect skirt and pin every 5 years per TDI '
- recommendations 1
l l I
__i_a _m - - -..--_a
. . - __.-__-__.a ,aa a - - _ - --- u-2 _ -#n- ___ . ,. _ ..e4m - , .u- - -- A a ___
i l
l l
b t
3 i V .5 C3 5 g
(U c D . @_ $
., LLI @ g 40eu s
.o i GG o
'V 0-
=
e LL @ E m =
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& LU o
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-e,.- - . ,y-- w,.p--- , , . - - - - - -,- -
l Push Rods -
(Ball-End, Forged-End and Friction-Welded Designs?
Conclusions 1 1;l Concur with OG that ball-end rods should be removed from service
- 2) Concur with OG that forged-end design and friction-welded-design are acceptable i
M/S Recommendations:
l 1;l Inspect after 800 hours0.00926 days <br />0.222 hours <br />0.00132 weeks <br />3.044e-4 months <br /> with LP; replace rods with
! detectable cracks 2;l implement OG recommendation for destructive i examination of friction-welded design i
f
l
[
Rocker Arm Capscrews
{ Original and Modified Designs?
4 Type Failures:
Isolated fatigue failures from insufficient 4
preload i
i e9
Rocker Arm Capscrew's
! ' Original and Modifie'd Designs?
7 l
Conclusions:
i i
j 1) PNL piedicts stress may be 3 times higher than SWEC l prediction, but margin remains adequate 2? Both designs are adequate I
- based on conservative PNL stress estimate l - based on service history l
I M/S Recommendations:
f
! 1) Torque per Owners' Group /TDI recommendations l
j .-.
whenever capscrews are removed / replaced l
. t
- e
l f .
r j f
'! T
{ El.liott Model 65G/90G .
l Turbochargers i
i l
Type Failure:
l l Thrust bearing failure from inadequate l
lubrication during startup i
4 i
l l
}
Elliott IVlodel 65G/90G
~
l -
l Turbochargers jl t j
Conclusions:
- 1) Turbochargers are suitable, provided that FaAA recommendations on drip and full-l flow prelube systems are followed i
j 2) Flange and piping alignment and surge margin are i possible p.lant-specific items i
j Recommendations: '
j Follow OG recommendations on M/S
' - Inspect bearings after O fast /100 total starts
. - Measu.re plearances, clean bearings, analyze oil at l each refueling l - Inspect bearings, other items each 5 years Consider operation of manual prelube system for brief period folfowing engine shutdown, to cool down bearings
? ,
O i
a f
Inlet Nozzle Ring Elliott Model 90G Turbocharger Type Failures:
1;l Vanes Missing vanes i Fatigue cracks in roots (Iow operating hours;l t
2;l Broken bolts i
3;I Cracked washers 4;l Cracked hub i
-l Inlet Noizie Ring
~
Elliott Model 90G Turbocharger i
Conclusions:
1;l No evidence that missing vanes had, in fact, been installed l
! 2;l Fatigue cracks pose potential threat i
l Turbocharger destruction Performance degradation
- 3) Other isolated failures (e.g., bolts and washers;i pose a j less serious threat to operability j Recommendations:
I 1) Inspect at every refueling outage j 2) Replace missing or cracked components i
i l
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS
- SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS - -
i '
t: .-
- 4. 8.1.1.1 Each of the above required independent circuits between the offsite transatssion network and the onsite Class 1E distribution system shall be:
- a. Determined OPERABLE at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignments and indicated power availability, and
- b. Demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during shutdown by transferring unit power supply from the normal, circuit to the "
- alternate circuit,. -
- 4.8.1.1.2 Each of the above required diesel generators shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: , ,
l a. In .accordance with the frequency specified in Table 4.,8.1.1.2-1 on a
- f. ,
STAGGERED TEST BASIS by: -
- 1. Verifying,the fuel level in the dy tank.
g 2. Ver1fying the fuel level in the fuel storage tank. ,
- 3. Verifying the fuel transfer pump starts and transfers fuel from
~
7 the storage system to the day tank. ~
- 4. Verifying the diesel starts from ambient conditions and acceler-
, , ates to at least 441 rpm for Div 1 and Div 2 and 882 rpm for l Div 3 in less than or equal to 10 seconds". The generator l voltage and frequency shall be 4160 1 420 volts and 60 1 1.2 Hz l
- within 10 seconds
- after the start signal.
F .
- 5. Verifying the diesel eW EfqweielWeW52% generator 11d6for diesel is synchronized, generators Div 1 and loaded toih_
D' v 2 g' .-
% g , ahd 2600 Vfor'diese1' generator Div 3 in less than or equal to /
60 seconds *, and operates with this load for at least 60 minutes. /
~
- 6. Verifying the diesel generator is aligned to provide standby power to the associated amergency busses.
I
- All diesel generator starts for the purpose of this Surveillance Requirement l may be preceded by an engine prelube period, The diesel gene' r ator start l (10 sec)/ load (60 sec) from ambient conditions shall be performed at least once per 184 days in these surveillance tests. All other angine starts for the purpose of this syrve111ance testing way be preceded by other warmup pro-cedures recommended by the manufacturer so that the mechanical stress and wear on the diesel engine is minimized.
O This M ta rneard an.phlo osoik roAnc. over 'b phe eqde.
Ms m acaa.., u WibW w\Me Ab+ph us.,%,%
l skJ n-W. kas,%, %w YkF PERRY - UNIT 1 3/4 8-4 gg,
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)
. 4
. for diesel generator Div 2, and greater than er equal to 2200 kw 1 (HPCS pump) for diesel generator Div 3 while saintaining voltage l st 4160 t 420 volts and frequency at 6011.2 Hz er nominal speed '
plus 75% of the difference between nominal speed and the over-speed trip setpoint or 15% above nominal, whichever is .less.
s
- 3. ng the diesel generator capability to reject a load of p kw for diesel generators Div 1 and Div 2 and 2600 kw for .
4
., gr oi...i venerator Div 3 without tripping. The generator voltage shall not exceed 4784 volts for Div 1 and Div 2 and 5000 volts
,/
- for Div 3 during and following the load rejection.
- 4. . Simulating a loss of offsite power by itself, and:
f a) For divisions 1 and 2: ,
- 2) Verifying de-energization of the emergency busses and
'{f.
. d oad shedding from the emergency busses.
'& 2) Verifying the diesel generator starts
- on the auto- -
!, . sstart signal, energizes the emergency busses with per-1 manently connected loads within 10 seconds, energizes-
! .~ the auto-connected loads through the load sequence (individual load timers) and operates for greater i than or equal to 5 minutes while its generator is so loaded. After energization, the stea@ state voltage
- *and frequency of the emergency busses shall be main-
< tained at 4160 1 420 volts and 6011.2 Hz during this
- . test. ,
.: b) For division 3:
Verifying de-energiration of the emergency bus.
~
. 1) 9-
- 2) Verifying the diesel generator starts
- en the auto-start signal, energizes the emergency bus with the per-sanently connected loads within 10 seconds and operates i
for greater than or equal to'5 minutes while its gen-erator is so loaded. After energilation, the steady
- All diesel generator starts for the purpose tf this Surve111[nce Requirement may be preceded by an engine prelube period. The diesel generator start (10 sec)/ load (60 sec) from ambient conditions shall be performed at least once per 184 days in these surveillance tests. All other engine starts fo.' _
the purpose of this surveillance testing may be preceded by other warsup pro-cedures recommended by the manufacturer so that the mechanical stress and wear on the diesel engine is minimized.
PEIUtY - UNIT 1 3/4 8-6
_ . _ _ ._ _ --,,,,..,.. _,_,Q,-,m y
' 9if.j $b
. ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS gg) . . rt
- SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)
O. ,
voltage and frequency of the emergency bus shall be maintained at 4160 1 420 volts and 601.1.2 Hz during this test.
( 7. Verifying that all automatic diesel generator trips are auto-matica11y bypassed with an ECCS actuation signal except:
a) For divisions 1 and 2, engine overspeed and generator
,. differential current.
b) For division 3, engine overspeed and generator differential current. .
- 8. ' Verifying the diesel generator operates for at least 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. 9 i (Aco-700DYW During this test, the diesel generator shall be loaded to 5Mtf kwl i[
- - O d AIA 'IW % - 'for diesel-generator Div 1 and Div 2. The Div 3 diesel generator
~GG M d .'1 5, f,3 - shall be loaded to greater than or aqual to 2860 Aw for the first 4 g gg two hours of this test and 2600 kw for the remaining 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> of this test. The generator voltage and frequency shall be 4160 t
. M ALxfwed t~ v 420 volts and 6011.2 Hz within 10 seconds after the start signal; the steady state generator voltage and frequency shall
~;
- be maintained within these limits during this test. Within
' 5 minutes after completing this 24-hour test, perform Surve11-lance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.e.4.a.2 and b.2* or perform Sur-veillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.e.6.a.2 and b.2.*
J 9. Verifying the o-connected loads to each diesel generator g
- .? f do not exc for diesel generator Div 1 and Div 2 and T GC7 2860 kw for enerator Div 3. -
4, /
- - 10. Verifying the diesel generator's capability to
,r. .-
a) Synchronize with the offsite power source while the generator l
'* is loaded with its emergency loads upon a simulated restoration of offsite power, b) Transfer its loads to the offsite power source, and Se restored to its standby status.
c) ,
II. Verifying that with the diesel generator operat'ing in a test mode and connected to its bus, a simulated ECCS actuation signal over-i rides the test mode by (1) returning the diesel generator to
- If Surveillance Requirements 4.8.1.1.2.e.4.a.2 and b.2 or 4.8.'1.1.2.e.6.a.2 and b.2 are not satisfactorily completed, it is not necessary to repeat the preceding 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> test. Instead, the diesel generator Div 1 or Div 2 may be operated at 5740 kw or diesel generator Div 3 may be operated at 2600 kw for l
one hour er until cperating temperatures have stabilized. '
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f PERRY - UNIT 1 3/4 8-8 (b em he..Lcd Anhh shedtnkevnvd:Mc hMj $00k h, sbit n4beaenhos6 con rs srew A c-acho