ML20248G292

Safety Evaluation Accepting Util 840406 Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 4.5.2, Reactor Trip Sys Reliability On-Line Testing

ML20248G292
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	03/30/1989
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20248G291	List: ML20248G290 ML20248G292
References
GL-83-28, NUDOCS 8904130370
Download: ML20248G292 (3)

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I Aa UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

4 t 1j- WASHINGTON, D. C. 20666 -  !

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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY, ET AL.

PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-440 AND 50-441 GENERIC LETTER 83-28, ITEM 4.5.2, REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RELIABILITY

1.0 INTRODUCTION

AND

SUMMARY

On February 25, 1983, both ofthe scram circuit. breakers at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant failed to open upon an automatic reactor trip signal from the reactor protection system. This incident was terminated manually by the operator about 30 seconds after the' initiation of the automatic trip signal. . The failure of the circuit breakers was determined to be related to the sticking-of the undervoltage trip attachment. Prior to this incident, on February 22, 1983, at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant, an automatic trip signal was generated based on steam generator low-low level during plant start-up. In this case, the reactor was tripped manually by the operator almost. coincidentally with the automatic trip.

Following these incidents, on February 28, 1983, the NRC Executive Director for i

. Operations (ED0), directed the staff to investigate and report on the generic o implications of these occurrences at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant.

The results of the staff's inquiry into the generic implications of the Salem unit incidents are reported in NUREG-1000, " Generic Implications of the ATWS i

. Events at' the Salem Nuclear Power Plant." As a result of this investigation, the Commission (NRC) requested (by Generic Letter 83-28 dated July 8, 1983,

'Ref.1) all licensees of operating reactors, applicants for an operating license, and holders of construction permits to respond to generic issues raised by the analyses of these two ATWS events.

1 This report is based on our contractor's evaluation of the response submitted ,

by The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, et al., the licensees for Perry j Units 1 and 2 for Item 4.5.2 of Generic Letter 83-28 (Ref. 3). The actual )

documents reviewed as part of this evaluation are listed in the references at j the end of the report. j t

8904130370 890330 PDR ADOCK 05000440 P PDC

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g j Item 4.5.2 requires-licensees with plants not currently designed to permit on-line testing to justify not making provisions for such testing. ' Alternatives ,

to on-line testing proposed by the licensees wil? be considered if the objectives '

of high reliability can be met in another way. This review will:

1.- Confirm that the licensee has identified those portions of the Reactor Trip System that are not on-line testable. If the entire Reactor Trip System is verified to be on-line testable, with those exceptions addressed above, no further review is required.

2. Evaluate modifications proposed by the licensee to permit on-line testing against the existing criteria for the design of the protection systems for j the plant being modified. '

3. Evaluate proposed alternatives to on-line testing of the Reactor Trip System where the impracticality of the modifications necessary to permit on-line testing exists.

2-. 0 EVALUATION The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, et al., the licensee for Perry 1 and applicant for Perry 2, provided their response to Item 4.5.2 of the Generic Letter on April 6, 1984. In that response, the licensees / applicants affirm that Perry is designed to permit on-line testing of the Reactor Trip System,-

' and provide a summary description of that testing.

The licensees'/ applicants' response states that Perry does not perform on-line testing of the alternate rod insertion logic and valves because testing during operation would cause a plant scram. In lieu of on-line testing, the alternate .

rod insertion valves will be independently tested during each refueling outage.  ;

3.0 CONCLUSION

Inasmuch as the Reactor Protection System includes those components necessary to trip the reactor, the staff finds that the licensees'/ applicants' stated position on Item 4.5.2 of the Generic Letter, including (1) their justification for not performing periodic on-line testing of the backup scram valves, and (2)  ;

the commitment to test backup scram valves during each refueling outage, meets the requirements and is, therefore, acceptable.

4.0 REFERENCES

1. NRC Letter, D. G. Eisenhut to all licensees of Operating Reactors, Applicants ;

for Operating Licenses, and Holders of Construction Permits " Required 4 ActionsBasedonGenericImplicationsofSalemATWSEvents(GenericLetter '

83-28)," July 8,1983.

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2. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company letter. to NRC, M. R. Edelman

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to D. G. Eisenhut, " Response to Generic Letter 83-28," April 6, 1984.

3. EGG-NTA-7471, " Technical Evaluation Report, Reactor Trip System Reliability Conformance to Item 4.5.2 of Generic Letter 83-28, Peach Bottom-2 and -3, Perry-1 and -2, Pilgrim-1, Quad Cities-1 and -2, River Bend-1, Shcreham, Susquehanna-1 and -2, Vermont Yankee, WNP-2," F. G. Farmer, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, August 1987. ,

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