ML20148T781
| ML20148T781 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch, Browns Ferry, Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 12/01/1980 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20148T662 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8102270738 | |
| Download: ML20148T781 (300) | |
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I I GENERIC SAFETYEVALUATIONREPORI BWR-SCRAM DISCHARGE SYSTEM r.es.- DECEMBER 1, 1980 81022707 %
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l l ABSTRACT This report summaMzes the results of our geneMc evaluation of the BWR scram discharge system. The activity grows out of (1) the Browns . Ferry 3 partial scram failure event of June 28, 1980 and subsequent I i investigations, tests, and analyses and (2) failures of scram level instruments at the Brunswick and P stch plants. ) 1 The report addresses the short-tem actions taken or recuired to assure , continued safe operation of operating BWRs. It also provides the bads for the staff judgment that continued operation of these plants is accep-table pending the implementation of pennanent modifications. It des-cribes the content of two bulletins and a numoer of supplements which identify these requirements and provides the technical bases for these requirements. An appendix to this report provides a summary of the plant-specific actions taken by each licensee in response to bulletin requirements and the staff evaluation of these actions. The report also descMbes an additional requirement which should be met by each licensee within 2 months to provide an automatic air header dump on the cor. trol air system to prevent problems associated with fast filling of the scram discharge volume during certain loss of air events. The cMteMa with technical bases that were developec by a BWR owners subgroup for use in implementing pemanent system modifications to correct deficiencies are also described. These criteMa are endorsed when sucole-mented by an added staff recuirement dealing with potential comnon-cause failures of scram level ins +nmentation. n - , , , , , ~ , ,-m w - ,- .n-- -- e ~w * '
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Ways to comply with these cM teH a that are acceptable to the staff are descMbed. Use of these means will obviate the need for plant-specific pre-implementation approval of permanent modifications. - Other designs will require specific NRC approval . h i I e i iii
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. 1 A88REVIATIONS ACRS Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards l l
AE00 office for the Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, NRC I ATWS anticipated transient without scram i SF3 Browns Ferry Unit 3
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BWR boiling-water reactor l CRD control-rod drive GE General Electric Company 1 ID inside dianeter ! IE Office of Inspection and Enforcement, NRC
- IEB Office of Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin INPO Institute of Nuclear Power Operations IV instrument volume LCD limiting condition (s) for operation NRC U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission j NRR Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC NSAC Nuclear Safety Analysis Center OER operating experience report l
- SDV scram discharge volume l SER safety evaluation report 1
SLCS standby liquid contre system TVA Tennessee Valley Authority 1 iv ,
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bONTENTS
- 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 Short-Tem Program 1.2 Long-Tem Program 1.3 Problem Definition 1.3.1 Hydraulic Coupling 1.3.2 Instrumentation 1.3.3 Hydrodynamic Forces 1.3.4 Reactor Coolant Isolation 1.3.5 Implications of Anticipated Transient Without Scram 1.3.6 Additional Studies +
1.4 Additional Studius
- 2. BACXGROUND 2.1 Operating Experience 2.1.1 History of Events 2.1.2 Safety Significance
{ 2.2 Interim Technical Specifications 3. JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION 3.1 Bulletin Requirements 3.1.1 Technical Bases 1 l 3.1.1.1 Inadequate Hydraulic Coupling 3.1.1.2 Complex Vent and Orain Piping 3.1.1.3 Level Switch Problems ' 3.1.1.4 Control-Rod-Orive Air System Failure l 3.1.2 Generic Applicability ' 3.2 Implementation of Requirements 3.3 Generic Conclusions Regarding Acceptability V I I l l
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CONTENTS (CONT)
- 4. LONG-TERM PROGRM 4.1 Modification CriteH a 4.2 The CriteMa, Their Technical Bases, and Aoditional Requirements and Guidance 4.2.1 Functional Criteria 4.2.1.1 Functional CriteHon 1 4.2.2 Safety criteria 4.2.2.1 Safety Criterion 1 4.2.2.2 Safety CriteMon 2 4.2.2.3 Safety Criterion 3 4.2.2.4 Safety Criterion 4 4.2.2.5 Safety CritcMon 5 4.2.3 Operating CriteHa 4.2.4 Design CriteMa 4.2.4.1 Design CHterion 1 4.2.4.2 Design CriteMon 2 4.2.4.3 Design CriteMon 3 4.2.4.4 Design CriteMon 4 4.2.4.5 Design CriteMon 5 4.2.4.6 Design CriteMon 6 4.2.4.7 Design Criterion 7 4.2.4.8 Design CriteMon 8 4.2.4.9 Design Criterion 9
- 4.2.4.10 Design Criterion 10 l
l 4.2.5 Surveillance CM teria i 4.2.5.1 Surveillance CriteMon 1 4.2.5.2 Surveillance CriteMon 2 4.2.5.3 Surveillance CriteMon 3 4.3 Implementation of Criteria
- 5. CONCLUSIONS REGARDING ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA l
REFERENCES vi l l l i
SWR SCRAM DISCHARGE SYSTEM
- 1. INTRODUCTION ,
On June 28, 1980, during a routine shutdown of the Browns Ferry Unit 3 .
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(BF3) reactor, a manual scram from approximately 365 power failed to insert about 40% of the control rods. Two additional manual scrans fol-lowed by an automtic scram were required before all control rods were fully inserted. The totti time that elapsed from the initial scram until all rods were inserted was approximately 15 minutes. The control rods which failed to insert were located in one side (the east side) of the reactor. Subsequent investigations by the licensee, General Electric Company (GE), and by the U. 5. Nuclear Regulatorf Commission (NRC) staff narrowed the cause of the problem to an tecumulation of water in the east-side scram discharge volume (50V) header at the time of the first scram. This acegmulation reduced the avoiltale free volume for discharge of scram water which inhibited insertion o' control rods. It is believed that water accumulated because the SDY system venting and/or draining were obstructed. Furthermore, the accumulation of water was not detected by scram level instruments wnich input to the reactor protectfon system. It was believed that the SDV level instrumentation was designed to scram the reactor before water accumulated in the scram discharge volwee that could hinder scram. As part of the response to this event at SF3, followup investigations and tests were perfomed by the licensees. As a result, a number of other deficiencies were uncovered. At Duane Arnold, a scram discharge
volume drain valve was found to be incorrectly installed which re in a potential for off-normal response. A single rod failed to scram at Nine Mile Point 1 due to a faulty scram pilot solenoid. At Millstone 1, the circuit for Reactor Protection System reset did not have th - second-delay relay connected. (The 10-second time delay provides assurance that a scram signal is not reset until the rods can be fully ins e rted ) . The scram test results at Dresden Unit 3 and Browns Ferfy 1 appurt to indicate that a vacuum was being created in the scram discha g r e volume e that restricts,d draining after scram. At Peach Bottom 2 'and 3, incorrect parts installed in the backup scram valve solenoids rendered es these valv inoperable. On a walkthrough of the Fitzpatrick piant a 1o00 seal was discovered in the drain line between the east ed volume (IV). SDV head rument-At Hatch Unit 2, two of the four scram discharge volume level switches which are a part of the raactor protection , we re system found to be inoperable as a result of collapsed floats. (This is similar to deficiencies previously noted which are the subject of I&E n Bulleti (IES) 80-14 (Reference 1) issued 12, Jane1980.) 1.1 Short-Tem Program In response to the 3F3 event, events wnich cause collapse of level in - ment floats 'and other event listed above, two bulletins, IE3 30-17 and IES 80-14, and three supplements to IES 80-17 (Reference 1-5) were . IE3 80-17 (Reference 2), and Supplements 1-3 (Reference 3-5) of this bulletin have reouired testing and verification of scram system r-per'o
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mence. 1 The SDV drain tests at all operating BWRs ha the SDV will drain acceptably after reactorve demonstrated that scram. The requirement for positive venting of the SDV system also p rovides added assurance that water will not accumulate in the 50V . of SOVs that will be implemented in Decenter 1980 p rovides increased assurance that an adequate volume for the scram disch available. arge water is Functional tests of the IV level instrumentati on are being required after every scram; this substantially red uces the probability that damaged instrumentation would remain undet plant operation. ected during subsequent Additionally, each licensee has reviewed n yd M fied ad shutdown procedures to be taken should the SDV be filli ng with water or should other potential scras failure conditions o description of these events and bulletin ccur. requi A more detailed ! 80-14 and 80-17 (References 1 and 2) and in the direments 13 p in this SER. scussions included Detailed evaluations of the licensees' respons es to the events and IE Bulletin requirements are contained in th ) short-tenu evaluations that are attached as Appendix S e plant-s. These evalua-tions as well as additional requirements as fonn the interim basis for continued operatiospecified in this report final corrective action. n of operating SWRs pending 1.2 Long-Tenn Program To improve the overall design of the SDV syst em an MRR task force has been working with a subgroup of the SWR Owners G roup to develoo revised
scram discharge system design and safety criteria. This effort has included participation by The Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE) and E. It has addressed the major problems uncovered as a result of the analysis and evaluation of the BF3 event and other associated SDV opera
- ting experience. The revised design and safety criteMa derived from this effort will be used to establish acceptable modifications to BWR SDV systems. The major problems which have been identified are discussed in the following section of this Safety Evaluation Report (SER).
1.3 Problem Definition 1.3.1 Hydraulic Coupling The most significant design deficiency that contributed to the partial scram failure at BF3 is the inadequate hydraulic cecpling that exists between the SDV headers and the IV. Th1s finding is shared by E, the BWR Owners Subgroup and NRC staff. Inadequate hydraulic coupling was aptly dettenstrated at Browns Ferry when water accumulated in SDV and the protective instrumentation in the IV did not detect the problem. With respect to hydraulic coupling of the SDV headers and the V, there are two basic designs: (1) the IV is attached directly to the SDV header by a large diameter connection; and (2) the !Y is at a c::meara-tively long distance from the SDV header and connected by a pine of
- relatively small diameter. The latter design found at 3rowns Ferry
P is susceptible to problems because of poor hydraulic coupling . This SDV system design found at Browns Ferry is the out more comm 20 plants use this design. Figure 1 is a simplified schematic of the hydraulic coupling characteristics of 'the design in which s the IV i camparatively far from the SDV headers and connected by a pipe of - tively small diameter. The other design (Figure 2) is not subject to hydraulic coupling problems and will not be discussed r in furthe this section. Nomal operation of the system design illustrated in Figure es 1 provid a drainage path for leakage from the scram discharge Water lines. passing into the SDV headers flows down its associated SDV drain lin toward the IV and out the IV through the IV drain liney by gravit drain-age. The drain line for each SDV is 2 in, in diameter. One SDV drain line is generally longer than the other as shown in Figure . Vent 1 lines are about one in. In diameter and provide a vent path for the SDV headers to facilitate free SDV drainage. The !Y was designed to 4 detect water accumulation and provide indication and a scram ultimately to assure that sufficient free volume is available ers in the SDY to accommodate the water exhausted onOn scram. scram, the valves in ) the vent ano drain lines automatically close to contain the scram dis - charge water. Under conditions where a vent line or drain line fram the to the IV is r obstructed, or wnere there is inersased inleakage into s
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l l the SDV header, water may accumulate in the SDV header (these conditions may have individually or in combination caused the accumulation of water in the SDV header at BF3). The accumulation of water in the SDV can slow or stop rod insertion on scram (GE has experimentally shown that if water has accumulated to about 85". or greater of the SDV header volume, scram is effectively stapped). The extent and timing of water accumulation in the SDV header depend on the fluid-dynamic characteristic of the system from the vent line to the IV and on inleakage flow rates. Analyses, tests, and the BF3 event show that accumulation of water which car. ir.hibit scram function can occur. The degree to which the IV protects against these accumulations depends on the nydraulic coupling between the SDV headers and the IV. The accumulation of water in the IV is dependent on the system's fluid dynamic characteristics fram the IV thrcugh the drain line and the drainage rate from the SDV headers. For the design shown in Figure 1, drainaga fram the IV is such that the water in the IV accumulates relatively slowly compared to the rate of accumulation in the SDV headers. : i This ccn allow water to accumulate in the SDV header and not be detected, defeating the IV protective fmction and endangering the scrae function. l Therefore, the basic ob,1ective is to provide an adequate hydraulic couo- l ling between the SDV headers and the protective instrumntation to assure that for any potential inleakage, or possible vent or drain l l costruction, the instrumentation will actuate before adequate scram j volume is lost. I
I o 1.3.2 Instrumentation Given adequate hydraulic conninication between the SDV headers and the protective instrumentation, it is necessary to assure that the instrumen-tation is reliable. The existing water 16 vel instrumentation in the IV consists of float-type level sensors. There are three el' evations monitored it, the IV with identical instruments used for each of these pt.i nts. De lowst level instrument is an alarm which indicates to the operator that there is a small accumulation of water in the IV. The next level instrument activates a control rod block which prevents ; further rod withdrawals when water ac' cumulates to a preset level . i Each of these functions are provided by a single, non-redundant float- ; type level sensor. The highest level point is monitored by redundant instruments which provide a scram signal into the reactor protection ; l system. There are a total of four sensors at this point which acutate I scram on a "one-out-of-two taken twice" logic (This logic is identical to that found in all other SWR scram functions.) The connection of sensors to the IV varies from plant to plant. Some are connected to the IV directly, others are connected to the vent or drain lines. Some share connecting lines with the other sensors, others have secarate connecting lines. Float-type level instruments have experienced some failures [at Haten 1 and 2 and Brunswick, see IE3 80-14 (Reference 1)3. These failures have demonstrated the potential for common-cause failures of the instrumen-l tation. Althcugh this common-cause failure (hydrodynamic forces) has l .- .- _ - . - . - . - . . - -
I 4 i 8-been specifically addressed, there is also concern that other conmen-cause failures such as human error, manufacturing defects or environmental conditions may contribute significantly to the unreliability of level = instrumentation. In addition, a review of the instrumentation connections shows that shared connections to the SDV system vents and drains may also contribute to its unreliability. For the system design which is not susceptible to the inadequate hydraulic coupling problem discussed in the previous section, a potential instrumen-tation problem (also related to hydraulic coupling) has been identified. Figure 2 shows a simplified schematic of this design and instrumentation. For this design a potential water accumulation in one IV could occur without accumulation in the other IV. Given a single failure of an instrument in the IV in which water has accumulated, water could accumu-late in that side of the SDV undetected, and jeopardize scram in hal' the core. Therefore, the objective is to provide reliable instrumentation which can accommodate a single failure or potential common-cause failures for all postulated SDV filling svents. 1.3.3 Hydrodynamic Fcrees The specific causes for the damaged floats at Brunswick Unit i ano the Hatch units have not yet been determined. However, two possible mecha-nisms may have produced the observed damage:
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- 1) Large flow rates through the float chanber that drive the float to the limits imposed by mechanical stops on the float stem and can cause local deformation of the float wall; and
- 2) Water hamer.
Either of these mechanisms could produce dynamic forces on the floats that could have caused the observed damage. Damaged floats have been observed only in plants with the design shown in Figure 2. Note that this design generally connects one leg from the ficat chamber to either a vent or drain line. Further, damaged floats have been generally observed when there has been a delay in closure of the vent or drain valve. These conditions nay enhance the possibility of either identified damage mechanism, i.e., large flow or water hammer. Large flow rates can be expected if the lines from the float chanter are connected to points with large differences in static pressure. , 1 For the Figure 2 configuration high velocities through the relatively i small vent and drain lines comoared to the velocity in the IV on scram j or reset, could result in such a condition. This concition is only possible when the system is essentially water solid which is normally the case on reset but not on scram. Nonna11y on scram there is suffi. l cient air in the SDV on closure of the vent and drain valves, such that the dynamic head in the vent or drain lines does not result in large static pressure differences, and the crocess is a sinmle, constant volume comoression. However, given a delayed closure of a
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valve or a system that is already partially full, a water-solid system - - . could result and in the manner described above cause damagingly high flow rates through the float chamber. Water hanner could result on closure of the valves when water is - , , passing through the vent or drain lines at high flow rates or possibly from steam bubble collapse. For the classical water hammer on valve closure, the causes of passing water at high flow rates through the vent and drain lines are similar to those discussed for large flows through the float chancer. For the steam bubble collapse, a delayed closure of a valve could allow hot water into the 50V which could flash, fann steam and cause two-phase flow through the system. On closure of the valves, system pressurization could cause a collapse of the bubble and possibiv water hammer. At one plant, damage was not ; limited to the floats, since the vent line was found to be pulled frau i its restraints. This emphasizes the importance of designing the ; entire system to withstand potential water hammers. Given tnis explanation, the basic objective is to provide a system which is not subjected to adverse effects of hydrodynamic forces. 1.3.a Reactor Coolant System Isolation In the review of the SUV system, the adequacy of the reactor coolant system isolation function that is provided by the valves in the vents and drain lines has been brought into cuestion. Currently given a 2hram that is not or cannot be reset ar.d a failure of one of tne these _ _ _ .. ._,.. ~,._ ,~_- ._ _ . ~ . . _ _ . _ , _ . , _ . _ _ _ . . . . . _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ . _ _ _ .
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11 - valves to close automatically, there is a direct path from the reactor vessel through the scram discharge lines, the SDV, and vent or drain line to the reactor building. Cansideration was given to the possibility of closing the,se valves or the scram outlet valves manually to assure isolation of the reactor coolant, but access to the reactor building to perfom this manual action, given the influx of reactor water, cannot be assured. Also the potential for resetting the scram, thus isolating the system, was considered, but for most cases reset would not be possi-ble since a number of scram signals may be present. Further, NRC staff has perfomed a radiological dose as'.;essment of post-scram leakage of all scram discharge from the SDV and has calculated the dose to be a small fraction of the limits set forth in 10 CFR 100 (Reference 6). The staff has also assessed as small the probability for such leak-age. On the basis of this low overall risk, NRC staff concludes that _ this problem can be resolved in our long-tem program and need not be a6 dressed in the short-tem. Therefore, assurance of the capability to isolate reactor coolant given a postulated single-failure of a vent or drain valve must be addressed in the long-tem program. 1.3.S Implications of Anticipated Transient Without Scram l L Our proposed ATWS rule (Referen:e 22) was presented to the Commission on Septemoer 19, 1980. The effect of the Browns Fern event on ATWS probabilities has been incorporated into this proposed rule. The conse-ouences of a Browns Fern type of event coupled with a limiting antici-t- cated transient such as a main steam isolation valve (MSIV) closure 9 7 -- . < y % ., .=.--+,e---- r --w%,. , - , . - - ,s. .we-*- y-et, en-,m----.,.~
4 l i from 100t power have been estimated. The results are acceptable assuming a rod insertion similar to that actually achieved at BF3 and timely operator action in actuating the standby liquid control system (SLCS) and the residual heat removal system. However, for more severe scram failures such as no rod movement on one side of the core, the consequences may not be acceptable and ultimately could result in a significant health and safety impact on the public. This could have been the result of a partial or complete filling of either SDV header at BF3. Therefore, we continue to actively pursue implementation of separate and diverse means to reduce the probability and also to sitigate the consequences of ATWS in our generic efforts and will not discuss the topic to any great extent in this report. 1.3.6 Additional Studies . For the long-tem program, ma,jor modifications to the SDV system are pl anned. In order o assure that improvements to the system are made in an efficient manner, NRC's Probabilistic Risk Assessment Branch is analy2:ing failure modes and effects to identify areas where design l changes may most improve SDV system function. This analysis will consi-der the two types of SDV design as illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, and ! i systematically identify potential failures and associated effects and probabili ties. This study will be used to delineate long-tem improve-ments in the scram discharge system which should be incorporated in the design of future plants. v- ,r - *--e' w
VENT LINE VENT LINE SC 4AM DISCl!A (GE LI ES SCRA RG LI ES-Di[r
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SDV HEADERS . SIN DRAIN LIE I LEVEL INSTRUMENT , INSTRUMENTED VOLUME t; e IV DRAIN LINE
. ACCUMULATION VOLUME I:lliURE 1 - SIMPl.IFIED SDV llYDRAULIC COUPLING SUBJECT T0 llYDRAULIC COUPLING PROBLEMS
l VENT LINES
< . 6 S[ RAP DipCllARGR LI4ES '
SCRAM DISCilARGE LINES I l I I I F l i 1 1 1_ I SDV llEADERS SDV HEADERS l l) I. ) SCRAM b I IV IV l ROD BLOCK C ALARM _J
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z lY DRAIN LINES - l ACCUMULAIl0N VOLUME FIGURE 2 - SillPLIIIEI) SliV llYl)RAULIC COUPLIllG NOT SUBJECT T0 llYDRAULIC COUPLING PROBLEMS 1
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- 2. SACKGROUNO l i
2.1 Operating Experience 2.1.1 History of Events ! The event at Browns Ferry Unit 3 resulted in prompt action by personnel- ! of TVA, GE, and NRC to analyze and evaluate the seriousness of the : event, detemine the cause, and take corrective action to prevent recur- j rence. This evient has been described in more detail in a memorandum l to D. Eisenhut, D. Ross, and V. Stallo from C. Michelson dated July 30, ! 1980 (Reference 7). The NRC initiated an inmediate investigation by f
'two NRC Resident Inspectors assisted by a specialist in core physics ,
from Region II. A Confimation of Action letter (Reference 8) was f issued by Region II confiming TVA's commitments for action to be taken i i before restart of Browns Ferry Unit 3. An evaluation team was fomed { from NRC headquarters and the team was dispatched to the BF3 site under t direction of the Region II Director. Preliminary Notifications were { issued by IE on June 30, July 3, and July 14,1980 (References 9-11) ! I to notify all NRC offices of events related to BF3. The Director cf ! IE briefed the Commissioners on July 3,1980. Preliminary inspections, testing, analyses, ano evaluations indicated ! the cause of the BF3 event was the accumulation of a significant amount of water in the east side SDV. The exact cause af the water accumulation : l could not be detemined, but the most probable cause was detemined !
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to be insufficient draining of the SDV due to an cestruction in the { crain and/or vent lines. ! l t i f
l 8<. J i l ID 80-17 (Reference 2) was issued on July 3, 1980 to provide test and surveillance requirements to assure that similar conditions did not exist at other operating BWRs. This bulletin required licensees of BWRs designed by GE to initiate corrective actions to prevent a signifi- : cant accumulation of water in the SDV and to perfom tests confiming that no other significant problems existed in the scram system. In l addition, IEB 80-17 required actions to enhance mitigation should a ; scram failure occur. i Supplement 1 to IEB 80-17 was issued on July 18, 1980 (Refertnce 3) ! following NRC evaluation of additional detailed infomation received ! on "as-ouilt" SDY piping configurations and administrative procedures f related to the use of the Standby Liquid Control System (SLCS). This f supplement required (a) additional inspection and evaluation of the l as-built SDV system, (b) procedures specifying action to be taken if i water is found in the SDV, (c) additional procedural controls on the ! use of SLCS, and (d) installation of a system to continuously monitor j for water accumulation in the SDY. During the period from July 30 until l August 5,1980 working level regional meetings were held with BWR licen- l sees to gather infomation regarding the as-built configurations of the scram discharge system at each operating BWR. Supplement 2 to IEB 80-17 was issued on July 22, 1980 (Reference 4) wnen testing required by IES 80-17 at Drescen Nuclear Power Station
'Jnit 3 and additional testing at Browns Ferry !jnit i higt. lighted the
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i I importance of proper SDV venting. This supplement required that each ! BR licensee with an SDV system similiar to BF3 must provide a vent i i path continuously open to building atmosphere. Subsequently, all plants .j have verified that their SDV vent systems contain a direct vent path . to the reactor building atmosphere. ' i A proposed abnomal occurrence report was issued on July 30,1980 (Reference. l '12) classifying the BF3 event as a major degradation of essential safety-related equipment. IE Information Notice 80-30 was issued August 19, l 1980 (Reference 13) infoming all GE SWR licensees of the potential I for adverse interaction betareen the scram system and loss of control air as discussed in a Memorandum to H. Denton, NRR fran C. Michelson, ; AEOD, dated. August 18,1980 (Reference 14). This infomation notice { i was issued in mid-September (Reference 15) when NRC staff learned that i t some plants were not scramming on low-air-pressure alam indication. ! Confirmatory orders were issued on October 2,1980 (Reference 16) to ! 16 facilities that had provided unacceptable responses to requirements setforth in IEB 80-17 Supplement 1. The orders confirmed crmmitments i by each utility to install instrumentation to provide control room indica-l tion and alam of accumulation of water in either SDV header volume. The orders also provided for increased surveillance (once per shift) of the SDVs until the installation of the continuous monitoring system i is comoleted (by 'Jecember 1,1980). Browns Fern is committed to be
e i t' ations which is acceptable since Browns Ferry is also committed to surveil. i lance of the scram discharge volumes once per 30 minutes until the modifica-tions are completed. During the course of the above events, special inspection procedures were developed and issued to the NRC Regional Offices for guidance i in inspecting licensees' actions in response to bulletin requirements. f Briefings of the significant events and NRC actions were prov'ided to the Commission and the ACRS both shortly after the BF3 event and follow-ing implementation of certain short-tem actions. Several SWRs have experienced degradation of the IV level switches that are not associated with the cause of the BF3 event. At Hatch I damaged scram floats were found on June 13, 1979, and at Brunswick 1 collapsed rod block and alarm floats were discovered on Novemoer 14, 1979. These events resulted in the issuance of IEB 80-14 on June 13,1980 (Reference 1), before June 28, 1980 when the BF3 event occurred. The cause of damage to the level switch floats has not been fully detamined but is believed to have been caused by excessive hydrodynamic forces result-ing from delayed closure of the vent and drain valves at Brunswick 1.
!E3 80-14 required actions to prevent recurrence of damaged floats, to detect damage if it did occur, and to review plant records for other instances of damaged floats.
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i i 1 j On July.26, 1980, during testing _ required by IEB 80-17, collapsed scram . l
' t floats were. discovered at Hatch 2. The cause of this float damage has !
not been datamined, but a revier of available infomation indicated i that these level switches had been inoperable since June 2,1980 and ! that. response to IEB 80-14 had been inadequate. In response to this, l Supplement 3 to IEB 80-17 required functional testing of SOY level , j i switches after even scram, since as previously discussed, damage occurs ; i on scram or scram reset. ; 2.1.2 Safety Significance The BF3 event on June 28, 1980 involved the failure of the scram sys*Je l i to perfom its function as designed. This represented a significant ! 1 departure from expected performance for a system important to safety, { and caused the NRC to question the reliability of the BWR scram system. This event did result in close scrutiny of the BWR scram system wed-l identified design deficiencies requiring both short-tem and 1r ! corrective actions. I As proposed, an abnomal occurence report was prepared (Reference 2) f classifying the 3F3 event as a major degradation of essential safety- l l related equipment. j l The Hatch 1 and 2 and Brunswick i events each involved two inoperable IV level float switches and highlighted the potential for a ccumen-cause i failure mecnanism to be responsible for degradation of redundant float I I I
i i l l switches. Such degradation cou?? potentially result in loss of manual or automatic protection, including reactor scram, noma 11y expected : to occur when the IV fills with water. ! l No connection has been established between these events involving degraded r floats and the BF3 event. Also, in the Hatch and Brunswick events, i redundant switches were operable. t 2.2 Interim Technical Specifications ; l On July 7,1980, the staff requested all operating BWR licensees to
- propose technical specification changes that woul d improve the capability
- of the scram discharge system. This effort was begun prior to the BF3 event as a result of other events that had occurred in operating BWRs involving common-cause failures of SDV level switches and operability to SDV drain valves. The proposed technical specifications were intended ;
to strengthen the provisions set in place by IE3 80-14 to assure that j the scram system would continue to work during reactor operation. The proposed technical specifications provided surveillance requirements for SDV vent and drain valves and LCO/ surveillance requirements for i Reactor Protection System and control-rod-block !Y limit switches. As l 1 a guide for the licensees, NRC staff prepared model technical specifica- {
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tions for incorporation into the GE standard technical specifications. As a result of the BF3 partial scram event and subseouent requirements imposed by IE3 80-17, it is apparent that mre interim technical specifica-t , - .
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i 1 tion changes will be necessary. One example is the requirement, imposed l by IEB 80-17, Supplement 3, to perfom functional tests of instrument . volume alam, rod block and scram switches after any scram. The staff intends to incorporate these changes into the license amendments that are processed in response to the July 7,1980 request. We also plan l to incorporate surveillance requirements in technical specifications according to our findings on the long-term criteria (Section 4.2.5). l l
- 3. JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION ,
3.1 Bulletin Requirements j 3.1.1 Technical Basis The requirements of IE Bulletins 80-14 and 80-17 provide a technical basis for continued operation, in concert with requirments established , in this report, until long-tem resolution is achieved. These bulletins
. required tests and verification of scram system function as well as verification of shutdown procedures in the event of scram failures. ;
These bulletins also contain requirements that correct or protect against the design deficiencies identified as a result of the events discussed I above. This section lists these deficiencies and discusses the protec- l tion provided through IE Bulletin 80-14 and 80-17. The principal design deficiencies identified for resolution in the short-l term program are (a) inadeouate hydraulic coupling between the SDV headers and the IV, (b) a complex connection of piping to the vent and drain
I of the scram discharge system that may compromise these func , (c) common-cause failure mechanisms- c es, andfor the IV leve (d) specific failure of the control air system that is c ompounded by ' an inadequate hydraulic coupling, which could conceivably y ca ! to scram control rods. 3.1.1.1 . Inadequate Hydraulic Coupling Inadequate hydraulic coupling between the SDV headers and th e IV is - the most significant design deficiency that may cause water t 3 undetected in the SDY. o accumulate The disadvantages associated with this inadeounte hydraulic coupling are: (a) reliance on the SDV vent for timely draining of the SDV following scram, especially if there is leakage thro i the scram outlet valves; (b) the potential for water ac i cumulation in i the SDV due to the relatively high probability of block age or a loop i seal in a 2 in. pipe compared to impediment in aer;pipe of large d. and (c) the possibility of a leak rate into the SDV greater than the , drain rate out through a 2-in. line. i Until changes are isolemented to improve theydesign raulic of the h d ; coupling between the SDV headers and IV, detection of any signific , j accumulation of water in the SDV is provided by directly monitcH the SDV. i This detection measure is required througn IE3 80-17
. Supple- i ments 1-3, and the confirmatory orders. ;
Until continuous monitoring is installed (committed to be empleted beginning Decem { e r 1, 1980 ), periccic monitoring is provideo at least once per snift j This frecuency
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is adequate to detect a. " slow' fill of the SDV. assuming expected leakage i (less than 0.5 gps, total) through closed scram outlet velves and a block- l age in the 2 in. line leading from the SDV to the IV.. This frequency is. ! also adequate to protect against the opening of one scram outlet valve. ; In this case, the exima expected leakage (less than'10 gps) would drain f
'through the SDV without = any significant accumlation. The operator my be alerted to this condition by a rod-drift alarm or increased CR0 tageratum l t
and would have enough time to take corrective action. Periodie direct unitoring is also adequate to protect against the opening of several" l outlet valves which do not cause rod stion (1 to 5 per rod). Again the operator would be alerted by increased CRD tagerature. It is 'also impro-bable that such leakage could occur without rod stion. So that reasonnele f i assurance exists that the operator would take acequate remedial action for { this as IES 80-17, Supplements 1-3 require. ,' < For sona plants, another source of water leakage into the SDV could be the flush connections attached to the SDV. Water from this source is highly j unlikely during peer operation and could only occur by a series of oper- l ator errors. Water accumlation from this source would be also detected by directly unitoring the SDV. 1 The requirements for direct unitoring of the SDV provide protection ] against an accumlation of water from all possible sources. The adequacy 4 this protection, involving as it does ooerator action, depends on l l l
i l (a) equipment which alerts the operator, (b) procedures and training i 1 which require the appropriate operator actions, and (c) sufficient time i 1 available for the operator to take the appropriate action. A fast I fill of the SDV could occur from unexpected opening of multiple scram outlet valves. Theoretically, this could happen when malfunctions occur either in the electrical distribution system or in the air source.
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Soth these systems are needed to hold the scram outlet valves closed. The limiting case, in evaluating the protection' afforded, is the failure of the CRD air system that results in the ' fastest" fill of the SDV and the least time available for operator action. This evaluation is provided in Section 3.1.1.4 that follows. The potential for electrical distribution malfunction, which may cause-SDV fill, is very small (such a failure would require multiple solenoids de-energizing). Additionally, definitive information in the form of a large number of rod drift alarms would be observed by the operator and immediate manual scram would be initiated as is required by Supple-ment 3 to IG 80-17. Therefore, this problem, has net been addressed further. In addition, this report will not address previously identified j i potential failures on motor-generator set electrical power quality i and its effect on scram failure. This issue is the subject of a letter to all operating BWRs in September and October 1980 from the Division of Licensing (Referenca 23). (This letter is typical of a set of letters to all SWR licensees.)
i q 3.1.1.2 Complex Vent and Drain Piping ' The emplex r.onnection of piping to the scram discharge vent'and drain potentially compraises the vent and drain functions. However, if- i blockage or system interaction occurs in the IV drain piping, any signifi-cant accumulation of water is expected to occur in the IV. This accumula- , tion, detected by level switches in the IV, would result in automatic f scram of the reactor, if necessary. For the vent function, blockage l or significant system interaction could potentially cause ineffective draining of the SDV header. In this case, water could accumulate in
. the SDV for those plants which have inadequate hydraulic coupling between j t
the SDV and the IV. To protect against this, IES 80-17 requires verifica- l t tion that the vent is free feca obstruction and that the vent valves i are operable and open. Also IES 80-17, Supplement 2 requires a positive ! vent directly to building atmosphere without reliance on any caponent j other than the vent valve. These requirements accootably minimize the potential for a loss of the vent function resulting fra caplex piping l l configurations that existed previously. I 3.1.1.3 Level Switch Problems Operating experience at Hatch 1 and 2 and Brunswick 1 indicates that comnen-cause failure mechanisms exist for IV level switches; as a result,
- switenes could fail to initiate a reactor scram. Identification and resolution of these failure mechanisms is ongoing.
l [ t i However, these failure mechanisms result from forces which are believed ! to occur during reactor scras and/or scram reset, not during power , operation. Supplement 3 to IEB 80-17 requires that a functional test ' of these level switches be performed following each reactor scram and before return to power operation. Such testing provides added assur-ance that level switches are operable and identifies such failures j before power operation is re-initiated. Additionally, there are require- l ments for periodic check of level switches per technical specification , to help assure that random failures that could occur during nomal opera- ! tion would be identified. 4 I 3.1.1.4 Control Air System Failure : i As discussed above, failure of the control air system has been identified ; as a mechanism that could conceivably be the cause of inability to scram the control rods. Sustained low pressure in the control air l system could result in complete or partial opening of multiple scram ! I outlet valves, causing the SDV r.o fill rapidly, thus leaving a relatively I short time for the coerator to take corrective action before scram capability is lost. IE Bulletin 80-17, Supolenent 3 recuires an imreci-ate manual scram when low pressure occurs in the CRD air system or when other indications occur, such as multiple rod drift alares or a marked change in the number of control rods that are at high temocrature. Beginning on Decemoer 1,1980, protection will also be provided by contin-ucus monitoring of the SDV. Since only a short time could De available I 1
r i l . 1 ! for the operator to successfully initiate a reactor scram, the adequacy f of equipment and procedures available to the operator were reviewed. t I This review took into account the current requirements and equipment : available as well as the continuous SDV monitoring equipment scheduled to be installed December 1,1980. ! While this continuous monitoring system and operator response provide important protection against water accumulation in the SDY headers under i slow fill conditions, it does not address adequately the potential loss of air events (fast fill scenarios). A human factors evaluation deter- ! mined that: (1) It is not possible to assure that the operator will not be diverted ; by other alams or activities; (2) Indication of air pressure may not be sufficiently clear to assure immediate manual scras. Some analysis by the operator may be l reouired; l (3) The use of two alam systems (air pressure and SDV level) as a signal +4 manually scram (Decemer 1980 requirement) may be i confusing; and l t (4) The GE UT system, the system that will be used by most 3WR licen- l sees to satisfy the Decemer 1,1980 requirement, has an excessive numoer of alarms and indicators that may tend to confuse the acer-ato r. Additionally, system malfunctions can defeat its alam func-tion, operating procedures are unclear, and the operator is recuired to carry out too many actions to verify the need for a manual scram.
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l Based on this review, reliance on the. operator to successfully carry- ; out a manual scram within a limited time frame (2 minutes) may not , be assured. .Therefore, in order to provide added protection for credible degraded air conditions in SWR control air supply systems, the staff .i requires that the licensees (except those excluded per Table 1 on this subject) install an automatic system to . initiate control. rod insertion by dumping the control air system header for degraded air conditions. This automatic system shall be installed within 2 months. This peHod is considered acceptable given that an immediate manual scram is required on loss of air per our bulletin and that the SDV continuous monitoring system ; will be used as cor, trol room indication of water accumulation in the SDV' i headers. Additionally, each licensee will be required to specify clear { operating procedures for the use of the SDV continuous monitoMng system ! i and appropriate remedial action on its alarm. These procedures should be ! i submitted within 2 months to the NRC for review. The probability of an j i event wnich degrades air pressure in such a manner as not to give addi-tional indications is small. Additionally, the probability of a degraded l air condition in the 2 month peMod is considered small. Therefore, the f overall M sk for this period is acceptacle. The following criteria for this system have been detemined: ! 1 (1) The system shall automatically initiate control rod insertion under postulated conditions of degraded air (at 10 psi or greater above
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scram outlet valve opening pressure); ! l (2) The system shall be oesigned, procured and installed to provide l l the best relianility obtainacle in the short time seriod; I
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(3) The system shall not degrade the existing safety systems (e.g., reactor protection system); , (4) The system shall be designed to be testable to the maximum extent practicable, without upsetting normal power operation; i (5) The system shall allow for scram reset; . (6) The design shall minimize the_ potential for inadvertent or unneces-sary scram; and (7) Any required power supply should not be subject to any failure j i mode which could also initiate the degraded-air conditions, unless l l it can be demonstrated that an automatic scram will occur promptly I because of the failure mode of the power supply. j Consideration should be given to the use of a vent valve (similar to ! the backup scram valve) in the camaan air-supply header which is actuated on degraded air pressure. This system can be implemented independent j of the existing reactor protection system. l l l The BWR owners subgroup plans to continue their effort and resolve this issue of automatic air header dump on degraded air. In the long ters, [ the improved hydraulic coupling will assure detection by level instrumenta- ] tion and thereby provide a timely automatic scram independent of the inleak-1 age rate when the SDV headers fill. ) 3.1.2 Generic Applicability IEB B0-14 and B0-17 reouirements and confirmatory order cemitments apply to all General Electric BWRs. If these reouirements and cammit-ments are satisfied along with the adcitional requirement for an automatic
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I i lt I air header dump on low air pressure, and acceptable technical basis exists for continued operation. The bulletin requirements were written I for. the worst-case plant so that if all. the requirements are satisified, ; continued operation would be acceptable. Some SWRs have unique designs j or improved hydraulic coupling so that no action was required for some i i bulletin itans. For example, a ' plant that had a very complex vent-piping ! configuration would have cut open the vent line; this would not have been done if plant venting was already open to building atmosphere. ; General Electric's BWRs can be grouped as indicated in Table i for generic applicability and major action that must be ,. wided until the indicated l design deficiencies have been resolved. As shown in Table 1, Big Rock Point, Humooit Bay, Dresden 1, and Lacrosse have unique features, so f that most bulletin requirements are not applicable at this time. Hatch l j 1 and 2, Brunswick 1 and 2, and Duane Arnald have adequate communication ! between the SDV and IV, so that some of the bulletin requirements are not aoplicable. The remaining SWRs are essentially equivalent to Browns Ferry 3 with respect to concerns related to the scram system. Di fferences from Browns Ferry 3 are plant specific and have been evaluated against the bulletin requirements. Detailed plant-specific infomation can be found in Appendix B of this report. 3.2 Imolementation of Requirements I l Section 3.1.1 above establisnes an acceptacle technical basis for :on- 1 i tinued operation provided the bulletin reouirements and confirmatory J order commitments are satisfiec and the automatic air header dumo is ! 1
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1 i l I I Table 1. Generic applicability and major inteHe actions to be provided until design deficiencies have been resolved. 1 l i Design Deficiency Applicabili ty* Major Interim Action I Inadequate hydraulic All GE BWRs except Hatch Monitor the 50V for l coupling 1 & 2, Brunswick 1 & 2, water accumulation l Duane Arnold ! Complex vent piping All E BMs Provide or verify positive, operable ; vent Level switch problem All E BWRs Functional test level i switches after scram : Air system problem All GE BWs except Hatch Automatic air header 1 & 2, Brunswick 1 & 2, dump on low air pres-Duane Arnold sure (in the interim, as backuo, a manual ! scram on low air pres- l sure alarm is reouf red) I
*The following are excluded for the reason listed: Big Rock Point - unique design which is not susceptible to the majority of design deficiencies; Humbolt Bay and Dresden 1 - shut down indefinitely; Lacrosse is not a GE BWR - design of CRD is unique ,
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installed per the requirements of this report. For each GE BWR, the NRR Task Force has reviewed the bulletin responses for acceptable cam-mitments and IE Regional / Resident Inspectors have inspected licensee's ! actions for acceptable ~ implementation of these casaritments. The detailed results are in Appendix B of this report. l l Since the confirmatory order commitisents will not be implemented until ' i after December 1,1980, inspections for acceptable implementation will be conducted after this report has been issued. The results of these inspections will be documented in a future inspection recort for each , plant. 3.3 Generic Conclusions Regarding Acceptability The staff has reviewed each licensee's response to the requirements , of IEB 80-14 and IEB 80-17, including Supplements 1, 2, and 3 (References i i 1-5), and has evaluated the actions taken in response to these bulletins. i The staff believes that campliance with these requirements provides l; a sound basis for continued operation of operating BWRs pending implemen- l tation of additional short and long-tem nocifications to correct known f
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defici enci es. The results of the bulletin evaluations are summarized j for each plant in Appendix B to this report. Based upon these evalua- ! tions, the staff concludes that continued operation is warranted. l 1
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4.. \ L.ONG-TERM PROGRAM l 4.1 Modification Criteria During a meeting with several BWR owners \
, i encouraged the BWR owners to participate in develon Aug \
i ance criteria which would fom the basis for 1o oping design and p} I to correct scram discharge' system .defi ng-tem modifications i event and during subsequent investigationsc encies noted dur { operational experience accumulated by the BWR oApplying th l i of plant operation to the solution'of the problwners over many ye i emsasassociated with the { BWR scram discharge system, as well as I as balanced approach in detemining how to solvsociated syst ' e the problems, expected that after the criteria were developed It was I use these criteria in developing specific desig . SWR licensees; dual plants. n modifications at incivi- , As a result of the staff request, a BWR o I met during the week of September 3 to draftwners subgroup was fo \ on Septemoer 19, 1980 the criteria. At a meeting ; with the subgroup, the NRC t $ these criteria and suggested improveme ask t force reviewed i n s. i were directed toward making the criteria In general, these suggestions i i assure consistent implementation by individual limore specific i censees. ! suo-group had avoided being prescriptive The owners I - flexibility to develop modifications in c, allowing each owner substa designs, yet solving the basic problems i onsonance with specific plan t charge volume system. dentified with the scram dis-I i i
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At a meeting of the subgroup during the , comments were considered and e. criteHa were modifi dw were again reviewed by the staff on Octob The cHteria nical differences of opinion were identified:er 15, at which tim , (1) The need to consider the potential for c i scram level instrumentation; and ommon-cause failure in the (2) , The need for dependance on the SDV heade 5 promet drainage of the SDV headers r vent system for assuring 1 The subgroup has since reconsidered its issues and has changed Designposition CriteMoon these technical ' strengthen the recuirement for an 50V system thn 1 (See SI a vent for prampt drainage. at does not depend on need to address common-cause failures of scraHow , was not resolved, and the staff has m level instrumentation + in this safety evaluation report to replaced an additional require ' solve its concern. . The CMteria were submitted and acceptance on November to the full S WR Owners Group for review
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i 19,1980 (Reference 17)
- 0. Waters, Chairman of this grouo datedand $! a letter frs ovember ;
25,1980 (Reference
- 18) orovides confirmation of acceptance \
Group. ' An NRC 1etter of October 1,1990 (R fof these criteHa by t \ i BWR licensee to state its intent to reeval e erence 19) recu! and either to modify that system to meet the addi iuate its pres ! perfom.ance cM teHa ceveicoed by the o t onal design ano wners subgroup or to provide
l l i l other cHteria by which to judge the adequacy of th sys tas. e present scram , i I a 4.2 The Criteria, Their Twchnical Bases, and Additi i and Guidance onal Requirements l A complete set of BWR ownerse subgroup crit H A to this safety evaluation report a are included as Appendix
. j provided to facilitate an understanding of thThe format \
bases, additional staff requirements e criteHa, their technical for compliance with these criteria, and means acceptable to tha staff i cussed relative to the aforementioned format . under different headings such as functional critThe criteria are operational criteria, design cMteria and surveilleria, safety criteHa rally speaking operationis cHteria provide ance criteria. re Mne- , system and component performance'duHng on. Safety cHteria operatiquirements r and design criteria deal with systas changes to pe rwanently correct problems norted during the BF3 event and d j investigations, uring subsequent plant-specific i a.2.1 Functional Criteria 4.2.1.1 Functional Criterion 1 The scram discharce volume shall have contain water exhausted by a full reacter scrsufficient caoacity am without adversely affectino control-rod-drive scram cerfomance. _ Technical Basis--The SDV must provide ade exnausted by a full reactor scram and water from leskouate volume for t age past the CRD
i seal s. If the scram discharge voluse'is insufficient to contain this r water, a back-pressure would develop relative to rod insertion which would slow the rod-insertion times. If adequate volume were not pro- ' vided, a slow scram or a failure to fully scram could result. s Accootable Compliance--An acceptable means of meeting this criterion is to provide a sinimum scram discharge volume of 3.34 gallons per : drive (GE Letter OER 54 dated March 14, 1972, Reference 20). 4.2.2 Safety Criteria a.2.2.1 Safety Criterion 1 No single active failure of a component or service function shall orevent a reactor scram, under the most degraded conditions that are coeratio acceotable. Technical Basis--The single failure criterion provides the basis for this criterion. Acceptable Compliance--An acceptable means of complying r e- with this c rien is to design the system such that partial loses of service function 1 (e.a. , degraded control air pressure) as well as full loses do not adverse-ly affect system function. 4.2.2.2 Safety Criterion 2 No single active failure shall orevent uncontrolled loss of react or coolant.
t
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, Technical Basis--Presently the SDV vent is provided with a single isola-tion valve. Similarly the IV drain is also provided with a single isola-tion valve. Failure of either valve could result in uncontrolled loss {
l of reactor coolant. Satisfaction of this criterion is necessary to l meet single-f ailure criterion with regard to containment of reactor coolant. Acceptable Cogliance--An acceptable way of meeting this criterion is to provide two isolation valves in series in all SDV vent and IV drain lines which are sufficiently independent to avoid failure due to solenoid failurts. This resolution will also correct the potential for excessive hydrodynamic force generation previously discussed. 4.2.2.3 Safety Criterion 3 The scram discharge system instrumentation shall be designed to orovide redundancy, to coerate reliably under all conditions, and shall not be adversely affected by hydrodynamic forces or flow characteristics. Technical Basis--This criterion is neeoed to satisfy single-failure criterion for scram level instmmentation and to assure reliable opera-tion after hydrodynamic conditions irmosed by the discharge of reactor coolant under normal scram and reset conditions, and abnormal conditions ; caused by maloperation of comonents, such as delayed closing of vent and orain valves. However, this criterion does not d.ecuately address the potertial for I corrmon-cause failures of the scram level instrumentation. The safety
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. . l function of reactor scram is a necessary safety function and its failure !
i can lead to unacceptable consequences. Therefore, it is extremely j important that there be sufficient volume in the 50V for accepting a [ full reactor scram at all times. In this regard, there have been' sources' ! of water identified which could fill the SDV. ! Given that water could be present, reliable instrumentation is needed ! to detect water buildup and scram the reactor. The existing level ( instrumentation has experienced some failures. These failures have
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demonstrated the potential for common-cause failures and therefore,- l canonecause' failures may be the most significant contributor to the - unreliability of the scram function. ? Although it is now believed that tha canen-cause failures (i.e., hydro-dynamic forces) have been identified for the crushed floats,, there ! are still concerns for other common-cause failures such as human error l h (particularly during testing), crud buildup or manufacturing errors. ! Therefore, it is the staff's position that each BWR licensee should address single random failures as well as comon-cause failures with resoect to the SDV level 1nstrumentation provided for reactor scram. Acceptable Compliance--An acceptable means of complying with this crite-rien and addressing the additional staff concerns on canon-cause failure , of instrumentation is as follows: (1) With respect to single failures (random) provide sufficient r.eoun-dancy in the automatic scram level instrumentation to meet the single I l
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1 1 i I f ailure criterion on each instrumented portion of the SDV. (2) With respect to cosinon-cause failures, meet either of the following ] l two alternatives. j I Alternative 1: ! (a) Provide additional (or substitute) level-sensing instrumeritation ! for the automatic scram function to include diversity as well as redundancy. - The diversity should, as a trinimum, be achieved by
)
level sensors that esploy different operating principles for measuring the water level; (b) For the instrumentation selected, demonstrate how connon-cause
. failures; such as those identified by operating history and those identified in the Foreword to IEEE 379-1977 (Reference 21), will '
be considered. Alternative 2: (a) Utilize the existing type level sensors, i.e., float level switches; (b) Provice a demonstration that the cause of the damaged floats has been identified and will be corrected or concensated for; (c) Provide a periodic test procacure (for on-line at power testing as well as for testing during and after shutdown) which helps ensure that testing-induced human error and adverse environmental factors i will be minimized (requirement under surveillance criteria); and (d) Provide either: 1 (i ) Additional (or substitute) level switches for automatic J scram wnicn are mace oy a different :nanufacturer; Or i
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7 q t i 40 - 1 1 (ii) Demonstrate that the diverse indication of SDV water accumu- ,
.1ation provided to the operator by an alarmed continuous ;
i monitoHng system can provide adequate backup protection i
-if the level sensors (providing auto scram) should fail ,
(Note that operator's response to a fast SDV fill event ! umst be considered, i.e., automatic air dump on loss of air). The alanned monitoMng system does not necessarily have to l t be classified as part of the protection system. However, ! its adecuacy needs to be addressed considering: (1) The reliability of the information provided to the'
.l operator, specifically its redundancy and testing; and !
(2) The operator actions and time available as a result of this l i information. ' 4.2.2.4 Safety Criterion 4 System operating conditions wh';ch are recuired for scram shall be contin-uously monitored. Tecnnical Basis--See basis on scram level instrumentation listed under Safety CMterion 3. l Acceptable Compliance--An acceptable means of complying with this crite-rion is provided under Safety Criterion 3. In addition, the staff l i will provide guidance by issuing proposed technical specifications. l l i
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1 4.2.2.5 Safety Criterion 5 Repeir, reolacement, adjustment, or surveillance of any system component q l shall not reouire the scram function to be uypsssed. Technical Basis--This c'itacion is based upon the requirements of the )
*1 out of 2 taken twice" logic and specifies that a scram level instrument ' !
cannot be bypassed for repair or replacement without violating the single-- . failure criterion. Acceptable Compliance-for instrument (cr instrument channel) repair or replacement, half-scram (1 out of 2) should be implemented in accordance with existing technical specifications. 4.2.3 Operational CriteM a These criteria are treated here as a group since they deal with operational convenience and not safety: 5 (1) Level instrumentation shall be designed to be maintained, tested, or calibrated during plant operation without causing a scram: (2) The system shall include sufficient supervisory instrumentation and ~ alams to oemit surveillance of system coeration: (3) The system shall be designed to minimize the exoosure of ooerating ' personnel to radiation; } l (4) Vent oaths shall be orovided to assure adeouate drainage in orecara-l tion for scram reset. i _ _ . - - .-, - . - , , , , . - - - - , . - , - --, - - - - - - - + - - - - -~
i (5) Vent and drain functions shall not be adversely affected by other I system interfaces. The objective of this reouirement is to preclude water backuo in the scram fristrument volume which could cause sourious,u scras. Technical Basis--These cMteria are based uoon operational convenience . {
. and are not directly related to safety given that the hydraulic coupling
- between the SDV and the IV is sufficiews to quukly detect an accumu- j
- lation of water in the volume and that the instrumentation available to detect the water is extremely reliable. For example, criteHa (1) l t
and (2) are meant to prevent inadvertent scrams resulting fram maintenance l and test operation and to assure that the operator has enough infomation ; I available to pemit him to take corrective action prior to conditions ! I which would cause an inadvertent, scram. Similarly cMterion (4) would l facilitate placing the plant back in operation after a scram. However, ! i thew criteria are indirectly related to safety in that they prevent ! unnecessary challenges to the safety systems and so should be followed. Acceptele Compliance--Accept 21e cceplicance is not specified. 4.2.4 Design CriteHa ! 4.2.4.1 Design Criterion 1 l The scram discharge headers shall be sized in accordance with GE CER-54 l (Reference 20) and shall be hydraulically coupled to the instrumented j i volume (s) in a manner to permit operability of tM seram level instrumen-tation prior to loss of system function. Each system shall be analyzed i l l-i
l I i l l l i i based on a plant-specific maximum inleakage to ensure that the system l function is not lost orier to initiation of automatic scras. Maximum inleakage is the maximum flow rate throuch the scram discharoe line j i
"e aaalysis .
without control-rod motion summed over all control rods. l i should s*ow no need for vents or drains. Technical Basis--The most significant feature that contributet to the ] BF3 partial scram failure which is common to most SWRs, is thh inadequate - f hydraulic coupling beteen the SUV headers and the IV. In the Browns ' i Ferry desfgn (and in the design of many other SWRs) the SUV headen j are hydraulically connected to toe IV by means of a 2-in. pipe. The j t length of this pipe varies considerably with the spetific plant but l in many cases the pipe connecting the IV to the most remote SDY header is more than 100 ft. long. Because of this poor hydraulic coupling, I drainage of the SDV headers to the IV depends heavily on the hydraulic j characteristics from the header to the IV and the adeouacy of the SDV { vent. Tests have shown that wi th the 3F3 SUV-IV configuration, a blocked l vent path could seriously hampea drainage of the SDV header to the extent that water leakage past the scram outlet valves of the hydraulic control unit could be retained in the SDV headers, thus filling up the volume withcut actuating the scram level instrumentation located in the IV. The specific cause of the retention of water in the SDV that resulted in the SF3 event of June 8,1980 has not been firmly established, but is thougMt to be the result of either poor SDV venting or olugging of the 2 in. pipe beween the SDV header and the IV, or a comoination
t { i
- i i
thereof. Although extensive inspections were perfonned to detamine t the cause of water accumulation, a specific cause (i.e., blockage, loop seal or valve malaperation) was not pinpointed. SDV drain tests per-formed at BF3 showed that the flow rate from the east SDV header to ! the IV with the SDV vent and drain valves closed was only 0.6 gym. A similar test of the west side SDV header revealed a flow rate of 3.2 gpe. Drain tests of east and west SDV headers with vent and drain valves open showed the average flow rates to be 11.5 gpa and 35 gym, i respectively. These tests show that with the BF3 SDV-IV configuration, a blocked went path can seriously hamper drainage of the SDV header. , The extent of this decrease in drainage capability could be of such l k degree that water leakage past the scram outlet valves could be retained ! t in the SDV headers, thus filling up the volume without actuating the j i scram level instrumentation. l l These tests showed that even with a fully effective vent off the east ! I SDV herder, water will drain out of the IV at a faster rate than the east SDV header drains into the IV, or fra another pQrspective, water l l will accumulate in the SDY header if inleakage is greater than the drain l rate from the SDV to the IV. Thus, a condition could exist wnere there ! is no water-level indication or automatic protective function in the IV while water is present in the SDV headers. I I The above disetssion shows the importance of having an extremely good hydraulic coupling between SDV headers and their IV(s) which is indecen-I
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l- i l l- 4 l L-I 1 1 dent of the ver; ting _ characteristics of the SDV. Design Criterion 1 ; addresses this concern by requiring the SDV headers to be hydraulically , j coupled to the IVs in a nanner to permit operability of the scram level l instrumentation before loss of system function. It further requires f an analysis to show that the system function is not lost prior to initia- l tion of automatic scram without the need for SDV vents or drains. i Acceptable Coupliance--One method acceptable to the staff to meet this criterion is to provide an IV for edch SDV vich is an integral part of the SDV (i.e. , connected directly to the SDV with piping of a diameter equal to or greater than the d ametar of the SDV headers). The General l l Electric Company's recoamendation for the use of f adependent IVs that
- i i
a t attached directly to the low point of the SDV piping and are essen- l 1ially a vertical extension of the SDV satisfies this criterion. i I In discussions with Gd, NRC staff has concluded that a maxinum flow { rate past the scre outlet valve without rod motion is 5 gpm per rod ! l and this value should be used in the analysis to assure system function, ; i or justification should be provided for using a differer.1 value. Any l t value that is used must be verified to be conservative by assured CRD l I seal naintenance requirenants based on stall flow tests. The only driving j force for the fluid in this analysis should be that proviced by the ! gravity drainage that has been verified from as-built drawings. Funher, { the analysis : rust be performed according to the criteria, with no reli- l ance on header venting. Given these assumotions are used, the analysis is acceptable. I
i 1 6 For system which do not follow the ethod acceptable to the staff as : described above, a design verification test shall be performed after [ i modifications have been a de. This test est take measurtments over ' the full range of potential inleakage and scram conditions and nust i verify system function as well as that there are no significant hydro- f dynamic forces that may adversely affect system func ion. 4.2.4.2 Design Criterion 2 l i Level instrumentation shall be provided for automatic scram initiation ! wnile sufficient volume exists in the scram discharce volume. [ d Technical Basis-The justification for this criterion is stated'under ! Design Criterion 1 above. , j Acceptable Coeliance--Acceptable conpliance is listed under Design Criterion 1. I 4.2.4.3 Design Criterion 3 : l 1 Instrumentation taos shall be orovided on the vertical instrument volume ? and not on the connected oicing. l Technical Basis--Damage to scram level instrumentation has been noted ; as a result of large hydrocynamic forces generated during scram opera- l tions at Brunswick and Hatch plants. NRC staff does not know wny these l i forces were generated, but they may have been caused by a ecceination j l of the delayed closing of vent or drain valves and the piping configura- ! I tion associated with the instrument taps. This transient loacing cents l l
. i l
l I i the float and causes the float to collapse on scram or reset. GE is !
.I continuing to investigate why these instrument floats fail, but believes !
that the problem may be caused by (1) the instrument tap connections to i vent and drain lines, or (2). the choice of the material fram which the l l floats are fabricated. GE' recommends eliminating the attachment of the j i level switches to the vent and drain linea. Design Criterion 3 satisfies I this GE position. j Acceptable Compliance--This criterion must be satisfied. Addi tional ly, faictional tests of the level switches using water after each scram i t amtt be continued since there remains concern for residual comnon-cause l felllures. l 4.2.4.4 Design Criterion 4
- The scram instrumentation shall be capable of detecting water accumulation !
in the instrumented volume (s) assuming a single active failure in the j i instrumentation system or the plugging of an instrument line. , Technical Basis--This is an explicit statament of the staff's position on single failure as applied to instrumentation. The cHteMon requires i that a specific class of passive failures (i.e., plugged instrumes lines) l 1 must also be assumed. l l l Acceptable Compliance--An acceptable means of meeting this cHteHon is to satisfy the requirements under Safety CriteHon 3 and to install the instrumentation in such a manner that no credible active or passive _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ __ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ . . _ . . . _ _ . . ~ . . _ . . . . _ .
f l 1 48 - ; i l failure can significantly impact the ability of the instrumentation ! to monitor the SDV for the presence of or accumulation of water. ! l 4.2.4.5 Design Criterion 5 l l Structural and component design shall consider loads and conditions j including those due to fluid dynamics, thermal expansion, internal f pressure, seismic considerations, and adverse environments. l Technical Basis--The design of the SDV and associated vent and drain f piping must take into account pressure, fluid-dynamic forces, therma'l ! expansions, seismic and environmental factors, and other transients : loadings during scram and subsecuent to scram reset. l l Acceptable Compliance--No a captable compliance is specified. , 4.2.4.6 Design Criterion 6 i The oower-coerated vent and drain valves shall close under loss of air and/or electric oower. Valve position indication shall be orovided in the control roca. Technical Basis--Loss of air and/or loss of electric power will cause I a scram and primary coolant will discharge to the SDY. The vent and drain valves must close in order to control the release of esclant to areas outside primary contairunent. Acceotable Compliance--Present configurations meet this requirement.
l-
- l. I i
j i l 4.2.4.7 Design Criterion 7 i i Any reductions in the system piping flow path shall be analyzed to assure l
. system reliability and operability under all modes of ooeration. -
Technical Basis--This criterion requires the analysis of piping systams when a reduction in the available flow area is caused through a reduction ; in piping diameter in the 50V and SDY-to-IV piping. This analysis i should consider system reliability and operability under off-nomal j modes of operation such as excessive inleakage of coolant past the l individual scram discharge valves during a loss of control air pressure event and the potential for plugging. Acceptable Compliance--In the past, NRC staff has required (in reviews i i of emergency core cooling systems) that hydraulic line plugging be , i assumed as a single failure for lines less than 2 in. ID and will require j a similar assumption for this application. Therefore, acceptable system i function must be demonstrated, given this potential single failure, j 4.2.a.8 Design Criterion 8 i System einino coometry (i.e., pitch, line size, orientation) shall be such that the system drains continuously during normal plant eceration. ; Technical Basis--This criterion addresses the need to provide a flow ; t oath which pemits the continuous draining of coolant that results { j fram normal roo leakage past individual scram outlet valves. It
~
recuires a positive downward sloce of the SDV and associated drain
t l piping, as well as piping that is free of loop seals and adequate in size, to prevent buildup of water in the SDV. ! Acceptable Compliance--This criterion must be satisfied to assure the ; assumptions of the analysis for system function under Design Criterion j
- 1. :
4.2.4.9 Design Criterion 9 e i Instrumentation shall be orovided to aid the ocerator in the detection j of water accumulation in the instrunented volume (s) prior to scram initiation. I I Technical Basis--This criterion provides for instrumentation to allow the operator to recognize as an SDV overfilling event that will eventu- i i
~
ally result in scram of the plant if the buildup continues uncorrected. l It can be regarded as a first line of defense against an SDV filling : event and could provide time needed for corrective action to prevent challenge to the reactor protection syste:L [ i Acceptable Coupliance--The present alarm and rod blocx instrumentation ! meets this criterion given adequate hydralic coupling with the SDV l headers. j 1 l l I i i ____.l -
i. l l i l i { 4.2.4.10 Design Criterion 10 l l Vent and drain line valves shall be provided to contain the scram dis-charge water, with a single active failure and to minimize operational ., encosure. l I i Technical Basis--The basis for this criterion is given under Safety ; Criterion 2. l i Acceptable Compliance--An acceptable way of meeting this criterion is to provide two isolation valves in series for all SDV vent and IV drain I
}
lines. Additionally, this requirement provides added assurance against j 1 delayed valve closure and the attendant hydrodynamic forces previously l di scusSed. l l 4.2.5 Surveillance Criteria : 4.2.5.1 Surveillance Criterion 1 l l Vent and drain valves shall be peHodicaly tested. i l i Technical Basis--Periodic testing of the vent and drain valves will ! I verify acceptable opening and closing times and assure proper valve stroke and operation. This testing will provide a basis for assuring that improper valve operation will not cause excessive dynamic forces f to generate during and subsequent to a reactor scram, which could damage piping systems and cause loss of system integrity or function. l
4 i i -- ; l f k l l ! Acceptable Cospliance--This testing should shou valve closure in less ! than 30 seconds (current GE specification). Additional conditions
?
w'ill be requimd in technical specifications. j 4.2.5.2 Surveillance Criterion 2 l Verifying and level detection instrumentation shall be ceriocically l tested in place. Technical Basis--A periodic test will demonstrate continuing availability ! of instrumentation testing. To avoid isolation of insmments after f testing and to assure a clear instmment tap, testing procedures should , include steps to demonstrate an open instrument line after test. l Acceptable Cospliance--An acceptable akthod would be to require that the { instrument chancer is drained after functional tests through the taas off j the IV and that post scram a cosparison is made to determine that the I l response (time to lower level) is consistent with previous measurements. j l l 4.2.5.3 Surveillance Criterion 3 :
)
The coerability of the entirt system as an integratec wnole snall be I demonstrated ceriodically and during each operating cycle, by demonstra-ting scram instrument response and va1ve function at oressure and temoer-ature at accroximately 50% control-rod density. l l Technical Basis--A total integrated system test will demonstrate that the system retains its capaoility to monitor the recuculation of dater i
t i i l i L l in the 50V and to scram the plant when required. It will check the proper operation of system components and instrumentation under operating l conditions normal to a scram operation. t t Acceptable Compliance--Show reasonable agreement with design analysis - i and any previous measurement. Addf tional conditions will be required j by technical specifications. i i 4.3 Implementation of Criteria ! I The staff has reviewed the cHteHa developed by the BWR owners subgroup i and has datemined that, subject to the additional staff requiment ' dealing with diversity of scram level instrumentation, they provide acceptable resolution of the problems associated with the scram discharge ! system. Therefore, compliance with these criteria and the additional i staff requirement provides an acceptable basis for long-tem audifications i to the scram d<ischarge system of operating BWR plants. These criteria should also be applied to any plant awaiting a near-tem operating l license. Originally the staff's plan of action assumed that application of the soon-to-be-developed criteria to a specific plant design would recuire no additional staff approval beyond generic approval of the criteria. However, during development of tnese criteria, it became accarent that although they would provide a sound technical basis for correction of deficiencies in the scram discharge system, their specificity was such i
that consistent iglementation for all BW plants could not be assured without further review and approval of each plant-specific design. In order to provide additional spidance concerning acceptable mans of meeting the criteria, the preceding sections list for certain criteria, the design andifications that are considered to be in acceptable cogli-ance with the criteria. If a licensee chooses to provide a modification that meets a design acceptable to the staff as outlined in the acceptable ' coaliance section discussed above, no further staff pre-iglementation approval will be required. The staff will conduct, instead, selected post-iglementation audits of the final design. However, in those cases where a licensee chooses to use a different method of coglying with the criteria NRC staff will require pre-imolementation approval of the design, together with supporting analyses which fully justify that the proposed design will meet the applicable criteria. The staff will also require that a suitable design verification test be performed after modifications are completed.
- 5. CONCLUSIONS REGARDING ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA This aoove section describes the NRC staff's evaluation of the generic criteria that were proposed by the BW Owners Group and are to be useo to develop permanent modifications for the scram discharge system of all operating BWRs. These criteria will be applied to each BWR plant-specific design to correct deficiencies noted in this system as a result of the 3F3 event of June 23, 1980 and the investigation of e<ents that c: curred before and after the BF3 event.
l l . [ i i f I
- 'The staff has reviewed the criteria proposed by the owners group and !
recommendations made by GE and other interested groups, and concluded l that subject to the additional requirement regarding consideration of : common-cause failures of scram level instrumentation, these criteria will provide an acceptable basis for proposed modifications to the scram discharge system. The additional staff requirement is necessary to l t address concerns regarding common-cause failures that would render j inoperable the installed scram level instrumentation. i In the evaluation of these criteHa, the staff has concluded that these { same criteHa should be apolied to those BWR plants which have not yet received an operating license, since a number of deficiencies noted l l during this investigation, are equally applicable to these newer plants. I Schedules for implementing proposed design changes in compliance with l these criteHa and the additional requirement will be established by li individual licensees in compliance with NRC letter cated October 1,1980 i I (Reference 19). ! l
s REFERE' ICES ! l l
- 1. Memorandum from t!. C. "oseley, to Regior.a1 Directors, Office of Inscection and Enforcement Bulletin 90-ta, Degradation of Scram Disc' - s "clume CapaM11ty, June 11, 1080. ,
C. "ere rsecue ' enc !!. C. "oseley, to Regional Directors, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Bulletin 80-17, Failare of Control Rods to Insert Curing - a Scram at a SWR, July 3,1980.
- 3. Pecorandum from M. C. Nseley, to Regional Directors, Office of Insoection and Enforcement Supplement 1 to Bulletin 80-17. Failure of Control. Rods to Insert During a Scram at a BWR, July 18, 1980.
- a. Memorandum from M. C. Mcseley, to Regional Directors, Sueolement 2, to Bulletin. ,
60-17. Failure of Control Rods to Insert Curing a Scram at a BWR, July 21, 1980. ,
- 5. "emorandum from M. C. "oseley, to Regional Directors, Of fice of Inspection I and Enforcenient, Bulletin 90-17, Sucplement 3, Failure of Control Rods to Insert !
Curing a Scram at a BWR, August 22, 1980. ;
- 6. Memorandum from P. Easley (AE3/OSI) to V. Panciera (RSB/DSI) BWR SDV Leakage Dose, November 11, 1980.
- 7. flemorandum from C. 'dichaelson, AE00, to D. Eisenhut D. Ross, and l Y. Stello, NRC, Browns Fern Unit 3 Partial Scram Failure Event, July 25, 1980. '
.3. Letter from J. P. O'Reilly, Regional Director Region II (IE) to H. G. Parris (TVA)
Confirmation of Action, June 30, 1990. j
- 9. Office of Inspection and Ec'ertement, Preliminary Notification of Event or Unusual Occurrence i
- 10. Preliminary Notification issued by Office of Insoection and Enforcement, July 3, 1980.
- 11. Preliminary Notification issued by Office of Insoection and Enforcement, July 14, 1980.
- 12. Memorandum from S. Bryan (IE) to Dudley Thomoson (IE), Precosed Abnorval Occurrences - Failure of Control Rods to Fully Insert During a Scram, July 30,1980.
- 13. Office of Inspection anri Enforcement Information 'lotice 20-30, issued to all GE 3WR licensces, Potential for Unaccentable Interaction Beween the Control Rod Drive Scram Function and '!on-Essential Control Air System at certain 3E ,
TVR #acilities, August 19, 1980. l l 14 ftemorandum from C. Michelson to H. Denton, 4tential for UnaccectaDie Interaction ! beheen the Control 90o Orive System ano Non-Essential Control Air System at ; the Browns Fern Plant, August 19, 1980.
l REFERENCES (CONTINUED)
- 15. Memorandum from E. Jordan (IE) to Regional Reactor Operations ano Nuclear !
Support Branch Chiefs (IE), Licensee Response to IEB 80-17, Supplement 3 ' Fcilure of Control Reds to insert During a Scram at a BWR, September 18, 1950.
- 16. Confirmatory Orders from V. Stallo, Director IE to 16 facilities, October 2,1980. '
17.: Criteria submitted to BWR Owners Group for review and acceptance, November 19,.1980. 9
- 18. Letter from D. Waters, Chairman of BWR Qwners Group to D. 3. Eisenhut (NRR), ;
November 1980.
- 19. Letter from D. G. Eisenhut (NRR) to all BWR licensees, WR B Scram System, October 1,1980. '
r
- 20. GE 1etter from D. G. Bridenbaugh to all GE BWRs, Operating Experience Reoort !
Reference No. 54 - Revision 1, March 14,1972. '
- 21. IEEE 379-1977 "IEEE Standard Application of the Single Failure Criterion i To Nuclear Power Generating Station Class IE Systems". (
- 22. Procosed ATWS rule - SECY 80-409, Septemer 1980.
- 23. Letter from D. G. Eisenhut (NRR), to Carolina Power and Light dated Seatember 24, i 1980. ,
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B 4 f Appendtx A i i t I 1 i i l I i I i l l l
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1
,i Long-Teis Evaluation of Scram Discherne. System -
- \
The utilities have reviewed General Electric's evaluation and am ; following the ongoing INP0/MSAC study on failure of the control rids to I fully insert on a scram signal at Brown's Ferry. The utilities agne that at Brown's Ferry there was an undetected accumulation of water in ths scram q discharge volume. Subsequent testing at some plants has also indicated that ' under certain conditions the instmeentation may not give consistent level indication due to the piping configuration as it ties into the instrument l volume. D The following is a listing of design and operational criteMa that shall be i followed by the utilities in formulating individual design changes. The cMteria has taken into consideration the original system criteMa, problems expeMenced in the operation of the system and concerns rtgarding l; operability and reliability. CMteria which have been. added or changed as a msult of this evaluation are denoted by an asteMsk (*). For the purpose i of this discussion, the word " system" includes all components downstream j of the scram exhaust valves. The philosophy for evaluation of the design : is that the safety function is of prime concern. The safety boundades i are whatever affects the scram function of the system. The evaluation ! must show that the safety boundades considered meet this philosophy. { Functions
- CriteMa l l
? The scram discharge volume shall have sufficient capacity to receive and contain water exhausted by a full reactor scram without adversely affecting .
control rod drive scram performance. Safety CMteMa j
~
1.* No single active failure of a component, or servic'e function shall' l prevent a reactor scram, under the most degraded conditions that ! are operationally' acceptable. ; 2.* No single active failure shall prtvent uncontrolled loss of reactor coolant. l 3.* The scram discharge system instrisnentation shall be designed to provide redundancy to operate reliably under all conditions. and shall not be adversely affected by hydrodynamic forces or , flow characteristics.
- 4. System operatir.g conditions which are requirtd for scram shall be continuously monitored.
$.* Repair. replacement, adjustment. or surveillance of any system component shall not require the scram function to be bypassed.
9
Operational Criteria
- 1. Level instrumentation shall be designed to be maintained, tested, or calibrated during plant operation without causing a scram.
- 2. The system shall include sufficient supervisory instrumentation and alarus to permit surveillance of system operation.
- 3. The system shall be designed to minimize the exposure of operating personnel to radiation.
4.* Vent paths shall be provided to assure adequate drainage in . preparation for scram reset. 5.* Yent and drain functions shall not be adversely affected by other system interfaces. The objective of this requirement is to preclude water backup in the scram instrument volume which could cause spurious scram. Desion Criteria 1.* The scram discharge headers shall' be sized in accordance with GE CER-52 and shall be hydraulically coupled to the instrumented volume (s) in a manner to permit operability of the scram level instru-sentation prior to loss of systen function. Each systen shall oe analyzed based on a plant-specific maximum inleakage to ensure that the system function is not lost prior to initiation of automatic scram. Maximum inleakage is the maximum flow rate through the scram discharge line without control rod motion summed over all control rods. The analysis should show no need for vents or drains. 2.* Level instrumentation shall be provided for automatic scram initiation while sufficient volume exists in the scram discharge volume. ,
- 3.* Instrumentation taps shall be provided on the vertical instrument volume and not on the connected piping.
4.* The scram instrumentation shall be capable of detecting water accumulation in the instrumented volume (s) assuming a single active failure in the instr'.mientation system or the plugging of an instrument line. 5.* Structural and component design shall consider loads and conditions including those due to fluid dynamics, thet-nal expansion, internal pressure, seismic considerations, and adverse environments. M
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.' 6.* The power-operated vent and drain valves shall cl.ose under loss j of air and/or electric power. Yalve position indication shell '
i
.be provided in the control room.
7.* Any reductions in the system piping flow path shall be analyzed to t assere system reliability and operability under all modes of opera-tion. l' I , 8.* System piping geometry (i.e.. pitch line size, orientation) shall be such that the systas drains continuously during normal plant i operation. ! r l <
- 9.* Instrumentation shall be provided to aid the operator in the l detection of water accumulation in the instrumented volume (s) !
prior to scram initiation. :, 1 10.* Yent and drain line valves shall be provided to contain the ; scram discharge water, with a single active failure and to ! minimize operational exposure. l Surveiliance Crite*ia ; I 1.* Vent and drain valves shall be periodically tested. , 2.* Verifying and level detection instrumentation shall be periodically . tested in place. 3.* The operability of the entire systas as an integrated whole shall be demonstrated periodically and during each one ating cycle, by ! demonstrating s: ram instrument response and valve function at , pressure and tanperature at approximately 50% control red density. { l I
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- 51 AFF LVAtuAllon5 of Siguiti Illel RESPONSE 5 PLAMI IUw)ts SIG IIOCK Pollli lat nutitlim h0. 80-17 PAGt 3 SUMMAltV Of LILLIl5EE5 R[5POIISE staff EVALIMilGil
- 1. tur pl nts without Alus related kPI Analysis shows thenges la plant ogr. Pareneters will show no net API will be lastelled in all BifR plants perteem analysis of met sa fety of lacrease in margin of safety estili respect to code pressiere lay Ibecember I.1980 tinies this concern Jer. Ling per unstJerations list llett. - Big fluit will not exceed Jesign pressure in Aiv5. Is ellainated.
le bulletin.
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$1Afl' L"VALWAllell5 Of 54001111ElWI IttsrcIISts PuWii lleeti eIG auct Polar Surettntal I Siegwig o[ tictlistts ecsron5E swr Evaularnas Ist utaltlin no. _mo-lj ___
- a. il r...lde .a .malysis f the .dessuecy of Licensee coicludes that entsting systesi is ade<leste. ilm licemee's analysts was revtemed "as-built" 504 system & associeted espi (pessid 4cteptebje, went & drain systems inclueling any l Identifice Josign deficienthes.
- 2) nevise as*d implement operating precedure to 168 procedure revision is recluired. Operator can lattiate Response acceptable, provide clear pidente te licensed operators lajection at own discretion.
las the contral room reSarding Inittellen of t StL% esiti.out supervisory duti.ority.
- 3) Assure that procedures esist and are implemented . Annuncleters sound winem accumulatloa of water is detected. Response acceptable.
tur rtensdlel a(tlon it water found la $lW wleta followleg actica includes checking drela and went velve it sleuld I,e free of uater. for opening. -
- 4) nevise & lanplement administrative procedures SLC5 is initiated by two handswitches. Response acceptable.
to enhance 5t05 key sk.lt be readily avellaisle to operetor In control room. b) t'ontinue delly monitoring et water levels la Ealsting analtering system is adagnete. Sally monitoring lesponse acceptable. all sl* will be continued for 30 dcys then discontinesed.
- 8. 1) Install a system to continuuusly mualter Licensee feels entsting system is adeepsete. Licensee is esempt from lastellatissa of a q u4ter levels In all 514 by *.spt.1.19110. continuous SOU level mualtering system.
t) Pts tuem e stoJy of potential Jesigns for Ateesspheric vent installed w/ respect to supplement 2 Criteria developed by oumers subgrees6-e pe u w in.: vent sysica. lavved eJestuste, no esore mods be necessary, addressss the concern regarding venting of SDW. G
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SIAIf LWALUAllutt$ OF Sattut! IllM kt%FONSE5 ltAlli limt; B16 leutK POINI Iat uutiLIIa me. 88-87 % Imment 2 51sMAAy Of LICEle5EE5 AE5PGst5E STAFF EVALO4Titu l) tech tout licensee ulth a SDW veut system which itemoved a pipe cap from the stead pipe of the weet Respeete acceptable, had on any tempament other the time vent value drain line to the enclosure dirty sw such thet ele e tur proper ==mting must provide as alternate there is an unobstructed went path to the centalaneet vcat path continuously opca to Iulldlag atmos. Insilding atmospliere.
- sa .csc as the slJe et the vent valve piping away ts u== t he Sw. Ibis ovat must t effective se,4rJtess of tempuneet operability other the the vcent valve.
O e t e
6-SIAff [tAtllAllOIIS Of 544tMit Itasi RE5P00:5[5 ptAni NAflEs BIG ancs pasar 8 ST M M W ISE Isi utst tillN 800. _SehlL SupptEntNI 3 StiMnARV Of LICENSEE 5 REstell5E
- 1) for plaats with sky ceanected to IV by 1" ple.e. we reipstre:
.) iod
.a femmedlete men. scree en leu control Licensee feels that seen. scree for valve leakey Aesponse acceptable, drive air pressure with ela. It is met reguired because of presently lastelled psi energia elsove spealog pressure of aute. scree, scree outlet velves.
b) en Immendiate scree la the event of a Design doesn't locarporate "rse drift la alarm." Response accepteblo, multiple red delft-la alare er a "bl-temperature * &lars, marked change la number of centrol suJs with high te.aperature aleros. . ,
- 2) Begitr cat procedures iAlth respaire a Licenses feels that because Suppl.1 real. bis Rock potets' ualapse design mlatelaes the s.mt 6onal
- test isslag water for tk have been met they should be esempt from types of f alleres (crushed fleets) Identitled .
1.v. level alare, red block & scree this regnirement. to date. The large slae of the scram dis-
- sultthes ef ter each screas before charge drels test campered to the diameter :
s etus silag to power." of the talet header to the drala taak (a (This is a temp. precediere tillitem 6-In. header provides a path of water free 3.1 of lit 8017 Supp. I are completed.) the scram discharge velve outlets to t%e drain - tank) aletelzes the pessthflity that large e kr Leeld redfdesage nemic forces the lastrumentweseld he fueet Peted thatthe-
. Alse. '
large enouet of operating esperience with as level last seat failures adds ceaffdence to . the adeepsacy of this destga. Thereferei me unclude that Big Aeck Point shoestd be esempt : 4
;rsen the functlen.1 test after every scr.m.
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1 STAFF EVAR.MlleII5 SF 5810181 itir RESPOII5ES PLAIII IIAME: SIG BKE roIIII Ist het t Liill IIB. 3014 PAEL 1 $lggqAAV 0F LICEll5EE5 A[5POIISE $1Aff EVAL MilCA A) Licensees of GE OWils' l) Iteilew plant records for lastances of Ile lastances recorded. Response acceptable, degradation of any 51#V level switch i vesulting fruse a demeged er bent fleet m eubly. Identify cause end turies.tive ettlen.
- 2) avview records for degradetlen of 584 Ihee lastance terrected. Average closuret 17 sec este. Respeese acceptakle, uset end Jrain valve operation. Proside 45 sec eenmal. g stesure time resguired and tiiose normally .
abserved and fler bests for the rewired j tioning tl=es. Identify cause and core =ctive eitlon.
- 1) by procedores, reepstre 50W vent 8 llew ps'iscederes to be le'planented. gegy ,,,, ,cg ,,g ,gg ,,
deeln velves he normally operable. open 4 periodically tested. If valves see not spesable er closed e i hour in ear 24 liour per feit during operstlen. 7 ti.e ressen shall be legged 1 hitC nettfled within 24 hours. I 4 4 9
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51Aff LVAt94110N5 of $went ItalM st[Spilll5E5 ftAlli NAM [I DIG l100E Pelui Isi uteItilN IIG. _Edd Nel 2 I
- 4) Iteview lastances of demoge ison and/or caused by water heemmer in SIMf related llo instmes we reced. h p e accqtette, psyeng. Identify cause & cosrective seteen.
b) Peview sur. precedures to ensure tiset Licensee feels that tairrent surw. procedures are
%v level switch deyedation due to e dessa te. Response acceptable.
al.maged float would be detected & that inoperatellity free any cause was tested
& sepus ted.
el it me femctional test er inspection test finactlenel testing preformed Oct. 17. 1979. et SDW level sultth has been performed Response acceptable. d.aring past 3 imenths weils h would detect llew testing scheduled for meat reerlor sleutdown
> 48 hours eaction.
Its den redetlan, snete psovlston to ele se deering neat shutdown a 48 ieuners.
~~5:eglA3y we have reviewed Big ihnk Fulat's responses to bestlette requirements of IBE 80-17 and 90-14. Our evaluellen includes the Resident Inssrector's essessment of the a Ilcensee's compilence willi these receiraments, we conclude that interne operation of Big Rock Point is justified pending laplementation of long term modificettens.
4 4 0
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SIAf f LVALUAll0NS Of 500011i liipt RL5rUII5ES PL AIII leAML; 30tamh flaar I.281 STAFF EVALIIRTIGII Sl89tARY OF LICritSEL5 EISPONSL lat staltIIII 110. El_-Il PAGt i On July 2.1980, ultrasonic (WI) measurements showed me teater Response acceptable.
- l. (e) r6rform surveillante test tu verify that in 50W header and asseclated piping at Units I and 2. Snit 3 ahes e is na significant enount of weter g, Sw. has a slauler system which has been la place slace almost len*dlatel_y after the event.
SDV vent velves at Units 1. 2 and 3 were cycled and correct Respuese acceptable, (b) Perform surselltente test to verify that valve Indication verlfled on July 20, 1980 vent valves ese operable. (t) Perform surveillante test to verify that 5 tests dated .hsly 20, 1980, the licensee verfiled that aespease acceptable
- vent system la treu er eintruction. t re were no obstNctions em the 59W.
Pc, surm menuel & .utumatic scree infor. The roepaired mess .aents of scr.a system perfwa under Response acceptable.
- 2. pienuel and automatic scram condillons teere respleted by Julyli, e teen IIsted a tieru & fc pulletise.
1980 for limit 3. ty letter dated July 29, 1980 the licensee provided the roepstred informellen for lhelt 1. For Unit 2 this informellon was provided by Aseg.1,1980 letter. Ils significant enamelles were identlfled in tbis test program. As part of the tests la item 2 It was vertfled that the vent Response ecceptable, J. At tuntiusion of stree tests and all ilmes were functional and there was me significant amount of utNr strem.t water in the 514. (e) Verify ti.et all vent llacs on $1N j era functfunal. (L) Verify that ti.ers is sie signititant
. .unt ut water in SIN ]
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t SIAIF tVAiW411btlb WF Lasual itsee utbrunst5 . gg . pt.Alli IIAM[; SSRMIIS fleaf 1.283 l&L Sutttllt led. tis. l F PALE 2 .$tsethAT Of LICENSEL5 Af5p01:5E STAFF ETALMAlles 4 Revlee !==rgency (speraties procedures to the Ilceasee has reviewed emergency operating precedures to Sospense ecceptable, ensure that for scree operater actions assere appropriate operator actlees le the eveet of a treesis loclude e thru e of Bullette. Ferry thilt 3 type scram failure. frellelearytrefaloghas been completed and fell tralelog coessitted te. S. neview & ewelop serveillaece procedere the licensee developed and leylemented precedures to moetter Response acceptable, " to smaller daily for residue water la meter level la flee 59W. 50s.
- e
- 6. tabate etplC. RCIC. SLC5. Apl/liett/p0GL cuellag & male steam bypass operetten byt (a) prwept estificaties tAee systems Irss A*purtleg regelreseets se sefety systen leeperability and Bespense acceptable.
it.se fully operable end when restored. suppressise peel cooling procedural respairements are still la place per this bullette. ! {b) taperate all available supp. pool lleportleg reepstrements en safety system leoperability and Aesponse acceptable. 1
- teollag wi erever supp. leal esceeds Suppression pool caelleg proceJural ragsfrements are still 1
eermal operating temperature liasit. la plete per this bellette. (c) perfere A 50.69 review to letresse Review of SIC 5 has sheese thet 2 pump operettee is not there is disagressent la degree of difft. '; Siti flow to esshe coaststent feasible because of problems la (l) up5si. {2) piplag system celty for modificattees to allow tuo p' ump ; with safs*y (2 pumps. waless. destge, and (3) berse al6ing. operettee. This pro 61em will be resolved ' ans.te), la ser generic AIWS of fort.
.. _ . . . . . _ _ L. s ,. _
- - II -
SIAFF EVALUAlloits OF SMtWii IEIWI RESPgIISES PL ANI IHWIEt 94taats,((gv 1.F&3 STAFF EvaltinfleII lat auttLilN NO. ,88-17 PAGE 3 5tsetARY OF LICLIe5EE5 RESPOIt5E Browns terry het Allis related liff. API will be installed in all Best plaats-
- 1. tur plants withuat Aivs selsted MPI i.erture enelysts of att safety of by tec. I.1900 thus this centern is Jer. ting ier considerations inst ellelmated.
*n Italletta.
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l i 51Af f AVA1.UAll0W15 Of Sit 0RI Ttlet RE5p0N5LS punti ItAML: ##848NS fillitt 1.2ai 5t996RY Of LICEN5LES RE5postSE STAFF EVALU4Tiell tat utettillst M0. _80]f StFPLEMLNI I
- 1) Frevide en analysis of the edequay of the licensee evaluellen of the 58V systeen concluded The Ikeq4et's emelytts was reviewed A.
" 3-tsullt* $W system & essociated that with the surveillance seetheJs esployed et the plant gegd foeped SCceptable.
went & drain systems including any (lie 50V system sees acceptable. Also enclosed la this identitled destgee deficiencies. reponse are as-bullt Isometrics At the sysien. Operating procedores have been revised to reepstre 5tCS hesponse acceptable.
- 2) Revise and Implement operating procedure to inttletion for condittens where (l) red lasertion is not t**u'Ide tic *r ysidence to licensed operators adeqpate to assurs safe slustdown. (2) reacter isotor level in else control soon regerilius inillation of cannot be eaintained er (3) suppresslen pool temperatere
,t t5 w'**wut supervisory autiority. gs h!gn. This assumus appropriate protection without supervisory approval. l
-procedures have been coe" trued and implemented in the Response acceptable.
- 3) Ass . procedures entst and are laplemented event el mater accismulatten lathe 50V. If water level is sur rt. . 41 etsswa if w.ter found in SW when less than 1.5 laches in the 58V vent and drain valve et siuuld be tret of us,ter. WW m Mild W thW wu hdM If water level is betaeen I.5 and 2 laches. power is reduced by recirc. ping run back and the reactor is scresumed. For water levels greater than 2 laches en teamediate shutdown to cold conditlens is inttleted.
lhe SICS toy has been ettethed to the central panel Response acceptable.
- 4) acelse L 1 plement ed Intstrative procedures con rols or proup use by tb operator eu en..nce 5tCS t=y st ll bu readily evell.ble s U',# ,
s u upee stor in cu*trtsi ruom. Droints ferry requirtiments were already la excess of the tenfirmatory Order Issised on Oct. 2.1980
- 5) tuntinue d.lly munitoring of water levels in bullellas. Ultrasonic monittoring on a 30 minute Line reepstres a ence per shift sierveillance
.it Sby period of SDV header water level will continue. Also troepsency until a continuous mentter this munitoring system is alarmed and a dedicated operator system is installed in Dec. 1980. This 16 stalloned to respond to the alarm. roepstrement is being met by license -
response acceptable. i I i
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51Af t iVRl84110 ell Of blecti Illpi K5 Poll 5LE pg mg SR0Wel5 fillAT l.2&3 SieglAAT of LICLII5EEE RC5FOIISE staff EVRIIATim i si tout t l i t et sal. sul-l l FM2 2 of Seculemment i
- 5. 1) Install a systein to continiseutly oionttor A system to continuously monitor seater level by Continuous m>stiterlag system to be water levels in all SDV by Sept.1.1980 ultrasonic (111) sensors esas lastalled on all units lastalled by Dec. 22. 1980 per IIRC by August 18. 1980 the systes features a local Confisimatory Order.
alarm to alert a dedicated operator la the event of water accumulatloa. It is checked once every 30 minutes and calibrated every shift.
- 2) Pertosa a stuJy of potential Jemlyes Browns Ferry is considering crosstying the weats. Criteria developed by owners subgroup for luproving vent system. venting to clean redweste (CIBA) drain system and addresses the concern regarding venting providing a positive vent from the CAW and routits o f SDV.
the vents to the dirty raJmaste system (Dhl). The , ' crosstying of vents would maintain vent capability la the event of a single vent valve failure. I ag, S % W
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SIAFF [vAtuAlltml% OF ilMNtl ILIWt RESPOInE5 ptaggy ma,et; esenweis Ithat I,2&3 STAFF EVAttIATION SleetARf Of Littit5LES RESPON5E let autttilm No. 9d1. 50Frit19EMI 3 . l) for plants with $DV connected to IV by 2* pipe, we require: Plant lustructions were thenged to provide for a assuel scras Ibis 5ER will regire an estematic reactor a) en lamedlete men. scree on law control on loss of air pressure alare. scran en low air pressure. In the laterie. suJ drive air pressure with aln. 10 thelicensees response to use a aamuel Scram pst mergin above opening pressure of It acceptable. ures outlet valves. Plant Instrwe s tens were revised to manually scree on multiple Response acceptable. b) en lameJiete scree in the event of a rod drift alants or morted changes la the awaber of control multiple red drift.in alarm or a marted change la number of control rods with high temperature alarms. ruds with high te.perature alarms. , functional tests of SUV level switches have been rewired >; Response arceptable.
- 2) Imple. cat procedures weilch resguire a tuattsynel " test estag water for the revised plant lastructicas alter each scram before returnl:rg I.v. level eless, red bluck & scrag to power.
switches af ter each screm before returning to power." { this is a temp. procedure till Itte is.l of Ils 80-17 Supp. I are completeJ.) t 4 -.._________________.______.____.____m._ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ ___. . . . . . _ . - - . . . . . . . . . _ - _ _ . , . , . , - , , , __ _.,.. - , . - . , , ,,
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$legtART Of LICLN$tts RL5PONSE 5TAFF EVAttitil0Il I.
(a) Pertuou surveillante tet; to verify that thes e is nu significent emitiesent of tseter h slyn of water in 50V. 5W vent velves are In SDv. operable ased free from obstrisct fun. Response acceptable, (1.) Perform surveillence test to verify Lliet vent valves are operable. ~ (t) Perture surveillante test to verify that vent system is free of obstruction. 2. Pee form nwavel & autusnetic screm latesmation list =J e thru k in Sulletin. e) All rods laserteJ; longest Llee esas 2.83 sec.s Some Tods alssed due to burnt out bulbs. Response accepteble
- b) Zero voltage af ter scree, norsial voltage before.
c) Air flow and voltage verified on solenolds. One , battup scrae selve failed. dj & asurements talen ea.1 noted in raspm se. Rod block sultcli didn't respond due to believed air lock. e3 3DW vent and dran valve times termed " satisfactory." f) Tlasus measured satisfactory.
- 9) Ils significant resid.se found.
h) Hecorded closing tieus tsere sdLisfactory.
- 8) h residual teater found nor taas any air lieerd to enter $DV following scree.
j) krem delay relay are function of properly. k) b s3pnificant differences. 1
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I staff EVALIIAll0ll5 0F SliORI Itasi attresl5E5 PLA88T Ilantt tillel5tilCE I & 2 - t lat uutt t ilN NO. _b0-1) SUPPttntlei 1 5t9 MART Of LICEll5EE5 AE5 Fen 5E STAFF EUAtlI4Tl85
- A. l) Ps= vide an analysis of the edeeluecy of "es-built" 50V system & estociated Analysis conducted and no design deficiencies were found. The licensee's response taas revlemed went 8 drain systems laclueling any and found acceptab4e.
identitled design deficiencies.
- 2) Nevise and leptement operating procedure to provide clear goldence to licensed operaters falstiny instructlen provides clear lastructlens for en the control raea regereling initiatten of initiating Sl5C withwat sup. approvel. llesponse acceptable,
*11.5 without supervisory authority.
- 3) Assure that protedores solst and are implemented tur reutdlal action if water found in 5DV when .iest being made by water essemeter at an initleted low point drate which will alert operators by annunciator, Response acceptable,,
et should be free of water.
- 4) newlie & leptement edelnistrative precedures to mhance SLCS Ley shall be readily available lievisions te lastreact operator that 5tC5 key is in tu operator la control rues. sblit teremen's contrelied key cabinet in the centrol Response acceptable, rees.
i ' 5) tantinue delly monitoring of water levels in ' ell Sby tantinuses daily monitoring is being Septemented until ! a contineses monitoring motleed is being leptemented en licensees response was issued befu e + the 5Dr. Af ter one week of operetten, licensee will esemptlen was granted this plant en cease monitoring by lastrument drain valve motland and lastalletten of a continuous 58t level depend on dally channels checks of $bt lastrument alarus, munitoring system. Dally M level. sonttoring is not required. R. l) lastell e system to continuously monitor water levels in all 5by by Sept. 1, 1980. Liseases provides justification for ne installation of III devltes, i tcensee is enemyt from lastelletten of e continuses we level sonitoring , ,systee.
- 2) Pee fore e stuJr of potential abigns for 'I
' ave uving ve t systte.
n les constriction lines therefore ne venting necessary
- eccording to Ilcensee. lCrlierla. developed by owners sub-group jaddressestheconcernregardingventing
.of ICW.
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SIAf f tvAtuAllgel5 Of SeecIII TLuft RL5 Pense 5 l't Alli leAnts _tkletWKK : &2 _ _ist. . _Dutillin see me-ty; suppttpetNI 2 St## TART SF LICLESEE5 f.25P01:5E STAFF DALWits il test suu licensee with a 5et vent system which Jeswnd on any component of fier thaa the vent valve Review of Sep yeak llees conclesded that the SM is Respense acceptable, : alue.c ter psoper venting must provide an alternate edeepsetely vesited to Llie atmosphere and depends only vent p.th continuously open to isoliding stems- on the vent valve for oprability. The vent lines phas e on the slJe of the vent valve piping away connect to each esalt's RDEDI* common vent and to uw the SW. Ihis vent snust be effettive drala header which is in turn, vented to the redisaste vent system. scoprdless of component operability other LMn the ve.it valve. O _. ._ .__..~..,..-,,__..._...._.4. -m.,.. ~ , . . _.~ . . , ~ . ~ . .._._.mm, 4..~,_~. .,.... ~ .
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5TAfF LVALUAII0ll5 0F 5HORI IL151 KTP9815ES PLANI IIA 80ts _ prunsultt I & 2 ist uut e t tle leu. 3014 pAGE } SlectMT IW LICLN$tE5 K5P9815E $1AFF ElfALIIATIGIl A) Litensees of GL BWRs' il meview plant records for lastancel of One occurrente torrected. Itesponse ecceptehle, dcyr. Jet ton of any 509 level sultth resulting from a desmayed or bent fleet e nen. Sly. IJuatify tause and currective actlen.
- 2) Neview records fur degradellen of SDy seven reported fellwres asere identified and currected. nesponse eccepteble, vent and drale velve operetten. Provide Closure times esere acceptable.
Llosure tisc reapstred and those normelly oliserved and the bes ts for tise reclutr:4 cleslag times. Identify cause enJ torrect,lve action.
- 3) By postedures, reagelre 514 vent & Pert Alc testing iglemented. Response eccepteble, de sisa veless be noeselly opershle, open & perloJlcelly tested. If velvsa are act operable er closed > I hour in eny 24 Isor perlod durIng operetlon, al.e season shall be legged & leRC notified withla 24 leurs.
i e
- - . . - . . _ . - - - . . -. . - . , - - . -- - . , - . ~ ~ . . . . . . . . . _ . . ...m. . -. , - + - . . . . . . - . . , . - ~ < . .-. . . . _ _ _e, . -
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- 25 51Af f EVALUAllell5 ef 5410Af ILAPI Rt5 POW 5E5 PlJillI IIAflEI BadmSMirr I a P 5tsetART OF LICEIt5LES RE5P0pg STAFF EVRWATIGil lat asut t LIIII tal. _1848-3 FAGL 2
- 4) helew lastantes of deange free and/or One event recorded. Response eccepteble.
t,esed by weler hemmer la SDW related plying. idsstify teuse & currective ee.t lun . b) ineview ser. procedures to ensure that Ilew periodic testing leptemented 13 ensure float level Respense acceptable. StrW level sultch de padation due to a switches are checkeJ. d,=,ged fleet neauld be detettcJ & that lauperability frwe any tause was tested
& sec urted.
- 6) Il me lunctlenal test or inspettlen funttfaael test templeted during Amie 1980. Response acceptable, et sist level sultth has besa performeJ durlag past 3 mwaths wielch wuuld detect it s degr adellen, mete peovislun to de se 4.erlag meat sket M w , 48 Imurs.
St#91ARY We have reviewed Rnsnswick I & 2 responses to Llletin requirements of l u 80-17 and es.14. Our evaluation includes the Resident Inspoter's assessment of the licensee's cumpliante witte lhese requirements. We conclude that later;a operettom of Brunswick 1 & 2 is Justified pendlag laplementation of lung tem audifications. ! i a l e ______._m_..mm_...m_._____ _-_---_______m m.m ______m - -- ~ r - ~ . - - ~ - . . ~ ~ , m.-m. u m__m. __.__m__m___._m.. __- _..
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- n e t s .
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- t. ti c np e t m ti t i n
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SIAsI tvAt.UAllus45 Of Litidtf illet ML51wthsh Pt ANI hMt,; touper Itt tut tilth 82. f>8 Il PA(.t 2 LisetAAV 0F LICLIISEE1 h[5F0ft5E staff EUAtisAiltu 4 Review la.ergency Ogarating Frecedures to terrgencs operating procedures have been revised & training Response acceptable. essure that for scree operator acticas completed to assus aplate reactor shutdoun actions in
, include e thru e or Bulletin. the event of scram fatture.
- b. Nevsew & develey surveillance ,wecedure Daily surveillance for water in the SDV is contimulng. Respeese acceptable.
to sentter delly for residue water in 504.
- 6. tahante 34PIC NCIC. SLC5. RPT/fulM/ POOL cooling & male steam bypass operation by; (e) rewayt motification when systees less Appropriate notification procedures have been instituted. Response acceptable.
then fully operable sad when restored. 1 lb) operate all available supp. pool Frocedures have been revised to assere appropriate suppressten Mesponie acceptable. teoling whenever supp pool enceeds pool cooling et temperature limits. nerinal operating temperature llelt. (c) Perfore A $0.69 review to increase Major auxilfications are twguired to enammodate 2 pump SLCS there is diseerement in degree of citricolay 5105 riow to maalaus consistent operation. for modificatleas to allow two pump operatten. with safety (2 pumps unless this problem will be resolved in our generic
.usale). tilf5 eifort.
4 l S
+ - . . . - , - , , .w - e- - - - . r m-w....-.. --.-..-e n--- 4 -_e.,~w-,*.,.wem.-%=,. ,-~e.-..- e.-sw--,-*,.ce,- ----w.--ew - ,.i. - , - - - - . , . - - .- .
i . 4 51AFF LWA411Allose5 N SHORT illet RE5 Pest 5ES PLAfli ment: Cooper synennat M LICENSEE 5 Rt5 Poll 5E STAFF EVALWhil0H Ist outItIin No. 80-11 PAGE 3 _ _ _ . . . ..... RPT will be testelled la all Out pleets
- 1. for plants willowt ATW5 related RFI Cooper has the AIW5 pesy trly and no emelyses are necessary.
by Bucember 1.1990 thus this concera is perfort emelysis of net safety of elleinsted. Jer. ting per considerations list ta balletin. _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ = _ _ _ _ , , - , _ . _ - , , - . . , . . , . . . . . , . . . ,a--.~,,,. .~ . .a __
)
. rg .
SIAf f LVAIDAll0els Of $1001t1 illyl RESP 0il5ES ptANI plAML3 Cooper SlagtART Of LIE (N5tES ItESP0mSE 51Aff EUALIIAT10Il I tl tut t tillt 100. ,190-1 7 SlWl'ltfetRI 1 Analysts of the "as-built" 50V system has identitled me lhe licensee's analysis was A. 3) resvide en analysis of the edespuecy of reviewed and found ecceptable, "es-built
- Sur system & asseclated design and/or lastallatlan deficiencies.
wret & drain systems including any identitled design dellclencies. (sperating procedures provide clear guidance to the license < Response acceptable,
- 2) Revise and implement operating procedure Le revvide steer guldence to litented operators operator for SLCS Initiation and do seet reclutre supar-en the contrul rous regarding inittetten of visory approval.
SILS ulti.uut supervisory authority. procedures seqalre that the 50V be drained if water ?s Response acceptable.
- 3) Assure that procedures entst and are leptemented found in the headers. If the water cannet be drained, tur remedlet action if wete - found in 5tV wher reactor shutdown is to be achieved by rod lasertion with et should 1.c free of water. the reactor inasmal control system.
t) avvise & implement adminlsteetive procedures Operating prriedures require it.at the 58C5 tey be kept Respeese acceptable. o enkence 5tC5 tey shall be readily evellable readily av diable to the operator. to operater in tontrol room.
- 5) tuntinue delly monitoring of water levels in 50g daily eenitoring for water level is continuing. Confirmatory Order issued on Oct. 2. Itse
.11 5py regstres a esce per shift survelliance fregsency until a continutes usetter systen is testelled in tsec.1980. This
- s. l) lastell a system to tuntinuously munitor 1""slamous auntturing system to see lastalled nF requiement is being met by licensee -
uiter levels in all 5by I,y Sept.1,1980. Ints.1.1980 per IIItC Confirmatory Order. response acceptable.
- 4) t'ee foe e study of petesittel designs for Putentiel design tapelsvements of the vent system which are Criteria developed by owners sisbgroup sessuele.y went system. being cenisloered sie: adJeesses the concern regarding venting of 5DW.
- - - - - - - - - - _ - - - - - - - - - - . - _ _ - - - . ~ v e' e - - - _ _----_s--,--,-- > -- c
- M-blAft LV EUAIIGI 5 06 blIORI Illet RL51985L5 ftANI IsAMt Commeer StemARV Of LICLII5LES RtSP0el5E STAFF EVRtIATitR ill utal tilN H0. ,no-If PAGt 2 u.
- 1) Installation of parallel vent lines on each 50V
- 2) (tuntinued) header.
- 2) Addition or Sov lastriment volume (IV) so each SOf has independent IV.
- 3) Iteplate 2" drata line inen SUV header to IV with pipe eigual in size to header.
- 4) Direct distkarge of the 5tN header through an equal sire pipe to an esitteste beat sink stach as the torus.
+ l s' l-
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- T =T y
6
- 31 51 Af F (vat.UAlltnis Of W10lli Illet atLSPONSEE PLAll! IWit Cooper .
SUPPLtHtNI 2 5tsetAllt OF LICLilitE5 Rt5P0lI5E STAFF EVALGAtl m Ist B{l tilN No.' I@-11, i ~
- 1) t tl. pull licensee with a 50v vent system which Cooper's SDV vestlng is througli a ftert section of line nesponse acceptable.
.lcpted on any congament other than tlie vent valve attached to the air operated went valves with two alue.= ter proper venting must prowlJe an alternate ched valves in parellel lines directly to atens-vent patie caentineaumsly open to building atmos. phere.
gAetec un the stJe of the vent valve piping away is. the SDW. Ihis vent must t.e effective ec.prdien of camponent operability other than Lt.e went velve. E e e _ _ _ us_. _ ____.-_____._________:_._ - _______m m_.._ __,c . . .um-. .,.,,-,,w m c . -- , . v .
~.
- SIAff tyAtuAlltsch 0F 1000011 Illet lit 5 Pole 115 PLAllt luutti Cooper
' 51AFF IVALUAll0li Ist atR t t iIN 140. .thll StiertLMtill 3
SUMMARY
Of LIClitstE5 RisPel:51
- 1) for plants with SUV connected to IV by 2" Cooper has instituted procedures that resluire laimedlete This SLR will regstre an automatic reactor pipe. we sequire: manual scrasson: scram on low air pressure, la the laterla, a) tow CR0 air pressure (#10 pst above scram ositlet valve the licasees response to use a manual openingpressure)t scram is acceptable - response acceptable.
a) .= lamediate men. scram on low control b)Multip.ereddriftalarms.and ] rud drive air pressure witte min.10 c) A marked lacrease in CRD higle temperature 41 sties, i pst margin above opening pressure of scree outlet valves. I b) en lemmediate screm in Lise event of a multiple rod drif t-in alarm er a i' murLed change la numiser of control suda with higli temperature alarms. - 4 2) Impicnent procedures which respatre a Pgwedures have licen instituted to require fianctional tests Test with 18 0 - response acceptable. 2 tim t tunal " test using water for the of SDW leve's switches after eeth scram before power I.V. level eterm rod block & ss.res ascenslan. switthes a f ter each scree before 8 retusning to puwer." (Ibis is a temp. procedure till item u.I of fle 80-17 Supp. I are complet=J.) 4 i i 4 4
,-~ -- _ . _ . - . _ . _ . . .,~ , m.. -. , , . . - , . . . _ . . , _ , .
staff LVR u4fl00t1 0F 51s0RT 1[WI St5 peel 5E5 -- PLANT llApeEs r-- r lat out tilin se0. 80 14 PAGL i StettMtf Of Littait[1 RL1P045E staff EURIIATIGIl A) t itcascus of fE Buks* I) neview pleat records for lastances of la December 1974, new 50V level sultches were letstalled per til Desponse acceptable. reccessendatloa. During hydrostatic testing one of the sete
.segr.Jetten of any SUV level switch sesulting from a dem. Sed or btut float sultthes failed at about 1750 psig. The cacse was deteratand asseeably. Identify casse and to try a collapsed float assenhly which may have been due to tussettive ar,tlen. damage la skliment or lasta11ation. Replaced sultch 19 co Tect.
- 2) sh: stew records for degradation of 5DV 80 0 lastances of 50V vent or drata valve degradation here been Response acceptable.
vent .nJ drain valve operation. Provide recorded la plant records. The closure Llaa has remained stesure time regelred and tieuse normally 8,eluw 5 seconds since startup which is within the < 30 second ut.ser==J and ik t.es ts for ti.e regelred criterte reccean:nded by GL. (lestag times. Identify cause and tersettive action. si er procedures. regelre 50V went & Station operating procedures reigulre time 50V vent and drale Response acceptable. dialm walves i.e normally operable. valves to be open and operable with fisel in the reacter & have even & perloJitelly tested. If valves i.een revised to s'egelre periodic testing that includes closure see met operable or closed a 1 hour time. Also. Inoperability on closure for spot than I hour out in any 24 lueer period durlag spesatloa, of 24 ellt be logged and reported to the IIRC. ' the reason shall I,e legged 1 hkC mottfled within 24 6. cars. e' a-_-- -_____-_-__mm m_____mm.um._aa _.m -_ . .i.-,._me ., :s- e iwy y - --g-- ,-+e --w m e v , , - ,- 9 , , y- n yg,--- ,# .- ,y,,_ pg ,y 7, q
l l . . i l . l l l
- 34 51Aff LVALUAll0Il5 Of $410RI ILitM Rl5P0ll5ES, Pt.AMI IWt[g Cooper STAFF EWALDAT30It sismAllt of Littel5EL5 at5POIl5E ist una t tilu iso. ,so;14 rAct 2 100 events of water hasumer or events causing water Wr damage Respoese acceptable. ) acelew fastances of desnage from and/or to SDV related piping have been observed.
caused by water Itummer in SDV related piping. Identify cause & corrective ettlun. Existing surveillante pswedures are satsifattery to detect any llesponse acceptable. h) lieview sur. procedures to ensure that degradation of any SDN level sultch and any falltare wit) be Sbv level sultch degradation due to a d =a. ped float would be detected & that reported in an itR per Tech. Spec. requireammts. leiuper bility from any cause was tested
& s eported.
functional tests of SDW 1evel switches are perforised on a 3 Response accepteble.
- 6) It no tunctional test or inspectica of 50v level sultch has been performed acnth schedule and calibration is done at refueling cutages, during past 3 months weili;h would detect its de.,radation, snake provision to de se during neat si.utduwn , 48 hours.
SismAuf We have reviewed Cooper's responses to belletin regstrements of 18E 80-17 and 80-14. Our evaluation includes the Resident Inspettor*E assessemat of it.e licensee's compliance with these requires =mts. We conclude that laterle operation of Cooper is justified pending leptementation of long term modificattens. l
6
.y
. j5 SIAIi LVALIAAllulI5 Of 58M811) ItV6 K5PUIl5(5 PLAfsl seApeEs 18resden 2&J ,
1st htH t tilie seu. _so;1f PA6L I glegget er LICLNSEL5 RLSP9115E staff EWElIRTieN
- 1. (e) rcriurm soe welltente test tu verify that Singleredscrewsintoeach5[4headerandtheobservation 'Byneele air tests aise vertfled this I theee is seu styilligent emiount et water of the SDV drein line temperature response verlfled that response ecceptable.
en hist. there was sio significent moeunt of water in Llee 50V. (L) rce term surveillante test te verify that SUV vent & drafn valves have been verified operable. Flow path was demonstrated - response vent velves ese operable. acceptable. (n. ) resterm surv=lllence test te verify that The 53V. 50V vent lines & SDV drein lines were vertileil free Response acceptable vent systta la ises of obstructfue. of obstructions by perfosuing a dynamic air test.
- 2. rte sur_ anuel 5 eutumist ic stree infer- Ihe results of the menaeal and automatic scrans were accept- Additional tests verfiled no selfunctlen -
meinve listed a thru k in pulletin. able except for llha drain tests at Unit 3 on the manuel scram. response acceptable. As a result the StW vent system was modified to assure wentleig & tl.e subse p t scree results were acceptable. At Unit 2 edditional drain tests were perfotwd with no venting and verlfled potential dralnege delays. J. At timleston et stree tests and all ottier itse SDV vent & drain valves were verfiled to be fisactiosial. . Heter flesh piping added and used te ver-steams. the vent lines wese verlfled to be open by dynaelt air tests. Ify free vent path - response acceptable. UI te$ts to shuw sw significs.t water la the IDV. (e) Wes efy thet all vent lines on 50V are finu.tlonel. (b) Verity that there is eso slyillicant emmmit of weler in SDV. 4 _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ . _ _. _a___ _ _ - .m_. _ __ __ _._ _ ___ - _y-___ _ _ _ _ _ -. _ _ _ __________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___.__ _ _ _
SlAlF LVALUAIIUlsb Of Snott! IDIN Rt5r0kSE5 " Pt.Alli IWlE; Dresden F 5 1 _ 5tse%AT OF LICENSEt5 A15Nel5E staff EVAtllAtita . Ist butttilm he. Lb-If FACE 2 4 heview t ency Operellay Pow.edures to Emeegency proced es have been revised to assure reacter sheet- Response acceptable. essure it.at lur strem ey=reter (tlons doun in the event of rod insertion failure on scram & treinlog include a thru e of Bulletin. Instituted. Delly monitoring procedures for residue water la the 50V have Responso acceptable.
- 5. Iteview & develop surveillance procedure to nunitor daily for residue water in been desaloped and Instituted.
5Dv.
- 6. Enhente serIC. kCIC. 5LC5. Arl/ftHn/ruGL couling & main stese bypass operetton byn le) rrumpt notilltet ten when splees less titensee did not respond to this bulletin requirement and Operating orders la place end personnel then fully operable end wl.en restored, therefore contec.t was made through the resident inspector tralmed - response acceptable.
and is included in the staf f evaluellon. (b) operate all avellable supp. Puol same as above. Operating orders in place 4 4 personnel tooling wl*=never supp. Pool enceeds traleed - response acceptable. harwel operating testperature limit. 5.sie as above. There is disagreement la degree er difft. (c) Perfene A 50.69 review to intresse caelty for modificattens to ellow two passy 5t05 flew to maalawn consistent speratlen. This problem will be resolved - with safety (2 pumps, unless In our generic Alus ef fort. unsafe).
. _ _ _ _ . _ . . , ~ . . . . _ - . _ . . _ _. - _ _ - - . . . - , . -_ , . _ - _ - - . . . . - . . - _ - - - _. .. -- _ _ -- , , - - - . . _ . . . _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _
6 37 - 514tF (VALUAll0NS Or 5Hual lien RE5PONSE5 PtAmt mAnt; ikesden 2 & 3 5TAFF EVAWAllell 1&L uutittlN N0. 80 17 PAGE 3 S M RV 0f LICENSEE 5 RESP 0sl5E
- 7. for plants without A!W5 related RPI Analyses without en ATW5 RPT were Perforined to determine any API will be installed se oll gest plaats perseem emelysis of met safety of derating needed to meet the service level C reactor vessel by December I.1986 thus this concere pressure llelts in the event of severe! Aills events. The resul($ is elletaated, derating per coaslJerations llbt la bulletin. show no derate is needed.
a l I i 4
.E._
- - .---.c _.._n_________.-.__. - -
-.x.._ . _ -._- _ _ _ -.. - _ _ . - . . _
~..
y1 SIAf f LVAI.DAII0015 0F 5110111 illet ut.511185L5 ptANI mApett th esden 2 & 3 Ist stit t tilN NO. 80j l SUPPilfttNI I $lgetARY Of LICER5EES RE5 post 5E -5TAFF EVALil4T10ll A. l) PiovlJe en analysis er Line adeiguacy of the as-built 50V systein has been vertfled to seest the lhe liceresee's response was reviewed "as-t,ullt" suV system & assetteted pitch design requirements to facilitate draini & level and found acceptable, vi-at & drata systems inclinling any indication. potential water traps in the vent I ne have identitled denlys deliciene.les. been identified & proceilures instituted to clear the vent line when water is detected in the 50V or after scrasi.
- 2) stevise and laplement operating procedure to procedures have been revised to require StC5 startup with- Response acceptable, psuvide sleer guidante to licensed operators out supervisory approval. GE & the licensee have revised -~
in the control ruu regarding initiation of the IE Bulletin requirements on adjacent withdraisn rods SILS without supervisory authority, foun 5 to 2. This is conservative.
- 3) Assure that precedures entst and are Septemented .An operating order has been written that sp cifles Response acceptable, sus remedial actis,n if water found in $Dv when remedial action of water is found in the sov. The action it should te free of water. includes investigation of the systein and order t.y shut-down If the water cannot be dralned.
, 4) hvise & implement adelaisto stive procedures- Ihe 5btC key has been unved fram the Shif t Engineers key Response acceptehle tu enhente 5t05 tey s8 11 be readily available locter to a locatlose adjacent to the 5810 keylock switcli to upts etur la cuntrol room, to assume that ik is eeadily evallable in the control roues. 4 S) (untInne Jelly munitus ing of water levels in Daily wal% ring for water docesmulation in Llie 5DW la Confleinatory Orifer tssised on Oct. 2.1980 all sov. continuing and will (entinue until the continuous - reigulres a ence per shift surveillance i monitorisig system is lastelled. freepsency until a continisuus monitor ~ system is lastalled in Dec. 1980. This - ) regstrement is Wing met by licensee - 1 response acceptable. 1 1 ? 4 1
M
- J9 -
51 Aft ~ ty R u4110Il5 0F 5410AI Illut R(5r915LE PLAfsi IIAMts presdam 2 1 3 l'AGt 2 5tD9 TART Of LICLII5til RE5Fele5E staff EVKu4TIGII I&L DUtltilN 000. ,e03 7 _ installation of the continuous 50V level soaltering Continuous maaltering system to be
- 5. l) Install a systen to (ontinuously annitor Installed by Dec.1.1900 per IIRC water levels in all SDV by Sept. I,1980. system has leeen delayed from the 9/l/80 deadline to the end of October. Coef fraatory Order.
vent systen audificattens have been studied & leiprove- Criteria developed by easiers subgroup
- 2) P=rturm a study of potential designs for sJdressed the concern regarding venting
- layevving vent system. ments are planned. Some specllic ceasiderations are; (a) Vent lines pitthed to assure proper drainage; er 50V.
(b) Vent paths shall be provided to preclude loss of system function due to single failure; and (c) Vent funtilon shall not be adversely affected by laterfaces. 4 4 e 1 l
- 40 SI Alf LWAtUAlltNe$ Of belosti illut RL5 Poli %L5 pigg g Dresden 2 & 3 SteetART of LICLASEE5 AE5PONSE STAFF EWALGATION sat mutt alla see. so-y, supptteetni 2 I) teth gut licensee witn a 50V vent system which Constant atmospheric venting has been assuqed by Response acceptable.
JeppJ on any component etter then ll.e went value endlfications (tut vent Ilne Prlor to vent header), e tusic for psoper venting snust provide an alternate went p th contlemuntly open to buildin2 almes-gdetee un the stJe of the went valve piping away te n.= ti.e Sl4. Ihts vent must t>e effective regardless of custonent operability other then the vi:nt velve. 8 --- - - .___ .. ..~, . . _ , _ _ _ _ . . _ , , _ , , . . , , , , , , , . ,
l l SIAf f tvAttaAlluMS Of 51ecal Itast M5PONSES PLAlt! Ipett; Dresden 2 & 3 STAFF EMMilm 5tmMAAY SF LICLM5LES R15r0NSE R&L tutttilN NO. JL en Slettottar 3 _
- 1) for plants with 5trW connected to ly by 2*
pit e we re wires This SES will require se estematic reacter a) en lammediate men. scree se low centrol lamediate mesual scram en low air pressure ($ 50 pig) has scram on low air pressesre, le the laterla, ted drive air pressers with alm. 10 been lastituted. the licensees response to tese a masHael pal mergia eleve speelag pressure of scram is acceptable. uren outlet velves. P:otedures have been revised to require lasmediate unauel scram Response acceptable. b) en lamediate scree in the event of a when three rods have drifted. Dressen has not Instituted sultiple rod delft-la alare or a manuel scresa est high CAD tempes atsere feedications becease the morted change la nessiner of centrol soJs with high temperstwe e aleros, puettuslag systest for this parameter is r.ot adequate to respeed to a postulated less of air & tecause the manual scram en loss af air or rod drift are considered adequate protection. Ansponse acceptable.
- 2) las,le. cat pret.edures which rearstre a b operating order has been issued that ressultes testlag of tuns ttuaal " test eslag water fur the ,cian level sultches af ter each scram evnt.
I.v. level eterm, red bluth L stram swltti.cs efter each scree befare returning to puwer." (this is e temes. precedure till Itta n.l et Itn 80-17 Supp. I are templeted.) 3
.m
.. . _ _ . . _ . . _ _ . _ __ _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ = _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ , . _ , _~. . . ._. ,, ,,_...m,. . . ,. ., , , , , , , m.. ., .. ., . . . - , .
51Af f LVAt.jpAll0m10F 5HORT itDI K5POIl5ES PtAuf IWutEs Dresden 2 & 3 ist 'aus t tilm me. 80-14 PAEL i 51 SMART of LICEll5EE5 MSP0mSE staff EtatisATISI A) titensees of GL suas' l) meelew plant reords for lastances of Sha degradatlon of SDV level switches from damaged tv bent SesPense acceptable. Jcyedellen of any 50v level sultch floats has been recorded. ensultlag from e demoved er bent float essembly. IJentity tasse end corrective action.
- 2) seulew records for degradation of 5M 100 degradation of SDV vent or drala valte operability has Response acceptable.
vent and deeln selve operetten. Provide been recorded, tlesere time reegulred and tinase normally ut.serece and the bests for the required closing times. Identify cause anJ 6.<rective action.
- 3) sy procedures reepstre SW vent & Procedure changes have 14een lastituted t.o verify that SUV sesponse acceptable.
disin valses be nurmelly operebts. vent & drale valves are open. Surveillante procedures have open & perledicelly tested. If valves been endlfied to include vent & deala valve operability & e e not operable er (losed > I hour operating orders require appropriate notification la the in say 24 5.uer period durlag operetten, event of inoperabilley, the ressen shall be legged & HEC nettfled ulthen 24 lu,ars. 6
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9 staff LVALU4fl0Il5 Of 5H01li 1Liin RL5P0185E5 pt,Alq[ 31Apl[g Diesden 2 & 3 51stlAAV Of LIClll5LL5 RL5P0115g STAFF IVAL11ATIGII Ist utMilllN 100. ,,80-3 FAGE 2 10 0 lgstances of degradation er damage of 50V related piping am p se acceptable,
- 4) llev t instances of damage from and/or due to water heeseer have been recorded.
uused by water beener in SDV related - piping. IJcontity caisse & corrective act6an. Surveillance & procedigres have been reviewed & assure that SSW Response acceptable. b) Review sur. procaduces to ensure that SDv Isvel switch degradellen due tu a level sultch degradatiost due to a demaged float er other caerse de.sg:d fleet would be detected & tIeet would be detected & that inoperability of the rod blecit or lauperability from any cause was tested scree switches would be reported. E reported. lastrument surveillance procedures assure that level switc' . Elesponse acceptable, b) It no functional test er laspection are tested iguarterly, ut 5DV level sultch lies laen performed eturing past 3 seanths wlitch would detect its degredetton, make prowlsion to slo se
- iluring neat St.utdowei a 48 hours.
5teetAlti Ue hve reviewed Bresden's responses to bullette respelrements of Ist 8017 and 30-14. Our evaluation includes Llee Residut laspector's assessment of the licensee's compilance witm these revirements. We conclude . that laterie operation of Dresden is justified pendlag. Implementationet long term modt ficettees. l s
- - - .. . . _ . - - . - - .--, - .. _- -- _ _ ..~. -._.--- -.-- ---- . ,..m...~. _ - - , . . - - - . . - . . . ~ . . - - - . - - - . . - - . . - ~ . . . . - - - - - . . . . - _,- . - . .
e 4 SIAf f LVAtuAllulI5 0F Salolli illpt htSPull5LS PtAlli NA81L; IluAlif AIIN05 0 ist ben e t IIII lui. .f);11 pas.t I 58491Mtf Of LICLN5tL5 attir0RSE SIAFF EUALIInfiell
, l. (e) 6crevem surveillante test to verf8y that Test giratedesre (5pecial test Procedure #79) completed by Data reviewed by It'.l. and esas t i.ce t es ne slyillitasil enouns of esoter licensee and is available upon our re yest. satisfactory-response acceptable, in LW.
(b) Perturm surveillaine test to verify that vent velves .s e optreble. (t y res lorie se. vuillante test to vert fy (liet vent system is trts of obste wtlun.
- 2. h.e suse sunuet & automat ic sto nes linfor- Date available (Spec. Test Proc. #80 Rev.1) upon reipsest. Resposise acceptable.
e e a listeis e Lt.ru L la pollstin. knual and automatic scram testing completed July le,1980. SDV drain valve taas foined to have not 1.een lastelled correctly and was leaking excessively no adverse effect. J. At tuntiuslun raf stree tests enJ ell utsus st rean Testing pencedures available from R.R. lie probles a.t. ruviewed seat'precedurve end test eiscousitered. resulte and foisni these so be (el Verity ti.et all vent lines on SIMf es e tunstlunal. 4 i (b) Verity that tl.cre is seu slyilfitent
...un t a s we t tr les SW 3
e
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SIAff LWAt.UAllull5 0F Satust! Illet Rthrus 5L5 PLAlli 1841C; talAllt ARieutD 4 StegqART Of LICEN5LL5 RL5P08tSE staff EVALilATIGII ILL but ttilla ho. _tu.17 Fact 2
- 4. neview L urgsacy D mreting Pancedures to i Operating lastructions adJed and reviewed by 11555 vendor Response acceptable.
ao us= ti.4L for 56ren ag=rator actions and presently being reviewed by Supp. and Shift Sup. Include e thru e of Rulletin. Engineers. Preliefnary trefning is complete,
- b. Deview & develop surveillancs procedure lest procedure completed. Results available from R. I. Response acceptable.
to ensalter daily for residue water in SDV.
- 6. Labante stPIC, RCIC, 5tC5, RFI/Ritaf ruol.
cueling & sneln steam bypass operation by; (e) rrompt notification when systems less Operating order issued for fast IlltC notification. Response acceptable. tl a fully operable end when restored. ! (b) Uperate all evallable supp. puul Will not Lomply. Will inttlate other coollag subsystems Response acceptable, tuullag whenever supp. pool en(eeds that justif y more prudent reacter operation. norm.) operating temperature limit. Licensee disagrees on 2 pump operation. Ibere is disagreement in degree of b) Perform A S0.b9 review to intrease difficulty for modifications to allow SICS tiow to manimum coa lstent with ser ty (2 piamp , walass two p q operation. This p oblein will uns fe). be resolved in our generic Ailf5 effort.
SI Af F tvAtuR110ft5 0F Silosti Ittet RESPUst5L5 PLANI ItAME StMk ARIl01D STAEF EVAttlATI0le Iat uut t tItse 800. 50-17 PAGL 3 5tseMRV 0F LICENSEE 5 Ristost5E
- l. for plants without Ai h related RPI ht applicable leecause BAEC has Aivs re.Nted Rri system. pri will be lastelled in all slet plants pertain analysis of net safety of by December 1, 1980 thus this concern Jereting per comslJerationb IIst is ellelnated, in tsulletin.
- , . - - ._ . . , _ _ . . , _ _ ..__,..,_......_.__..m._.. ,. - _... , m., . . . . . , . ~ , . . . . . _ . . . _ . . . . . . , . _ . . . ... .. -. -m~_ , . s . . . . . .
I 5fAff LVRisAll0lIS Of 5HORT TList RE5 Pol 5L5 ptAsti llAptEg 1RWit AleI0l 9 SiggtRAV GF LICLil5[L5 RESP 0n5E staff EgE*14 TION lat bulltiltd NO. ,_u0j F SUPPttMilel I A. l) Provide an analysis of the eJeepsacy of Analysis of the SDW system & asseclated went & drale The licensw's h lysis a s m l W "es-levilt" 5tW system & associated systems ladicated me design oeficiencies. Licensee W (eund anYWe, M Md k went & Walm systems including any I will cowlete a seismic analysis. . noted that the criterien in this SER iduatitled design delictenctes. will restuire an accaatable selsmic 4esign.
- 2) nevise and implement operating precedure to Statement added to advise operators that supervisory Response acceptable.
e.sevide clear geldence to licensud operators approval is not reatuired to initiate SLCS la the event en the control room regarding inttletion of of I) CR system is unable to maintain subcrit. and Am StL5 willout sispervisvry authority. level cannot be maintained. 2) CR system is unable to maintain na subcrit. and torus water
- Ile*F.
)) Assure that prosedures entst and are Septemented . procedures entsts for water levels found > I apsart.- Response acceptable.,
ser re.nedlet action if water found in SDW when it should I,e free of water. , i
- 4) ne lse & laplement administiettve procedures Key is available at panel. _ htes eJded tp procedoro6. Response acceptable.
tu ent.ence 5LC5 ter shall les readily evallelsle to esperator in control room. S) fontinue delly monitoring at water levels in Surveillance lest pScedures is presently being liceensees response taas issued before ell Sw performed on dally basis to verify me 41,0 in 50t emagtlen esos granted to this plant en er assoctried piping. Ihis will continae till Sig lastelletten of a contineseus SDV level level emnitaring system is lastelled, monitoring system. Response acceptable.
- s. I) Install a system to continuo.ssly munller Will not change setisp due to 6 already lastelled suliches u ier levels in all 5tHf ley 5.;pt.1.1980. ,,4 ,g ,,,,g, ,,,g,,, y,,eg ,,,gg,,g,,
Licenseeise)tfromlastellation og congg,,,,,, system. ! 21 lce tuem a study of potential designs for Vent valve illsclearge and one went valhe is open to Criteria developed by oweiers sub-group -
. i.. u v e n.3 ven t s y:. t em. reactor Inallding via a dedicated line. 1he alcensee addresses the concern regarding venting feels this is adespsate end changes will not increase of 50W. ?
safety shutdown.
- b 8
-,.-m.m..-~.--.-w-----,.~-.~,,-.m.-,mmm~-.-- ..---.--,...--,._m._ - . ..m., ...m . . . . . ., --..--o,.. , . . - - , . , , . _ . . - , ._. .
4 ' SIMF LVAL.UAlluN5 OF Lae61tl Mapt RE1 pole'4ES pl.Alli NAMLi __ eta 41st AllstolD IEL eut t t Iin No. Ika-17, 5 wrttestal 2 5tdetAlly Of i1CLil5EES M5 pol 5E STAFF EUALDAilGR
- 1) leth put licensee with a SW vent system ashich A section of eulsting SW vent pipe taas removed . Response acceptable.
Ja p.nd on any tempunent other then the vent valve sisch' that the SW system is vented directly to alu c sur proper venting ausst provide an alternate reactor building atnespliere. The downstream vent patti continesuusly open to building atsms- section of the cast SW connected to reacter hullding ' phcee on the slJe of the vent valvo piping aesay equipment drain siemp header esas capped and seal-feue. the SDv. This vent emast t.e effettive eselded. regaeJtess of compunemt operability other than the voit velve. present preparatten to entend uncapped SW vent line to a more sealtable point of discharge in reactor , bialldlag. His will vent directly to reactor building. q i i f
- 1
- e
$14f F (WALUAlliaII5 Of $1404l Itih4 RESP 00n[5 pt Alli leAML t N N0 s
lat tuttLillt too. All $UPPILMLMI 3 $UMMAlif Of LICLIl5EE5 RC$Poel5E *
$1AfF EVALIIAT1811 l) tur plants with 5DV tonnected to IV by 2* Ilot applicable because no 2* pipe.
pipe, we reepaire; Ilesiense acceptable, el en leasediate men. scree on low control ruJ Jrive air pressure with aln. 10 psl wrgin above opening pressure of stree outlet welves. b) en immedlete strae in time event of a maaltiple red Jrift-in alarm or a mee ked thenge la niesber of control euJs with Ilyh temperatura eterms. , a) laple. cat procedures which respelre a Temporary procedures la ef fect to require a functional tuns tlunal " test using water for the test of 1.V. level alane, rod block 8 screar switches Response acceptable. f.V. level eiere, rud bluth & u res af ter each scram Inefore returning to power. sultthes a f ter cach screw befus e o ctue ning to puuer." (Ihis is e temp. procedure till Itta u.I of IIB 80-11 Supp. I are cumpleted.) 9 4 4 __. .___m.___..---_._--.,_.____m__m.____ _ w--- ~_m *_ --+-~ =- .- += e ~ -r---a= * * , - m-- s- + +-%' , , - , .---- -w -e--= =*wm -- _ +_ m .__-_--, . - - _mx-am.__.__--
. 50 STAFF LWAtuAlI0115 SF 5Holti Illel RE5Foll5Es PLAlli leAftE: IR8Allt ARIIOR B e
gtggqART Of LICENSEE 5 llESPON5E 5TAFF EVALIIAlleil
,88[ ,,8UlilllN 880 .50;l4 par,t g _ _
A) l lunsees of GE BWRs*
- 8) Review plant records for Instances of One ociturrence corrected. Response acceptable.
dcy Jetion of any 50v level switch resulting from a damaged or leent float assembly. IdCnkily cause end tuerettive ettlun.
- 2) Review records for degradetton of 3DV 50V drein velve laatege probles revealed in IE Response acceptable, vent and drein velve operation. Provide Bulletin 80 37 test tshich was corrected. Average 58V tinsus e time reytred and ti.ose normally went valve closure time was 23.0 sec. SDV drain velve ulescrved and the bests for Llie rescuirec 21.4 sec.
tioning times. Identify cause and turrective 4(tlon.
- 1) by pav(=Jeres, require Star vent & Isew test procedurc whitch will verify by isuelly testing that Response acceptable.
.ts ein valves lee normally aperable. 5DV vent and drain valves are open.
upcn & perluJitelly tested. If valves
- ese not operable or closed , I liour ,
in any 24 liuur period during opesetion. the season shall I,e legged t NRC nettfled , within 24 hours. i 4 4 i _ _ _ _ _ , _ . _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ . _ __~-._m.m... _ - . .. , , . . . , _ , ....m,..e- ... . . , , , . . . - _ . . , - . , . . < ..w.. . . . , _ ,_m .~. 1. , , , , , , . . , .. , , , , .m
51Aff Lv4LuAll0lI5 Of $lt0RI TList RUP0ll5ES pl.Asl{ llApti; INIAstt Ales 010 5tst%AT Of LICLleitti RESPoll5[ SIAM MMM Ist Duti tlist is0. 80 14 PAGE 2
- 4) steview lastantes of demage free and/or als lastences recorded. Response acceptable.
teus,cd by water heemmer la $14 related piping. Identify cause & corrective
. tion.
- 5) Iteveew sur. procedures to ensure that Review of Surveillance.Iest Procedures are functionally Response acceptable.
$w level sultch degradation due to a tested quarterly and calibrated Juring each refuelleg d - p:d fluet wuuid be detected & LIndt outage.
le.opesability fium say cause was tested
& repus' Led.
t) It nu functieaal test or laspection All SDV level sultches were functionally testtag during Response acceptable. et SDW level switch lass been perfesmed scram testlag and associated SDV outage work on during past 3 mesnths wiel(h would detect July IF.1960. It s Jcys edellan. cute pavtalose to do se due-eng enemt shutdowee a 48 leurs. Supe %NT We have reviewed Duane Arnold's respunses to bulletta requirements of R&f 80-17 and 80-14. Our evaluellon includes the Resident Inspedor's assessment of the licensee's compliante with tuese requirements. We conclude that interim %.oratloa of Duane Arnold is justifled pending letilementattua of long term audift-cetions. I 4
- . . _ _ _ _ _ _______________m _ - . . -- . ._ _ ,m _ . --- - ________ __. __ _.__. .m__ . _ .____
l SIAff LVALUAll0lli Of 5110RI IlllPI RESPUltSE5 rtANT NAtett fitspetrid STAFF EUAllIATI0lt 5tfrinART Of LICLN5EL5 Rt5F0el5E ist mus t tilN NO. 60-if PAGt 1
- Verified 50V, IV & associated piping free of significant Respase acceptable.
- l. (e) rerlores servelliance test to verify that actimaalations of water using ultrasonic testing.
ttice s as me signtiltant emuunt of water In SDV. Vertfled sirl vent values were operable. Response acceptable, (n.) rurture surveillance test to verify that unt v.t ves .s e operable. Vertfled vent system is free of otastructions. Vent system vertfled free of obstruct-(t) P=rture survelltese test to verify that len by blotting air through piping -
, cat system la tr6e of obstruction. acceptable.
Manual & automatic scrams conducted required information sub- lteslutrement to perfom a manual &
- 2. res term manual & .utu=.t ic ur.as infor- mitted. Scram times acceptable scram sollnold valves & backup automatic scram was satisfied. Vent iso IIsted a ti.ru & la pulletin. & drain valve closing times were valves operated satisfactorily. Vent & drain valve closing times > 30 sec. EDV drain times consistent with other plants. grealer than 30 secs. Slou closing Does not appear to delay drala. times have net caused water hammer ef fects & time system operates nor--
mally la other respects. Other eqasip-functfuned satisfactorily. Drain tie s for 50V headers tsere consistent with system geometry.
a 51Alf LVAl.uAlt0115 Of SHORT ILDI R[5PoltSL5 ytAseg safwet.; fitspatrick STAi7 EVAttIATlell PA6L 2 5teetARY Of LICLitiLLS AL5P0stst ist uutitless see. so.If
.l . At unes.lusion of scram tests and all other loop seal found in 2* line cornecting east *E to Selv.
st:4=>: vent ilnes verif fed to int fianctional. (a) Vesity that all vent lines sui SUV are Sasu as above. Vent lines vertfled to be fianctlenal famntional. - acceptable. 5ame as above. U.I. surveillance of SOU & drain (b) verify that there is no significant amount piping revealed a leep seal to the of water in $DW. 2* deala line from the east SOU header & the IV. Licensen is con-ducting daily VI anaminetten of this pipe sectice esntil a modif t-cation is made to ellsinate loop seat. Action taken by licensee is satisfactory for the lateria. t 1 1 1 _. _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _. _ . . _ . _ . . _ . _ . . _ . . . _ . ~ - _ - - ~ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ . . . . - . - . . _ . _ .. ... . _ . _.
5IAf f tvAI,UAllo'Ib 0F Saloaf If Mfl N.SP0llSt5 rtAfi[ IWWit.; jltipatrick R&L But tillel 900. ,3k8-If pag 3 5tsetARV 0F LICtl5tE5 At5 Poll 5t $1 Af F ".WAtil4 TIM
- 4. Review t=ergenty operating Procedures to Pro (edure revlewed & resguirement of a thru d Incorporated Responge acceptable.
e nsu. = temat for steem operater attluns tealning given all litensed operators (emcept absentees). Intlude e thru e et tulletin. Absentees to be given training as soon as practicable efter rettern to wolL.
- 5. Neview & develop surveillance procedure Surveillance inittsted using ultrasonic esamination. Confirmatory Order Islesed on Oct 2, to a2nitor daily for residue water in Surveillante to be done dally until continuous monitoring 1980 reqielres 4 ence per shift sur-SDv. system Installed. veillance frequency until 4 contiseiseus munitor systen is las".411ed in Dec.
1980. Requirement is being met by
- 6. Enhance lePIC hLit. 5t05. RFI/Intet/r00L Licensee has written & leptemented a standing order to coullag & main steam bypass operet ten byl provide for a) prumpt nottfl(allon of systems less than telly operatele & restoned b) operation of all avalleble suppression pool tooling whenever supp pool exceeds normal OP temp limit.
(a) rrompt notitlution when systems less ti.en fully operable end wl.en restoi-ed. Response accepte.le. (b) operate all evallable supp. pool Response acceptable tuollag wieenever supp. pool esteeds novenal operat ing itaperatus a Ilmit. , (t) Per Nro A bu.h3 review to intresse 50.59 Review stut yet completed. There is disagreement la degree of sits view to m.elmies consistent difficulty for modifications to allow with selety (2 pumps, unless two pump operation. This problem will unsere). be resolved in our generic ATWS effort. I 1
.. . g ... .._.___.____ _ _ _ _ _ .____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . . _ . . . . _ _ . . _ _ . , _ . . . - . . _ , > . . . . . . ~ _ _ . _ . - . . . . _ . . . . __ , _, . . . . _ . , , , . . _ _ _ . ._ .
51 Af f LVAttWLil0N5 Of 5600mf Illet RibP0185E5 PLANI NAHLt ,_[itgeggp 6 80-17 par.L 4 SupeWLRT OF LICLM5EES RL5Polt5E STAFF EVALMAflell ist mutt tilN N0. _
- 7. for plants without ATW5 relate.1 RPI Fitzpatrick has AIWS related RPI. HPT will be lastalled la all Bla plaats periore enelysis of met safety of by Decader 1.1980 times this concern Jeeating sa:r conslagerations list is ellelmates.
In bulletin.
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ptAli leasts Fitzsetriti 5 N r W LICt M 5 m m W N HMM lat stets tilte no. ee.t r Stentef 1 hrsvided en enelysis of adequacy of as bellt 50V. Stiv & The licensee's analysis was revleued A. 4) Provide en emelysis of the edequecy of assecleted vent & drala systems. foisnd leap seal of 5-6 landfoundacceptable, e s-a,.llt- 5ts syste. a essociated we,t & drain systems is.cludlag any inches in height la present 2* drain line. Licensee does 8 iscotifled destyn delictencies. not feel that dretning of 50V is not adversely af fected - l by loop seal. Will conduct delly IIT esamination of pipe section initil modifications made.
- 2) mestse and Ieylement owreting precedure to licensee has luplemminted changes to normel & emergency Response acceptable, provide clear 9uldance to licensed operators operatlag procedures to provide clear guldence te operating en the control room regarding inttletten of shif t personnel regarding initiatless of 5tC5 SLC5 without supervisoey authority.
I
- 3) Assure that procedures em16t end are Septemented Standing order written & leglemented which regaire that Resp ese acceptable,
- ser remedlet action if watcr found in 50V when the reictor be placed in cold shutdowns condition witlila 24 tt shuuld be free of water. hours if results indicate presence of water when iseter should not be present. I
- 4) scelse & loplement administrative precedures Standing order leptemented to require key be located oss hesponse acceptable, au enhance StC5 hwy shall be reedily evellable thn control panel adjacent to the control switch.
to opcreter la centeel room. i
- 5) tems.In.e delly menttoring of water levels in Delly UI survelliance of 50V leglemented. lSeeresponsetoIKpulletin80-17 ell sts Iitem 5.
l) install a system to continuuusly munitor Will install GE monitoring system. Caanot commelt to date Continessess monitoring system to be
- 3. lastelled by Bec.1.1988* per lutC suter levels in all SLN by Scyt.1. Igets. because delivery of system is emot item. Will centlnue Jelly tai surveillance. Confirmatory Order.
- 1) rertare a study of potentiel de;lgas for Presently conducting study el potential designes for la- Criterte developed by ounws sub-proving the venting of SUV. In Interle vent path con- group addresses the concern reuerd-e.pseeing vent system. venting on SDV.
Linuuusly open to reactor building eteusphere provided on piping. ~ t l ! . __.__m_.--__.___...u _ _ -m_._mm____r __.m__m._mm__- _m__~---a.----
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51 AIF LwALWAllgell Of 5860AI IllWI litSPuetSES gg gg Iltzpetrick SteMAtt 0F LICEN5tt5 AESPOII5E STAFF EUAL94 flag Ill 8888 8 I 3 3 88 880 .M. -I.l . strettntal 2
- 5) letti sua licensee ulth a SIN went system which Plant modification installed to provide a vent path Ventgipingtergestedfreinthereacter Jegn ud un any toepeneet other thee flee weet welve tentiscuously open to beellJing ateesphere. beellding sesg to a fleer drein vie a eIphs sur proper vtatleg misst prevlele en alternate $4sV4CM M er. Me eCCept- '
vent p th (untinuuwsly ey== to building etems. able, phes e on the stJe et the vent valve piping away Irene tl.e SW. this vent must be ef fective seeprJless of tesepunent operability other then the veut velve. i 4 4 I t 4 I 1
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l l i _ gj _ 51Aif (v4LUAi1016 9f 1980RI ItiM RL5F0llSES pt.Alli NNil: Iliriestrick 51Aff EVALUATIGII bilmlART SF LICLIl6LL5 RL5PostSE lit, mut t tilu Iso. , au; t 4 PAGE 3 A review of scalatenance & oper. records did not reveal instance Response acceptable.
- 4) R.vtem Instantes of dessage from and/or t u:,cJ by weter hea.acr la 5tMr related of dastage caused by watter hammer, piping. IJcatify cause & curreClive attsun.
Instrument surveillantp procedures require that unexpected Response acceptable.
- 5) n vecw sur. protudures to ==sure that Stev Icwel sultcle degradation due tu a system perfosimance (float desiege) will be reported en est d wicJ tlaat t ould f.e detettsd & tImat ouureence report and reviewed isy plant operations review I perahllity tram eny cause was tested consul t tee. An LIR is prep 4:ed it appropriate.
& esported.
funttlanal test of the SDIV level switches utlllring water has Response acceptable.
- 4) 18 e tunttlow.l test ur inspettlun e s *.bv level watcl. has been pertus med I,een (unducted routinely since 1974. Functional tests of the d..rsng past J am,ats.s i.e.lets would detect level swltthes will be perfoemed prior to reacter startup.
Otb ddyraslattua. his peuvlslun tb do no - d.ering neat St.utdove , 48 !.our s. Ide have reviewed Fitzpatrick's responses to bulletin StomaRY~ ~ ~ ~ seguirements of R&f 80-17 and 80-14. Our evaluation includes the Resident insposter's assessment of the licensee's tuspliance with these requirements. lie conclude that interim operation of Fitzpatrick is justifled pending implementation of long term nodift- ' ca t lotts. e h
blAff tvAtlaAllull5 Of SIFJIll Itift RL5 Poll 5L5 l'l Asti st*Jef s . ..llAIOLI. Ist tut t t illa 110. 80 ,1 SleetAAV Of LICLli1EE5 R15PosiSE staff EUALilH10ll _ _. . _ . . _ ___ _ ___f l'.At.t i __
- l. (a) Persuem surveillante test tu verify th,it m residual water found, went valves are operable, air injec- Response acceptable, t we e: es sua sspiltitemt ==eunt of teater LI8" "*1 preformed to verify went Ifne operation.
la SW. (4.) resfase survalliante test tu verify tiet vcat v tect as u upes elet e. (t) rcriurse surveillante trat tu verify that veut systte la frem of ubstruttlua.
- 2. Poi suis m.anuel & .utumatic strae later. The SDV responded properly and no problems acted. Response acceptable is listed a gl k in pulletin.
J. At ==ntlastusi of stree tests seid all All lines tsere verfiled functional at the conclassion of - Response acceptable, uts r str.as; eleve tests and no significant espunt of water was found in SDW piping. (e) ves ity that all vint times on SW .
.ss lunstlun.l.
(t.) Vce lly ti t al.tre is seu s opillicant
.wust a l wa t er tu SW
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d blAlt LWAlUAl!Ulth Ut haluill ILisH NLhlushth pg g __ IIAICH I Sl89tARV Of LICDl5EE5 RESP 0ll5E staff EVAttIATI0li 1&L sulttilu 640. alo-li FAGE 2 neview tuergency Operating Pancedures to anecessary changes made to both units and reviewed by Georgia Response acceptable..
- 4. Power and GE.
assure Lliet fur scree operator actions IncluJe e thru e of Bulletir..
- h. haview & ilevelop surveill.nte procedure Daily munitoring of leth units slaow no residual water observed. Itesponse acceptable, to sannitor daily for residue water in SDv.
- 6. Enlunse striC ACIC. SLCS, RPI/italA/ POOL coollag & main steam bypass operation by; listification given to both units began on July IB.1940. Response acceptable.
(a) Frompt notificatten when systems less than fully operalle and wl.en restorad. !- (b) opus eta all evallaisle supp. pool The requirements of this item have Recent incorporated. Rksponse acceptable. tuollag winenever supp. Pool maceeds
- normal operating temperatus e limit.
6PC has contacted A/L and requested assistance. A submittal There is disagreement la degree of (c) Perform A $0.59 review to intresse difliculty for modifications to allow SIL5 flow to unamleue consistent Jue 7/31/80. with selety (2 pumps. unless two pump operations. This problem will be resolved in our generic ATWS , unsafe). effort.
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t-SIAlt itALUAlitass W bleusta ILMH mainasid FtANI DAML; ItaltH 2 1st out tilla uo. ,tas-I! rau 2 54setNiv af Littsestis AL5P045E STAFF EUAtilATitu
- 4. Review Leergency Isyerating PrwteJures to leecessary thenges to plant emergency operati procedurel itespunse acceptable, e s .=e = t e.e t ter str.e operster a(tlues of both setts have been completed and revi ey Georgia dislede a thru e et sulletta. Peuer and GE. Operater Irelaims completed 8/2/00, 5
- 5. teview & develop surveillence pres.edure helly munitoring of butb theits shoers no residual aseter observed gespo,3,agg ,g,gy,,
to semiter Jaily for residue water la a3,50y, 5bt. , e O. takante ItPIC ACIC. StC1 hPl/setM/ POOL teeling & aule staae bypass operettem byt . ksponse acceptable. le) prempt mett fl(ation when systems less bilflCetion began on .iuly 12 for both salts. them fully operable and weite restored. (b) operate all evellable supp. s=>ol Procedures deptemented into teth units. Response acteptable. toullag whenever supp. pool esteeJh mor ) operating tempeesture I t=!L. (c) Perser A S0.69 review tu lacrease lhe A/t has tongsleted at 10 Cl2 50.59 eeview covering the There Is diseereement in elegree of Sa ts flew to meslan=s cuakistent operation of 5tC5 =lth hth = =s. Tu ==aluation indicates diffloulty for endlfications to allow with safety (2 piamps. trolens the system, as designed. 6ennut be operated safelr with two pimp operstlun. This problem will
.nsefe). both pumpt running and the reactor at mentamam ATit5 pressure be resolved in ser qs m ric Aini5 effort.
of 1297 psla. _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ _ <, , - - - - - . . . ~ - - . - . - ,.-.m m r.. - - - - - , _.____m__ _ _ _ _ _ . _.__m-_
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SI Af f LWALUA110NS Of SIMMti It1st RLhr0It%E5 PLANI MAME: _ HAICM 2 5tputANT OF LICENSEE 5 RESP 0ItSE $1AFF EVALUAllem R&E suttiIIN NO. 80-11 PAGL 3 ,
- 1. for plaath neithout AIWS related hPI tietth 2 hos AIWS relatesi RPI. IIPI will be lastelled la all Sim pliants..
icrlors emelysts of net safety of by December 1. 1900 thess this concern Jeret tag pcr conslJerations IInt is ellelmated. 6n bulletin. T 1 q- . a 9 1..__... . - _ _ _ . . ~ . - . . _ . . . . . . , - , _ . - . _ _ _ - . , . - _ - - . . _ . _ - - . _ - . _ . _ _ _ _ . - , . . . ~ . . , _ . ~ _ . . . . - - . . - . _ _ - - , . _ . ~ . . . _ _ , ~ . . _ _ _ . . . - . . _ _ _ _ - . - - _ . - _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _
SIMI LVM.uAll0Its GF 5110RI illft itL5Nel5L5 1tApli IIAME; ital [H l & 2 StegERY Of LIClit5EE5 RE5FOst1E STAFF EVALUAT10ll a ist still tilN NO. _180-11 SurritMLNI l A. 1) Psevise en analysis of the edcapaecy of Analysis geswsented in stegional meetteig. the licensee's analysis was revlemed e s-teellt" 50V system & associated and (vund accepleblg. vent & drain systeens including any identitled desi pe t deficiencies.
- 2) Nevise and japlement operating procedure to lievisions implement. Itesponse acceptable.
3.ruelJe sleer epalJante to litensed operators an the control room regarding initiation of 114.5 uitbet supervisory aut krity.
- 3) Assure 161 procedures entst and are templemented once per shift a test line located below the bl-level llesponse acceptable
- sur remedial attisen if water found in $Dv when sultti.es on the SDW be opened and not sure than 500 ml e t should tsc fe et of water. of water can i.e released.
- 4) Nevise & Is.plement administr ative procedures Procedures implemented to require al,1 keys, including SLC5 Itesponse acceptehle ,
tu enhente 5tC5 ter siall lee reedily avalleble be la control room. to operatur la control room.
- 5) tuntinue delly monitoring of water levels in laater levels being monitored, pending permanent UT water Licensees response sees issued before
,ll spy level monitoring esculpment lastallation. enesytton was granted to this plant on lastallatloa of a continuss 50W level monitoring system. Daily monitor-B. 1) lastell e system to continuunsly munitor Litensee believes existing setup is adespeete dose te large Ing of SDW is not reeleired.
- usicr le.ct s in all 5tiv t y sept.1,1980. ding Licensee will Install a temporary UT connecting pipe lufuraation on and no cy redundae modif andttations diversityi.eofmadebnstru.
S mentation. Licensee is adding a U1 device. device even though they are esempt from
- 2) res term a study ei potential dealgns for empeavi"5 vent systee. Licensee claims vent system is adesluate. Criteria developed by owners sub-group addresses the concern regarding venting on SDV e
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hf AIF tins.UAf ttel5 Of SHGill ][let RL5PolthE5 PtJWil llNK; itAttH I & 2 SleMAny Of LIClll5EES MSPptEE STAFF EVM W4tl M 1st elft s t f lu te. 80-R , SUPPitMLNI 2 t) Leth must licensee with a 5tMr ve et system which Licensee feels no audifications are necessary Response acceptable.
.tepsed on any component other than the went velve e to units I er 2 since time as built system alue.e sur proper ventlug must peestJe en alternate settsfies the rey trements.
nas path continuuusly open to building etmus-ed.ce s en the slJe of the e;nt velve piping duey reu= the 5tg. Ibis vant must s.e ofrective s esse dless of component operability other then the veut velve. 'k e i 6
F l t l ~ i l l 61 Aff tvAtusillats Of Suomi 1Elin RESPol5ES PLANI MAMt: IIAICH I & 2 STAFF EVALUAileN 5UMMART OF LICtM5EE5 RE5PONSE lst suit alla no. P.All. SUPfttMtNI 3 Unit I has no 2* pipe. Unit 2 has 2" pipe but the bl-level This 5ER will wluire an automatic I) for plants with SIN connected to IV by 2* scree switches are connected directly to the SDV. reactor scrar. on law air pressure. pipe, we require: In the laterte, the licensees response
. to use a manuel scres is acceptable -
At present the following procedures concerning Supp.3 are la response acceptable. e) en immedlete men. scree on low control effect et Hetch: ved drive air pressure with ein. 10 psi margin shove opening pressure of 1. toss of Instrument air. ures entiet velves. 2. loss of CRD systes.
- 3. Rod drift.
t) en lassedlete scree la the event of a 4. 50V not drained. multiple rod dritt-in alarm or a merled change la number of tontrol suda with high temperature alarms. With iten 2 a standing order has been issued to re p tr# Response acceptable.
- 2) Implement procedures which require a sum tional " test osing water for the a functionel test of all Elevel switches (scree and 1.f. level eierm, red block & stree rod block),
sultthes ef ter each screm before retwening to power." (this is a temp. procedure till lite B.I of lib 8011 Supp. I are cumpleted.) i e
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5?AFF IVALUAl10ll5 0F 5Heilt itivt ilt5Foll5E5 plAg igygt: IsAlot i 8 2 5tstiARV 0F Littil5tt5 K 5P0ll5g STAFF EVAL 9ATIsil 1st utN i t t lN NO. _ IM8 II PAGt 2
- 4) Review lustances of damage fece &nd/or One occurance recorded and corrected. Response acceptable ,
taused I,y water hemmer in 50v related piping. Identity cause & corrective attlun. It should be noted tipu collapsed floats b) Review sur. precedures to ensure that once a month surveillence of level switches on unit 1 were found in tietch 2 en July 25; 1980 - 51tv level switch degradation due to e and unit 2. during testing required by lat Bulletin damaged fleet would be detected 8 that 110 . 110 . I 7 . Review Indicates that these te.uperability from any caase was tested switches had been inoperable since June'
& reported. 2. 1960. See age lg of Generic Stil
- (Sectlan 2.1.1 .
- 6) It ne functional test er inspection Functional test is confirmed Ig Tech.' Specs. Response acceptable.
of %DW level switch has been performed during pest J sainths which would detect its degradatlen, make prowlslor to do se during nest sl.utduwei a 45 Im;ars. 999Wtf tie have reviewed flatch I & 2 responses to bulletin requirements of IK B011 sad 8014 Our evaluation includes the Resident Inspector's assessment of the licensee's compliance with these requirements. lie conclude that laterle operation of flatch I
& 2 is justified pending tagslementation of long term modifi-cetlens.
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- 74 51AFF LVAltRil0N5 Of SHORI IllWI A(5PONSES
' PLAMI MAME: Mfit5 lone I Supe %RY OF LIELR$tES RESP 0185E STAFF EVAtenIIGR'- lit utstittlN NO. 80-17 PAGE 3 . - _ _ . . . ~ . ticensee concluded that a conservatlye Inounding plSty Rfi wlll be installed in all 9tSt plants
- 1. for plants witliset ATW5 related RPT by December 1.1900 Lluss this conceni is pertes= enelysis of met safety of half scree evaluation show that the 1500 pstg llelt is stot esteeded. lhe turbine trip naalysis Slews pressure ellaineted.
des ting peer considerettoets ilst In Bulletin. < 1500 psfg also. a 3
- t e
I 3 I I e.
75 - 5IAff tV R DAll0fl5 Of 5MORI IEfft NE5POR5L5 rtAni teAML: J1LLiInst 1 STAFF EVR UAll0lt SurPttettIII l 51stSRT OF LIGitSEE5 RESPONSE ist tHMt t IN Ho. 80-11 Analysis of "as-built" 50V systeo 8 associated went The licensee's analysis was reviewed A. Il fSevide an analysts of the adequacy of and drain systems was provided at the regional meeting. and found acceptable,
*as-built" 59V system & associated vent & drale systems including any identitled desteps deficiencies.
- 2) nevise and implement operating precedure to SLCS can be implemented by any licensed operator. Response acceptable.
provlJe cleer 9uldance to licensed operators Operator sust first verify scram has occurred or not, la the control room regarding inttletion of htts without sepervisory authority. j) Assure tW t presedures entst and are laplemented If > 39 gallons of water is in SDV. scree is Response acceptable,' - ser remedial action if water found in SDV when initiated. If SDV headers are found to contain 6t aould be f ree of water. > I Inch of H 0, the plant will lie shetdown within 2 8 liours.
- 4) nevise & l.,le.e=t ade:'ntste ative procedores 5105 is required to remain in the 5tC5 control switch. Responsible acceptable.
to cahance SLCS key sbli 'se restlity available to operatur la control room. i Licensee will continue to asalter for water la the SDvs Confirratory Order issued on Ikt. 2
- 5) tantinue daily moniterlag of water levels in 1900 requires a once per shift all Stry using UT until e permanent, continuous monitoring system is Installed. survelliance frequency until a con-(Inwoes monitor system is Installed in Occ. 1980. This requira: ment is being met by licensee -response scteptable.
9 i
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. d u
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- 11 SIAlf LVALUAilust5 0F SlHNIT Illet lit 5Ptletst5 PtJulf IUyttg mills 10 set 1 Ist aut e ttlet sec. e0-1]{. SurettMtMt 2 5tMtART OF LICEstSEL5 lit 5P0stSE STAFF EVALUnitelt
- 1) leth but licensee with a 5tw vent system which stillstone valt has an 50V vent systes en both the Response acceptable.
.lcawnd on any compment other then the vent valve north and south side and is dependent only upon the alone ser proper venting must provide en alternate respective vent salves for proper venting. Vent vent path continuously open to insilding atmos. path is cent. cpen to building atmosphere. A ps.ce e en the side of the vent valvo piping away modification was necessary to the north side since the orie= the SDt. This vent must lee effective SDV vent system on tinal side discharged to the scram ,
regardless of component operability other than discharge Instriment voltues drain line between the the vent valve, drain valve and the reactor building equipment drain tank. thalt Is now in compilance.
- O O
. . _ . . . _ . _ _ _ . . _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _,_. . _ _ , . . . . . . _ _ _ . , , , , , s.,_ , . . . . . _ . , , , , . . . . . . , . .. . . ., , , _. . . , _ , ,
4
~
- 18 51Aff (VALUAlltsl5 Of 5HORI ItRM Rt5PONSEI ptAMI MAMt: MlltSIME 1 STAFF EVAttIAfl0Il tr.t stu t t illi NO. ,My surrltMitll 3 StIHMAtt Of tlCtNSEt3 Rt5POM5E
- 1) for plants with 5DW connected to ly by 2* Operating proceduras re=Ise.1 to require een scree on low this SIR will require an automatic reactor pipe. we require: CRD elr pressure el 60,st. Also revised are procedures to scree on low air pressure. In the laterle, require a manual scram in the event of multiple red drift the licensees resrwse to use a manual in alarms or a marked change in no. of tas with hish temper- scram is acceptable, a) en lamediate man. scree on low control ature alans.
red drive air pressure with aln.10 = psi margin above opening pressure of scree outlet valves. b) en immediate scree in the event of a multiple red drif t-in alara or a mas ted chan.pe in nWeer of tontrol evJs with high temper;ture alarms. Fl Impic.ent procedures whith require a Pre-critical check-of f sheet has been revised to " require a Response acceptable, lenst eenal " test vsing water for the fon(tlonal test using water for the I.V. level alare. rod I.T. level alare, rod block & scree block & scree sullches af ter each scree before returning sultti.es af ter each scree before to power." These procedures are la effect till modification returning to power." are made to substantially Inueese the reliability of water (this is a toep. Procedure tillites level Indication in SDvs. 8.1 of IIS 80-17 Supp. I are completed.) f e I w -
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s SIAf f LVALMi'ON5 0F 5H0lli Ilfft RE5P0ftSE5 PLANT MME: Mill 51008t I t ist t17 tillN 999. _80-I4 PAGL 1 5199%Itf Of LICEll5EE5 RE5PONSE STAFF EVALMTI0li Al Litensees of GL Wuns' I) neview plent records for instances of Ib instances fowid. Re-nonse acceptable,. dege setation of any $DV level sultch ecsulsing fruei a danuged or beest float absemellI F . IdentlIf tausti and toinettive attion.
- 2) Revlew records for degradation of SDV in 1976, drain valve stem was bent when the drain valve was Response accepteble*
vent and drain valve operation. Provide maa.a+11y closed for a system test. Replacement of the tissure tire regelred and tiese normally stem was undertaten and the valve returned to morenal service. oliserved *.Ad the tusts for the required Closr#8 tlWes were satisfactory. Llosing tl=es. Identify cause and corrective action. .
- 3) By procedures, restelre SDV vent & Procedures lieve been modified to require 50V vent and drain Response acceptable ~
de eln valves Ire normully operable, valves to be normally operable and periodically tested. open & periodically tested. If valves License will comply with notification ilme, es e not operable or closed > 1 hour ln any 24 Igur perlod during operation, the season shall be legged & IIRC notified within 24 lurers. 9 9 _ _ . - m .m ,- __ . - - . . _ . . , _ . . m , .. _ ... . . . . - _ . .~ . _ . . . . . . . . - . . . . . - ~ _ _ . ...m.. .__. . , .- .
-m-STAFF EVALUAfl0N5 0F SN0lli itRN RESPONSES rtjpli nmE Mittsiont i 5tremRV 0F LICEN5EE5 RESP 045g . STAFF EVALUATION Ist etn i t t lN NO. , IM8; 31 FAGt z les Instances recorded. Response acceptable,
- 4) Review instantes of Jenner face and/or taused ley water basseer in St* related pigein g . Identify cause & corrective ettsun.
S) Review swr. precedures to ensure that Surveillance procedureg revised for SDW level switches. Response acceptable. 5 tty level switch degradatl.no due to a dennaged float would lee detected 1 tbt inoperability from any cause was tested
& seported.
- 6) If no Junctional test er inspection 5 tty level switches functionally tested senthly since unit Response acceptable.
et 51st level witch ks beest perforleed was placed la service. durtny past 3 auenths which u,u?d detect its degredation. inste prowlslen to do so d aring nest shutduwn , 48 hours. 5tMMRY We have reviewed Mllistone I responses to belletin reqettressents of IEE 80-17 and 80-14. Our evaluation includes the Resident inspector's assessment of the licensee's compilance with these requirements. We conclude that Interim operattori of Millstone 1 is justifled pending iglesmentation of long terin mdllications. B.
,.7"L SIAff LVAL.tIAll0015 0F $ll0RI itlet At5P0ftsis ptApll ItAMt t IngsTitri a n .
5tsgtART OF Li((H5LES RE5PON5E STAFF EVAtllAilell Ist utsit t llN s@. WJ-lf PAGE ]
~ - '
Surveillance tests performed July 4,1980; (a) no Response acceptable. s
- 1. (a) perform survellier.ce test to verify that there significant amount of water in SDV and piping, (b) Vent is no siptficant anzunt of water in SDV. valves operable. (c) Vent system was free of obstruction.
A regulated air supply and rotometer were used to supply I (b) perform surveillance test to verify that vent and measure air flow through vent lines as vent valves Response acceptable. valves are operable, were operated closed and open. Test confirmed the valves
==ve operable and the vents were not obsttacted.
(c) 5urveillance test to verify that vent systee is free of eletrwction.
- 2. Perform munaul & automatic scres infor- a Data was found satisfactory. Response acceptable estiuse listed a thru & la Bulletin. b Data was found satisfactory.
c Bactup valves remained open during presence of scram signal. d i Data was found satisfactory. . . hh Data was found satisfactory. I ! SDV and piping monitored for residual water by ultrasonic testing before and after scree. lim water was detected. j len second delay was vertfled. k Data was consistent. J. At tantiuslest of scree tests and al) Vent lines vertiled by retometer and regulated air Response acceptable. etter straen supply. tiltrasonic tests verified no water remained in 3DV. (a) Vee'Ify ll.at all vent lines on SDW are functlenal. (b) Verify that Lleere is no significant
. unt et water in SDV I
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51 Af f LVAttlAll0005 0F 5 HURT TEltti NESPONSE5 PtANI MAME: NNilltt_Il_0 90-17 FACL 3 SUMMART OF LICENSEES RE5Fon5E STAFF EVALWATION IEE CU111114 40. - F. for plants without AIWS related RPI pbaticelle has en operable ATW5 related RPI and itPI will be lastalled in all Sist plants persone analysts of net safety of ARI system therefore this flee is not applicable. by Dec.1.1980 Ces this concern is derst eng per consideratlens 1951 eliminated, la belletin. t s e 4 8
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s 9 SIAf f LVALUAll0Ils 0F Sl80RI T[let Rf.$rgelR5 rtAnt tupet: M0fillctt# 9 STAFF EVAlletitell 5t#PPttMthi J StemART Of Littit$tE5 Rtirostit Ist DUttilIN NO. M -If q
- 1) for plants with 50V connected to IV by 2" pipe, we require:
precedores isswed Aug. 27. 1990. By Dec.15, ticensee the 5ER will regelre an estematic-a) en immedlete man. scree on low control will festall se air pressere gange which reeds pressure reacter scree oc low elr pressere. In ved drive air pressure with ein.10 downstream of regulator velve. prior to Dec.15 the laterle. the licensees response - psi mergin above opening pressure of Licensee will f altlate a enneel scree upon receipt of to use a manuel scram is acceptable. urae outlet valves. a low pressure alarm. cedures tsseed Aug. 2F.19PO. Response acceptable. b) an immediate scree in the event of a
- multiple rod dritt-in alarm or e werked change in niadier of cintrol sods with liigh temperature alares.
procedures issued Aug. 27. 1980. Response acceptable.
- 2) leptement procedures Alch require a luattlunal " test osing wal r for the I.V. level alere, red block & scree switches efter each screw lpefore returning to power."
(this is a temp. procedure tillitem . B.1 o f 110 80-17 Supp. I are completed.) l . l.
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l s 4 t e eh .l ,bibrar t 1 n rf eet snrt sc s d aeh u 0 e B t oedcrI a di raed ea orenm esorns r ei e I oh E nnf cdl ai e uvrp n 8, G ao li g .ev e L rd n e d t v i dl eepeo4 o4 2 s2 O
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pt n yi eil t wat e gt vnc cv& o oyena t H N s wdt eel d.e ce ues e it b esr u ri e r n pl n eee nnsi e et h l _ e e i v p. s b r vnosor eel bl e ye ps ahi i_ s eeeb u Rd r et R vsoct Bd oel t w t _ n l i t ) ) l . i .
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W m 51 Aft EVAt.UA110NS Of Sil0fti TilWI RE5FON5t5-PtJWil fygggg P1000111t18 0 STAFF ETAtlNLifell 5tnweV 0F LICENSEL5 K5P08:5g lat steltilm 180. _su_,1] par,E 2 Response acceptable, 163 Instances reterJed.
- 4) Review Instantes o f damage from and!cr taused by water haammer in 5tW related paying. Identif y cowse & corrective etttun.
Response acceptable, Revised surveillance procedures. S) avview sur. Procedures to ensure that SIN level sultch degradation due to a , d m ged float would be detested & that Im.perability free any c.use was tested -
& repus ted.
Response acceptable,- A functiosial test of all switches was completed withfa
- 6) It no functional test os- laspection the last 3 months, et SIN level switch has been perfoemed during past 3 unenths which would detect its degradation, eneke provision to tie se ehering nemt shutdown , 48 hours.
lie have reviewed 16mticelle's responses to beslietIn require-SIN 99RT Our evaluation incliedes the ments of I K 80-17 and 80-14. Resident inspector's assessment of the licensee' caugilance with these requirements. lee conclude that laterte operetton , of Montitello is justifled pending toplementation of long term modifications.
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51Alr t vAIUAlivils UF SituRI 18101 lit 51'911515 - - 93 ~! rtAnt n et; nint un f9 Jar- -l 5199tARY Of LICLIl5tt5 RL5 poll 5E STAFF EVAttfAtlell REL SUtttilN NS. . 848,-l] PA4.t 2 , 4 4. Review tuergency Operating pewtedures to presentif a review of Bulletin regstrements is Response acceptable. essere twt ivr stree operator actions taking place. Licensee provides responses to Intle.le e thre e rf telletin. each specific implementation reepsest in the ' Bulletin. Review & develop surveillence procedure item B.I states that 50V is being monitored Response acceptable. b. to =nitor delly for residue esoter la daily. Sim.
- 6. Inbete ISPIC. 11010. 5105 RP T/ltlR/p001.
touling & mein steme bypass operation by; (a) prompt notillcation when systems less Licensee will comply. Response acceptable. tkg fully operable and when restored. (b) tipesete all evellebte supp. Pool Gcensee will comply. Response acceptable. tuollag wlienever supp. Pool exceeds nesimal operating temperature llelt. l I , (c) rerlors A $0.53 review to in(rease Analysis continuing into possibility of this There is disagreement in degree of st r3 flew to mesteen cosisistent operation. difficulty fier modification to allow - j witie safety (2 piamps, unless two pump operation. This problem will unsefe). be resolved in our generic Alus eftert. l t .. . , 0
. _ , . _ . --,_.-_..-.-.--._...__._~.---_....._~..e-,. . -.,.-- ...., . - ,-- - . -.~ - , . . , . . - . , , . - . ~ . . ~ - - - . . _ . . - - - - . , . _ ~ . . - . . ~ . _ ., , . . .
v i 52 - . SIAIF tvAtt*IIONS Of SHORT lllet RESPONSES ptant unptE NINE MILE MlWI I BL stR i t llM WO. 80-17 PAGL 3 5UPMARY OF LICENSEE 5 RESPoll5E STAFF EVALM if8J1
- 1. ter plants willevt AIM related RPI Analysis templete and sulmitte.1 to MRC. RPT will be instelled in all gifR
. per;.n o anelys t s e r ac t sa f et y o f plants by DeceWy 1.1980 tieus this
.tc. tlag per (unsiderations list concern is et selneted.
In belletin. l i 4 e 4 6 9 e
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51AfI tVRUAll0IIS OF 5110RT TLIWI RL5 toll 5ES ptAny sqAsets filNt MllE P0lNI SteritMtNT I $gpHUtf 0F LICLil5tES RE5PONSE STAFF EVR UAil011 ist totM t I litt #s0. ,no-11
- 5. 1) lastell e system to continously monitor Being installed by 12/1/80. tintil then UT Continuous annitoring system to be water levels in all 5DV by Sept.1.1900. =>n!toring will continue on a delly basis. Installed by Dec. l. IMO per IIRC Confirmatory Order.
- 2) Perform a study of potential Jesigns for Pending modifications: Criteria developed by owners subgroup improving vent system. addresses the concern regarding venting g, $g gg ,,, g , y ,
or $DV.
- 2. It>ds to vent and drain lines -
- 3. Install holdlag tank I
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1 SI All LV4ttIAllulI5 Of SlitINI IERM RESPt4ISES ptaggi sempgt: _IllNE Mitt P0lMi j 5tlHMARI Of LI IM5EL5 RE5r0ftSL $TAFF EVAttl4TI0li I&t StMittlW NO. ,po:)/ $UI'FitHtNI 3 _ l) Der plants with SUV (onnected to IV by 2" pipe, we reepaire: Procedures revised to implement a manual scree at This SER will regstre en evtomatic reactor a) en Ismediate men scram en low control scram en low a 8r pressure. In the laterie. the sod drive air pressure with min.10 60 psig rather than 75 psis previously, est mergin elnsve opentag pe essure of licensees response to use a manual scram is strem outlet velves. acceptable. Roth procedures modified for rod drift and awaber Response e coptable. b) en lammediate serem In the event of a enaltiple rod drilt-in alarse or e of control rods with hlgle temperature alarm. aus bed change in naamber of tenIrel rods with hlyte temper atuem alarms.
- 2) Implement procedures whle.h reepsIre a Procedures Implemented to
- test using water for Response acceptable, f uni tional " test using water for the the I.V. level alarm. rod block B scram switches I.V. level alaen, rod blei.k & scree after each scram before returning to power.'
swital+es alter eat.h scre.e before retiesning to power." (this is e trap, procedere tillitem 3.1 or 118 80-81 Supp.Iaretempleted.) l i i A 4 0 0
c- - SIAfF LyAt UAlIUN5 0F SHUM Illpt ilL5 Poll 5L5 ptApli 114t(3 MINT MllE polNI I6L stRI LIIM No. _80;.19 FAGL I 5t99%RT Of LIClltSEE5 lil5P01:5E STAFF EVAtteRTI0ll Al Litensees o f GL WIMts* il Msview plant resords for lastances of he Instances of degradetton in any SW level Response acceptable. Jegradation of any 599 level sultch switch resulting from a deaefed er bent float resulting frase e deneged or bent fleet essoobly. e s seedil y . IJentify tause and surrettive action.
- 2) Neview records for degradet ton of 5W Ihn related occurrences. Closing Response acceptable.
vent and Jrein valve operation. provide times everage of 3.3 sec. For cuesere of drale tissuie time resguired enJ those normally valve end 3.7 sec. For vent velve monitored observed and the bests for the required durlag scram. slosing times. Identify cause esul toes ettive ection. 4 i 3) By proceJures respule e SW vent & proceAres revised to iguerterly test velve Response acceptable. J eln velves be nutually operable, for operability. Reporting precedures open & perloJitelly testeJ. If valves also leptemented as reipsested, es e not e. pes eble er closeJ , I kwr in ear 24 bur period during opeestion. al.e reason shall be legged & NRC nett fleJ within 24 k urs. l i e t , __._._m _ ____._ _ .________._______.m_ _ _ _..-,... ...__ s.-.,,,.....c. - m.. . . - . . - . . . .,.--m.., . . . , . ~ , . . . . . , . . , , , , . . - . . , _ - . , . , < __....+, ..- .. .,
4 I STAf t LVAL.UAIIONS Of 58601t8 IllWI Rt5rUllSE5 I' Pflull ll M it NisIE Mitt P0llii s SisH hlt OF LICEN5tt5 RESPoll5E STAFF EVAt#Allell lat gialtllN Hu. 80 l4 FAGL 2 . ._
- 4) Meelew Instantes of damage feces enJ/or hu instances has occurred. Response acceptable.
taused by water hammer in 50V related piping. Identity teuse & corrective ei.tlen. I b) keview sur. procedures to ensure that Monthly Instrument surveillance /callbration Response acceptable. Llev level sultth degreJation Jue to a plans were implemented , i dauugcJ float wuuld be detetted & that - . Inuperability (see any tause was tested
& seported. l.
t Tests have detected no degradation. Response acceptable,
- 4) It me tunttlonal test er Inspection et 5f4 level sultth has been perfoemed during past J mesnths which would detect its de.padation, snake poivistun to do se dselag eient shutJuwse
- 18 huurs.
5tiP9Wuti ife have reviewed Illne Mlle Point's responses *o tulletin requirements of l&E 80-17 and 80-14. Our evaluation includes the Resident inspector's assessment of the licensee's compilance with these requirements. lie conclude that lateria operation of Mine Mlle Point is justifled pending fuglementation of long term medl(Ications. I , _e
-e.
~
l SIAII LTli10Allufts 06 SHolti Illet RL5rull5L5 FtAMI MAML; Dyster Creek StrenRf Of LittlestL5 Rt5P0s 5E STAFF EVALLIATICII 1st sta t t IIN NO. 850-31 rAbt I
- l. (a) rerseem survelltente test tu verify that UI testing in SUV distliarge header showed no water. Response acceptable.
thce s ss ne signit etent ..uunt of water en SM. (b) s'ertesi sue vcillante test to verify that All vent piping and valves weie observed to be free of Response acceptable, vent v.t ves .se operable. obstructions and fully opesable. (t) retterm surveillante test to verify that Same as (b) al.ove. Response acceptable. vent systese is free of obstruction.
- 2. rt, tone manual & autunutic stram Infor- tute found acceptable. Response acceptable.
- m. tion Ilsted a Lt.ru k in Belletin.
J. At tuntiuslen of str.e tests and all llo significant amounts of water detected. Also procedures Response acceptable. ott.er sos eas; revised to insure Verification of no water is present in SDV and associated piping following scrae. (a) Verify that all vent lines on $1M
.se tuntticael.
(b) Verity th.t tlwre is seu slyellicent
. un t o f w t tr la SM -
e 0 _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .. _ . . _ . . . . . . . . - - _ _ . , . _ _ , _ _ , , _ ~ . , _ . , ,-, _ _ ,_. _ _ ... _._._ _
9 SIAlf tVat.UAlltish UF 514UN8 l[left RL5#%SL5
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pigpty gemt; Oyster Cretk R&L tottEllst180, to-IF Pact 2 SteMAllt 0F LICENSEES stESPOIISE STAFF EVALUAllelt 4 Review tmergency byerating Procedures to Thorough review of emergency and operati procedures has Response acceptable. essure tl.at for scres operator actions been completed and documented by 11555 y r and licensee. InsluJe e thru e of Bulletin. Procedural changes have been issued to insure strict com-ilance with IE Belletin 80-11. frainingwillbecongletewithin30daysofbulletinissuedate
- 5. Review & develop surveillance peocedure Itew procedures have been developed for $DV for restemat water - Response acceptable.
to mentter daily for residue water la check performed daily until permanent system is lastelled. SDv.
- 6. Enhance HPIC. RCIC. SLC5. RFI/letR/ POOL cooling & main steam bypass operation by; (a) prompt nett ricat ten when systems less Prompt notifications will be made, itesponse acceptable, then fully operable end when restored.
(b) operate all available supp. pool Procedures developed to require the initletion of all evall- Response acceptable. cooling whenever supp. pool enceeds able suppression pool cooling whenever norm. pp. Ilmits are normal operating temperature limit. enceeded. (c) Perform A 50.59 review to increase Tuo pisy operation cannot be made possible under 50.5$ change. There is disagrement la degree of diff t. StCS flew to man % consistent culty for modificaties to allow two pomp with safety (2' pumps, unless operation. This problem will be resolved unsere). In our generic Anr5 ef fort. e MOO.
- OE & 90- O g gg,g, f
.- - - . . , - - - - , - ,, - _ . . , . - - - - . , , , . . ~ . , - - - , - - - - - - -+-n., -,. . - . . ~ -- . - .- n. , . . ~ . . . . .. --- . . . - - . = _ . - . _ _ _ - - - - _ - _ ._ . - - - - . _ _ _ _ . _ = .
101 51 Afr (WALUATIONS Cf 5HORT liitM RESPONSES pe Ang nApt: Oyster C'eek STAFF EVAL 94TItil 5tmMrsRT OF LICENSEE 5 ItESPONSE ILE etRittlN MO. 30-11 PAGE 3 _ Ari will be lastelled in all SMR plaats for plants wlthout ATW5 reisted RPI Relistrement is not applicable to Oyster Creek. by December 1.1989 thus this concern
- 1. is ellelmated, perleen analysis of met safety of '
Jerating per tonstderations list in bullette. I 9 9 e 9 .._____.__.___._.______.___.-__.____.____.-___m__.____ _ . , . , - . , _ . __ . ..,-....o_ . . _ . . . , . . . . . + . , - . . . -
, . , - ~ , . . . . . . # .+~. ..c. . . ._ , . _. ,m...
n
- 10 2 -
SIAff' LVALUAll0105 Of SlWill illWI hC5r0NSE5 PLAMI IIAME: Dyster Creek
-1 1
STAFF EVAllIAffoll Ist DUlllllN Mo. _50-11 5UPPtititNI l StetWRi 0F LICLil5EE5 RESP 0M5E A. I) PawwIde an analysis ef the adesguacy ef Ito sy5 tem imadt fIcaL1on j$ needed as ststed by Ilcensee. The 1lcensee's analysis was revlewed "es-built" 514 system & associated and foiand acceptable, vent & drain systems including any r' identilled design dellclencies. e ll Pon review of procedures, conclusion was that no Response acceptable.
- 2) Revise and Implement operating procedure to provide steer geldence to licensed operators revisions were necessary. 100 supervisory consent was in list control ruum regarding Is.ltletion of needed to inittste 51.05.
5105 witleut supervisory authetity.
- 1) assure that precedures entst and are implemented .I'rocedural actions to remedy water in 50V are pending. mesponse acceptable.
sur remedial action if water found in SDV when Installation of SDW water level monitoring systein, A - it should 1.c f ree o f water. " Standing Order" to tonmence a shutdown has been issued. This shall be in ef fect till SDV level monitoring systein is operable.
- 4) nevise & implement administrative procedures location of $105 switch key seas been adeled to en operator Response acceptable.
tu enhance SLC5 tey shall be readily available turnover check list. to operetar la control room.
- 5) Continue delly menttering of water levels In Ihmitoring of water levels in all 50V's is being per- confirmatory Order issued on Oct. 2
.Il stry foemed on a dally basis pendin<l Installation of continuous 19110 respaires a ence per shif t water level monito Ing system. surveillaisce fresquency until a con-Linuous montter system is lastalled in Dec. 1980. This requirement is being met by licensee - response acceptable. .
e e
- 10 3 -
SIAff LVM,tlAll0st5 Of 5180111 ffNrt At5 NillSL5 PtANT MAML: Dyster Creet
$tyggggt Of Ll(gN5[ES RESP 0stSE STAFF EVALIIATISII Ist uuttlllN HO. 80-17 5UPPLEMLNI I Systen lastallation due lhec. I.1900. thtfl then. Continuous monitoring system to be
- s. I) Install a systen to continuously u nitor Installed ley Dec.1.1980 per IIRC water levels in all SDW by Sept.1.1980, 50V will be monitored dally for wter.
Confirmatory Order. Licensee states that venting modifications will be Crf,teria developed by Osners subgroup
- 2) Perform a study of potential destes for addresses the concern regarding venting fueroving vent system. made.
cf 59V. k 1 i 9 4
- . , _ - - < y- ,.- -- -v-- - ,___mm ___-_-_____.m_._ _.u_u___
P
- 104 -
SIAFF LWAl.UAi! Ult 5 0F 51011 TElin Itt5Ptwt5E5 FtAll! IIAN(; Jgt_e_r_ Ca tek 5tniART of LICEltSEL5 Rt5P0ft5E STAFF EVALWATICII Ist ettR t t ilM 880. 90-17 , 5tWPLtHlNI 2 il teth suit licenses with a Sitt vent system which Oyster Creek 5IN system design does not include any Response acceptable.
.l.p.ad on any toaiponent etter than the vent valve : component ottier than vent valves, arut the IIcensee a t es.c for peoper venting suust provide an alternate claims exemption.
wreet path tuntinuously open to inallding atmos-phoe een the stJe of time vent valve piping awey tru.e the SDv. This vent must tse ef fective negardless of Lossponent operability other*then kl.e vent valve. T 6 E
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- 195 -
51 Aff tvAtuAlltNIS Of SmMtl Tilet htSP0ff5(5 ptAni Itapag Oyster Creet staff EVKuAfleil 50pritIKMT 3 5UMPIAllf Of LittNSEE5 K5 Poll 5E Ist Otfi t ti t M NO. _m.hll Il for plents with 59V (onnected to IV by 2* pipe, we reystre: a) en teamediate men. scree en low centrol Procedures in ef fect to scram at 60 psig where opening pressere s afr s ) is 4012 psig at scram outlet valves. Also. licensee revised end drive air pressere with aln. le the licensee response to use a manuel scram pst mergin ebeve opening pressure of C W lastrument air header low pressere alarm. Is acceptable. scram outlet valves. . . ] Manuel scram in the event of 3 or sure control rods drive Response acceptable. d b) en lammediate scram in the event of a temperatures rise rapidly to teeps > 2500F. Also a menwel enltiple red delft-in alare or a 4 surked ctten pe in number of control scram la the event of sultiple rods drif ting. ends with I.lgh temperature aleras. , i aesponse acceptable.
- 2) Implement precedures which regstre a Plant proceduees were revised to *reclutre a function 41 test funttlen.at
- test estag water for the asing water for the I.V. level alarm. rod block & scram c I.v. level alare, rod tieck & scrass bwltthes after each scram before returning to power",
sultches after each scrose before returning to power." (This is a temp. Procedure till item 5.1 et lit 86-li supp. I are completed.) , 4 4 5
. s
+
~w-e e w w-wr -way--w-a e,- am-www ee wemave w ee wm= ww w ow -vw ww-ev* - * * *** se -+w w e e swe.w -w wa *-y-owaww ow n - ,eew-c-,-,e-w,wa e + w-+ -v e n w .w eeve--e,+ e--r-P4 e'%w++--v- -v- ri -ww+ w i wwe vw w + 1-==e.w--wwwv'w svo*-e-w+u, sm- =ua-- *u_m__m--- -_m, _am... _wm____
- 106 -
5fAFF LVAl.tfAll0ft5 0F 5HORT TilWI RESP 0ll5L5 puuli leAME: Oyster Creek ist suit tilN 980. 80-14 PAGL I 5teplARY OF LIClit5LES R[sP0st1E 5TAFF EVAttlAil0Il Al Licensees of GE DWils' l} Iteview plant records for lastances of 100 instances recorded. Response acceptable. degraJat tua of any SUV level switch eesulting frees a desieged or bent float assembly. Identify tause and . torrettive action.
- 2) Neview records for degradation of 3DW 10 0 Instances recorded. Closure times were found satisfactory. Ilesponse acceptable.
vent and drain valve operation. Provide e.lusure time reystred and those normally ' oliserved and the basis for the required
- tiesing times, identify cause and torrective action.
- 3) er prvcedures, reystre 5DW vent & Surveillance procedures will be mudlfled to incorporate Response acceptable, ifrain valves be normally operable, operational testing and closure times of 50V vent & drain os.cn a perleditelly tested. If valves valves. Pruspt notification will be made as requested.
ase not operable or closed > 1 hour in any 24 hour period during operatlog. the season shall be legged & IIRC notifled l within 24 hours. 1 1 l l 8 8
- _ _ _ . - . . - _ . . . . - _ . , - . . - . _ . - - . , . . . _. - , - _ - . , .. . ,, - _ r
- 10 1 -
STAf r tvALUAlluel5 0F secolli 1[let Itt5Polt5ES Pl. Aft! IINtf. Drster freek
~
SisHWtf 0F LICENSELS K5ptel5s STAFF EVAt0ATI0ll lat stu l tiin No. en 14 pAGC 2
- 4) IIcelew lastances of damage from and/or 91 0 instances recorded, llesponse ecceptable.
caused by water hammer in 5t:V related plying. Identify tause & currective attton.
- 5) me,lew sur. procedures to ensure that Plant surveillance testing performed every 30 dAyn on SDV Response acceptable.
saw level suitch degradation alue to a level switches. da.uged float would be detected & that
- le.uperability free any cause was tested
& s epos ted.
it me functional test er inspectlen test survelliance test was on July 10,1500 with no nesponse acceptable. 6 't et 514 level switch has been performed discrepancies amted. during past 3 asenths weilch would detect its degradation, mete prowlston to de se during nemt shutdown > 48 hours. 5t#9 mitt tee have reviewed Oyster Creek's responses to bulletin requirements of I M 80-17 and 00-14. Our evaluation includes the flestdent Inspector's assessment of the licensee's compliance with these requirements. He conclude that Interic operation of Oyster Creek is justifled pending iglementation of long term modif t-cations. 4 9
- 9 . . _ _ - . - - . _ - - . - - . - - - - - . _ _ _ _ -.--,w. , . . . . - . - ,,.r .~ ,.n.. .-n,--.,, , , - ~ , , , - , , . . . + - .,w. ,,...w.. . -n , ,. . . , - . .,, .n., . ., .- ._
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iesl ue scgoqc el e s . el eoec buPnI cOI cae e e Shr R R RI rcra < s , e t n o t e n a h n o i e i t i t r i t s a . p n t o n r o i e n a u g r r p r ly s t i f p . e s o i r n as t s e o - e a c c . er w n 9 wo 5 E ru ul e o s u p p - E 5 si u p m 5 ll sa d s c u _ N 0 af i t S i p . O . P s . n C l P S 5 C om t a ed ret e s L S cd yn o . wn L M R r e ca t o . 3 S dc ru r e dy i es ot i h et . l e& L s fi u t r hs s E if t q iot t e rs nq u t 5 vo e f vl i 2 N E e on r o:o auc i C rt t iI y s n n nt or ll t a ut e I L ne ev lnn ee e i o o in ti c .ifoe nt li b u t F ee se b t a t og ainl lit a O b B e o c rti aSas f O h T eh vt t e v i f eancPr pciifl ed ( R a sa i oif m r pe - 5( a A hn eh t t euw . e 1 r o i ect e - luP l t s t s es i di us n e mdt s ioal uav eati l 5 re es l l b p m u e qh e q A uv ca a a et ivn U ; L t A M du ed t e ob r py m. r os t p ot eed w u d h ad u t oat e V Ae uc l nt s e h ed n c L F i l io pr p el ca nd tt oe c a st eedua u i r gil owunvce - I ll y a e e saont A A cn nw l a dm ea s neshrou alACPct I S P t eo l i n nr n o tb i gd rt ee v rt us p li us st i s e u n rF t s ma n uD ie 1 e t o nh ef I s SS Ro l $f I c sd se o y er s , e t e b l o dt . s r L t ei s . sn un On ss l ea a ee di Oo me er ocl et rn rl e Pi onl pe ce ut cr /t R t sn e nt s d c oe t a ye .l r i ss ea rt pa i l i e r sh peu i e c pet usl or ro . e w /p I o n w ug a t nn Pt n ce nu F Rs ed h n s
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*- 110 -
SIAFF EVAtuRTIONS OF $HGRI IElWS RESPON5ES Peach 90ttom 2 & 3 PtANT MAME: _ 80-17 PAGE 3 supptART OF LICLMSEES RE5Polt5E STAFF EVAtllAT194 I AL suit tiin NO. . - - - . . . _
- 1. for plants wittiewt ATW5 related RPI The Peach Bottom plants have ATW5 related RPI. API will be lastalled in all sut plants recture analysis of not safety of by December I.1980 thus this concern derating per considerettens inst is eliminated.
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- II) -
SI Af f LVALU4llust5 0F 5 sciti item RL5 Pose >Es pg g g g g Peach Ilotten 2 & 3 las sutitlisttso, tm-If. SurettMthf 2 5tfMART OF LICLIISEE5 MSPOIISE STAFF EVALIIAilele
- 1) tu h nutt IIcenses with a 5 W vent system which To ensure venting a 1* diameter vent standpipe tsas Response acceptable.
Jcend on anF cesgionent other than time vent vehse attached to the vent drain funnel & a 1/4" hole was alene for peoper venting.must provide en alternate drilled in the funnel to provide added venting vent path continuuvsly open to building atmos- capability. Additionally, tests were performed phese on the side of the went valve piping away under the untaped funnel configuration & showed a f e ww t he 509. Ihis vent must 4 ef fective positive venting capability. segndlest of tempunent operatllity other than the ,tiet valve. ,, Y n _- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ . _ ._______.,_.mm _. . .-m .._ m . . , - - . . , --r.,--- -
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- 115 - -
STAf F EVAtUAll0N5 0F El#0RT TLfpl Efsroll5E5 P't ANT IIAME: Prath Bottomit 2&3 lat 517t11:14 NO. 80.89 pAtt i StatlART Of LICENSEE 5 RESPONSE STAFF Evn UAT10ll A) Litensees of GE SWts' No Instance of 50V level switch degradation due to damage Response acceptable. I) Review plant records for lastances of degradottua of any 50V level switch float assemelles have been Identitled. (Several Instances sesulting free a damaged er bent float when level suliches did not function due to other causes essembly. Identify cause and locve been recorded), currective action. - One lastance of SDV valve degradation has been identitled Response acceptable.
- 2) Review records for degradetton of 50V vent anJ drain velve operat1Sn. Provide when scran backup valves were determined to have the in-closere time resquired and those normally correct electrical compenents & thereby be considered in-observed and the lusts for the respaired Operable. The Iroblem has been corrected & reported in (losing times. Identify cause and itR 2-80-12/IP of 7/22/90.
coerective actica. A dally surveillance procedure to strote the 59f vent & drain ResPense acceptable.
- 3) By procedures, reipstre SDW vent &
diale valves he normally operable, valves has been Instituted. As well as a dally verification open & perledicelly tested. If velves of valve Position with appropriate reporting reapairements. are not operable or closed > 1 hour . in any 24 howr period durtny operation. the reason shell be legged a NRC notifled within 24 hours, i I 6
. . _ . . _ . _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ._________.-____________m . _ _ _ _ _. - _ _ . . . ._.__m____.
l I F
- 116 -
51Aff LVALUAll0ll5 Of SH0sti Illel Atsr0II5(5 ftJull IWit: Peeth Betteig_2 $_3 5tetuRV 0F LICEN5EE5 at5POII5g STAFF EVALWATItil lat one t tile Iso. ,so 3 , PAGE 2 llo Instance of water hanumer or associated damage has been Response acceptable.
- 4) Acelew Instances of damage fase and/or recorded for thc SOV or its related piping.
t.wsed by water h. cr la Srst related piplay. Identify tause A corrective attion. . Surveillance procedurgs to assare that degradation of the SUV Response acceptable. S) Review sur. procedures to ensure that level sultches from any cause would Ise detected have been Stev level switch degradation due to a d wycJ fleet would be detected 8 that verlfled. The pvw edure regulres shift Supervisor verification Im.pesability from any cause was tested of inoperability, rotificat;on of ti.e Station Superintendent
& reporLed, and the IIRC.
All SDW level sultches will have been functlenally tested Response acceptable.
- 6) If no functional test er laspection of SDV level switch has been perfonsed within a three month period prior to startier, during past 3 uunths whicft trauld detect j lts Jeepredation, mate prowlslon to do se during nemt shutJun > 48 hours.
5l59M:17 les have reviewed Peach Botton's responses to bulletin
~-
regelrements of IK 00-17 and 80-14. Our evale,ation includes the Desident inspector's assessment of the licensee's compilance with these regelrements. 18e conclude that lateria operetten of Peach totton is justifled pendtal laplementation of long terns modifications. l 8
~, .~. _ .--.. __ _ ._.--. .._ ~ ... - - _. .. . - , - . . . . - - . . - , - _ _ -
- 111 -
slAfF LVALUAllells GF Silolti itiff RL5f9115f.5 riant leant: Pil Git (pl Ist sta n tilN me. 80-If PAbt I 5899 Wif Cf LICllist[5 kE5f0mSE STAFF EVAttlH I0li
- 1. (e) rerless surveillante test to verify that Ultrasonic (UT) examination of the SDV header. vent line and Response acceptable.
al.cs e is no segeltitant emment of water drain to the IV vertiled that there was no significant water in sov. accumulation or obstruction in the SDV. (b) 5%rlora survulliente test to verify glial Actuation of the vent and drata valves isolation function Valves were cycled and wisdal observation vent valves .se operable. closed the valves. This was verf fled by observations of locally and by ladicator lights slowed valve motion and by control room ladication. tlie valves functional - response
. acceptable.
(t) Perform survalliesite test te verify that Saue as above. Individual rod scrans and system tenp-vent system is free of obstructlen. erature response vertfled that the went was free of obstruction. Also, the drata line was walked and vertfled that
- 2. run tusa menwel & eutoestic stres Inter. The required sensurements of scree system performance under aution IIsted a thru k in pulletin. manual and automatic scrae conditions were taken on July 25 Response acceptable, and 26.1980
- 3. At tuntissinia of stree tests and all The licensee has committed to verify that there is no Verified by air test. Response acceptable, other stroen; significant amount of water in the SDV piping after scram.
! (a) terify ti.et all vent lines on Siri era functlenal.
(b) Verif y that there is sie significent
. .unt eI weaer in Sur s
9 _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . - _ _ _ _ _ . . . , . . - - . . . - . . . .~ . . , . _ _ , . . . _ . - - . . . . . . . . _ . - _ . . ., . . . . . __ ._______._m
SIAtf LVALUAIIUM5 0F Silent Illel uthp0MSt5
- 118 -
FLAlli NAflEt pitga.8): SUMMARf 0F LICLN5tti RE5p0R5E STAFF EVALUAII0ll lit SUlttllN HO. IR8- l i PAGL 2 4 Review tecryency Operating prwcentures to lhe emergency operating procedures hav6 been revised to ltesponse ecceptable. essure ti.at for scree operator actions faclode procedures that assure safe shutdoins in the event incIvJe a thre e of Sulletin. of a scram failure, and training to laplement those procedures has been completed, Review & develop surveillance pros.edure SDV water level surveillance procedures have been established Response acceptable. b. to mennitor dally for residue water in and lastituteJ. Suv.
- 6. Ent. ente lipIC RCIC. 51C5. Api /futR/p0OL cooling & main steam bypass operation by;
{a) Frompt notification sAen systems less Operattens personnel have been lastructed to nettfy the IRC Response acceptable. then fully operable end winen restored. ulthin 24 hours when HpCI. RCIC. SLC5. Rpi/RHR/p00L coding and mein steam bypass systems are less than fully operable and to I notify the NRC upon return to service. (b) operate all available supp. Scol Operating procedures respaire suppresslen pool coding with all Response acceptable. coollag whenever supp. pool exceeds available systems should normal operating temperature lletts
- normel operating taaperature limit. be exceeded.
(c) pertene A 50.59 review to lacrease : lie review of the 5t05 2 pump operational mode has concluded that liiere is disaymt la degree of diff t-5105 fluw to sentows consistent it is an unreviewed safety question under 10 CFR 50.59. The culty for modifications to allow tuo pump with sa fety (2 pumps. iniless licensee has concivJed that substantial redesign would be operation. This probles will be resolved unsafe). required to make the current 2 pump system single failure in our generic AlliS offert. proof for active components. e
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FI Alli IWVl4 _ _ Pil rstin 181. stet s tlin sie. ,sg-l_! _ $UPPltntni 2 5WHulv 0F LICENSE 15 litSPtlil5E STAFF EVALWATIGII
- 1) tech BWit licensee with a SDV veest systee which Continuous SEV venting has been provided with no Cut of f vacusa rallef volve - respesse elepind on any component other then time vent value other component then the vent valve in the line. acceptable, alee.e for proper venting must provide an alternate vent path continuously open to building atmos-3 Aces en the slJe of the vent velve piping away fewen the $14. Ihis vent asust Ise ef fective eegardten of component operability other then the vseet valve.
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- 123 -
51Aff LVAltIAllDell Of $110111 Illel at5 Poll 5(5 PLAlli RAME: PilliRIll + STAFF Evattinil0E R&t nutilliti MO. ,,1NAR SurrttMtill 3, p.9, y SINelAltf Of LICil:5EES R yL E
- 1) for plants with $UV tonnected to IV by 2" pipe, we reigelre:
a) en lemmediate seen scram en low control 5tation procedures have been revised to inttlete a manuel scram this SER will require en automatic reactor red drive air pressors with ,;fn.10 on low air presssire. The scree is to be at about le psig above scram en low air pressure. In the lateria, est margin above opening pressure of the opening air pressere of the scram outlet valves. the licensees response to use a manual strem outlet valves. Scrass is acceptable, b) en lemmediate scram la the event of a Station procedures were revised to reestre manual scram en ved Response acceptable. multiple red dritt-in alare or a drift of 2 out of 9 rod anay. Serveillance of CR0 temperature inerted change in number of control has been Instituted. Ilew procedures reapaire stram of 25E CRD seds with high temperatuse alarms. Indicate leakage. .
- 2) Impleeent procedures which reerstre a PScedures were revised to require operability verification Pilgrim has been provid8ng a check of level som tional " test issing water for the alter each stram of the SDV level switches. Instreamentation in accordance with G.E. SIL 1.V. level alarm. rod block 1 stram 331. The Ilcensee has not been doing funct-switti.es after eetle scr.e before lonel test of these lastruments using water retm ning to puwer.* after every scram because of ALAltA consider-(this is a temp. procedure till lies ations (dose rate in Llie vicinity of in-e.1 of its 80-17 Supp. I are completed.) struments is Ser/hr without shleiding 8 3r/
hr with shielding). The licensee will develop acceptance criteria 8 a specific procedure to leplement the test of SIL 331. This criterle will be based upon historical data from previews screme. It should be noted
, that the Pilgrim level Instruments are manufactured by Robert Shaw, a different manufacturer than the irttrisients that have exhibited crushed floats. The ti.T. con.
Linuous monitoring system will be Installed by Dec. 1. 1980 thus providing a bactup indication of water accumulation in the
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- 2) trmtiM level sultches using unter will conti-In additlen the licensee will perfere a functional test of these switches using water after each scran until satisfactory acceptance criteria for the SIL 331 tests are in place.
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PIAfli RNIEt I)oad Citles 1&2 Ist tutttIIn te. to-li FAGC 2 SteMART OF LICllt5tt5 RESPON5E STAFF EVALUATION 4 Review toergency Operating Procedures to Emergency procedures have been revised to assure reactor shut- Response acceptable, assure that for scram operator actions duwn in the event of a scram failure. (this wts done in con-include a thre e of Bulletin. junction with GE) and training instituted
- 5. Review & develop surveillance procedure Daily surveillance of SDV water level is being performed. If Response acceptable.
to monitor dally for residue water in results continue to be acceptable the period stay be extended S DV. to weekly & saking this a petmanent procedure.
- 6. tahance itPIC. RCIC. 5LC5. RPl/RilR/ POOL cooling & main stese bypass operation byg (a) Prompt notificatten when systees less Frompt notification & followup LER will be provided if IIPCI. Response acceptable.
than fully operente and when restored. ItCIC. 5BLC & RHR-Suppression Pool Cooling are less than fully operable (when required to be operable). ! i (b) operate all available supp. Isoel Procedures specify actions to initiate suppression pool Response acceptable. tooling whenever supp. pool esceeds cooling, normal operating temperature limit. (c) Perform A S0.5g review to increase Licensee did not respond to this bulletin requirement
- There is disa m t in M n of SIC 5 flew to maalaise consistent difficulty for modifications to allow with safety (2 pumps, unless two pump operation. This problem wl11 unsafe). be resolved in our generic ATUS effort.
4 _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ - , - - - _._..m_ _ m, ... ._,_._s.. ._._...m.. ,,,m - . - . , _ , , ,m_, . . . . . . _ . , _ , . . _ __
. - 129 -
SI Af F (VAttRil0N5 0F Sleti IEIM RE5PtWISES ptAsti napgE: Qued Cities 1 8 2 o 5tpMARY OF LICERJEE5 RESP 0015E $1AFF EVateRT195 Itt stat tlim no. 80-11 PAGE 3 . _ _ . . -
- 1. For plants without ATW5 related RPI Analyses without an ATW5 ItPT were performed to determine any RPI will be lastelled in all 5851 plants pers.,= analys ts of net sa fety of derating needed to seet the service tevel C Reactor Vessel by leecember 1. 1990 thus this teatern is des'atlag per tensiderations list pressere limits in the evett of several AlW5 events. The results elleinated, in Belletin. showed no derate was needed for scram failures steller to that at growns ferry but for full stras failure the analyses showed a 20% derate may be necessary.
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51AFF LVALUAll0fl5 0F SilORT itset RE5rgil5L5 - ptAflT HAME: flued Cities I & 2 STAFF EVAt#4TIOlt
$UPyttMini 1 FAGE 1 St99 TART Of LICEltSEE5 llE5P0ftSE ist suittilN NO. 30-17 the as. built SDV systese has been verlfled to sneet the lhe licensee's analysis was reviewed A. 1) reevide en analysts of the adequecy of design resguirement of a dounward pitch to facilitate and fewed acceptable.
"es-tnellt" $UT systes & essociated went & draln systems inclinling any draining & level Indication.
Identitled destyn deficiencies. Procedures have been clarlfled to allow SSLC Initiatten nesponse acceptable.
- 2) nevise and Implement operating precedere to for potential scram failures or AillS silentions.
e 1revids cleer guldence to Itcensed operators la the control room regarding inlttation of 5tts without swpervisory authority. I
- 3) Assure that precedures esist and are teptemented .Remedlel action in the event of water acctosalation has g,,,, ggg ggy,'
sur rtmedlel actioi it water found in 50s wleen been Instituted via procedures. et slousld be free of water. Procedures have been revised to clarlfy location & tese Response acceptable,
- 4) Revise & loplement adelaistrative procedures to eat.ence SLCS ney shell be readily evellable of 58tC tey. The ter is in the Shift Engineer's office.
to operator la control room.
- 5) tontinue delly monitoring of water levels in Delly sonitoring for SOV water accumulation in the 50V is Confireetery Order issued on Oct 2. Ig80 ell St#v tantinuing & will continue until the continesoiss senitoring rectulres a ence per shift serveillance system is Installed. frettuency untti a continuous monitor system is lasta11ed in Dec. 1980. This requirement is being met by IIcensee -
response acceptable. I I. e e i _ _ . _ _ _ _ _._m__m._ -.m ,.. .-.,w- . - . - - -* .- 4- - e< -~ . -- <2-r r,--- v v - + - . , -
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- 131 -
SIMI LVM.ttAltipli Of SeseRT ltigt RESPeleW5 Fiffel It488t: Quod Cities I & 2 STAFF Eviltia4TIGIt 181 atMttille NG. 80-17 5tFFitNthf 1, PAGt 2 $99tAAT Of Litth$tE5 Rt5 Post 5E
- 8. 1) Install a system to cositinvoissly nunitor Isistallation of a continiscus monitoring system for 50V Continvoes Itanttoring System to be water levels Ise all SUV by Sept.1.1980 level has been delayed from the 9/1/80 deadline to the Installed by Bec 1.1g80 per 151C end of Octoiser. Confirmatory Order.
- 2) Perfois a stisdy of potential designs for Vent system leproveeents have been studied & are planned Criteria developed by eeniers sub-twtoving vent system. Some specific considerattens are: group addresses the concern re--
(a) Vent ilnes pitched to assure prepar dralmage; garding venting on SDV. (b) Vent paths shall he provided to preclude loss of system function due to single failure; and (c) Vent funct(en shall esot be adversely affected by laterfaces. s W e i
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51 AIF (VALUAlltWIS Of SituRI itINI RtS1985f 5 ptAMI InfML: oisad CILI s I a 2
' 51AfF EVALUATI0pl 5UMMARY Of LittNSEE5 RE5PomSE lat staltilm No. _Inhli 50pettnini 3 Il lor plants with SDV tonnected to If by 2" pipe, we require:
lausediate manuel scram on low air pressure b 50 psig) has This 5ER will rewire an automatic reactor a) en Is.nedlete man. scree on lowe control
- scram on low air pressure. In the Interim, rod drive air pressure with m n. 10 been instituted. the licensees response to tese a manual scram psl mergin ebeve opening pressure of is acceptable.
stree outlet velves, Response acceptable. femmediate manual scram oss three or sore [RO drif t Indications b) en Ismediate scree in *he event of a at the same time has been required. Manual scram on high tilD multiple red drift-in alarm or a morted change In number of control tene rature indications has not been instituted. since the ends with liigh temperature alee,es, scrittoring system is not destyned to respond to postulated loss of air pressure & since the manual scram on loss of air alarm & tRD delf ts are considered adequela to provide pro-tection from the loss of air event. Procedures have been changed to require functional tests of Response acceptable.
- 2) Implement procedures which respelre a fune.tlunal " test esing water for the the SDV level swltthes following each scram event prior to 1.1. level alarie, red block & scrase return to reactor power operation.
switches ef ter each screen before seturning to power." lihls is a temp. procedure till llee s.1 of ILO 80-17 Supp. I are completsd.) 1 0 9 _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _.________.__________..______.____.___._..._m. _ , .m,, , . . . . . . . _ , . . _._....m. . . . , _ _ , . _ . . . . .. , . - ,
. !1l e .
l l l o e e e i l l l R b b b _ U a a a t t t . R p p p _ V e e e . E c c c . c c c . F a a a A F e e s e s T s S n n n p o o p o p s s s _ le e e l t i R t _ n - e v l l i _ e r Voe 0t v m a 5 r . o f du . r seo er tes as f h vur l se hiy t vt c . aod ei .. td vl r yrl ,. n co i e f i E wd ieb 5 s sr ire rra . E si o aoh ear 5 o l c rft v sp e ll P ee d 0 5 vr sn oeo _ F t e &eo t r _ 5 t i l l n e u ddi uc _ R 5 tl e Ve nt r eed , E 0b e u t co 1 5 2 E 5 vos uoi . 1 5 s No t rr 1 & l t ya V l ipe _ 1 T I E C I nh a y D S ds
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er - t bd oeoh s sl n it ht u ve p . > g& nera tt t a n i vo ae rc D Voddid _ e e d rdo aenf y S yt sug eere rlds o eu rpa go f l sodg I f9 ga si el el e . D a c e dt t rat cdl E G s5 n ney deesn i us m e A d r yd f vree yrl e
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wJt d c war vnt e e & oyen t eal n e urie i a nnri g e i ruer i t s esr pl n a h i l e s vgs s r eeeso vnoaor leel t l u a ee ye pe nhi et _ E n hds ec f vcoct Bd osI t w t l e t u i l ) ) m t I 2 J t s ) _ 1 A _
i
- 135 -
STAIF tvALUAlletts Or 5Nellt itiel RESP 0ft5ES pt.ANI MAMit Quad Qtles 1 & 2 . SIAff EVAttpAffell 80 I4 PAGE 2 51999A410F LICElestts IIE5 Peel 5E Ist stM t tilN 880. ..
- 4) neview fastances of damage from and/or No instances of water hamper or associated SDV piping dameTe R*SPonse acceptable.
teased by water haeuser in 50V related due to water hammer have been reco 11ed. piping. Identify cause & corrective ettlun. b) lieview sur. procedures to ensure that Surveillance precede:rf to assure 50V level steltch operability Response acceptable. Sify level switi;h degradattun due to e are in place, as well as reporting requirements for inoperable daeuged fleet weisld be detected & that suitches. lauperability from any cause was tested
& reported.
- 6) If ne fuectional test or inspection SDV level switch functional tests are performed aguarterly. Response acceptable.
of SDV leval switch has been performed during past 3 munths tehich would detect its degredation, make provision to do se during neat shutdowre a 48 liours. Steet4RY We have reviewed Quad Cities responses to bulletin requirements of ISE 80-17 and 80-14. Our evaluation Isicludes the IleslJent inspector's assessment of the licensee's compll6nce with these requirements. We conclude that interim operation of I)uad Cities is justified pending Implementation of long terin modifications. t 9
4 n
- 136 -
SIAfI LVALUAl10G Of 5HUlti 11198 RL5rUll*>8.5 PLAlli IIAML: YEftnoeII TAM EE l&& D+8 8 t illt 180. Blil-lf PAGt 1 5tep%AT Of LICill5f t5 R15r0NSE staff EVALilATim -
- 1. (a) Pertuse surveill nte test to verify that inspection / surveillance perfoewed F/4/80. Verfiled no measur- Serveillance was performed by Uf seasure-thes e la ne stylittant emuunt et water able water in SDV & associated piping. eent of SW headers. The action taken
- Is satisfactory.
in SUV. E (b) Perform surveillante test to verify that SDV vent valves are operable. Valves were cycled te verify operability. ] wat a.Ives ese opu eble. This action is satisfactory. (c) Perfore servelllance test to verify that Vent systee is free of obstructions. Vent system vertfled free of obstruction vent system is free of eintrattlun. by confirmation of flow path-Acceptable.
- 2. Pertoen manual 4 automatic scram information Manual & entomatic screes were initiated. Retystred information The rettelroment to phrfere e eenval and listed a thru k in Belletin. was subeltted. Scree times were acceptable scree solenoid automatic scree was satistled. Egelp-valves, backup scree valves operated satisfactory. Vent & drain sent functioned satisfactory.- 1he opening & closlag times were within GE requirements. Brain small amount of water found in the Spy times indicated no hydraelle blottages. A small meount (s 0.3%) headers (< 0.3% of volume) is not of water found in 50V.10 sec delay on scree reset functioned significant - response acceptable.
pror-tri y. J. At enesiuslun of stree tests and all . elles su.en Vertfled by UI that there was no significant sement of w6ter Verfiled went path was function.1 ey con. In SDV <0.3E o f volume. ducting a water flush of the vent line - thre an opening la the vent systes check (4) Verify that all vent lines on SDV valve. Ui messerement was used te verify j ese tunttinnel. that no significant amount of water re-malmed in the 50V headers following 18 e manual and autoestic scree tests. Start-up prerespelsite checklist changed to (b) Verity that alwre Is ne siptfitent require UT measurement for 59V residual l
. mnt ul water in StrV water be made prior to startup -
l
- Acceptable.
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IIt5 Pol:5E - for plants witkut AlWS related RPI Licensee sateltted rstuits of a transient analysts RPI will be Installed in all stNt plants , f. perseem emelysts of net safety of grformed by GE of 1) a generic bounding case for by De eatier 1.1980 thus this concern l de,.tlay per considerations list mly closure with scree of all reds in a 180* sector is eliminated. s In Belletin. of the case and 2) a plant specific case for turbine e trip with bypass with no scram. licensee feels that . these analysts adequately address Belletin re y frements W S
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51MF EVAt.UA110les Of SHORI ltRM Ris*0M5ES l FtJull NNEt Vtle19MI T48if f l . STAFF EVAL 94710h SIN #9 ART OF LICElI5EE5 RESP 045g Ist put tillN HO. 80 14 pAGE 2 Response acceptable. Never emperienced any falleres of SUV system which would '
- 4) Review instantes of deniage frees and/or it.dtcate that it had to be subjscted to water liesseer.
t.used by v.ter han==er in Sily related laspected system; no degradation observed. p e p t.ig. Identify cause & cestettive es.t ion . Respoese acceptable. 5urveillance procedures are capable of detecting failures.
- 5) Review sur. Procedures to ensure that flotifications of MRC have Leen isteluded in procedures.
stsv level switch degradatten due to a d,= ged fleet would I,e detected & that lauperatellfly f rase any cause was tested t eeported. SDV level switches are fimctlenally tested every 3 amonths. Ilesponse acceptable.
- 6) It no ten (tlonal test or laspection Ito Instances found of degralation of float assemblies.
ot %DV level switch has been perlossed during pest 3 suntts which would detect its specific testing is necessary beyond 3 month test. Its degradation, make provision to do so during neat shutdown > 45 tents. nie have reviewed Versumt Yankee's resporises to bulletin MRfMRT , reigulreements of l&E 80-17 and 80-14. Our evaluation includes the Resident inspector's assessment of the licensee's cosyllance with these sequirements. lie conclude that Interist operation of Vermong Tankee is justified pending implementation of long term modif ftations 0
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