ML20204K042
| ML20204K042 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 06/09/1986 |
| From: | Asselstine J NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20204J386 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-88-198 NUDOCS 8810250327 | |
| Download: ML20204K042 (249) | |
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The implications of the Chernobyl Accident
. for the U.S. Nuclear Power Program Remarks by Comissioner James K. Asselstine U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Connission Before the New England Conference of Public Utilities Comissioners 1996 Annual Symposium Chatham, Massachusetts June 9,1986 Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. It is a great pleasure to be here this -
evening te discuss the implicaticns of the April 26, 1986 accident at the Chernobyl reactor in the Soviet Union for the U.S. nuclear power program.
I want to begin with a brief sumary of what we do and do not know at this peint about the Chernobyl accident. I should say at the outset that I do net have any surprises as to cur understanding of the events during and following the accidant.
I believe that the available infor ation has been quite well publi:ized.
We believe that the accident resulted in a large early release of radiation from the plant that continued for several days. Based upon back calculations from actual contaNination levels experienced in western Europe, principally in Sweden, we ertirate that between 30 and 60 percent of the radioactive icdine and __ _
cesium contained in the reactor core was rellased offsite. For comparison purposes, this relates tom offsite ,
( releases that are sombat less than the worst releases predicted in the Comission's Reactor Safety Study. In the parlance of the Rea;ter 5#.fety 8810250327 080914 NS -198 PDR
, Study, SST-1 and SST-2 accidents, the horst considered, would result in the release of 70 per:ent of the iodine and /* percent of the cesium. The next most serious sequence, SST-3, would result in the release of or.ly 20 percent of the iodine and cesium. Thus, the Chernobyl release would equate to something between the SST-2 and SST-3 levels. We also believe that the
- graphite fire provided a strong driving force which, by creating a chimney effect, aided in the offsite release of the radiation, particularly oser the longer distances.
l The effects of the release have been fairly well publicized, with se'hething ap; reaching 30 f atalities thus far, with the cea.taminatten of substar.tial areas arcund the plant, with the need to evacuate large numbers of pecple from the vicinity of the plant, unfortunately tr.any hours af ter the release began, and with the need to monitor the futy,hylth of per,halsgrary,as 100.000 rec:le. It is also w:rth noting that during the course of the accider.t. EFA's prever.tive pr:te:tive action guides were exceeded by the contamination in several western European countries including Sweden, Finland, Norway, West Gemany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. While these l
preventive protective action guides are admittedly fairly conservative i
levels -- 1.5 rem to the thyroid and 0.5 rem whole-body exposure, this l t
provides sone indication of the world-wide impact of this accident.
l 1 should emphasize that our knowledge of the accident is still very limited. Our estimates of the radiation releases from the plant are still' based upcn back calculations over long distances rather than upon actual
- measurements in the Soviet Union, and we still do not have a clear
o j . .
l .
- 3-I understanding of the sequence of events that caused the accident. Nor do i
l we have detailed design information for the Chernobyl plant as yet. The ;
Soviet Unien has agreed to provide a full accounting of the accident to the l
_ - - /' j Inttrnational Atomic Energy Agency by September, and perhaps as early as
,j ;
l July. I suspect that our many questions about how this accident began and l progressed to a catastrophic early release of radiation, and how effectively the Soviet Union is dealing with its aftermath, will not be I fully answered until then. Clearly, this detailed accounting is important )
to us, as it is to many other countries. But I do not believe that we need !
to wait until then to begin learning the lessons of this accident for' our nuclear goaer pr:; a..
Unfortunately, it is not clear that these lessons are being heeded, either, by the industry or by the Nuclear Regulatory Comission. In fact, the initial reacticn frc many in the U.S. nuclePr industry and in gevernment
'swellha'.beeneneofd,ea.iaj. We are toit that such an a'eticent cculd not happen here because of the trany differences in design ottween this l Soviet ret eter and U.S. reactors, because of our stronger comitment to l safety, and because of the existence of an independent regulatory process l
l in the United States. Interestingly, in support of this thesis, the nuclear industry points to the willingness on the part of the governnent regulator, the Nuclear Regulatory Comission, to insist upon continuing l ,
safety ir provements 'n the U.S. plants and to the use of an open regulatory process that welcones public involvenent. For these reasons, many in w --
industry and governner.t argue that there are few, if any, lessons for us in
- the Chernebyl accident.
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I disagree. To be sure, there are some rather significant design a
differences between the Chernobyl plant and the U.S. light water reactors that comprise the bulk of the 100 operating nuclear power plants and the 20 plants now under construction in this country. Perhaps chief among these differences is the combination of large amounts of uranium fuel, zirconium, water and graphite in the reactor core of the Soviet plant which creates the potential for generating substantial quantities of explosive hydrogen l under accident conditions. And there may be differences as well in the containment capabilities of the U.S. and Soviet designs, alth.: ugh we do not yet have sufficient information on the design of the Chernobyl plant 'to reach an inf:r ed cen:1usion on the degree of similarity or difference t between the Soviet and U.S. containment capability. I would also agree that our safety philose;hy and system of regulation are different than the Soviet syste . But we wculd be remiss if we ignored so e of the broader
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l lessons of the Chernctyl accident that tgscend these design differences. , {
In ry judg ent, there are several lessons that apply to the U.S. nuclear j progran. Some of these lessons reinforce previous safety decisions r.ade here. In this vein, the thern:byl accident seems to demonstrate the wisdom
- _of some cf the new safety recuireG adopted in t.he United States in the 1
wake of the Three Mile Island accident in 1979. One example is irn tved emergency planning around comercial nuclear power plants, which provides an added metsure of public protection, independent of plant safety systems, ;
I to mitigate the consequences of an accident resultirg in the offsite '
- release of radioactivity. Ancther example is the addition of hydrogen
- 1 j Control features on fertain types of plants which are intended to prevent I
1 i 1 i
5-large scale hyc rogen explosions that could breach the reactor containment.
And still anet'ter example is the environmental qualification of electrical equipment, w'sich is intended to ensure that nraessary safety equipment will continue to function under s. tous accident conditions such as heat, moisture and radiation.
All of these measures reflected a recognition af ter the Three Mile Island accident that severe reactor accidents involving the melting of the reactor core and the potential release of substantial amounts of radioactivity can
. in fact occur. Obviously,theChernobylaccidentreinforcesthevalidity ;
of that judg ent. A m:re detailed understanding cf the Chernebyl accident gy p may tell us that we need to revisit some of these issues, such as emergency
'.,g p1anning and hydregen contrel.
'. - )
h.'
! The Chernebyl accident a150 de enstrates quite vividly that nuclear safecy 1
J j is truly a glotal issue. It is nc= clear that the effects of a severe
{ reactor accident are not necessarily limited to the imediate vicinity of the plant, and that such accidents can affect many other countries. In a very real sense, we are all hostage to each other's performance, s
But perhaps the most important lesson of the Chernobyl accident has to f.io with the acceptability of a severe accident in the United States and the adequacy of the measures new being '6aken by the industry and the NRC to 4
prevent such an accident. For tnis accident brings home the fact that *
( severe reactor accidents which involve melting of the reactor core, the l potential for dangerous expcsures to radiation, the potential for extensive i
- --- - -- as-.- -. -- -. .---, ,_ , - - , .,.n.- ,-- .- - - - , -- - - , ,, - r-- -- - _,- - . , - . ----.
. land contamination, and public stress and trauma, can occur. The fundamental lesson from Chernobyl inust be that such an accident is simply unacceptable, and we must make every effort to reduce or eliminate the chance of such an accident in this country. The central question I want to
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incus on shis evening is whether our present regulatory approach and the level of perfomance of the U.S. plants are fully consistent with t.his. .most.
fundamental lesson of Chernobyl. 1 must conclude, based upon the experience of the past few years, that they are not, and that we should be pursuing additional measures both to reduce the possibility of a core
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meltdown accident in this country and to mitigate the adverse effects of such an acticent sh:uld one occur.
To support ry conclusion, I want to turn first to an examination of several actions by the NRC over the past several years which evidence an N increasingly co placent attitude on safety and a reluctance to insist u;en further safety ir;roveMnts in the plants that would substantially reduce the risk of c:re meltdown accidents. I want to begin my analysis with a historical look at the period irnediately following the Three Mile Island accident, in the af temath of TM1, the President's Comission on the Three Mile Island Accident charted a new safety philosophy for the country, particu'tarly with respect to the prevention and mitigation of core ultdown accidents. In the words of the President's Comission:
1 Whether in this particular case we came close to a catastrophic accident or not, this accident was too serious. Accidents as serious as TM1 shculd not be allowed to occur in the future. The accident g:t sufficiently out of hand so that those atteepting to control it were 1
operating sonwhat in the dark... Once an accident reaches this stage, ene that goes beyond well-understeed principles, and puts those i
controlling the accident into an experimental mode ... the uncertainty of whether an accident could result in major releases of
. r Mioactivity is too high. Adding to this the enormous damage to the plant, the expensive and potentially dangerous cleanup process that rerains, and the great cost of the accident, we must conclude that --
whatever worse could have happened -- the accident had already gone <
too far to make it tolerable. Wnile ... we emphasize that fundamental changes are necessary to prevent accidents as serious as THI, we sust not assume that an accident of this or greater seriousness cannot happen again, even if the changes we recomend are made. Therefore, in addition to doing everything to prevent such accidents, we must be fully prepared to minimize the potential impact of such an accident on public health and safety, should one occur in the future. (Repert of the President's Comission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, p.15.)
The Comission adcpted this safety philosophy in favor of new safety l
~
improvements both to prevent serious accidents and to mitigate their c ce s e cue r.c e s . Acccrdingly, in the years iriediately fellcwing the TM!
recident, the NRC developed and imposed on the industry a substantial, ny ber of new requirerents to address many of the specific weaknesses that had been identified at TMI. Thesenewrequirementshaveresultedinmg ex:eeie4:ti_Ld.better. trained personnel at the plants, it;r:ved.pr:cedures f
,Qc'ing with acticeat s],gtions, better plant instree-tation and i plant diagnostic teols, and up;raded emergency pitnning and response capabilities. Satisfying these new requirements took a considerable effort
, p by the utilities, state and 1ccal governments, and the NRC, and ecst the i
.E utilities and their ratepayers en the order of $50 mhlien per plant.
i l In addition to it;: sing these near-term safety improvements, the NR0 1 .
cemitted itself to a number of longer-tenn efforts aimed at reassessing the risk of core reltdown accidents and developing eere fundanental safety' improvements, The 1er.;er-tern cemitgtnts teck the fod of an imediate - '
! reappraisal of the risk of core celtdown accidents at the east heavily i
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,Thi' populated reactor sites in the country, focusing onplan- the near New York City, and a broader examination of measu redut the risk due to core reltdown accidents at G existing and u ure plants.
f But as time passed and the memory of the Threeent Mile Isla faded, the Comission's enthusiasm for both of these efforts wane.
bega And in three decisions last year, the Comission _ out an gn
_ urther efforts
(
both to reduce the possibility of a core meltdown accident e United States in the future, and to minimize the consequences o should one occur. _ accident In those decisions, the Comission effectively re the vigilant and forward-looking approach to safety that ha n advocatec by the President's Corr.ission on the Three Mile Island Acc S .
e The firstplants.
Indian Point of these decisions involved the Lev e
e Despite projections of severe consequences from core meltdcwn accident at Indian Foint involving the offsite radiatier., anc despite the long-standing difficultiesnginadequate providi erergency planning for the heavily popula,te,d Indian , the Point site Comission declared the two Indian Point ,.reactors
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f e n, ac rejected all of ,the croposed safety improvecents, including ._
for tht pla
{ the relatively straightforward safety improvements ur own urged b technical staff and our hearing board.
These improvements would have cut the severe accident risk at Indian Point in hall.its In reaching decision, the Comission improperly placed heavye reliance on bottom-line results of probabilistic risk assessments and ignored the '
uncertainties in the risks associated with the operatien of the Point reactors.
1
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safety perfomance that would reduce the possibility of a severe accident or minimize the consequences of such an accident.
A review of recent safety studies of U.S. nuclear power plants and actual operating experience with the plants demonstrates that the Comission's new-found philosophy of safety complacency is inconsistent not only with the advice of the President's Comission on the Three Mile Island Accident but also with the lessons of the Chernobyl accident as well. Safety analyses of a nur.ber of U.S. plants indicate that even with the improve.
- ~
ments made af ter the Th! accident, there is about a 45 percent chance of a ,
cere reltdown at one cf the 100 plants new in o;eratien in this country over the next 20 years, a - -
in addition, plant operating experience dem:nstrates that losses of reactor
- stfety syste .s, r.ultiple and simultane:us ecuipment failures, human errors, peer raintenance practices, p: r maragement and rapid ur.plahned reactor h shutdowns are still frequent occurrences,at nuclear power plants in this country. These weaknesses in plant performance can serve both as the initiating events for accidents and as complicating factors that can turn less serious operating events into severe accident situations. Last year, these weaknesses in plant operations caused se_veral significant operating N #
events which created the potential for a much more serious accident in this cour:ry.
These operating events included the total loss of feedwater evLnt n at the Levis-Besse plant in Ohio, the water hanner event at the San Onofre '
Unit 1 plant in Calif:rnia, the severe overcooling event at the Rancho Seco
- plant in California, and the many crerating events at the Tennessee Valley O
Authority plants leading to the collapse of the TVA nuclear management structure and the iginite shutdown of all five of TVA's operating plants, u
The number cf serious safety events at our nuclear power plants together with the existing safety analyses which show a high likelihoo'd of a core reltdown in the United States over the next 20 years provide clear evidence that we are not yet at the point where we can relax our search for practical safety improvements. Many other countries appear to have learned this lesson, and are achieving substantial improvements in reactor safety at reasw.able cost that go beyced what this country is now requiring.
( Japan. West Germany and Sweden have achieved outstanding quality in the construction of their plants and in the material condition of plant
\cceponents and equiprent. This high quality in plant equipment is r.ain-tained thrcughout the cperating life of the plant through extensive preventive raintenance pr:grar.s. In addition, each of these countries consistently achieves outstanding levels of human perferr.ance. As a result, plant reliability is very high, with few unplanned shutdowns, equipment failures and persennel errors. Serious operating events involving widespread equipment failures, losses of safety systems, and the potential for a more serious accident are virtually nonexistent.
in addition, the United Kingdom is considering the addition of extensive new safety features beyond those found in U.S. plints for their preposed
- new light water reactor at Si:ewell. The purpose of these new fectures is
- to further reduce the risk of a core meltdown accident. West Gerr.any,
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Sweden, Belgium and the Netherlands have also added or ar2 adding new safety features to their plants, which go considerably beyond the designs of U.S. plants. The purpose of these new design features is either to reduce the itkelihcod of a core meltdown or to mitigate the consequences of a meltdown to the public. These advances in achieving true excellence in plant performance and improvements in accident risk fer existing as well as future plants means that many ofrthese e=+de are already well ahead of X
the United States.in reducing the risk of a core meltdown accident. -
This foreign experience dem:nstrates that there are practical and reasenable c; tier,s available to reduce the severe accicer.t risk in this country as well.
I would pre;cse a three-part program to achieve this cbjective.
First, each of the 100 operating plants in the U.S. should be T
reexamined to identify design deficiencies and vulnerabilities, of the type
-.-----t-...-...-. .
sten in cur recent sericus op ating events and plant safety analyses, that could_-cause or centribute..to p severe accident. Se:end, imp'rovement 3
. . , , . ... e programs should be required in areas of demonstrated weak perforr.ance at the U.S. plants such as gnagement, esintena_nce, personnel performance and equip.ent relgity. Q[ective should be to bring bl U.S. plants up
, to the highestltandards of operating perfomance being achieved in other countries. We should insist upon rapid improvement in the case of those '
U.S. plants with a history of poor perfomance.
V gd.,new design features should be considered for existing and future U.S. plants which have the potential to reduce b.th the l.i.kelihood and the _ . . - -
.censequences of a cere meltdoc accident. The design features being added*
e
in foreign plants, such as an added indeoendent decay heat removal system, improvements in the reliability of reactor control systems and emergency l
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oower sucoly_ systems, systems to protect against th_ e loss of power te grate o cooling and safecy systems, and systems to allow the controlled venting from some reactor containments, provide a good starting point for this review. l Taken together, these measures should lead to a substantial reduction in the risk of a core meltdown accident in this country. They would also represent a return to the vigilant and forward-looking safety philosophy advecated by the Presider.t's CcT.issien on the Three Mile Island Accident. '
If we are to heed the lessens of the Chernobyl accident, we must return to i
a safety approach that stresses the need to improve plant perfomance, to i i
learn the lessens of operating experience, and to pursue practical safety l improvements in existing as well as any future plants in order to recute the risk of a core meltdoan to a level that is as low as reasenably
, achievable. Protection of the public, protection of the sizeable investment rade by the utilities in the 100 operating plants, and public confidence in our nuclear program demand nothing less. Thank you.
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CMtomille Troieseg Center V PO eos1065 5
, Ptymowth. Massachwsens 02360 N)J4/ .(' s July 25.1986 A.L.Oasen v.ce resident Vi'PO #56-83
, Ncieer operatiens Hr. Peter Agnes, Jr.
Asst. Secretary of P.blic Safety Coracnwealth of Massa:husetts Executive Office of Public Safety 1 Ashturten Place - Re:m 0133 Ecston, MA 0:1C3
Dear Mr. A;nes:
As re;uested, please find en:1cted the status, effective June 25, 1986, of Boston Ecison's plant-s;e:ific co mitments in res;cnse to INFO's 1955 evaluati:n cf Pilgri.. fiaclea- P wer Station.
If I ca- te cf anj f. .tr assistan:e, clease d; r.:t hes' tate to c:nta:t te.
Viry traly y:.rt.
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A. L. Oxsen Enclesure .
9
sanoing . 4-1) The im seek and e6pevi.n ter ewh section u.e b .
de icred sha farus en careccent hao.n prohica.s. I'.cse taa' 'he 1986 goals /objectiv::s developed for each ,
.ad e,rc e..n ..n be maa.iored accordance . 2h noe w. :llon are helng revisited la Ilght c,f the ~
M h M mgN~d hm M W occurred at PHPS. The goals / objectives will be re-af firmed / revised to rddress present direction by July 198f>.
Finding (OA.3-1) Act cas ha.e bem va6ea s. reassica ad=iaise,asi.e ras 6s that The Site Procurement Support Group is in
.e,e e,aa.i.comier daac t,y r.,se. .ae sur-,.. sons. Aoshar.ra a has bem rece..ed i. sorm a s.ie rear.,ement c...p and ' place and functioning, although all positions have not Ma.asmaare riaanerig Ca,.f. Cmarbda tes ha.c been been filled with BECo personnel yet. He still lack one ease,..e.ed, and the v.aan sei < e pus, .: the rv.. ess es =
r <t'en. senior-Icvel person and the engineering function is
,,an. gam ,aTh.s t'*',P
..n n "'n c, be t.aics.orut by Atarch 9EA. Ibc
,she s..,.,,..s..s s shes o.,y ca,. curr.*ntly being addressed with contractors.
iar and d.ect f.ekt acii....cs so .,,y,o.c she a.-as acord po.,s.ae maaag - sc.,, ar, cur casir esvahi;shed :" *""" DECO personnel and has been involved in two unplanned the erreci.. earn .: s.v.er.i ars ,a caro c=g h,gh na~s <ds. outages where they were of great assistance.
W II M d 6 km a we cohesive and effective group.
fleid observation guidelines are being developed to assist / standardize monitoring of fleid activities.
Fleding (0A.3-2) rriorieirati.in .as co -d aavien er resources .,e
. .gh th, in s.. . pi a. The r*.rscar orcaa.,an.ca n esvaws.shed On May 29. 1986, the Nuclear Operations Manager.
...,, , ancu.cg a~s a.i.5-.c base-saa.: 6 v. o., es aa. .h.c h 01 rector of Outage Manngement. Sect 1on Managers, a
. r Ni **'"' rcpresentative Irom Planning and Scheduling, and other
- s. t.
n., d,,,sa "*~'Uin*~~
art s
- '[ d u .i,N ~ rya'EsYin key personnc1 were sequestered off-s1te for 10 day 5 to d :, ,44,en sh, probie. ,,cas aosed aho., aa. .. :
t, ..,.,pa, a ied .a.a ihe i.ac erem paa,. ..th appe .pria c revicw anil develop ac11ons to improve our abiIIty to pr.-.tr 8,y f et wa<r 8'ss. Control and mJnage the operatlon of PNPS. The concerns tach ace.ca plaa .ill ha.c a resprwis.ble indi wn.al an.gr.ed =ho of IllCo. NRC, and IMPO t ere reviewed and prioritized in
..n be xce-asabic for ,ae-i., estabi.shed - iesiaaes. order that we may develop long-standing leprovements. '
As part of this review. It was determined that our Work Control /long-Term Plan process needed considerable attention. There was inconsistent understanding of the
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process; definitions of what should be la the process were weak /nnn-existent; there was no confidence in our ability to project manpower requirements; and the current prinritization process does not meet the organizational.needs. ,
BECo management is currently reviewing and revising the process to provide a system that will assure activities are properly prioritized, coordinated, assigned owners.
resource constralned, and followed up. ,
m______ _ _ _ _______ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
. - _ _ - - _ - _ _ _ - - . - _ - _. .- _- -- _ -- -- . _ = - _ _ - _ .
Br5PON5( $1A35 .
i finding (OA.3-3) u.a.gns .ad super isms ne a. - .cc.a*.h'e far
- i p,,so,--e or w.r pmirie ia ihe =c. at ha.aeheerar =ah The first "CycIlt" evaluation of the Housekeeping p, . cur, empum on cor,cei.as the p,ot. sees aoicd aba e. Service Assistance requests is nearing compietion W W11 k MM h sa .dd ii incre.wd emph ses = pt.as seuse6eepes us beca and additional attentlon.
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.ppi,,d o. ,ch ,s e.hiname,i .: a ,. . r s . e-
.,s.g s. 3..e p, -a w.- inca .ss.g-ed h.iusekeepas
, esp, s. ,.i. .es to, spn.r.c wci.nas er w si e.aa.
,..i .=,. .e o s ia.,wseep.ag se...cc asm:4- e ,e<r.nis -.it A cres.c Tour inspection checklists are being Jeweloped b, .,s. ,,ed i. .nrerm m.a.gemen . she *-a ums candd""' which address all the issues of concern. These d.,r. g ho ,6,ep.ag . men sam 8. ..d = uca s.ag ad as-sser will be used by the Maintenance (.roup area owners
, si. - ,w6cep g coad. -=. Adda.na.n v . ==~rms .as during July 1986. Comments from the owners will s..pn.na,s ,e aa. cona. ime ,cevin asper e-s ia ssas o-crini.. .ns or is -cas .r o.c ha.nescer.ag e ege. - be intnrporated into revised chectllsts which will he used to develop a training module targeted for ri.a. pm,a.mes ..i mes., .a e,..e- or she e s.-nese, pag coepietlon by August 1986.
re *C'.m .ad .dd. .on. i,..n.pg en .mpet i.ar. se* i--'r,s by
$4.sch 8996.
1 1
e' f ni.a.gers .ad super.isars are held arca..ni.hle far she g,er rorm. ace or she.r propie .n she .,c. . .adhner . s resy by Finding (OA 5-1) e.e.e- .r t,w .nd shop .c i,.it.cs.
The on-site industrial safety representative now saaneri.: u ses , is a integ, p= er o e ae- tw=,wteepiac reports directly to the Nuclear Operations p, og, .m. o r g iad.cunws he me. .-ans -.n ee. e.., Manager, thus emphasizing the leportance of
.dd.i.en.1 dwectuw. ed trie.r role w.sh reg.,d . . . =<w h er at INPS.
safety i
..eie,c,= e i. pe,sonnel s rciy pr neci.e.i requ.,emeans and .
l cormieas ureir .,mds a ..ih.a ihe- ,c .
a e..i The first "Cyclic" evaluation of the Housekeeping
..n se .ured ian i.r o-
=r-mHm cseep.acos m.n.gement ser. iheice Assist-c
.s-r..ad .msonu' re p.esis Service Assistance requests is nearing completion ureir condai s v. ..d = nead-,g .ad and will be used to assess areas for leprovements r advocasas c usn. ureer der.c. enc.cs. ca,,co-c "* and addi tional a t tentior-
)
saipse.aeni.ii.n .t v ese .cii . n in conpieved 6, ai , im.
4 I
j l
- Finding (0%.8-1) TI e Qu iivy Assur.are (QA) M.a.ger bs ,eemph. sired i.
ou.iii, rion<.ntorm. ass,ace
.arep erc, posona -c :nas th.: ihe or rur.cicarr is,p.-epy in addltion to our Inttla1 response, a revislon to she . air pr.., nws rar Nuclear Organization Procedure (NOP) 8349 eeperi.ng chse,ved def.r.cas c.nel.8-ms. Sie Ms . msi,uc ied oAroc pns es sus *-r essa u.e o.e et.s.gn- so mue Hana9ement Corrective Action Process *" has been i
ei. mien. ace aimi,.cc, n.4-4.g.c.: occurrence ,,pmis. .ms draf ted which provides a formal methanism for r..wciu.it.e cs c. .eparts heihe, ther .<e ,ci.ied .. spec.r.c
'et"'*'"r c.aiph. ace w ,mi. reporting and resolving non-regulatory issues.
sa .4s. s.n, is Nuclew O,g.mr.ii.a penannel M.c tice,,
This revision is currently under review and ,
<em.nded ih.: et is the ,esiums. belsey or the ind..wa I wt- comment wIth anticipated approval In July I986.
{
! ebse..*4 she d,r.rseas c,w.i.e.na v. .n.i
- car,n i,.e p. ,,. -6 i. su e ,e ie the .it'*f" 84 5-s.
\ -- -- - . _ _ _ . _ . -- . _ _ - - _ __ _ . - -_. _ _ - ._ _ _ _ _
~
RISPONSE STATlf$
finding (OP.1-1) Aw*.rir vi.a w iarre.* .,erew c- . a tr - n sa Je The ten (10) additional operators authorized in s ,we..e4 w 4 , sm. T. .s. w. r..e .4s. .aa.: Nov. 198',were on board in Feb. 1986 as planned.
Ir*I.'.,Nm c M ~.v W,7 I [Ee'c'E'. A one-time agrcement wiih the Union ta reIaa the c w-aced b J a nory Im e. tr.m new s-vuia t is asum.e 5 tate Ii(ense requirement aIlowed ihe hlrIng oI
-8'cea'+d d=e* = *** * *P "aced a*a-cea' personnel with much more favorable backgrounds c me en.wed ne. . rexe , e . .w i*cas.ag .'d :2sses*****
Joe, am. si is ai.c.p.ied eh 3 per.r.,s ..is .nece u , ).sr 1han previously.
es.ss. -
In Feb. 1986, two (2) BECo senior-level management e,iA U 7 "
ea
"*,*'"","j'h'"",,*,',
- e. g Individua15 wIth eatens1ve operating and operator o c sur. 6,. ,h rhys.rs. .as ec . sis .a m errar ..it me .acioned
-e p.,s..aari. The training enperience vere assigned io the iraining ihe s. - cain inatus Grotrp and are directly involved in the licensed "P""-
operator training programs.
Seven (7) of the operators hired in Jan./ reb.1986 completed the cupanded non-licensed nuclear plant operator tour training. Results of the quizzes.
cuans, and oral evaluations showed a high degree of knowledge and excellent attitudes. A second class consisting of ten (10) operators began in March and will be completed in August 1986.
The reactor operator licensing class was esamined by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in May 1986, and we have received verbal notification that all four operators pasred with high scores. A new class began in June with nine (g) candidates and will complete training in April 1987.
The apprenticeship programs for operators health physics tcrknicians, radio-chemistry technicians.
maintenante, and instrument and control technicians have been accepted as part of the contrac t negotiations just completed. Our current plans call for developing training programs and resource .equirements to laplement apprentice training in 1987.
O
_- -- - - . --- ~ -- - --
l Findine 'tation Proced:re 2.1.16 (Operat:;rs Tour) has L -
- 1) t.evept pr.<eanpersonaci 2.1. 5.un cers-- h .e been ei .a iimtructed ie r ..ich brtau re.ie. ca.a Ccren.s u
221. d.ted December 20,17:3. A gael .ill be estahinhed b) vised to incorporate a requirement that the' ree,u ,r ses rar e.ch ..ech ear.aeer .ad es e .v.ar. s..re<= sa, educlear llatch Engineer 10peratIng Supervisor
- i. spend i.. consecuti.c ho. s . -ih ..th e.ch aua i.ccawd conduct periodic tours with the non-lltensed opn. ., ihe- sh. , eonhn.g .,ws estruc .ca. NucIcar l'Iant Operator.
- b. .dd.i.na. ..ich eng.neers .ad eper.iing super.isce s er.fi coa 4.r u .adecea+-as sours . seas .r rie tr .a. - e may 4,v,,p.or.,s oie.e w..,er, ,erieried ca ihe a. -s- eawd Although the Hatch Engineers / Operating Supervisors cper.e,- s saur sheet.
An .ssessmeni et the tw eased are spendin3 more time coaching and instructing t
opn.ia, ons.,per..w.s pnry,a. ore ..u t.e - ic .. ccr. ..,i, non-licin..-d operators, a means to formally ut.aa 46e i. co,.cci y noica de. i ,. re.~. . r .e dactement this has not been established. Ihis will r~ 'm =*ar e- he adifrened by July 1986.
The assenment of sinsupervised performance of non-licen,ed operators still needs to be addressed. This will also be formalized by July i
1986.
finding (OP.3-1)' * *'"'d t' i" '* ' '*" * * ' """"d
- '""" r I I.
' ""' " Tag audits have been conducted on a regular basis; s,'rI,c .c u. sI.'s c .,' however, all were not being performed monthly.
A me ..s issued (CR 36-09) conrera.ag *NA* cr "ISC .s This has been corrected. A review of those a , cess.,, und ,, she esai.e.aas seri.~. .s ao
~.r.er be =t performed indicates stronger aClion required to 3., hmered by it, ..ich eag.acer. Au nos i-s ..is t, prcvent deviations from occurrin9- Ihi5 action i5 doc-i,d. heing ianen.
ua iner i.g s.es ..it be pee re,-ed i. ca.,e the .ve.5 . sed 1 .ha.e .,e ddressed. An .ti.chmen: ..it be .Sied to the g -
g g yg 9 gy l u ..ai. m c p eg..-si (uns usin t s't reove. .. e = rs -.s protective tags was not Issued in March as Thew us.aas ..u i, .-c u mense.s by pianned.
i I
.ppi.r.sa, s. sh., u p.
M.nb I'pt&. IL wiII be in effect by July 1986.
! f i ndi ng (OP.3-2) An s,sie n ideovir.ed .s reer ,ct.ied by oper.iians reare<6,e 24 of the 27 identified procedures have been 7.8.88 h..e bec ve.ie.ed i. em.we dauble -ev.f or.i.a. .s WWM M Adh M NMW* W par-med .ad d <umeased pracair. A ne. . .: srsiem remaining three (3) procedures required additional pret,6,,s dei,,..aed eh. . . . .r 2r proce+,es .,e sa be
*"'d. N ewwe6,n ..n boe.ised br u nh am work heyond double verification and are scheduled for approv.il in July 1986.
Finding (OP.4-1) The ,e.ie. .t occa a is .an ag. A mem dated neeen.ber 20 Training in watchstanding practices has been i
1981 (CR 81-221) .nstruried ..ich eag.neers .a.: crer.s incItided into the curriculum since April 1986 and e-r.no,s in c..e. ihe i., ..th she Ntreos t., <.su s.'aCg
, .ad -s e,ue s.an. sa .45. .aa. . ,
. . . sa. . d, sh. is stressed with each candidate during his surn.na r cer-i . .ssess pic perfarm <e .: e h retteo on-watch training. The licensed senior operator
- a 5'"fi * *8= aasmat- assigned to Training personally emphasizes i
The -process NtNPo coni.a. in..a.at p, ate.- caan.nn professionaiIsm with each student several tines 1 arde.c,t.acs..agbas.< inca),aads, sics. r,. .ag . during ihc coursc. Additiona11y, the watch j ..icr4i ad.ag p, c s.res ..u be .ncio sed by Ar,.i im. engineers are actively assisting the Training Group by overseeing the candidates' progress in j this area prior to signing off their qualification cards.
R[Sipl5[ STATil5 rinding (OP.5-1) reece.hsre ih, . g. ,c..e 1.it is meias d re..si re-hed i iarsude besser d-eci.aa a i A draf t copy of Procedure 1.3.4 which incorporated
.t porea,n. n..s ,e' "'"
..S sus.m.iied t. INPO for commeats. .ad thene caewaeaisappropriate .ere somments by INPO and BECo Quality c.os.de. a rar .acorp.- i.a iai. Fore +-n. once s.l.* .s Assurance Organization was reviewed in detall by the
.pr o.ed. . <,.ai..csor ..inne rei..ned s e. -.a.ie ni.ere-.s.on Nuclear Operations Manager and the Section Managers
. ,.nie g ror,4,n. r,. peer r rus.t.ed pi.ai rasaaari ..n in April 1985. Ihts extensive review resulted in re..e. ihe gworedure f,v settv..c.I canien: *: .dera.r y p,.o,
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , . Au p,.re.5-n ..u he en. s : .e co numerous comments and process revisions. The e., 2. , star. A sui.n .e ine s.. gens ..u be r.no.she.i .nh ihe comrrents hav> been incorporated and another review
--aaih p','s' e ** ,ero,i-has been scheduled because of the organizational thanges which have occurred. It is anticipated that the new procedure will be in place in July 1986.
Iinding (OP.f-1) 5.d*-a* hr .a<' The wits down of area 5 to Identify equipment re rarmg .de ..r =".r.5i--.8i..nhe <aa*.r ied . 8aio,e'J..nc de esi.oi.si.e.:
e.r.'r'aea im.
o re .:.ans per-s ..u de ch.,ce at she t.hri e sicar.' requiring identificatlon was impacted by 5trlke
==i nc .,.e.: . su.i. die un es ro.,wi .a si.,
.,e
... aua cca.,ni PreParatiens and ofher comeltecnts of resources and Is currently sir (6) months behind schedule.
n o per. ;aas c , .p .;is 6 , respoos.t.se io i h ,i e,r..p m e r,ca. the inn. As esgs ,e s de ihey ..el be one r, by Ope,. .ons A Hatch Inalneer J was recent1y e assioned to coordinate r -
pers ace. t..t.ein.g .as be coa.picie nr ruce , im. thl; ef fort and progress is being made. The areas ,
. .+s. a. . ,,ogr.m v. cas.ne eg. cm,a 6.srai.r;r.i- i.h belt.3 concentrated on first are those normally
.,e repi. red. . hen ,. ceded, due se tass er dam ge .13 te .a inaccessible durIng operations and are to be ef f e<.i br M r am. completed prior to startup from the current outage.
The program to ensure that labels are maintained will also be in place prior to startup from the d
current outage.
(
O e
_ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _m _ m -. - -- -- _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ m _ _ ___ ___
_ = - _ _ _ = _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ . _ . __ _ _ . . _ _
MSP_DNSE ..
SMILIS
- Firdle., . 13-1)Tw chemic. control Technici Traiainccreg . h.s beca p ecarco. ead er.
ag ing.a ia ).au.tr sm.
- aa-w'r.* 8 An assessment of Chemistry personnel's knowledge level N"rrNs's. ' TUrc~iY# =. 7s~e pr' '.'s"o$.~N,Y'y' was conduc t ed in March 1986, and the resu orparimeas tar sne aa 4-iar.es .a.s .o.m...ce-c i .m.ac .s incorpnrated into the training program. As stated in rweded ne amerewe the ever.316poeledge level .aw r g themistry our original response, training began in January 1986; pers-i. c,mi.au.ag vr.m-g for chem.c.i c.ac ..: ies ha.c.*"' hOwever, allendance was Inconsistent because of Station
=.lt be saplemented by June tits. needs. In April 1986, authorization was received to Increase con =plement from nine (9) to eleven (11) technicians to allow personnel to attend training while Stat'an needs are met. A strike by the Union prevented fil'
.9 of those positions expeditiously.
The contracts have beca settled, and tre expect to have all positions filled by July 1986.
F i nd i ng (NA .1-1 ) '""*E '*' "f"'# '"pn= nam has teen Jarss,4 by obe
'*"**"'E*c"*"' The site Prncurement Support Group and Hafntenance
.. rarm. .a. .:
a r,acuremene 3..pna,e c.ra..p in Planning Group are in place and functioning. He are comb.aes the cura : one.pemes for currently evaluating the effects these groups have had prwurea-an dncunicans p.o cu.ag on reducing unnecessary adelnistrative tasks to I
- b. determine what addlllonal leprovements Can be made.
ess.bl.shmeat tea m e s.epererche a separate pt.naing . art seher6.I.ag
'* .aienaare xi....ese.,apr.:
Iniphasis has been placed on hiring needed superylsion c.
.a.irsis er the neticities et supervisars ia o,se,mia, and is still ongoing. He are currently short one (1) maa.i.on.i ruaci.ons th c.a be r,.u.gaea na.o.,rs IEC Supervisors from the 1985 authorized complement.
However, the Senior II.C Engineer was promoted and a N['D.. C .lc."aT*"" **
$N. .ans Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor is out on long-term disability giving us two (2) additional openings.
- e. Additionally, authorization was recelved to raise the pot.cr =~2.are rar eaaducims peria.s.c otaer m'a 's er mami ace ci...i.es pre.. ora i. sus e..s, by pay grade for it.C Supervisors which has improved our M 11 M MrL A status with .cs.nas conipteW *e deve win b? iactuded in the s.e-month gwegress repart, i The pollcy gutdance for conducting periodic observatton I -
gg ,3ggggggggp ggggyggjgg $ghgdg)gd [gr M3rCh I$ $tl11 under development and scheduled for implementation by July 1986.
1
.- , s
>IAlus
,a4 res
.*'d ce "*,.r.- e The first "Cyclic" evaluation cf the
_. f .pf.res pari er itsee
. o, an.r.a,d mt. aus.
..e cy.n. m an llousekeeping Service Assistance requests i
ih, rese=r*se ~ a.rer . u Is nearing completion and will l'e used to
.suvera.: der.r.em y repari.ag. Tbc f=*at ** assess arcas for improvements and
. .4 ..ll repw t. b, zoalu. sed .ad summar. red m additlonal attention.
.1-3) wewm .., b u.
- - . cruc i., .i. Tw - inform.i - svu,m . Th
- e. Ih,s m ..,s.svu ,m ..a m ,s ..., .,,as.n
<~ ri,s a 4.ves ::: .,4. ,o., ,.p,a,,i.e :: resent work status information iaen.mse,% p,oo sei..i,4 .a is,es , s ..es u s <i,d systcm has been restructured to provide repar e. sa <*e recoac i,4 br St r ms. . the si.ivs or . i. ,,,,,us ..g,,,, n ti, current information with regard to Preventive equipment maintenance calibration. tasks and tes
The 1981 and 1982 validated and theHaintenance Requests are curre 1983-1986 Maintenance t
Requests the data base.
are being inventoried to update l- ricding (HA.2-1) A ca m ce*i'e imp compleled by August 1986,These efforts will be in..: =*as Face.=
caan. .aa n+u,i.,m ess.6:na f*
wrc**'-
.s. 'be pi.ars
.6, c e e,.e, T8, .i,iv
.iw p.gr.gscu.r.r.n,
.. 1 . hu .i * . ara us ..u u, .ar- ,,5 aa'ed The Hilntenance Organization is planning w,,as a,. <-,,e,i acy i.gwi.ag.
,.4, we, sca .i.su,a .p.,..,4
.o. o,, routine activities dering normal mare g,anic 4,r. ,r he.
... u r operations on a weekly basis with has,5,eperc s ace.c.,ar.,s shan $.e cor,eci,. ii.e
=~ .a isc u.iu= partIcular attentlon being glven to the arcas oI plant in5trumentation:
- .,inpeo br o, rem 6-r a m ar,na .4s.iion. . ere.e grease fi.e progr.,, rar piseal
/oll leaks; : p,s, .. iaa leaks ..:: d and i.apiemratea a., A.:, mi. deIicienties; and valwe problems. pump Aa e.wvii.e s.mmu,y rec ,n senaa,. recart 4
.r ewe co:n-. acc-.g.iin mpiah- be is,
,a rurais...m hed it, Projects and planned worlt are identified
.r.s.ic p ,, ,as pog,n, us .a4 by Hednesday of each week for inclusion
. Into the schedule.
In addition to the above, a concentrated effort is being made during the current ontage to complete as many diesel Finding (MA.3-1) generator deficiencies as possible.
1 A pl.aniag .=f ert,4Ww.g te.m coatinw.g of edoc.pr.ac ..it be misce t>, St.rch im ... pi.aaer in each saag. ,,m work sched.i,s.ra is ..n meim. .c p.m.e.i, Tws, ,p .aa.. ,, i.aa.:
- e. o.. 4., ,,4r The Actions identlfled in our. response j
They ..t: h..e si., e have been completed. and we are l 1 2-a actica se .4 dress the ebe.e c= e,a s.
,sp...s.tus. y i,evaiuating to identify areas for
\,
shauto eedure .orh b.cb1cg .ad .mpto.c co.,4 a.iihese S'a"PS- .
carorn improvement.
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rei r e i t i i s n apoeiier l pr z . _
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(gji?NT 5 - T MININ" A!O PEI EE M) g 2.JE:il\'! : ENSURE TEMICRS ARE READY TO USE PLAfiT FEATURES TO EEST ADVANTAGE IN SEVERE A*CIDENTS EQJLLR.EfitaS : -
.l . C EAR SYMPTO'. BASED STRATEGIES (INTEGMTED)
- 2. EEMOV;L 0: U'nECESSARY IN':lEIT10ii -
- s. .i. .. ,.,
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RC5mE STATUS Finding (MA.8-1) D gr.d 4 -ir e sliess ha.e sie,a re=a.ed from se,ere. Statinn Procedure 3.M.1-14 has been
.w su. , c au.e. .,e p cc i. cas e ih.s e,r peaca revised to provide adelnistratIye i sc aed and/or rep ned pr,or i. is i ace.
controfs.
A program .li be developed ased irap'eeinented frw the control of pers.6:e t.frias e.r,.pmeat i>r r -.i im. t ie= 'h' i.er,e ..n - i.,i,.t ,i t,e i ied i en $.c .aspeci.on. All portable lifting equipment was
. sci.ne. d 4,gr.oed e.r p-cas. removed from service inspected. and those that were acceptable were made available for issue /use.
i The'nnly remaining issue is to develop an automatic requal process so that required inspettlons are performed.
finding (MA.9-1) A rrarure- sarcart c e go has t e4 r-d aad has At the present time, the Nuclear Steam ni.e.:.ss-d .. . p,.o . , ih, ,ed s. e r r,e s..ei, ..m erneare Supply Systems (NSSS) spare parts lists
, su c ,a,s .a.co .,, .r.c. .on irsi- .. n she si.in."
ysiem/suttsyseem Jes.gn.v.ca. are undergoing a review by CE utl11:Ing Our spare parts catalog. and comparing rre, ess .ad si.e.,s reparts ..: noe sars sed - is, s;. -= cash the itens against their latest part j :-et nues**'-
nunOcrs for the component / system regaired. This cross-reference will actoirpilsh the following:
(1) establish latest part number identification; (2) estabitsh safety class; i'
(3) sort out obsolete parts;
- (4) provide cross-references between part numbers and BECo stock, symbols and i
- establish a numbering system tonsistent with GE. Our major supplier of spare parts.
L '
i 1he l'alance-of-plant spare parts shall be
- donc upon completion of the MSSS spares. !
l I
l ..
J *
. \ ,8 . f l - - - - - - - - - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ - - - - - _ _ -
BESPONSE STATUS Tindin.; (MA.9-2) T'- Praru ~aeat 5.w-t Cr., .n ci-ab.e = e gr., .is te, ee. . f.=ct. s ensur i. s . ..e r an., ~.""' The newly-forened Procurement $ifpport
- d. - isd.,eeivy.. ,,,e ac yd,p ..eis.i 45.i.r Group has reduced Purchase Order the g, ., s>.n 4.sem.in .n de. . n. e, e n e m as .aspec..*a*-
s.wi.e, s, dev.iations and the con 5tructIon material 1ists to what Is considered normal work
.er.--, is ..n t.e + m ehe .a..e i.: s,si- . r.c.de . attivitles 8n these areas. In addltion, u.ss-,e fe. car e me ee. ca enis. v e., rr .,e ~. .jppro=Imately 2.000 items have been 5 re.-s c,=, =u .44 ess .ad c~,e. t ehe .et.e re n S aeed
- ""#- transferred to automatic re-order based on usage, availability, and delivery lead time.
He are investigating the .nossibility of creating a lobby stock area for common 1
non-safety-related parts to make
- available items such as fittings.
washcrs, belts, etc. to Station personnel and maintain Inventory levels within the warehouse as backup.
Finding (TS.1-1) 5e. iaa Prwe**** ' 3 *. **r"' Caa.Pe'er 8 'rda.* ha' 6*"'
ec,'. sed t. re g.we darv e ied tMhn.c.t rew.ews .ad .s centenifyStatlon Procedure 9.14* "Process Computer 4,i sh, .pp .s p.,,ss. An .ds. a.s pore 4 e .e... ..u w lipdate., was revised to rectulre
- t. ,+.,, e sari-ne o en. .h-e .cr uc.we. to t- dorumented tethr1 cal rev1ews post-change in.ed t. ..e.:.v.,d accepi. ace er.in.. .a4 , e'"" 5
- "'"""*"d**'"*
testing, and acceptance requirements for i
sof1 ware / hardware changes.
j tws,,%e ts-in de :m a. :e4 by u.<rh itss.
Finding (T5.3-2) A re-ie- of tw 'e=ra.=v ch a"y 'ai.aa*.at w - ****
5tation Procedere 1.5.9*
- Temporary 6,. pi sysie e ..n de p ,fer e4 =~s arrrrrr ie n.su. . c.,2,.es -si.e.ied or u neh im. P.t.se Modifications . was revised to 5trengthen p, ,, ,,.rps.,s eh. ps..g .a,. .es .c ee,ere xses = a tw 1
.,.n,d .s p ,s.e,se t 4s. They =u se s. -,ed '* **""'
the design review process. However.
si *-y d. aat e. reed tw desica cap.h.her .I she -e8*at further review Indicate 5 a need for
.,,,,,,s. id t.f.ed e. .na- t<=ce.a.d.or. =~f as.=f .4 addltiona1 changes. These changes will c ..n.d f. , ..r.i.a n ,,.cr.= -in be - eine by Ap.: he incorporated by Airjust 1986.
196.
~
AH te=per.ry .ned fir.tions i.e e'fect for a e th.n sis en.hs
- e, ,..i .,d .. de.n- < t a.e,
- re t-I se...cc te.p.ests h.w been .n.ti. ed far inese to tw de
] per e t. .n4 t:rget d.tes hs.e bec.e , ,s.bt.shed for thase se be re ed. l 4 9.t w . s inar ti age gw.e ess f s bee j de= eloped th.t o.d redure et.e Mess.t y t. e.e.l.re the ,
sempa,.ry s ad.f.c...na p.ress.
T+ ape,.ry Mad. fir.iin P,acedure t.3.9 ..it t.e revised s.
l y ase god.are far twefer wg desq eew.e-s. Darumenied des.ga eew.e-s w lt be perforwed far .It f t.n, sempar.ry v .nad.firsi.cas piar la easi.u.t.ne These .< temas sts f.e s L p ;c-sed by ).aw 8986. , ,
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ . _ . _.__.__.-. _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - - __ __ ______r - _- - -- -----
I ,
Rf5PlW3C SLARIS Tindin.) 0:P.1-1) er a.r, ae is ca==.*ved 6.*ias .a e ress ,as nP
- r. x m ,,ws.. ,s.n.'a.easspec.r.cne a. A tour ,;iside checkilst was d,~...'~ied for use by 7 ..ute Radiological Protection man gement personnel to p r
,a .
e,,, wn.ise, r ,ser : , esse ..n beta *=8. t assist in standardizing (f.elr tours. These e,, masc .ae
..n i.e a. * .
rs,< par.,=. ace. Ih. ..e nega checklists provide formal feedback to the e,rren. ,y sm. RadiofogicaI SectIon Manager.
- h. b. One of the Radiological Protection supervisors was The n 1.:, ca. .cn.iiaa .in s, ri ea e=*
s..p,,w.sary .ticat w. t. em ,e pape, s,uem .ad in c pn r.r assigned specific responsibility for the whole-body i
unch im.
ace. TN ..n i., au. ,4 b, counter-and four (4) technicians received specific training on its operation. These techniclans will be the only ones assigned to operate the unit until additional ones are trained.
- c. r,ar,6,,, ., se C-6 p e pn r e..,.,4 .a4 ,,..-
,i .a4 c, va,ae p.,ra,. ,
sa
.a.,
Il'e () of twe' sty-f1ve (25) programmatic 4=r-a e 81., e a;.'r of <*=t's. ins ..in t.e radiological procedures have been revised. The s
ca=r ,ted tw it.,,h 8 98'. remaining procedures are scheduled for revjslon by August 198(3.
- 4. w.ii :1-e.noremeces ins,p ed,4a.r ne d.
p i i. c., e .. - c .a .~
Additional Radiological Protection personnel have
+,.ae. ..an p g .a .a.e .ne g a.ar, ca, been provided to contaminatlos control and tha. i. .a ,. :.,4 c.a. a . .a...: decontaelnat1on prograos. Due to contractor and e,..c,. is i,,.ng e,.cior,4 .a4 ..n 6, .a pi.r, o r BECo labor strikes. the training on use of standard Ap.s tm.
contamination control devices has slipped and is currently scheduled for completion by August 1986.
- e. Actina, h e ti n ia;ii.ied i. ess.6:; n e.
e.em.cs.-e ..u ,,4.co err,r,i.,
regr.m, net.s==s .=
BECo has leased a Cry Active Haste Systen whlch
' " provides the seans for sorting. shredding, purc Yie . N .: Y c h i , $ 4 r i,7 "0"IIO[ing. compacting and packaging. This unit is operational.
- r. rer nr en : ..n f.
v.nny .e.
6 , .r eu..e,-,. .. The Radiological Section Manager was scheduled to e-i.ricue c . .g .a mm e
- h=aa = 8 *- participate in two (2) INPO evaluations; however.
plant conilitions necessitated they be postponed.
lie will reschedule for later in the year if possibic.
t
- TIndina
- -2) h Ced.at-t r.1 secti a si..d .im ee.sc. the acwe separ's .
c e ih.: ..g r.c : e,c 9, .re 6deaeir. d .ad ter 'ed a 'atlon Proredura 6.1-20g. "Rad!'.;1ogicci Occurrt I '
appar i..e se.es. .f =.a.ce-cas ad ,e<..saer pres.~wl .* . sorts.' em revised to cddress the deficiencics J.
anen.r y. . ,
ror s'Ca'f'c.at RORs. . testw=ne fr.m the resgwesible e .r r.is.w
..!! t. enr red i.e -r.t.ag ..th ident.f.c.t.w. et the ecce t ne of the errarverre. The e e..e. .a.e upg..de ei the NOft gwweAre .15 be rempleted by M rcts 1936.
I revi g.c 3 meries ee aet ..fi c tia..e 4. be g. .ded in appapr te le.els of m.a.t* ment.
f inding (RP.1-3) ^*,,8',"
, .j ms ,
- e ch seniaa ..n *.esap As discussed in finding (OA.2-1). the Section goals are at ..rects .e e,.e e.d c.r : g,.e ci ' pat, ruro being reviisited in light of the current events and c.a+i.ae s>-coe ..n be ined v. .sme the *.ciacment er ihev .cs pt sunagement thanges that Isave occurred at PflPS.
A . ia.-um. .ii
.. e th.: the.r .erk gene.ps' perfars
.ad caaer.cs.e super.is.,. ..u h, a ae The tour guide checklist referenced in finalnq (RP.1-1) e .n e.a.alag.r.1 pr ,ce sapars .ad ..n ne . exiac sa s e ** {$ being gged by 73d{gigg)g3] ggpgry)$gr$, }hg p ,ra. r%.aa.as unch s,ss, v. pee. . checitlist his been made available to other e e..i
. .n i.e ee r.3 ed 8. a.6e e='e'"'.' *** * *f the '"a = . Incorporat.nor into their tour programs.
Sertions for mao.,i,.m ,od pc + .n e. ecc . .a r a .iac.r.:
c s, d i.,c reern ar e. n oui w n be ."'a **
7.I . ..*u C",",Sc .5 .
- pni ea..
N *' ' ' *
.re[~'.,, Q R.idiological Protection Section. Realistic esposure budgets ar This was delayed because of probicas with the Radiological Information N,* O7",*e *,' ' ' System (RIH 5), a computerlZed data base of eirposure
, .t 7 ,'~6 j history.
l wi re. The ar nep.,imene ..ne This was necessary so that the budgets would c.a.,. s . re.ine.c. but ch.ne .ag ..i e..de.smi inio care . be realistic. The ALARA Group is developing dose Pe cs.cc 84P.643 ..it be ened es . referewe for esi.htesh.ag . reduction plans for each Section as required.
do.c ree.r_t.se pl for e.ch depert nee.i.
ser .,.e RHP's are I cing tracked and trended. This has improved
.ad ria.siaen ..n Sc we dre s. **cem.ae c 6: ems.
P e perfer.ners .a t9es ere. .13 be smeed s actesury v. the timeliness and use problems identifled by 19:00.
.d credless delays .ad e.r.arcessary espasur es to lir a cc tm.r ..ne. This tr cb.ag .11 beg.a rebruary I936.
e r
finding (RP.2-1) ns >-e rebruny
- s. Aad. a,es. a.: r .ha.:.r HPmanim techa.cl.as .in h e re..e ed %OcR The RadloIDqlcal SeC1 Ion Manager has established
, u. ag .cu.~w '8**
ied ses a e., n.. p" Technician Required Reading tora. All personnel ~
.nsaso..nd Ses a .ad cmoert in*=.c ,ve,.% s.
wc=..- n .v .*,. ...ii T. c.r. ..ri .w i.ie Perfrirmin1 the function of Radiation Protection
. d ae. pw e n.
Terhnician are required to review the contents of this book, da il y. A $1gn-off sheet is provided in the front of the boot.. Each Individual is required to Indicate that the m.nlerial has been reviewed and that they understand the material. The sign-off sheets are reviewed weckly by supervision to ensure that all
\
n . technicians have compiled. *
[,
~ . ..
R(SPONg SIATUS - -
fireding (RP.3-1) Th r'**at aack h.
. ...,. .h,w,-a,-o,'S~a r, 6 =*'d"d'*'".reis.e ch,. 6- tr it medi.r '* -~'" In addition to the leproved check-off sheet for the co ., in.v .n .=6ns us.sr.co.ra c.-r r ie wem b ne=. frisking practical exercise, electronic tleers have
- been provided to ensure trainees get .1 feel for how long a i. hole-body frisk takes.
Tindiner (RP.4-1) roca.,e raa's h. e kea n'*'sh-o f- 85 e, Y*$, g i. ..n Ef forts are cont inuing to address the areas of
,r'.ie4 -.i. o.
g.
- d. 89 . --e6 8r. .ad 8 t s :.n.na . ..ra w h,s4 m < a.
'a=
e',*.-6 -*-t contern.
eu, .e.e, s.- 6,. The Radiatlon Hork Permit process has been c'=cs ca t = =.ar e- it*
=*'ea'* *8 -.d-t - '*.'=., . revised to address pre-job ALARA reviews based on
..n u .e en,4 :evauch "'e =" *f '*d e '*f"** '**"s
,4.i. o., ,.ir ni.hinwa Atan^ twers r'd Ca""" 8a projected esposures. (The higher the projected
..it rene. the other .,4.s er e.m eds.ie centces assag ite.r exposure, the greater lead time required for ALARA
,.. x,,44,4
,, r y mai n.,
,ci g. sp,r.r.c .ci - e.
.s.,4 4s.en ihn, review.) In addition, a lead Radiation Protection
..n w ,w-eated by J.ae t*. sw .i.----il. si.e-s ,epari saa Technician Is assigned to any job which has a
,,, crr,ce..ea,n.^<i =* ia :--re,n .e s h* suhstant lai potent ial for rad! alogical harards
-.-e4 3. *in . Use of respiratory protection devices has been reduced.
Radiation Hork Permit usage is being trended, and significant leprovements have been made in RWP usage and efficiency.
The improved sample sinets scheduled for Installation during RIO #7 will reduce cuposure of Chem. Techalcians due to inadequ.ste on-line monitors. A storage area for l radioactive samples has been provided outside the ,
i Chemistry lab.
f i nd i ng ( RP. 4-2).n P Aa **ddn'.r*~'aaa'a'
- 4. .w A t* *^ "t~" ca' a ha' **ea The ALARA staff was lacreased as specified. However, u in g th, Atana ..tr c= ,^ = '
I,M~,2n ', 3
~~'"'~~"
""'"ItNA r. c. r - *< n , complement has not been achieved. It 15 anticipated due to internal transfers and the labor action, full b,.ag 4,,,i.p,4 *s. ,4 mro c dehar a ro% ..n be
- =p =ad by 2,.e sm. -
that the additional engineer will be in place in July g935, w,as, g 4.are ac re. ,n .w,, ,
c.- . ea w
.i. .a.:
- -sap,4.a4 6nt,c aewie4v.,at.,,n sm. scien..,-,..n w<e4,,4b,eccas.-~i- .a4 The ALARA program procedures are scheduled for w .i.e.m .s.ephc.6w - caan.a as o.ia. g ,pice,ntatlon in August 1986.
Written guidance on ventilation a'nd containment was provided as scheduled.
n -
e
Bf5Poust Sulus -
Finds.., (RP.7 1) The septicab'e racedures f- ** era'W *f * *r ***'e Station Temporary Prce.edure TP 84-64 requires that all ~
b id.ag ..n be ,, and me4.r.ed n ace,,,-...e se e s..'
that all masse es chett.e4 far 181u.d centent. ins =.It be waste is thecked for liquid content.
- A.-.;=ed by Agwel I?96.
- BECo has ! cased a Dry Active Waste System which
$as'" Nang* N o m t [* er t$dIt/ provides the means for sorting, shredding, monitoring,
.aue. iws a .ars e th, s-1, g .r -aue s.an-< ted to oc tempacting, and packaging.
et,s by as t This unit is operational.
n., c - ta m.aas.s,a.
Tws e m t.re ..n he
- g- ; =ed n - = e.,,.ca.cr e es e-chu,.t. tasied. and par e.e.ncs rettevi. Yt.c statwo et stese a(s s ..rt be Clean wastc receptacles have been Erovided at the
.,n. seed i the s..-ei.smth erec.cu rep t. entrdnce to the RCA, and instructions on minimizing Artwies ha e already lieces sabeve se collect (fesa =aste items waste has~licen enhanced in our General Employee
, lefare they enter cA.eingiratty conte,tled a<en. Thew act aas Iraining*
88 I.e estem4ed te other g.saat a.cas te n.r br ee the me of < 8eaa
=au, re-eptarses at the h wta.scs of ead e-c. cast, < ee sied seems. 'sks e,its te completed by March 8996. 814, ement of cleme easte ceregwarles ens.de esdeelagurally ter ***4ted aceas
..it e.at crew esafit waste .egeegata=. eq upment aa.8I wed wes see awa.lable.
laste.srtwwi in the appregwiste doresal of cleaa. cantam.nated sad eews ble saaversals ..It sne g..ess to all stasease a.=f ransear saw g.ersa.wwl by Pgws4 8996. Segweennes it stress the omgwwtm re of es a.misarig waste and 8.old workers a(s c.sne bte for per far enaate.
Finding (RP.g-1) s-, o.ed centres or thc oacaeng *c-am ation m errart oisa be ar<e-.pieshed tw .rh narrene 8 ust--> =aaareme-t - ersm'n. The first "Cyclic" evaluation of the Housekeeping I
netsnaeag March 8996, a m.emtier of 19.e stassen seaff well be Service As Istance r est is neariOS c letlon* TnI
- .eid d.ectiy area atahn- s., St.e e n fe,.n , er the number t.f contaminated areas is identified by square
.ent-wa mat.ast erra,s. rweassai.nai.en etrarts aren ..th sga.fscaat red.atwee espas.sre rates wall cere.we thew e.sg'e footage anel contamination levels in this report.
s ew.ew. f orm.we unit be saw*w.used stem gh gwe-pe s.nweys to adentef y the sences et coavamenatesse as the area.
Areas that are escentaa mased =itt be dersnaented and
! sawestb ted e.i St8"'Its ist screrdenre th the seier-mece et the errwe eare. Ident.f.ed ca.nas of eccoetsensaatawe . 18 be carrecsed.
71.e escraN effectiveness of 59te abacountaestanation effort eritt ter
)* evali.ated fresysently by statica manage 1wne. To f akeletate tbs.
ehe easet ee of contamenated areas *.It be treaser.s by ssp.are fantage and contaemenat.asi le.cl Tract'aC S'I f aat**"*ated
- areas ..H begwe in yes s996.
G S. *
, q
l RESPON5E STATUS finding (RP.9-2) nea.c. ,,,www ==6n, n me em er .sen's-use The original CET tape prepared by the n c ,c,,. i.r rew r sm. o==5 es as -
are. s.e - .w , -.u Nuclear Operations Manager was shown c- ,...n . ., 6, car-r ,,we , ,.A , . a3 6,<- ece e .ce - . ,,,,,, during the Febrnary sonth1y safety
. vo reer .a.are :-.4 ica, w .r.,a pons .ad meetings 1o re-emphas1ze that
- c. .: . 4.ie, -.n t,, v,ww,4 6, . s . -.w, --h sec.'
radiological safety is an Integral part
'""' N of their~ job. All new hires and annual requals view a revised tape of the same information. .
Performance probicos identified in ll0R's are distu. sed with the Individual by his supervisor, and the supervisor is required to determine root cause, corrective action to prevent recurrence, and appropriate discipilnary action if i required.
l l Significant performance problems which
! result in an HP hold on a job or l esclusion of an Individual from the l process buildings require a meeting with the Nuclear Operations Manager, the ,
indivivual, his supervisor, the MP '
Individual who stopped the job or pulled the person's access, and the l Radiological Section Manager / Chief l
l Radiological Engineer.
l l
l g
I l
l l
e
1 pr5tortst -
SM105 _
Find. . . .-1 ) A wiia, per : r.cw w : ,,r.ics h., n,.. ,,tc.eea c .+ r....,a erre, s. :, s s er .r.ar ** - s - Sr ar .ce Chlef Chemical Englacer was hired la ADrli 1- '*
cw e -r.. .. w o t cw .r.or cn.,er . ,e.te,,, and we are currently interviewing for the last Senior ~
we p.or...,s. s p.e ,,- e*.ie e.-r+ n.s ..n t., CheniraI Ingineer.
te,intea en terrett.ag stir retde==1 e.eied.
A design cirige is currently scheduled to be Impicmented during RIO #7 to resolve the pro *.lem with controlling sample temperature. 1 He have identified and corrected a major source of our air in-lealage to the condensate-feedwa.er. Just prior to shutdown for the current outage, cuygen levels had I
been redured by 50 percent.
A temporary modification was installed to automatically trip the tcriparary makc-up 5ystes whee poor quality water is genrrated and a continuous recorder was installed.
The Chesistry Group has implearnted a program of monitoring and make-up of sodium nitrate to the Closed '
Cooling H. iter Systems, and Maintenance has corrected several deficiencies. At this time, the Reactor nullding Closed Cooling Mater Sv,rees are under control. The Turbine 8vilding Closed Cooling Mater System. although being maintained in specification, is using an c cessive amount of chemicals. The Technical Group is investigating to determine cause.
Additional procedures have been developed and impicmented. The only remaining procedure to be written is one for PH measurement currently scheduled for July 1986.
The Turbine Building equipment sump no longer pumps to the condenser. It is now directed to radwaste. In addition a temporary system has been Installed to process some drains highly contaminated with nitrates.
Trending and review of cheelstry. data has been significantly improved.
~
REsf985E STATUS .
Tinding (CY.2-1) The Cwaeres prep.,,4 .aa sr.ia.,c c ated
> Tech
.a Jea <y s tes. na ki a %iases Pr.tr.= w. twea An assessment af Cheelstry personne1*s i,4c, 4,,,:
..s,..-- a .t .n o.e ain,cn sm.
u r ca.==-1 :: > e. r -ved t y knowledge Icvel was conducted in March s
15., ,, an ..a w pr w e s. sw r,.
o ,p . . ~ r ,.a. - * .eice. m .-4 . + - - sen .ac or..= r. .g 1986, and the resvits are being ne,+ 4e. ,, e e,- .i.sa i,4ccse : ==-c ,, c.uF Incorparated into the training program.
'*"~~' As stated in our original response.
training bc<pn in January 1986; however.
attendance as inconsistent because of 5tation needs. Iai April 1986.
authorliation was received to increase compiceent from nine (9) to eleven (II) technicians. A strike by the (Jnlon prevented filling of those positions expeditiously.
The contracts have been settled, and we capect to have all posillons filled by July 1986.
finding (CY.3-1) T** < * =.ic.I c.**r*8 c
- ,,. e4.g.m .a . .e.sah,'es'a 4.aaa ,pdr.ft 6. cwrea'tr k g A draft site chemical control progras
- e. it.ec****
-.n w ,,.., 4 .eem,n,- .e.gc r. twi ' .'... has been devcloped. It Is cerrently l
,es,c, J u c.
,, stes. se.p pi 4a.. . ..as w *r.a,4 .-.e scheduled for revlev 1.i July 1986.
_r =-s a.r ,*, r I's'. Car e <> - rtaa r
l
- i. 4r.e%d, -. , . ;.tre /.te -.88 k fwra.stwd ea st-
. ,* p.eren eep v.
Finding (CY.3-2) .u,,..,"4 6'vr* * **" ia '* **** """d 'i"8 e .. . ,,' .rs p c*P'"'
.g..- rre","<."."'a' The design change for new sample sinks
,rc,
.us p ca. sa, to- -. ,,
4 .e w J.m r t. wasa e.aa rar.=~ c,'e with leproved on-line mostforlag has i unmi nar
--i.m .e so., e.a 4 .e 4 . o. heen approved. The welts have been
.me'e,<t,sg e.g er=h,4*4 b' '. " *' 8 *- ordered anet are being manufactured.
1 hey will be installed darlag Rf0 M.
I
n n wit.
F1ndinr b >M W)
) The Ters r.: c,c, s s .n;g.wd ehe i. 6 .r e..
. ~
- pt e c.< m
. ,,.,,,, . 4 ,
.e c.,,m- , e . - .ae-6.'" P. Chcolstry Gropp has Isplemented a progras of
.no . co e m 7 The e..i
.ae ec.ui,,g c.,veo..e .ct rt ..n t.e impi,=. eased by mEnitoring and make-up of sodium nitrate Arr889sa. to the Coolfrig Hater Systems, and Maintenance has corrected several deficiencies. At this time, the Reactor
- Building Closed Cooling Hater Systes is under control.
1he Turbine Building Closed Cooling Mater System.
although being maintained in specification. 15 using an escessive amount of chemicals.
investigating to determine cause.The Technical Group is Finding (CY.4-1) so,evim .:
g=_ _ .rs; m ww t,m ,,5m ,e som vs
- - em rac..a --. -s.w
..nn,cu -, --,4m eh, p. , .- ear-.
,ir4,r , Station Procedure 7.10.1 and 7.10.2 define the
- 4 u
.m. r .- - - ce ved ' e Lt r. *'. Cheststry Quai 1ty Progran at PNPS.
1 Tindi ng ((.Y.4-2) 8'-= Wa e'*r' ire' 6
~e. o .u - -4 s ,'s = e. e****" "."rv~s 4, y c**ed c n .r .'a n w.s. s. 6*s s e4
The proposed espan".1on of the chcolstry Iab wis
. , u .g. . . o,.e c.w .ce .c.re u .-. m......e Impacted by 1he Iabor actlons and i5 currenfly behInd i
p-e, : ic.i ~.y e.c . i.n . . ., , , , , .. a scheda1c.
i,*ii ., .. > -e-n .
Finding (Cf.4-3) p.e c , er ewmews, :=ce :e=s.ce.6 -woi bi > a.=,
. cw wye .r. sea m. 6ee= <.- ecsed-r Al though we have corrected th e Identified problem.
- other inherent deficiencies with the old equipment has provided justification for replacement. He have i received authorization, selected the new equipment, and rinding (0".1-1) w .rit-i enoi se .**e= *.e .6 espect to have It on-site in July 1986.
e c cm i. .n.-u
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,... ame mesi ..n w. .,- eh, an The effectiveness
'ndependent evaluator.review was conducted in June 1986 by
. ,4 s, nero The resulting
. --. < h.o.4 a , .e., .,e.a...e.erre. 6,.. com plan.recommendatlens will be incorporated into an action ened. yr L 4% Ceartrere ce est die e thesh.8 gy se 3-. !
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The st.t.ase -itt .er.esap mq:- _4-we.ed m8ppeti.e. .ad trsteri, by Ayrsi l'SA
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![STOKSC 5iATUS j finding 4MA.g.1) A Materials Management. Accounts (1984) The full laylementation of 9904PP5 is not regelred to Payable, and Purchasing System correct the findings defined by 914.9-1 (1964).
) (tetAPPS) will he implemented at Processing has leproved.
) Pilgrim Station la mid-1965.
- Additionally the Nuclear Organtiation a) By co e lning the Station procurement functions i has reviewed and recommended changes into one group, the timeliness of Purchzse i to the procurement process to reduce Order processing has leproved.
s paperwork, eliminate cacessive
} 1ayers of approval, and relocate b) In-house procedures control the issuing of i
quality assurance, auc: car engineering, safety work to only approved ved ars.
and procurement perst,anel to the ,
Station to espedite resolution of c) A computertz:nl male.tenance program for inventory i Pw chase Order and materlat management of materlat provides automatic reorder
) problems. Relocation 15 cepected to information sin months prsor to espiration date.
occur in January 1985.
d) In deallag w'th items from the N555 vendor. '
items needing evaluation are placed on hold in the warehouse sotll an evaluation is performed i
or until items are received to replace them.
- This practice is beleg considered for espaaston to other items.
i i
! finding (04.6-1) bro will review Good Practice MA-304 Twenty-seven (27) manuals remain to be approved
! (1984) conduct a survey of sister utilities, and are scheduled for completion by July 1986.
and saayle significant vendors to i -
determine methods being utilized or '
i planned to control vendor echnical I
information. Using the results of this effort the Nuclear Orgmiration
=l13 develop a plan for controlling ,
vendor information that addresses ,
I the problems noted above. 14e plan i will be formulated by April 1985, and
) an laplementation schedule will be i provided in the sir. month status
! report. '
~
j .
\l 6Ptin j'. -
BCSP0MSE -.
Finding (OP.5-2) STATUS 1
A reduction in the number of immediate actions has been achieved The DECO Nuclear Safety Review and Audit in some of the procedures revised Comelttee has questioned the approach PNPS is under the Procedure Update Program (PUP). taking in reducing immediate actions in the PUP review and revision of Emergency abnormal and emergency procedures. The Operating Procedures, coupled with use revision process in on hold until this can of the generic guidelines, will result be resolved.
in additional improvement in procedure content and make possible the retirement of some procedures. Once this is accomplished, the remaining procedures will be reviewed with emphasis on consolidation or climination of unnecessary immediate steps. Ihis effort will be completed by July 1985.
1 1
\~
6PPf4 .G '.- .
BESEQNSE C .
Finding (OP.5-2) STATUS A reduction in the number of Immediate actions has been achieved The BECo Nuclear Safety Review and Audit in some of the procedures revised Committee has questionef the approach PNPS is under the Procedure Update Program (PUP). taking in reducing immediate actions in the PUP review and revision of Emergency abnormal and emergency procedures. The Operating Procedures, coupled with use revision process in on hold until this can
, of the generic guidelines, will result be
~
resolved.
in additional improvement in procedure content and make possible the retirement of some procedures. Once this is accompIlshed, the remaining procedures will be reviewed with emphasis on i
consolidation or climination of 4
unnecessary immediate steps. this effort will be completed by July 1985.
i
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Federal Emergency Management Agency i1 Washington, D.C. 20472 4 . .
.." .y 5 IH5 HEMORANDUM FCR: Edward A. Themas, Chief ,
Natur 1 and T chnological Hazards Olvision
. en ! .
FRCH: ..n H. .. .
, Acting Gene 1 Counsel
SUBJECT:
Offsite Emer;ency Planning at Seabrcck Station In ycur meicrancun of January 23, 1955 to Joseon Flynn, you ccmmunicated the request of Rctert Boulay, Civil Defense Director for the Cer.ncnwealth of Massachusetts, that the federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the N. clear Regulatory Commission (NRC) review and correent upon a' memorandum of law prepare by Themas Olgnan, Ccunsel for Public Service Ccmpany of New .
Hamoshire. In his memorandum, Mr. Olgnan addresied what he considered to be three miscenceptions accut offsite emergency res;cnse planning as it relates to the Sea:reck Statten.
I recently received a letter f ecm Ed.,ard Christer.:.:ry, Directcr ar.d Chief Hearing Counsel, Office of the Exe:stive Legal Directer (CELD) of NRC, which rescends to ycur request. A cecy of that letter is attached. The legal discussion in that letter reflects the ccebined vie =s of cur respective effices. I concur in Mr. Christenbury's analysis of the Olgnan memorandum.
Attach ent I
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l Ih08;3'i Yh33 l
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. / #e, UNITED STATES 8 i A NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2 x .
I casmuctcN. O. a. zosss
,.....# June 18,1986 Spence W. Perry, Acting General Counsel -
Federal Emergency 61anagement Agency ,
Room 840 ,
500 C Street, S.W. ,
Washington, D.C. 20472 , , ,
in the blatter of Public Service Company of New Hampshire, et al. ~~
(Seabrook Station Units 1 and 2)
Docket Nos. 50-443 OL and 50-444 OL Dea.r Mr. Perry:
In response to a request made by Edward Thomas of FE.*ilA Region 1. we have evalu a ted , in conjunction with Joseph Flynn of your otDee, an u ndated memorandum prepared by Thomas Dignan ,of Ropes and Gray on
, behalf of the applicants for the Seab rook nuclear pikt.t ("Dignan Me moran du m", a copy of which is attached At tachment A). Our evaluation is set forth in the following discussion.gs The Dignan Memorandum addresses What are described as three misconcep-tions" pertaining to o "f r it e emergency planning for the Seabrook nuclear plan t , an d conclu de s that they are " fals e as matter of la w " (Digr.an Memorandum at 1). These purported "misconceptions" are as 'fouows:
A. That the plans must be shown to gu arantee that no ;
adverse effects on the pubuc health and safety will ,
occur no matter what kind of accident occurs , at Seab rook.
B. That it must be demonstrated that the plans viB assure ,
that all persons loc 6ted in the Emergency Planning Zone I or some certain portion of it can be evacuated in some ,
l certajn time. -
1 In particulcr. there have been assertions that the i plans must assure the sheltering or evacuation of persons from the beaches in approxima tely 1/2 hour. -
I lt should be noted, however, that under the Commission's regulations. l 10 CFR I 50.3. only written regulatory interpretations provided by the Gencent Counsel will be reccgnhed as binding upcn the Commission.
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Spence Perry, Esq. )
l i
l That 't h e plans must be designed. end shown to be C. l able , to cope with a particular type of accident -- in .
particular, one invoh-in g an early release of radioactivity off-site.
For the reasons set forth below , it is our opinion that, with minor clari- .
i fication, Mr. Dignan's conclusions are essentially correct as to items (A) and l (B) above; however, his discussion of item (C) appears to contain an, error ,
which requires corr,ection.
DISCUSSION .
A. Absolute Assurance of Perfect Safety.
As set forth above, item (A) concerns the ' question of whether an emergency response plan must be shown to guarantee that no adverse health and safety effects, will occur, regardless of what )dnd of accident may occur at the plant. In our opinien. Mr. Dignan correctly concludes that "[nleither the Atomic Energy Act nor any re gulation of NRC, whether dealin g with emergency planning or not, requires absolute assurance of perfect safety" (Dignan Memorandum, at 1-2). ,,
As you know, prior to issuance of a full power operating IIcense NRC regu- l lations require a finding "that there is reasonable assurance that adequate j protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological j emergency." 10 C.F.R. I 50.47(a)(1). With respect to offsite matters, the '
NRC will base its findin g on a review of the FEMA findin gs and determinations "as to whethe.- St:te end leca] cmergency plans are adequate and whether there is reasonable assurance that they can be implemented."
Id., 5 50.47(a)(2). These regulations plainly do not require any demonstration of "absolute assurance" that the public will be totally protected in the event of a radiologica] emergency. Rather, the intent of the Commission's emergency planning regulations is to reduce the impact of I an accident and achieve "dose savings" through protective actions that take !
into consideration plant condition s , evacuation t.imes.. abelter factors, and '
other conditions that may exist at the time of the accident. N UREG-0C'4 /
FE.'.lA-REP-1, Rev.1 states as follows (at 6):
. l The overa)) objective of energency response plans is to provide dose sa vings (nr.d in some cases immedjste life savin g) for a spectrum of accidents that could produce offsite doses in excess of Protective Action Guides (PAGs).
The A ppeal Board has similarly stated, "[t]he basic goal of emergency planning is . . . the achievement of cica.d. mum dose savings in a radiological .
emergency." Cincinnati Gas s Elcetric Co. (Wm. II. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit No.1) A L A B -12 7 , 17 NRC 760, 770 (1983).
Spence Perry, Esq. .
s In Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station,
. Units 2 an d 3), GLI-83-10, 57 NRC 528, 533 (1983), the Commission cummarized its ratienale for selecting an emergency planninF basis as .
follows :
The underlying assumption of the NR C's emergency planning regulations in 10 CFR I 50.47 is that, despite application of stringent safety measures, a serious nu-
- clear accident may occur. This presumes that offsite
. individuajs may become contaminated with radioactive material or may be exposed to dangerous levels of radi-ation or perhaps both. Planning for emergencies is required as a prudent risk reduction measure for those individuals . Since a range of accidents with widely differing offsite consequences can be postulat ed , the regulation does not depend on the assumption that a particular type of accident may or will occur. In fact no specific accident sequences should be specified be-cause esca accident could have different consequences both in nature and deg ee. Although the emergency plannin g basis is independent of speelfle accident se-quences. a number of accident descriptions were con- .
sidered in development of the Commission's regulations, including the core melt accident release categories of ,
the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400).
These statements demonstrate that the goal of emergency planning is to reduce the impact and achieve dose savings for a spectrum cf accidents, and that emergency planning may satisfy NRC regulations even though the pote ntial for adverse he r.J t h effcets in an emergency has not been totally o!!minated.
Notwithstanding our opinion that Mr. Dignan is essentially correct in his .
conclusion as to item (A), two statements contained in this portion of his memorandum require clarification. First , he goes too far in assertinF that l "it has' been recognized from the outset . . . that if one assumes. a. major l accident with offsite releases , some adverse effect on the pubtfe wiD. by definition eccur" (Dignan Memorandum at 2: emphasis added). Contrary to this assertion, the occurrence of a major accident accompanied by offsite re- '
leases will not necessarily lead to adverse heaJth effects. Rather, in some circumstances, emergency planning may serve to avert the occurrence of any ,
adverse health effects. Further, whether any such health effects occur, and the extent of any such effects, will depend upon a host of factors, such as the type and quantity of release, the plume dire tion, meteorological conditions , exposure du ra tions , and the timely implementation of an appropriate protective response. ,
Secondly, his memorandum states that emergency planning is intended to '
limit any adverse health effects to as low a level as reasonably possible.
- given the facilities at hand" (!d . ) , possibly implying that add!'f onal
v.
Spence Perry, Esq. .
, l l
' facilities will never be required to be built or installed to satisfy NRC
. emergency planning regulations. In support of.this . statement, Pir. Dignan !
cites the San Onofre decision, supra. However, that, decision provides only limited support for this conclusion. There, the Commission addressed only I the issue of whether additional hospital construction should be undertaken, and concluded that such extraordinary measures are not required.
E. Evacuation Within A Specific Time Period.
The second item addressed by Str. Dignan is whether the Applicants must demonstrate that all or part of the plume exposure pathway EPZ can be evacuated in some specified time ; in particular, this item addresses the question of whether the beaches in the Seabrook vicinity must be evacuated within approximately one-half (1/2) hour. It is t.ir. Dignan's conclusion that NRC regulations do not' require that an evacuation be assured within any particula.r tim e (Dignan hiemorandum at 2). We concur with Str. Dignan's l conclusion as to this item.
In support of his conclusion en this matter, hir. Dignan cites two decisions:
Cincinnati Cas a Electric Co. (Wm. H. Zimmer Nucicar Power Station, Unit No. 1), ALAB-727, 17 NP.C 760, 770 (1953), and Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plan t . Unit 2). AL AB-730, 17 NRC 1057, 1069 n.13 (1983). In Zimmer, the Appeal Beard
- stated as follows:
The app!! cants are . . . correct in their insistence that the Commission's emergency planning requirements do not prescribe specific time limits governing the evacua-tion of plume EPZs. The matter of the time in which evacuatien can be acecmplished is left to be determlncd '
on a case-by-case basis upon consideration of all rele-vant conditions prevalling in the specific locality. But l I
it does not follow, as the applicants would have it, that l a particular evacuation plan need not be concerned with i the efficiency with which evacution mlF ht be accom- ,
plisbed give.n t.be conditions under which it must t a.ke -
place (n. 16 ] . Indeed, the Commission guidelines sug-gest the contrary. . . . If the responsible govern-me n tal officials are to make an in formed decision respectin g whet is appropriate protective action in a given radiological emergency, they must have avajlable to them time estimates which are realistic appralsals of the minimum period in which, in light of existing local condition s , evacuation could reasonably be accom-plis he d . And, the nearer to the plant the area that might have to be evacuated, the greater the importance of accurato time esti; cates.
- n. 16/ Those conditions include, for example, the size and nature of the popu*ation, the avajlable
1 Spsnee Perry, Esq. .
1 1
tran sportation fa c!U tles , the existing road network. -
. topographical features and political boundaries. . . . .
Zimmer, aupra, 17 NRC at 770-71. Similarly, in the Ferm! decision the Ap-peal Board stated:
. . . [T]he Commission's emergency planning regula-tions do not specify the time within which the plume .
EPZ must be evacuated in the av.ent of a nuclear emer-gency. 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, f IV, requires only that appucants provide "an analysis of the time required to evacuate and for taldng other protective ,
actions for various sectors and distances within the l plume exposure pathway EPZ for transient and perma-nent populations." .
Fermi, supra , 17 NRC at 1069 n.13. Thus, there is no requirement that an evacuation be accociplished within 30 minutes. While some other functions nust be capable of being accomplished within that time fram e . those functiens gennally invc!ve the noti 5 cation of appropriate government al officials and netiSestion of the pubuc. See 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, I IV.D.
C. Plannine for A Particular Type of Accident.
The third issue addressed by Mr. Dignan is whether a facility's emergency plans must be designed to cope with a particular type of accident and , in particula r , an accider.t involving an "early release of radioactivity off-site."
Two conclusions appear to be reached by Mr. Dignan in th'is regsrd: (1) that while emergency plans must be designed to cope with a spectrum of acejden t s , they need not be designed to cope with a specific accident or "an y worst case accident" (Dignan Memorandum at 4), and (2) that emergency plans are not required to be designed to cope with an early release of radioactivity (!d., at S-3). While we agree with the first of these l conclusions , the second. conclusion is incorrect and requires clarification. l l
First, Mr. Dignan is correct in stating that the emergency plans must be de-signed to cope with a spectrum of accidents, but are not required to address any particular accident sequence or a "worst case accid e n t . "
The l Commission has decided , on a generie basis , that compUance with its emergency planning regulations provides the reasonable assurance required by 10 C.F.R. I 50.47(a)t accordingly , offsite emergency plans are not )
required to address particular accident sequences. In the Statement of Consideration pubushed upon adoption of the Commission's final emergency planning regulations, the Commission stated as followat The Commission recognizes that no single accident scenario should form the basis for choice of notification . I capabiUty requirements for offsite authorities and for
Spenc2 Perry. Esq. perf e :t safe y. Indeed, at has been recog.. :od fr=. the ca se of the for..ulattor. of the cur e-- e '
the public. Emergency plans musfle Te#Mo'p*eh v 3ikit'n 9
. r e r.:l a :i ewWI -hws $be oSaxiN1Jhetp pn:syg :reporjgt,'to ,4, yrjde ,
spectrum of accidents. This wide specir'um of' pot'ehtial effs::e re@f 4ga,t5, airo.e c . re/le.c es.3gn e tghe, app p offsite not!Scation capability. . . . gp, giayp~~- ,
u,g ,ofe t.M -- .- DY det:n::'en, eccur. The -- ese et Any accident invo VME severe [u"ii. 'd k.M. aff o, $ ".e . r. .ebre
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nave in peshte Spinteinues .5:piggif(can}e[qv,eptgrigg
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products in the containment ~ wotad' trarfatt %nedfile *V
- n'orde: publjs e:noMedificgif f g,rgd 3 cgusipgrgtgp,iirtlyas4,dreton%ctive the particufar circum stances , of approp p
- e a s c r.a:1 pc)f os sit tc.ap sa . o( J hr.
tainment bu!!cf.ing." In"poteluial ad dTtio~n*,' .f,or'(eakagg[of,,the fMe waThid
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, con-ttme MM * 'n C a 1 : .'::r.: able : fee r.ttt*. . pupffp". to take aqtion gay ,be substantially le ss than tne total tir:ie' VeIwe'e'nthe oMEIWl'friif'iting C st:en. trNset EncketJte itime-46.whi_ch-signif! pan! Tadioagtjyt re-
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leases take plac'e'. .' ." Thf rc'dijciibn Bf nottWcaf f,ef.:. .4 -
S e :: . dimes s fre,e Jhm. . .se.V,e,rg) . . ppucq, . reguired for s t r e e t - b y - s t r e e t" ni:diMit t'l65 "t othiriu ti's' wfD 'N} dnffh:fantfy' I
- . c a,bje .as a prptp.ci!ve aetions. un-
- ..s :::. ine deren e the:
severe pp:ioru 'c'en accide'n't ayaj{ditioris'."' TMs'e#ittibi'.s# i:o6?t'Il- n I areas w:: {DAlusiec Etoyirls indagr.s irkf hg cyg_of,,a . release that t 11as aJready occurred'c'r' 'a pFe'fa'utfoifai y e9detfitidn ill tW - 3
)
"'t.e A.p r e a ' cec a p(; s a epotential .r.eltaet. thought to beg a, few })gurs I
away. A c cidi."t's t6af Yoni:N resuit 35 cfrU cielt" r:fa~y Y I !
a r. : w ::. :Wst::qp.use :r_Matively gulch. relpaset.,for which ,.protectjve 2PY actichs, at leist"'for 02 VM L7 ^ J'd C TJ Cpla F
. w- -i . :vicirity.c r p a tde snr.bj e, e . . . . . .
- e. . ..-
- 15
- ;fsd i f.eg--;5 40;2- g3 9 50 h. . Situtt!y. ' ' ' ' ' ' bT.R.E.q-Of 5..I / TD1 A R ey .j , R e v . 1, provid e s a s follow s (at 6 -7 )l' ' - -" - ~- i'5#;:- 3'rr; A ::. .: c :-: er ..a.
.,.t.
No single . specific :a)c'c icie~n:t seciu'e'nce sh'6tt1d-be isohtted-r 13 (ice 9s trig,:gW for . accident could have dif fe r, ent r ychc'cm.,.to,s e q 0.glan . b,ec au.s,o . e achEbth-'in nature and e ric^e's'.
r e ga1 a . :nde EtteM f futther. .(he. xagge .of pots,1ble,. select,,ien for a platining basfi'li vert'IaYge!'stirting"etth*a rero point a : :: . ; ; : :..*( . .r$q.u.i. rim no,13 12ncing. a.t , all beeau se .s.1g plSennt off- ,
alte radjologicid acei'd'edi co~nsiqueMes"'are un8kelf to :
.- :s 1. . a accident , re- -
- .5Mi9.ug.:.t,o gardless of itsplanning extre:019"164 for ths..yotst, IIXe"Ifhobts popsib)e,the .~ #1 1110/EFA
!..7.I - 0 5 5 4.Taghe F,qp,qe /Jql .n sequence or even'gt. stte;np,t.1qe d_en,.ne .a single accidenta'lff:iitid tillbib
..:rt ert.44 identined.the. bopods q.f tt e.l parametprs for which
'planninF f.sreciniriencfed',' bIhid ett; fen
- kWewie6(e of %6: A2
- n =c:ra r.c poAMtial corlsepecem !!;rJn g ,, ,and., rel_ ease characterf s-
' tics' of a spect rui::"of"ac'eide nt'n 'Nthmfg~tt tt.i:ss!Ected
- pe
- a r:: c u i a quences, r Platini,ng,.; bast,s. .is ,ingepgngnt ,of, specinea w erenumber t'e n- oi adc1cerit' cre sidercu in the devc!opment of the guide.nce, including 1
1
. 1 That prepositzen as net Spence Perry. Esq. ~7- only bad Icv. It is directly l
de. cen.rary to the theery cf the NR I emergency planning crateria. The theery upon whic' he of' TEEI hM6ftit. Were based the core melt accident release categorfes V 85s fie bf *S ttuly i W ASEe H o gn e u t e e e n , g , 7 , ,pe,.,..,,,.,.,.,. c .,
Accord . a 5KA CIMd#e , Ebp rk.e 3171 F%Eatt g. ong, Island Lightine Co.
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station), LBP-85-12.2 Eb(rt N .SW31""8685 31595)1(asee le
%.Aqsy nissed a contantion as-in DignM41tWtR*Mlemeit r+k.u019.Jitags!serting eo that the emergency ar9/amsrut plans
- "m case ac6HieM*-(tMcM4nuolhyngetM: Ms.sible sCBh pffsite the Board stated, "NUREG-0654 does not require an a equafe Ma%, nsk' power)t Y811 ft hina twors t possible8 :46dident' at Shorehsm. . . ." In sum, these regulatory pronouncements and decisions clearly demonstrate that emergency pinnning for a nucle s.r plali6 thc enet rR9R4i rgd Lo beqdggi e to cope with any particular accident. h(detrce:erc a therit gygen .l'Eg Jh2ffflayrespect, we
- concur with Mr. Dignart'alstentaqq%m.re y.al a tion hoes 7 '
ceFer.6 cr. the The Dignan Memornadcmedt airt'tMtf t e Ntf *'itst/(d"f8 conclusion that the emergency plans stecarot regulfsd- ato s s'fi(SCV.eh" 6EpWMh~~-.
an early c 1
release of radioactistty.(Digriaq, Ale,m, u rEgt2 pradlhe
- ! M ) .
- d(s . * *lHii eWror. ap p e a rs t o ;
have resulted by esclusieg:b% "mbpc77g15 a(8)dEhf'"fVr any accident l involving an early cr1M T.; e.4creikc Q e "% cts t.
an early release M :r.adigActiyif ye-j&e V .'le,p.p.hMe n,.*
~ ,(, efi aESFeMs 'a~pd* mightden t"also could inl
. result in early ralva aese ntM- were JrhWdct " 'htnn ihe")MaMters which established the Ces@eicndt ,e'rge'r,byy [p[.aYnj #$frfi,s~- The Statement of FConsideration , quctede :a.tmYt e..g!e% ! ye rae.cgrJt *(firt; "early releases" may
, occur; it is for tidevedasone .ip part...,M,Qq'~ psey is required to notify offalte au t horities t edt.hin. ; M, sminute s . . s ft.et ] 'II'censee h ts declared an emergency, and t.tti: : net p o.n!Ne['(f'l'i capabilit y to notify the pubite kithin :1:5 sirp4tp a;fm,Ii"lutJi, .t f.p{ ,,,; t Mcei [c.idghif
%d netification e ; a from the licensee of an eme:gency conditien. * "--'
':: was nev.-
-w
,t The fellowing guictmy:.e . fa pseyis'.pd.%.,. ,N ME %. . 31F
. '~. . f.t! A %p . 1. Rev.1 (at 13-14): :nd:. ec:1y that state a..h1cea~'
TCVerr ents acept ex- a-.a..
The ranpa e6:tircqs hsty,ecg e tge.,MuE.f.)I*,$~cTdent condi-
~
tjens anttidbe:at.m q(-a..mafgr rV s'p!
one-halt'h rto:agvdhgG ~s [.g 'Id(1J[cf* tfie order
- hi$lic6Te~ntC (imeof period pienorhisb.ra4]osctive y}eHF'?!Mf 3
- Cak h5 b' FP'eted D die'a(short-
!or'cf m.pf g* d -
. to termberefease 21e4.knus ed aise 96 M"lG@s.(con,1fgf, *i'elelle f.n .
.to p :(e.w ~
i
[, Ic.-Nis h#capaSMi&...bee 68used in deveddhings&t.e:.gpf 4Q1222 e z ta ssw,y: ifr,7 2
j!I a ,$!.{rdt esa 8 k' rey] rat (![Gluid nstifieatlon capablinich-decimi,e fasti'r-mpder~it r et eu s e s for wh;.h protective actions are desTraMe 'a'hii the need for sub- !
atantial lead times to carry out certajn protective mea-tures, cuch as cvecuation, when this is indiented by plant conditions.) . l It should be noted that the responsible offsite authorities are not necessarily required, in ajl cases, to notify the pubtle within 15 minutes after they have l
l i
- - - - - - - - - - . . , - - , - - - - , . - - . _ - - - - - . _ - - - - - - - , -g,
Spence Perry. Esq. l l
~
I received notification by the licensee. Rather, the time in which the public
- is not!5ed will range from immediate notification (within 15 minutes after state and local officials are notified that a situation exists which requires urgent action) to the more Ukely events where there is substantial time available for them to make a judgment as to whether or not to activate the public noti 5 cation system. Also , it should be noted that the 15 minute criterion refers only to the time in which the public is to receive notification, and does not refer to the time in which protective actions are to be completed.
In sum, responsible offsite authorities must have received notification of the emergency situation within 15 minutes after the licensee has declared an emergency, and the offsite authorities must have the capability to notify the pubuc within 15 minutes after they have received notification from the licensee. Emergency planning for accidents involving "early releases" is required --
although the protective action recommendations may be issued be fore , during or after the occurrence of an offsite release of radioactivity.
There is no requirement that protective actions be completed within 30 minutes after the licensee has declared an emergency. l l
l
_C O N C L U S I O N ,
For the reasons se' forth above, the foUowing conclusions are offered as to ,
i the matters referred to in the Dignan Memorandum: l
- 1. The basic goal of emergency planning is to reduce the impact of and achieve dose sa vings for a spectrum of accid er,t s : however, there is , no requirement that absolute assurance be provided that l adverse radiological effects wiu not occur. .
l
- 2. The Commi.ssion's emergency planning regula-tions do not require that the evacuation of all or part of a plume exposure pathway EPZ be completed within -
any pa.rticu.lar time.
- 3. The emergency plans must comply with the Commission's emergency planning regulations and there-by shculd be capable of responding to a wide spectrum '
of accidents; however, the plans are not required to be designed for any specif:e accident sequence or a "worst case accident."
e
1
\
Spanee Perry, Esq. ,
l
- 4. Accidents involving early releases are within
. the Commission's emergency plann!nr basis, however, the regulations do not specify a time within which the recommended protective actions are to be completed.
Sincerely.
Edward 5. Christenb[
Director and Chief Hearing Counsel Enclosure cc: J. Taylor ,
E. Jordan T. Murley 6
l l
\
i l
l 5
MEMOP.ANDUM
'. t This memorandum addresses three misconceptions which have arisen as to the standards to which state and mun cipal I
l emergency plans will be held in an NRC licensing proceeding. '
These misconceptions are: .
1 A. That the plans must be shown to guarantee that no 1 1
adverse effects en the public health and safety j will eccur no matter what kind of accident occurs at seabrook. J B. That it must be demonstrated that the plans will assure tha a.1 persens 1ccated in the Emergency l l
Plant.:nq 2:nc cr seme certain portien of it can be evacuated in some certain time.
In par :cular, there have been assertions that the plar.s mus: assure the sheltering er evacua ::.. cf pers:r.s frcm the beaches i r, apprcximately 1/2 heur. I 1
C. That the pla..s must he d 'igned, and shown te be able, to cepe wit.) a par :cular type of accident --
in particular, one involving an early release of ,,
radioactivity eft-site. ,
Each of these prepositzens is false as a matter of law.
First, the issue cf absolute safety: Neither the Atomic Energy Act ner any regulat:en cf NKO, whether dealing with eme rgency plar.r.ing or ne t, r e qu: r e s absolute assurance of
m, perfott cofo:y. Indaad, it hos baen rocognizod from tho i outset of the formulation of the current emergency planning l regulations that if one assumes a major accident with offsite releases, some adverse effect on the public will, by ,
definition, occur. The purpose of emergency planning is to )
have in place means and methods of coping with such an event in order te keep those effects to as low'a level as reasonably pc3*:ble given the facilities at hand. Southern )
Califernia Edisen Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating 1 Station, Un::s 2 and 3), CL:-53-10, 17 NRC 528, 533 (1963).
1
,s e e e n d , as to the prepes:::en that the plans must be !
demons trated .:e be capa:1e cf assuring evacuatien cf certa n areas withi.. a certain time: This simply is not the law.
The Appeal Boards of the C mmissien have so held - flatly ;
and w: heut equiveca:Len. Cincinnati Cas & Electric Cem=any (Wm. H. Zimme r Nuc lea r F cve r S taticn, Un : No. 1. ALAS-727, 17 URO 760, 770 (19EO); Cr. e Ce:re:: Ed:sen Ce. (Enrhco Term:
Atomic Power ?).4.t. Unit 2). ALA3-730, 17 NRC 1057 1069 n.13 (19E3). Indeed. the cnly activ ty which the regulati:ns specifically require to be capahle ci-acceeplishment an one-half hcur is public notification. And - '
1 it is in that centent the 1/1 hcur ' rule is discussed in \
trJ7EG-0654, the NRC energency planning guid a nc e document.
Third , the prop satten that the plans will be judged as to adequacy av nst a certain type of accident and in particular c..e involv:nq a release as socn as 1/2 hour:
4 2-
That proposit::n 10 not only bad low. it as dirtetly ;
der contrary t the {
theory of the NRC emergency planning criteria.
The theory upon which the regulations were based 1
was that {
the planners should consider a spectrum of !
accidents. !
The key is that the plan he shown to be flexible '
and capable of reducing the adverse effects to the greatest extent reasonably possible.
The Commission itself has stated:
"Since a range differing offsite consequences can beof accidents with wid
. postulated, the regulation does not depend on the assumption that a particular type of accident may or will occur. In fact, no specif c accident seguences sneuld be specified because each ace: dent cculd have different conseguances both :n nature and degree.
Althcugh the emergency planning basis is independent of specific accident 3
sequences, a number of accident develcpment were c'ensidered in descr:ptions of the Commission's regulatzens. :ncluding the core melt accident release caceg:r:et of the Eeact:r Safety Study (WAfM-1400). *
- 1:
was never the intent of the regulation indirectly that to require directly or state and local governments adept extraordinary i measures, such as construct en of additzenal hospitals er recruitment cf subs antial acditional medical a p e rs accidents.
plant o r.n e l , just to deal with nuclear p ru d e n t The emphasis is on '
risk reduction measures. The of resourcesdoes requiatacn not require dedication to handle every possible accident that can be imagined."
CL1-83-10, 17 NRC at 533.
's
~
"Thero 10 no cuandard time requirod to '
bo mot for ovacuation in a radiological
, emergency. Estimates are necessary to determine accurately the actual time requi. red for evacuation. These estimates are needed to aid in
- protect:ve action decasion=aking.
"No massive investment of resources (stockpiling of supplies or construction of hespitals) are required for emergency p l a r.r.i n g . We will apply a practical star.dard of efficience of utilization of existing resources (such as roadways and manpower) in evaluating the acceptability of the evacuation plan. "
LSP 85-12 at 782.
h e
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. .hElfGINdY PNEhe'..'hdDN lf., N.. .
- '.2@, R'0 CESS lFOR C051MiRClAL NUCI. EAR 'P'0WElf '
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001DUTTEE ON
_ INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS . l IIOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES .
NINETY. EIGHTH. CONGRESS -
. + .' .
T1.P.ST SESS!ON
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. THE SilOREHA.N! Ntl CLEAR POWERPLANT .-
~
IIEAR*NG HELD TN WA!}!:NCTCiN . rc AT Ril h, lh,3 Serial No. 9S-52
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'ere 100 A larger EP2 vow 1d te feasitte trwt at the \
price of added compleatty and cost to a va- l
{ Aa Dr. riety of local agencies eveh as the
- schools. frsphasis added] l l
,, elle t?I* Tr. 15. l see of I
',g eng a 6 0 C.
_$ee f f,,.. elee f eal sad Psvemelettes) fesues In t rie rce a e v
, fr. 1142 g, i
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{nalessee* overresetlea sad the tweevetica Fredew t h e m e=* e a ea
'ye a 10 Cee of the key isswes confronting the Cownty's planners ,
,'which generated a significant eet thsete of apowns of dis;wasion during the V#,'
i pre 11.
Le;t,elatswe hearings, was the qwestion of hev pec;1e will te-have dsting a rednolt;ical energency.
pe,a 1C*P13e It was an isswe which
, hg n : te place! tre wateesses prof fered ty LILCD in clear d!sagreemeet
=ta= d te C:.*ty's es;erts.
) d one fP1, they s9owld L:L*0 asserief an tcte its wrnsten swt=&ssion te the Le;- E,
- 3. swcm en islaure a*d d rtri tPe attwal testiremy of its e s,erta that h.=6* t o e.s v a c t gly increase the ices met vary tietween dif f erent types of dises. '*.
ters. ,
ogical e=e rge *tra Based on research of disasters sweh as ficots, hwrri-tares sad tPePital s;111s. L:LCO'a esperts testif ned th at pec-t, g stief so ;h es;erte ca ; a raf aele;: cal e or; ems / wi;l te t to react te;*;/ a
- f:..:. e.t*.cratstive ,) '
Y ti ettate i.
ar e.t s i!# cf et*'
erters. L:'**.Tre;aref state- ..
pode detect etie at 43 61. Gat Tr. 146 346, ')
J pe rt *
- t c>ance ' t?.treftre, tPey ceme:wie, a .'
tatic c;1 cal e*erge=ef res; case plan esed net l}
{gatle.Sc he Echance P A S r e- .
take into actowns g
',, g f a*/ ;ttemtnal overreaction or dnsstedeemce to teattwettoas. h i
that level of k1 tr. 3al Ja*. l,1!
' A lo clle tPt. .- e4
.e rne e.-e e r ef 0 -
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- ti 176 that
-*,'% - - ' The Cownty's esperts, however, take a different approach,
'I L supported by their stwdnes of TMI. the dnsaster related litera-ture, and the actual studies which have teen performed on Long I""'
"h' Island. The testimony of Dr. Susan Seegert. Professor of Envt=
- stud rompental Psycholegy at City University of New York, was typ!=
8' I cal of the County esports' waanimous position on the isswet b' ell I think that the sessage that 1 think
, ... , . . . wowld to clearest in psychological liters- This ture is that there are aspects of nwelear hasards wPich make then different in pe o- ,g, ple's perceptions than ether kinds of basatts and these teclude the pore involum-tary, pere dreaded. . ..
perceived as bele; ewt cf control, per-pore feared, 3,g, telved as toim; unamewn both by lay pes;1e and by st.lentists, and pertelved as teirt ccv 4
2 hard to accate teth iceset and offsitel.
T'ese t'aracteristirs *see it cere litelv
, f* x fv' d.'f ,\
,r , - 4. . y fg
~
trat get;;e m;;. everreert t a t'. rest. ;.,
fr. 1121 11:2. As Ct. J e P e s e s c f '.
[ ,
'.A a r.d t r . S e t s l e r c f C1 C g,g.
M*191em Umaversity testifted, radiation is wedrtectable by swrv hw:=an senses. as sweh. It cowses a greater fear in pec;1e. rose
.. term owt of wrcertainty, cowsis; them to overestimate the th,
- y. " ; ' der;er of a mwelear accideet sad thws to overreart. Tr. 1C35.
y,gg
, },[ [.[ f 1:!* Attac -e** I at la see als: testa ==?y cf Cr. trinsen, g;e,
~
- 1*4*.
- e. -
1 ti TPe cert 1wsicas dre.m t, Crs. Jtemssa a*d ten;*er are eet p, ,
tened om steewletiem, bwt em their detailed siwdies of hwan p,7
~
g tehavict t'e t h at Three Mile Isleed am Loag talard. At Three dee:
Male Island, the Coverret of Pemesylvania isswed am advisery int-8, 3 $
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- 177 J
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he that pregnant woner and pre.achool aged ch!!dren within 5 elles of the plant should evarwate. An estimated 2,500 persons with= ,
,ite ra a 18*f in the five o!!e area around TM! fit that este(. ye bowever, grei- the studies of Des. Johnson and teigler, as well as two other studies (fr. 1100), revealed that over 144,000 persons livin0 tTPl * ,
s es far as 15 r!!es free the plant in fact evacawted. Tr. 1037, 1099# see also testimony of Dr. Stanislaw cast, fr. 1399.
s' This tendency for persona in a radiological emergency to evacw.
f ate in great nweiers, tr.owgh not advised to do so, has been '
lateled the 'evacsat ten shadow phenenenon.'
.A mandt. of this octwtreece et Tnt, the Steering Coesittes l
, covissioned a alvdy to investigate whether such 24havist sigP c e
- ce:sr en Leag Islemd in t** event of an accident at SPeret.am.
f, ime stsfy, c:*:.ete! gra arily ty *ts. Jernsea, t r i a s c r. , ,
et Cid teigler, ard Cole, ete.sisted Jf a tardem sa ple tele; Pone Vf a by swrvey of Pere t'.se 2.lCC Long Island residents. Cr. Cole's le. .
researth f i ts . Setial Cata Analysts, administered the swrvey, e'
tPs reswits of which are contained in Decaments 4 and 5 of ti.* 10 31.
vglw.e lit cf ee Ctwnty's ptrP. Tne focws of t*.e stwdy was ,
asen. y;e, g.,,, ,,,;,,, ,,,gg,3, ,,,,,7gg,
\. peg,g ge ,,g.
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1*ters e.**.
!* tre art; c*e, es:n 1* tern e.ee ses atett <* a t .gs are ret ,,s he er sPe et.1d oc if there was er official advisery tP.at human p,,,,,, ,;,3,, , g ,;g, ,,ggy, ,, g3, p3,,g ,g,,gg ,,,y g,,
detts.
he oee was afvtsed to evaewate. Tre res;emses of tPe
I intervlevees infatsted 45st 211.000 fa*'lles, or atewt see g
i 4 I 30 s
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t . l s
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., ' { 38 i-A' b 6 ki f
. 170 qwarter of the popwlation of Long Island, vow 1d attempt to evaewate. Tr. 1040.
Scenario Two was patterned af ter the TN! accident where a partial evacuation out to $ miles from the plant was advised.
wnile auch an advisory would cover only 2.100 f amilies in swffola Cownty, responses indacated that 209.000 families wcwid attempt to evaewate. fr. 104).
In scenarie Teree, en evaewatica was ordered owt to 10 elles frem Shoreham. Tetrty-cre thewsand families live within that. area. twt the owrvey diseevered that 430.000 f amilie s --
atowt half the ;e;d;attom of Lee; Isleed -- in. ended to leave their boaes in asch a essa. T r . 10 4 ; .
A t**de ty 1: ever'.ste vel.atarily in swe'. lar;e s-ters Pas erv;:.: a f severe 1 ;11:st *s fer eaerge !/ ;.a**. g
=>tch, caetrary to the seatissery a;;rtsch cf L:L*C's es;erts and its wes.tPeriset sipF. cameet be igested. Cr. Je*mstm sum- -
varised the.e le;11 cat toms and tPeir censideration ty t%e Cose.
ty's esperts ir. ecatritwties to the definition of detteing the 4
Ccue ty's 2 * -11e EP: as follows:
! t*t e ge*erally say deftmitica ef a te ::e 171 6;*eres w*st we Pave def;*ef es t'e e.st.atace s* ate. 'e***eaca. t'a' .
ts. t*e to teacy f or sec;;;e teire! a des t;- ,
eatef dae;er soee to overreact and arcata-eec. sly evacwate, kcw the silmifteamte of this evat.a-t:ca stefo< p*eme e en is t>at yev're q:le; to Feve all of teose peo;1e om tPe evassa.
tiem revtes as well as the pee;;e frea witht* the desigmated daeger scee, and t>e m
i 179 se
- traf slow fic t* yond the ten nile tPt .. . towld ist.atedor danger hinder the evacuattom from sone. the des.
,*ere 8 ,
our purpose in redefining the 272 for
-,delsed. twenty elles is to accesemodate the evaews.
tion shadow phenomenon t>ecause we acknow1 .
es in edge or realtse that that traffic is golmg I to have seae ef fect on evsewating the des.
[3les vowld Ismated some, however it's def.*med.
e Tr . 10 l -10 72.
In shert, if people beyond 10 miles f roa the plant are gelet to evacwate in Crest nwebers, there owst t.e em EP: pre.
- porttemately evt% !arger than that in order to provide police ef to le8'e
- tre!!!c control and other pre-planned peaswres designed to
es;edite the a*.tleigated traf f te flow f as e.ch as pess1Dje. The 3arge eg=te r s !
?
20 elle 172 t*ws is based not only on the amties;sted desea cf
- rettetter< t*st ts* to es;ettet in
- - a radiolesteel e ert. ty. ,
.y;;;'s ei;e r t s 1. 9 aise rett; ises t?e Peef te 5 a* f ar tre orac.atace s *.a t e .
gr. JePesem se 6 F emeaemea.
j,, gy g3, g,yn.
Ia N !8~-8 '
') ' de h mi P g W t e.
tier to t.ttress its ar;weemt that pes;1e vill behave
,, calely aad rettemally dwrin; a rattolo;ical ewergemey. t!LCC !
g,,,; cf feret t e eaa ;;e cf a train accident in Massissetwa.Cesario, w m ca.se. e :en.e ,,e to estare i,te t e .t e.,,e,e.
l g ;,g,5- rei.: . t ere ..e a, a
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ee sore
- diffleult. g gg, ,, , , ,
- phased over a relatively relased period of
- 20 howrs or even scre, and that's a lusury am that oee dare not assume that one wowld h8,gssagwa is nct have in the event of a poteittal .. f uture Ie 8 ,,g ,ang g, , accident involving radiation. The people of Mississagwa, during the whole of that ,
evaevation, had no reason to suppose that I,,d th a t po s i t i o n i n they were in grave danger at the moment.
- j' - (tw;hasis added).
/\ ,,,,,,,
- Thus, he comelvded, Suf folk Cownty would be t>etter served by g, heedteg the studies done in Swifolk Cownty pertainte; to a
,,M,*,' radiciogiesi e.orge ,cy, rathe, than the ..rerience of h" P asatssagwa, the relevance of which to dwbiows to radiological
- , emergemey reopense plammieg om Lent Isised. Tr. 1610 see also
'g ,
Tr. 1064*1066.
[,h f' 3. Pole Ceafliej I As disewssed earlier, Swffolk Cownty also was ececerned istNe .
and t' e f- e t -
- w . t s t ?.e ise.e cf
- Pet *er e=ergemey gerscarel wit? fa*ilaes ahs p r e s t a t ,
,,. i, 'v tf est we.1d te availatte for dwty dwrim; a radic4csical emet;emey in u e., la
,;,,. **.ich swch persemmel wowld have two eenflietteg dwstes, one to
'( w g e n their jet ord the other to their families. Tr. 1067 The i begam at prstle* is tsown le sociolegiest terms as ' role conflict.'
ee sit of si the tach dwty is eqwally netle, b n many workers wowld te espected
'J 3dJiress te rescive t*e com!!act in favcr et t*ett fa-tites, partlewlar-
- erf teef 1 e, err altesty li le a raf.cle-ital eaergeaty v'ere t?e daa;er is ett eas!1y of Jith eest detectatle and therefere more feared. Tr. 1044.
8%t t>e evt. tes, tritsen and Cole perforved two swrveys to deterwies 49 oveh all eg g, to what esteet, if sey, t*e proble= of role comf11ct si;*t te I
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4 182 hamper the Cownty's response to a radiolegical emergency. The '
first survey etwdled the attitudet of school RNe drieers in suffolk CownW, who mmtd have a major role in evaeusting e
school children and et.ere from the EPt. The second survey etwdied role confilet emeng eelunteer firemen serving fire die. -
tricts close to the shorehas plant. Dwring a radiological s
v- emergemey welvateer firemen would else be espected to perfors varlows evaewation dwties. 6 The details of the role conflict studies are containet in u Ve1 wee Ill. Document 4 ('aesponses of trergemey Personnel To A possible Ateldent At The shoreham Plant '). Tney reveal that 68 percent of tPe Isre*em
') swrveyed tediested t'er wow 1d first sete
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safety et t*eir laailles a*d tPereftre wcw!d ett te .4 av2ilatie ter 17.=ediate emergeecy dwty. Atewt Je percemt indi. . a, p ested tPey wcwid met to availatle at all. fr., Jan. la. 1943. 1- E Attachremt C et 6.
9 nt a t h respect to school bws drivers. 69 pertemt indicated that they vow!d not
- report to dwty wat11 they were certain tP.at t>eir families were safe. Tr.. Jam. 24
. S *. '
1981. Atter? eet 06a 7
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i, l',A Pn;*'1;'t:a; t%e *;1:cetteep cf t'est res 4ts fer t eno&c;; cal e.er O
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= v imey plernim;. cr. grimsoa concawde1 '
?
' ese are strities and leportant find-legs. They ledneste in the sher;est way tPat it is teetless to assw-e that o'ergem-cy perse* eel tem to towated om to re; ort to dwty im e $*ereSam eaergemey withewt aaswr.
amees that their families are safe. Nor showld we to swrprised. for, if scelal and behavnettal teneettsts ame, saythirg. It is t
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s "8'**#* that pe o ple lastimetively turn first to the g
- 'al mee4s of their own offspring. ;
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Tr.. Jam. 24, 1983. Attachment C at 7. f i a oesewating
).oecond survey L! Leo, preferring to refer to the probles as ' role l strain.' testified that in all other emergencies. persommel
' '(* ,4rving fire die, g ,edioleg'ical perforusJ adequately end that therefore they cowld tw ervected to do so in a radiolosteal emergency. L1LCo prepared statement
[*peetedtoperfor,
.** tt 70 79: Tr. 179-200. Tmat position, however. temores the '
findimos of the Cownty's esports that a radiolegical emergency I e4 o.
ore contained in ~
is not itke other energencies due to its undetectable natwre. $'
'ery Pe r se mae l to A See, e.e.. fr. 1048. Moreover, the presemee of a potential pey reveal that og ,
role comf atet pretten among suffolk Cownty esergerey persommet w y would .'i r s t care M*, ,,, : ,,c t to
- e s e t
- f t r- e d t y t P e testiecey of the Cov issiocer of the
- g gg p,eg,. g.;,. 8.f!G* Cc.rty police ce; art?ent, set t*e Cterasster,ers of ,
, ,' J e n 34, 39,3, st e a l t P. , $senal services er,d P.tlae herb s. all of whom es;tessed <
f sedrivers.4, sisgivings stewt the availatility of .%eir persemmel dwring a
'te d u t y w e t i t t P e y radiolo; teal e*ergeecy. fr. 1210. 1285. 1290. 1292: Swffolt !
Cownty Fallo C+part. rent prepared otat<. ment therelmafter SCPD
[f't..Jan. 24. ,
statemeat) at 11 12. As Covissiemer 211=crth cf the swf f ola novits fer Cc wa.ty Psa tt e cig a rtre mt testifted:
(.; Lies, t*cse w*c are at P:=e er cf f d.ty.
coac1.g 33
~4 a* t?e great pre;crtner et c.r perscoel ,
t fled. witSim tee 571, we vow 1d certately see scae at rey r:1e coe.f* set. It is our c;imlom t ?.a t energea. treat comf14ct wcwid te a coral res;cest-
_ h Po r t to tility to their twtite daties aed trent assur- fa*tly dwtita, sed they wowld first provide for trear families.
,la. 4 r l sad
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Owlte obviewely, role conflict As a problem which esists and swst be resolved in order to have an effective emergemey r e s pon s e .
Until the problem le resolved, aey attempt to Laple-ment a plan withcwt en asswrance of odequate erergency person =
nel wow!d threaten the sa f ety of suf folk County's residents.
4 ether social and Povekrieeleal feswee in additism to the problems of the evacuation shades phe-nomenca sed role conflict noted above, Professor Saegert of the City University of New Terk noted other important problems in
' plannleg for a radiological erergemey. For instance, stressfwl sitwattoes sit *t arise during an ovatwattom in faffelt Cowety
. **.tet to.1d lest it a:errams vaclert er irratsees; te*avser t ?.a t tow!d ha ;er am ef fective res;erse:
Tre other problem that I think shewld t+
a ;*asised is the difftewlty test tris partiewlar site presents for coordiPating am evaewation to the person who's faced with trytes to deelde what to do. The i lleen1 of alternative rowtes, possitte ter-
- esivet time presswee. the possleility of ca ecise; a rowte and fledteg it to te
. ve s se re s s f.1. ekee s ir; a arthe r res t e a nd fast;*t is to te umswetessfwl. are the kttfs of tate;s tPat tar t'aage tme inteat evat. ate le a= cr forly f as?;ca latt se
- t1 1rratatr.41 kand of tJnavner.
Tr. 1122 1121. Comeerms atout disorderly behavior were also raised wy tPe Sw!! alt Cownty Polite Departeemt. fr. 1212 1229 1221s 1248 see also SOPD statement at 32.
el-A A'
185 N.
\ In addition. wh!!e it has teen swegested tPat pwtite J
. esists edweation about radiation and radiological emergencies mit.it reduce disobedience to orders free puplle of ficiale or police, rtency to teFle* studies indicate that pwelle edweation say, in fact, heighten persea- contwston eed fear showt rediologiest scrifents and cause nn tests. Ameresse in vedesirstle behavior. Tr. 10gl. Accordingly, it is met clear that tre difflewlt isswes awraewmding preparedness
, for sr.oreham -- evacuation shadow, role confilet, and the ,
J others - are a-enable to asolution by educatica evem with a total ec+ritaee.t of Ccwety recewrees.
rtressful rimally, Professer Saegert wr;e
- that the Cowaty show1d be
- a. ore of set centermed with the pretters of Icas term stress
,,,, . . , s . i s e , u l t e t . , e . . i t , e , ,, i e . a . , , s . , e e ,, .. . d :. r e e . o e isla*d. Tr. 1:49 1**0.
, e, S. T*e Va!se ef 5.rvevs
.* As disc.ssed ateve, scre of the coeclustees drawn by the Co.ety's es;eits atewt hvean tehavier derive free scientific g .
stwdies of s.ffolk Cownty's t esidents and emerge 9ty persamael. .
- t.
- i. Lit:0 Pas attacked tre Cowaty's etwdies as irrelevaat, tattes l-
, *f!;a' IPe ;te:tica that s.f tys careet afet.ately predict f.twre 9 D '
e g, ,
i t.*s* te*ar. r. L*;** ;re;ared state-e** at 8* I;r TV. 1*9 h4 Im essence. L1L 0 wtges that the Cowety showld forse upon hw mam f
a og behavier le etPer, ecm.ewelear, disastc;s set i;ecre tPe lefer.
'- , ' retica offered by its c.m residemts.
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October 1, 1985 Mr. Peter Agnes, Assistant Secretary
,0ffice of Public Safety The Commonwealth of Massachusetts Executive Department 1 Ashburton Place 21st Floor Boston, MA 02111
Dear Mr. Agnes:
Enclosed is a recent publication describing the State of Illinois Nuclear Emergency Early Warning System presented at a recent American thicicar Society reeting. This supplerer.ts the inforcatien I sent to you in August. I plan to call you in the near future to obtain an update on your current plans for possibly implementing a similar system in Massachusetts.
! Sincerely yours,
, SCIEtiCE APPLICAT10f45 ItiTERt4ATlotiAL CORP.
g /. ed.:/
Victor J. Orphan *
] Corporate Vice President l
i VJO/ks l
) Enclosure l
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G'df.10i2 MONITOR!NG OF
, NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS
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I ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF NUCLE AR S AFETY 1035 OUTER PARK DRIVE SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS 62704 (217).546 8100 TERRY R. LASH, OlRECTOR 4
l 1
- A STATE.OF.THE. ART APPROACH TO EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS..
. REMOTE MONITORING OF HUCLEAR POWER PLANTS l JAMES A. BLACKBURN, ASSISTANT MANAGER OFFICE OF NUCLEAR FACILITY SAFETY AND MICHAEL C. PARKER, CHIEF i DIVISION OF ENGINEERING 1 ILLINols DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR SAFETY 1035 OUTER PARK DRIVE SPRINGFIELD, IL 62704 l
ABSTRACT ,
immediately following the nuclear accident at Three Mile Island, the State of Illinois began to design a state of the art emergency preparedness system for the thirteen nue,4 ear power reactors within i
its borders. This system incorporates an on i;ne reactor parameter cata communicar.:n link, an on line automated isotopic gaseous effiuent monitoring system, and gross gamma monitors installed around each site. Liquid effluent monitors will soon be installed also.
! The sensitivities and capabilities of this remote monitoring system have been clearly demonstrated both during abnormal events at the reactor sites and during emergency preparedness exercises. These a
experiences readily illustrate the system's ability rapidly to provide comprehensive, technical data to the Dspartment's staff should an accident occur at an Illinois reactor site, ,
PresSntet. at the Amerlesn Nuclear Sc:lely Tepleal Mettin2 on Radic!cgical *
- Accidents 15 September . Perspectives and Emergency Planning. Bethesda, Maryland.
17, 1986
i .
INTRODUCTION .
Immediately following the nuclear accident at Three Mile Island in 1979, the State of Illinois began to design a state of the art emergency properedness system for the 13 nuclear power reactors being operated or constructed within its borders, in 1980, the Illinols Department of Nuclear Sa'ety (IDNS) was formed, initially by Executive Order of Governor James R. Thompson, then by confirming legislation. An immediate challenge was to provide a mechanism whereby governmental agencies would receive more timely and accurate information regarding both the radioactive composition and the magnitude of any accidental release of radioactivity to the environment.
The initial goals of the Remote Monitoring System (RMS), in the event of accidents, were: to analyze as accurately as possible the discrete radioactive !
' components being released from the reactor site; to assess the magnitude of their radiological impact on the populace, and to transmit the results of the l analyses to the Departmental decisionmakers as rapidly as possible, it was quickly rea!!aed that pred:cting rad:ation deses to members of the pub!:c was j
alm 0st irhp.:ssib'e without aed.tional knowledge of reactor cend.tions. Since 1984, the RMS has been significantly enhanced and expanded by !
Incorporating on line information regarding the status of essential safety i systems at the plant. Crucial factors in the RMS design were to provide !
i re!: ability in the acquisition and transmission of data and to minimize the ,
amount of time required of utility staff for collection and transmission to IDNS.
The current objectives of the RMS are threefeld: early warning of nuc' ear reacter events hav;rg a pctential off s!!e impact; fast risk ana!ysis of reac ct systems; and rapid identification, quantification, and verification of a radioactive
) release to the environment. Each of these objectives plays an essential role in f t
assunng the abit;ty to recommend prompt off site protective actions.
I i
SYSTEM DESIGN j
The Illinels Department of Nuclear Safety's Remote Monitoring System
] incorporates three major components: gross gamma detectors radially j
l positioned around each nuclear pov9r station; on line automated, Isotopic gaseous e!!!uent monitors, which sample from major engineered release points; and an on line reactor parameter data communication link to each lacility's on site computer, in addition, on line liquid effluent monitors, which
)
i will be located at each plant's liquid dischage points, are scheduled for installation at two sites within the next year. All RMS components are 1
j connected, through dedicated data communications links, to the IDNS .
Radiological Emergency Assessment Center (REAC) located in Springfield, tilinols. There, a technical staff comprised of nuclear engineers, health j
physicists, and other nuclear safety speciahsts reviews the data and performs i
i l
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. _ . ____.._._____..______.,,,._.___,,____,_____.__m, _
analyses of plant conditions. This REAC staff is divided into two cnalytical groups: one concerned with the status of reactor safety systems, the other with environmental assessment.
E Confirmation of a gaseous release to the environment is accomplished by a network of up to sixteen pressurized ion chambers installed radially around each plant at a, distance of approximately two miles. These monitors hav3 a dynamic range of 10 6 to 101 Roentgens per hour (2.6 x 1010t o 2.6 x 109 X units per hour ). The siting of these instruments involved a balancing of many factors, including maximizing the probability for plume detection, while minimizing plume transi? time to the detector and the potential error, either due l to observing building shine from the containment or sky shine from an elevated plume. Using typical Illinois atmospheric conditions, the off site system will detect a plume with a centerline reading of two milllRoentgens per hour approximately 90 percent of the time. This criterion for detection requires one monitor to report values double the levels associated with natural background.
Non detection is limited to extremely stable conditions with wind directions bisecting the distance between adjacent detectors. Since these atmospheric conditions can be easily described, the Department is planning to develop settware, to reccgni:e such cond.tiens rapidly and disp!ay an apptcpriate warning fer the analytical staff.
Quantification of a release is accomplished through radiological analyses of data supplied by the IDNS gaseous effluent monitor. This monitoring system is complicated, incorporating high purity germanium detectors and gamma spectrcscopy to identify and quantify components of the isotopic source term, i.e., those raC.cactive contaminants released into the environment, whether
' par,iculates, dynam:c volatile range cf 10'13 iodines, to 10- 2or noble gases. TUs instrumentation 2
has a
! uCi/cc (3.7 x 10*9 t o 3.7 x 10 B cc) for the paniculate and iodine stations, and of 10'9 t o4 10 uCl/cc (3.7 x 10g' x 3.7 x to
, 108 Sq/ce) for noble gases. The radiological data gathered by this gaseous eftluent monitoring systerr is continually received and updated by a combination of PDP 11/34 and 11/70 computers. Software has been developed to compute atmospheric dispersion and postulate environmental I
exposures from a release, based upon current meteorological conditions and effluent radioactivity levels.
Early warning and risk analysis of reactor events are accomplished utilizing the IDNS Data Link (DDL). DDL receives approximately 1200 to 1500 Irey reactor I
and engineered safety system parameters every two to four minutes directly i from each reactor's on site computer. Early warning of abnormal reactor j conditions will soon be provided through software which will monitor each
] plant's engineered safety system configuration, identify the presence of key abnormal events, and indicato proper operability of enD incered safety systems. .
Additionally, IDNS is researching the use of expert system technology to develop a decision aide to diagnose reactor system status dudng abnormal I ,
2
events and to apprise the REAC team of possible sequences leading to a release of radioactivity.
The analysis of the liquid effluent streams may use only gross gamma monitoring rather than complete isotopic analysis, Such a reduction of complexity and cost is being considered due to the longer lead time before the onset of exposure to the general public by the water pathway and the relative ease with which such exposure can be reduced or averted.
CURRENT STAlgg At the present time, the gamma mor... are installed and operating around all reactor sites, providing baseline data for t. )se facilities still under construction.
A gaseous affluent monitoring system has been operational at LaSalle since 1982. Additional systems are currently under construction for installation later this year at Zion and Dresden. The contract has been signed for fabrication and installation of systems at Quad Cities, Byron, Braldwood, and Clinton during the next four years. The IDNS data link is installed and operational for all reactors except Braidwcod. Braidwood will be incorporated into the DDL network prict to initial lead ng r.,f fuel. As previously mentiened, the liquic ett;uent monitoring systems are currently undergoing initial review as a pilot '
project for the Zion and Dresden facilities. Upon satisfactory completion of that evaluation, meditional systems will be procured 2nd installed at all Illinois reactor f acilities.
DDL SOFTW ARE DEVEl.OPMENT I A'thcugh the DDL ana'ysis schware is on!y in the first of three deve!comental stages,it has already become a major facet of the Departmental approach to .
4 Emergency Preparedness and Response. The initial phase in DDL scftware I development was to estab!!sh a data base with access to both historical and
! l j current data. At the present time, a four day data base is available for instant access. The basic capabil,ty is to display data for up to seven signals chosen at '
random from among the 1200 1500 points available from each reactor. These data may be either sequential two minute measurements or samples chosen at i
spec 4fied intervals. The user is also allowed to track real time trends of the chosen signals. Under this mode, the oldest data, approximately forty minutes 8
old, automa!!cally scrolls 01 the terminal screen as the current information is received. An afternate format allows real time display of the current status of up i to twenty different signals, although the trending capability is sacrificed. This ;
latter format is truly user selectable, having the flexibility to group points '
associated with a given subject, a given reactor, or seler:ted at random from the l system at large.
The second phase of schware development for the DDL system will be to design an 'euly warning" alarm into the system. This feature will consist of ,
k 3
software programs which will constantly monitor various data packages for !
Indications of abnormal conditions, such as loss of off site power. Although not l I- necessarily an indication of accident conditions, such degradation is important i i
- to assess the ability of the facility to respond adequately in the event of an !
accident. The Departmental response to such an alarm will be to alert the reactor analysis staff to ensure its awareness of the situation.
i j
4 The third and final phase of DDL software development is presently envisioned l I
as an expert system to aid the reactor analyst in his ability to determine the ;
current status of reactor safety systems, project in a faster than real time i
l environment the possible consequences of the abnormal events and advise on l }'
protective measures off site, it is not the intent or the desire of the Department
- to direct utility remedial actions based on this data. IDNS will use this I l information only to the extent that likely consequences of an event can be
- analyzed in support of off site protective actions. l
[
TECHNIC AL DIFFICULTIES
/
~
i j The development and operation of such an extens:ve remote monitoring 1 system tas had its s .are of technical difficulties anel challenges. The off site l
l men; tors, for example, require the use of a 300 volt battery which is both !
relatively expensive and short lived, in addition, impenci.79 failure is characterized by erroneous indicistions of increasing radiatics levels, ;
sometimes as high as ten to fiheen times normallevels. Additional prcblems :
I
' encountered with the off site detectors include loss of electrical power, failure of l I
the telecommunications link to Springfield, vandalism, and susceptibility of the :'
2 electrenic ccmponents to pcMr surges caused by lightning.
, i i
Despite these d.fticutt:es, over the past year (July 1985 throug'h June 1986), the off site component of the system, comprised et 96 detectors with thalt modos, t
- approximately 2130 kilometers (1325 miles) of telecommunications lie.;, two i
computer systems with attendant hardware peripherals and required software, achieved a system wide operability factor (availability of data for display in
{ Springfield) of 93.1 percent. ;
! To increase the reliabEty cf the eff site monitors even further, the Department is i
developing a 300 volt power supply to replace the dry cell battery. Josearching the ability to use solar collectors for back up power, and evaluating radio communications to a central collection point rather than leased lines to a telecommunications bridge, in addition, the Department has piready installed l
electrical surge protectors on the power supplies to reduce susceptibility to lightning.
l
! The complexity cf the isctop!c gasecus et!!uent men!!oring system creates
- complicated prob' ems. A major cause of system failure is failure of off the shelf components and a lack of environmental support systems, rather than problems 4
J
!~
i a
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ ~ , _ _ _ . . . . . . , _ , . . . _ _ _ _ _ _
' with the custom designed components. For example, the system has failed several times following faiNro of the air conditioning system for the Technical Support Center (TSC), the location for the system's on site process computer.
Although a TSC is required by NRC regulations, apparently the operability of its (-
support systems is not. Sometimes substantial effort is required to obtain repair of this essential support system by the utility, ,
A recent failure of the effluent monitoring system was the result of loss of electricity to the TSC. Although supplied with back up generating capability, ,
the circuit breaker feeding the system had been manually thrown due to a
- noisy transformer" which was annoying a worker in the area.
To eliminate these types of operational problems, the Department is requiring the construction of a dedicated building on site. This building will house the entire gaseous' effluent monitoring system, including its process computer and dedicated support equipment such as back up power supplies, heating and air conditioning, and ihstrument air.
J Not all of the problems with the effluent monitoring system are the result of vanab!e in p! ant environmental cond;tions. A substantial amount of d;fficu'!y 1
was finally traced to microphonics in the coaxial cables connecting the gress count rate meter to the multi channel analyzer. Since this gross indicator is
- designed to signal the system to rapidly increasing radiation levels within the 4
l sample, the presence of these spurious signals caused the system to decrease the analysis times and consequently the system's sensitivity. Although the ,
system never specifically failed due to this problem, the ability to detect i radioactive contaminants being released into the environment was substaa.tiaHy impaired.
In spite of these difficulties, the gaseous effluent monitoring system has performed well, panicularly for a prototypical system. Over the past year (July i
l noble gases, were t opera)ional 86.7,83.3, and 89.8 percen
! In contrast to the approach used for the off site and the gaseous effluent monitoring systems, the DDL incorporates no State owned sensors or
! instrumentation, relying exclusively on utility installed and maintained
' Instrumentation. The Departmental components to the system a'e limited to a pair of statistical muttiplexors, dedicated telecommunication links, and the REAC computer system. To minimize the cost and time required for system installation, this component is currently limited to a subset of the signals ,
presently residing on the utility's computers at the various reacier sitos. Such l I
an approach minimizes the direct responsibility for proper operation and reliability, a!thcu;h at a sacrifice of control and assurance that the system will -
be functional when needed. The utility's computers, for example, may be l removed from service for preventive maintenance with little, if any, advance !
(
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notice to the Department or Departmentalinput, in addition, utility personnel !
j have, on occasion, unilaterally altered the contents of the transmitted data i j ,
stream, adversely impacting the Department's data analysis capability. L 4
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OPER ATION AL R EEtJLTS 1
The primary intent of the RMS is to provide the capability of independently !
i assessing the possible off site impact of an accident at a nuclear power reactor, j Such a capability is a major support to the recommending of specific protective
- actions for the general public. Since monitoring effluent streams during normal i operations is of secondary importance, only a limited amount of data analysis l l has been performed to date. Gaseaus effluents from the reactors have j remained below the minimum detectable levels of the off site monitoring !
system. Environmental radiation levels nominally average between seven and i ten microRoentgens per hour due to natural background. During times of l precipitation, however, the ambient levels are elevated, chen reaching as high !
j as fitean to twenty microRoentgens per hour. (See Figure 1) .
i The data generated by the gaseous effluent monitoring system has routinely '
j ind.cated the presence of radicactiv;ty in each of the three stations, when the reactor is at power. Typical fission products including isotepes cf Coba!!,
j Manganese, Sodium, iodine, Krypten and Xenon, for example, were identified j
by the system during May,1986. Research is being done to match the ongoing i results obtained from the gaseous effluent monitoring system and the daily grab samples gathered by the utility, as a portion of its Appendix i requirements.
Although not yet available for publication, these comparicans appear to correspond remark 7.bly v, ell, considering the variation in methodology used for obtaining and analyzing samp!as. (See Figures 2,3)
Late in January,1986, a smallleak developed in one or more of c reacter's fuel rods. The IDNS Gaseous Effluent Monitoring System readily identified both increast d levels et radioactivity and additional nuclides within the effluent stream. The noblegas station, for example, reported effluent concentrations j ' averap:ng 7.4 x 10' uCi/cc (2.7 x 10'1 Sq'ec) for the 64 analyses performed between January 23 and Februay 1. This compares with an average of 9.4 x 10'8 uCl/cc (3.4 x 10 3 Eq'ce) for the 96 analyses obtained betw3en January 1 and January 15. (See Figure 4) By combining these data with DDL l parameters, such as off. gas radiation levels and the readings from the utility's ettluent radiation monitors, the Department was able to verify the presence of j this leaking fuel.
I i
The DDL was directly utilized by the Department during the feedwater transient event at the LaSa!!e station on June 1,1986. The system cid not document the water level as being less than the low water level scrum setpoint, due to the ,
translent's short duration when compared to the two minute sampling frequency. However, the system clearly showed the initial downward trend of i
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the water level and other affected parameters, both during the initial event and the subsequent manual shutdown of the reactor. During this event, the util;ty !
telephoned the REAC at hourly intervals, indicating the power levels and the
(" I reactor status. By monitoring DDL, technical staff within the REAC were able Independently to verify the status of individual control rod banks, reactor power j ;
levels, reactor water levels, etc. (See Figures 5,6,7)
. J i
EMEAGINCY USE OF THE RMB l i i
Although the RMS monitors the activities of the lilinois reactor facilities during l 1
' normal operations, its purpose is to provide data during emergency conditions !
l at a nuclear power reactor. During a major accident, the REAC staff would j {
initially analyze the various DDL parameters for trends and diagnose the ;
! . problem. The reactor analysis staff would concentrate on the status of the
{ reactor's engineered safety systems in an effort to predict key trends and their consequences, while the environmental analysis staff would focus on i
j containment radiation levels, area radiation monitors, and effluent !
concentrations. In anticipation of a possible radioactive release into the j environment, the environmental analysis staff would also calculate dose l
) reduct;cn fa: cts due to atmospheric dispersion, using the meteorologir:a!
l parameters availab's item the DDL. If the situation warrants, calculat!:ns l would be performed to determine the protective actions which would give the j l least dose to the general public living in the immediate environs surrounding !
the faci!!ty. l i If a release occurs,its presence would be verified by both the DDL and the gaseous efUuont mcnitoring system, and the postulated impact en the general l l
public calculated. Using the isetcpic source term provided by the gasecus !
i i
eftluent monitcring system, the environmental analyst would'also be ab!e to
! predict the presence of released radionuclides which would contribute to ground contamination. Verification of the wind direction and the anticipated
- otf site radiation levels would be available from both the environmental j
monitors and the Department's field teams dispatched to the area. Following l 4
the termination of the release, the isotopic source term, in conjunction with !
I contamination readings obtained from the mobile field teams, wculd be used to !
dstermine and document the integrated dose to the offsite population.
l Although the Remote Monitoring System does not solve all problems associated with assessment of reactor accidents and their impact upon the 1 general public, the !!!inois Department of Nuclear Safety believes that this !
l approach is a technological advancement in providing accurate and timely l 3 information to decision makers during a radiological accident at a nuclear power reacter.
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!'3[rMi ; 16th ANNUAL I
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NATIONAL CONFERENCE
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. .: M. .:.3; Radiation Decision Making
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{ ILI.DCIS' EXFD.!DQ with MDUFE ME3f!TCRING
.f NUL. LEAR EIAm! CAL CEMERATDc FACILITIES i
! James A. BlacAburn, Assistant Minager Of fice of Nuclear racility safety Department of Nuclea.r safety 1
INFR3DUCTICH Pollcwing the nuclear accident at three Mile Island, staf f in the I
) Department of Public Nealth. Division of Nuclear safety, were requested by i
the Sovernor's oifice to roccamend injrreved methado100iee by which nuclear Powe r plants could be monitored. Recomme ndat ter,s of that staf f wors 4
subsequently codified into the Nuclear safety Treparedness Act Wich I
required the establishment of "A Reacto Effluent 'enitoring system (PJ:xs) capable of continuously ide ntifying and qua'.tifying the radioactive i
cce,ponents of all e f fluents f roa nuclear faci 18.sies to the environment."
During the 198 2 C1tC'PD me t t ing he ld in Po rt land , Mai ne , ! reviewed the status of this reacte acni:oring project up to that time. As a conrequence, today's presentation will primarily dwell upon orpansions to the systes as well as cuc experiences sir.co that date. To refresh your
- f. ,
svamary, and to lay the groundwork for those unable to attend the Portland j
theeting, the Illinois Famote Ef fluent Monitoring System consists of six (6 )
identifiable cce,ponents.
- 1. At the heart of thi system is a Radioactive Chaecus Effluent Honitoring system (R.cDCs) which utilises high purity germaniumn de t ectors and game spectroscopy to identify and quantify the l isotepic coeponents .if gaseous ef fluents whether partseviates, iodine, or noble gases. ghe RACC O is provided with isokinetic 1
sampling probes in each engineered release point so that all j gaseous of flus r.t streams are continuously sampled and analysed.
1 i
j 2. To assure capability of pertos,etng atmospheric transport and {
] ditsusion vedeling, the RDO acquires a real-time meteorological inforw tion consisting of wind sp**d and direction at threv levels, adiaNtic lapse rate, and precipitation free the LaSalle station Meteoro1cq1 cal Tower. Each of these parameters is i updated on a minute-t'y-minute basis.
\
j 3. To provide the ear 11eet possible indication of an accident
- condition as well as supply essential paraaisters for source term '
calculations, the systen also acquires cert ain plant , i
! inat twe ntation signals. Twsoe signals include contairument l l , radiation levels, effluent flo., rates, and effluent radiation l l
1evels. Both the meteorological information and the plant status j t, inforu tion are provided to the syntes through a data interface i with the utility's ccepter system. ,
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- 4. To provide an independent confirmation of a release, verify C.* w teorological parame t e rs , and provide some limited capability l for assessing the environmental impact of a release through a e
.nonengineered pathway, the system also includes a ring of gross environmental monitors. Wis ring is coesprised of up to eirteen i ,
pressurised ion chambers installed approximately 2 - 2 1/2 miles
- tros the plant.
S. To manipulate and analyse this massive data base in an appropriate time frame requires dedicated computer facilities and I sophisticated modeling software. W ie component is (* signed to
- acce pt , manipulate, display, and store the resniting 2 formation both during normal ope rations and under accident conditions. I We se computer facilities include an on-site coe6Nter within - i htnich the PACDO, meteorological, plant etatus, and environmental
- data ara originally collected and stored. A central computer l f acility is located in the Department headquarters in springfield which is connected to the 1,a3411e computer by a dedicated, high-speed telecoccunicatten igne. At the central facility, rwathesatical e.am pu la t t e ns involving attesphe r ac dirpgrsion ard the projected environnental censeque.sces are perforwd.
- 4. Since the prir.ary purpose nf this system is for use during accident conditions, the output must ba eas uy and rapidly j cceprehensible. As a consequence, siignificant tine, ef fort, and l
[ resources have been spent developing an output sedule meeting these criteria, nts redule consists of two (2) graphics generators and eight (8) color renitors, each of wtsich can be dedteated to displaying sene f acet of the eme tt ency data base.
The software p r eg rar.s uttitre trending histegrams gnd two
( 2 )d tze n s tena l plots overlaid un a digitized aerial representation of the e nvironme nt to depict the geographical distrabutton and environnental ispact of the release.
CFERATING E%FERIEN::2 l
J Throughout the las t few years, the C4partment has amassed a rather
- j 10rge ope rational data t>a.se for the radiation monitoring instru:entation incorporated into this Eerete Mnitoring Ef fiuent Systers. Assessing ar.d i l
cvoluating this ope rating experience of necessity reflects upon the l Cpecific instrumentation chosen as cecponents to the rystem.
Although no o rders ement is being given for any of the instruments l wtsich will be discussed, rwajor eccponents will be identified for ease of Corusunication.
2nyi enme nt a l veni t e rig;.-,-Jte r/
- t o e g As discus sed in our previous presentation, the initial environnental
- installation was comprised of seven (r) pressurized ion chanbers which werv
.m talled in the sa.all pepulation centers within the plume omrgency
'lanning zone Arourd the L.13411e County Station, for et.se of cperation.
Mse ins t rume nt s are usually installed at facilities cw ed by 1ccal l(
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l i g gen rrimenta.1 entitiese nort frequently on the radio antenna tewers i operated by the police or fire depanments, subsequent installations have j*
been a.ltered to utilize a Nema-12 cabinet installed on a conente pad.
his inatA114 tion configuration was chosen to allcw ease of maintenance and accessibility, while providing an appropriata operating environment for the
, twtherproofod electronics.
l he groes envirorsa ntal acnitors chosen are a mixture of peuter stokes
- 8 pressurised ion chambers, sentry models 1011 and loit. D e loll's are the older versions which comprised the pilot project and a subsequent order for prseden. Two (2) major problems with the 1o11 eystems require mentioning.
he first is the equipment's relattw intolerence to voltage fluctuations.
! Due to our original installation design, such instruments were frequently
, visited by lightning, much to the distress of the instrument. me Mesaa-12
- installations han been less frequent targets, houwwer the 1011's tend to l . drop of f-line whenever the power level fluctuates. Althouth the instrument i
can be reset easily, this amist be done manually which requires a technician I
to travel to the site.
E The uneced penhien with the 1011's is their inability to nepond p rope rly after !=ing off line for a period of' time. CNe to telecommunications and/or cocputer problems, a specific instrwient may not be polled for a substantial pericd of time--seve ral mir.utes to hours.
Unless a signal is sent to reset the equipment, the initial poll af ter a reertablishing coas:vnications will be erroneously high, apparently due to the instnament failing to account for the tapee since the previous poll.
]
- g RAM 11y. both of these problems han koen corrected in the Model 1012.
1 We M: del 1o12 appears to han its cwn set of dif ficulties, although
. the entjer enes tsay have been resolved. It appears that we vers the first
! large-s c ale installation of th i.m equipame nt . Several buge required j ] elia.ination and/or proper tra.ining, The initial pretlee encounter *d with j the 1012's was an extrwee ser.sitivity to action, ne slighteet physical 3
movement, such as caused by the vind, resulted in vildly fluctuated
] re ad ing s . nis problem was ctrrected with a modification of the detector j e lect ronics , no e* cord proble s involved the itsware programmed into t se I nad only amucry. On f r*quent intervals, the clock would etep, ef fectively 4
d ropping the insttunent off-line. Wie problems was tosolved through a nprograssaing of this memory.
l j Department et a f f have been agrehe nsive throughout this project !
- rege rding the potenttal aid frequency of varujalieu. Although we have p ro ** nt ly l e exportoneed an roximately 65 inet rumme nt-ye are of operating i
! history, we have encountered only a few instances of vandalise. We enest: !
I dramatic was when same irdividual attoepted to dismantle the low-leve3 l
1 detector frtue a 1011 unit. For somme reason, the vardal(s ) stepped upon -
i reaching the tCo-volt detector. Since the electrvnics were lef t esposed to the elements, howwver, substantial corrosion occurred, necessitating aspair i of the detector. 21s detector was refurbished ard recalitrated by the
- sunnu f actu re r f o r a t ot a l co st o f 3 25 0. aid is new back in s e rv ice .
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M ee re i ed i en t 1 Plant Status f n f e rmat i r.n One of the nors perplex.ing and frvatrating esperiences with the entire Famote Etfluent Monitoring system has been the inability to gain trve cooperation from the u t t ',ity. Since the meteorological and plant status I signals are pr7vided from the utility's Paine compJter, these signals are I I
frequently interrupted, sometimes for extended Periods of time. For eaamplo, early this month, the utility was modifying the entire prime l computer system. As a conseque nce , this portion of the eyeten, wam l non-ope rat ioAal for approximately two weeks. 31nce we were not notified een the sodifications wre cospleted, it was almost by accident that the Departme nt learned that the utility system was again operational, but due l to taprope rly clonnected cabling, we wre not recgiving the data stream.
Since the instrsmentation originating these signals is owned and operated by the utility, the Department has limited control over this segment of the system. For example, the wind speed sensor installed at 375 feet has been non-ope r at iona l since early February,1984. It appears that thest signals ass considered non-critical for powr plant operations he nce , they do net receiue the maintenance priority allocated to essential systems.
N. M 1
'It s ope r ating expe rie nce with the MC Ks ratuf actured by Science Appiteations Inc. (SAI) mingles varying ascunts of frustration and success.
This untque s t at e-o f- t he-a rt system was custem designed to match the
, effluent streams present at the tasalle county station. 'Ite system was delivered to the station precisely on schedule, something unheard of in nuclear Mwer plant constrv tien. As previovsly descrLbed, this systes is l
a cceplex instrunent requiring centinuous attention by the onsite ceter.
'It t s cc ;Nter centinuously checks the status et the vasteus parts cf the systen as wil as the gross count rate f rom the noble gas channel. l l
Although the De Mrtme nt leadership viewed the MCIX5 with e geo$ 1 degree of sk e pt ic t ra. both tcvards its cambilities and its reliability, the custos designed coaponents h.sve appeared to be more reliable than ce rt atn s t anda rd of f-the-shelf iterm incorporated in the design. 'th;s is not to say that such a systes can be installed and forgotten. LtAe the o f fice copying machine with Wich w ars au tco f amiliar, the McDO requires f requent ad jus tr.sent and attention. Liquid nitrogen euant be added ,
to maintain tha detectors at the prcret tezperature. Presh cartridges must l bs ins e rt ed into the herrers, and used cartridges reseved. Char:oal dust l need s to be reseved free rhotoelect ric light sources and s e nsors . '
Pneumatic seate erust be reintained to assure their integrity, etc.
'th e talor disappointeant with the MCIKS eP1Fu nt has been the dit ficulty in cbtaining sof tvare support for its convoluted process control programs. Since the SA! Division manafamuring the McDCs is 1ccated in San Diego and has a limited staff with sof tware e Ter41se, et taining kncwledgeable supMrt hss f requently been dif ficult. '
Another problem involves the dif f teulty of saintaining an ardequate environrent for the on-site coefvter etat; tent. Tne McDC is insta11aJ in the firct sub-Irvel directly beneath the station vent. 'Its onsite ccupate r is installed contiguous to the 'Ischnical Suttert center (TSC) affroxtrately e 7J
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2000 feet awey. A.1though both of these installations are provided with onsite becanap electrical power, such power comes from two ditforent eyetens.
his aituation was unforeseen whon the RACEMs aoftvars was written. Ao a consequenos, additional logic must be designed to address the probloes encountered with loss of power at the RAGEMS without a corresponding loss to the computer.
Deajor ditficulty has been experienced in keeping the Tsc air conditioning system in an operable condition. Foresee 1ag a potential heat
, problem, the design of the inCEMS includes a small air conditioning unit.
No such provision en.ists for the on-site computer. Since the TSC air conditioning systen is non-sa fety related, its failure does not require shutting down the reactors. As such, the priorit/ level ass 1Tned to its repair has been rather low, hence, the on-ette computer has been rendered inoperable on several occutons due to high-temperatures in the TBC. such a situation would be further aggravated during an actual incident due to the nsambe r of people prssent within the TSC. We Department is contoeplating installing a stand-by air conditioning unit in the ta.salle Ceaputer Center, to maintain an operable envirorument for this equipment should the C air coMitioning system fail.
In spite,of the prchlew outlined above, the RAC::M3 hu proven itself to be a highly depeMable a.nd capable eyetou. An ertensive evaluation of its capability was concluded by De partze ntal s t a f f in Decembe r o f 1983.
In the initial pha,ses of this remote monitoring project, opinions were g frequently expressed by utility personnel that such a concept "will not work". Possibly the createst compliannt to the system has been the gradual erceion of this position to the current s t ance ,
- 1t 's not nece s s ary * ,
Recent results of effluent analyses teveal er.all amounts of Iodine-131, I cd i.n e- 13 3, and ! cd i n e-13 5, a.s w il as Arvon-41, K.r /7t o n- 87, Krypton-8 0 aM Xe non-13 5 m. Wese results are not unus ual . De concentrations being toleased are small, howerer are elearly identif table by our eyetes.
PRE.stprf 37Mus
'the Remote Effluent Manitoring systese is virtually complete for the 143.a 11e county station. As previously indicated, this system consists of the RA:ZMS. a estoorological and eyetum status interface, aM sixteen pressurised icn char.bers in the environment, l
Pollowing ctumpletion of the pilot project at tasalls, our efforts were I directed tonrd instrumenting the rema.ining facilities. It was recommeMed that the initial phase of this expansion consist of installing the i envirorumental ion chambero around all operating f acilities first, then those uMer construction. During the past two (2) years, an addittorial 64 ton chambers have been 3 tocurvd aM installed around the operating nucleas facilities at tion, Dresden, aM Cordova, and the plant being conettveted near IPyron, Illinois. 'thirrieu additional detectore are awaiting inst allation arcuM Clinton AM Braidwood. It is aM icipated that this
- Th&M of the system will be ocapisted during 1994. To usure that the entiti eystem will not 1:e affected by failure of either the err-atto cougNte r or the t e leccummunications link with the central facility, the environmental detectors are Folled directly frtas the Springfield ccupater via a se<cM t61ecau.unications lira rather than 1.y the crr-site ocspJter.
9
$75
( Due to the trous ndous costa of the Radioactive m='= Monitoring System (at least for a radiological health budget ) the Departament refrained irta procuring additional syyt ow unt11 the tasalle syntes had toon inatalled and had campiled an ertensive operating history. Inatalled in April,1992, this evaluation continued through December,1993. The results of that evaluation and a ocuparison of its capabilities with those of typical utility systems, are the subje:t of a tectutical report entitled, "Isotopic Effluent Monitoring for Nucioar Power Plants A Comparative Analysis between the Radiosative Effluent Manitoring Systems of e - nwealth Edison aM the 1111nois Department of Muclear safety". Draft copies of that report wre distributed to various entities with knowledge and interest in the area of envirorumental monitoring. Although various
- entities indicated that the cost for such a system oudweighed its tenefits, no one challenged )ts t echnic.t1 capability. Cceements regarding the technical merits of the system included the following:
""the two systems are cocpared on the basis of A) isotopic capability, 3) ope rating range, and C) timeliness of isotcpic analysis. . . . the tcss system clearly is surerior."
C Wayne Karr, Director 01 fics of state Programe U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccessission "Cur staff agrees that thJ proposed equipment has a greater 4
- caMbtlity than Edtson's curri t installeJ equiFunent."
Ce tell Psed, Vice-President Cec onwalth Edtsen CecMny me proposed systou for ,easuring radioactive affluents and Projecting offsite doses wul represent a significant advamco over present practices."
Cot an 'thcapoon. D . ' I'h il con ultant in Enervy/ Environment
"...ynis represents impressiv . techno1cqy that is more advuced than existi.ng systems.*
.7r . Magd i Ma gh eb Muclear Engineering Program ,
University of 111&nois 1
1 Such exce rpts sheuld not he taken to imply that all the twviewrs endorsed the expansion of this systes. For er.asple, toth the Nuclear R*Vulat o ry CcomLission and e m nwealth Edison Coupany orpressed the position that ex.1 sting systems wrw suf ficient. l
- In terms of protecting the health aM safety of the sublic, Edisen's -
acnitoring equipment is sors than adegaate."
. Cordell Paed I
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requi' ring such relatively expensive of fluent monitoring systems =
- c. weyne Kerr As a result of that analysis, and the commmente received from various entities, the Departvent ham decided to proceed with procuring and installing systems for each nuclear facility in filinois. With the ,
concurrence of covernor n orspoon, (MS) 3 cts was introduced and is being I conside red by the t3rd General Assembly. (see Attachment ). Wie proposed legislation increase s the fees which provide the budgetary resources for the Nuclear safety program, and increaras the nwber of systou status signats that are to be incorporated into the system. l Passagt, of House sill (Hs) sose in its present condition will allow procurement of a FACDCI-type rystes each year for the next six (6) years.
The tentative schedule for installation of this equipment is as follows:
Eton ( NIS ), Creeden (ns6), Cordova ( rye 7 ), Braidwood ( rye t ), Byron
( rYs t ), a,nd Citnten (n90). n as installatten sequence is ba. sed upon the i pc Wlation denetty wtthin the I:re rgency Protection 2.cne. Obviously, I unfore seen cirew.s t ance s ray alter this sequence. In anticiation of passage, De prtre nt staff are pre s ently pr e paring the technical speci fications so that a Rsquest for Proposals can be issued early next fiscal year.
ne second runnr th rus t of this legislative proposal involves the provision of plant status information. Although Illinois has installed a dedicated t eleccaunicat ions itrk with each nuclear facility for tranytstting in t e rr.a t, t e n during esergency conditions, the timeliness of incident notificat nons bas been poor. Since July 1,1982 ' forty incidents have bee n repo rt ed . Although incident notifications are to he given within fifteen (1S) ainutes of the incident classification, such notifications have taken as long as tsve (5) hours. During FYO3, only S.7% wori transmitted to the state within the required time limit. An equal percentage required over 120 minutes for such notification. (See Table 1).
As a result of this record, NB 3098 conta. ins the provision that a signals Wich inttiate eme rgency s et ' o n level declarations, actuate accident atttgation, and provide attigation vertitcation shall be provided in a manner and at a frequency specified by the Department for incorporation into and augmen*,ation of the assete Effluent Monitoring sYetes.* We eight (t) grcups of signals listed in Table 2 cosPrise the buh of this data package. specific signale may be deleted or augmented based upon plant design and ease of inecrporation.
e
$77
__ __ _. __- -. -. _____ _ _ __- _ _-__ -_ _ __ ~ __
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TAa!2 1 Incident Notification Times (FT 83)
TN f nt e rv4 Nur.be r o f Percent of l pqgu*rePeen St ati cecurre neem )
i 1
ell minutes 2 5.7% !
16-30 atn. 6 17.1% '
31-45 min. 8 22.9%
{ 44-6 0 min. 10 28.6%
61-73 min. 5 14.3% 1 76-90 min. 2 5.7% '
eM min. 2 5.7%
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I TMt2 2 Plant status siguls to be Mded to Roc 34 actor Pow e 1. ave 1 1
Seactor Ve e ae1 Coolant Leve 1 Reactor Cooling systto Proeeute Temporatun P.adiation taveis. & -
wyd m en Cenenntretten P r im.ry Co n tAirm n t P re s s u re s . Tempe r a t ure , & P,a.d La t i o n ta v o l e status of toelation Valvees safety Amitet valves statue of toervency Core Cooling tyetens statue of Vital Po ors A/C & 0/C '
) Noble cas Corwentraticn in secondaty Contairseent. Aw(111&ry Building, &
Puel MaM11ng Areg. I i .
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WTUNE FtJJr3 As previously irdicated, the Department anticipates procuring additional PAczxs-type systems for each reactor site in 1111nois. l Discuestona erith utility personnel have renaled that adequate and !
appropriate space is ranly available within the facility. Two majur problems appear to be mrtually esclusive. W avoid plate <mt of
, particulatee aid iodines, the sample linee need to be as shert as poesible.
In aMit ion, sample lines need to be maintained in a vara environment to prvnnt cenoensat ton, ainoe these same phencesna also affeet ut111ty i
- e yet eus, epace is virtually rionesistent in close proximity te release
points of effluent streams. We only open area, in Illinois plante at !
least, is on the tuttine deck. Wie ans, howver, is required as a lay-down are a durittg aujer repairs. As a consequence, the utility is i urde rstarsiably hesitant to allocate this are a for installation of the ;
stat e 's ar> nit o ring syst em. l M alternative affroach is the cout:Netion of a small dedicated l f ac t i tty tamed Lat e ly ad j ace r t t o t he re act o r bu ild i n g . nis f acility wuld house the on-site etapit e r, the effluent monitJring eyeten, a small, e
star 2y electrical generator. A'.though this apptcach has been mentioned to the utility staff, the desirability of this alternative has not been decided. Wie approach would cropli tate the plate out probles, but would I
( e ase maint c nance o f the rys t se ard d a partas n t a 1 acce e s . I i
, ne s+cerd na$or area of conevntration during the Lamnediate future is I
- the ders lepe nt aid re finement c f the syet es so f tvsre . Pro 7 tame need to be {
I a
de vo leped eich will cc rrelat e pro 3 *et ions with data c.btained f rta the I i e nvirorme nt , whether frue the meute r-stoke s envirvrumental detectors or !
cther inst rume nt at te n. M11ttenal wrk will also be performed to utilize i acre fully the plant status signals incorporated into the system. I il j
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LXCLRPT DLSC,ftIBING THL' ILLINOIS SYSTEM
. i Radioactive Casechs gffluent Henitoring Systems Illinois has a much more comprehensive and sophisticated system for ,
monitering the LaSalle nuclear reactor and its emissions than at Pilgrim or Yankee Rove. The primary detector is the Radioactive Caseous Effluent Honitoring System (KACEMS) which utilises germanium detectors and genna spectroscopy to identify and quantify radioactive particulates, todine and k coble gases. Isokinetic nampling probes allow continuous sampling and analysis of gaseous enissions.
Atoespheric transpert and diffusion modeling is acceeplished ,
by integrating up t'e the rinute retecrological data into a eteruter monitoring j
system. To provide early varning of accident conditions, key reactor conditions are also integrated into the computer system. A ring of 16 pressurised
_, ton chambers conitors radiation levels 2 miles frem the reactor. A dedicated cc puter with se;histicated nedcling'scf tware rapidly analyses this cassive data base. The reactor nenitoring system is hoaked up to a central Digital !
Equipment computer in the state capital where mathematical sanipulations '
involving atnespheric dispersion and projected environmental ccesequences are perforced to deterrine when and what kind of energency response actions I ore appropriate.II (Similar ronitoring systers hav; been installed at eajor f
chenical plants across the country. including Union Carbide in Institute.
- i W. Virginia.) I In case of an accident and release of radiation a' 9 rfa s s 4 t hu s e t t a roactor, DPH is responsible for prompt analysis of cen4.sion: and recoreendation l l
'I"Illinois' Emperience with Remote Henitoring." er. cit y p. 90.
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1 of protective actions including the timing and extent of any evacuations.
Present ' utility ef fluent detectors asonitor only gross radioactivity--not the radioactivity and type of specific particulates, noble gases and radiciodines simultaneously which are all hazardous to human beings.12 The NRC acknowledges that there are "very large uncertainties" in the release rates for specific radionuclide species during an accident.13 The characteristics of accident releases are not only unpredictable, but they also change duries the course of an accident l4 (e.g.. the radiciodines are generally released earlier i
than less volatile radionuclides).
The rate of release and types of radioacs e emissions are essential information for determinir.; what protective actions are necessary and appropriate.
The failure to delineate the isotopic nature of the release can lead to "an error f actor of two or greater in of f-site protective action decision-making."15 Here accurate menitoring systems enable vsore informed emergency response decisten mavir.g vbich could save lives and unnecessary costly evacuatter.s.
This new system also provides DPH ic=iediate infor=ation on reactor conditions and emissions without having to wait for BEco's notification. NRC and Comonwealth Edison officials concede the RACEMS system is superior to the present utility system but do not think the price tag ($1.3 to $2.2 elllion per reactor)16 12"Isotopic Effluent Honitoring for Nuclear power Plants: A t.omparative Analysis between the Radioactive Effluent Honitoring Systems of Commonwealth Edison and the Illinois Department of Huclear Safety," Cary Wright and James Blackburn, Illinois Dept. of Nuclear Sa fety,1984, p. 91. -
{
13"Isotopic Effluent Monitoring," on, eft., p. 90. l I'"Isotopic Effluent Honitoring,"_op. eft., pp. 75, 76.
15"Isotepte Effluent Honitoring," on. cit., p. 91.
16"Isotopic Effluent Henitoring," _nt. cit., p. 92.
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As worth the extra protection.17 The Illinois legislature, however, decided
$1.20 per ratepayer 18 was not an excessive assessment for the additional protection afforded and ordered RACEMS for all 8 lilinois reactors. Furthermore, Illinois' pressurized ion chamber field monitors are more qualititively and quantitatively sensitive than our TLD's.19 Feroknendatiensi A primary purpose of state and federal legislation governing nuclear reactors is the protectlon of the public health and safety from the associated dangers. Although the likelihood of a major release of radiation is small, the disastrous consequences justify existin, monitoring and emergency planning requirements.20 Tith increasing evidence of the hs:stds of low level radiation, it is alsv important to monitor closely the routine emissions from operating reactors.
Numerous studies have documented the inadequacy of existing emergency response plans, and we have reperted cut S. 137 to improve emergenty preparedness.
I In order for the DPH to recen=end the appr:priate protective action for j the public in res;ense to a radiation relesse (either indoor sheltering or evacuation of specific areas) prompt and precise information on the size, type and timing of the release is essential. Illinois has decided to install 1
the RACEMS syste in all of its reactors, because of the ic=ediate, expanded 1
i 17"!!!inois Experience with Remote Monitoring," op. cit., pp. 576 577. l 18"Isotopic Ef fluent He,itoring," or. c i t . , p. 92.
l 19"Isotopic Effluent Honitoring " co. cit., p. 45.
20 A Congressional Analysis based upon NRC data h.is concluded that a .najor .
meltdevn at Pilgrim could kill 3,000 people, injure 30,000, cause an additional 23,000 f atal cancers and cause ptepe rty damages of $80 billion.
"Calculation of Reactor Accident. Consequences For U.S. Nuclear Power i Plants Conditional on an $$71 Sclease," U.S. Ilouse of Representatives l Cenmit tee on Interior and Insula r Af f airs, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 198?, p. 9. ,
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INTERNAL MEMORANDUM l
TO: Robert J. Boulay, Director i
FROM: Edward S. Frttto .h ~*
DATE: July 31, 1986 I
SUBJECT:
Estimated Geographic and Population Character *=t*cs l of Expanded E=ergency Planning Zones As per your request, I have prepared the Co_11owing preliminary Onalysis regarding the subject matter: --
ESTIMATED GEOGRAPHIC AND POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS 1
OF EXPANDED EMER3ENCY PLANh1NG ZONES EPZ RADIUS NUMBER OF
'LANT (=iles)
COMMUNITIES) POPULATIONp Pilerim 10 5 65,000 I 20 22 231,000 40 94 2,102,000 l
Seabrook 10 6 48,000 1 20 19 184,000 ,
40 71 1,560,000 Vermont Yankee 10 6 25,000 20 22 71,000, .
40 89 553,000 e e 4
m.
EPZ RADIUS NUMBER OF P' * %T (miles) COMMUNITIES t POPULATION 2 a Yankee 10 11 37,000 20 29 93,000 40 91 454,000 NOTES:
- 1. Censiderable "professional judgement" was used to calculate those numbers. ' Actual determination of EPZ com= unities would
- Involve factors that were not considered in this analysis. In the case of Vermont and Rowe Yankee, especially, there is a Iorge number of communities that lie within both EPZ's due to thG close proximity of the two plants. (See attached map).
For the purposes of this analysis, however, each plants' EPZ was considered separate ar.d net affectLng one another. Due to these and other* factors the nu:ber of EPZ co=munities are sub-joct to change and considered preliminary estimates only.
- 2. These figures are based on the 1980 Census of Population, and
- ounded to the nearest thousand. For the reasons stated in
' 1) above, these numbers are also subject to change and con-
.dered prell=inary estica tes only.
=c: John Lovering, Deputy Director '
Buzz Hausner Attachment !
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liOCES$ F0'R CONfsRClAL NUCLEAR 10WER '
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IIOUSE.0F REPRESETATIVES .
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THE SHOREHAM NU. CLEAR POWE.RPLA.
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- HEARING HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC - -
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APRIL 18,1953
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STATEMENT OF SUFFOLK COUNTY t EXECUTIVE PETER F. COMALAN &
BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON L OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS Or 9[
I THE INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFTAIRS COMMITTEE, h U.S. BOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 3 I
REGARDING h OFFSITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS FOR THE SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION Q
!. Preface Mr. Chairman and Subcommittee Members, I wish to extend '
you a warm welcome to Long Island on behalf of the 1.3 million /4 citizens of'Suffelk' County when I have beten elected to serve as County Executive. ,
f As you are aware, a centroversy is raging on Long Island concerning the feasibility of adequate offsite emergency j preparedness for the shoreham Nuclear Power Station, which the ,l Long Island Lighting Cempany (LILCO) is constructing within i
Suffolk County. The focus of the debate is the Suffolk County )
(
Legislature's determination,)/ in a 15-1 vote which I j cm;hatically su;;crted, that crer;ency preparedness to prctect f a
the public welfare io not possible for Long Island and that, j therefore, the County will not adopt or implement any radiological emergency response plan (RERP).
l F
jf Pesolution No. 111-1983 (Exhibit 1) adopted on Feburary 17, 1983, i I
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A. The Emerceney Plannino tone (EP2) .
The EP2 developed by the County's experts relies largely upon the conseque ce analysis performed by Dr. f'inlayson, the health effects expertise of Dr. Radford, and the need to accom '
modate the evacuation shadow phenomenon studied by Drs. Johnson, zeigler and Cole (see below). The EP2 consists of an area ap-proximately 20 miles in radius from the Shoreham plant, divided into 7 sectors, see Herr, Discussion overview (Exhibit 7) at'4.
The first sector is the so-called "inner sector" which is an area approximately five to seven miles in radius from the f Shoreham plant. The remaining six sectors are approximately 3C '
j degree segments that radiate fre.* the outer boundary of the s inner secter to the outer beundary of the EP2 With res ect te radiatien doses and the health effects of I such doses, the characteristics of the EP2 were develeped according to the following criteria. It was the overall objective of the planning ef fert to limit doses to the popula- g l tien as much as pessible. Fer very serious accidents, the first priority was to prevent the public free receiving life- q threatening deses. In the case of less severe accidents, the goal was to limit doses belew those that would cause early injuries (vomiting, fatigue, etc.). REPP, Vol. II, Document 2 (Finlayson and Padferd, Basis For Selection of Emergency Plan- l ning Zones for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant)fhereinafter I Finlayson and Radford) at 47; Tr. 1131, 1185.
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[ The 20-m11o autor limit of the EP2 secks to cacot both of J these criteria. Two hundred rems to the whole body is the level
' at which early deaths (those occurriag within several weeks of
, l exposure) occur. As the EP2 is presently structured, during se-l vere accidents the chance of receiving such a potentially fatal i
dose of radiation outside of the CP2 (i.e. bayend 20 miles) is l
very small. 2d. at 48: Tr. 1132. Thirty rems to the whole body
- represents the point at which detectable physical damage can occur. Tr., Jan. 27, 1983, Attachment A at 4.1/ In the case of p
a less severe cora melt accident, there is no more than a i percent chance of receiving more than 30 rems outside of the i
- EP2. Finlayson and Radford at 48 Tr.1131 'L5us , the 20 mile i
EP2 is required to provide protective actions for those actually in danger.of sufferin; aarly injuries or fatalities in.the event of an accident at Sherehan.
that I The existence of the inner mone reflects the f a'.t
' those clor,est to the plant are in the greatest danger. The time i
> allowed for people to take protective action within abis sene will be relatively trief tecause the wind (which wculo carry ra- .
dioactive particles during a severe accident) often blews at a .
I 2/ In addition to oral testirony, the !.egislature received j
written statements f rem most of the witnesses who appeared before it. In rest cases, those statements were included in the transcripts of the hearing as attachrents. State-l ments bound into the transcripts will be cited by I
transcript date and alphabetical designation (Attachrent A, Attachrent B, etc.).
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- speed of ten ellos per hour or more in the shorehem vicinity and shifts direction frequently. Thus, if ovacuation was deemed l
' necessary, the entire inner zone would always be evacuated to '
1 ensure that wind shifts would not catch part of the population within the inner zone unprepared. Id. at 50.
The six sectors between the inner sector and the outer boundary of the EP2 provide flexibility in the emergency re-l sponse.
Since a plume of fission products' released from the Shoreham plant would follow the direction of the wind, protec-tive actions would be recommended for the sector along which the wind was traveling, as well as both adjacent sectors. Jd. at
- 50. The other sectors, whose population would be in no im,sediate danger, would not be ordered to take protective actions such as evacuation or sheltering (but note the problems of the evacuatien shadow phenemenon described below).
It is important to note, however, that the development of the EP2 and protective actions within the EP2 do not guarantee I
freedem from risk. Tr. 1135 Dr. Finlayson's consequence analysis determined that esen where protective actions are taken, the core pretable of ths severe cere melt ace.idents ceuld cause a maximum of $77 early fatalities within the EP2 with a mean .turber of 15.2.
The same accident could cause a maximum of 1,270 early injuries within the EP2 with a mean of 18. Failure to take protective actions would increase these numbers substan-tially. Finlaysen e.d Padford at 35.8/
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In centrast, ecr;are the results of a study conducted by Sandia National Laboratories (Technical Guidance for (Teotnote cont'd next page) 1 e
m=." " _ _ _ --- -
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h Cancer fatalities would also occur within tho EP2, ranging I
/ from a few to over 1,700, depending upon delay time (time between public notice of accident and taking of p'rotective action) and evacuation speed. Id. at Table 8. It is also in- :
teresting to note that most fatal cancers, up to 7,000, will ;
occur outside the EP2, whether protective actions are taken or l not, fd.
B. _The inadecuaev of a 10-Mile EP2.
e LILCO, in its testimony before the Legislature on January !
i 1 l 18, 1983, was critical of the dimensions of the County's EP2, I urging that the County adopt an EP2 of only 10 miles in radius, ,
such as presented in LILCO's unauthorized submittals to the DPC. 1 i
h l LILCO prepared statement at 33-41:1/ Tr. 175-177. However, j
[ LILCO's criticism appears to be based in large part on a lack of <
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ur.derstanbir.g cf the risk criteria by which the County derived '
the EP2. ,
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l (Teotnote cent'd frem previews page) .
' t t Siting Criteria teveleprent, NUREG/CR-2239, SANc81-1549) i
- which concluded that a 'wcrst case' accident at Shoreham l weuld result in 40,000 early deaths, 75,000 early injuries
, and 35,000 cancer fatalities.
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9/ As part of its presentation to the Legislature, LILCO sub-i mitted an 85-page document explaining its position on emergency planning into the record. That document, though not included in a transcript, becare part of the hearing record. It will be cited as *LILCo's prepared statement.'
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In criticizing the 20-mile zone, LILCO stated that:
The County consultants ussd 200 rems as the dose above which early deaths from radia- l tion can occur. They then chose a it con-J 1
ditional probability as their criterion and . '
i found that, according to the plot, the chance of receiving 200 rems would be only 1 An 100, even assuming a core-relt ,
accident occurs. _This analysis produced 't I
_the 5-7 mile ' inner rino." i This "inner rino," it is important to
- reecentre, corresponds in concept to the Federal coverneent's 10-mtle EP2 The 1
reason the former is 5-7 mt tes in radius '
while the latter is 10 miles is that the i calculated results of accidents at the Shoreham plant are less severe than the . 1 results calculated in NUREG-0396. In other '
l werds, had the County planners used the i same ris< criterton that the Federal t )
government used, but with the Shorenem-seeet!1e draft PRA, they would have cew? 'n witn an eser;eney planntnc zone of suestan-
- _t_ t a ' l v less_inan tne 10-mile EF: reeutred by the Pederal cegetnrent. IImpnasts accec.) . ;
LILCO prepared statemert at 39. As is clear f ren. this explana-
- tien of the County's EPI criteria, LILCO has misunderstood the use of the 200 ren dose level. Contrary to LILCO's characte.
1:atien, the inner secter was not based on any dose level at all, but rather was an atte ;t to identify an area where rapid '
l protective respenses were rest essential, due to its proximity to the plant.
Actually, the 200 ren dose level _for the most l severe cere celt accidents was one of the criteria for establishing the eutar edce of the EP2, not the.5-7 mile inner sector.
LILCO's misunderstanding of these essential factotw l l
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1ed it to conclude erroneously that the 5-7 mile zone
[ "corresponds in concept
- to a 10-mile EP2, which it clearly y
does not.
More importantly, however, LILCo's above testimony asserts that if the County's planners had used federal risk criteria, i the EP2 they would have calculated would be less than 10 miles.
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$ l Again, LILCO's assertion is inaccurate. Tederal risk criteria I 1 as set forth,in NUREG 0654 provide that projected doses beyond (PAG) ,
the EP2 should be belcw the EPA's Protective Action Guide The upper bound of the PAC levels. Se. NUREG 0654 at 12.
levels is 5 rees to the whole body. If the County pisnners had l the EPZ at a point rigidly adhered to those guidelines and set where there was less than a 1 percent chance of exceeding 5 EP2 would have been approxiestely 60 miles in radius, rees, the not less than 10 miles. See Finlayson and Radford, Tigure 12.10/
-- It is evident frem the County's analyses that nothine less j
than a 20 ette t;2 will effer ade:vate protectien to the l
LILCo also testified the County's experts failed to 10/
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account for the 1 ewerthat potential dose levels caused by the "scrubbing action
- of Shorehan's suppression pool (a t
feature of boiling water resators) and by LILCO the interaction prepared of fission products with other However, eierents. as Dr. Tinlayson testirony at 42-52: Tr. 253.
testified, beth f actors were secounted for in the Cour.ty's analyses. Tr. 1144. Indeed, it should be borne in mind l
that the fission product release values used by the Coun-g ty's experts are precisely those thit were derived by LILCo's own consultant, science Applications, Inc. ,
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public.
The consequences of an EP2 less than 20 miles are too severe to justify a smaller EP2 such as LILCO suggests. As Dr.
Finlayson testified, if the County were to adopt a 10 mile EP2, in a severe accident there would be a 35 percent chance of receiving 200 rems (enough to cause early fatalities) and a 60 percent chance of receiving 30 rems outside the EP2. Tr. 1142 see also Finlayson and Radford, Figure 11. Even in a less se-vere core melt accident, a 10 mile EP2 would provide a 50 percent chance of receiving 10 rems and a 20 percent chance of receiving 30 rems. See Finlayson and Radford, Figure 12.
Clearly, th'ese risks are unacceptable. Therefore, a 10-mile EP2, and indeed anything less than a 20-mile EP2 would be ill-advised.
If any adjustments should be cade to the EP2, they should be directed outward. Tr. 15; see also Tr. 1459. Such an outward adjustment, however, would significantly increase the complexity and costs of planning for a radiological energency.
i As Mr. Herr testified:
Stated ancther way, the EPZ is sized so that in the event of a cere-melt accident, .
early it, fatalities will not occur outside of exposure high enough to make detectable blood changes has only a one percent chance of happening inside of it, and the EPA pro-tective of beingaction threshold has a 50-50 chance exceeded.
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No safety smaller outside EP2ofwould allow that level of the zone. _A 10-mile EP2,
_for exar-le, wculd place a lar;e nunter cf persens at substantial risk outside of tne
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O A,1crgor EP2 would be foosiblo but at tho price of added complexity and cost to a va-riety of local agencies such as the schools. [ Emphasis added]
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C. seelolecical and Psycholecical ,3ssues In Emercency Planntne
- 1. Overreaction and the Evacuation shadow Phenomenon one of the key issues confronting the County's planners, which generated a significant amount of discussion during the .
Legislative hearings, was the question of how people will be-have during a radiological emergency. It was an issuu which placed the witnesses proffered by LILCo in clear disagreement l l
with the County's experts.
LiLCO asserted in both its written submission to the Leg-islature and during the actual testimony of its experts that human behavior does not vary between dif f erent types of disas-ters. Based on research of disasters such as fleeds, hurri- !
canes and chemical spills, LILCo's experts testified that peo-pie experiencing a radiological emergency will tend to react calmly and fellow authoritative orders. LILCO prepared state-ment at 63-65. 84: Tr. 345-366. Therefore, they conclude, a radiological emergency response plan naed not take into account i any potential overreaction or disobedience to instructions.
Tr. 346-347.
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Tie 77"0FY OF FICP/El S. PUVAVT? t Gryrprep C0f'"Cf1lEALTP OF P/FFANilSFTTF PFFCPE THE JOTFT 00f'"TTTEE Of' Ef'FPGY CF TPF MA'SACPUFETTS LF07FL ATUPE PECEPDFD 17. 1960 t
PEP 0(SENTATIVE /LEXAPDE*, FEMATOP COSTELLO. .LHD MEMBEPS OF THE COMPITTEE. THANK YOU FOP THE OPPOPTUNITY TO PAPTICIPATE IN TODAY'S HE' JPG ON THE D7LGPIP PUCLEAP POWEP STATION.
i I WAVE E'.'70YED WOPKING WITW YOU ON TWE WIDE PANGE OF Et!!PGY
!!!UES THAT FACES "ASSACHUSETTS. PILGPIP APD THE FUTUPE OF NUCLEA* ;
ENEPGY APE NEEDLESS TO SAY. A CPITIC ALLY IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE DEPATE. D!$CUSSICH APD PLA'NIMG THAT PUST TAKE PLACE MOW IT WE ACE TO ENSU8E THAT ffASS ACHUSETTS AND PEW ENGL AND HAVE AN ENEPGY FUTURE TH AT PUILDS ECO'!OWIC GPOWTH APD VIT A LITY WHIL E PPOTECTING Ol'8 HEALTH. SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY.
THE PRC'S DISCLOSuot E APLIEP THIS YE AD THAT THE DILGPIM PLA"?
HAD ONE OF THE WOPST OPEPATING DECODDS OF ALL COMMEPCIAL REACTORS IN THE COUNTRY WAS STAPTLIFG PEWS. PADTICULAPLY IN LIGHT OF THE TPAGFBY AT CHEPNOBYL.
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WHEN THE P'PC AND PnSTon rDr$0 3 S U B S E OU E *.t Y ave 00"Cro Tur l T E"POD A DY SHUT 004"' 0F THF P'LGDIF PLAHT. T SAI? THAT THE PILGPIP l l FACILITY SHOULD NOT GO PAcr ON LINE UNLESS ALL PEACTOP SAFETY .tSSUES l
AND P AM AGEME *'T DEFICIE NEIE S t'f or FUL L Y PESOLVED APD UP'TIL ) E0VATE T
EMEPGENCY PESPONSE PL ANS WEDE IN PL ACE. N SHODT. PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY FUST BE THE PRIF0tPAL CPITEDIA THAT GOVIPN DECISIONS PEGARDING THE PESTAPTING OF THE PILGPIM FL ANT. MY POSITION HAS NOT CHA NGED AND HIL L NOT CH At'GE l'FTIL A L L THPE E A PE A S A CE ADDPESSEO FULLY.
l UNFORTUNATELY. Tut r0MPONWEALTH HAS NO IGAL AUTH0 PITY OVEP A F ACILITY THAT IS ALDE AD* FUL L Y LICENSEP RY THE "DF. FEDEPAL LAW PPOVIDES THAT TWE PEGULATIO" 0F A L ICE NS ED MUC'.E A P FACILITY IS THE I
SOLE PESPOPSIA7LITY OF TWT rFPFDAL GOVIPMMEPT. CTATE JUDISOICTION OVEP THESE MATTEPS HAS BEEP CONSISTENTLY AND SEVEPELY LIMITED BY 9OTH COPGPE S S At'0 THE COUST!. PPT PE B0 Haur THE o!GHT--A PB TPF '
pt SPONS t OIL ITY--T0 INSIST TW A T THE FACILITY FE PANAGED WELL:
COMST0VCTE D OP
- ECON!70VCTE P To PD0 VIDE THE PAv7FUM DEGPEE OF
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TO *E SUDE. TWEer WAVE FEEN SUEST ANTI AL po03*FSS IN PECEP' MOPTHS. POST 0" C0! SOP dAS TAf8" S0"E IPPODTANT STEPS TO CODDECT Tur SEPIOUS MANAGEMENT AND S AFETY P90PLFMS THAT HAVE PL AGUED THE PILGo!."
FACILITY SINCF 77 orose corea yco yo 197?,
I ASSUME THAT THIS EFFOPT WILL Bi THE SUB2ECT OF EDISON'S TESTIPOMY HERE TODAY. WE WILL BE LISTENING CLOSELY FOR SIGMS OF PERMANENT IMPPOVEMENTS. f!EVEPTHELES3 THE STAKES ARE VERY HIGH. A ND THE PURDEN OF PPOOF CONTINUES TO PENAIM WITH THE COMPANY YD DEMONSTRATE THAT THE PILGDIF FACILITY C AN PE S AFELY MANAGED.
OPEPATED. AND FAIPTA!PEO. ,
OUALITY PEACTOP DESIGP. prLIABLE CONTAINMENT. SOUND
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FAINTEMAPCE. pporE SSIC" A L P A" A GEFF"T. AHD p;su OPEPATIONAL STAP0APnS AFE ESSENTIAL If WE APE TO Po0TECT THE SAFETY OF OUP CITIZENS.
T Art F00 F.vAFotE TWE 00"*POVEDSY OVED TWE STDUCTUDAL INTEGPITY OF THE D!LGeIP Paer T CONT AINME NT VE S!!L . THAT ISSUE CA"PCT 9E SATIScACTCc!'V .
- E SFL VED Ir THIS ISSUE "UST NEVEP BE Of'E WH E R E T H E t'PC R E OUI o E S 0':. v P:e!PA. IMPPOVEMENTS TO BE CONSTPU0TED F0P VESSELS OF THIS KI'?.
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7t' HIS PEF APKS OP' A VISIT POSTOP SEVE P A L CE EKS AGC. f'PC COMMISSIONEP JAMES /SSELSTINE CPITICIIED THE FPC FOP LEANING TOWAPP PECUIPIMG ONL Y MIP'OP CH A NGE S CHE tl POPE FAJ0P PETP0 FITTING APPEAPF NECESSARY TO MAXIMIZE PLAFT SAFETY. ASSELSTIPE SUGGESTED THAT THE COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS BEING l' SED PY THE FPI TO APRIVE AT THF LESSFP PEQUIPEMENT DID NO7 TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE COST TO THE SURPOUNDING ENVIPONMENT OF AN OFF-SITE PELE ASE IN THE EVENT OF A CONT AINFEPT FAILURE. IF SUCH COSTS APE T AKEN INTO ACCOUNT. /SSELSTINE SAID. AD l EXPENDITt'PE FIVE TO TED TIMES GPE ATE D PEP PLAPT WOULO BE JUSTIFIEP.
I CLEARLY. IN THE CASE OF PILGoIM. THE PUBLIC HAS A RIGHT TO FMOV THE FlllL P A PGE OF OPTIOPS TH AT APE AV AIL ADL r TO 2PP00VE THE STcUCTUPAL INTEGPITY OF THE CONTAINMENT VESSEL AND TO BE ASSUPED ,
l THAT EDISOM IS PDEPAPED TO Fart THE HECESSAPY CHANGES. NO MATTEP WHAT THE COST.
"0DE0VEF. TWEPE APE KEY S T E P S T W A T M L' S T PE TAKEN NOW TO l A!!UCE REACT 00 SArETY APD PPOPfe y a ,' A G EM E t'T :
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POSTON FOIS0t: SH0VLD rest rfvrt 0D A c0*ooruturive PtsTanT PL AN THAT WILL IPCLUSE A COPP L ET E A S SF S.tFE t'T OF P A ST DEFICIENCIES IN Tut AprA 0F PLANT MAtlAGEMENT AND REACT 0P S AFETY AS WFL L A S A DETAILEP QESCDIPTION OF ALL PEASUPES TO PE TAKEN TO GUAPANTEE TWAT EPPOPS OF THE PAST WILL NOT RECUP.
POSTOP fDISON SHOULO EST APLISH AS PAPT OF THE PEST APT PL AN A COMPPEHENSIVE Mot'!TCDING SYSTEM THAT llILL PROVIDE E APLY DETECTION OF PPOPLEP APEAS IM PEEP OF IMMEDIATE ATTENTION.
POSTON EDISON bHOULD AGDEE TO SUBMIT THE RESTART PLAN TO THE GEf'EP A L PUPLIC F00 PEVIEP ANB C0FMENT.
THE PPC SHOULO HOLO A FULL PUBLIC HEAPING BEFOPF THE COMMISSIONE8S Ot' THE ADE0VACY OF IDISON'S PEST APT PL AN.
POSTON EPISON ANr Taf t'PC SHOULD PoEP Apr A DETAILED SITE SPEtyrIC eEper +
wE C0po' .ET E D A PG E Or CONSTDUCTIO" ALTEPNATIVES AVAIL 15'.E TC IPPDOVE Twt D ILGoIP CONTAINMENT VES$!L.
AL L CONT AI'lP.E NT A M A'.Y SE S S HOUL O B E P A 0E A V AIL A BL E FOP PUBLI PEVIEU At'e COMPE "' .
-c.
THE PPC SHOULD INSTITUTE A SPECIAL "WATCwSOG" PROGPAM WITW STATE PAPTIr7DATION IN STEPPED UP OF SITE INSPECTIONS.
E MPTWEPPORE. IT IS ESSENTIAL TH A T A DE0L' A *! EME PG E NC Y R E SPONS r PL AMS TO PE IN PL ACE PEFOPE ANY CONSIDEPATIOF IS GIVEN TO PEST APTIFS THE PLANT. L AST ?UNE. 7 ASKED SECPET APY BAPRY TO ASSESS THE ADE0VACY OF EMEPGEPCY PPEPAPEONESS AT PILOPIM AHD TO REPORT HIS FINDINGS TO ME BY THE END OF THIS YEAP. SECPFTAPY BARRY'S EVALUATION IS NOW COMPLETE APD AT THIS TTME .T WOULD LIXE TO SHAPE THE RESUL TS OF HIS ANALYSIS WITH YOU.
l THE REVIEW CONDUCTED FY SECPET APY PAPRY INCLUDED A THOPOUGH ANALYSIS OF THE EXISTIPG EMEPGENCY PESP0 HSE PL A*.'9 WHICH WEPE SUBMITTED BY THE COMMONWEALTH IN 1981. THESE PLANS HAVE BEEN GPANTED INTERIM APPPOVAL ON FOUP SEPAPATE OCCA3 IONS PY FEPA SINCE THAT TIME.
TWE FINDING? CONT AINED IN THE PEPORT CLE ARLY IDENTIFY A HUMPED OF MA70P DEFICIENCIES. THEY INCLUDE:
OUTD ATEo a 90 ;Nc0*Dt Ett tv AcuaTION TIME EstrMATEs e ASED 04 1970'S cEMSUs DATA. (ETE DATA LACKS INFOPrATION rop EACH SUBSECTOP OF THE EPA (I.t. BEACHES) UNDE' VARYING CONDITIONS (I.E. VFATHEP. TPAFFIC. TIME OF YFAD. ETI.))
l
THE AP?fncr er A enwoo;wrustyr pWrtTre scovrv.
INADE0VATE ATTENTION 'O Tut _VULHEoAfftITY Or TWF oEACW-GOING P000LAT70H.
LACK OF ATTENTION TO NEEDS OF THOSE WHO CANNOT EVACUATE TuEMSEL VES INC,L UDING SCHOOL CHIL DPE 5'. HAP ^ICAPPED, AND ELDERLY.
LACK OF AGoEEMENTS WITN OPGANIZATIONS EXPECTED TO SUPPLY PESOUPCE S APio PEDSONFE L FOP EVACUATIOu IMADE00ACIES IN EP.toGENCY C0tiMUNICATIONS. PUBLIC NOTIFICATIO AND PUPLIC EDUCATICN SYSTEFS.
LACK OF 0FF-SITE FON:T0cING.
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i AS IT STANDS TODAY. tut EXISTING CMFrGEM0v PFSPONSE PLANS F00 i
PILGPIP 00 NOT SATISFY Frpt: AL SAFETY STAPDAon! AS WE INTEPPoET THEP.
1 IHEPEFOPF. BASED O'l TWE NUMEPOUS DEFI"!EPCIES OUTLINED BY l
SECPETAPY PAPPY'S PFPO*T. I HAVF ASKF0 THE FFCDETAoY 70 FDPPAoD l
l COPIES OF HIS PEPOPT IMMET: ATELY 70 ff"/ A*l7 THE "PC. AND I ASSUME AND EXPECT THAT THEY UILL of3P!DE POSTON FDISOP TO PPEPADE THE DATA l AND A"$WEP THE OVE!TIONS C A!!EP PY FE CoET ac A' 2A 0Y'S PEPO *T.
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It) CLOSING. I WANT TO EMPHASIIE THAT 0U0 PUPSUIT OF TWE HIGHEST STANDAPDS OF PUBL!C Pr AL TP AND S AFETY OAP' NEVEP BE COMPr0MISED AS WE ADDRESS OUR MUTUAL Cf)NCERNS PE6ARDING MAN PEACTOP SAFETY. AND EFEDGENCY PDEPAPEDNESS AT ?ILGRIN. PHILE OllP OPTIONS UNDEP FEDERAL LAW ARE LIMITED 6 WE HAVE A SOLEMN OBLIGATION TO DO EVE *YTHING W7 THIN OUP POWE P 70 l'POTECT THE HE ALTH. S AFET WELL-BEING OF OUP CITIIENS.
THAHx YOU.
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.QONTENTS \
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' l EX EC UTIVE S UMMARY.. ..... ... ........... ...... ........... .. ... . 1 CHECKLIST PROGRAM OBJECTIVES................. 2 i
CH EC KLIST FORM AT.............................................. 3 ITEM SELECTION GUIDANCE................................ 4 l
CH EC KUST DEVELOPM ENT.................................. 5 C H EC KLI ST U S E . . . . . . .. . . .. .. . .. . . . ... . . . .. . . .. . .. 7. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . :
CH E C KLI ST D ESIG N. ... . ... ..... . . .. . .. . . ... .. .. .. . .. .. . ..8 ..... .. ..
IN FORMATION SOURC ES....................................... 10 i
f CH EC KLIST H EADING S......................... ......... ........ 11 GENERIC AND SPECIFIC CHECKLISTS............. 12 C H E C KLI STS. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . ATTACHMENTS l
l r r/41
I EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Checklists were first used during RFO #6 for the Rectro Pipe Replacement ;
work; based on this effort Plant Operational Condition Change Checklists I were created to provide a management tool that aids in trackin.g RFO #7+
tasks and issues. The checklists incorporate as many tasks and issues as possible in one location and provide an additional check on important i itemc. Attempts have been made to make the checklists as comprehensive I as possible without being overly redundant with existing plant tracking l systems. 1 Checklists have be n developed for eight (8) plant outage milestones. Each milestone has its own unique items to be accomplished, but the majority ;
of items on all checkflats are items that are common to all eight '
checklists. For example; the completion of Appendix R required modifications will appear on each checklist, but the actual completion of the modifications is not required until plant startup. This was done to ensure that the ongoing Appendix R project work did not interfere with the :
cc,.1pletion of a particular milestone.
Status updates of checklist items are distributed on a weekly basis to all managers and personnel responsible for the completion of enecklist items.
Daily checklist status meetings are held when the milestone is approaching to more closely follow items that may become impediments to I accomplishing the milestone. Informal spot auditting of the completion of required formal documentation is performed to verify the closeout of l checklist items. Section Manager concurrence with the completion and '
disposition of each item on a checklist is required before tho checklist is ;
signed by the Director - Outage Management for presentation to the Plant Manager. This presentation is one of the Director's means of ensuring the readiness of the plant to enter the milestone and is meant to aid the ORC in reaching the decision to authorize entry into the Plant Operational Condition.
At this time the Checklist Program is informal in that it is not an 1
approved plant prugram. RFO #7+ is being used as a trial outage to determine the usefullness of the checklists. A determination of the usefullnes.)
- d continued use of the checklists will be made at the end of RFO #7+.
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PLANT OPERATIONAL CONDITION CHANGE CHECKLISTS pag 3 2 CHECKLIST PROGRAM OBJECTIVES Tne program objectives are broad enough in scope to allow the program to encompass all outage related work and any other committments that must be completed for particular milestones during an outage. To allow construction of a comprehensive checklist very general Checklist Objectives were defined, to identify all the areas that might contain l items of interest or concern for the outage a very detailed Checklist Format was designed, and to allow in. corporation of nearly any item on the checklists a very broad Checklist item Selection Guidance was designed.
l CHECKLIST OBJECTIVES
- 1. Provide management a tool to aid evaluating outage progress.
- 2. Provide a means of breaking down the outage into distinct milestones.
- 3. Provide a TICKLER FILE for items to be accomplished prior to performing milestone activities.
- 4. Provide a final management check on required work prior to Management authorizing per'orrrance of milestone activities.
- 5. To preclude running into an insurmountable number of items to be accomplished just prior to entering a Plant Operational Condition .
Change. I
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f PLANT OPERATIONAL CONDITION CHANGE CHECKLISTS pag 3 3 CHECKLIST FORMAT A. HARDWAREITEMS A 01 Applicable Systems / Equipment A.02 Plant Modifications (PDC'S)
A.03 Plant Temporary Modifications (TM'S) (TM Log Book)
A.04 SystenvEquipment Maintenance Requests and Procedures, including Preventive Maintenance (PM)
A.05 Failure and Malfunction Reports (F&MR's)
B. _ SOFTWARE ITEMS B.01 Operating / Maintenance Surveillance Procedures (ST's)
B.02 Temporary Procedures (TP's)
B.03 New or Revised Operating / Surveillance / Maintenance Procedures l
B.04 Deficiency Reports (DR's)
B.05 Non Conformance Reports (NCR's) ;
B.06 Potential Conditions A&erse to Quality (PCAO's) l B.07 Training B.08 Engineering Support Requests (ESR's)
B.09 Drawings and Vender Manuals (Associated with Modifications)
B.10 Operating Experience Rev!ew (OER), including ' Conditional
- Saiety Evaluations B.11 Stop Work Orders E,12 Management Corrective Action Reports (MCAR's)
C. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ITEMS C.01 Technical Specification Concems D. NRC RELATED ITEMS D.01 NRC CommitmentvConcems and Ucensee Even Reports (LER's)
E. EMERGENCY PLAN ITEMS E.01 Emergency Plan issues for Criticality / Power Operations F. BACKLOG PROJECT ITEMS F.01 Baddog Recommendations G. PROGRAM ITEMS (nad Protection, Fire Protection, Security, Housekeeping,Decon, etc.)
a H. "P_pNCHLIST" AM[LOTHER ITEMS
PLANT OPERATIONAL CONOITION CHANGE CHECKLISTS pag 3 4 CHECKL!ST ITEM SELECTIO.N GUIDANCE
- 1. Any uncaptured items you know or believe arn necessary to "COMPLETE" prior to beginning a Plant Operational Condition Change (Checklist Milestone).
- 2. Any required and "Tracked" items which, because of their substantial multidisciplinary review and approval process, require increased management attention to insure completion of all facets of the item, Usually an item of this type will have multiple checklist entries that cover the major events within the single work package.
- 3. Any items that historically have been items that have caused problems or delays in reaching plant milestones.
- 4. Surveillance procedures required to be performed prior to plant milestones, including MSTP scheduled procedures, i
- 5. Any item that the Checklist Team (OMG) wishes to follow due to potential for delaying a milestone.
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- 6. Any item for which you are responsible and wish to be reminded.
l There will be eight (8) checklists used during RFO #7+. These checklists correspond to the major milestones that will ocurr during the outage. The titles of the checklists are:
- 1. REFUEL BRIDGE TESTING COMPLETE OFFLOAD CORE !
- 2. COMMENCE RELOADING FUEL l
- 3. RELOAD COMPLETE ASSEMBLE VESSEL & CONTAINMENT
- 4. PLANT HYDROSTATIC TESTING l
- 5. INTEGRATED LEAK RATE TESTING
- 6. PRE CRITICAL TESTS / PLANT STARTUP
- 7. PLANT HEATUP & TESTING
- 8. POWER ESCALATION & PHYSICS TESTING l
PLANT OPERATIONAL CONDITION CHANGE CHECKLISTS pago 5 CHECKLIST DEVELOPMENT Checklists were developed using the defined plant milestones (Operational Condition Changes) as guideposts for identifying items to be incorporated {
i into each checklist. Checklist #1 Refuel Bridge Testing Complete / Offload l Core was initially developed and used as a reference for the other l checklists. Many of the items on Checklist #1 appear on the other checklists due to making #1 as comprehensive as possible. Items were identified by reviewing the P2 outage schedule, program tracking systems, and work tracking systems; in addition to asking all groups involved with the outage to contribute items. Items were then classified using the Checklist Format and reviewed for applicability to the checklist. Items were then assigned to sections within the format and determinations made on the responsible Approvers and Doers. Attempts were made to make the initial checklist as comprehensive as possible by including items that ;
were not necessary to complete for this milestone but important enough for the outage to bring people's attention to the itams very early in the outage. A complicating factor was that the INSERVICE INSPECTION PROGRAM began prior to moving fuel which raised a number of system operability concerns that would normally have been identified after the fuel had been offloaded.
The initial checkhst was widely distributed for review, comment and revision with regards to incorporated items and assignment of responsibility. After comment review and checklist revision the initial distribution for uso was made on December 1. Two different distributions have been made each week: an Open items List sorted by Approver, and a full Status Update on all checklist items. When the Refuel Bridge became available for operator training daily checklist status meetings were held to focus closely on the items to be completed before fuel movement could begin. At this time daily checklist status updates were produced that allowed responsible personnel to focus in on the items remaining to be completed. Section Managers were required to review the completion and disposition of checklist items, prior to authorizing fuel movement, to provide an additional level of management review. A similar sequence of events is planned for the other checklists.
i PLANT OPERATIONAL CONDITION CHANGE CHECKLISTS page 6 i
Checklist #1 items that have been dispositioned as Not Required for Offload will be cascaded to Checklist #2 and subsequent checklists until the item is completed. Checklist #1 items that have been dispositioned as Complete will be reviewed for applicability to Checklist #2 and subsequent checklists. items that are required for multiple' milestones will also be cascaded to Checklist #2 and subsequent checklists. This will cause all items to be reviewed for applicability to each of the checklists so that the checklists for RFO #8 will be much easier to assemble.
Use of Checklist #1 will stop once the movement of fuel begins. At that time Checklist #2 will be issued and items on that list will begin being tracked. This will be possible only because of the relatively long timeframe between offload and reload. Subsequent checklists will have to be issued prior to reaching the previous milestones to allow adequate lead time for the checklist to be effective. One to two weeks prior to reaching a specific milestone is a minimum required iead time for issuarice of the applicable checklist. If a review and comment period is desired an additional week should be provided for in issuing checklists.
It is anticipated that future outage checklists w;ll be handled in a similar manner so that items that appear on the first checklist for an outage will be reviewed for applicability to the subsequent checklists for that and future outages. The intent is to identify tasks with milestones so that future outage checklists can be built using the plant's computerized ,
planning capabilities. Although each outage is unique the vast majority of outage activities are repetitive in nature which wou'd allow th9 plant's .
planning program to produce the baseline checklists for future outages.
The outage unique items could then be added to the appropriste baseline checklist for use during that outage.
Although the checklists are repetitious of already existing tracking and
) planning tools, they are unique in that it is presently the only system that
- crosses all boundaries by incorporating items from essentially all of the l
plant's tracking and planning systems. This coridition will exist unti! the new Relational Database Program is installed on the PS & CC mainframe
- computer.
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7 PLANT OPERATIONAL CONDITION CHANGE CHECKLISTS page 7 CHECKLIST USE The checklists are best used as a management tool for tracking the status of work items for particular outage milestones. Effectiveness requires a great deal of front end work and continual updating. The checklist is a dynamic tool that changes daily as new Items are identified and the status of existing items changes. This information must be assimilated in an organized fashion and disseminated expeditiously in order for it to be an effective tool.
The ability to add items to the checklist at any time is of utmost importance. As a milestone approaches it is important to hold daily checklist update meetings; in order for these meetings to be effective the checklist must have been updated since the last meeting. The checklist has been designed to facilitats rapid turn around of update information. A complete checklist can be updated and printed in 2 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, i
Checklist items were initially identified by a two man team, who i
reviewed scheduled outage work and other available work documents and tracking systems to identify potential checklist items. Items were then categorized using the checklist format and computerized using a database program. Plant management and supervision were then asked to review the checklist items for ac. uracy and applicability to the checklist milestone.
The checklist was then revised and distributed for use. New items were added to the list as they were identified. Weekly update reports were i
distributed until the milestono was eminent; at which time daily meetings began.
Checklist items can be added at any time, items deemed to be Not Required for a particular milestone can be cascaded to the next checklist.
Items are not removed from the checklist; items are dispositioned as COMPLETE, NOT REQ'D, CLOSED, or DELETED. COMPLETE means that an item is field complete, NOT REO'D means the item is not required for this t
' milestone, and CLOSED means that all necessary paperwork has been completed. DELETED is normally only used for items that should not have been on the checklist, such as duplicate items. An exception to this is the l Operations and Maintenance Surveillance Procedures. For surveillances the :
status block contains the required frequency of the surveillance and the date it was last performed.
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PLANT OPERATIONAL CONDITION CHANGE CHECKLISTS p:g3 8 CHECKLIST DESIGN Checklist design was accomplished by considering all possible work groups, work and committment tracking systems, outage plannk1g systems, and past outage experience. This lead to designing the Checklist Information Sources organization chart on page 10 and created the subsections of the Checklist Format on page 3.
Because of the large number of organizations involved and the varied types of information that was being gathered it was decided that the checklist design must be easy to use yet flexible enough to handle complex issues.
This was accomplished by breaking down complex issues to smaller tasks and categorizing the tasks according to the checklist format with one major item that was a final check that the issue was completed.
The checklist has nine (9) Headings under which information is entered.
Those headings are as follows:
ITEM NUMBER ENTRY DATE SYSTEM PROJECT NUMBER REFERENCE DOCUMENT ITEM SUBJECT PRODUCTS NEEDED OR JUSTIFICATION APPROVERS DOERS STATUS - DATE An explanation of each of the headings is included on page 11 under CHECKLIST HEADINGS. Sufficient space was allotted to each heading to ,
allow for inputting enough information to ensure the item was fully ;
understood by everyone involveo with the checklists.
1 To provide for rapid turn around of updated checklists the checklists were computerized using a dedicated computer terminal. Updated checklists can be produced within an hour of receiving update information, although updates are normally printed once per day.
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1 PLANT OPERATIONAL CONDITION CHANGE CHECKLISTS page 9 l l
I The checklists can be printed in many different forms. The normal method is to print all the items on a checklist with the status of each item. A ,
very useful printout has been a checklist with just the open items, i.e. the !
items that have not been completed or dispositioned as no.t required for I the milestone. Capabilities have also been provided to allnw printing the checklist sorted by any of the headings. This gives the checklist program ,
enough flexibility to be able to handle any type of special request for j analysis of data.
l In order to standardize some of the terminology used when reporting !
status of items it was decided to use the term COMPLETE to mean field complete, CLOSED to mean documentation complete, and NOT REQ'D to mean '
not necessary for the milestone. By standardizing the terms used for l'
dispositioning items, the program now has the capability of sorting the checklist items by status, i.e. If an item does not have a status of one of ;
the three terms above then it is an open item. Another useful printout ,
would be to print the checkilst sorted by system number. That report ,
would provide a sequential listing of all the items required to be i completed for a system during the outage. t l
To provide a final check on the ooerability of important systems a number !
of checklist items were added that require the checklist user to verify i that required system MR's are completed or that the system meets i operability requirements. The systems included on a particular checklist l
are those that are required by Tech Specs or through experience have been }
necessary to support the operability of required systems for a plant j milestone. For example, the HPCI system is not en the Offload Core i Checklist but will be on the Heat Up and Power Escalation Checklists. ,
Future checklists should be developed using the checklists used during !
RFO#6 & 7 and the Generic Checklist to arrive at an outage specific j checklist based on the tasks to be accomplished during the outage. l Consideration should also be given to developing a master checklist for l each outage and using that single checklist for the entire outage, items on the checklist could then be specified as to the milestones that the item would be required to be completed.
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1 PLANT OPERATIONAL CONDITION CHANGE CHECKLISTS page 11 CHECKLIST HEADINGS ITEM NUMBER !
A Sequential number assigned to each line item that f .cilitates categorizing each line item. The number is comprised of the checklist number followed by the section number fro'm the checklist j
format followed by a three digit sequence number that is just the order the item was entered. ,
l ENTRY DATE '
The date that the line item was entered into the checklist.
SYS PROJ# -
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i The code used to identify systems or projects. Note that the system numbers are the normal number codes used for identifying systems.
SUBJECT 1 The system or issue to be addressed by the line item. This should include enough information so that no confusion is created in !dentifying the task to be accomplished.
PRODUCTS NEEDED OR JUSTlFY IF NOT REQ This Is the end product needed to satisfy the objective of the checklist. On cchecklist #1 it is tne product needed to perform a core offload, i.e. the systems, procedures, evaluations, and conditions that must exist in order to offload fuel, if the item is not required then sufficient information must be given before an item will be signed off or authorized for transfer to a following checklist. This oolumn only needs to be filled in if the product is not obvious.
l APPRVR l i
This is the initials of the person responsible for approvat of the line item task. Persons' initials l
will be followed by a period, organizations, such as GE, will have the abbreviation listed.
DOER This is the person assigned by the APPROVER to either perform the assigned task or to tupervise the cc.mpletion of the task.
ST ATU S-D ATE A completed item should be marked as complete with the date of completion. The official status will be that posted in the tracking systems maintained by Nuclear Management Services.
Additional information can be provided to aid in identifying problem areas and in resolving issues in a timely manner.
PLANT OPER ATIONAL CONDITION CHANGE CHECKLISTS page 12 GENERIC AND SPECIFIC CHECKLISTS A G.ENERIC CHECKLIST has been developed which should be used as the bateline checklist for each outage milestone. This checklist encompasses items that should be considered when getting ready for' any plant operational condition change. The majority of the items on this generic checklist are confirmatory items that require the verification of the operability of required systems. The generic checklist thus becomes an outline on which to base the development of milestone specific checklists.
SPECIFIC CHECKLISTS are checklists that contain all the items required to be performed or completed before entry into the milestone should begin. The specific checklist contains the generic items as they pertain to the specific milestone plus those items that are milestone specific.
Included with this Checklist Package are a series of checklists. The first checklist is the generic checklist followed by the actual Checklist #1.
The generic contains approximately 200 line items. From that initial 200 items, checklist #1 developed into a comprehensive checklist of nearly 700 items. Many of the items on checklist #1 will be cascaded on to the following checklists because they were deemed not required for fuel offload. The additional checklists are lists of those items that have been identified to be completed for the particular milestones. Each of the milestone specific checklists will be constructed as that milestone approaches by combining the generic checklist, cascaded items from previous checklists, and the milestone specific items. Thus, each checklist will be a comprehensive checklist of the items to be considered for entry into the milestone.
Each checklist will be used as a dynamic tool for evaluating and following the progress towards achieving a particular milestone. Although the checklists are not a work planning system they are used to identify important and necessary work to be completed prior to entering a milestone and thus will become an important management tool throughout RFO #7 and future outages.
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CHECKLIST # G GENERIC CHECKLIST A. HARDWARE ITEMS JAN 28 87 Page:7 A.05 FAILURE & MALFUNCTION REPORTS (FMMtS)
.M ENTRY ~
PFCDUCT5 MEIDCR em)MER DATE SYS#RCue FEFEFENCE N MW $UWECT JUBTM F NOT FEQ APPR W 000t $f ATUS DATE -
4 G AC6001 DEC 188 si a M 3-1. F6MR maavE PEEDToPEPFGW OETUtMhATION BY AL& P M.
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CIECKLIST# G GENERIC CHECKUST B. SOFTWARS ITEMS JAN 28 87 P8ge: 8 8.01 OPERATINOMAINTENANCE SURV PROC.($T'S)
.d ENTRY PR@UCTS PEEMDCR PA445ER DATE SYSPROJs PEFTAENCErrri W $UE)ECT JUETFY F NOT PEQ APPRvR 00ER STATUS-DATE G BC1Oc1 CEC 184 14 &E1J CORE SPRAY WCV PIM WONTHLY ~
CPERA8LfTY LAST 00P4 i
G S C' CCt CEC 18C 14 4 W 2 2 'O t.1 CCAE SPMY LCGC TEST PLES PW $1ut ANNy AL~
LAST DOP4 G B C1 W3 CEC 1 es is a M 2 2.$0.12 CCRE SPMY LOGC TEST ALS PW SEWFANNUE LAST DCe4 0 8 01 Otd DEC 1 d6 14 0 W 2 2.101.3 CCPE SPMY LOGC TEST RLS PM SE WL ANNu At LAST DCv4 G B Ci Cc6 DEC 1 at 14 8 W 2 2.1014 00pE SPMY LOGC TEST RL& PM li SEWFANNVAt LAST Dord 4 8 01 Ote DEC 186 14 8 W 2 2101.5 Cope SPMY LOGC TEST RLE PM EE WL ANNu4 LAST DOP4 G B 01007 ~ CEC 1 as is 8 W 2 21014 CCfE FRAY LOGC TEST RLS PM SE Wk ANNU4
'! LAST DOP4 j G B 010C4 CEC 1 er 14 8 W 2 2.101.7 CORE SPMY LOGC TEST RES PW &&MbANNu4 LAST Dord G B C1000 CEC i SS 14 8 W 3 21018 CCFE SPRAY LOGC TEST PLES Pu $4WsANNvAL LAST DOP4 G S 01 C9 C CEC 186 14 &L15 CCRE SPRAY WOW FBOW CPCE PER it he3 PLM CroCL t4 WO
); ALTEPWATE SHUTDOWN PANELS
- 'i C11 CEC 1 e6 14 8 C 13 CORE SPRAY 40tC PLW 2wCNTM V4VE LINEUP LAST DC6E LaeC1C12 CEC 186 14 4 Ai4 CCfE SPRAY SYS NTEGR.TY Piu QUARTERLY LAST DCtd 4801013 CEC 1 a5 14 4 L18 OtfE SPM Y ST1 CSECK PLM QNCERO V4W C*th ASUTY SA499 LAST DCr4 G B C1014 CEC 185 14 2220 CORE SPRAY SYS Lp4I.85 Piu ATTACMMENT A.DC1)EE V4VE VERvC ATCH G B C1 Cil CEC 186 901 8102 PERFCAW CLA&$ N 4 31 i PRE $7ARTVP ffEW J B. J$
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CHECKLIST # 0 GENERIC CHECKLIST B. SOFTWARE ITEMS JAN 28 47 Page:9 !
8.01 OPERATINGAMINTENANCE SURV. PROC.(ST'S)
W ENTRY PRccuCTs eCR mR DATE SYS# Ram PERpsNCE rm azNT SURACT JusTFY F NCT MQ APPRVR DOER STATUS DATE G B @1022 MC 186 14 8 C.24 COM SPf%Y M&kLY LLeE PIM M EKLY LAST DC*4 0 g C1 e23 CE C
- 88 14 8 C to CORE S* RAY- '
PIM &EW'AMewA[
SEMb ANNUAL LUGE LAST DCP4 G B 01 C24 MC 188 14 4 E.14 CCRE SPRAY P45TR CAL ALA PW ONCL* Q LAST DONE G aet02$ DEC 1 e6 14 e C.is CCRE SPRAY 410KV480V PLM
~
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G B 01027 DEC 186 to 4112 COPE SPRAY REMOTE PIM ONC0B0 904CATICH CHECK 1
0 581 C2t DEC 186 14 e W 2-2 41 -
CCRE SPRAY MADER CELTA RL1 P.M OUARTERLv P TEST.OPER 1i LAST DCt4 G B 01 C31 DEC 186 14 eW 2.1.1 CORE SPRAY Ms WATER
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$AT1SFIES CS & Rm POWER ILS WONITOR lAST DC*4 i
G 8 0t C35 CEC 186 14 8W223i SATWlES CS & R4 CCM $ PRAY AD6 PLaAP REE Pu MDNMT ~
DeCMAGE A0 NTERLCCX LAST DC*4 1
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. C3 7 DEC 186 11 441 $8LC PVW OPERABLrrY PLM uONTMy
- O FLCM RATE TEST LAST DCet G 8 01034 CEC i 86 11 7.1.19 $4LC VOLLME COC. Piu RC hCNNLY SOLLm0N N TANN LASTDCe4 l G S 01 C33 DEC 1 e6 11 443 smLC NLEF VALW C4CE ONCLCM TEST PLW G B 01040 DEC 186 11 8 L12 saLC REWTE NCeCATod CDCLC CI TEST Piu l CHECE G 8 0t De1 CE C 186 45 3 W 120
!' sov LEWL svCCMS RLS PW OVARTE A v OPER 10 LAST DCr4 I G B01 042 CEC 186 46 O li2 CM MEWTE POCATCH PLu ChCLtvCLE (RP 6)
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! G 8 01064 CE C 1 e6 45 833 $0V %E NT AND DRAN 8LDC TEST Piu CNA RTE A v ~
' FUNCTCNAL TEST PERFCRW.D wTrH LAST DCP4 S W 121
'a B 0 5 08 6 CEC 1 M M S73 SEC CONT LLAA RATE TE$T Piu Ct4 LSO CPER 10 LAST CK*4 J G SG1064 CEC 186 60 tC6 TEST or CPES crtRASUTY P1W WONTRY
. LAST CCet G 8 01 De? CEC 1 e6 W 8729 CMS DAWER NEPECTON
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B.01 OPERATING,WINTENANCE SURV. PROC. (ST'S) !
.W ENTRY PMou:Ts usmnCR NUWEER DATE SYS#RCus PERRENCE DOCLAENT SUBJECT JVETFY F NOT MQ APPRVR DOER STATUSCAft (La 0 t A*8 CEC 1 as se a 7.2 7 MATA P ACROS$ CONTROL PLM CNCE/10 WC ROOWGNYPODNENTAL SWTEM G 8 01 Cic DEC 1 as de 4 8 is 800i SPRAY $YSTEM PLW CNCECYC[I 1 (FRE WATCH) . LAST DCr4 l
j G B #1 C5.9 CEC M M e4 47.2s 23T $11TVW OPUW4Urv PLW I CNCLCVCEI
, I LAST DC*4 I
G B C1C12 DE C 186 44 6 7.2 J 98GT MOTY
AFTER WTR WANT.
G S 01 CS3 C(C 1 a6 48 8 7.2 e NGT CONTRCL 20 Cad OKE PER it WO CR PLW cec L'il dO~
MJWOfrY . HEATERS AFTER WTR WANT.
-G B C1 eta CEC 1 as 44 8 W 21.5 4 3 SSGT HCuTON ANO RL1 PW SEWFANwn '
% EDG 16OLATON LAST DCed
, SY1 A940ARD t
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].
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. G S 410$7 CEC 186 30 4 E 30 PS:CW SY3TE.M N$TR CAL RECD F CONT, RL1 PW CNCERO COOLNG M 20 LAST DCr4 G B C1 CSS DEC 1 e6 33 8 C i3 l RSCCW LOtC VAtW LNEUP RECD F CONT. PiW 2 EhTH ~ I CCCLH3 REDO LAST DC#4 050 CEC 186 M 4 Lit AB:CW COLD MJTCCWN RECD. F CCh7. PLW 20NTHLv ^
VatW TESTNG COcue3 MOD LAST CO.E G B C1063 DEC 1 at 3 *,, e C it RECW 4 itKY 40CV
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' CPER AalLTY TEST t G S Qi Cnia CE C 1 e6 M &&34 i
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CHECKLIST # G GENERIC CHECKLIST B. SOFTWARE ITEMS JAN 26 47 Page: 11 B.01 OPERATINGMAINTENANCE S'W. PROC.($T'S) a EwTmy PecouCTs esCaoem s.#IE R DATI SYS#mCus PERPENCE N Mh'T SUEJECT JUSTFY F NOT pEQ APPmW DOEA STATU$.DATE o a ei 07o DEC 1 as le 11e2 asw Cnoseone vALvis maco. p CcNT. Piu oNCtmo 00CL883PEco. LA8T DONE c a 01071 CEC's as 45 8W2132 N ECA EN"#
WoNrfom RhCTCNg "A * #
LAST DONE ea 01072 CEC i as to e C.is mMn (LPCn Lcnc vAtvss PLM twoNTH LAST Cod G 8 01.073 DEC t m 10 e C.ie mMR4im v4eOy PERpomW WEEgy PLW veEnv Swf7CMEM BLRVEELANC4 LAST 00P4 G a 01074 osC i as $0 e E.50 pHm LPCs sysisW us eu Cectso ' ~
NSM CAL. CPEA 12 LAST DDPd G e ot ers CEC i ss 10 asas w LPCIPLow AATs ust Piu ouAmrtn5 -
LAST DCPd 0001077 DEC i as 10 S Att FNm LPC18YS NT10RfTY PLW QUARTE 41 LAST DCPd G s ei 07e DEC i as 10 e W 215 e LPC4cw mEssumE us ex uceawy PEmWESM LASTCord C5 91079 MC i 88 10 4 W 2-2.10 21 LPCI MCTON NT PLE.1 Pu MWwANW4 LAST DCed G S 45.0m CEC i 88 10 8 W 2-210 2 2 LPCI MCTON NT R& Pu SEWS ANw4 LAST DCed G B Ct 0e1 CEC i es 10 4 W 2 2 to 2 3 LPCI MCTCN NT RLS PW SEW $ ANN A LASTDCed 04J DEC i es 10 0 W 2 210 2 4 LPCI M CTON NT ALS PW Siu-awgal LAST Dced G a 01043 CEC i e6 10 4 W 2 210 2 5 LPC4 MC7CN P(T e k7m E E W us PW SE W5 Aw;4 SETS TO PEMOfW LAST DOPd G S 01044 M C i86 10 8 W 2 210 2 4 L;Cl MCTON NT e k7m PECRC W RLS PW HW ANw4 SETS TO PERPORW LASTOced G 8 01 Del Ch 186 10 0W221027 LPC4 MCTON NT DGED BOTW FEC8C W RL1 PW &EWKANw4 MT5 TO PUFORW LAST00Pd G S 41006 CEC i e6 10 a W 2 210 2 4 LPCI MCTON NT DGEDBCTHIEC E ha3 RLE PW MWb A.Nw4 SETS TO PE8FORW LAST DONE G B 01007 CEC i e5 10 e W 2 210 2 e LPCI M CTON NT ut Pu 6Ewt awJ4 LA57 CCNE 6 8 01 Det CEC i al 10 4 W 2-110 210 LPCI MCTON NT RLS Pu stW- ANw 4 LAST CCP4 6 0 01 Das CEC 188 10 4 W 22it211 LPC4 M CTON NT AL& PW 6LW.ANNbhi LAST DCed
__GS31OM CEC 1as 10 4 W 2 210 212 LPCi MCTm NT 955D KmoECec ha3 RLs Pu u Woasw d SETS TO PtfrCRW LAST Cod G S 01 Oli CEC i st 50 0 W 2110 213 LPCI MCTCN NT RLt Pu MW$ANwn LAST DONE G B 01002 CEC 1 m 10 4 W 2 210 214 LPCs MCTON NT RLS Pu uW&aws4 LAST DOPd
- OM DEC i 88 10 4 W 2 210 2 il LPC4 MCTON NT RLs Pu EE M' AN%4 LAST DOPd
CHECKLIST 0 G GENERIC CHECKLIST l
B. SOFTWARE riEMS JAN 28 87 Page: 12 '
B.01 OPE RATINGMAINTENANCE.SURV. PROO. (ST'S) l
~
I d ENTRY PRIILCTS EFMDCPL AedMR DATE S YS-PRCbe PEPEFENCE rirYt urNT SUBJECT JLETFY F esOf fEQ APPR%14 00ER STATUS-DATE G l e1 00s DEc l es 10 s W 2 2. 0 216 LPCi MCTION NT DEED 00TH f5C#C MG RLA PW MWFANNv4 SETS TO PEMofed LAST DCNE 4 8 0' De9 Cf C 188 10 8 W 2-11C 217 LPCI MCTION NT RL1 P.M M WFANW4 LAST DOPE 0 801086 MC 186 10 SE23 LPCi v4%10PEnestrry -
Pin 4 WONMY LAST DO*4
' G S 61097 DEC 1 es 10 8 L11 LPC4 COLD 8+41TDOWd R600 > CONT. PLW WONMY VALVE TEST 00CLM1 pEQO LAST DONE l G B 01 Det CEC 186 8W2164 ^
10 LPci H 20LATioN RL1 Pu MWtANNun l V4vtTEST LAST Dord C.B 01 ces MC 1 as 10 4W2154i LPC4 M tbOLATioN PW RES uWi ANNv4 v4YE TE5T LAST 00Pd a e 61 too DEC 1 as 10 8W215t LPci M ISCLAT10N RLS PW StW' ANN 75 V4VE TEST LAST Dort
-I i
Q B $1.101 CEC 1 as 10 8W216&1 LPCI N GOLATiON RLS Pk MWn ANNv4 V4YE TEST LASTD0*4 J Q 8 01.102 DEC 45 10 tE28 LPCs WQv ALT EQ PA>EL PEPPOW OPCECYC11 Piu CNCLCYCt1 LAST DONE G B 01103 CEC 1 et t0 8 W 2 21.7 LPCJ LOW Pas &SURE PLES PW ouARTIRLY PERW45NT AUTO hrf LAST DCNE O O 01104 CEC 1 e5 90 0 W 2-2.t 8 LPCILCW PRE $$URE RLS PW CuARTE RLY PE8WSSN1 PUECTICN LAST DOPK j
VALVES l
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SAFE 0VAAD LAST Dord J Q R 01,104 DEC i et 10 4W211 LPCIPC S REACTOR HG4 RLS PW ucN M Y PfESSURE LAST DCNE G 8 01109 MC l ag 10 8 W 2 210 31 4
LPCI CCNT AWWENT & PRAY RL1 PW $( W,. ANw4 PERWESNT LAST Dord !
I O 8 011to CEC 1 et 90 8 W 2 210 3 2 LPCJ CONTA846ENT SPRAY RLS PW &EW AN%4 j PLRWSSNT LAST0074 0801114 CEC t et 10 21.7 LPCl%1&ML HEAT UPCCCL fEOD FOL CRJTAES PLW DCmH (84A 4 0eO O4CK OREATER THAN 3 hc )
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) G B 01 til CEC 1 as 10 4f18 LPC4LLRT OF PRICONT JB PW PENETRATICW4 4 VAL %tS WG100123 A.26A298 60, 80.8347 G S et122 CEC 1 e6 10 8 C 24 LPCI ME 4Y Lt.4lE
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W ENTRY
Q B 0112e MC12 40 8.10 2 CPLA 14 FUEL HMOL94G PLM ME4Y i 50VPWENTDECs3 LAST DCrE G S 09103 CCC 186 49 8103 OrEA 14ML KINDLNG PLM EOUMENT DECs3 I
G B 01.130 CEC 1 se a8 8104 1
OPER 14ML HANDLNG PLM EOUMENT OGC40 '
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l G S 01132 MC 188 45 8W11 CPER14mus l MLS PM CNCLCYCLE LAST DOPd G B 01133 DEC1 m 45 eW131 CPER 10. APRW SETDom RLS PW OCLCYCLE "
LAST DCPd G e oi t34 C(C 186 el S W 121 ~
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1 G B 01 ill MC 1 as 45 4W142 CPEA 12 4 WCOE $MTCH REA Pu CH".L90 N SHJTDom LAST DOPE G B 01134 M C 1as 45 4 W i.23 OPEA 12 h MANUAL &CAAW RL1 PM OUAMEAv LAST DCed G 8 01187 CEC 1 st 45 4W233 OPER 12 5AW FUNCTON4 i RLS PM CNCLCYCLE j LAST DOPE l 0 8 0113e CEC i ss 45 a tt OPEm il evW OPERA 8aLfrY PLu o # 01.113 MC1as el 4 W t.1 OPE R 16. PW FL*C TIC % RL& PW CNCLCYCLE 1
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, EOCK SYS LOCC OECK B LA.1T DOP4 G S 01148 CEC 186 10 8&21 LPC4PUhr CPLfu8tny PLW OTHLY j
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CHECKLIST # G OENT.RIC CHECKLIST I
- 8. SOMWARE ITEMS JAN 24 47 Page: 14 3
S.02 TEMPORARY PROCEDURES UP8) 4 ENTen dm recouct e maDom '
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B. SOFTWARE ITEMS JAN 20 47 Page: 15 5.03 NEW MEVISEts OPERSURV PROCEDURE S d ENTRY PRutnCTS MEDEDCR esAsER DATE syg m MPgpWC40COMENT SURECT JUSTFY F NOT MQ APPRW CCER STATLt 0Att G S SHi? DEC 1 es 1ce APPEeOGER LST NEW CR REV CPEA AND MMA hMNT PROC REQUWED CR,lE TO W Rte 00s l I i
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i
! 8. SOF1 WARE ITEMS JAN 28 47 Page: 14 ;
- SN OEFCENCYREPORTS(OR1) t
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.M LNTRY PRCEUCM PEEEEDOR NUweER DATE SYS-PWJ REFERENCC CXUMENT SUSKCT JUSTFY F NOT REO APPRVR 00ER STATUS DATE G L 06 001 JAN 15 t7 ' PC.AQs ENSURE PCAOS AFFECTNG Rvf. DAW
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1 CHECKLISTD G GENERIC CHECKUST B. SOFTWARE ITEMS JAN 28 87 Page: 19 8.07 TRAINING NEEDS AND REQUIREMENTS
.M ENTRY NUMBE R PR3 DUCTS MOR DATE SYS-PROJs REFEMNCE DOCUMENT SUEJECT JUSTFY F MDT REQ APPRVR DOER STATUS CATE G B C7.001 DEC 185 de ' PROC &4 0,4 2.OPER ~
TRAN UC OPS PER80PedEL COhPLETIO TRA8dNG MAR 0a 25.5.4 3,4.3(APP.A) CN GEMM ERELNG O*ER 10-18,0.901-6 PROCEDr.RES W
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CHECKLISTD G GENERIC CHECKLIST B. SOFTWARE ITEMS JAN 28 87 Page: 20 8.08 ENGINEERNG SUPPORTREQUESTS(ESRS)
A ENTRY PICOUCT5 Pssrsncs usdBER PATE SYS#fule REFERENCE N m W SUS /ECT JUSTFY F PCT MQ APPRVR 00EA STATUS DATE G B.00 001 DEC1# ESR u.YYY ENG9EERNG SUPPCRT OF CM TEW$NC CHANGES PEEDED FOR CUTAGE ACTMTES GB C8 0C2 DEC 1 M ESR M ZZZ SAFETY EVALUATIONS ON RVI,
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OPERA 8tffY OF REQ SYS S
CHECKLISTD G GENERIC CHECKLIST B. SOF1 WARE ITEMS JAN 28 87 Page: 21 B 09 DRAWING & VENDOR MANUAL CHANGES (MOOS) 4W ENTRY MEX)UCTE MCR NUW9ER DATE SYS#ROJs REFERENCE m adcNT StWECT JUSTFY F NOT REQ APPRVR DOEA STATUS-0 ATE G BD9OC1 DEC 1 as et PDC PACMGES LPDATE OF PRIORITY 'A' h1MA J C.
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CHECKLIST l) G GENERIC CHECKLIST B. SOFTWARE ITEMS JAN 28 87 Page: 22 B.10 OPERATING EXPER1ENCE REVIEW (OERS)
..fM ENTRY PRX)UCT5 Pssrsnm NL.NGER DATE SYS#RCue PEFUENCE DnriasNT SueKCT JUSTFY F NOT FSO APPRW DOER STATUS-DATE G B 10 001 DEC 188 10 SERS, SOERS COMPTTE REVEW AND
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SER EVALUATION MEMO PDS SSW ACTCN FOR SERS
&SOER1 O B 10 005 JAN 22 87 45 PC67 TRP REVEW ComeETE PO6T TRP COMPLETED 8EVEW
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AEP. SDH i REVIEW PRCR TO STARTUP - 1
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CHECKLIST # G GENERIC CHECKLIST B. SOFTWARE ITEMS JAN 20 87 Page: 23 B.11 STOPWORKORDERS j J ENTRY M pgEEEDM ~ ~ ~
NR DATE S M RCus PEFEPENCE N MNT SlalECT JUSTFY F NOT fEQ APPRVR DOER STATUS DATE
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G B 11 001 DEC 188 49 STCP WORK Cfr ~AS
. Cl. EAR APPLCABLE SWCTS CLOSEOUT CF SWO KFa A LP.
PROR TO MLASTOPES l
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CHECKLIST # G GENERIC CHECKLIST B. SOFTWARE ITEMS JAN 28 87 Page: 24 B.12 MANAGEMENT CORRECTNE ACTON REPORTS (MCAR S) ;
.M ENTRY PIECUCTS PEEDEDOR reANER DATE SYS#ROJs PEFEFENCE N uNT SURECT JUSTFY F NOT REO APPRVR 00EA STATUS CATE G B 12 001 JAN 20 87 WCARS PESPONSE AADCORRECTME AEP.
ACTION TO WCARS
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CHECKLISTD G GENERIC CHECKLIST C. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ITEMS JAN 28 87 Page: 25 C.01 TECHNCAL SPECIFCATION CONCERNS
.M ENTRY PRODUCTS PEECEDOR
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m488ER DATE SYS# Raw FfFERENCE ryys a5W SURECT JusTFY F NOT REO APPRVR DOER ST Atut; DATE G C 01.003 DEC 186 10 POC4 f4ESOLW TECH SPEC DEO
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TECH SPEC CHANGES A EP. JDK FOR PLANT WOOS G C 010'0 CEC 30 06 117 IE CO F.XX,YW NAG mt)E SUPP. S IET*
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NRC APPROVA1 PRIOR RVF. JDK EVAL CN h4APLNGR FOR TO STARTUP SUSWITTAL NRC
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CHECKLIST # G GENERIC CHECKLIST D. NRC RELATED ITEMS JAN 28 87 Page: 26 0.01 NRC COMMITTMENTS, CONCERNS, LERS 4W ENTRY PRODUCTS PE.EDEDCR NUMBER DATE SYS PROJs PEFUENCE rvv1 W SUSKCT JUSTFY F NOT REO APPRVR DOER STATUS-CATE GD 01002 DEC 186 NRC NSPECTON CChPETE RESPONSE. E.T.a &Sw
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REN)RTS ACTON MOURED PROR TO WLESTONES G D 01004 DEC 1 e6 46 LER'S REVEW ERS APO COfmECT LER UPDATE LTG BL CUTAE RELATED WORK TO SWfTTED TO NRC
- COMPLETE ER COWWITTW.NTS G 0 01.054 JAN 18 87 til 1BXX S ALP, NRC tP4SP ~
TECHNCAL SPECFICATON NSPONSE TO PAC RVI. JDK REPORT, POC$ CHANGES TO SUPPORT PLANT M9PECTION REPORT P.TA !
STARTUP (NAC APPROVED TS CHANGE) 2 l
CHECKLIST # G GENERIC CHECKLIST 1
E. EMERGENCY PLAN ITEMS :
JAN 28 87 Page: 27 i E.01 EMER PLAN ISSUES FOR CRITICAUTY/ POWER OPS ITEM ENTRY pgxxLmmocg4 NLMSER DATE SYS#ROJs fEFEfENCE N W SUMCT JUSTFY F NM REQ APPRVR DOER STATUS CATE G E 01.001 JAN 147 999 EAG4GENCY PLAN 4 EVALUATE EAEf4GENCY Pt.AN R1 FESPCPM PROCECWES 88UES FOR CRIT 1CAUTY.
POWER OPEAATIONS D
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l CHECKLISTD G GENT.RIC CHECKLIST t l
F. BACKLOG PROJECT ITEMS JAN 28 87 Page: 28 F.0t BACKLOG RECOMENDATIONS i
.M ENTRY l PRODUCT 5 PEEEEDOR '
NUW8ER DATE SYS N NRPENX OOCIAENT SURKCT JustFY F NOT PEQ APPRVA DOER STATUS-DATE G F.01.001 DEC 1 as q SA1 EFa --
REG JP.o N E W MOURED MoonMitioN DURec CyrAoE PEnco l l
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CHECKLISTJ G GENERIC CHECKLIST G. PROGRAM ITEMS (RAD PROT, FIRE,SEC, HOUSE,DECON) JAN 28 87 Page: 29
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M ENTRY PP G UCT5 M CR j ER DATE SYS SAOJs PEFUENCE N a*NT SUWECT JUSTFY F NOT MQ APPRVr1 DOER STATUS CATE
~E G U1001 DEC 186 See PHASE le MANT MMR RES PROGRAMMATC 68UES QuC1004 DEC 18s 33 EST.T Mer FRE WATCH RV.
PATROLS N KEY PLANT AREAS
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G G ot 006 JAN 19 87 48 WPROVE RELIABLfTY OF RN S. J P.
WF$rrE PCWER SUPPLY FOR PPPS BYDECREASNG mEQ AND DURATION OF PWR LC6S l
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CHECKLIS'ID G GENTRIC CHECKLIST '
H. *PUNCHUST* AND OTHER ITEMS JAN 28 87 Page: 30 W ENTRY PRODUCTS EEMDCR
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.M R DATE SYS-PRCue EFUENCE DCCUE.NT SUBJECT JUSTFY F NOT MQ APPR W COER STATUS.DAT[
G H 01 Cc2 DEC 186 42 OECMOUT 8V7 N NCAT. CJ.R OE
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Q K015)3 CEC 186 48 FFF SERW E8 DECKOUT. C.1M CJ M ELIC WATER. AR G H01Cc4 DEC 196 49 NSTALL REFLEL DRIDGE CJM TECH
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CC64ANCAT10NS CA8LE AND REEL Th 01.006 DEC 186 64 P2 LNCERWATER TV CAMERA RES. PM O G O(CUT # O REPAR G H 01007 CEC 186 10 P2 fESTORE ALL R$ OUADRANT WJA GE "NTERFERENCES*(LET ,
ITEMS AS APPROPRIATE) j G H 01000 DEC 186 64 P2 NSTALL CATTLE CHUTE CJ M CJM
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G H 01.009 DEC 186 106 POCPS EXHSIT 9. OPERATKNAL NO NTEFIFENCES WfTH KPA WMA TUNCMR DOC 1)MENTATON SYSTEMS NCURED AE.P.
FOR WILISTCNES OR COMPLITED PDC G K01.021 DEC 186 09 CHANGE CUT DW AREA RES PM CCCLIR FLTERS FCR tRT G H 01022 OEC 186 50 SEC. CONT. PEET1%T1CNS CONTROLLED PLM PLUGGED PEETRATICNS G H 01024 DEC 5 06 993 ~ ~ ~
WATER AVALAB:LTV TO SUFFCENT WATER SDM PEM FLOCO PCCL CAvmES
- " 01 025 OEC 8 86 49 ENSURE 145 DOUBLE BLADE
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SPECIAL BCLTS 6 RES. PW GUDES AAE AvALABLE FOR NIJTS TO MA4 0000LE RJLL CCRE CFFLOAD BLACE GUCES G H 01026 CEC 0 06 31.32 -
!LAMPLE AR FROM CUTPUT RE$ Pu CF AR CC64PRESSCAS FCR '
AAR QUALITY G H 01033 JAN 7 87 45 CHANCE SETPONT CN RES PM REFVEL FLCCR (11P) APM FOR REFUELNG ACTIvmES
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CHECKLIST # 1 OFFLOAD CORE 1
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THE ENCLOSED PACKAGE CONSTITUTES THE NORMAL WORKING CHECKLIST DISTRIBUTED FOR CHECKLIST #1 ACTIVITIES-FUEL OFFLOAD l
ATTACHMENTI EXPLANATION OF CHECKLIST HEADINGS ITEM NUMBER A Sequential number assigned to each I'ne item that facilitates categorizing each line item. The number is comprised of the checklist number followed by the section number from the checklist format followed by a three digit sequence number that is just the order the ' tem was entered.
ENTRY DATE The date that the line item was entered into the checklist.
SYS-PROJ#
The code used by the ' WAR ROOM' to identify systems or projects. Note that the system numbers are the normal number codes used for identifying systems.
SUBJECT The system or issue to be addressed by the line item. This should include enough information so that no confusion is created in identifying the task to be accomplished.
PRODUCTS NEEDED OR JUSTIFY IF NOT REO This is the end product needed to satisfy the objective of the checklist, in this case it is the product needed to perform a core offload, i.e. the systems, procedures, evaluations, and conditions that must exist in order to offload fuel, if the item is not required then sufficient information must be given before an item will be signed off or authorized for transfer to a following checklist. This column only needs to be filled in if the product is not obvious.
APPRVR This is the lnitials of the person responsible for approval of the line item task. Persons' initials will be followed by a period, organizations, such as GE, will have the abbreviation listed. A complete list of initials used is provided in ATTACHMENT ll.
DOER This is the person assigned by the APPROVER to either perform the assigned task or to supervise the completion of the task.
ST ATU S-D ATE A completed item should be marked as complete with the date of completion. The official status will be that posted in the tracking systems maintained by Nuclear Management Services.
Additional informailon can be provided to aid in identifying problem areas and in resolving issues in a timely manner.
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ATTACHMENT 11 CHECKLIST APPROVERS & DOERS INITIALS M INITIALS M J.A. J. ABOLTIN M.M.A. M.M. AKHTAR P.T.A. P.T. ANTONOPOULOS W.J.A. WJ. ARMSTRONG H.R.B. H.R. BALFOUR A.B. A. BALTA J.B. J. 3ELLEFEUILLE T.M.B. T.M. BENEDUCI H.F.B. H.F. BRANNAN M.N.B. M.N. BROSEE P.T.C. P.T. CAFARELLA R.C. R. CANALAS W.C. W. CLANCY J.C. J.COUGHUN S.D. S. DASGUPTA R.V.F. R.V. FAiRBANK F.N.F. F.N. FAMULARI E
- GENERAL ELECTRJC J.P.G. J.P. GERETY D.G. D. GERUTS E.T.G. ET. GRAHAM R.EG. R.E GRAZ)O DH D. HEARD J.E.H. J.E HOWARD S.D.H. S.D. HUDSCN D.H. D. HUGHES J.J. J.JER2 J.D.K. J.D. KEYES '
D.K. D.KUBA D.L D. LONG B.L B. LUNN MAINT F.%)NTENANCE M.M M. MACUIRE C.J.M. CJ. MARTIN P.E.M. P. MASTFMNGELO D.A.M. D.A. MILLS C.M. C. MINOTT P.M. P. MORAITES A.V.M. A.V. MORISI J.W.N. J.W. NICHOLSON NED NUC.ENG. DEPT. J. P. J. PAWLAK A E.P. AE. PEDERSCN J.E.P. J.E. PETERS H.D H. POSTIN W.R. W. RIGGS K.D.R. K.P. ROBERTS J.R. J. ROGERS D.A. D.RYDMAN J.S. J. SABINA J.A.S. JA.SEERY R.E.S. R.E. SHERRY R.S. R. SILVA N.S. N. SIMPSON P.D.S. P.D. SMITH T.LS. T.L SOWDEN V.S. V. STAGUOLA W.S. W. SULUVAN J.B.S. J.B. SUTTON R.N.S. R.N. SWANSON TECH TECHNICAL LV. L VALLEE R.V. R. VELEZ D,A.W. D.A. WHITNEY P.W. P. WILLARD M.W. M. WILLIAMS S.S.W. S.S. WOLLA%N F.W. F. WOZNIAK E.J.Z. E.J. ZIEMIANSKI
ATTACHMENT lli PLANNED CHECKLISTS l
- 1. REFUEL BRIDGE TESTING COMPLETE - OFFLOAD CORE
- 2. COMMENCE RELCADING FUEL l
- 3. RELOAD COMPLETE CHECKUST
- 4. HYDRO CHECKLIST
- 5. ILRT CHECKLIST
- 6. PRE CRITICAL CHECKLIST
- 7. HEAT UP CHECKLIST
- 8. POWER ESCALATION CHECKLIST 1
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ATTACHMENT IV CHECKLIST FORMAT '
CHECKLIST #1- REFUEL DRIDGE TESTING COMPLETE / OFFLOAD CORE A. HARDWARE ITEMS A.01 Applicable SystemWEquipment A.02 Plant Modifcations (PDC'S)
A.03 Plant Temporary Modifcations (TM'S)(TM Log Book)
A.04 System / Equipment Maintenance Requests and Procedurcs, ~
including Preventive Maintenance (PM)
A.05 Failure and Malfunction Reports (F&MR's)
B. SOFTWARE ITEMS B.01 Operating / Maintenance Surveillance Procedures (ST's)
B.02 Temporary Procedures (TP's)
B.03 New or Revised Operating / Surveillance / Maintenance Procedures B.04 Defelency Reports (DR's)
B.05 Non Conformance Reports (NCR's)
B.06 Potential Conditions Adverse to Quality (PCAO's)
B.07 Training B.08 Engineering Support Requests (ESR's)
B.09 Drawings and Vendor Manuals (Associated with Modifications)
B.10 Operating Experience Review (OER), including ' Conditional
- Safety Evaluations B.11 Stop Work Orders B.12 Management Corrective Action Reports (MCAR's)
C. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ITEMS C.01 Technical Specification Concems D. NRC RELATED ITEMS D.01 NRC Commitments / Concerns and Ucensee Event Reports (LER's)
E. EMERGENCY PLAN ITEMS E.01 Emergency Plan issues for Criticality / Power Operations F. BACKLOG PROJECT ITEMS c 01 Backlog Recommendations G.
ESQGRAM ITEMS (Rad Protection, Fire Protection, Security, Housekeeping, Decon, etc.)
H. "PtJNCHLIST" AND OTHER ITEMS
ATTACHMENT V CHECKLIST OBJECTIVES
- 1. Provide management a tool to aid evaluating outage progress.
- 2. Provide a means of breaking down the outage into distinct milestones.
- 3. Provide a TICKLER FILE for items to be accomplished prior to performing milestone activities. -
- 4. Provide a final management check on required work prior to Management authorizing performance of milestone activities.
- 5. To preclude running into an insurmountable number of items to be accomplished just prior to entering a Plant Operational Condition Change.
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CHECKLIST ITEM SELECTION GUIDANCE l 1. Any uncaptured items you know or believo are necessary to l "COMPLETE" prior to beginning a Plant Operational Condition Change (Checklist Milestone).
- 2. Any required and "Tracked" items which, because of their substantial multidisciplinary review and approval process, require increased management attention to insure completion of all facets of the item.
Usually an item of this type will have multiple checklist entries that cover the major events within the single work package.
- 3. Any items that historically have been items that have caused problems or delays in reaching plant milestones.
- 4. Surveillance procedures required to be performed prior to plant j milestones, including MSTP scheduled procedures.
t 5. Any item that the Checklist Team (OMG) wishes to follow due to potential for delaying a milestone.
- 6. Any item for which you are responsible and wish to be reminded.
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PLANT OPERATIONAL CONDITION CHANGE CHECKLISTS CHECKLIST #1- REFUEL BRIDGE TESTING COMPLETE / OFFLOAD CORE l
- 1. Items marked as "COMPLETE" have been completed to the necessary degree for this milestone and that degree of work has been accepted by the final signator in the applicable work process, i.e. ,the work is "Fleid Complete". In many cases the work is finished including the documentation.
- 2. Items marked as "NOT REQ'D." have been determined to be not required for this milestone. These items will be cascaded to the next checklist and carried until completed for the appropriate milestones.
- 3. A number of items are entered on the checklist as final checks on the condition of a system just prior to authorizing entry into the milestone. Examples of this type of item are those items in section 1.A.01, which are a final check that the required systems meet operability requirements and those items in section 1.A.04 that refer to the completion of required MR's for required systems. It was the intention of the checklist team for these items to be on the checklist to provide a last minute "Stop and Think".
- 4. The Surveillance items in section 1.B.01 w;ll not be marked as complete but instead provide the required frequency and the Last Done Date as a means of checking on the completeness of required surveillances. Surveillances not required for this milestone were marked "NOT REQ'D.".
- 5. A few items had to be marked as Working Not to Affect Offload so that the potential to affect offload would be recognized and to provide a means to instigate a final check that no interferences with required systems exist.
- 6. Section Managers will be asked to confirm that they agree with the disposition of NOT REO'D ltems. Carefull consideration has been given to all items dispositioned as NOT REQ'D, but it is felt that Section Manager concurrence with those dispositions is necessary prior the ORC receiving this checklist for review.
enclosure 1
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CHECKLISTJ 1 REFUEL BRIDGE TESTING COhTLETEOFF LOAD CORE A. HARDWARE ITEMS JAN 30 87 Page:1 A.01 APPUCABLE SYSTEMSEQUIPMENT
- (TEM ENTRY PRCDUCTB PEEDEDCR
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NUW9ER DATE SYS-PRCUS PEFUENCE rm asNT SUEECT .AAITFY F NOT EQ APPRVR DOER STATUS-DATE 1.A 01001 OEC 188 14 TS Pg 1@122 SPECS 2 CORE SPRAY SYS or 1 OPER CON 4 $4PPMS SDM PLM CCWPLETE "
15445AREH CORE SPRAY a LPCI(3 POOL CCCLNG SLWY1 1/2687 VPNE 88-64 PUMPS) (UCENSNGWCFM 00 4) 1 A 01002 DEC 186 11 TS P0 85102 SPECS STANCSY UQUO ~
OPEAATONAL $8LC .&DM PLM 3 4 8 4 4 A.RC CONTROL SYSTEM 1 A 01003 DEC 186 C3 OPEA to COPITROL ROO CFWE SYS PNSSUR2EDSYSTEM SDM Piu HCLSOV CPEMR.E CfC SYSTEM 1 A 01.004 OEC 186 50 TS pg 19e SPEC 3.7 SECCDCARY CCNTAMENT OPEAAEL CONTAN4ENT SDM PLM COMMETl
& 4.7 C FOR REL H40 LNG & tt$ 37 SO WAAON 1a 01.005 CEC 186 30 T8 pg 104107 &PFCS 2 RSCCW SYSTU45 S S & 4 59 OPEAAaLE CCRE S SDM PLM SLPf4ESSON POCL COOLNG Sta8YSTEMS 1A et004 DEC 1 a6 29 TS pg 104107 SPECS ~~
&&4458 2 SALT SERVICE WATER OPEMBLE CON 40 EDM PLM LOOPS (How wy pumps?) SLPPRESSON POCL COOLNG Sta643TEMS 1 A 0100? DEC 1 as 41 SLsPCRT3 SYSTEM 2 DESEL OENERATORS TECH SPECS CPEMBLE D3s FCH SDM PLM NEED Q PEQ $4FETY SYSTDeS FUSE $ FCR BE00 1 A01.0C0 OEC 186 48 TS pg 150154A SPEC STANC8Y GAS TNATMENT CPEMaLE SSGTS WEN SDM PLM 3.7 Et 4 4.7.82 CCNRETE SEC CONF NTEGRfTY 1/2587 B NOUFED E9 CEC 186 24 TS pg 15f&154C CCNTROL ROOW CPEMaLICES SDM PLM PEED TS CHG SPEC 47 82 & EWBCMENTAL SYSTEM WM.N SEC CCNT 47Et CR TEMP M 5 NOUfED 1A 01010 CCC 196 44 844%ms SYSTEM TS 125V SATTERES A & B SAFEGUARDS LOGC 4 SDM PLM COMRETE SACXUP SCAAM 172617 (POWEA SLPPLY) 1 A01011 CEC 186 44 SL5hesia SYSTEM TS 250V EMTTER ES APS VTTAL SERVCE SDM PIM CCNRETE WG SET 17617 (PO%EA SLPfU) 1 A 01012 CEC 186 44 Stim. viia SYSTEM TS 24V BATTERES A & B NEUTBCN WCNfTORPG SDM PLM CCM%ETE~
(POWEA SLPPLY) 07& 47 1801013 CEC 186 46 SGhriia SYSTEM TS IRJSSES- AS A4.81.36.817, SLPPCRT CPERAat.ffY SDM PLM B18.014.815.8J0 Ste.829 CF PECLUED SYTTDel (PO%EA SLFPLY) 1 A 01014 CEC 186 45 TS pg 43 4 80 SPECS NFVEL FLOCR CPfGL H5TR WCH SDM PLM S10.14410.14 E.WAU57 MONflYORS NfrMTES4 CONTRCES TABLES A PROTICTM FUNC.
1 A Ct015 CEC 1 as 45 OPER 10, CPE.R 25 NRAL FLCOR AAEA OPERAoLE AAWsCN SDM PLM RAD WOMTORS EF1EL FLOCR 1 D 01014 CEC 1 as St SLPPCRT SYSTEW 15 OE.LVQF SYS DCis & SAGTS SYS CPYAABLfTY NO SDM Piu '
1A01017 CEC 186 45 TSpg82$PEC 700 WORTH WheEER REACTMTV CCNTROL SDM PLM S38364383 1 A O t 018 LEC 1 se 45 TS Pg 2640 TASt1 '
EACTCR PROTECTICN SYS D4STM & A&&OCATED SDM PLM S.1.1 DE W 4 8V H CH H T, A Ra SCAAM 010 DEC186 12 NACTOR WATER WATER PURITY SDM PLM CCNPJTE~
Q.INAJP SYSTEM tt687
CHECKLIST # 1 REFUEL BRIDGE TESTING COMPLEIEOFF LOAD CORE A. HARDWARE ITEMS JAN 30 87 Page: 2 A.01 APPUCABLE SYSTEMS 40VIPENT
' .. [W ENTRY MCOUCT5 M CR MMBER DATE SYS#RaJe MFUedCE DOCLAENT S M CT JUBTFY F M7T MQ APPRVR DOER STATUS CATE 1 A 01.020 DEC 1 as 32 SUMCE AR SYSTEM SERVICE AR FOR 8.DM PEM CCNPLETE~
REF1.ELDdQ CP& TOOLS 1/26 t7 1DS1 C21 C2C 186 31 H57RUWENT AR SYSTEM $@PORTSWTEM SDM PEM CCNPLEli.~
CPE N REQ 1/26e7 1 AD1 C22 DEC 1 es 21 MMPERAu2ED WATER REFLEL FLOm SDM PEM CCNPLETE WATER Mi.EDS 9 A01 C23 DEC 15 86 10,14 SLPPORT SYSTEW T5 ENSLIE OPU%8tJTY OF OPERMEK CO3.ERS EDM PEM FOR Rm AND CRJAD ROCW ANA COOLIRS CORE SPRAY 1 AD1.024 JAN 16 87 30 TuesE SADNO CLOSED COOLM3 WATER FCE SDM PEM CCNPLETE CCCEM3 WATER SYSTEW AUX 44RY EOUPWENT 1/26/67 1 A 41.025 JAN 20 87 2 NACTOR RECRCULATCN OPUuSLE PPH3 TO SDM PIM SWTEM $@ PORT OFFLOAD 1A 41C26 JAN 20 87 4 FOCTOR REDWATER $WTEM OPEAMLI PPPG TO SDM PEM
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CHECKLIST # 1 REFUEL BRIDGE TESTING COMPLEEOFF LOAD CORE A. HARDWARE ITEMS JAN 30 87 Page:3 A.02 PLANTM00tFICATIONS(PDCS) 1
..tW l ENTRY PRXRK;T3 pmsnOR M NGER DATE SYS-PRGJe PEFENINCE N uNT SUEJECT JUETFY F NOT MO APPRVR DOER STATUS.DATE 3 01001 CEC 186 10 PDC 36-33 FNR WNNUM FLOW PDC rs rusOLIT RES P.W NOTREOD 1 OR WANUAL PDC on HOLD NfT1ATON OF per ORC !
WW FLOW 1 A 02 OC2 CEC 1 se 10 POC e6-30 FNR NSTRLNENTAT10N (CAL FCC CLOSEOJT RES. P,M COMRETE 86-10) OR war 4R PRCC REO BY CPS & OSS .
1 AC2 003 OEC 196 45,116 POce547 MACTOR WATER LEWL POC CLOGEOl/T er DAM JEP. WCAKtG EQT j W REQUND SY5 TEM TO AFFECT i NTIMEMNMS OFFLOAD {
1.A C2 004 DEC 186 45.116 POC M 70 ANALOG TRP SYSTEM POC CLOSEOtJT or DAM J LP. WORKhG-NOT NoMOUND SWTEM TO AFFECT I NTEMEMNCES CrFLCAD 1 A 01005 OEC 186 61 POC 8547 DESEL CEFEMNTML PDC CLCEEOJT RfA PM COA %ETE 1 A C2 OC* M C 186 61 POC 3530 00 A&8 JUMPER 1&2 ANNUN. PCC CLCEEOJT RE& P.M CQJPLETE 1 A C2 007 DEC 186 104 PDC BSSI A FW D E.PC TIE INS NO
- MOUND SY3* DAM JEP. WCAKh3 NOT NTEFFEMNMS FRCN TO AFFECT E.PC CUTCM.RS OFFLCAD 1 A C2 Oct CEC 186 de POC 6554 COMPLETE FOC to M. POC CLCEECUT PM W C. COMPLETE ~
E* BIT s7MFUEL DROGE (WAJOR FRN) P.W PARTIAL EmerT #7 ExHs?
1 A C2 OC1 CEC 186 de POC 85 54 W.R FY MFUEL PLATTORM PDC CLOSECl/T(hCO PM P W. COM%ETE~'
3L 244 POSIT 1CN INTER.OCK TO PRENT.NT MED TO NCLN CBCUriRY WCRK NCLLEED AMPER NTERLCOQ PDC 8554 N PCC 4554 1 AC2.Cic CEC 186 14 POC 06-30 ~
$EAL WELD ADAPTCH FtATES POC CLOSEOJT RE1 P.M CCNPt.ETE FCR WC 100 4 A&B Ot*E C4WGCtJT 1547 PRc670SM NSP REPORT & RESPONSE i SENT TO hED I 1 AC2.011 CEC 186 10 POC 06-20 CAP RFE >E.AD $ PRAY WC5E COE. FfW PCT REA PM NOTPEOD TO SE EISUED UNTL FCR Cff LOAD 1/27/87 1 A 02 012 DEC 9 86 33 POC4341 3 HCt.R E4RRER LFORACE I
PCC CLCCECtJT MWA CCUPLETE FOR FM PROTECT 1CN OR WAf4R FCR CrFLCAD 43419 OCNE 1 A C2 013 DEC 17 46 33 APPEFOCKR EEWFY MOUMD WCOS CCWFtETE APP R WOOG R V.
FOR A19EPCIX R MOURED NOME FOR REL LJJ.
FOR FUEL CmCM OFRCAD OR CCN#VMS*TDRY WEA4MEE W PLACE 1 A C2 014 CEC 10 66 99) CAD 061229 MTEPMtE MED TO REC. NO. 46406 ESIOtW TO CA NC KPA DAW PoiPEOt~
PENCRW FNAL SAITTY LONG ftM EVAL. FCR CrFFAD EVAL FOR POC Pm8 WTH hAATM1 SAFETY EVA13
&CR WAJOR FRYS.
CHECKLIST # 1 REFUEL BRIDGE 1TSTING COMPLETE /0FF LOAD CORE A. HARDWARE ITEMS JAN 30 87 Page: 4 A.03 PLANT TEMP MOOS (TMS)(TM LOG BOOK)
..tu ENTRY PRIFJCT360R NUW9ER DATE SYS-PRC1W P8799Cgrw1 W Sug)ECT JUSTFY F NOT NQ MPRVR DOER STATUS.DATE 1 A03 001 DEC 186 81 TW 0505 ACN 1250 EWOVE WCO PA1 PCTRECO e606 DG DAWPER(WISPCS FOR OFFLOAD 0010233) 1 A 03 002 DEC 186 999 CPER 10, TVS % Ve n G D STpvG OPERA 8tfTf CF PLM. CCMPLETE TUFORARY WOCFr ATCNS MQUFED SWTEbel PA1 TCH 87 34 1 A03 003 DEC 186 18 TW REL POOL COCLPs3 PLW WETY RELATED PAS TW BErvo WOTCN PCHOED FRW -)WER SLPPLY CRAFTED SAFETY RELATED PWR SLP NEADLY AVAR.A8LE A2 PRE APPROYED TW 1 A 03 004 DEC 186 44 P2 WOC $18 4#V WC1DED CASE NO m rsnCASE RES P W. WORE PGdT' BREAXEA TEST (PART 1) MEAMER TEST 8 TMT TO AFFECT AFECT OFFtDAD CTFLOAD 1 A03 005 CEC 9 e6 14 TW 9637 fEWChi TEMP WOO TW 06 37 RLS P.M CCNPLETE 1L'11/M
_______l CHECKLIST # 1 REFUEL BRIDGE TESTING COMPLEIEOFF LOAD CORE l
A. HARDWARE ITEMS JAN 30 87 Page: 5 A.04 MAINT REQUESTS & PROCEDURES NCL PMS
.iEM EPITRY PRCRCTS MECEDCR NUMBER DATE SYS-PfCJs PEPEM NCE N W SUWECT JUETFY F NOT MQ APPRVR 00EA STATUSCATE 1.A 04 001 CEC 186 14 MQ CORE SPf%Y SYS WR$ PREWNTNG RLS P.M l We COMPLETED OPEAASUTY EDM PLM I COMPtKTED l 1.A 04 CC2 DEC 1 as 11 MQSaf4 WRS PREVENTNG RES PM Ws COMPLETED OPERA 8UTY SDM 'LM COMMITED 1.A 040C3 CCC 185 03 PEQ CRD SYS WRS PREWNTNG RE& PW 1 Ws CCMPLETED CPEAABUTY &DM PLM f CCunstED
~~
- 1. A 04 CC4 CEC 1 as 50 MQ SEC CONT WRS PREWNTPG RL& Pu ms COMPLETED OPERA 80TY SDM PEM CO4PLETED 1 1
1 A 04 CC S DEC 186 30 MQ RECW SYS WRS PREWNTPC RE1 P.M Ws COMPLITED CPERABUTY EDM PLM )
COMPLETED '
1 A04 006 CEC 186 29 MQ MLT SERV WATER WRS PREWNTPC REA PM l Ws CCMPLETED OPEAA8UTY SDM Piu '
COMPtKTED l 1 A04 OC7 CEC 1 as 41 MQ CESEL QEN WRS PREWNTNG RLS P.M We CCNPLETED TLILL Pr SDM PLM NDCATON l CCMPLETED l I
1 A 04 008 CEC 186 45 MQ CCNTBCL ROO WRS PREW.NTPG RES P.M Mt4N RE Q PC6ff CN PGCATCN CPERASUTY SDM PLM FCR CFFLCAD WTe COMPtITED CCMPLETED A OC3 CEC 186 4e MQ SeGTS We CCwtERD WRS PREENTPG RL& Pu
~
CPERA8UTY $DM PLM CCNRITED 1 A 04 0 t 0 CEC 1 e6 24 REO CONTRCA ROCM WRS PRE AMTPG
~
RLS. PM EMPC*ACNTAL SYSTEM CftAA8UTY SDM F */A i We CCMPLETED CCNPtKTED 1 A04 011 CEC 186 12 MQ RVCu b fSTEM WRS PP&WNTPC RL1
~
P.M We CCMPtETED CPEAAaOTY $DM PLM CCMPtKTED 1 A 04 012 CEC 1 as de MQ 125V MTT AaB WRS PREWNTPG RLS P.M WTs CCs#tETED CPEAASUTY EDM PLM CCNMITED 1 A cc ota CEC 186 44 REQ 2scv sATT Pott pu WRS mEWNTPG f We CCMPtKTED CetRAaCTY EDM Plu !
CCMRITED 1 A 04 014 t(C 1 as 44 REQ HV sATT WRS PMWNTPG RL& PM
~
We CCNMITED CPERAAUTY SDM P E.u COMPtKTED 1 A 04 0tI CEC i et 48 MQ BUSSES ASA4 81.88 MRS PREWNTPG RIS PM j
B17. Bit.514 815.BP0 828. CPERaJutlTY SDM PEM ,
Rf6 We CCWPLETED CCNRITED l i
inc4 01s CEC 1 as e5 PEQ MML FLCCe WRS PREWNTPG ALS PW j
EJoeU$T WCNrtCH CPEAAaUTY SDM PIM Ws CCMPLETED CCMRITED
'.017 CEC 1 e6 45 PEQMREOLO@ A/Ws
~
WPr$ PMENTPG RLS PM We CCWetETED CPERARfrY SDM PLM CCNRITED l
l I
\
CHECKLISTD 1 REFUEL BRIDGE TESTING COMPLEIEOFF LOAD CORE A. HARDWARE ITEMS JAN 30 87 Page: 6 A.04 WNT REQUESTS & PROCEDURES NCL PMS
.i EW D(TRY PRCOLCTS 6CR NUMER DATE SYS#RQ)# MPUENCE ryrs a8WT SUSJECT JtJETFY F NOT MO APPRW COER STATUS DATE 1A04018 MC 186 45 MC RMA tRs CCnRETED WRS PREWNTNG R11 PM Op9uSE. fry LD 4 PLM 4WPLETED 1 A 04018 DEC185 45 MQ RPS We CCnPLETED WRS PREVENTNG RE.A P.M OPUMBUTY EDM*
PIM COMPLETED m04 C20 CEC 186 32 M Q SERVQiAR SYSTEM WR$ PREVENTNG RES PM Ws CouptETED OPUMBUTY EDM PLM COMETED 1 A 04 C21 CEC 186 31 MQ NSTRthaLNT AR SYS WRS PREVENTNG REA P.M Ws COMPtKTED OPAASUTY SDM PLM CC %ETED 1 A 04 C22 CEC 186 60 MQ EC CCNT DueERS & WRk "5EVENTNG KE& PM
^~
DOORS REPAftED OPEA .BUTY COMPLETED 1 A 04 C23 CEC 186 H 3 W 448 VESSEL PENOmd PROCEILfML STEPS COs# LITE PROCED.fML RLS. CJM CC&8PtETE CPENed3 PREFAAATEN CF ATTAO4ENT A PCR STEPS FOR WSSEL PUDENCED PROCEDlKE OPEMNG 1AC4324 CEC 186 H $W448 VESSEL PUFOW Perrm s%L STEPS COhrtKTE PMDLf91 RES CJ M CCadPLETE CPENNG CF ATATCledENT S PER STEPS FOR WSSEL MFUENCED P9rrm st OPOeNG 1.A04C25 CEC 186 10 WR H+31 f0R HANGER REFAR CPERAAI HMCEA CH REA P.M OPEAASUTY EVALUATON 026 CEC 186 44 ETAT 10N 850 RELAY TEST RLA PM NOTRECQ FCA CSFLCAD 1 A W C27 CEC 186 44 AC8 TESTH3 & COFft RE.S. PM tCTREGO CMRK4UL MSPCS 8316200 FCR CWFtCAD 4016300.601&&00.6014500 1 A C4 C28 CEC 18e ' 44 WR ROOTCAUSE ANALYS8 CPEAARIBRENER PM RES. NOTRECD~
ERE.AKEA BBC3 FALURE CPER BbR l N P(ACE 1 A 04 C23 CEC 188 45 3 WS14 3 MS2e 6 FPS WG SET LPA e RL1 Pu NOTAECD PICCEDUfE SMS18 SO{DAED OC TE$T 1.A 04 030 CEC 186 48 CCNTHC4, ACCN WR1 THAT AMECT RL1 PW CCWR$
CEFCK4CES411CTRCAL fEQURED S4TTEM RDM PLM THAT AIFECT OPEAAaOTY CTFtCAD 1A to 031 CEC 1 # 4S CCNTBCE. ROCN WR1TH4T AHFECT Ria Pu CCWRS CEFCCHCES-14C MCURED SYSTEM SDM PIM TWAT AIFECT CPtNnUTY C#ftCAO tA04C32 CEC 186 800 msFOO10 CCNTBCL ROCN WM1 THAT NTECT RLS PW CC WR$
CEFCENCES PECURED Ff1 TEM SDM PIM TWAT AFFECT OPEAA8UTY CFFLCAO 1A04033 CEC 186 10 P2 PERTOSA PsA,N6PECTICH & CPEMALK WGN RES PW WORE 9,Gidt MST) on EO Wov(EM) To AFFECT CSFLOAD 1 A 04 034 DE C 188 50 VARCUS WRs SECOOARY C4NTA964ENT SEC CCNT DAM (WATER SEAS) POETRA704 SEAID 1 035 CE C 186 21 MQ CEMN WATEA MR$ COhrtKTED TH4T RLS PW We COMFUTED SLPPORT MAEL SDM PLM FLCCM WATER)EEIt
CHECKLIST # 1 REFUEL BRIDGE TESTB'G COh&LETEK)FF LOAD CORE A. HARDWARE ITEMS JAN 30 87 Page:7 A.04 MAINT REQUESTS & PRCCEDURES NCL PMS
- eTEW ENTRY PRCOUCTS DEEIEDm
=.
NUW8ER DATE SYb#RCue PETERENCE N u MT SUBJECT JUET7Y F NOT 7EC APPRVR DOER STATUS DATE 1 A04 034 DEC885 41 NPLACE T DG AIR START EW STMA PESS SW &DJt Pi.u $URV E%ERY PRESSURESWffCH &CR DETERWHATION 46ftBEto OF OPEAABEJTY FOR DCPE OFTLCMD tA 04 037 CEC 0 06 13 fE. ACTOR WATER CLEANUP fEPLACDENT Ptar
~
R14 P.M. NOT RECQ FETER DEWN ANDOR WOTOR CA FCA CFFLCAD HCtDec PUw SWTEM CPERAaLE TO WANTAN WATER ,
PUPJTY J 1 A 04 038 CEC is a6 10 CWG DeLAE CCPE MuYAft Of WOM COFLETED TO WJA. E COMPLETE WORK 8 TOWPLETE' & A44tRE SysTIM 604ED CFF BY CSTAm.3HD OPEAASUTY CCNTMOL SYSTEWS.
(GE TMAWLERS. ETC )
1604 C39 JAN $87 3 WR SC 340 , VALVE 165 A (CAD CD) CCwtETED WR RLS PM NOT RECO~
WNt41.4d FLOW L9E HAS FG CTFLCAD FALID 1604043 JAN S $7 3 WR 06 344 CRD PWP B D6CHAAGE LIAM CN ptET FITTING CCEPLETED WR RL1 PM NOTAEC I CR CPEMaLE EOUP. F@ CFTLCAD 1A04041 JAN 5e1 3 WR 86-345 CRD PWP e EXCESSM CCwtETED WR RL1 Pu NOTRECO V1BRATION CR CPEJWL1 ECUP. F G OFFLCAD 1A04042 JA5se1 3 WR e6425 CR3447 LEST CAD) COWLETED WR RE.1 P.u NOTREQQ l fFR SCCYSCCY VALW LEM Os % A4.L N FG CFTLCAD
'* N 043 JAN 547 3 WR 45 3 34 CR3411 (C9CS) CR3411
' ~
CO8MITED WR R.E.1 P.u tcTRECO PRNTS 90. REPAR OR CA FIAL N FCP CF8LCAD z
W C44 JAN 567 3 WR85321 CRh15 (PNL 905) RCO CCW6 N WR RL1 PM NQTREQQ.
CRFT N 44 PC4fT10N CHCA ML N FG C#FLOAD
8CAAM T546 NO '4' DGff OR CA FLAL N FM C(FLCAD l NDCATICH I i A 04 Ces JAN s e7 Wa 853 ts 3
RCO nts (Cecs) NO sca m T u NOPCs u CCwtrTED WR Rh ru ectstoo '
eR Ca Fm N F m CtrLeAD NDCATION j 140404? JAN t t7 3 WR evs.37 C0 R.m.1410 (C9,0,5) CC.wtE,TED WR RLS Pu MATE m TCN CC - N,OT 'lECO C,-
1 A C4 044 JAN l87 3 WR 85 3 31 I ROO 1010 (C006) NO CChetETED WR RE.4 Pu tctP(Ct !
SC M edTmE NO PC6 44 CH CA FLt.1 N FCf C(FLCAD NOCATICH '
1A04048 JAN 6e1 3 WR skv10 RCC 44 30 (CR) CCwtKTED uR RLa Pu tcT Rt3D DM ST10ATL9tf PAft OR CA 6 Lt1 N F G CFFLCAD PF PRCet 1 A 04 0$4 JAN &87 3 WR M479 RCO Mit (C405) NO
~
CCwtETED WR RLS PM NoT RECO N ftE to POS e4 CR CA FLA.L N FCR CFFLCdD DOCATICH 1 A 04 CL1 JAN 847 3 WR 8k3-30 RCO 16 23 (CDOS) NO CCmMITED WR RLt 7u NOT RECO SCAAMT5E POS34 OR CA FTAL N FG CfiLCAD DOCATON BAD 9 A C4 01J JAN 547 3 WR 45314 RC014t ? (C405) CCWtKTED WR RLS Pu tcTatOO ~
DMSTMP&M PO4 ND OR CA Fu.1 N Fm C#FLCAD 053 JAN 847 3 WR to 310 RCC 3011 (Cecs) DRIFT ConeGTED WR RL1 Pu NOT Rt00~
ALARM 4 RJhAA 9 POS 44 OR CM FL11 N FCR CfFLCAD
CHECKLIST # 1 REFUEL BRIDGE TESTING COMP!EIEO"F LOAD WRE
$. HARDWARE ITEMS JAN 30 87 Page: 8 A 04 kWNT REQUESTS & PROCEDURES NCL PMS (TE W ENTRY PFCDUCT5 DEEDEDOR NLAAER DATE SYl#RCus IEFEfENCC h uNT SUBJECT JutTFY F NOT PEQ APPAVR 00ER STATUS-DATE
~'
os 064 JAN 587 3 WR 88-340 ROO 3018 (C805) ORFT COwLETED WR R1A PM NOT REQO AuRW i n u. Fet oR CR FRt N FCaemCe 9604055 JAN 587 3 WR E 7 ROO 1647 (C805) CowLETED WR RE& PM NOT RECQ~
NVESTMPAR ORFT OR CR F(Al N FCA CFFLOAD ALARW AT POS 44 -
1.A 04 054 JAN 5 87 3 WR 884-24 ROO 34-36 (C806) NO FULL CCwlETED WR RE& PM CCNPLETE N POCATION OR CR FR1 N 1 A04 057 JAN 587 3 WR 86444 NCU ACCUW 3647 (23 Rs) CorLITED WR PLE.S. PM NOT REQD EXCESSM LIMAGE OR CR FML N FOR CfTLCC 1 A 04c58 JAN 587 3 WR 864-22 VAmaOUS NO FULL N IND. CCW W 40WR R11 PM COMPLITE ON VARCUS RODS O' CR FLA1 N 1 A04 0S8 JAN 567 45 WR and5 25 ROD 1623 (UNDER YESSEL) CCardTED WR RL1 PM NOT RF0D I
NO FML CUT N) POS 4 OR CR FLLL N FOR CFFLCC 1.A 04 Of,0 JAN 587 45 WR 86 44243 P9A 806 DGfT CF UPPER COwtETED WR RES
~ ~
1 A 04 061 JAN 887 10 WR 861040
' 67C (A FNR QUAD) CCwLETED E *CMNETE~
PDC 85-30 NSTALL 11/1586 NYPASS CEC 4 VALVE 1.A 04 062 JAN 187 10 WR881047 A RNR TRAN (00 W RW) CCwtKTED WR RLS Pu NOT RECD W POC 88 30 PRESS GAGE 5 N TESTM 1.A 04 063 JAN 887 14 WR 8614 31 WO*140044 (Rs BLDG) CCwtKTED WR DAM SHOULD K WOPE MQURED FOR APP R OtrE 1/21 87
'1 A 04 064 JAN 487 14 WR 86-14 32 60140048 (Rs BLDQ) 00wlITEDWR DAW SHOULD E WCfE MOURED FOR AFP R DONE V22.17 1a 04 ot t JAN 887 1 WR86129 3" WAN STEAM DRAN CCwlETED WR REA Pu MAY NOT BE
($TW TVN) RPL DRN LN PNT OR SEC CO(T RECFD F peR B OL,rT ESTAGUBE D SECCoiTCM 1.A 04 OE4 JAN $87 24 WR 8524406 WoM4 ATE UNff 4 (PS6CC) CCwtETED WR Ria PM PCTREQQ N5T AUTO CONO PUWP CR NO M*ACT ON FOR CfTLCC SYSTEW OPERA 84EY 1804067 DAN 487 37 WR 85 'e718 P403 8 (B RHR 00) PE RF COPLETL;WR RE& Pu COMPdTE LLE OL SAWLNG PW B MW OL N S n TEW 1a04 000 JM87 37 WR 85-3718 P 203 0 (t RHR QD) PERF CCwtITEDWR RES PM CCNRETE LLE OL LAMPLNG PW D Ew C% N
. Sn%W l 1 A04 CJS JAN 887 37 WR 864717 CO rtITEDWR P403 C L4 RHR 00) PERF R11 PM CCWRITE l LOWE OL SAMPLNG PW C Ew OL N SnTEu i A04 070 JAN 887 37 WR 85 3714 CowuTED WR P 215 8 (B RHR CO) PERF RLS Pu CCpFLETE LLSE OL SAMPUNG M WC4 N .
CORE SPRAY SnTEM
! ta04 e7i JAN s87 37 WR 8s 3711 x 107 s (a est otN) PtRF CCwtrTED WR Ru Pu '
CCu a tTE LLSE OL SAMPUM3 Ew OL N SYSTEM ;
072 JAN 6El 37 WR 85 3710 x 107 A (A DSL GEN) PERF CCW%ETED WR REA Pu CCMAETE~
LLSE 08. SAMPLNG Mw OL h
$n.IW
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1
, q , -- - - - -
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CHECKLIST # 1 REFUEL BRIDGE TESTING COMPLE1EOFF LOAD CORE A. HARDWARE ITEMS JAN 30 87 Page:9 A.04 WNT REQUESTS & PROCEDURES NCL PMS
~ niu ENTRY PRX)LCTR EEIEDCR MJWER DATE SYS-PRCue NHNNCE DOCLSENT SUBJECT JUETFY F NOT MQ APPRVR CCER STATUS-DATE 1 A 04 673 JAN 687 44 WR 46 4 344 (WAW DESEJ SAMPLE CCMUTED WR RiA P.M COMMITE CEMATER TEST EW OL N SWTEu 1 A 04 074 JAN687 46 WR 8546 25 (WN DSL B) SAMPL104. COhPLETED WR RLS P.W CCM%ETE ~
WmTEST RUN , MW OL N 84TEW 1 A04 075 JM667 46 WR 864G77 A C1 AWWTR ,
COhfuTED WR RLS PW CCNPLETE ~
('94. C 003CM) 12/4 86 CALeRATE 1 A04 076 JAN $87 48 WR 9643 ($1 TB StGT RW) RESN CChrGTED WR REA PM 7".STWG N '
P6P EED6 TD DE CCAP P90GREss COMPLETE 1 A 04 077 JAN 847 61 WR854164 P1419(06L 3 RW) REP CABLE CChe'LETED WR DAW CON $TRUCT CCWRETED
~
1 AC4 078 JM667 64 WR 85 6418 EW FUEL AS8 CCheUTED WR RLE PM NOTREQQ (Rs BLDQ 117) FOROFTLOAD P4SP6C6%NNL NW LNRAD M.
1 A 04 078 JAN 607 64 WR e6 64 20 (Rs 11791) PERFORM RX Coh5MTED WR Ria P.M CCN%ETE D6&ASMMR,Y 1 A 04 063 jai 407 48 WR 8646-10
=
NFULL ORDO (R8117 NL ConsMTED WR PDA CCs4PLITE BRDO) NST PER PDC 4554 1 A 04 081 JAN607 40 WR 86 4 18 RFL SRDG W AST (117) CCheUTED WR RLS PW CCN%ETE REPAR LAW ESR 86-01 PdST EED MW MAST e 082 JAN 647 48 WR 86 4 14 NW RFL ORDCmRFt RA) CCn5UTED WR MMA CCW%ETE ~
TEST WL 500 PROC TP86127 1 A 04 043 JAN 487 45 WR 8644 A ERM (CR PNL DOS) CChfMTED WR RLS PM CCW %ETE NOT REAM CCRECTLY 1 A 04 064 JAN 687 46 WR 86 44 557 CohfUTED WR A C 4 AWWTR (PNL C803) DAM CCb 4ETE CAL 81 RATE . KED FIE WATCH VEN HOLI DRE11D 1 A 04 085 JAN 647 46 WR 88-44 552 BRA R20SMCC 510s8 SWGR CCnfuTED WR REA PM Cow &ITE RX 23W) TEST FDR CRI 1 A 04 064 JM647 44 WR 8t-46 551 BRK B2%WCC 014(5 SWGR COh5MTED WR RLS PW Cou RITE B AUX BAY) TEST FDR CSL 1%17 1 A 04 047 JAN 647 46 WR e644411 WCC 818 (% M WORK CCa#UTED WR DAM CCPcTMT MOURED FCR APP R CCadPLETE 1 A04 064 JAN 607 46 WR8644410 ha:C Bio (Aux E4Y B) ALL CohfUTED WR DAW CCNETET WCRC MOUWED FOR APP R CChMITED 1 A 04 088 JAN687 46 WR8644400 D8125 VDC (R123) ALL CCheUTLD WR DAM CONSTRUCT WCfE MOUWED FOR AM R CC6M ITED 1 A C.4 C90 JAN 687 24 WR 84 24127 TCH 87 34 AO4128 (3 DESEL) CChMITED WR k .1 PM NOT REQQ KWOVE TEWp WOO 8645 CR NWW OF TW FCR OFTLCAD 1 A 04 001 JAN 447 24 WR 86-241D3 N106H113 (C7) RESTORE Coh5MTED WR PM REA CCn4%ETE RJ6EL 4 PWR CliAR Tu a2445 092 JAN647 10 WR 4416-10 LS4811 (SKihWER) REPLACE CChfuTED WR RL1 PM VCRKh3 LOW LVL ALARW 11117
I CHECKLIST # 1 REFUEL BRIDGE 'ESTING COMPLEEK)FF LOAD CORE A. HARDWARE ITEMS JAN 30 47 Page: 10 A 04 MMNT REQUESTS & PROCEDURES NCt. PMS
.W ENTRY PRCDLCT5 PEEMD CR NUWeER DATE S M RCus RGUENCpvvi urNT $UEECT JUSTFY F NOT PEQ APPRVR DOER STATUS-DATE 1.A04 003 JAN 847 10 WR85101 FUEL POOL FLTR) EPLACE Ota5 U TED WR DAM TESTN3 TO PER PDCR stas aE COtetETE t"lit?
1.A 04 004 JAN 487 14 WR 861413 NSULATON WORK TO COhPLETED WR RL1 PM PCTREQQ SUPPORT RFOs? ISb FCR CFFLOAD LNEAR DCCATION (OC
- HOLD)NOTHNQ TA00ED i A 04 095 JAN s87 14 WR e614-33 W(>1400 248 (RX SLDG) CowuTED WR DAW TESTN3 TO ALL VCPM PEQUPED FCF1 IE CChMITE APP R t1L 87 1.aC4 094 JAN 687 14 WR 8614 34 COPE SPRAY PP S (9 R>ft COhMITED WR DAM CCNPLETE 174) WK TO SUPT APP R t12'47 1 A 04 097 JAN 847 14 WR e6-14 37 Ae07# tine (9 SMR RW CCheUTED WR RL1 PM CCMPLETE B fNR 00) TEST 6MV t?/PF FOER CAL M 04 CSS JAN 887 11 WR 8611-8 SEE PPNG (DW) FE NST COhMETED WR RLS PM PCT REOD NSUL FOR ISI P6P FOR CFFLCAD 1 A 04 069 JAN 687 11 WR 86118 A SLC PWP (RE 01) PMP CChfMTED WR RL1 PW CCNPLETE LIAKNQ POSS STWT OOX 1/1617 1 A 04100 JAN 687 10 WR 641444 (HQ DRAN W) NO HANO CCa#UTED WR RL1 PM NOT REOD '
WEEL (NCEDS OC) FOR CFFLCAD M40WEELS DCN CF 2SA) 1 101 JAN 447 10 WR e610 72 R>ft (VARCUS) RWV RENST COhfMTED WR RE.1 PM NOT RECD NSUL & PANT FOR El FCR CFTLCAD 1 8 04102 JAN 4 37 10 WR 861483 W410017A (8 RHR 00) COh5MTED WR RLS PM WORKS.4 PC T MRFORM hCV PW 70 A/7ECT CFTLOAD 1 A 04103 JAN 4 87 10 WR es 14102 WO 100124A (Rx 81) COhfuTED WR RLS PW VCRKt4 PCT PERFCfW haw PW TO AITECT CFTLCAD 1 A 04104 JAN 687 to WR es 1010s Wo 1001 tsEL8 RHR W RW) CoatITED WR RL1 PW REA15E Wikh3 PERFOfW WCN PW N TE$TWG 1 A04105 JAN 647 10 WR 8610122 he>1001238 (RX SLDQ) CObeUTED WR DAM CONSimCT ,
ALL WOFM SEQUPE.D FOR TESTNG PDO943 COWFMTED l APP R RESOLLITCN CF NEMLR SETTNG 1 A04106 JAN 687 in WR se 10 ite H.101018 (9 RHR 00) CChfMTED WR RL1 Pu EMNEEAt.3 614 LNGTH 41/t CCW TO RESOL)E ON WLD O fHR TN 1A04107 JAN 447 10 WR to 10179 M M631P2038 (a FDel CObeUTED WR DAu TESTN3 TO ;
174) WC REQ TolVPT 9E CCMUTE AFP R L1217 1 A 04100 JAN 687 10 hft 8610131 A405#2033 (0 $WG R RW COheUTED WR RLS PM CCNPJTE i 8 M 00) TEST EMY tat?
FCER C8LK 1.A 04109 JAN 647 10 WR46i&1M FIS 1044A,1030A COh8MHD het C74 RL1 Pu PCT RECO PS 100174A (TRS RW) NO V5UAL LE.AKS FOR OFTLCMD PERF PT Nsp Y JAN 487 10 WR 8610135 FES 10488.10508 CoheuTED het OR RL1 Pu DCT RECD PS 100174B (TRS RW) NO v5UAL LE.AKS FCA CFTLCAD PERF PT NSP
]
CHECKLIST 01 REFUEL BRIDGE TESTING COMPLEIEOFF LOAD CORE A. HARDWARE ITEMS JAN 30 87 P8pe: 11 A.04 E!NT REQUESTS & PROCEDURES NCt.PMS
. . a.W ENTRY PRXACT5 MEEEDCR MJWER DATE SMMCue MCE DCl:L6ENT SL4 JECT JUETFY F NOT PEQ APPRVR DOER STATUS CATE 1 A 04111 JAN 687 6 WR 84443 it" FWT PNT (STW TN) CCRMITED hR CR SEC MA P.u WAY NOT BE PPMIPL Rm BT TO CAO CCNT ESTAEEED MEDED F BAY WSFW MC CCNT CM i A 04.112 JAN 68? 10 WFi 51446 1001730 (B R>m CD) COhPLETED WR RLS PW PCTRioD NEPECT WN ROW FCR CETLOAD 1 A 04113 JAN 68? 10 WR 86144? 1001730 (t RHR 00) CChPLETED WR R1A P.u NOT REQD M8PECT WN RChv FCR CWTLCAD 1.A 04114 JAN 66? 10 WR 8810104 ha>1001268 (M 23 TP) CObetKTED WR RL1 Pu NOT RECD PEAFORM WOV PW FCR OFFLCAD 1 A04 ill JAN88? 14 WR 8614 20 CA Mt214 (B C0) DEC Conf %ETED WR MA PW NOT REOD.
I WLMN CFF PT STEM 4 STEW TEMP LCD MJT WS 1 A 04116 JAN 68? 33 WR 88 33101 FTE PP WTTRY ($Gtpe46E) OPEMBLE EATTERY. MA Pu NOT REQU A SATTERY N8 TEhPEMTWE P90 AIM SATT ARE 8C 14IL3 nWWES ML LOOK SAO CPEM&E 1 A 04.117 JAN 487 33 WR 88 33182 (SCRNH6E) 8C 144 3 OPEAASLI SATTERY . RLS PW NOT REQD 1.8 VOLTS VCETAGE PflORIM N BATT. 85 ONE C< OPEAAaLI 1 A 04 tit JAN 607 33 WR 9533 225 FIRE OR ett (RK SLDG 23) COhPLITED WR DAW NOT RECD PEPLACBENT DOOR FCR OFRCAD 1.A 04118 JAN 48? 66 WR 86 54-64 PP $UPPORT(RX B 00) COhrtITED WR M.& Pu CCMUTE ff9 RGO STRt/T A&&EWEY
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120 JAN 687 41 WR 864128 (At D6L GEN) COCLANT CCaf%ETED WR RL1 Pu CCWPLITE LLSE OL SAMPLIS EW C6. N 84 TEM 1 A 04 iti JAN447 45 WR864485 RW G (PNL 80$) RPR CCartETED WR ALS Pu COWRITE ERMTC NDCATON I 1A04122 JAN48? 45 WR 8HS24 7 RW CH E(Cc8C5) CAUSP*3 COhPLETTD WR MA Pu CCh R ill ~
l spumous tt aCMMs i A 04123 JAN 68? 45 WR 8644 A SRW (CR PNL 806) NOT COhrtKTED WR RLS Pu NOT RECD l FEAD90 COfEECTLY SAME A3 l 1A 04063 1 A 04124 JAN 48? 45 WR 86438 APRW D (CR PNL 805) DOES COhP(ETED WR PLES PW CCMUTE~
NOT LOHT 1 A 04126 JAN 6 8? 24 WR 88 24 272 V55103A (C7 CONTRCE RW) CCafuTED WR ~~~ RLS PW CCMMTE NOT WORP@e3 REE ECmN 1 A 04126 JAN 687 61 WR 864111 S C45EL OEN) PEP AIR OPEM5LE 8Y5 TEM Ris Pu PCT RECD CL LEAK CN OCMRNCR FCA CFFLCAD 1 A 0412 ? JAN 6 87 41 WR E4121 06L AA8 (D$L GEN BLDG) COhfGTED WR DAW CCNSTRUCT.
fEh015EINCER COWRITED DRAN LNE 1 A 04128 JAN66? 81 WR864144 06L GEN 3 R1078 (27 EL) COhfMTED WR DAW JS$ CCNSTRUCT PEACE PM & hsLL COhfuTED 1 A 04 itt JAN 48? $1 WR 864152 C A B P91(00 B EL F3) CChPLITED WR DAW CONSTRCT SdFtEhENT hCDFCATON COhf MTED 1 A04133 JAN 487 61 WR 864164 Aso64102 (s $WCA 8 D$L COhrtETED WR RLS PW CCWMTE ftt, TEST 9(V FDER C&I l
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\. HARDWARE TTEMS JAN 30 87 Page: 12 1 A.04 hMNT REQUESTS & PROCEDURES NCL PWS i ITEM ENTRY PNGDUCTS 84EEDCR NUMGER DATE SYEMCue PEFUWQ DOCLMNT GULIECT JUBTFY F M7T MC APPRVR 00EA STATU$CATE 1.A 04131 JAN 20 07 30 EQ TECom ters QQtfMTED REA Pu SDM 1.A 04132 JAN 20 07 2 ftQ MACTOR MC#tC RLA PM SWTEMhfrt OcarWTED SDM 1604133 JAN 20 87 4 PEC MACTOR FEDWATEM RAA PM i
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MW ENTRY PRXLCT5 PEEMDCR NUWER DATE SYS#RCue PEPWeim Nv1 W eLEECT ASTFY F >eOT PEC APPRW 00ER STATUS-DATE 1.A Cl 001 DEC 188 10 F4W 88110 m W WITH M SYSTEW RESOLUTCN CF M fLEL P M. MAYBE POC 84-33 W R N3TO WEETSMOLE See.E FALURE CM MT EQD FALURE CAffERIA PROELEW OR MANJAL PCC ON HXD F6W 80 110 Nff.OF WN R OW 1 AC5 0C2 OEC 188 44 F6W te 1M RESPOND TO F6W 86136 OPERA 8LA Y 10 JP G PCT REQD PANEL Y.10 AUTOMATICALLY F4WR D6P.
TRAMFEMED LATER 1 6 85 0C3 DEC 186 81 8 M F1,F4W 85350 fESCLVE EKD TO PENGM MTUt40EDTOE M& P 64 CCWPLETE 10$$ OF OFF SITE POWER' REQUPED PERPEM MustBE SURV TEST POLLOWNQ PENORMED 00 MANTENANC4 1 A C1004 DEC 0 88 to F&WR as 3ee RPM SNUSSER H 141 SS 23 OPERARI SNI.WER PLL& PW W)T REQD ~
FCR CFFLOAD t a010C5 CEC 0 BS 14 F&WRes.M29R LOCEE BOLT 5 ON OPERARICOFE WHAY PLES< PD.S CCN MITE '
G H 73 M14044A FCA CFFLCAD TCH8719 F4WRD69 LATE R 1 A C1CO4 JAN tl 47 24 F&WR 8714 PEED F&ne FOR F A&lDE CF R.E1 PW WFUTE T CfES SYSTEW TEST F&WR 8714 1.A C& OC7 JAft 22 87 45 F4W ee 347 PE.SCLW EED TO NMAN F6M D6P OURNG MJ SD)( PCT REOD N CCLD SHJTDCMH CEA TO FOR OFFLCAD FALUPE OF WEL PRESS ee00s N RUN WOCE
CHECKLISTD 1 REFUEL BRIDGE 175I1NG COh@LE'IEOFF LOAD CORE B. SOFTWARE ITEMS JAN 30 87 Page: 14 B.01 OPERATINGMAINTENANCE SURV. PROC.(ST'S)
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PYCOLCTSDEECED m MJWGER DATE SYSMKuo REMPENE N uNT SURJECT JUSTFY F NOT REQ APPRVR DOER STATUS DATE 1.8 01 001 DEC 1 st 14 &E14 CORE 8PRAYWOV PLM MONTHLY r OPERA 4UTY LAST DONE v15's?
18 St.002 CEC 1 as 14 8 W 2 2.101.1 COPE FRAY LOGC TES f RL& P.M M WhANNVAL' LAST DONE 11/17/06 !
t 8 @t 003 MC i e6 14 8 W 2 210.1.2 CofE FRAY LOGC TEST RL1 PW M WF ANNv4 LAST DCNE 1iMW i 8 @1 004 M C 188 14 e W 2 2.10.1.3 COPE SPYMY LOGC TEST RL1 PM n M WhANNuAL LAST DONE !
11/17. 4 18 01 OCS DEC 186 14 8 W 2 210.14 Cope FRAY LOGC TEST ALS PW SE Wk ANNu4 LAST DCe4 11/17.a6 1801004 DEC i 86 14 8 W 2 2.10.18 CCNE SPRAY LCGC TEST RLS PM M Wi-ANNv4 LAST DCt4 5 11@ e6 I 180100? DEC 186 14 4 W 2 210.16 COPE SPRAY LCGC TEST RL& PM '
SE Mb ANNV4 LAST DCr4 1111W j i 8 01 004 DEC 186 14 8 W 2 2.10.1.7 CCFE SPRAY LOGC TEST RES. PM M MFANNUAI, LAST DC*4 1672 %
.009 DEC 186 14 4 W 2 2 t0.1.8 COfE SPRAY LOGC TEST RLS P.W SE Wk ANNV4 LAST DCr4 11/17 36 1801010 DEC 1 as 14 L E1.8 COPE FRAY hCV FMON CNCE PER 10 WQ. PLM PCT REQU l ALTEM(ATE SHUTDOWN NA CptCC '
PANELS C*CE/14 ho p 1801011 DEC t as 14 8 C.13 CORE SPRAY 4QtC VALVE LNEUP PLM TWO LAST DCt4 1,1517 1801012 DEC i a6 14 4 A 18 CCFE SMuY SYS NTEORffY s
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] &?$14 I Ya 010t4 DEC 186 14 22 20 CCPtf SPRAY SYS LNELP. PLM ATTACMdENT A.DOUSLE LASTDCPE I
VALVE VERFCATION 81.1117 {
A t/17,87 I I 1801Gil DEC 1 as 101 & t.8J PEMORW CLASS a a Bt PESTARTVP ffEW J& JS SCT RECD SYSTEM WVDROS (UPAPCED WCW TO 04Cp15T 4 OUTAGE) 4 1801016 DEC 1 e6 10 PENOped LEAK TEST CN % 1 AYCLE SURV J& DL NOT RECO DOECTON C44C8t VALVES DUE WEN H LOOP DPANDED OUTAGE) E D6R 70 SE j
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CHECKLIST # 1 REFUEL BRIDGE TESTING COh&LETEOFF LOAD CORE B. SOFTWARE ITEMS JAN 30 47 Page: 15 B.01 OPERATINGMAINTENANCE.SURV. PROC. (ST'S)
..EW ENTRY PRCOLCT5 PEECEDCR NUWER DATE SY D RCue PEF 9 9dtkrrrimsyT SUsECT JUSTFY F NOT REQ APPRW CCEA STATUS DATE 1 e @t.017 DEC 1 a6 14 a 11.1 COE SPRAY PUW PLM MONTHLY OPERAaUTY 4 FLOW LAsT DONE RATE TEST 1/1617 1301018 DEC 186 44 8ee RATTERY LOAD RL1 PM CNCLCYCLE C# CHARGE TEST WW LAST DONE I
1417.16 1801010 DEC 186 41 4W31 CX3 Lost OF OFF9fTE PCMEM RL& PM ONCECYCLE (W1SPC4 3077300) WM LAST CCNE 1214 14 1 Bot.020 DEC 186 14 8 C 22 CCFE SPRAY 44 WWR PLM MERY LAST DOPE t/26 87 1 8 01.021 DEC 186 14 8 C 23 CORE sehAY40 *FwR PLM ME r.Y LAST DONE L1617 1801A22 CEC 186 to 8 C 24 COFE FRAY.M14Y LUBE PLM ME4Y LAST DCP4 L1187 1881C23 CEC 186 14 4 C 28 CORE SPRAY a PLM &EW6 ANNJAL SEWkANNUAL LUBE LAST Dorn 1&1316 1881024 DEC 1 e6 to 8 E 14 CORE SPRAY P6STR CAL PLEA PM ONCERG LAST DOP4 111686 02$ CEC 186 to 8 C.it CORE $ PRAY 4.10KV40CY iPLM ME4Y
$WTTC>CEAR SLRWELANCE LAST DCNE V2617 58@)024 CEC 186 14 P L11 CCFE FRAYCCX.D SHJTDC4sN PLM 643NTWY VALW TESTM LAST DONE iW1336 18 01 C27 DEC 186 14 8 til CG1E SPRAY. REMOTE PEMOF1W C2JRM PLM NOT REQO POCATON C>iECE RFOs7 KR CFFLCC OPCEM t 8 81020 CEC 186 to 4W2-241 CORE SPRAY m DELTA RL1 Pu QTRLY ,
itMs6 1 B 01029 MC 186 14 4 WJ 2.1.10 CORE SMAY An A4 4KV &4ME AS(TEW RLE. PW hs3NTHLY SATISFES CS 4 R* EhERENCY R.5 CEGMDED 1.E 01105 LAST DON 1 i VOLTAGE 111116 I i
18 e1 CSC CEC 185 14 8 WJ 2 til CORE SPRAY A5 At 4KV COLED CAdEE LO64 CF Ri1 PW PCTRECO SATISF13 CS & R$ EAEMENCY RA CEG%CED STATEsd PO4ER FCR CFTL*4 WLTADEMED SACKSCUTTL4 SAME AS rTEW CAN WJT CC 1 E01.106 LAST DO*eE &W j~ 1801031 CEC 1 a6 14 8 W 341.1 CORE SPRAY . Mi n AT1.R Ri1 Pu hscwTHLY LIWL SAFEOUARDS LAST DONE t S17 1 B 01032 CEC 186 14 4 W H.7 ~
CCfE SPRAY CaCS &AME AS ITE W RL1 Pu ha.w tRT PUw DescaAME 110titi LAST DOP4 i i
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CHECKLIST # 1 REFUEL BRIDGE 1ESTING COh&LEIEOFF LOAD CORE B. SOFTWARE ITEMS JAN 30 87 Page: 1e 8.01 OPERATINGMAINTENANCE SURV. PROC. (ST'S)
.W ENTRY PYGLCTE MEmDCm ender DATE SYS+RCue fEFWENCE N W SUEJECT JLATFY F NOT FEQ APPRVR 00ER STATUSCATE 1 e 91034 OEC 1 as 14 8 M2-2.10.10 CON SPRAY TRP SYSTEM SAME A8 ffEW RLA P.M ONCERO SAT 10FES C4 4 Rm POWER BLA WONff0R 1.1 01.113 LAST DCK 11418 1501035 CEC 188 14 8 W 2 2.31 COM GPRAY AOS PM SAME A8ITEW RL1 P.M WONTRY SATISFES C8 & R4 DeCHm0E AC NTERLOCK 1.E 01.124 LAST DONE 12,761s 1801034 OCC 1 es to e W 24.14 Com hPRAY Rs ORYMLL REA PM MONTRY W PT.S&LfE LAST DONE t?it?
I 8 01 037 CEC 1 as 11 04.1 SEC PUhr OPEAASLITY PiM MONTR Y MC FLOpt MATE TEST LAST DONE v1617 1001034 M C 1as 11 7.1.18 SEC VCLladE CONC 4 PLM R C. 6CNTMY
. SCLL/ TION N TANK LAST DONE 1/1617 1801038 OEC 1 es 11 842 M.C NLEF VALW OECM CNC& Cit 2.E TEST P1R NOT RECO.
FOR COLCAD 1001040 CEC 1 as 11 4L12 anLC ROCTE NDCATON OPCEC11:LE TEST PLM WT REOD CHECK FOR OFFLCAD
~1801041 DEC 1 as 45 & W 120 SOY LEWL SWTTOES REA PM QT4Y CPER 10 LAST DOPE 11/1718 1801042 CEC 1 as e5 4 L12 CfC PEWOTE DOCATON PEPForld OURNO PLM NOT RECD (RPB) RFOs7 FOR OFTLCAO CPCECYCLE
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1801043 MC i es 45 S W 131 SDV WNT AND DRAN RL& PM CNCECYCLE TIMIPe3 LAST DOP4 42b38 1801064 CEC t es el 433 &UV WNT ANO CWWN F1NC. TEST PLM QUARTE RLY FUNCTCML TEST PUFCFMD WffH LAST DOPE 4 W IJO t?t17 1801045 CEC 1 as 50 873 EC CONT LIAK RATE TEST PIM CNCERO CPE R 10 LAST COE V2117 10 01 Gas CEC 1 as to &C4 TEST OF CMS OPERAatHY PIM 6CNTRY LAST DONE 1517 1801047 CEC i ss to 4729 C7ES DAwtR p6 PECTEN PLM M Wi- ANNU(
LAST DONE PA&&ED SURv FALID TS 1 B 01044 CEC 1 es 44 87.21 843T DELTA P ACAO&& PUFCfte CPCE PLM PCTREOS FLTERS PER 18 bc PART OF L7.2 $
' i B 01 Dee OLC 1 as 4e t 7.2 7 CELTA P ACRO && CN PLM CNC(/18 W3 ROCad EW4CPedENTAL LAST DOPE SYSTEW PAESED SI#/
FALIDTS 1901050 CEC 1 as 44 4 B 18 SS3T SPRAY $11TEW PLM QNCECYCLE (FFit WATCH) LA$TDCNE
CHECKLIST # 1 REFUEL BRIDGE 1ES11NG COMPLETEOFF LOAD CORE B. SOFTWARE ITEMS JAN 30 47 Page 17 B.01 OPERATINGMAINTENANCE SURV. PROC. (ST'S)
..tM ENTRY PPODUCT5 PEEMDCR NJWER DATE SYS#RCue PEFUENCg m uWT SLMCT JUSTFY F NOT MC WPPM DOCR STATUS.OATE i B C1.C51 DEC 30 96 44 & T.2 4 23T SYSTEW OPERAasJTY Piu LAST DCNE 10 91 C12 CG 186 44 &7JJ SaGT N M A' 'S CNCE PER 14 WCL CE PLM PCT RECO AFTER HTR MANT. SCM CHLCAD 18 01 c53 DEC 1 as 4e a 7J e seGT CONTMCL ROOW OM:E PER 10 WC1 OR Piat NOT RECQ HJWOITY NTERS AFTER HTR MANT. FCR CMLCMD 1 8 01.054 DEC 188 de aW21.543 SeGT NffMTON AND RLS PM SE Wh ANW4 m EDO GOLATON LAST DONE SYS A NGCARD t n s?
18 01 Cll DEC 186 44 gW21.644 SaGT NfTMTON ANO R11 PW SE WF ANNy4 h kDG ISOLATON LAST DONE SYS B N0040 tM17 1901056 DEC 186 M &E31 PW:CW PWP CFEMSLlTY RECO F CCNT. PLM OuARTE Av 40 CAPACITY CJECK COOLM3 M00 LASTDCtX 1 a 61.057 CEC 1 e6 M e E 30 PWCCw SYSTEM PETR CAL RECD F CONT. plLS PW OPCERO COOLN3 MOD LAST DONE 1811153 1801454 DEC 186 30 0 C.13 PWCCW LOtC VAlb1 LNELP RECO F CONT. PLM
&WC#.TH COOLN3 MOTL LAST DOP4 17587 18 01 C53 CEC 186 30 4 L11 m CQD3>4JT3:mN RECO F CONT. PLM WONTHLY V4%T TESTING COOLN3 REOD. LAST CCNE 1t16 as 063 CEC 186 30 8 C.10 RSCCW 41SKV>4Ocv RECD F CONT. PLM v4EqY COC1H3 ECD. LAST DCfE 47917 i 8 C1041 CEC 186 30 t C 24 PECW WELAY LLSE RECO F CCNT. PLM V41qY COCLN3 MQQ LAST DC#4 tn17 1801062 CEC 1 E M S CJG PWCCW SEWh ANWAL LUGE RECD F CONT. P1W SE WL ANNV4 COOLN3 MOD LAST DOPK 1801063 CEC 1 to M &E33 PWCCW CONTANENT RECO F CCNT. PLM OJARTE4Y COCE D63 VAL %T COOLM3 MOD LAST DONE OPERAaETY TEST 6% e6 1001064 CEC 186 M &138 PW:CW PUhr.M TERP6 ATE RECO F CONT, PLM CNCLCYCLE MJTDCmN PANEL TEST COOLM3 McQ LAST DOPd 18 81 MS CEC 186 M SL12 P40CW REACTE DOCATEN RECD F CCNT. PLW CHCECYCLE OECK COOLM3 MQQ LAST Cord 9 8 01064 CEC t 36 29 &L32 &S W P W P GFT RASL m REQQ F CONT. Piu OJARTE4v AND b AL)T TEST COOLH3 MOD LAST DCr4 l 1B 1 04 ? CEC 1 as 29 4L30 &SW Plaap ALTERNATk RECD F CONT. PLM ONCECYCLE ~
MJTDCmN PANEL TEST COCL9e3 MQo LAST DCtd 18 01 M4 DEC 186 29 SEJ9 &$w $YSTEM NETR CAL RECD F CCNT. R,LS CNCECYCLE COOLM3 MQQ LAST DCr4 RFC e6 i 1801Ma CEC t es at 8 1.12 asW REMOTE DCCATON REQQ F CONT, PLM. CHCECYCLE i
04CE COOLM3 MQQ LAST DOPE 0 70 CEC 186 29 2.182 &BW CNtR b 4L%%5 RECO F CCNT. Piu CNCERO CCOLN3 MQO LAST DCr4 i
CHECKLIST # 1 REFUEL BRIDGE TESTING COMPLETFsOFF LOAD CORE B. SOFTWARE ITEMS JAN 30 47 Page: 14 8.01 OPERATINGMAINTENANCE.SURV. PROC.($T'S) 4W ENTRY PMIluCT5 PEEDCft 14AAKR DATE SYS#RCue PERPD G rW W CNT SUE, LECT ARTFY F le0T PEQ AP*RW CCEA STATUSCATE 1881071 CEC 1 as 4s a K21.3 2 MFUEL PLOOR exhaust RLA. PM WONTRY W0edTOR FWCTIONAL LAST 00P4 1rt&'s? ,
1001072 DEC 1 es 10 0 C.13 RHR (LPCt) LCKC VALVES PLM. 49eONTH
, LAST DONE t 1/2697 1 ILot 073 DEC 185 10 6 C 18 PlHR 4.10KV>440V PEPFCPtd MDLY PLu ME4Y SydTCHMAR SLe%TL1ANCE LAST DONE t7st?
1881074 CEC 186 10 8 L10 M LPCa SYSTEW Pe8TMmENTSFOR RL1 PR ONCEMO i DelTR CAL.OPEA 12 CPERA'MJTY ON R>ft LAST DO*E AME DOPE Witte t B 01076 DEC 1 as 10 &L21 M LPCa RJ05YS OPEMAI Plu NOT RECD SAWE AS 1 8 01.145 1891074 CEC 1 et 10 &E2J M LPCI FLCwt RATE TIST Piu QuARTEfty LAST DONE V1517 1801077 CEC 196 10 S Ait PHR LPC18Y3 NTEGNTV PLM OUARTEFLY LAST DOPE 11/1116 t 8 81078 CEC 1 as 10 0W2218 LPCa LOW PREstuff. RLS PW WONTRY MRW$$NT LAST DONE t7117 I
078 CEC 1 m to 4 W 2 2 10.2 1 LPCI M C7 > P(T RLA Pu M Wk ANW4 l LAST DCf4 11 S1e 18 01 CN Cf C 185 10 0 W 2 210 2 # LPCI MCTON PdT RL1 PW H WF AN%4
! LAST DONE 11sts I t 8 01041 CEC 1 e6 10 8 W 2 210 2 3 LPCI MCiON pdf I t
RfA PM M uk ANw4 l LAST Cod i j tig es
] i 381 ca2 CEC i es 10 8 W 2-210 2 4 LPCa MCTON NT RfA PW M Wk ANW4 LAST DONE j
11518 l ' s ai en Ce C i =
i 50 e W 2 2 to ti Lrci MCTc= pai eamucetW Rts PW u WsANwn KT3 TO FUFORM LAST Ocfd it1115 ;
i 1891044 CEC 186 10 6 W 2 310 2 6 LPC4 MCTON pdf DEEDDOTHPECec W RLS PM
' M WLuw Ai SET 5 TO PDFCpW LAST Dord vints i
t501 col CEC 1 as 10 8 W 2 210 2 7 LPC4 M CiON NT DGED a:Rh SEC# C W RL1 PW M W6 ANW4 SET 5 TG PUFCftd LAST DOrd )
mu j 1801C44 CEC 188 10 8 W 2 21014 LPC4 M CTON pdT
- EEL BOTk PEC80 W RL1 PM M WF ANW A i MT5 TO PEMCFW LAST CCPE 61110 1401C47 CEC t as 10 4W2tiO29 LPC4 M CTON NT R.L& PW MWFANWAi LAST DONE 6136 f
CHECKLIST # 1 REFUEL BRIDGE TESTING COMPLETEOFF LOAD CORE B. SOFTWARE ITEMS JAN 30 47 Page: 19 B.01 OPERATINGMAINTENANCE SURV. PROC.(ST'S)
A ENTRY PIECUCTS PEECEDCR MR DATE 8vl#RC# IEFUENC& rm asWT SURACT JUSTFY F NOT PEQ APMtb4 00EA STATU$CATE 18 01 ces MC 1 as to e W 2 t10.2.10 LPC4 M4CTON NT REA P.W M Wb ANNV4' LAsT DONE 12/tres 1 4 41.044 C G 1 a6 10 8 W 2110 211 LPG 4 MAGTON IPs T RfA Pu M WFANNUAt LAST DONE 12/17 86 1501090 DEC i 88 to a W 2110 212 LPCI MCTON Psf PEED SON PECPC WO R11 PW MW&ANNv4' MTSTOPUroped LAST DCPE 61606 1801091 DEC 1 M 10 0 W 2 210 213 LPC4 MACTON NT RLS PM M ML ANNV4 LAST DOM 61666 1 8 01.092 CEC t es 10 8 W 2110 214 LPCI MACTON NT RLS PW M Wh ANNv 4 LAST DONE
, 12/1&W 1 B 01083 DEC 188 10 8 W 2110 2 il LPCI MACTON NT REA PW M WF ANNU AL LAST DCNE 12/1645 1801064 CEC 188 to S W 2 110.294 LPCI MACTON NT PEED BOTH PECfC MG REA Pu SEW > ANNUAL MTS TO PENCRW LAST DCtA tM17 10 0100$ CEC 1 as 10 $ W 2 2.10217 LPCI MACTON NT RLE Pu SEWLANNV4 LAST Cord tM17 M6 DEC i m 10 4123 LPCI V4%1 CPE RA84.fiY Piu WONTHLY LAST DC#4 0 LOOP vist?
8 01 047 DEC 186 10 4411 LPCICCLD $4JTDOM4 REQO. F CCNT. PLM bChTHLY V4VE TEST COCEN3 MOD. LAstDOE LPC4 VAL %ES TESTED 1tt& es M85114 4122 1001094 DEC 1 as 10 t M 21 &4 LPC1 PHR IKLA TON RLS Pu SEwtANNUAL v4VE TEST LAST Dort itse6
'i 8 01 044 CEC 188 10 4 W 21 & 4.1 LPCI PNR IbOLATCH RLA PW MW ANNU4 V4YE TEST LAST DONE 12/1615 01.103 CEC 1 M 10 8W21El LPCIfHR 4&cLATON l REE PW &E WE ANNv 4 N4VE TEST LAstC0 4 '
11598 i B 01101 CEC t 86 10 4 W 21 E.5 i LPC4 PNR IKa.ATON R1A Pu M W5 ANNv4 ' l V4VE TEST LAST DONE I 111115 1801102 CEC t es 10 Stil LPCl6CV ALT &O PA4L PENCred CN1 CYCLE Piu PCT RECD.
PCR OFFLOAD i 8 01.103 CEC 1 sE 10 8 W 2-117 LPC4 Low PRESSURE RL1 Pu CTRY PLAW6Shi Al/TO Nff LAST 00t4 V1117 104 CEC 186 10 0 W 2114 LPCs LOW PRES $vRE RL1 #u CTRY PEN 65N190ECTON LAST DONE VALVES 17517
CHECKLISTO 1 REFUEL BRIDGE TESTING COMPLEIEOFF LOAD CORE B. SOFTWARZ ITEMS JAN 30 87 Page: 20 B.01 OPERATINCLWINTENANCE.SURV. PROC. (ST'S)
A ENTRY PRCCUCTS NESCEDOR MR DATE SYS#ROJs PEPUEMM DCCUENT SURJECT JUETFY F NOT FEQ APPRVR DOER STATUS-DATE 1.s @i.ics M C t es 10 S WJ 21,10 LPC4 AS A4 0EORADED VOLT SAME A8 ffEW RL& PW NOT RECD SAT 1erES CS a Mm 1.a01.02e SAME AS 1.s 01.eks 1.10 u 06 M C 1e6 10 8 W2 2.1.11 LPC4 An A4 MJ MWR SAME AS TTEW RE& PM NOT REQD SAT 18FES CS 4 Rm CEGRADED NOLTAGE 1.E01(20 SAME AS 1.s 01.030 1 e Guer DEC i a6 10 W 2.t u LPCs mACTOR WATER LEWL RLS PM E WTHLY SAFEOUARD LAST DCr4 1417 1 8 81.104 MC1SS 10 4 W.21.1 LPC1PCS REACTOR HGH RL& PW WONTHLY PfESSURE LAST DCf4 12/11 W 1 5 01.109 MC 186 10 8 W 2 2.10 31 LPC4 CONTAMsENT SPRAY RE& PW SEWL ANNUAL PERWESN1 LAST DONE 1174 06 1 8 @i.110 DEC 186 to 4 W 2 210 3 2 LPCI CONTAmeENT SPRAY RE& PM SEWFANNVAL PEAW6SM LAST DONE 111416 1.8 01.111 CEC 186 10 8W227 LPCICSCS Ptne DeckWGE SAME AS fTEW RL1 P.M NOT RECO.
SATISFES CS & Rm WONITOR 1.E01.032 SAME AS 1.8 01 032 1891112 M C 186 to 8W229 LPCI SVEQUMO AmA HCaH EAWE ASITEW RL& PW NOT RECO
&AT)$FES CS & R$ TEWPERATUFE 1.E 01.033 SAME AS 1.8 01 033
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1 113 CEC 186 10 4 W 2 21010 LPCITRP SYSTEW OUS I SAME ASITEW RLS PW NOT REQD 5ATISFES CS & Rm POMR WONfTCR 1.1 01.034 1AME AS 18 010M 18 01 i ts CEC 1 se 10 2.1.7 LPCI W&&EL HEAT UPCOCS. REQQ FOR CUTAGES PLM NOT RECO U0#464A&tasCHECK UrtEATERThnN 3 WO FOR OFTLCAD VALYES. LATEST REV TO DCLUDE TH6 TEST) 1 8 01.116 DEC 1 e6 10 t F,16 LPCA LLRT OF PR CONT J& PW COM MITE PENETRATIONS & VALW$ 7P 2,4 d e j WO 100123A.26A.298.50, or Not Ret
) 90.&3.47 j 18 Out! CEC 1 as to S C 24 LPC1ME4Y LLSE PUT0fte M14Y PLM MErly I
LASTC4',E 1130?
18 @U23 DEC 186 10 4 C 29 LPCJ SE WI MMJAL LUBE PLM SE WL ANNV AL LAST DCf(
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CHECKLIST # 1 REFUEL BRIDGE ESTING COMPLETEOFF LOAD CORE
., B. SOFTWARE ITEMS JAN 30 87 Page: 29
- 8.06 NON-CONFORMANCE REPORTS (NCR$)
..iM ENTRY PIEDLCTB DMEDCR MJMSER DATE SYS PA0Js MRMMCE DOCIAENT SUEJECT ASTFY F NOT PEQ APPRWL 00ER STATU$-DATE i
) 1SClC23 JAN 14 07 49 NCR 87 40 PEFWLNG5405v4LI4 NCR CLCECUT KFA AL P. CCMPLITE DAW 18 ClC24 JAN 14 47 44 NCR 87 M FEMLS83 W400E v4LDu NCR CLCEOL/T KFA ALP. CCMPLITE ~
DAW 1
1.8Cl02$ JAN 14 87 10 VAACutNCR$ LARGE Nm W ERS CLC200VT CF NCR'S PLV7, WPLETE l
POTENTALLY AFPECTING I CPEMBLfTY OF REQURED
, SYSTEMS POR OPMDAD r
4 1805026 JAN 16 87 41 NCR 87-81 T DE8EL GEN NCR CLOECUT KFA ALP. CCWPLETE PLES
. i8ClC27 JANil67 ER 62 444 SHAFTCCUPLNG APO NCA PEVEW MATERAL KFA ALP. NOT RECD I i sTtFFWG ASSEhSLES N WAPEHOUSE FOR OrFLCAD a 18 @lC24 JANilt? DeCR 01004 1*.Y40E VALVES NCA PEYEW MATER AL KFA ALP. NOT MCO N WAPEHOUSE FOR CFFLCAD !
l 18 C 5 029 JAN 15 07 NCR 4F065 1* Y OLOSE VALVES NCA PEVEW MAMR AL KFA ALP. M3T REOD CCWVAL (MRR W it) N WAFEHOUSE FOR 0rFLCAO i
18 CS C30 JAN tl87 23 NCR 83-009 TWLST RDeG FOR WCA fEVEW MATERAL KFA ALP, NOT RE00 Mckracr 3 N WAPEHOLSE FOR OFFLCAD 1895031 JAN tS47 23 NCA kot3 NAMCO LNrf SWfTCH NCA FEVEW MAMRAL KFA ALP. NOT RE00 N WAfEHOLSE FCR orFLCAD l t
t B C5032 JAN 15 87 NCR 84-003 >F A MLAY CopMASON KfT NCR MVEW hA44RAL KFA ALP. NOT MOD N WAPEHOLSE FOR OFRCAD
- 333 JAN in 87 E R k iet CAPACITOR $ NCA PEVEW MARRAL KFJ ALP. NOT RECD I
N WAPENOLSE FOR OFFLCAD 19 ClC34 JAN il 87 45 NCA es 147 LPRM CMOS NCA FEVEW MATERAL KFA ALP. NOT RECD f
N WAfEHOLSE PC8l0FFLCAD 8
1805035 JAN 15 47 45 NCR k150 L78%f CMOS NCR PEVEW MATERAL KFA AL P. PCT MOD q N WAfEHOUSE FCR CFFLCAD I s
18 C5 034 JANtl47 45 NCR k ite MLAY CARD NCA PEVEW MATERAL KFA ALP. NOT RECD l,
N WAPEHOLSE FOR OFFLCAD 1 B C5 037 JAN il 47 45 NCA kite LEWL SWTTCH NCA PEVEW MATEAAL KFA ALP. NOTRE 00 N WAfEMOLSE FCR OFFLCAD I
i 1 S C5 034 JAN tl 47 45 NCR 84-203 I
AAW'LF ER FOR QEMAC NCA MVEW MATERAL KFA ALP, NOT RECD
, M WAfEMOLAE FCR OFRCAD 1SCSC30 JAN 15 47 45 NCR 94 306 DaZAT10N DETECTQfe NCR #EVEW MATERAL KFA ALP. NOT MOD j N WAfEHOLSE FCR OFRCAD
- i e C5 040 JAN il 47 23 NCA k221 >@C4 LEWL SWTTC48 MCA fEVEW MARRAL KFA ALP. NOT REQD j kt>104 FWLM44 AND 450 N W4fEHOLat FCR OFFLCAD I
j 18 CC041 JAN tl87 1 NCA k-223 hSAV SCETS NCA PEVEW MARRAL KFA ALP. NOT MCD.
N WAfEHOLSE FOR OFFLCAD i 1 8 01042 JAN ill? ER 64 224 1
MSRVs. 900Y 3 N 10. psCA fEVEW MATEAAL KFA A L P. N3fREOD
}' BASE &N 118. N WAfEHOLSE FOR OFFLOAD SASE SH 131 1
18 C5 043 JAN tl 47 E3 DS CC2 l l CAAPEThG N CONTROL NCR PEVEW KFA A LP. NOTRE 00 1 ROOM AfD Afon NSTALLED MEDS FCELOWAP FOR CFFLCAD j WffMCt/T PECEPT NSP.
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CHECKLIST 01 REFUEL BRIDGE TESTING COMPLETEOFF LOAD CORE B. SOFTWARE ITEMS JAN 30 87 Page: 30 B.05 NON-CONFORAWJCE REPORTS (NCRS)
..iW ENTRY PYC0UCT5 PEEEEDCR NUWKR DATE SYS#ROJe MTUDQ DOCL&ENT SUEUECT AETFY F NOT KO WPRVR DOCA STATUSCATE i 8 Cl 044 JAN il 87 NCA 84004 &SW SUCTION BERS EA EYEW 144 TERA HFA ALP. NOTRECD N WAMHCUSE FCR OFFLCAD 1SC5MS JAN 1847 M A 46014 1* ecos MRQTE5T VALVE
ESR 45434 N WAMHOUSE FOR CFFLCAD 18 Cl C46 JAN il 67 3C NCR e644 A EACESSNE CONO6CN ON KFA A L P.
NCR CLC6ECRJT vosxCoA THE BASE PLATE 40 NUT NED DEPOSfnCN CF t787 CN AKHCR EELT 6 LOOGE NCA 8644 ON 1011 1805047 JAN tl 87 i NCR0647 CCLD SETT N3 P6TCN NCA CLOSECE/T KF A ALP. RES WR864147 D6TNG CH lNLSOER OR OPCAAatRY TO C6P.
NED44505 RE)TW 1.8 CS D48 JAN il 87 i KR8640 MALI T A3 FOR FLUO NCA CLO6ECrJT KFA ALP. CCMPdTE WR K4147 LETTL RDOP*3S 6 OR OPERAAUTY WESNG RE%TW i 8 C5 04 9 JAN 158? 1 NCR8449 PLATES NOT ALG4ED NCA CLO6CCan KFA A L P. RES WR W4147 OR OPERABUTY TOD6P.
reb 1W i 8 Cl Cic JAN 16 s7 i MR e680 IKLT ON PFS Ct.AWP 6 ER CLO6ECRJT >J A ALP COnuTE WR864147 PCTTG4TDED 17687 18 Cl Cl1 JAN il07 55 KR 6641 F ALIO TEST ACCEPTAKE. NCA CLOGECUT KF A ALP. RES WR844544 FALID TO SUPPLY OR OPERA 8Lfry TO D6P.
DOCLAENTATICN . SMODER reb EW 6 PCT NSTALLED 1 8C5052 JAN ils? C2 P4CR e652 TmEA CEFC DC E.3 94fE P8:R CLCEEOUT KF A ALP. CCwPLETE WR864216 FOLNO 179 t?
4 Cl3 JAN il 47 C2 NCR 66la FOUR MfTS AAE W64NG NCR CLO6EOUT KFA AL P. RL5 WR864210 OR COEMaWTY TO D6P.
RENTW i 8 C&Cl4 JAN tl87 C1 ER 8657 WR 96-0147 NOR CLCEEOUT KFA ALP. TO R E &
WR864147 LNEAR tosCATON ON OP OFTAA8tffY 70067 MLDS 1 A4 519A1 REVEW t14 87 i8C1Cil JAN il 87 C2 NCR86la TCKL uaAK.5 v4.AE FCLDO CN NCA CLCriCRJT KFA ALP. RE$
WR 964210 TT PSTCN OF l#ARER OR CFTRAAUTY TO D6P.
REbTW 18 5C54 JAN ill? C1 KRM43 thACCtPT AJL1 LPE.AA NCA CLQ6E QUT KF A ALP PCT RE00 WR364147 PosCATON vi AS CAOPERAAUTY CH FCR CFFLCAO EENTW ED CW MLD 1 Aa REVEW i e C s Cl? JAN i597 C1 NCR664i PAM.BCut RCLKED WR864147 MA CLOE4 CiLfr KF A ALP WTPEO E DOCATENS MN FOL90 OR CPUUetRY CH FOR C#FLCAO T4tCLO4 Calf LAAWhATO4 RE VE W AALA CN MLD 1 A7 18 ClCl4 JANil47 Ci EA 06M2 THNILK AAPOCAT0+5 PCR CLO6ECRJT KF A A L P. WORK C64~
WR864147 MM FCLs0 ALCpc AR6 CF OR OFT RASUTY PPE RE41W i 8 CS Cl4 JAN 18 87 01 ER te 0E4 LDC64 IKLTPol KR CLOGEOUT KF & ALP RE1 WR864147 CBSTRUCTchs PFtitNTP*3 OR Cf1RAa urf TO C67 FFE! hsCNT6ENT CF PWG R RE)1W 10 C5063 JAN il e ? C1 Ka stc67 ua LOCr4 EKLT N1 CLAMP NCA CLOELOUT KFA A;P Gm M to41-4 7 IKLTP*3 6 LCC54 OR CF4MALfrY RI)1W Mi JAN i 5 47 64 NCR 44 C?$ CEFECTS MN FCLIO, NCR CLOE40VT H 4 L P. 42 W'F 5 WR466418 EXC11%E RFRIS ON CtE OR CPERABLfrY FUCL C+M.
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CHECKLIST 01 REFUEL BRIDGE TESTING COMPISIEOFF LOAD CORE B. SOFTWARE ITEMS JAN 30 87 Page: 31 B.C6 NON CONFORN%NCE REPORTS (NCRS) au D(TRY PEDET5 EEIEDCR M,AAGER DATE SYS#RCue RERMNCE OCCAENT SUBKCT JUSTFY F NOT EQ APPAW 00ER STATUS @ ATE 1 B Cl 062 JAN 15 67 64 NCR 84074 RKL CHANNEL 9667T M WA NCR CLO6EC41T ALP. FLEL CWA WR86$414 CC MRK NSTR,10.12 OR CPERA8tJTY B N WRHSE MV.1. A DENT N DCESS REVEW CF SOC', CN THE FLAT SUFFACE CF CNE 1 B Cl De3 JAN 15 47 23 NCR e6-04i FCUR CCPUETE FASTDEAS NCR CLCEECUT WA ALP.
WR e6 2342 00 NOT HAvt T4 CA CFTAAatfrY NOUfED TM 64/T3 EACM REVEW PLATI MD EXCESSST Co mC6CN 18 Cl064 JAN il47 C2 NCR 960s3 TWO >AJT5 ON TW TOP CF NCR CLO6EOUT WA AEP. RE$
baR 864210 TK SuTORT AM WESNG OR CMMaLfrY RES TO D6P.
REVEW i 8 C5 045 JAN il 47 C2 NCR 96-064 COTTER PN DCT FLAREO NCR CLCEEOUT WA A L P. PCTHE00 CPEN Pf0T. FLY. W ASDERS OR CPERABLITY RLS.
( CN DE THE PM CLAAP REVEW ARLA NOT NstALLED PfDTRLY4PA41AER 18 C S C44 JAN 1687 23 NCRtoCe6 GfoJT743 ARCANOILASE NCR CLOE&Cm/T WA A L P. COdFuTE WR e6 2342 PLAT 1 WA5 DAMAGED OR CMRAsuTY REVEW i 0 Cl 047 JAN 1687 23 NCR 84-00? MLD MATTIR A/C NCR CLCEEOUT WA ALP NOT RFCO b4R 86-23-72 STRD13. (POCMUT ON OR CMRASUTY RLS MLD PFEitNTS NSPECTON REVEW i S C5 044 JAN 95 87 06 >CR 06-009 FOLR CESCFUAtCE S DCTU NCR CLCEECnJT KFA A E P. RLS WR8646'50 OR OPERA 8LITY RLS TO D6P.
REVEW
'i 8 C5 040 JAN 16 87 24 >CR te 101 13 CRPet GEAAS RfACTED NCR CLOE40VT KF A ALP COJ5uTE KACALEE CF CJWXS N 1M17 T4 OEAR TIITH AFE A-PART5SCAantD 3Cl C 7C JAN il47 12 NCR e4102 LOCEE NL/T5 Ato IKAT5 CN NCR CLOSEOUT KFA AL P. RES WRe61214 DE CLAMP CF EPRH3 OR CMRA8LffY RL1 TO O6P.
rue 3ER N-12-14e w AM REVE W
>+3 N 4149) i B CSC7t JAN 15 87 01 NCR84103 LOOSE DA/T5 A10 0CLTS NCR CLOCECLIT KF A ALP RES WRe64147 WUE RICOFOCD CR CFTRAALJTY RES TOD6P RE%T W i 0 Cl C 72 JAN il 47 C1 NCR 96104 LOCEE DA/T5 Ato KLT3 bsR a64147 NCR CLOSEOUT KF & ALP SACKTs MJE >CTEOCN TM F1T OR OPERAaLJTY RLS REE CLAMP reb 1 W i 8 C& C 71 JAN 1567 NCR te105 WRONG Elf 4ATCN NCR CLOSEC11T KFA AEP TORE $
OR CMRA8UTY RLS FOR REWCM REVE W 1D & t6 10 C&C74 JAN i50? O1 NCR SG 106 Eea.BBC R F A11O VEUAL PG CLOGECn17 KFA ALP. DCTRECO WR86414T NSPECTCN CR CFtMaLfTY RLS FCR CWL04 NED 644G L RE gTW 18 C1075 AN il e? NCR e6107 bb4TE RA DO NOT HA41 PsCR CLO6EOUT KFA A E P. CO # TETE WR 86-b:c TMOE ABLfTV
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RL& tM17 5 8 C1C76 JAN il 87 10 NCR84904 $NLESE R F A110 460AL NCR CLCEECRJT KFA A L P. RL4 MR e64T2 DAWhATot OR CMRAauTY RLS TO C6P.
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CHECKLIST # 1 REFUEL BRIDGE TESTING COMPLETFAFF LOAD CORE B. SOFTWARE ITEMS JAN3047 Page: 32 B.06 NON-CONFORMANCE REPORTS (NCR$)
.W ENTRY PetExcTs>= m nCR NLNER OATE SYS# Acus PEFWWCg hnri urNT SUEJECT JUSTFY F NOT MO AMRi9 00ER STATUS CATE 18 CD 077 JAN il 47 06 NCA es100 SPRNO HANGER H+1107 NCR CLOECUT KFA ALP RLS WR 8646-94 FALID NSPECTION OR CPERABUTY REA TO D6P.
REVEW t a CD07s JAN il 47 e NCA es 116 Hus01A F ALLD VSUAL NCA CLOeECUT MA ALP. NOT REOD EXAWNATION OR OPEAAstfrY
- RLS MWW 1 s CD 078 JAN il 87 0 NCA H 111 HueGER F ALED VIEUAL NCR CLOeECUT KFA ALP PCT REGO E14MNATION OR OPERA &EJTY RLS MVEW j
1805000 JAN il 47 14 KR ed til LIAMOFT CCBM FMCM NCA CLQeECUT K7A ALP. CCNPL&tE WR 84473 6014004 A WAS DAMAGED RLS titt e?
1 B Cl041 JANil87 02 NCA 90114 $NLSSER F AUD WUAL NCA CLOeEOUT K7A ALP, RES WRes4210 peSPECTm OR OPEAABUTY RLS 70 06P.
DEED 64 tel MWW 1866042 JANil87 C2 NCA estil 4NL 88ER F ALID V5U4 NCR Ct .1eEOUT K7A ALP, RES WR 884219 peSPECTON OR OPERASUTY RLS TO D 67,
! NED k les MWW l i & CS C43 JAN 16 e? C2 NCAestil SNLS K A7ALID V5U4 NCA CLOKOUT MA ALP. RES WRas4210 peSPECTON OR OPEAABLfrY RLS TO D6P.
NED N tel MvEW i 0 01 C64 JAN il87 C2 NCAse117 $NLSAER F AL10 V5u4 NCA CLCSEQUT K7A ALP RES WR884210 94&PECTON OR OFEAASLfrY RLS TO D67, MVEW
- Cet JANil87 02 NCA 44110 SNUDER F ALID VEU4 NCH CLOSECUT KFA ALP. RES WR as42.it St&PECTICN OR CPEAASLfTY RLS TO DEP.
MMW 18CSCM JAN tl47 C2 NCA e6 til SNLeeEA F ALED V5UAL NCA CLOeECRJT M7 A ALP. RE&
WR864210 pe&PtCTLW OR OPERABLJTY RLS TO D6P, MWW i B Cl 047 JAN il 47 C2 NCRest20 6MLeaER F ALAD VEU4 NCR CLCSECRJT KFA A L P. RE$
WRst4210 peSPECTON OR OPEAAALITY RLS TOD6P PEYEW t 8 01 C6a JAN 15 47 C2 NCA 80121 DNUDGER 7 ALID Y$uAL te(R CLOSECUT K7 A ALP R F. &
WR as4210 pe6PECTON OR OPERASLffy RLS TOD6P M YEW i 8 CS Cet JAN il 87 02 NCA eEr122 SMAeER F A&ID YEU4 NCA CLOeECRJT KFA ALP RE&
WR864218 DeSPECTCat OR CPEAASUTY RLS TOD6P MWW i 8 cl 060 JAN Il 47 06 NCR88123 $PRp$3 KUGR M41 112 NCR CLCNEC1/f KFA ALP RE&
WR es44 94 F ALID %EU4 94PECTCH OR OPERAAUTY RLS 70 06P.
I' WR es-1413 DOCATCH OR OPEAARLfrY RLS T0067 l MMW l 5801042 JAN 16 e7 10 NCA es ise HUsosaFALIDYsV4 NCR CLOSECUT Kf A ALP. CCp %ETE peePECTON l
- WR e614T2 ORCPEAABUTY RLS WHf MVEW 1 B C1063 JAN tl87 3 NCA 06127 HANGER F A LED VEUAL NCR CLCEEOUT M7A ALP RE&
DdPECTCN OR CPEAA8UTY RLS TOD6P MVEW l
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CHECKLIST # 1 REFUEL BRIDGE TESTING COh&LETEOFF LOAD CORE I
- 8. SOFTWARE ITEMS JAN 30 87 Page: 33 B.06 NCNCONFORMANCE REPORTS (NCR$)
. sW E8(TMV PUCERKilp6EEDOR MIMER DATE wYSMcJe PEPWENC$ DCCla4NT SL& LECT ARTFY F NOT MQ APPMW ODER STATV$CATE 1805004 JAN ile? 3 NCe s>1ts tWGA F ALID VsuAL NCA CLou0i/T MA ALP. Ris MSPECTON OROPUMSUTY RLS TOD67 REWW 1845006 JAN 14 47 01 NCA E120 SPmpe MANGEMfA410 NCR CLontoff MA ALP. REs Wmes4147 VEUAL MPECTION OR OPUu8417Y
- RLS 7006P i MWW 18 05 0M JAN1547 01 EA es 150 DPmM3 HAMJEA F ALED NCA CLOSE0i/T MA ALP. RES Mmas4147 VsUAL MPECTCH CR CPUust JTY RLS TO D6P.
MWW 1
180606? Jeh il af 01 EM ee 131 SPmfeG HAM 3/A F A41La NCA CLOMOLIT ~ MS ALP i RES WR W4147 V50AL MP(CTION OM OPERABLffV RLS 70 06P.
REWW 1 B C6094 JAN tl 47 61 DeC4 94132 NCN O f UMS P4IALLIO N ~
umas41te NCR CLoeEOJT MA ALP can1TE STTTEM EOLeNG Q FUM$ RLS t?S e7 J
l 18 C1099 JANil4? 49 PeCA 90133 W41f4 DO NOT 84.ET teCA CLOSEOJT MA ALP, COW %ITE
! W9 86 4 tl AW5 01.i ite0 MCT. 815 RLS t?tt?
i 1 8 @S100 Jah 15 47 NCA 80154 OAwEAS FCR POC 8014 NCA CLOIfOJT MA ALP. CNRITE j t76 87 1806101 JAN FC 47 F3 teCR 87 52 MANGER N 71122 1
PeCA CLO3(Q/T MA ALP. NOT RIOC
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CHECKLIST 01 REFUEL BRIDGE *!ESTING COhTLEMOFF LOAD CORE B. SOFTWARE ITEMS JAN 30 07 Pego: 34 B.04 POTENTML CONDITIONS ADVERSE TO OVALITY
..au ENTRY F9CmJCTlelCE00R PA.M8ER CATE SYS#RCue MMNNX 00M. SURACT JLSTpY F NOT MQ APMMt 00EA STATUS-DATE 18 M 001 JANil47 14 PCAQs Q4D e6 33 CCM GPRAY Spa.aER SN NOT MOD Rvf. DAW M3TRfCD' ~
ESR e7417 6+1417$ POR CPEMANUTY WR FOR CFFt0A0 M Ototel M MFUEL 1 8 U CC2 JAN il 47 30 PCAOrQAD86i3 ABCCW HANGER 43411M ESM as-877 OPERAEA HWsMR RV7. DAW PCTRECD ESR DeP. 00 pe07 04
- WOYE TO Fed 0 OPERA 8UfY USTe4 CONCSMt i8 M OC3 JANil47 # PCAQs OAO 8814 MCM HANGEA WERARA >WGA RV7- CAW CCNPLETE ~'
ESR 86 la$ H314418, SNVMER$ JJ.
H 21485,7.8,12.15 t 5 M OTA JAN il 87 to PCAQs OAD 9616 RHR MANGER Hibi 80 ESR 87404 CPER4EAtweQ&R Rv7. DAW P4.0 WCes.r4 OR OPERAKffY JJ.
EVALUATION i S M CCl JAN il l? 3 PCAQsOADe&17 CROSVPPORTS ESR 87 0064304 OPERARI HWGER R VI. CAW NLO WORa te OR OPERA 8tJTY JJ.
EVALUATCN i 8 M 004 JAN il 47 01 PCAQs CAD 46 it leAJN STEAM SN@SER SitTIM NOT MOD RV7, CAW teOTREQD Det0 64.nel 411401 #CINLMER heCf REO CH F m orFtcAO FOR OPEMA8 duty h MFVEL
CHECKLIST 01 REFUEL BRIDGE TESTING COMPLEIEOFF LOAD CORE B. SOFTWARE TTEMS JAN 30 87 Page: 35 0.07 TRAIN!NG NEEDS AND REQUIRDENTS
..cW ENTRY PICDl. CTS PEEED CR NUWER DATE SYS-PROJe fEPWGMCthN N NT GUBJECT ASTFY F NCIT fEQ APPMW DOEA STATVS-CATE 1807cci CEC 1 as se 'PMcC44 0.4 2.0PER TRAN UC OPS PERSONNEL 'AD0m0NAL PROCS MAR D4 COMPLETE tt.l 4 3.4 3( APP. A) CN Qi4ML fEMAthG 43.12.7tTECM OPER 1414.410.14 PROCEDL848 SPEC 44 WAACH.itto RUVELN3 DCOENT.
PRODCCMPL 77NG i s c7 Oct cec i es ses SERawa UC OPERATOR TRAhNQ CPERATOR AVA4. KR& DM DCT RE00 FCR CULCAO 18 87E3 CEC 185 000 SCER 8&O6 UC OPERATOR TMAhhG 84E0 LEVEL 1 PRA KPLA DM PCTRECD (ON D4E JOB TMcG) REfL000N3 AML, et To j
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1 B 07.0c6 CEC i 86 ee PDCekte PtAPOS ON T*NO FCR LC OP CCwdTED TMs0 KR& DG Pd PROCESS ~
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.W (NTRY PMOUCT5 PMEDCR MJWK R DAlt 8YS#Rcus PUUENM DCOAENT SUEJECT ASTFY F NOT PEQ APPRVR DOER STATU$CATE
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MDiduO M 8LA1WE1ANCE T15TN3 LETTER DU90N3 RV7, VCRoe%ED (94CLUDN3 PLAG TECH EJUSTNG TESTS EVALCCuPL MC REWW MPORT) 1304004 C(C t es 41 E59 8610s DO SYNCHONIZATON 880T AN RFO s7 TA&M PDA J P. NOTREOC ERP 122 et 1304005 DEC 188 10 ESR et t74 M MPQ1ER v4.AA hs45 CCaMUTE MRJLD 4 WJA PW CCN % ETE h4ANTENANCE OM AN ALY5 t$
RE NG DCr4 ON CLD RMS 1304004 CE C 1 as 10 E$R et.itt WC>10013&A 5 E. FOR U$E ~ ORC M M M.D W R.LA PM CCNPLETE OF ALTERet4TE El AT EVALUATON t S 04 00? CCC 1 e6 14 ESR ab167 ADAFTOR AND DAT FAILURE CLCEEOUT OF RL1 Pu CCN AITE h4014004 A PDC 0632 18 04 OC8 CEC 1 as 10 ESA e6134 ROOT CAUSE 4 CCfvECTW CWSEOLrt OF Pl.1 Pu CCM UTE ACTON FOR W31001304 POC e630
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- # 04 Oc9 CtC 1 as 45 ESR8644 MvisON TO T5 APPR'M DT5CHANE RVf. J P. NOTPECQ CR1447 TARE 3JB SWTEM PCT MGJPED 40K. FOR CFFLCAD 6AAN STEAW SETPONT FOR OFit0AD 18080'0 CEC i s6 44 ESR e6 70 PHP$ RELAY ACCEPT ANC& CNTER.A RL1 J P, DCTRE00 TEST PROCEDLsE DR 1574,1447 FOR OFFLCAO g&CCEPTANCE CRffERLA) 1804011 Ctc 1 as 14 ESR e6431 CHECK VALW 14535A&R 84STAu1D TEMP CKaE JE WW >CTRECO ET OPERASUTY FM Pfu CCHT CNLY &D FOR CFFLCAO i B C8 01# CEC 1 e6 10 ELR 80#78 ACCEPTANCE CRfrERA Rm CohrtETED ESH J& PCT RECD MC DECM VALW TEST 5 PESPONEE FOR PRI FCR CFFLCAO CCNT ONLY t 8 Os 013 CEC 1 et 10 ESA st it3 CELTA P RATN3 EVAL FCR het FOR FVEt RLS P IA NOTREQD M100144 AAB AND OFTLOAD WR FCA Cf FLCAO M100147450 Rn 9 411d08 P9tESS 15 C4 014 JAN 147 24 E ER *H36 CONTROL PCOL LETTER PEOK5th3 RVf. CCN %ETE M CO 2 47.007 ENWCNWENTAL T5 CHANGE t'27 67 ACCEPT ANCE CRfTERnA 13 ?a til J AN 1147 48 M PRN TO PESCLUT04 CF DDLTP*G" CW PW CCNPLETE PDC 0554 MSCM. PAPS'E $ KR DEW PE M LGPKKE
CHECKLIST # 1 REFUEL BRIDGE TESTING COMPLEIEOFF LOAD CORE I
- 8. SOFTWARE ITEMS JAN 30 47 Page: 37 8.00 DRAWING & VENDOR MANUAL CHANGES (MOO'S)
.EW ENTRY M,aAER MtXACT3 MEEEDCR DATE SYS-PRCue fEFEPOMM W h8NT SUSACT JUSTFY F NOT NQ APPRW DCER STATUS DATE 1809001 CEC 186 de PDC 4&te LPDATE OF PRORITY 'A' MMA J C- C W RETE DAQ& COh#GTE NoDWG1 N CD.
t 8 Os Oct CEC 186 4 L116 POC4547 LPOATE OF PRORfTY 'A' NO E04 A712%26 MMA J C. NOT REQD Dn0& CohrtETE PDC NOT OEH3 . FCR OFFLOAD bdPLAhsr.NTED 1804003 CEC 186 106 PDC 64430 (PDATE PRmffY A D946 UPDATED ORAwtOS CM J C. NOTREQD E7.EO.E13.E4CLE303 beses 1 A2A08,108 WORAiOCAtt
.orR CAD 1800004 CEC 186 106 PDC k43F LPDATE PRmlTV A DwGS UPDARD CRAmeGS CM J C. C @ MITE EJ7.EJ03&mtAE303Sm2A & t7t 47 66 22 18 De Del CEC 1 e6 10 PDC to 30 UPDATE PmoRrrY ADwGS UPCMTED CRAnect CM J C. C4NFtETE '
W241 b 1 & 2 t?& 47 18 C8 Oct CEC 186 10 PDC 0633 (PDATE PeCRITY A DwGS LPOATED Dm04 9 alAu CM J C. PCT RECD We+2 4.E216.W 2418m142, Plut E.226 hec 441,4 POC NOT W849.WlH16-4.WH14 7, E2JES$64490 ES4XD WPl1111.WPS12 0, WPlid 12,WPl150, t 8 08 007 CEC 186 41 PDC ekM LPDATE OF PRORITY 'A' WMA J C. CCN*LETE DnGE COhrtKTE 1t/1to 18 0e oce DEC t es at PDC e647 LPOATE oF PeoRITY 'A' uuA J C. CCW%KTi DAQ& CChFtITE 141116
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'009 OEC 1 a6 10 PDC e6 32 LPOATE OF PRORrrY 'A' uWA J C. CCMSLETE DWG& CChetETE NO PRfA' 0 Funds 1809010 CEC 1 a6 10 POC 86-20 LPOATE OF PRORtry 'A' EID LM #7 EED6 W MA J C. CCN MITE DnOS CChFtITE M F7N CwoPsCM 1809011 CEC 188 4Liit POC 64 70 LPDATE OF PRORITY 'A' WWA JC NOT RECD DG CChetITE FCR OFFLCAD 1808012 CEC 186 104 PDC 43 81 LPOATE OF PRORITY 'A' uuA J C. tcT MCD -
DmG1 CohetITE FOR C5 FtCAD 18090t3 Of C 186 46 RESOLL/ TON OF v4LD Cu PW CCW%ITE DRA*983 CESCREPANCE$ J C.
FOR ww NAEL WLOCE 1809014 JAN 22 87 106 PCC 64-03E EMBE PRCRITY 'A' DWGS LFOATED CRA **GS WWA JC NOTRICD wm4 PDC TUlveMR F<R CFFLCAD
1 CHECKLIST # 1 REFUEL BRIDGE TESTING COMPLEITAFF LOAD CORE 8, SOFTWARE ITEMS JAN 30 47 Page: 38 8.10 OPERATNG EXPERIENCE REVEW(OERS) 4W &NTRY M,aE R PRXECTS MCR DATE SYS#RCue PEFEPENCE W uNT SUEJECT JL2TFY F NOT MQ APPRVR ODER STATUS CATE 9 010 00 t M C 1as 10 SER SW,42 M SYS MIRLCQ4 SE.R EVALUATON MEAS 0 PLM $8W NOT REQD ~
DuDWRTANT W86EL FCR OFRCAD OfwNee0 1810 oc2 MC 1 as e1 SER es 25 EVALDO U MCil M A FOR PNPS J& D K. mi RECO
, reRorrLcAo 1 1.3 10 003 C(C t es to $ER it te.SOER R? EVAL FCR P9PS FALUM OF NED ESPONSE YW PDA COMPLETE M VALW8 NED te N1,792,1248 TCH47W EBR88F(OKFOR ONLCAD4s0ftup OR PMSS PRouttus) 1890004 DEC 188 41 SER SHS REWW DQ L0aO SECMMA TCH 07 30 PAS CCad8uTE APPLCABLE TO P*PS TCH4P14 PROC AND DOCS AM ADE3JATE !
1010 DCS JAN 22 6? el P06T TRP CartETE Post TRP CChPLETED MWW ALP. LDK N37 RECD REV1W 8644 REYit W G&004 PRCR PRCR TO W FOR OFFLCAO TO $TARTUP l
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CHECKLIST # 1 REFUEL BRIDGE 7ESTING COh@LEIEOFF LOAD CORE
- 5. SOFTWARE ITEMS JAN 30 87 Page: 39 8.11 STOPWORKORDERS MadeEm DATE S 4 PACue fEPWEME Dool,%: ' AECT JJETFY F M0f MQ APmVR 00ER STATWDATE 1 a 11 con DEC 1 es se stop work ~ ludstse encos a riman rt a gao upA ALP. CouruTE CADEA#41
CHECKLIST # 1 REFUEL BRIDGE TESTING COMPLETEOFF LOAD CORE :
C. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ITEMS JAN 30 87 Page: 40 C.01 TECHNICALSPEClFICAT)ONCONCERNS '
i
.(W EcRy PUCULCTIPEACEDCR M. uter DATE SYSMWe PEPEPENCa rrys asM St.WECT JUSTFY F NOT fEQ APPRm 00E4 STATUS-DATE t C 01,001 CEC 1 es et NED8L #3C27 44CLW PE10 FOR TS fLV5. C W PLETE PELEF TO WCNE FUEU OLAetf REL EDCLE N SFP 1 C 01 Oc2 C(C 1 as tot PL40 TECM SPtc henc FRtm 64D e ALP. JR 84DMtu3 PEPORT PEVIEW KPA ACTCH tthit COMPL.. tit TO R v5. 7.M t i 8 04 oc3 1 C 01003 CEC 1 m 10 PDC ss-M mt0LW TECM tPbC fE0 TUCH SPEC CH6ME ALP. MAy Not SE" 40% (
POR PNM WhMUW FLCW Al0D f M CHLOAD i C 010Cd Ctc i m et WAN STEAM Low PRE 46LRE UPDATED TS Rys. 4 0 k. PCT RECC ' -
SET PONT CH4NGE (TS) (PRCR 70 &M FCR CULCAD !
1 C 01 CC5 CEC i m 100 84373 ft N 60T3OWG NOCM WCm WITH Rv7, J D z. DCTRECC ~
FOR FULL LOAD 94G FLEL M WatEL OR FCR CHLCAO TDCH IPlc CHWoE i C 01006 CEC e a to Esm a us CCRE SPRAY LOW RCW
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POTENTWL TECH SPEC PLVs. 40% NOT PE0t EVALUATCNAESOLUTCN CHWQE FCR OPEAAT. FOR CHLCAD PCR OPERATICN AFTEA CofE RELCC i C 0100 ? Ctc 8 m el NRCasi1es PEsan DEC KM LOGC COdPtKTED TA&M
- ALP. TM& N P$ioGAtst l SYS Fl#C TEST CoteAinEc FCRCE STt0Y KPA EJPECTED CMR et TS TO PPCW tritt?
ECC4 CPEf%3UTY KF0fE FUEL OFTLCAD 1C 01OC4 CEC e to 60 et CO 2 87 007 CCNTRA MOOM ALP, NPC APPRChTO LTR At Nec EPATC6edENTAL fCRES) TS CHANGE KPA t'37 47 T5 CHANGE EFCAE FUELOfTLCAO i C Ci 004 CEC ti M 86 PDC 44 70 TECH SPEC CH4CE #pll N io TECM ALP. ~ 'CTKLCO APPROVAL BY Pec FCm THE SPECTODJPPORT ATS K.P A FORCHLCC '
AMLCG TRP SYSTEW (PDC k70) scc 1cio CE C n es ti? TEteo t? hA3 Pachts swP svETy NmC aPProv4L PmCR R Vs. J o m. 93 Tat:0 i KC0 t es iM EVAL. ON WAPLHGM FOR 70 $TARTUP FCR CnLOAD SutW:TTAL Nmc WCM TO C.cstsT se
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CHECKLIST 01 REFUEL BRIDGE TESTING COMPLEEOFF LOAD CORE D. NRC RELATED ITEMS JAN3087 Page: 41 0.01 NRC COWATWEES, CONCERNS, LERS
.W ENTRY PFCOLET5 PEEMDCR M,adetR DATE SY$#RCue MRPgig rvv1 W SUEKCT JUSTFY F NOT MQ APPRWI COEA STATUS DAT(
l 0 01.001 C(C 1 es 40 LER as t1 MSCLW OPUICONC47N OF SE $3C27 SeGT CK ALP. J PL COWRITE i NE0 061034 4NOLE ACTM FALURE' FOR MRAL. LEA LTCL 1 CN 6tGTS REMAN 5 CPEN PlfeDee33807 M004 10et0C2 CEC 1 e6 10 HRC es 1744 ACTCN FOR WONrTORNO 4 LT& 13 w tofPict CAL 0610 A8&El8NG CCpFRECTM
- F@ CFFLCC i ACTON RL PHR PM&&,
MbtE ET Pyrw srn m l t C 61003 CEC 1 to 41 LER to 13 PEPLACE CE TWE CFD LER UFCATE LT a EL COAPLETI ' i j PELAYS wrTH MST. SA 1 StaWffTED TO NPC '
EtMQ DEXL CM P9CT.
~t001Cc4 CCC i 86 46 LER 9616 CAtatRAT14i80V GUS Al & LAR UPDATE LTa &L COJPLET{' ~
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4 A4 UncER vCLTAGE RELAYS &LaWW TO Nft" 1001005 CEC t 88 100 ES es c2 MSN*C TO EUuirN MF. BULLETH MVIEw AND JD m- 80 cod %ETI- '
- DECC 2 84111 ' STATC 0*RNO DP SMTCHS MSPOSE TO NRC to A FOA eNPS 1 D 61006 C(C 186 44 PsRC DCA MLAYS E&Ut MSPOet TQ NRC A (.P. J P. RE S P, 91'31 id WAROE PAPRWKi(
' 1 1001OC7 JAN 14 47 el NHC NVECTON M)ME PNCEDLRt 8 4.143 PpOCEDLfE Me$ON &Dn Piu NOTRICO '
REPORT 6510 W4AtonN F7CW OJTSCE FG COL *.A0 CAI Ct.K TO FRE OR NMA&iABLITY OF C.W 1 D 01000 JAN it 07 1il 1965 &ALPARC DHs Lm W m 9 CF triteKD PESPCNR4 TO **C Rv7< &DM tot R&OV CPERATOR$ PerECTION MPORT FG CFFLCC 1 Cc6 JAN it 87 116 1ets S ALP,6AC 46-06 LACE CF STAFT &LF90RT Rv7. &DM 6CTRIOD FM CPERATICNS MSPOSE TO PC FCA COLCC CEP ARTW NT NEPECTMN MPCRT i 1 0 01.010 JAN1867 til 1til SAiP.NRC that EMR CERTDE ComCL ESENIE To **C Rv7. ALP PCT RE.7 4515.46-37 psePECTEN MPORT Ir.P A FOR CFRCAD 9001011 JAN tta? til NRC ee 37 LNRUDASLE STATMN PESPCNid io teC Rv7. LJ2 NCT RIOD CMA*MS hePECTEN MPORT F @ CFFLC C l 1001012 JAN1847 ill hRC A07, et ti, SEbPCPet TO teC RV7. TLS DCT R100
. CONTMJpc xut WRAPMS&E.S ToraCM1W n h PECTth MPmT F@Cmee RADCLOGCAL CONTMCLS
, PROGAAM i 10 Cl 013 JAN 19 47 til NRC $644 WCMR ATTm,[E TCmeM:15 PESPONME 70 Dec Rv7. Ttt 6CTREOp .
} RADtATON PUCTICTON ANO DNPECTCN MPORT I FOR CMC 4 J ACCCUNTAS(fry l
, M i
to awm:PeaTAt Tto eartCTxN MPmt Fm Cmee PROGRAW 1001015 4AN iS87 til NRC eH4. es il remm e sICATEN IETwtime MSPONtE To tfC Av7 TLS PCT RICC M DE.ALTW PtMc3 QPOLP penPECTEN MPORT FQR CMC 4 WO OTE R LEENELE CEPT 3 1
10410'4 JAN1087 1il NRC eH4 uANTEweC4 $UPERvEm KnPCNid TQteC P.y 7 uhl PCT %7
$T AMDe3 VACANC E $ pdPtCTON PEPCRT Fm CMCC l 1001017 JAN 1887 til NRC e6t3 LN rto wa wT1we:( . pESENat To >#C Rv7. u%& 6CT 47
! CHRATONS NTWACK DerECTDd PEPCRT EDM F@ CMC 4
- * *1 014 JAN 9007 it5 1645 &ALPARC to #7 Seu WENT4 TEN C# M SPONDE 70 Dec AvF uha tot E'O WANTENANCE PLANhNQ DesPECTEN EPORT KR CMCC CPIOUP S C LCG OIGPO&fTON) l l
CHECKLIST 01 REFUEL BRIDGE TESTING COMPLETEOFF LOAD CORE D, NRC REL'TED ITEMS JAN 30 87 Page: 42 0.01 NRC CCMATTMENTS, CONCERNS,LIRS (W LNTRY ~
PRXnKT5EEOEDCR 4MEER DATE SYS#RCue REFEMPCE DOC 144NT SURKCT ASTFY F NOT MC APPRW 00EA STAfusCATE 1 D 01018 JAN it6? ill 1P46 & ALP,NRC Sb20 FCRMAL2ATON AND MSPONIE To mC Rys, upta 6530 DCT Mco' trLIWENTATON CF NW FTOM EPORT Tm 0FTLCdC PNVENTATM MANTINANCE P900A4M 1Dit C2C JAN 10 87 1tl NRC eros 8543, ATW5 MC#C P18(T FE.1D PESPO eETo m C
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ab to, 46 21, 06 #4 WWAEER FALUMS Rvt uka N3T MOO NePECTEN PEPORT J P. FOR Cf7tCAD (DECscN Aeo ACToNFoR M4 1 C C1 C21 JAN 10$7 til NRC 8814 IPENI.R KTTM3 ANO FESPCNEE TO NMC Rvf. ENS NOT MCD, COORONATCH NePECTON KPORT Fm CrnCdc truCATICN8 CF TM LOLS i
OF SVTTY tus 810 1 D 01.C22 J AN 10 67 til NRC 8814,06 25 PESPCHE TQ pfC uhed.M FLOW PROTICTON R VJ. ENS PCT Mco j
FOR Rm PWPS MGPECTCM REPCRT FCR CFRC4 i D C1 Ct3 JAN tt87 til NRC 4529, ebts, G%CMD 94.LIG MC LCoat PESPONSE TO*C R YI, MNS PCT REOQ '
04 54 BOLTE N LOW P9ESSLRE MePECTCN PE.PCRT FOR OFTLCAD t ECC8 BYETiWB 10 Ci c24 JAN tes? 115 NRC ee-te. es44 CCM amAY CHCM VALW PESPONIE TQ mC R Vf. uNS NOTRECO APO uOV PRohlut MrECTON PEPCRT Fm OrFl0AD I
10 CI C26 JANiS47 11% NRC04tS 64.Af mW TO pre 4AAY MSPCDM TQ pfC R VI, ukt NOT MCQ. !
CONTASWENT ECLATON NFECTON KPCRT FCR CFRC@ '
8YSTEidCAAL9*3 t@et CM JAN is 67 til PsRC e521. e4 25 EECOCAAY CCNTADMENT MSPONEE TOWC R VI, MN4 PCT MQQ D4MPER F ALUPE8 NSPECTON PEPCRT FCR CtTLCdC C27 JAN it 87 til NRC0844 & ALT SERvCE W ATER i M&PCNIE TO WC ttV7, uNB NOT REOD PF983 CORIC61CN MSPECTCM PEPORT FOR CTTLCAO i C 41.cs s JAN iss? ill NRC 88 25 POTENTW. CCff0&ON CF PESPCNEE TO ##C RV7, MNR SCT MCD P9UuARY CONTAD48ENT D8FECTEN PEPCRT FOR CFTLCAO ECLATICH VALVES 10 C1 C29 JAN 16 4 7 1tl NRC0625 CESdQN CE8 CEPCY N PE5PopeE To nfC
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Rv1. uNt PCT MCD NTEftdEDATE RANGE NrtCTON PEPORT FCR CfTLCC DEUTTEN 6CHITOR PCmtR j SUPPLY 1401CM JAN ite? til NM 86 21, te 26. Ptft Mc COPE SPRAY PWP MSPONEE TQ mC 8444 KV7. ukt PCT RECO i DePECTON RESLAT5 SerECTON FEPORT Fm CFTLOAD I to gt Cat JAN ie47 til N% as 31, a6 37 CEssGN Cap cE)CY PEnPCMaE TO >fC RVJ. EN& PCT M00 N THE StGT1 McPECTON MPORT
- FOR CFRCC 1061C32 JAN 10 47 til NRC 8881 Po*ENTML COPCETE PE4POM 70t#C Rv7. uNS SCT RECD W ALL E4UE pertCTCM PENRT FCR CFTLCM l
iD Ct eu Jo i . . r tii SC . is t>x CEuw Coc..cV N w ,E.c:.M To.fC l Rvi. uN. ,CT l
.Ca T mnW . m CTuN,EPCRT F Moo CFFteo 10 Ci Cu JAN ie67 ti5 NHc te u LCos4 wire.3 MPcNes To ##C Rvi. uma *CT Moo NytCTON MPCRT Fm 0FRCd3 10 41 C36 JANtt87 1tl NRC at 41, as ti, La4 Cf M ES M C WCTai fESPCNEd TopfC es fl R v7. uNS DCT MOD
' teas N CcNTn0L MSP(CTON REPORT Fm onLCAD CdRCulTS i
1DetCM Je is 47 115 NRC 4487 SEEMC OJALF CATON CF PEldOef TOefC RVp.
j uNB ~'PCTPEOS j H3A RELAYS MrtCTEN PEPORT FOR CFTLCM '
{ 13? JAN 1087 til NRC 46 C3,86 41 SJr%E1APC4 KafinADe3 E SPON E TQ*ec RvJ. LJ1 PCT RECD 8H4 V4 h M S&ES DerECTON FEPCRT FCR CFTLCM i
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CHECKLIST # 1 REFUEL BRIDGE 1ESTING COhTLETEOFF LOAD CORE D. NRC RELATED ITEMS JAN3087 P&ge: 43 D.M NRC COMMITTMENTS, CONCERNS, LE R13 iW ENTRY McCACT5 DEEEED OR NLNER DATE SYS#RCue MMPENC1fMKNT SUEKCT JUSTFY F NOT MQ APPmTI 00E.R STATU$ 4 ATE i D 61 CM JAN 10 87 til HRC 86f t ECCSTJT AOGOUACY MSPCNBE 70 mC RVI. uNS NOT RECO NytCTEN MPORT 10R OFT 10AD 1001038 JAN1887 ill NRC etil,e6ts CAteRATCM AND TESTNQ MSPONIE. To mC Rv7. WNS NOT RIOD OF PROTECTM MLAYS 40 NOPECTON MPCRT FOR OFRCAD DM APIAS .
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4 1 D D1.H3 A il 67 til NRC 8014 CO(TROL CF MEASLRNQ OC MSPCNBE To t#C Rv7. ENS NOT REQQ TEST Ecurt4NT NePECTON MPORT FOR OFRCAD 1001041 JANtt87 til LOCAL LAM RATE filf MtPOetTOPfC Ryf. JAS NOT MCQ PROJW ADMNMRATON NetCTON MPORT FOL OFRCAD 1001Ni JANit4? til hRC sarti, e6 25 MCumpC' LOCAL LAM fE SPCNEE To mc RVI. JA8 NOT MCC RATI TlST FALURES NFECTON MPORT FCR OFRCAD 10 61 W3 JANtt87 til NRC0063 GAGMEPCY PLAMAENDCY MSPONht 70mc RVJ. R1 N3T MCD.
ACTON Liitt MVEW HrECTCH MPORT FCR OFROAD 10 01 k4 JANII67 til NRC m 32.46 H. CCNTHJp4 V4APM46El N MSKNBE TO t#C Rv7. EJL PCT MCD e637 Faif>94 LP CN PROELIMS HSPECTCH MPORT FCR OFTLCAD VdTH TM SECURITY PROGRAM l' 1091045 JAN 19 et ill NRC OHe,8428. PRCRITOTCN C# MSPONIE To mC RVJ. uNA NOT MCO 0642 SECWTY MANTU6ANCE NytCTION MPORT Fm OF71 CAD 1001044 JAN1887 itt NRC aus. 86 28. TIM 8DdTM CF T4 JbE ESPOPsIE To n#C Rv7. EJJ. NOT RIOD 8642 OF LCMS TEMA NOPECTON MPCRT FCR OFRCAD COMPDEATCRY bdEA5UMS N asCwry moor.M I 04? JAN1087 til NRC e6 21. a6 26. h40ECUATE F FE ORGM MSPCMETQ *C RV7, ts M, e6 37. as 34 EDM NOT McQ DRE.18 ANO TRANH3 NIPECTON MPORT E.J1 FCR OFRCAD 1 0.01 044 JAN i887 115 NRC 8625. SS M heftOUAit USE CF MAPONRE TO 8ec RV7, KF A #CT R&CQ t CORMCTM ACTON NrECTON MPORT FCR OFRCAD l PROGR8*8 1001046 JAN i047 til NRCe64,t&14 F*CelTOTON C# F RE RE SKNSE TO Pe4 Rv7. MN4 PCT RECC to M.to M MCTIC' A N MANTENAM E DertCTON PEPORT FGt CmCAD 10 et C!c JAN1847 til NRC e64.9621 E1NTFCATON CF FRE PE SPOSE TQ me N. J . EJ 1. N3T MOD Str 54 EMPEM AND RESOLLfTON HSPECTON MPORT FOR CnLO80 OF PEPETRATON DECMPANC4S i 0 Ct ett JANis67 its i365 SALP.NRC 804 V4.APM &S N RE SPOC*C M &M 70 *ec JLK KFA NOT MCO T0 04 FN0stell N9PT CTON MPORT FOR OFFLCAD i
l t D Si t12 JAN 19 8? 115 1986 & ALP HCUEMIP983 QWTTt:A MN TQlfC RV7. MNR 'tCT RECQ 3 DetCToN MPCmf FCR CnteeD
! 10 at CS3 JAN 1047 til NRC06 H MalVTON CF NEEA1C4 MaPCNat TQpeC RVs. KFA 6CT MCO DeptCTEN DC4 DetCTON M PORT FCR OFRCAD DC4CATENs ON LATETV IELATID P99 4 4 0 Locad PP94 &(.PfCRTS 100i&64 JANt047 1t6 1665 SaiPVC e&t$ TEChedCAL SPECF CATCN M SKNhi TO pfC RVF, 40 k. Mli PLCQ M 29 E U LTY EV*1 CH4CES TO SJNORT P 44T NAP (CTCH MPORT PTA FOR OFTLCAO 2CR PDC 06% STA/ITtP NC AP99CNED TS C+dNCE) 1 1
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CHECKLIST # 1 Rhr"JEL BRIDGE'ESTING COMPLE'IEOFF LOAD CORE I E. EMERGENCY PLAN ITEMS JAN 30 87 Page: 44 E 01 EMF 9 PLAN ISSUES FOR CRITICAUTYSCWER OPS N. ENTRY PRXII.CT5 MEEDCR
.MER DATE SYS PRCue F4FEFENCg rvys asyy sugJECT JLETFY F NOT FEO APPRVR DOER STATUS DATE 1 E.8121 000 R1 NOT REOD.
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l CHECKLIST # 1 REFUEL BRIDGE 'IESTING COMPLETE /OFF LOAD CORE F. BACKLOG PROJECT ITEMS JAN 30 87 Page: 45 F.01 BACHLOG RECOMOOATIONS
.M ENTP't PREUCTS MCR aller DATE SYS#ROJe NFEM NCE N W 8'JRJECT JUSTFY F NOT MO APPRW DOER STATUSCATE 1 F.01.001 DEC 186 49 SL 374 MSALENED ORFICED FUEL COMPLETE SLPPORT PECE SEE ITEMS E03 014-20 1 F 01.002 DEC 186 de SL 244 MFLEt MOGE POSITCN COMPLETE NTEPtOCK(TO PREVENT SEE frEM EED FOR JAPERN3) 1 A.02 000 TF J DEC 3 e6 19 SL es NSPECT Rs CAv!TY ORANS SCREENS N PLACE CCSAPLETE ^ l NSTALL SCREENS F NODE WO4 TO CplST#2 SEE ITEM N PtACE 1.H 01.023 i F 01.004 DEC 9 86 we &L 350 ECSMMCAL (SPRN3) CORE DETUWNATION OF PD1 NOTRECO.
ESR 86-565 S& PORT PLATE PLUGS - EEDTO E DCPE FCR OFFLOAD NSPECT EFGE COM RFO se (TCH es 335)
ELOADTO DET. PEED TO MPLACE DURNO RFOs0 1 F.01004 DEC 913 45 8 L 275 51 SRM RM DET.NSERT. RES P.M NOTRECO NTRACT ECH QEAMOX {
F G OFFLCAD I LUBE. KO PROC REV 4 REV l
TO SPARE PARTS LET l 1 F 01007 MC 0 e6 of I SL 186 $6 NSPECT SRV ICOES - RES. P.M NOT RECO. i HOT TEARS N TARGET FCn CfFLCAD l ROCK SRV 800Y CASTNGS* CCMPL 190 i 1 F.01.008 DEC 10 to 01 8L 17s TMRMOCCUM CESON 4 CObFtETED DRYWEli RES P.M. NOTRECO SRV LEAK DETECTICN . NSPECTCN OF FCR CFFLOAD l PERfCfW WAUCC%N CF SRV TMPam SLES l TERMCCCUPLES !
079 CEC 3 e6 100 SL 372 NCChe4}CEDTS CHANGE REVISE 0 TS COusuTE FCR FUEL LOAONG SEE rrtu 1.C 01.005 1 F 01010 JAN 887 43 SL247 ILACE GUCE H4CLES CCNFLETED FFC 86 RE.&
CRACKNG ANO BREAXNG APART
CHECKLIST # 1 REFUEL BRIDGE TESTING COMPLETEOFF LOAD CORE G. PROG RAM ITEMS (RAD PROT, FIRE,SEC, HOUSE.DECON) JAN 30 87 Page: 46 W ENTRY PFEX1rTS PEEDEDOR ABER DATE SYS-PRCus FUUedCE rvvs w guaJECT JUBTFY F NOT NQ APPRVR DOER STATUS DATE 1.0 01.001 DEC 186 See PHASE le MAWT SLAaAARIZE ACTIONS 604& RE& NOT RECO.
PROGRAMMATIC BSWS NECESSARY FROW FOR OFFLCMD W WEEK PtM 10 010C2 DEC 1 K 48 FRE WATCH FOR 883TS CtK EED CONTRCL FBE PER TO DELUGE SYS SOLATON WATCH PROR TO OFFLOAD 1.G 01.003 DEC 186 909 TCH e6-364 E 203 WA11CCmm;ONCERNS WAMDOWN CONCERNS PDS COMPLETE GASED UPON FNONGS EVALUATON TCHM 364 NOFNONGS 1.G 01004 DEC 186 33 EST.T WIPr FRE WATCH R.V. NOTRECO.
PATROLS N KEY PLANT FOR OFFLCAD AREAS 1 G 01006 JAN1987 46 htPROVE REUABLITY OF KNA J P. NOTRECO CFTSITE PCMER SUPPLY FOR FOR OFFLOAD P9PS BY CECREASNG FNEQ ANO DW110N OF PWA LOSS
CHECKLIST # 1 REFUEL BRIDGE TESTING COMPLEIEOFF LOAD CORE H. 'PUNCHUST' AND OTHER ITEMS JAN 30 87 Page: 47 "M ENTRY PRODUCTE PEEEEDCR KR DATE SYSPRCue 8EFEFENCE m uNT SUEUECT .AJETFY F NOT NQ APPRVR DOER STATUS CATE 1 n 01.001 DEC 188 21 RFF P UST h@ ROW WATER SUPPLY FUR CJM E CCNPLETE DATED 11/1246 $PRAYNQ DRYER 4EPARATOR 1 H 01.002 DEC 186 42 OEOCUT M N WAT. CJK E COMPLETE 1 H.01.003 DEC 186 49 M nRW:ES OfCKOUT. CJK CJM COMPLETE ELEC. WATER, AR 1 H Q1.004 DEC 186 49 96 TALL REF1AL NUDGE Cd TECH CCadPLETE CObeANCATCNS CAR.E AND NEL 1.H Q1.005 DEC 186 999 REYSED PROC CHANGE $A TEST DR REVEW & AEP. NOT REQS PFwm PER AEA APPRCNAL OF PREOP TEST D6CMPANCES 1.H 01.006 OEC 196 64 P2 LNDERWATER TV CMdERA REi PM CCad*LETE CHCKCUT MC REPAR 1 H 01.007 CCC 186 10 P2 ESTORE ALL R$ CUADRANT
' WJA E CCadPLETE
'WTERFERENCES*(LST l ITEMS AS APPROPRATE) I 1 H 01004 OEC 186 64 P2 NSTALL CATTLE CHUTE CJM CJM CCadPLETE 1 H 01000 DEC 186 106 PDC H43A EXHBIT 9. OPERATONAL COtFLETED O0t se KPA MMA TUWOWR m a4ENTADON OR APPRCPdDWAfdR AEP.
1 H 01010 CEC 186 106 PCC 44438 EuBfT 9 OPERATANAL CC6FLETED E)04 se KPA MMA TUWOWR 00CLMENTATEN OR APPRCPdD WAf4R AEP.
I H 01011 CEC 1 e6 106 PDC 64-C00 EXHBiT 9. OPERATONAL COe4MTED EJ0i se KPA MMA TNER DOCLMENTATCN OR APPROWD WAAER AEP.
012 DEC 186 106 POC 4403E EXHBff 9.OPERATONAL COe4MTED EJ0i se KPR MMA TtfMR DOCLNENTAT10N OR APPROWDWAfdR AEP.
1 H 01013 CEC 186 106 POC H43F EXHBiT 9 OPERATONAL CCbMETED E)01 se KPA MMA l TtRNCPdR M WNTATTN OR APPROWD WAAER AEP.
1 H 01014 DdC 186 61 PDC 8530 EXHBIT 9. OPERATCNAL COhMITED E)ot se KPA MMA WAITNG ON TtfWCPdR m m3ENTATEN OR APFROVED WAfdR AEP. CPS PROCS I N 01.015 CEC 186 61 POC 6547 EXHBfT 9. OPERATICHAL COhMETED EJ0t se KPA MMA EXHBIT r9 l TUNCPdR N wNTATCH OR APNTD WANER AEP, KPGPROO 1 H 01016 CEC i es 48 Pf4 6M4 EXNSIT D . OPERATCNAL CChMETED DM ee KPA MMA WANER TUNCPdR DOCutENTATION OR MPRCPdD WAfdR AEP.
1 H 010 t ? CEC 186 10 PDC 66 30 F wHBfi g . OPE RATCHAL CCe@LETED E)0t se KPA MMA WAJNG ON TtFNOWR DOCLNENTATYJN OR APPROWD WAMR AEP. PROCEDL.RES 1H01018 00C 186 10 PDC 06-33 EXNBff 9.OPERATCNAL CC&RETED EJ04 se K.PA MMA NQTRECD TUNCPAR DCOLMENTATEN OR APPRCP4D WAATR AEP. PDC NOT S$UED 1 H 01019 CEC 186 104 POC SSSI A PN D EXH Bri t . OPERATICNAL COhMETED DM r) KPA MMA NOTRECO TUNCPAR rrrs uENTATICN OR APPRCPdD W AfdA A EP. FCR CFFLOAD 1.H 01020 DEC ie6 10 POc e6 20 EXHBf' t . OPE RATICNAL COnFLETEDOtt se KPA MMA NOTREOD.
ftfN O dRrres W ATCH OR APPROWD WAfdA AEP. FRN TO BE ESUCD 14?
1 H 01021 CEC 186 09 CHANE OUT DW AREA RE.A PM NOT RECD.
COOLER FETERS FOR ERT FCR Cf710AD 1 H 01022 CEC 186 50 KC. CONT. POETRATICN5 CONTRCE. LID PLM COMRETE PLLOGED PEPETRATONS SEE ffEM 1.A04 034
CHECKLIST # 1 REFUEL BRIDGE TESTING COheLEROFF LOAD CORE H, 'PUNCHUST' AND OTHER ITEMS JAN 30 87 Page: 48 i.M ENTRY PRODI. CTS EEMDCR IGER DATE SYS#ROJs FEFENHCE NY1 W SUEECT JUSTFY F NOT NQ APPRW DOER STATUS-CATE 1.H 0102C DEC 4 86 19 SL 06 NSPECT Rs CAVfTY DRANS NETALLED SCREENS PER NOT REOD.
MANT..NSTALL SCREENS NED ESR OR PDC PEFFCRM FOR VESSEL AS$u 1.H 01024 CEC 5 as see 820 WEETING 121 WATER AV ALA8%TY TO SUFFCENT WATER SDM PLM CCm4 RITE ROCO POOL CAVTTES 1 H 01.025 DEC 8 86 49 ENSUN 145 DCA.ER.E EADE SPECML D3LTS & RE.1 PM NOT REOD.
t QUDES ARE AVALA8LI FOR PA/TSTOMA4 m n 8 TOBEGN RLL CCRE OFFLOAD EADE OUOES OFFLOAD 141 DOUBLE 4 SNGLE I ARE AVAA.ABLE 1 HB1026 DEC 9 86 31,32 SA4FL1 AJR FROM OUTPUT REA PM NOT RECO
& AR COWNSSORS FCR FCR OFFLOAD AJR OVALTTY 1 H 01027 DEC 9 06 45.46 OMG e6 234 EVAL 4 $UBSEQUENT NOURED EFORE SV SDM PijA NOT RECO.
M130 f.;ABLE WAUCOWN CF ALL CONOUTT/ WOVE TO I DEGRADATCN WRNG THATIS ANALYZED CHKLST#2 TOIE VFECTED BY HICH EERGY/ TEMP PPNG 1.H.01.020 DEC 9 86 4146 O MG 86 238 E.O. PR3ECT PEPFORA NOURED KFORE SV CM SD NOT RECO.
M130 CABLE EVAL AND REVIEW VALIDfTY WOW TO DEGRADATEN & EQ CUAL N UCHT CF CHP2.ST #2
)
CABLE DEGRAWTICH 1 Hci 029 CEC 9 86 ~ 4146 O WG 44 234 PRCR TO &V, NSPECT & NOURED BEFOE SV RE.S PR NOTRECO.
M130 CABLE REPAR MANUAL ISCL VALVE FCR OFRCAD DEGRADATCH N VICNfTY CF SUBKCT CARE
' 030 CEC 9 86 45.46 CWG 86 234 MNSULATE VALVE / PIPING NOURED KFORE &V RLS PM PCTRECO M130 CABLE N VENITY CF CAaLE FCR OFFLOAD DEGRADATON 1 H 01031 CEC 9 86 45.46 O MG 86 234 CERN3 E.ATVP, NSPECT NOUFED EFORE SU SDM PEM NOT RECO.
Mi 30 CARE VALVE.PPNG NEAR CABLE WCrv'E TO DEGRADATICH FOR SGNS OF STEAM CHKLSTs2 LE.AXAGE 1 H 01032 CEC 3166 46 QECM 8 ECCS WOTCR 5kV RES. PM VCRX UNTL LEAD 6 FCR PRCPER RAY OFRCAD OEM $ PUCES PRICR TO FUEL CFFLOAD 1 H 01.033 JAN 7 87 45 CHAN*E SETPCHT CH RE.1 PM NRJEL FLCCR (117) AAM FCR RERJELNG ACTMT1ES 1 H 01034 JAN 80' 999 NPAR DAMAGED SH:HE REA PM NOTRECO FRONT EROGE (POTENTLAL FCR CFROAD SAFETY HA1.ARD)
H 01035 JAN 7 87 999 ESTAREH DC684ETRY T.LS.
Tape:3 PCUCY 4 FRCCEDLNE FOR REREL FLCCR WCWE 1 H ot 034 JAN 887 27 NSPECT & REPAR AS RLS PM NOT RECO
$8M AAARY COP (EMER FCR CfTLOAD CELTAY ELEMENTS (DSCHAAGE CANAL) 1 H 01037 JAN 14 47 10 WR E-XX NST ALL HSL4.ATON CN D6TALLID NSUL. WJA
CHECKLIST]1 REFUEL BRIDGE TESTING COMPLETEK)FF LOAD CORE
. 'PUNCHLIST' AND OTHER ITEMS JAN 30 87 Page: 49 W ENTRY PRCDUCT5 6CR alER DATE SYS-PRCus FEFU4ihCE W u YT SUBJECT JUSTFY F NOT NQ APPRVR DOER STATUS 4 ATE 1 H 01038 JAN 15 87 10 A & C Rm PLAdP WOTOR M.A P.nr NOT RECO.
LEADS Mi.ED N8PECTION SAME AS maE.DONFNONG80F 1.R 01.032 V R$ WOTOR 1.H.01.039 JAN 15 47 41 EVALUATE CHARED WWES E COMPLETE ON T 00 CABwET . PER NCR CLO6ED 1 H.01.040 JAN 27 87 de ADAJSTRFILEL MOGE WOfNNG nEETNG PM CCNPLETE aft 6ED TO ACCEPTA112 DFO 1/29 1/2S 87 LEVEL 1.H 01.041 JAN 27 87 48 PSTALL WAITtR SHELDS TO PM PYOENT KREL MOGE CONTAMHATCH
CHECKLIST # 1 REFUEL BRIDGE TTSI'ING COMPLETFX)FF LOAD CORE H. "PuNCHusT" AND OTHER ITEMS JAN 30 87 Page: 50 R SYS-PROJs EFEFENE W1W SURKCT PEQ APPHVR DOER STATUS-DATE CHECKLIST
SUMMARY
- 1. TOTAL NUMBER OF LINE ITEMS . _fififi' .
- 2. TOTAL NUMBER OF REPORT PAGES _ _!iQ _
' LNE ITEMS WTTHOUT ENTRY DATES AAE COWTED N THE TSTAL CT T GE TO NT ES.
The following information is an analysis of the Checklist Line Items to provide a more thorough understanding of the STATUS of'the Checklist with regards to being ready for the MILESTONE: 1 Of the 666 Checklist items:
1'4 Items are COMPLETE 243 Items are NOT REQ'D. for this milestone l 269 Items are OPEN Of the 269 OPEN items:
119 Items are Surveillances which are not statused as COMPLETE or NOT REO'D. but info on the Date Last Done is provided. ]
42 Items are OPEN NCR's 26 Items are Checks on the Operability of l Required or Needed Systems.
26 ltems are checks for completion of MR's on Required or Needed Systems.
7 Items are being Worked Not To Affect the Milestone.
CHECKLIST # 2 COMMENCE RELOADING FUEL 9
CHECKLIST 0 2 COMMENCE RELOADING FUEL A. HARDWARE ITEMS JAN 28 87 Page: 1 A.02 PtANTMOOlFICATIONS(PDC 3)
..tM ENTRf PRCOUCT5 PEEEDCR j NJMeER DATE SYS#RCue MFERENCE Dm KMT SUSKCT JUSTFY F NOT MQ APPRVR 00ER STATUSCATE 2A02.002 OEC 186 45 PDC e6 27 PENCFW UYW CHANOGOUT PDC CLOSECI.TT RE& PM PER PDC PACKAGE E 2 A 02 003 OEC 186 03 PDC e617 MPFCFW C@ CCMECTOR PDC CLOSECUT RLS. P.M AND CABLE REPt.ACEMENT GE PER POC PACKAGE l 2A03 004 DEC 186 45 PDC 06-23 PERFORM LPRM CCPNECTOR PDC CLOSEOJT RLS. P.M l ANo CAaLE REPtACEMENT E I
1 PER PDC PACKAGE 2 A 03 CC5 CEC 186 22 PDC 4653 PENFORM POST ACCOENT N2 PDC CLCEECUT RES PM VAPCRIZER TESTNG APC E TURNOWR 2 A 02 006 DEC 186 22 PDC M-51 06ECT TORUS VENT POC CLOSEOJT RLS P.M TESTING & TUPHOVER E 2 A 02 007 CEC 1 as 33,10 PDC 46 52 FIRE WATER TO POC CLC6EOUT RES P.R CCNTANMENT SPRAY CE TESTING & TURNOVER 1
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CHECKLIST 0 2 COMhEN RELOADING FUEL A. HARDWARE ITEMS JAN 28 87 Page:2 A.04 mm REQUESTS & PROCEDURES NCL PMS
.W ENTRY PfECLCTS PEEEEDCR MJulER DATE SYS#RCue FEFEFENCE W uNT SLEECT JUSTFY F M37 FEQ APPRVR DOER Stalls-DATE 2 A04.1H JAN 20 87 03 P2 PliPFGW CfCCHANCEOLIT RES. P.R AM)REPAR PER P2 E 2 A 04.135 JAN 20 87 45,03 P2 PERFORM PC6mCN
-~
RES P.M NDCATOR PROSE (PP)
PREWNTM MANTENANCE .
. ~
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CHECKLISTD 2 COMMENG RELOADING FUEL B. SOFTWARE ITEMS JAN 28 87 Page: 3 B.01 OPERATING / MAINTENANCE SURV. PROC.(ST'S) ad ENTRY NUMBER PRODUCTS PEEEDCR DATE SY5 PRCue MFENSCE rW1 asNT SUEECT JUSTFY F NOT MQ APPRVR 00ER STATUS DATE 2 9 01.154 JAN 20 07 03 P2 PENCFW CR0 FRCTICN RE& PM TESTNG OF ALL DRNES ADM PLM aB01.156 JAN 20 47 03 P2 PUFOfW SMOLi RCO RES. PM SUSCRITCAL TESTNG SDM PLM J E,,
CHECKLIST # 3 RELOAD COMPLETE ASSEMBLE VESSEL AND CONTAINMENT 1
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - , - , . - _-.--,.r,, ,,,---.m -- _ , ,, , _ ,, - _nn., ---r - - - - _ , - - , , .n-,-_,,-----
CHECKLIST # 3 RELOAD COMPLETE ASSEMBLE VESSEL & CONTAINMENT B. SOFTWARE ITEMS JAN 28 87 Page: 1 B.01 OPERATING / MAINTENANCE SURV. PROC. (ST'S)
~ (TEM ENTRY NUW8ER CJTE PRDUCT5 PEEEEDCR SYT PfH:Ur REFEMNCE DCCEAENT SUNECT JUSTFY F NOT FEQ APPRm DOER STATUS DATE 3 8 01.156 JAN 20 87 03 P2 VWUAL ANDDOCUhENTED SDM PEM VERFFCATION OF CORE J& M W.
3801157 JAN 20 87 50 P2 TYPE C LLAT OF AR TO SDM PLM CRYMLLVACUVW BFEAERS .J& WW RES. P M.
3 0 01.154 JAN 20 47 54 P2 P4 TALL MACTOR PMSSURE SDM Pila VESSEL HEAD REST P.M 3 8 01.153 JAN 20 87 50 P2 PERFORM TWE B L1RT OF SDM PEM DRWELL MAD ACCESS RE&. PM MATCH J&
3 8 01.160 JAN 20 47 50 P2 NSTAU. CRYWELL MAD SDM PEM REA P,M l
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.aER DATE SY$#RCue MFERENCErvy asNT SURECT JUSTFY F M37 MQ APPRW DOER ST ATUS 0 ATE 3 H 01.034 JAN 7 47 48 MMOW. CATTLE CHUTE C.lu PM
~3 H.01.035 JAN 7 47 45 PETAU. MACTOR PNS$URE RE86 PM W.SSELTEMAOCOLfuS 3 H 01 C36 JAN 7 87 50 C106EOUT ORYWEU. RES PM 3 H 01.C37 JAN 7 87 54 P4STAU HEADSPRAY AND
~
RE.S. PM WNT PPING l
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- 'M CHECKLIST # 4
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PLANT HYDROSTATIC TESTING
,i CHECKLIST # 4 PLAF; h~YDRO3TATIC TESTING A. HARDWARE ITEMS JAN 28 87 Page: 1 A.04 MAINTREGUESTS
- PROCEDURES NCLPMS
.M ENTRY taAER PICCUCT5 PEEDEDCR DATE SN fEFERENCE N K NT SURECT JUBTFY F NOT fEQ APPRVR DOER STATUS DATE O.A 04.1M JAP' h 17 AU. ConsuTE HRS ON $YSTEMS m PM PECESSARYTO SLPPORT PtANT HYDRO t
4
CHECKLIST # 4 PLANT HYDROSTATIC TESTING B. SOFTWARE ITEMS JAN 28 87 Page: 2 B.01 OPERATING / MAINTENANCE SURV. PROC,(ST'S)
.M ENTRY PR00UCT5 EECEDOR NUMBER DATE SYS#RCus MFEM.NCE W W SUEJECT JUSTFY F NOTMO APPRVR DOER STATUS CATE 4 8 01.181 JAN 20 47 $0 P2 PEMOfW TYPE B LLRT SDJi PLM RE.1 PM e 8 01.162 JAN 20 87 898 P2 PERFORM SYSTEW VALVE SD)( Piu LNELP 04 CMS RES PM 4 8 01.188 JAN 20 87 10 P2 PEMORW ACOfTONAL SD PEM SURVEL1ANCES ECESSAAY RES. PW TO SUPPORT HYDRO 4 801189 JAN 20 87 ALL P2 COMPETE LLRT'S SDM PLM ECESSARY TO St.PPORT RES PM l HYDRO l
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CHECKLIS'ID 4 PLANT HYDROSTATIC TESTING H, 'PUNCHUST* AND OTHER ITEMS JAN 28 87 Page:3 M ENTRY ~
PRXACT5 >E.EDED OR JER DATE SYS-PROJs MFERENCE e u NT $UWECT JUSTFY F NOT E0 APPRVR 00ER STATUS-DATE 4 H 01.034 JAN 787 03 P2 PERFORM VISUAL PM
~~
PLE.&
NSPECTION 08 CfC1 FA F.
C.H 01.045 JAN 747 21 ENSUN SUFMCE.NT RX RLS PW ORADE WATER AVALAm.E SDM PLM FORWVDRO d.H 01.046 JAN 747 50 N5 TALL RPWT EOUPWENT REk P M.
N CCNTRCL ROOM SDA PLM 4 H 01.047 JAN 787 50 EN60RE TEN (10) VT 2 F.M F. !
E.XAkhERS ARE AVALABLE O H 01048 JAN 747 50 ~
ENSLRE TORUS WATER LEWL SDM PLM E 84.000 TO 84.000 CUSC FEET 4 H 01 c43 JAN 7 47 50 ~
ENSURE FO.10WNG OPEN SDM PEM )
A0 22444. MO 202-4A,48 l
4 M 01050 JAN 787 50 ENSURE CMCK VALW5
__ l SD K PEM l 23017 4130150 ARE RLS PW EOCsGD CPEN 4 H 01051 JAN 787 50 TORUS TEMP 804 &
~
SDM PLM Wa$EL HEAD & FLANGE e504 4 M 0105J JAN 787 50 EPC TIE.NS OPERAT10NAL $DM PLM TO SUPPORT WO 4 H 01053 JAN 787 50 RELEF VALWS FCA MSN
~
SDM PLM ACCUEA ATION h$7ALLED RE.1 Pu 0 54 J4d ? $7 50 CC WAFY PRESS & TEMP
~
FR F.
AT TBE CF WO 4 H 01055 JAN 7 57 50 CC W AFY 4 HXR HCLD FA F,
~
TWE PRm TO STAAT CF l NSDECTCH
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CHECKLIST # 5 NTEGRATED LEAK RATETESTING A. HARDWARE ITEMS JAN 28 87 Page: 1 A.02 PLANTMOOlFICATIONS(PDCS)
.M ENTRY N M OR
~
NUW8ER DATE SYS-PRoje FWiFUENCE DOCUMENT $UBJECT MFY F W REO APPRVR DOER STATUS DATE 9 A C2 022 JAN 747 50 PDC reb 1W FOR ;Au APPLICA8tiTY 70 RAT b
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CHECKLIST 0 5 INTEGRATED LEAK RATE TESTING A. HARDWARE ITEMS JAN 28 87 Page:2 A.03 PLANT TEMP MOOS (TMS) (TM LOG BOOK) aM ENTRY PRCOUCT5 PEEEDOR
~~
NLM9ER DATE SYS#RCus MFUENCE N KNT SUEJECT JUSTFY F NOT REO APPRVR DOER STATUS DA1E SA03 C22 JAN 7 81 90 TBeORARY MOO REVEW FOR P.3&
APPLICASUTY TO UtT i
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CHECKLIST # 5 INTEGRATED LEAK RATE TESTING A. HARDWARE ITEMS JAN 28 87 Page:3 A.04 MAINT REQUESTS & PROCEDURES NCL PMS
.W ENTRY PFCOUCTE MOR NUMER DATE SYS-PRCue MFEMNCE Dm uNT SUBJECT JUSTFY F NOT MC APPRVR DOER STATUS.0 ATE 5 A 04 C22 JAN 7 87 50 ~ ~ ~
REYEW WR15 FCA PLM JM APPLCABLITY TO ERT R.E1 P M.
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CHECKLIST # 5 INTEGRATED LEAK RATE TESTING B. SOFTWARE ITEMS JAN 28 87 Page: 4 B.01 OPERATING / MAINTENANCE SURV. PROC.(ST'S)
.M ENTRY PR'OLCTS Pssrsn CR NUM9E R DATE SYS N MFERENCE DoctAENT SUEECT JUSTFY F NOT MO APPRVR 00ER STATUS DATE
$ 8 01.163 JAN 20 87 9M P2 PERFORM SYSTEM VALVE SDM PEM LNELP CECMS REA PM S O 01.164 JAN 20 87 999 P2 FtRFOmd EXCESS FLOW SDM PEM CHECK VALW TESTING RLS Pu
~
5 8 01.165 JAN 20 87 61 P2 LOSS OF CFFSTTE POWER & SDM PEM SEQUE)CE LOADNG OF RES PW DIESELS
~
5 B 01.190 JAN 20 47 ALL P2 COMPLETE LLAT'S SDM PEM ECESSARY TO RLS PM S N ^'RT ;
S B O'.191 JAll 20 87 ALL P2 EVE W PRMARY SDM PE M COKTANIENT SURWJLLANCE RLS PM TESTS FOR LAT l
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.w surnY
..MSE R maoucTassosooR DATE SYS#hGJe fGEFENCE m um SUSACT JUBTFY F NOTitro APPRVR DOER STATUS-DATE 6 8 C3 022 JAN 7 87 to ORC REVEW OF LRT JAS uMA PROCEDURES
CHECKLIST # 5 INTEGRA*ED LEAK RATE TESTING B. SOFTWARE ITEMS JAN 28 87 Page:6 B.09 DRAWING & VENDOR MANUAL CHANGES (MODS)
.M ENTRY M4CEM;T5 PEEMDCR NR DATE Sys#ROJs fEFERENCE N u MT SUBJECT JU5TFY F NOT fEQ APPRVR DOEA STATUS-DATE 6 8 09 C22 .lAN 787 SC NTED DRAW 92 CM JC.
PEQUIMD FOR LRT f
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CHECKLIST # 5 INTEGRATED LEAK RATE TESTING H. *PUNCHUST* AND OTHER ITEMS JAN 28 87 Page:7 M ENTRY ~
AER PPCCUCT5 mCR DATE SYS#RCue FEFUENCE m uNT SUEECT JUSTFY F NOT fEQ APPRW DOER STATUS-DATE 5 H 01058 JAN 747 60 PERFmW LOOP CALBRAT10N REE PW MCK ON LRTDEWCELS 6.H 01057 JAN 787 to PEMORM LOOP CALSRATION AE.A PM CECK CN ERT RTDS
& K01.0W JAN 787 50 N6 TALL TORUS V ACUUM FLL& PM WEhGA WEDGES FOR RAT SH01CW JAN F87 60 hsTALL ANOTEST RE& PM
~
TEMPORARY AM CCNPRESSOR 6 H 01060 JAN 787 60 CRYAELL M OHT F ACTOR JAS MW
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DETERMHATON (STA1) JB S H 01041 JAN F87 50 ~
TOAus WATER LEVEL N.000 SDM PIM TO M 000 CUBC FEET 6 H 01042 JAN 7 87 50 TORUS TEWLVT9RE atN l SDM PLM S H 01043 JAN 787 80 PREPAAE VALVE LNEUP SDM PLM FOR LRT (PROYCE DALY TARGET ANO 8TATVS) l l
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CHECKLIST # 6 PRE CRITICAL TESTS - PLANT STARTUP O. SOFTWARE ITEMS JAN 28 87 Page:1 8.01 OPERATING / MAINTENANCE SURV PROC.(ST'S) d ENTRY PRCOU:lT5 PEEDIDOR mR DATE SYS#ROJs N ner' u NT SUEJECT JUETFY F NOT MiQ APPRVR DOER STATUS-DATE SJ1;1.164 JAN 20 8? 22 P2 PEMCfW ORYWELL SDM PIM AIR SALANCE RL1 PM 6 8 51.167 JAN 20 81 22 P2, OPER 2 hfTIATE OPEA 2 SDM PLM CHECKUST 5 0 #1.164 JAN 20 87 809 P2 PERFCfW PRESTAARP SLAMLLANCE TTSTIPC 3$ Piu d.?.5. PW 1 ASS 1.168 JAN 20 87 809 P2 FWWCfW SMW WAUCCW46 ~' ' ' SDM PEu ANO NDEPDCENT RL1 PM VERFCATION CN SWTEM j VALW LNEUPS l
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CHECKLIS1D 6 PRE CRITICAI TESTS o PLANT STARTUP B. SOFTWARE ITEMS JAN 28 87 Page: 2 l 8.07 TRAINING NEEDS AND REQUIREMENTS
.M ENimy spuCUCTS PEEEED CR
~
MR DATE SY$#ACWe 85HPENCE N uMT SUEJECT JUSTFY F NOT 8EQ APPRvM 00EA STATUS-Of ft i 8 8 07 OC2 DEC 185 to CONTApodENT PCCS OPERLTOR TMJapG FOR C N nTM49dN3 MA.E 04 CCpnA84 ANT Ep44ANCEENT WOOFCATONS t
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CHECKLIS'ID 6 PREcCRmCAL TESTS o PLANT STARTUP H. *PUNCHLIST* AND OTHER ITEMS JAN 28 87 Page:3 w ENTRY PRODK4 MCpt ER DATE SYl#RCus PEFEPENCE wn nsNT SUEECT JUBTFY F NQT fEQ APPRVR 00ER STATUS-CATE 6 H 01039 JAN F47 01 P2 PEfWCret VISUAL REA P.M
~
DePECTION OF hlAN STEAM FXF, AND IELEF VALvl 30LT9se
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
& H 01340 JM F 41 el P2 haXE SELEC1CR SyHTCH TO SDM Pind STARTUP
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CHECKLIST # 7 PLAM HEAT.UP & TESTING B. SOFTWARE ITEMS JAN 28 87 Page: 1 8.01 OPERATINMAA!NTENANCE.SURV, PROC (STS)
.M ENTRY PIEOUCTSIMEDCR MAIER DATE SYSMCus PERP9 G N W SUSACT JUSTFY F NOT MQ APPRVM DOER STATUS-CATE 7 8 01.170 JAN to 87 See P2.0 PEA 2 CChPLETE OPER 2 scM Pig 0500,57
? 8 01.171 eAN2041 See P2, CPfA 1 ~
NTTMTE CPER 1 SDM PIM CHECKLET '
F 8 01112 JAN2087 45 SDk Piu
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SDM PLM MUEF VALVES RLs Pu I
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CHECKLIST # 7 PLANT HEAT UP & TESTING H. PUNCHUST* AND OTHER ITEMS JAN 20 87 Page: 2 AR DATE SYS N PEMtMCE D00AeNT SUEJECT JUSTFY F W pEQ APPRVR DOEA STATUS DATE F H Q1041 JAN 737 gg8 P2 MMM OF STWS$ m py STEEL PPfeQ PER hit FxF, F N 01.042 JAN FSF to P2 Nm m px EDM Piu F H ot 543 JAN F87 el P2 PUhCE WOCE SELECTOR gay ptg SWITCH N RUN i t
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& PHYSICS TESTING
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CHECKLIST # 8 POWER ESCALATION & PHYSICS TESTING B. SOFTWARE ITEMS JAN 28 87 Page: 1 B.01 OPERATINGAAANTENANCE SURV, PROC.(ST'S)
J ENTRY PFCCUCTB MCR
.AR DAll sTsnoJs psPeecum wgr sutKCT JUSTFY F NOT MQ APPRVR UDER STATUS CATE 8 8 01.174 JAN 20 87 46 P2 CAumATE Nr8 &DM PIM REA P.M
~
880t17$ JAN 20 07 23 P2 M'CA FLCM RATE TEST SDM PLM AT 1000 PSI RES PM 8801174 JAN M 87 F3 P2 WC4 CERSPEED TEST EDM PLM AT 15% POWER RE1 PM S 8 81177 JAN 20 47 884 P2 NfTATE OPER 6 EDM PLM 4801178 JAN 20 87 117 P2 PENCFed STARTVP PHYSCS SDM PLM TESTNG AT 28% POM.R PM JA 4 8 01.178 JAN20Of 117 P2 PERK 4td KT PVhe SDM PLM CALBRATON AT 40% POMR PM JA 8801163 JAN 20 af 117 02 NACTOR thGedElRed3 &DM PLM TEST 5 29% PM JA 88of141 JAN 20 87 117 P2 PENCFed KT Pune SDM PIM CALSRATON AT 60% POMR PM JA 4801142 JAN 20 87 'O P2 NACTOR ENOf4ElRed3 SDM PLM TESTSTh PM JA 8801183 JAN 20 47
- P2 JET PUMP CALBRATON 80% &DM PLM PM J1 4 8 01.184 JAN 20 87 117 P2 AT PUWP CALBRATCN IC% EDM PLM PM J A.
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185 JAN 20 87 117 P2 KACTCH f.NGNEIRPe3 SDM PIM TESTS "C% POMR PM JA 8 8 01.184 JAN2087 13 P2 PCC ILilM RATE TEST AT EDM PLM 1000 PSI RL1 PM 8801187 JAN 20 87 il P2 RCC CMASPEED TEST AT EDM PLM 19% PCWER RL1 PM ,
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CHECKLIST # 8 POWER ESCALATION & PHYSICS TESTING D. NRC REl.ATED rrEMS JAN 28 87 Page:2 0.01 NRC COhMTTMWIS, CONCERNS, LERS J ENTRY NLAER DATE 8'itMICue PEFUENCg e asNT PRIM l"f5 MCR SUBJECT ARTFY F NOT 750 APPRVR 00ER STATUSCATE 8001055 JAN 18 47 it? CAL e510 PERFORM CAL 8810 SDJ4 P1&&
POWEA TESTNG PA& J A,
CHECKLIST # 8 POWER ESCALATION & PHYSICS 17. STING H. PUNCHUST* AND OTHER ITEMS JAN 28 87 Page:3 i exmv putouetsmatuo m KM DATE SMMKus fWWENCE DOCMENT GUEJECT ASTFY F NQf fE0 APPRvM DCEA STATUS CATE a H e t.oes w r et 30 P2 pePECT ORYWEu gim gay pgg REA P.R 4
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- . _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ - __. _ . _ . - _ . . = . .-
I v v SAFETY ENHANCEMENT PROJECT STATUS l FEBRUARY 2,1987 4
1987 l
t JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN
- 8ACKUP NITROGEN y , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,,,,,,,,,,,,, ,
CONTAINMENT SPRAY ENHANCEMENT NOZZLE MOD pm m
- FIRE WATER TIE-IN g g w] -
DlESEL F1RE FUMP y , , , , , , , , , , g , , , , , , , y , , ,,,,,,,, g j
FUEL TRANSFER gg,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,_ ,
4 TORUS VENT g rfffff, , ,, w i LEGEND
% DESIGN
- j. '#' ' SITE REVIEW l W CONSTRUCTION L L
, TURNOVER lm. _ _ - - - - _ - _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ --__ __ _ __ _ _
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a r I L Gr< I t1 M AFJ:- I CO'JT A l tit 1EtJT EtJH AtJCEMEtJT 3 ti. Mcirida February 19C7 Z/n
y FIC1 M$ti!Fil:W ffAtt/ttn6TW 6641 tirect ver.t free the torus to the sair statt. fie vent mill Mar 6 / 5 ens use ai e41 sting penetration ci the tcrus (cr the stantby gas treatment systes (Slifl. An t inch pipe mill tap into ertstie; ;l;itt tetmeen to: ::stainte t it:lati:s valvss at! ty; sis tre $lif. An atfiticral inclation valse mill te irstallet in tte re lir.e. httro;ei ell! te sailled to syntes valves to that the vest path can te used during daring a statico tlackest. tre vent rath .111 enly to 6ted eith senior esmagesent 4: prev 1. ,
16 4 :4 Costatrient spray ts:21e stdificatien. Sin ci seien nctries Par 1 / 5 als in each dry. ell syay cluster mill te plug;ed to refute este' ilos during an accidant. This stil prevent the i, creatien cf a ccataiteent istu6e during actsation ci <
i drieell spray. Flee to the fictiles sill be refuted free '
five thcasand to cne thcusand gallent per einste.
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!64:t,t d i Firt sater intertie to tre residual tent rencol (M) Rat 1 / 6 ell systee, the site fire mater syntes mill te tied te the (intertiel 54 systes via a resovatle spect piece. The spost piece *
} sill est te insta!!ed d6 ting neraal c;eration. A second
! Par 27 / 3 als diesel ! riven fire pas; sill te affed tc the currently (nee fire peep) irstalled diesel and electri: drives fire pSe;s to prevtfe tes starten of (cr.taireta.t 1; ray that sill te indesentent May I / 2 ell cf etsite a.c. p: tr. Fire mater tai also te injected into the (fueltres,a:t.1 j isntter vessel via tSe $4 s)ttee crcsttle. Wyfraulicall) c;erated (6el traetfer pse;t stil te installes en the too Clesel fire p.e;s. The fire ester sistea is su;;11e3 mater
~ free too casite fire mater tails and fres a ea!cipal ester su; ply. The cresitie sill allen a fire truth to toply eater to the M systes, a third sethed that is inte;esdest of cisite 4.c. pc.er.
(643 Intlep riitro;en supply (cr dry. ell irstratettatien and Far 11 / ! els j tertain other critical air c;e'ated tes; rents. A tattup
! litaid nitrogen supply mill te placed insite ci a trailer, tottled nitrc;ei eill als te installed. 'te nitre;es n!!!
1 te ispplied to tte instrusetti via to tt9taireent
] atecipere ditwtion (C80 systee. Manal 6445: valves sill te installed arcat the C4 cartaineent inclation
- vahti te sale the entrc;en i4 ply inte;eettet cf q c* site a.C. ;ceer.
s l I646 A trird diesel geteratce. A es. f.cn4 diciel generater mill Par 20 / I ett te c:nstructed costte. It oill te alle tc le aanually tied inte either of the tea safety tutti free the etntrtl rete.
i It all! have attut 71 el the ca;atity cf cre cf the current distal generaters. It mill n:t repire a separate
] , scerte el tecling enter and eill have as independent l teits tay L.el su;;ly.
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difittilCN3 TH47 ATFICT CCWTA!N'Ini 516N!FICANT EVthTS l
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FOC i ttSCA!Fi!CN STAti/LthiTH 36 73 Aztesatic depressaritation systes IA!!) legit e:difications. Par 6 / 4 ski l Fcur e:fifitations eill te sade to tre Att systeer !!!
l sa%al it.hibit seitetes mill te installed hr the 120 setend-j tiser, (2) sa m t typass tients all! te installed to allce ,
depresiu'itatici en testeined les eater level althout high !
derell pressure, (3) ennual typass tisers allt te i irstalled to alles a It. pressere ICCS put; to start ;
! eitheat sustained les reacter pressure, and l 14)aby;asssillteinstalledtcallestepressuritation i alt'out a Ice pressare ICCS pus; running.
4
$675 Standty litaid centrcl actificaticas. The I 10 errittaent Mar 2 / 7 els ;
) in the teren sclutten in the stanity ligati control systes ;
, sill be increases, this eill c:stle tre capacity cf the estrent systes ard eliefnate the r.eed for heat trating. '
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8703 Patiu; d.c./a.c. pteer supply. A res t 2:0 vit tattery eith Apr 15 / 5 ans :'
charger nr.d tr.ierter mill te installed to satply critical q 480 v!C aad 120 VA: c:e;oetnts Grieg a statici blaticut.
The Scott supply sill te sanaally initiated dering a l'
blatlat. Tre tattery charger elll te tied to the diese!
tereratcr in the technical sap;crt tester.
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OFFICE OF INSPECTf0N AND ENFORCEPENT ACTHS J
0FFICE OF VHE DEPUTY O! RECTOR
- 2. CATE: 3na/g7 __
- 3.
SUBJECT:
ENCLOSES LETTER FROM CIT!ZENS URGING RESPONSIBLE FNFRF,Y (Chpri er SAFETY ISSUES RE PILGR!M NUCLEAR PLANT ._
- 4. AECUESTOR:
- 5. ACTION REQUESTED: Provide responst
% $ $. ',J' a,, .
(,'/ V),l,) ( ,i.b ' , .V p q
,l,,, YlLk b " h E {!L ' !.\f ' $A .',
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- 6. AS$1GNED TO: Jo_rd / 2 1
- 7. EXPECTED COMPLET!0'I c , d due to frcnt offica 4/1/97 L S. EXTENDED COMPLET!0N DATE: 4!.2c/gf (
- 9. COMPLETION DATE:
- 10. DOCUMENTATION OF C0tiPLET!0N: 1
- 11. CETURN TH!$ FORT! TO DEPUTY DIRECTOR'S OFFICE WITH COMPLETED eCT!0'1
.6 &Y t' ? ( ;;r 9 w s N m ~ 0 , f2flg,7 1
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_ _ __ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - - - - - _ - - - - - - - - - ~ ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - ~~~~~ ~~ ~~
- %,, UNITED 8TATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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EE9 [D3UbE0h E95f!E9995fS! 99EIRgg d FROMt DUE: 04/06/87 EDO CONTROL 002654 REP. GERRY E. STUDDS DOC DTt 03/06/87 FINAL. REPLY TO:
I CHAIRMAN 2ECH
- FOR S10 NATURE OF ** GREEN **
i SECY NO: 87-275 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR I- DESC's ROUTINO:
ENCLOSES LETTER FROM CIT 12 ENS UROINO RESPONSIBLE TAYLOR I ENEROY tCURE) RE SAFETY ISSUES RE PILORIM NUCLEAR PLANT NORRY DENTON 'l DATE: 03/20/07 ASSIGNED ,TO: -RTN h
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CONTACT EnLe.r . t
] SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS a.
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL TICKET PAPER NUMBER: CRC-87-0275 LOGGING DATEt Mar 19 87 ACTION OFFICE: EDO AUTHORt G.E. Studds--Const Ref AFFILIATION: U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LETTER DATE: Mar 6 87 FILE CODE: ID&R-5 Pilgrim SUIk7ECT: Criticizes the Commission's regulation of the nuc power industry ACTION: Direct Reply DISTRIBUTION: OCA to Ack SPECIAL HANDLING: Nohe
- NOTES DATE DUE:
SIGNA 7URE: .
DATE SIGNEDt AFFILIATION:
Rec'd Off. EDO Date d*M-f7 Time - / A #f A Y
kDO '
002654 b