ML20204J599
| ML20204J599 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 12/21/1987 |
| From: | Wessman R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20204J386 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-88-198 NUDOCS 8810250188 | |
| Download: ML20204J599 (528) | |
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, e Oecember 21, 1987 4
Docket No.: 50-?93 l
LICENSEE: Boston Edison Company 1 FACILITY: Pilorin Nuclear Power Station !
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SUBJECT:
i HEETING BETWEEN BnSTON EDISON COMPANY AND NRC, '
, ON DECEMBER 10, 1987 l
On December 10, 1987, representatives of Bostnn Edison Coneany (BECo) nat '
with nenbers of NRR to discuss the Eneroency Operating Procedures Procran for the Pilgrin Nuclear Pnwer Station. Sionificant matters discussed are sunnarized below. A copy of the BEco presentation is attached as Enclosure 1 to this memorandun. . Attendees are listed on Erclosure ? to this meno.
i BEco provided the staff with a briefino (Enclosure 1) recardino the current statur of the Energency Operatino Procedure (EOP) precran for Pilgrin and described the style and format of a typical E0P. RECo stated that the E0P procran at Pilgrin is described in the November 20, 1987 documents submitted ,
to th* staff as additional infernation regardino the 9afety Enhancement Progran (SEP). BEro is conducting trainino on the new E0Ps.
BEco further stated that Revision 0 nf the E0Ps develooed under this program were placed in the Pilgrin
- Control Room on Novenher 18, 1987 l
The staf' and BECo discussed the Procedures Generation Packace (PGP), how it relates to the documents provided Noven5er ?0, 19A7, and stees to be taken by PEco and the staff to yield an aceroved PGP. !
! 1987 submittal ennstitutes the PGP as it stands today.BECo that the November 20; stated stated They further that, although they did not exotet najor chances in their PGP, they would provide an update to the PGP after the staff approves Revision 4 to the industry proposed Energency Procedure Guidelines (EPGs). The staff reouested, and BEco agreed, that a letter be provided to NRC documenting that the November l
20 documents provided to the staff constitute the current PGP for Pilorim. i i
' The staff expects to review the Pilgrin PGP, make a site visit, and prepare a '
SER on the current PGP prior to making a restart decision regardino Pilgrin.
i The schedule Project Manager,for the review and site visit will be provided to BECo by the i' BEco stated that E0P directions regarding torus venting will not be implemented until there is agreement between the staff and BEco regardino the l
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' 88102501EM3 880914 PDR FOIA JOHNSON 88-198 PDR
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use of the (proposed) Direct Torus Vent. The BEco response to staff ouestions of Aucutt ?1, 1987 regardino the Direct Torus Yant, is still under deveinnnant !
and is not expected until early 1988. .
Sincerely, .
5' ot\ind 5'i**
- Richard H. Wessman, Senine Pro.i*ct Manaqer Pen.iect Directorate T-3 q
Division of Reactor Pen,1ects I/11
Enclosures:
1 As stated cc: See next pace ;
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DISTRIBUTION:
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' JPersensky IIRecan MEvans RGallo WKennedy JPengarra, Jr. ;
CTinkler WHodaes JCraig JZwolinski l GThomas AThadani a SVarga J
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i OFFICIAL RECORD COPY /
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. Enclosure a
. AGEflDA DECEMBER 10, 1987 1
- 1. E0P STATUS UPDATE
- 2. DESCRIPT10fi 0F PILGRIM E0Ps
- 3. QUEST 10fiS AllD DISCUSS 10fl ,
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l . UPDATE OF PNPS E0P STATUS SINCE AUGUST 8, 1987 l
i 0 COMPLETED VAllDATION ON PLANT-SPECIFIC SIMULATOR I INTERIM VAllDATION ISSUED I l
i o COMPLETED OPERATOR TRAINING :
40 HOURS OF CLASSROOM 40 HOURS OF S!MULATOR l l
0 COMPLETED AN UPDATE OF THE DRAFT E0Ps !
INCORPORATED SIGNIFICANT VERIFICATION AND l VAllDATION FINDINGS, AND OPERATOR COMMENTS I
REVIEWED, APPROVED AhD ISSUED l
0 COMPLETED AN UPDATE OF ALL E0P SATELLITE PROCEDURES 0 PROVIDED AN UPDATE OF ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTATION TO NRC l 0 FUTURE PLANS 1
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o FUTURE PLANS 1 l I
REVISE PSTG AND E0Ps FOLLOWING FORMAL NRC APPROVAL OF REV. 4 EPGs
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FINAllZE E0P VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION i
1 FINAllZE PROCEDURE GENERATION PACKAGE AND SUBMIT TO NP.C FOR REVIEW i
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CRITERIA FOR DEVELOPMENT l OF FLOWCHART PROCEDURES o Procedures must accurately reflect the technical content and intent of the PSTGs.
o Format must accommodate sequential, concurrent, and override 1
actions.
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o Text of instructions and decisions should be simple and l unambiguous.
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! o Procedures must include all cautions, figures, and tables required for execution of operator actions.
1 o Overall arrangement should be clear, easy to follow; l crossover of lines should be minimized.
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o Text must be readable, l
o Sheet size must be no larder than 36' x 60'.
1 o Entries to and exits from each procedure must be clearly and unambiguously presented.
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- NUREG-0899 Sections PNPS EOPs (Writers' Guide & Busan Factors) (Writers' Guide section) 5.2 General Guidance 5.2.1 Consistency Among the Procedures III.D,E,F, & IV.A,B,P 5.2.2 Cross-Referencing Within and Among Procedures III.A.11 & IV.D 5.2.3 Operator Aids III.A.12 5.3 Presentation of Information for Readability I!!.D,E,F & IV.B i 5.4 Organizati,on of EOPs 5.4.1 Cover Page N/A Table of Contents i
5.4.2 N/A 5.4.3 Scope N/A 5.4.4 Entry Conditions III.A.1 5.4.5 Automatic Actions III.A.4 i 5.4.6 Immediate Operator Actions III.A.4
, 5.4.7 Subsequent Operator Actions III.A.4 i
5.4.8 Supporting Material (Attachments) III.A.12 ,
l 5.5 Format of EOPs 5.5.1 Identifying Information II.A,B,C !
5.5.2 Page Layout III.E 5.5.3 WARNING, CAUTION, and NOTE Statements III.A.13,14 5.5.4 Placekeeping Aids (Training) 5.5.5 Divisions, Headings and Numbering a 5.5.6 Emphasis III.A.3 & III.B III.D j~
5.5.7 Identification of Sections Within a Procedure or Subprocedure III.A.3 & IV.D
, 5.5.8 Figures and Tables III.A.15,16 l 5.5.9 Use of Flowcharts N/A j 5.6 Style of Expression and Presentation 5.6.1 Vocabulary IV.G
, 5.6.2 Abbreviations, Acronyms and Symbols IV.G 5.6.3 Sentence Structure III.A & IV.A,B
- l 5.6.4 Punctuation IV.F i
5.6.5 Capitalization 5.6.6 Units IV.D l IV.H 5.6.7 Numerals IV.H l
t 5.6.8 Tolerances IV.H
- 5.6.9 Formulas and Calculations IV.B l 5.6.10 Conditional Statements III.A.5,6,7,8 1
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- l. NUREG-0899 Sections PNPS ROPs !
(Writers' Guide & Buman Pactors) -(Writers ' Guide Section) 5.7 Content of ROPs !
. 5.7.1 Sequencing III .B & III.E
- 5.7.2 Verification Steps III.A.8,9 5.7.3 Nonsequential Steps III.A.2 & III.C 5.7.4 Equally Acceptable Steps III.C & IV.D 5.7.5 Recurrent Steps III.A.7,8,10 5.7.6 Time-Dependent Steps N/A 5.7.7 Concurrent Steps III.A.2
, 5.7.8 Diagnostic Steps N/A i
5.7.9 {
WARNING and CAUTION Statements III.A.14 ;
5.7.10 NOTE Statements III.A.13 i 5.7.11 Location Information IV.E '
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PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES EOP-01,"RPV CONTROL" l
EOP-0?, "FAILURE TO SCRAM" EOP-03,"PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL" EOP-04, "SECONDARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL" i EOP-05,"RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE CONTROL."
EOP-07,"ALTERNATE RPV DEPRESSURIZATION"
! EOP-08,"STEAM COOLING" l
EOP-09, "PRIMARY CONTAINMENT FLOODING" I
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i SHEET # EOP# PSTG SECTIONS 1 1 3 Entry Conditions RPV Water Level RPV Pressure Reactor Power 7 Atternate Level Control r 8 9 Steam Cooling i 2 2 3 Entry Conditions RPV Pressure Reactor Power 11 Levet/ Power Control 3 3 4 Entry Conditions Suppression Pool Temperature Drywell Temperature Primary Containment Pressure 4
Suppression Pool Water Level Primary Containment Hydrogen ,
Concentration 4 4 5 Entry Conditions !
Secondary Containment Temperatures
' Secondary Containment Radiation Levels Secondary Containment Water Levels
- 5 6 Entry Conditions Radioactivity Release 1
! 5 6 10 RPV Flooding
! 7 8 Emergency RPV Depressurization t !
, 9 12 Primary Containment Flooding i
4 CORRELATION BETWEEN EOPs and PSTGs i l
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l KEY FEATURES OF FLOWCHART PROCEDURES o PRESENTS ON A SINGLE SHEET OF PAPER ALL INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL TO DIRECT EMERGENCY RESPONSE ACTIONS 1
o BEST FORMAT FOR MAINTAINING A BROAD PERSPECTIVE ON OVERALL PLANT CONDITIONS AND ASSOCIATED OPERATOR ACTIONS o ORDER OF CONDITIONS / ACTIONS IS VERY CLEARLY PRESENTED SEQUENTIAL BRANCH CONCURRENT o FLOWCHART ELEMENTS AR:! SELECTED TO REINFORCE THE "UNIQUE" TYPES OF ACTIONS ,
DECISIONS OVERRIDES CONDITIONAL ACTIONS WAIT UNTIL....
ETC.
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E O P-08 STEAM COOLING l
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START '
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If f While executing this procedure:
IF THEN
_m Ahernate RPV Depressurizaton Eiit this puedure and enter is requeed i EOP 07, *Amernate RPV j
Depressuriaston.'
l RPV ws'er level cannot t4 Eas this pecedwre and enter determined EOP 07,'Amernate RPV Depre s surgaton.'
g,g Any purc4 of inte: ton is Ened Enit this procewe a*.c enter up to the RPV wth at least one EOP 07,'Aternate RPV pump runnirg Depre ssurizaten.'
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AITUr RPV w stor Y 83 i. vet emps <
I e.3gg g Ein this proced.re av enter EOP47, I
'AJtereste RPV Depressurgaten
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RPV FLOODING 6-1 ,
START v
V while executing this procedure:
,F ,uo rue.
l nPV w,~ - d. term _, A. cor.rd rod, - to or be,or., Er. ~. ~ t,. RPV ;
posden 02 Wder Levet secton and RPV Pressure i secton d EOP-01. RPV Conpot.-
esecure twse sectons of EOP41 concurrerify.
RPV water levelcsi be determned Any control rod cannot to determnad te Exit thes p ocedwo and erver the RPV be inswted to or tepnd prrAen 02 Wmer level sacson and RPV Pressure serson d EOP-02. FaAwe so Scram.-
esecute these sectons of EOP42 amcurroney.
Pnmary corsainment wata level and --------- Irrespecssre d w*wthee adequme core torus pressure cannot be margamed cooLg is assured. tumeure inrecten bebw the MPCWLL (rvyure 6.t) into the RPV from sources enternal so the pnmary contanment UNTIL pnmary I co,<anm.re -mm inw.i and norus !
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IF OR THEN ,
1 AI control rods are inserted to or beyond poseron 02 It has been determined that the reactor win remain Continue at ,
shutdown under all conditions without boron 4
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,'(W ARemare RPV Finoding Pressure) l
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g e Numberof , RPV Pressure e s OpenSRVs (psig) '
hsssss sssssssssse 8
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1 s 767 l s
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Terminate and prevent an injection into the RPV EXCEPT from boron e MARFP e injecton systems and CRD. l (h Airemare RPV Flooding Pressure) e WHEN_. no SRV can be opened. WHEN RPVpressureisbelow w=====n5===========e'
.___________ Number of 8 RPV Pressure g.g the MARFP. e Open SRVs (psig) e l.......l7..........l 4 s 181 Y 3 246 e
l l e 2 g 376 e a
1 e 767 e 8
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CHANGES FROM DRAFT B TO REV. O !
(PARTIAL LISTING)
- 1. CORRECTED ENTRY C0tlDIT10ll FOR E0P-04
- 2. RESTRUCTURED PARAMETER TABLES IN E0P-04 i
- 3. CORRECTED HCLL CURVE
- 4. REVISED MSBWP FROM 00 TO 02 5.
CORRECTED CRITERIA FOR TERMINATING RPV VENTING IN E0P-09 .
- 6. REVISED CAUTION #1 1
- 7. MISCELLANE0US TYP0 GRAPHICAL ERRORS 1
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f Enclosure 9 MEETING BETWEEN NRC AND BEco
-PILGRIM E0PS-12/10/87 Name Organization R. H. Wessman NRR/PDI-3 Edward " -a 2 Boston Edison Jir Sc ,
Operations Enoineerino, Inc. for BEco John 6e,ety Boston Edison Jack Fulton Boston Edison C. S. Brennion Boston Edisen Robert Gallo NRC, Chie' f.perating Branch, RI J.J. Persensky NRC/NRR/DLP0/MFAR Wm H. Regan NRC/NRR/HFAR J.P. Bonnarra, Jr.
Michele G. Evans NRC/NRR/0LP0/HFAB-Procedures W.G. Kennedy NRC, Operations Engineer, RI Bruce Boger NRR/DLP0/HFAB-Procedures NRR/ADRI John A. Zwolinski NRR/0L70 Charles Tinker NRR/ DEST /SPLB Wayne Hodges NRR/ DEST /SRXB l
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, so m w anson Emergency Operations Facility Obery Heights Plymouth, Massachusetts 02360 December 23, 1987 EPC87-988 Mr. Peter Agnes, Jr.
Commonwealth of HA Assistant Secretary of Public Safety One Ashburton Place - Room 2133 Boston, MA 02108
Dear Mr. Agnes:
By letter dated October 26, 1987 Boston Edison Company transmitted information to you in response to certain issues identified in the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEHA) August 4, 1987 "Self-Initiated Review and Interim Finding for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station" (SIR). The purpose of that letter was to provide information for submission to FEHA in an effort to facilitate FEHA's review of the resolution of the SIR issues. He are now forwarding additional information in response to the FEHA SIR issues.
In particular, we are enclosing a copy of a report entitled "Reception Center Feasibility Analysis" dated December 22, 1987 which addresses subissue B.1 as identified in the "Boston Edison Company Action Plan and Schedule for Providing Assistance in Addressing FEHA Issues" dated September 17, 1987 (Boston Edison Action Plan). In subissue B.1, FEHA stated that "a new reception center must be found to replace Hanover." (Page 19 of SIR). The Action Plan stated that an "evaluation of the feasibility of using two reception centers" would be undertaken. (Page 12 of the Boston Edison Action Plan). The enclosed report documents that analysis.
The analysis summarized in the enclosed report assesses the caoability of the two reception centers designated by the Commonwealth -- Taunton State Hospital (Taunton) and Bridgewater State College (Bridgewater) -- to monitor the population for contamination in the Pilgrim plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) in accordance with agplicable federal guidance. While the report addresses other aspects of reception center operations, the primary purpose of the analysis was to determine whether the objective of that guidance could be achieved using two, rather than three, reception centers.
The report also provides planned traffic routes out of the EPZ and estimated travel times, and identifies traffic access and control points.
It is important to stress that the report does not purport to address the entire reception center planning process, but is instead only a step in that process. As you know, Bosten Edison is assisting the Commonwealth and local governments in upgrading their plans and procedures and is confident that appropriate plans and procedures governing the operation of reception centers will be developed.
r/%
EPC87-988 p
The analysis summarized in the attached report was conducted by planners provided by Boston Edison, in coordination with Taunton and Bridgewater officials, and concludes that the Taunton and Bridgewater facilities (with appropriate rei:ovi.tlons and equipment procurement) have the capability of monitoring the requisite number of persons evacuating from the EPZ in the event of an emergency at Pilgrim. Thus, the r6 port addresses FEMA's concern that a third reception center be found to replace Hanover Hall. Boston Edison will continue to work with town and facility officials to assure that appropriate plans and procedures governing reception center operations are developed, and will provide whatever resources are necessary to support reception center operation.
He understand that, as stated in the Action Plan (page 12), the Commonwealth is continuing its review of the possibility of identifying a third reception center. If those efforts result in the identification of such a center, Boston Edison will be pleased to cooperate in its implementation, including the procurement of necessary facilities and equipment, the development of necessary plans and procedures, and the training of personnel. While such implementation steps are being taken, the enclosed feasibility analysis demonstrates that the available two reception centers can adequately serve any emergency needs.
If you have any questions. p!&a>G do not hesitate to contact either me or Albert Samano at (617) 747-0439.
Siacerely,
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6 RontId A.
Staff Assistant to Sr. V.P. - Nuclear RAV/dlw 10#988 Attachment cc: R. Boulay - HCDA S. Varga - NRC R. Hessman - NRC NRC Region 1 Senior NRC Resident Inspector Mayor Ric.kard Johnson - Taunton R. Spearin - C.D. Director - Taunton D. Canepa - Chairman - Board of Selectmen - Bridgewater D. Ford - C.D. Director - Bridgewater E. Meaney - Bridgewater State College Taunton State Hospital - Administrator
, RECEPTION CENTER FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS Boston Edison Company December 22, 1987 I. Introduction
, the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) August 4,1987 "Self-Initiated Review and Interim Finding for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station", a number of issues were identified with respect to the state of offsite emergency preparedness for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (Pilgrim). In Boston Edison Company's September 17, 1987 "Action Plan and Schedule for Providing Assistance in Addressing FEMA Issues", Boston Edison identified a number of discrete "subissues" which collectively comprise FEHA's concerns. Subissue B.1, in particular, stated that "a new reception center must be found to replace Hanover." In response, the Action Plan stated that an "evaluation of the feasibility of using two reception centers" would be undertaken. Boston Edison Action Plan at 12. This report summarizes that analysis.
1 At the outset, it is important to clarify that the purpose of a reception l
center is to provide a location where monitoring, decontamination and registration of evacuees can be performed, rather than to provide long-term congregate care for the EPZ population. Accordingly, except for activities such as vehicle decontamination that can, if necessary, take place during the 1
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recovery and reentry phase of an accid 9nt, a facility designated as a reception center will only be utilized for the relatively short period of time needed to monitor, decontaminate as necessary, and register evacuees. Such a facility would not be used for longer-term needs (such as non-emergency medical care, temporary quartering, or other social services), which would be provided by congregate care centers to which evacuees would be referred.
The principal purpose of this report is to assess the capability of Taunton State Hospital (Taunton) and Bridgewater State College (Bridgewater) to monitor the population evacuating from the Pilgrim plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) in accordance with applicable federal guidance.
While the report sumarizes the overall process of managing traffic and monitoring, registering and decontaminating evacuees, as described in greater depth in Appendix A to this report, the federal guidance provides that reception centers should be capable of monitoring 20% of the population evacuating from the EPZ in about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Thus, the ceatral purpose of the analysis is to evaluate the capability of the Bridgewater and Taunton facilities to achieve that objective.
The assessment was conducted by planners provided by Boston Edison, in coordination with Taunton State Hospital and Bridgewater State College officials, and those officials have concurred with the conclusions stated in this report.I The report also provides (in Attachment 2) preliminary results l
4 of traffic management analyses currently being undertaken by KLD Associates, I
Given the recent resignation of the Bridgewater State College President.
Boston Edison is continuing to wark with the current College administration in order to ensure that its views are reflected in any plans to utilize the College as a reception center.
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, Inc., to assess, among other things, the ability of the road system outside the EPZ to accomodate the anticipated traffic to the two facilities, and thus l to support timely monitoring of evacuees. Attachment 2 provides planned 1
traffic routes, estimated travel times and traffic management plans (including i an identification of access and control points). I l
This report concludes that the Taunton and Bridgewater facilities have the capability to monitor persons evacuating from the EPZ in accordance with i federal guidance, and that those facilities could effectively serve as reception centers. In fact, although the federal guidance provides that there should be sufficient reception center capacity to monitor 20% of the l population "ig ha evacuated" in an emergency, and an evacuation of the entire EPZ is extremely unlikely, the analysis shows that the Bridgewater and Taunton facilities can accomodate 20% of the entire EPZ population. Thus, the analysis was based upon conservative assumptions. !
Facility renovation (principally at Taunton) and equipment procurerrent for both facilities will be necessary. A listing of anticipated personnel, and resource needs is included as Appendix B. In addition, the preliminary '
results of the traffic management analyses (Attachment 2) show that anticipated traffic flow into Taunton and Bridgewater can be accomodated and that timely monitoring of evacuees at the reception centers can be supported.
The next section of this report describes the general analytical approach that was used in the evaluation. Section III summarizes the analysis and results for Bridgewater and Section IV summarizes the analysis and results for Taunton. Conclusions are presented in Section V, I
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, II. Summary of Analvtical Acoroach l
The basic approach used to analyze both the Taunton and Bridgewater facilities was to first evaluate anticipated vehicle traffic flow to determine how and where sehicles would enter the reception centers, be monitored, be l sorted into "clean" and contaminated parking areas, be decontamicated as I'
necessary, and exit. The primary purpose of this aspect of the analysis was to assess whether vehicles could be processed in a manner that would achieve the goal of monitoring 20% of *.ne evacuating population in about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. In other words, timely processing of vehicles will enable evacuees to re&ch the personnel monitoring facilities and br, monitored in a timely fashion. 3 Second, personnel traffic flow tas analyzea to determine how and where evacuees could be monitored, decontaminated as necessary, registered, reunited ,
witn their family members, and returned to their vehicles or buses for transportation to congregate care centers or other destinations. I Finally, an effort was made to determine the approximate level of resources needed to monitor evacuees consistent with the applicable federal guidance and to determine if the Taunton and Bridgewater facilities have the capacity to permit effective use of the personnel and equipment needed to support reception center operations. Resource lists (e.g., personnel, equipment and supplies and facility improvements) for both facilities are contained in Appendix B.
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III. Bridaewater Analysis For purposes of the analysis, approximately 11,000 persons were estimated to arrive at the Bridgewater facility. This number (when combined with the estimate for Taunton) represents 20% of the estimated peak summer, weekend EPZ population of 108,000 as described in Attachment I to this Report (Letter, Reuben E. Goldblatt, P.E., KLD Associates, Inc. to Cherie Fuller, Boston ,
Edison Company, dated July 17, 1987).
Estimates of,the maximum number of vehicles which reasonably could be expected to arrive at the Bridgewater facility were also derived from the peak, summer weekend figures contained in Attachment 1. Yhus, for Bridgewater, about 4,500 vehicles were estimated to arrive at the facility.
Once these vehicles begin to arrive at Bridgewater, the first step in the reception center operation would be vehicle monitoring.
The option considered in the analysis was to monitor vehicles along Roberts Road. (See Attachment 3). Using about 12 two-person teams monitoring
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vehicles in "batches" of 12, and assuming a monitoring time of 2 minutes per car, monitoring of all 4,500 vehicles could be performed in about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
This analysis takes into consideration the time necessary for vehicles to I advance through the monitoring stations and for periodic relief of monitoring personnel, as well as actual monitoring time. More monitors could be added to facilitate even faster processing. Since vehicles can be processed in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> or less, timely arrival of evacuees at the Bridgewater personnel monitoring facility can be accomplished.
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, Once the vehicles are monitored, contaminated vehicles would be directed to the Bridgewater Field House parking lot or to the athletic fields adjacent i to the Field House lot. There is ample parking capacity at these locations, and perforated steel plate (PSP) will be provided to assure that the athletic fields remain usable in inclement weather. Transportation of evacuees from contaminated cars in the Field House parking lot to the Kelly Gymnasium (about one mile) for monitoring, decontamination as necessary, and registration could generally be accomplished using two 47-passenger buses and a third as a back-up.
Since vehicJe decontamination need not be performed immediately, that operation could be accomplished during the recovery phase of an emergency or as decontamination teams become available. Chemically impregnated dry wiping cloths would be used to reduce liquid waste.
Uncontaminated vehicles would be directed to the Great Hill commuter lot, where there is ample parking capacity as well. In inclement weather, additional buses would be used to transport evacuees from uncontaminated cars l to the Kelly Gymnasium (about one mile driving distance or 1,500 feet walking distance).
Handicapped persons whose cars are contaminated would be directed to the Field House lot as well and could be transported to the proposed monitoring facility (Kelly Gymnasium Building) by bus or lift-van. Those handicapped persons whose cars are not contaminated would be directed to the parking lot adjacent to the Kelly Gymnasium Building.
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, The Kelly Gymnasium Building is an ideal facility in which to monitor the evacuees as well as to perform the related functions of decontamination and registration. It provides ample space for evacuees who are waiting to be monitored or who have completed registration and are waiting for others to be processed. Persons would enter the Building at the northeast corner, ground level. Monitoring and decontamination would occur in the large gym on the first floor. (See Attachments 4 and 5).
To accomplish the monitoring of about 11,000 evacuees in about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> would require approximately f've portal monitors iresembling airport metal detectors) operated by five, three-person monitoring teams, and one three person team for manual monitoring of handicapped persons. About 180 evacuees per hour could be processed at each of the five monitors and 20 handicapped persons per hour at the one manual station. Sufficicnt space is available for additional monitors to facilitate even faster processing. After passing through the monitor stations, uncontaminated evacuees would proceed to the small gym for registration.
After monitoring, those persons who are contaminated could be separated according to sex and would proceed directly to the appropriate locker room.
Here they would wash and/or shower to remove the contamination and be remonitored to verify that the contamination has been removed. They would then be given replacement clothing (prestaged at Bridgewater), as needed, and proceed through the locker room and past the laundry to the stairs leading to the small gym for registration. Contaminated handicapped persons would be decontaminated at the facility or, as necessary, transported to a local hospital (qualified pursuant to applicable federal guidance) for decontamination. Bladders will be procured for the collection of contaminated shower water.
7
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, Once registration is complete, persons could be reunited with family members and would be permitted to leave in uncontaminated vehicles or buses to be provided, in order to go to private locations or congregate care centers. l Thus, monitoring of evacuees at Bridgewater can be accomplished in accordance with applicable federal guidance and, with the procurement of necessary equipment, the facility can effectively serve as a reception center. Boston Edison will continue to work with responsible officials to :
assure that appropriate plans and procedures governing reception center operations are developed and will provide the resources necessary to assure that they can be effe'ctively implemented.
i IV. Taunton Analysis For purposes of the analysis, approximately 10,500 persons were estimated 1 i
to arrive at the Taunton facility. This number, like that for Bridgewater, was derived from the estimated peak, summer weekend EPZ population figures contained in Attachment 1, and (when combined with the estimate for Bridgewater) represents 20% of the total EPZ population.
Estimates of the maximum number of vehicles which reasonably could be expected to arrive at the Taunton facility were also derived from the peak, summer waekend figures contained in Attachment 1. Thus, for Taunton, about 4,400 vehicles were estimated to arrive at the facility. Once these vehicles arrive at Taunton, the first step in thu reception center operation would be to monitor the cars for contamination.
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, Vehicles containing handicapped persons would be permitted to exit the main vehicle line to allow easy access for such persons to enter the facility for monitoring and decontamination. These vehicles would be directed to proceed directly to the Brown Building where personnel monitoring and decontamination could take place. Once handicapped persons leave their ca'rs, the cars would be brought back into line for vehicle monitoring.
Vehicle monitoring would take place along Hurray Road, using 12 two-person ,
teams monitoring vehicles in "batches" of 12. (See Attachment 6). Assuming a i
monitoring time of 2 minutes per car, monitoring of all 4,400 vehicles could be performed in about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. This analysis takes into consideration the time necessary for vehicles to advance through the monitoring stations and for periodic relief of monitoring personnel, as well as actual monitoring time.
More monitors could be added to facilitate even faster processing. Since vehicles can be processed in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> or less, timely arrival of evacuees at the Taunton personnel monitoring facility can be accomplished.
Once the vehicles are monitored, contaminated vehicles would be directed to the parking lot between Hurray Road and Chambers Road and, as necessary, to l
the adjacent grassy area. There is ample parking capacity at these locations, and PSP will be provided to assure that the grassy area remains usable in inclement weather. Uncontaminated vehicles would be directed to the large lot across from the infirmary and to a flat grassy area on the Murray Road extension.
This area too would be rendered usable in inclement weather as necessary. Numerous additionJ1 spaces are available around the Taunton State Hospital grounds.
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, Since vehicle decontamination need not be performed immediately, that operation could be accomplished during the recovery phase of an emergency or as decontamination teams became available. Chemically impregnated dry wiping j cloths would be used to reduce liquid waste. l i
Once the vehicles are parked, persons would walk to the Brown Building l
(approximately 100 yards), entering at the northeast corner, first floor entrance for monitorir.g and, as necessary, decontamination. (See Attachment !
7). Male evacuees would be monitored on the third floor using two portal monitors. (See Attachment 8). Uncontaminated males would then proceed to the Dormitory area for registration and then down to the first floor. Persons who are contaminated would proceed to the shower facilities. Here, they would 1 wash and/or shower to remove the contamination and be remonitored to verify that the contamination has been removed. Contaminated males would reoceed from the portal monitors to the decontamination area and then 4..ough secondary monitoring. After these persons have been decontaminated, and replacement clothing (which will be prestaged at Taunton) issued, they would '
proceed to registration and then down to the first floor. A similar process l
would be used for women and small children on the second floor of the Brown !
Building using three portal monitors. Bladders will be provided to collect contaminated shower water. (See Attachment 9).
At Taunton, handicapped persons would be monitored at one manual monitoring station located on the first floor of the Brown Building. Those l
who might be contaminated would be decontaminated at the facility or, as
{
necessary, transported to a local hospital (qualified pursuant to applicable federal guidance) for decontamination. Those who are not contaminated would 10
, join the general evacuee population on the first floor for registration, and a final registration check. Persons could then be reunited with family members and would be permitted to leave in uncontaminated vehicles or buses to be provided, ia order to go to private locations or congregate care centers.
The Brown Building is adequate to accommodate the monitoring function Lnd the related activities of decontamination and registration. Ample space is available for evacuees who are raiting to be monitored or who have completed registration and are waiting for others to be processed. Facility renovations will be required,(See Appendix B).
To monitor 10,500 evacuees in about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> would require approximately five portal monitors, operated by five, three-person monitoring teams and one three-person monitoring team for manual monitoring of handicapped persons.
About 180 evacuees per hour could be processed at each of the five monitors and 20 htndicapped persons per hour at the manual station. Sufficient space is available for additional monitors to facilitate even faster processing.
After passing through the monitor stations, uncontaminated persons would prceeed to registration.
Thus, monitoring of evacuees can be accomplished in accordance with applicable federal guidance and, with the procurement of necessary equipment and facility upgrading, Taunton can effectively serve as a reception center.
Boston Edison will continue to work with responsible officials to assure that appropriate plans and procedures governing reception center operations are developed and will provide the resources necessary to assure that they can be effectively implemented.
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V. Conclusion
, 1 The above analyses shows that the Bridgewater and Taunton facilities can, with appropriate planning, equipment procurement and (principally at Taunton) facility renovation, support timely monitoring of persons evacuating from the EPZ and that the two facilities can effectively serve as the reception centers for the EPZ population.
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List of Accendices and Attachments Appendix A - Regulatory Guidance Governing the Feasibility Analysis.
Appendix B - Lists of anticipated personnel and prestaged resources for Bridgewater State College and Taunton State Hospital.
Attachment 1 - Letter, Reuben E. Goldblatt, P.E., KLD Associates, Inc. to Cherte Fuller, Boston Edison Company, dated July 17, 1987.
Attachment 2 - Letter, Reuben E. Goldblatt, P.E., KLO Associates, Inc. to Albert Samano, Boston Edison Company, dated December 10, 1987 (and attached exhibits).
Attachment 3 - Bridgewater State College Reception Center Area Vehicular Traffic flow.
Attachment 4 - Bridgewater State College Kelly Gymnasium Building Ground Floor Plan.
Attachment 5 - Bridgewater State College Kelly Gymnasium Building First Floor Plan.
Attachment 6 - Taunton State Hospital Reception Center Layout Vehicular Traffic Flow.
Attachment 7 - Taunton State Hospital Reception Center Layout First Floor Plan.
Attachment 8 - Taunton State Hospital Reception Center Layout Third Floor Plan.
Attachment 9 - Taunton State Hospital Reception Center Layout Second Floor Plan.
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. - _ _ . _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ._..m_____ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - , . _ . _ , - _
. APPENDIX A Rggulatory Guidance Governino the Feasibility Analysis NRC and FEMA regulations (10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(10) and 44 CFR Section 350.5(a)(10) in particular) require that:
A range of protective actions ... [be] developed for the plume expose-a pathway EPZ for emergency workers and the public.
NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1,, Rev.1 (November 1980), "Criteria for Preparation and Eva'uation of Radiological Emergency Ra*ponse Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants" (HUREG-0654) Evaluation Criterion J.12 states:
Each organization shall describe the means for re of evacuees at relocation centers in host areas. gistering and monitoring The personnel and equipment available should be capable of monitoring within about a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> period all residents and transients in the plume exposure EPZ arriving at relocation centers.
The operative FEMA guidance interpreting Evaluation Criterion J.12 is the December 24, 1985 Memoraadum from Richard H. Krimm, Assistant Associate Director, State and Local Programs and Support, FEMA to NTH Division FEHA Regional Offices (Krimm Memorandum).
The Krimm Hemorandum addresses the "percentage of ... evacuees that could reasonably be expected to arrive at relocation center (s)." Krimm Memorandum at p.1, Since FEMA s experience with "a variety of natural and technological emergencies" suggested that "anywhere from 3 to 20 percent cf the evacuees arrived at relocation centers or shelters," the Krimm Memorandum states that the percentage of potential A-1
evacuees for radiological emergencies may be closer to the upper end of the 3 to 20% range after taking into account the "fear" and uncertainty associtted with a radiological emergency. Id. Accordingly, it provides the following guidance:
The State and local radiological emergency preparedness plans should include provisions at relocation center (s) in the form of 20 oercent of the estimated conulation to be evacuated.
For highly improbable radiological releases involving high levels of radiation encompassing a relatively large area ... ad hoc response measures (should be implemented.]
- 14. at p.2 (emphasis added). The analysis described in this report was conducted in accordance with this guidance.
9 A-2
l APPENDIX B List of Anticipated Personnel and Prestaged Resources for i Bridaewater State Colleae and Taunton State Hosoital' '
I. Bridaewater State Co11eae Ouantity I A. Personnel l
Traffic control (6) !
Vehicle monitoring and decontamination (24) 1 Personnel monitoring and decontamination (28) I Registration (12) {
Supervisory, other (3)
Transportution to congregate care facilities (10) '
TOTAL (83)
- 8. Prestaged Equipment and Supplies Set up Xit (Herculite, masking tape, rad waste disposal supplies, etc.) (1)
Bladders (15,000 gallens) (2)
Emergency diesel generator (1)
Emergency lighting for walkways (4)
Communications system upgrade (1) !
Perforated steel plate Portal personnel monitors (5) ,
Manual monitoring equipment (3)
Vehicle monitors (12)
Personnel decontamination kits (2)
The estimates process provided will be modified, as necessary, as the planning continues. Estimates will also be developed in the planning l process where no quantities have been provided.
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APPENDIX B (continued)
Vehicle decontaminat.cr kits Replacement clothing (2,000)
Shoe covers (pairs) (11,000)
B. Equipment ard Supplies (continued) l 1
First AiJ Kits Barricades and flashing lights (4) l Cones (24) 1 Astorted administrative supplies (e.g., registration forms, !
desks, chairs, etc.) i C. Facility Renovations or Additions Seal Kelly Gymnasium shower floors and walls Installation of bladder and connections at Kelly Gymnasium for collection of liquid radioactive waste. 3 II. Taunton State Hosoital Ouantity A. Personnel Traffic control (7) 1 Vehicle monitoring and decontamination (24) i -
Vehicle parking (10)
Personnel monitoring and decontamination (18)
Registration (12)
- Supervisory, other (4) 1 Transportation to congregate care facilities (7)
TOTAL (82) i B-2
APPENDIX B (cori:inued)
B. Prestaged Equipment and Supplies Bladders (15,000 gallons) (2)
Emergency diesel generator (1)
Emergency lighting for walkways as necessary (4)
Communications system upgrade (1)
Perforated steel plate Portal personnel monitors (5)
Manual nonitoring equipment (3)
Vehicle monitors (12)
Personnel decontamination kits (2)
Vehicle decontamination kits 4 -
Replacement clothing (1,500)
Shoe covers (pairs) (10,500)
First Aid Kits Barricades and flashing lights (7)
Cones '
(21)
Assorted administrative supplies (e.g., registration forms, desks, chairs, etc.)
C. Facility Renovations or Additions (Brown Building)
Repair roof and eaves Paint rooms, hallways, common areas Installation floors of showers (5) and sinks (5) on second and third i
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APPENDIX B (continued)
C. Facility Renovations or Additions (Brown Building) (continued)
Repair sanitary facilities as necessary Installation of handicapped access sanitary facilities (2) on first floor Installation of handicapped access ramp (s) on first floor
! Insta11attor, of bladder and connections for collection of liquid radioactive waste.
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KLD ASSOCIATES INCORPORATED l
MSSmoADWAY MUN stMulb84 9f allVM, N f 11/4t '
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July 17, 1987 VIA TELEFAX Ms. Cherie Fuller Boston Edison Energency operatione Facility l obery Nelghts Plymouth, MA 02340
Dear cherie:
In response to monton Edison's Jequett, we have developed astimates of the number of peopic, and vehicles which may be expected at Bridgewater State College and Taunton state Noepijal in the event an evacuation of the Pilgrim station EPs is ordered as a prctective action in response to an seeident at Pilgrim station. The information presented is predicated upon the use of 2 Deception centers only. Assigraents of communities within the 272 to Reception Centers is as follows:
aridaavatar stata caliaam Plymouth (North of Summer Street)
Marshfield Duxbury Kingston ,.
hunton State Meanital Flyneuth (South of Summer Street) carver l The number of vehicles which may be expected to arrive at each I Reception Center is based upon the FEMA Guidelines which state I that 20 percent of vehicles assigned to a Reception cantar will l actually arrive at that center.
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J..cc4o suAlor
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Pago 2 July 17, 1987 I
of the EPE boundary, traffic congestion in the vicinit Reception evacuate the Centers IPS. should not increase the time required to
{youhavequestion'sregardingthismaterial,pleisegiveus
'i Vergtrulyyours,
,.- .. 2_
R5G/rg Encl.
i R8&n3 Goldblatt, P.E.
8F* Systems Analyst ,'.
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ATIACle!ENT 2 KLD ASSOCIATES lNCORPORATED 300 Broadway Huntington Station. NY 11746 (516) 549 9803 December 10, 1987 '
Mr. Albert Samano, III Boston Edison Oceantown 59 Industrial Park Road Plymouth, MA 02360
Dear Albert:
As you know, a traffic management plan based upon the assumption that Bridgewater and Taunton will be used as reception centers is being prepared by KLD Associates Inc. The work effort includes fiald studies, highway capacity analyses, and traffic routing plans. Results of this effort will yield specific traffic management plans which support reception center activities while, at the same time, providing continue 4 access to host community facilities by local residents.
PreliLinary analyses, to date, indicate that traffic flow into the Bridgewater and Taunton facilities will support the objective of monitoring persons arriving at those facilities within about a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> perzod. It should be noted that these analyses indir. ate the presence of extensive traffic queues on approach roads to the facilities. These queues will be caused by the fact that the rate of vehicle monitoring at reception centers is likely to be lower than the lowest highway :apacity along the approach routes. Traffic queuing will commence shortly after the first vehicles arrive for radiological monitoring and continue to build until about 7 or a hours af ter i reception center activities commence when the last evacuating q vehicle joins the queue. Thereafter, traffic queues will dissipate as queued vehicles are processed into reception centers. The queue should be completely dissipated by auout 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
l This analysis has indicated that the primary focus of traffic
{ management plans will be to manage the queue. Associated with this objective will be the assurance of continued access to all points within the host communities of emergency vehicles. It 1
1
Mr. Alb0rt secano 2 D:ccabor 10, 1987 I
f I
i should be noted that conversion of two way roads to multi-lane, one way flow is not contemplated. Thus access to locations along the queue may be maintained by routing emergency vehicle in the direction opposite to the queued vehicles.
Route signs will be required for several purposes. First evacuees must be routed in the direction of the reception centers. Secondly, it is possible that some non-evacuating traffic will be intermixed with the evacuation flow in the area of the reception center. This traffic should be given an i
- opportunity to divert from the evacuation routes prior to the monitoring locations.
It is also advisable to alert people in the host communities and along the evacuation routes of the presence of congested traffic conditions. It should be suggested that they refrain from i
making non-essential trips during the course of the evacuation.
The following exhibits are appended to this lettert Exhibit T-1 Taunton Reception Center Approach Route Description t
Exhibit T-2 Taunton Reception Center Travel Time Estimates 1
Travel Time Estimates Frca The EPZ Boundary i Exhibit T-3 Summary of Traffic Control Points Supporting l l
The Taunton Reception Center a'
\ .--
l j Exhibit T-4A Taunton Reception Center 1 i
t
' Traffic Control Points - Middleborough ,
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! Exhibit T-4B Taunton Reception Center Traffic Control Points - Raynham, Taunton l
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Mr. Albort SCCCnD 3 D comb 3r 10, 1987 i
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Exhibit B-1 Bridgewater Reception Center Approach Route Descriptions Exhibit B-2 Bridgewater Reception Center Travel Time Estimates From The EPZ Eoundary Exhibit B-3 Summary of Traffic Control Points Supporting the Bridgewater Reception Center J
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, ExhLhit B-4 Bridgewater Reception Center Traffic Control Points - East Bridgewater, ,
Bridgewater l
i Very truly yours, f,. ,
i i /
/ i hh Reuben Goldblatt, P.E.
Systems Analyst RG/jan Attachments t
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Exhibit T-1 Taunton Reception Center ;
Approach Route Descriptions Route T1 Take Route 3A south from the EPZ boundary to the Sagamore Rotary. Exit the rotary onto Cranberry Highway going west and continue west to Route 25/495. Enter Route 25/495 going West and continue west to Route 138. Turn left (south) onto Route 138 and continue south to West Britannia Street. Turn right (west) onto West Britannia Street and continue west to Danforth Street. Turn left (south) onto Danforth Street and continue south to Taunton State Hospital.
Route T2 Take Route 3 south from the EPZ boundary to the Sagamore l Rotary. Exit the rotary onto Cranberry Highway going west and continue west to Route 25/495. Enter Route 25/495 going ,
l West and continue west to Route 138. Turn left (south) onto :
Route 138 and continue south to West Britannia Street. Turn right (west) onto West Britannia Street and continue west to Danforth Street. Turn left (south) onto Danforth Street and continue south to Taunton State Hospital.
I Route T3 Take Route 58 south from the EPZ boundary to Route 25/495.
Enter Route 25/495 going west and continue west to Route 138.
Turn left (south)
Britannia Street.onto Route 138 and continue scuth to West Turn right (west) onto West Britannia Street and continue West to Danforth Street. Turn left (south) onto Danforth Street and continue south to Taunton State Hospital.
Route T4:
Take Avute 44 west from the EPZ boundary to Route 25/495.
Turn right (west) onto Route 25/495 and continue west to Route 138. Turn left (south) onto Route 138 and continue south to West Britannia Street. Turn right (west) onto West Britannia Street and continue west to Danforth Street. Turn left (south) onto Danforth Street and continue south to j Taunton State Hospital.
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Exhibit T-2 Taunton Reception Center Travel Time Estimates from The EPZ Boundary Location at Distance Boundary of Route To Along Rte Average Time EPZ Reception Center (Miles) Speed (Hours)
- 1. Rte 3A at Route 3A 1.7 10 mph 0.2 Southern EPZ Cranberry Highway 8.9 10 mph 0.9 Boundary Route 25/495, 25.7 15 mph 1.7
.' Route 138, etc. _221 10 mph gia 40.2 3.2
'2 . Rte 3 at Route 3 1.5 15 mph 0.1 Southern EPZ Cranberry Highway 8.9 10 mph 0.9 Boundary Route 25/495 25.7 15 mph Route 138, etc.
1.7 221 10 mph 0.4 40.0 3.1
- 3. Rte 58 at Route 58 1.0 10 mph 0.1 Southern EPZ Route 25/495 20.3 15 mph 1.4 Boundary Route 138 121 10 mph 0.4 25.2 1.9 i 4. Rte 44 at Route 44 8.7 10 mph 0.9 Western EPZ Route 25/495 7.5 15 mph 0.5 Boundary Route 138, etc. 1A1 10 mph __ 0 . 4 20.1 1.8 Notes (1) Average speeds olong approach routes reflect congested flow conditionst Limited access highways (Route 3,
' I-495) are conservatively assigned a speed of 15 mphi :
At-grade, two lane roads are assigned 10 mph. l l
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Exhibit B-1 Bridgewater Reception Center Approach Route Descriptions Route Bit Take Road. Brook street west from the EPZ boundary to Colchester Turn right (west) onto Colchester Road an continue west to Mayflower Road. Turn right (west) onto Mayflower Road and continue west to Route 58. Turn right (north) onto Route 58, and continue north to Route 106. Turn left (west) onto Route 106 and continue west to Route 104. Turn right onto East Street and proceed to Roberts Road.
ESMAS_Ilt Take Route 106 west from the EPZ bottndary to Route 104. Turn right onto East Street and proceed to Roberts Road.
Route _Rit Take Route 27 west from the EPZ boundary to Route 14. Turn left (west) onto Route 14 and continue west to Route 18.
Turn 106. 19ft (south) onto Route 18 and continue south to Route RobertsTurn Road.left (east) onto Route 106 and continue east to Route B4:
i Take Route 51 north from the EPZ boundary to Route 139. Turn left (West) onto Route 139 and continue west to Route 18.
Turn 106. left (south)
Turn left onto Route 18 and continue south to Route (east) onto Route 106 and continue east to Roberts Road. l I
Route B5:
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Take Route 14 west from the EPZ boundary to Route 53.
right (north) onto Route 53 and continue north to Route Turn I
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- 18. left (west) onto Route 139 and continue west to Route l RouteTurn106. left (south) onto Route 18 and continue south to 1
i to Roberts Road.Turn left (east) onto Route 106 and continue east i
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Route B6:
l Take Route 3 north from the EPZ boundary to Route 18. Turn left (south) onto Route 18 and continue south to Route 106. ;
Turn Road.
left (east) onto Route 106 and continue east to Roberts !
1 3 Route B7:
Take Route 3A north from the EPZ boundary to Route 139. Turn !
1 left (west) onto Route 139 and continue left to Route 3A.
) Turn right (north) onto Route 3A. and continue north to Route 123. Turn left (west) onto Route 123 and continue west to 4
Route 139. Turn right (west) onto Route 139 and continue ,
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West to Route 18. Turn left (south) onto Route 18 and '
I continue south to Route 106. Turn left (east) onto Route 106 and continue east to Roberts Road. ,
l Route Rt: I
! Take Route 139, from the EPZ boundary, north then west to
- Route 18. Turn left (south) onto Route 18 and continue south to Route 106. Turn left (east) onto Route 106 and continue east to Roberts Road.
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Exhibit B-2 Bridgewater Reception Center Travel Time Estimates From the EPZ Boundary
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' Location at Distance Boundary of Route To Along Rte Average Time EPZ Reception Center (Miles) Speed (Hours)
- 1. Brook St. at Brook, Colchester, i Western EPZ Mayflower, d*
Boundary Route 58, 106 8.9 10 mph 0.9
- 2. Rtm 106 at Route 106 5.8 10 mph 0.6 Western EPZ 1 Boundary '
S 1 3. Rte. 27 at Route 27, 14, Western EPZ 18, 106 17.7 10 mph 1.8 I i Boundary :
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- 4. Rte 53 at Route 53, 139, Northern EPZ 18, 106
- Boundary 24.9 10 mph 2.5 3
- 5. Rte 14 at Route 14, 53, i
Northern EPZ 139, 18, 106 24.9 10 mph 2.5 Boundary i
- 6. Rte 3 at Route 3 13.4 15 mph 0.9 I i
Northern EPZ Route 18, 106 18.6 10 mph 1.9 j Boundary 32.0 2.8 i
! 7. Rte 3A at Route 3A, 139, i Northern EPZ 3A, 123, 13S, i
Boundary it, 106 35.7 10 mph 3.6
! 8. Rte 139 at Route 139, 18, 1 Northern EPZ 106 31.3 10 mph 3.1 i
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! Notes (1) Average speeds along approach routes reflect congested
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- Limited access highways (Route 3, I-495) are conservatively assigned a speed of 15 mph; 1
At-grade, two lane roads are assigned 10 mph.
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. . h!." PropostG Change Safety Evaluation No.: 2 I44 urrTY WattlaTION PILCRIM NLCLEAR PCNER STAT 10e(
Rev. No.
Initiator: Doct: Group: No.: Name: No.:
G. V. Mileris t:ED FSMC 86-51 Direct Torus Date:fl5fd9 S
Vent DescriptionofProhledchange ven to the main te sstack risent: Provide a direct torus t or e spfb7"V 5)
S AFETY WALUATION CIRCLUSICMS:
The proposed change, test or experteent:
- 1. (X) Does Not ( ) Does increase the probability of occurrence or !
consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipeent laportant to l safety previously evaluated in the FSAR. '
i
- 2. (:) Does Not ( ) Does create the possibility for accident or malfunction 1 of a different type than any evaluated prev 1ously in the FSAR. l
- 3. (:) Does Not ( ) Does reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis i for any technical specification. '
EASIS FOR MFETY Walt!ATION CfmCLLPSICMS:
SEE ATTACHED SHEETS l
Change Change (h Recommended ( ) Not Recounded SE Performed by [ IA C Date S M N 2 l
l Exhibit 3.07-A , , ,, -
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Safety Evaluation
. 1AFETY WstllaTIC8(
pILCtlu IquCLEAe PCkEe STATION f#&F r" ;L of / /
- Rev. No. O A. APPROYAL This proposed change hqiinvolve a change in the Technical
$pectftcations.
This proposed change, test or esperteent does ( ) does not. 9d involve an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10CFR, Part 50.59(a)(2).
/ This proposed change involves a chan e to the FsAR. per 10CFR 50.7)(e) and is reportable und r loc R 5 ).
Use of the vent s beyen e scope of this safety Comments: evaluation and will be covered in the er.ergency operating procedures. A separate safety evaluation will be written to cover use of the vent.
The safety evaluation basis and con 19sion ist nfS7
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( ) This proposed change involves an unreyteved satety evestion and a recuest for authertgation of this chan a sust be filed with the Otrettorate of 1.tcensing. NRC prior o taplementation.
( 1his reposed change does not involve an unreviewed safety onc $ $ O n $a W o,te ekin onc Meettas u d er
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- F710:j 0 7 P.2 0FOSIt O'.*AMI Th s ned;f :atien p:ovides a direct vent path from the torus t the mair, sta:X bypassing the Standby Gas Treatment System
($3 5) e:u:.pment on the t:rus purge exhaust line. The bypass is an 2" 1:..-[.a whose upstrea end :.s conne:tud to the pipe between prirary containrent is01staen valves A0-5042A&S (en 8 ' portion of 20" terus purge exhaust line to $375). The downstream end of the bypass is connected to the 20" main stack line downstrear. of SGT5 valves A0N-105 and ADN *.12. An 8" butterfly valve (AO-5025), ,
whien ca.n be rem:te:.y operated from the main control room, is This i
added d:wnstream cf 8 ' valve A0-50425. volve acts as the primary cer.tainrent outbcard is :.ation valve f or the direct torus vent line. The new pipe is ASME II: class 2 up to and inclusive 1 " - n e t /l.. . ... w..r,e n im. Iw A0-002; 1E y/g of valve A0-5025. A gf
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. Ars.sc25'. hc - y' AC solenoid r valve The ferp cpesed A0-5042B modification with a replaces cc solenoid the existing valve (powered from !
essential 125 vo'.: DC) to ensure operability during a station bla:kout. The new isolatie C-5025, is also provided :
with a D: scionettpcweredfromgaQpgM _- '
125 volt DC source. D
!:th of these valves' fail closed. 'One inch nitrogen lines are added to provide ba:kup nitrogen to valves A0-50423 and A0-5025.
The preswat legic of A0-50423 is being modified to override containment isolation signals by keylock remote e.anual action. ,
- New valve A0-5025 closes on containment isolation sig';als but is provided with the same isolation override control logic as AQ- i 50423. When 5025 and 5c425 are in the containment isolation i bypass n de a separate logic has haan aeded to isolate both
! va.ves if there is a high radia1lEn7evel in the Torus vapof space. This high radiatten over:16s 14 2.,r also ..; accospilthed x.yle x renote manual a:tton. , o it ac 'O A' ,b,$
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_ . - 'c A 20" wi '.1 replace t hs.6a= 4*m .- T a s=aru r cu c t between S37Spipe va.ves A0N-108, ADN-112 and the existing 2C" pipe to the maan stack. The existing 20" dianeter duct downstream of A0-5042A is shertened to a*lew . fi up of the new vent line branch l l
connection.
l A rupture disk will be included in the 8" piping downstrean i of valve AD-5025. The rupture dasX will provide a second leakage barrier. The rupture disk is designed to open at a pressure be.ow direct venting pressure, but will remain intact during i
normal operat ng conditions.
, This safety Iva'uat:cr. . derenstrates that plant safety during l n:::al et thedesign direct basis terus vent,operati:n :s n:t degraded by the installatioq,s vent cperatton la not addres by tha q gj a u M %. ve kr A n W&.sg&
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SATE!Y EVALUATION No.2 W REV. NO. 0 Sh* EFT + Org safety e v a l u t t :. n bat will be addressad by another Safety Eva Watt.cn in c:-du et.on with the Energency Operating Pro:edares.
A'th:agt.
. this safety evaluatien does net address the vent ope:atien, a des::1ption cf the venting operation and logic of the installed modif:. cation is p;cvaded be'.ow for inf orn.atien.
The purpose of the vent is to relieve excess containment pressure and prevent catastrophic centainment failure as directed by the Emargency Cperating procedures. Use oi the vent will be under canagement administrative control and would require that the keylock switches for operation of the A0-50423 and A0-5025 valves be placed in the Energency Open Position to override the '
containrent iso'ation signal which would be present if the containment was at high pressure. Prior to opening the vent valves the 6337 syster would have to be shutdown and valves AON- I 106 and ACS-112(,the outlet of SB3T)placed in a closed position. M g If there is high radiation,in the torus vapor space A0-50925 and A0-5C2 5 will rtico' .ate . Thatisolation signal can be overridden by A retra )
sd e k- manual Keylo:X actanted switches if v@. ting .1,. to. continue. )
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.. g.lOh B. PilRPOSE OF TEE CHANGE This med tication will provide thi-ability t_ Mins CONST.RU i r s=
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of the severe a:ctdent concerns by dire:t venting of the torus to prevent- primary containment over-pressurization during an extended station blackout. :f use can be justified this i modification opens a dire:: exhaust path from the torus vapor space to ma:n stack.
C . SYSTD!S , S'.'B 5 Y ST EM S , CCMPONESTS ATTECTED This mod:ficatien affects the containment Atmospheric Control System in the following manner:
The torus purge exhaust line inboard isolation valve A0-50425 and the associated 8" pipe are the a.omponents of the CACS affected by this proposed modification. With j in:orporation of the subject modifi,ation, the CACs wil.'. i depend on both esswntial AC (for valve A0-5042A) and c
essent:s1 :: (fc AD-50423)toperformitsgnetion, pq q p The new 6" to:as vent line will be conne:ted to exlsting 5" CA:$ piping between valves A0-50423 and A0-5042A. 1 This rt. edification affects tne Standby Qas . Treatment System l in the follow:.ng manner
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SATITY EVAttlAT:0N No. 2lh REV. NO. 0 SHEET 6*OF,jt,
$375 fan e.;tlet valves (A0N-105 & A0N-:,12), ductwork frem thste valves to the 20" line leading to the main stack, and the 20" line leafing to main stack are the components of this system affected by the prepcsed nedification. j Valve A0N-108 is .crmally c'.csed fail-open. Valve A0N-112 l will be revised to be normallyclosed, fail-closed,and thase valves will be previded with essential DC power and local safety related nitrogen supplies (Ref. PDC 86 70). ;
This modification aflects the Primary Containment Isolation <
System (PC:6) in the following nannert l This a s?,em is affected b the medification to containment inclet on valve A0-50425 1 gic. The addition of containment j outbcard isolation valve (AC-5025) and associated controls '
will also affect the PCIS.
D. SATE!Y TUNCTION CF AFFICTED SYSTEM /CCMPCNENTS Contair.nent Atmospheric Control _5ystem This system has the safet.y function of obviating the pcssibility of an energy ,,I.alease within the primary centainment from a Hydrogen-Oxygen.. reaction following a postulated LOCA cc:.bined with degr det,(pre Standby. cooling 5r'"$ ^ + ! CONST;uK. TION standby ons Treatment system -
This system filters exhaust air from the ;eactor building and discharges the processed air to the main stack. The system filters particulates and iodines from the air strear. I in order to reduce the level of airborne contamination 1 released to the envirens via the main stack. The SGTS can l also filter exhaust air from the dryw il and the suppression i pool. j Primary Containnent Isolation System 1
This system has the safety function of providing timely prctecticn against the onset and consequences of accidents involving the gross release of radioactive materials from the primary containment by initiating automatic isolation of appropriate pipelines which penetrate the primary centair. ment whenever nenitored variables exceed pre-selected operational limats.
Pc.m. 3 Gb.M h1h M
. Th6 primary containment syste'n, in conjunction with other safeguard features, limits tiie release of fission products in the event of a postulated design basis accident so that offsite doses do not exceed the guideline values of 10CFR100. g gyg C KY
i SAFE *Y EWLUATION NO.21'M RIV. NO. O sHIET g OF g E. ETTIOTS ON SAFETY T"NOTION Con t a ine.en t Atmospheric . Control System and Standby Gas Treatrent s y s t e.?. , and Primary Centainment Isolation By 3s -
The modification changes the solenoid A0-50428 control from AC to C0 enabling it to open (fro.m its norr. ally closed position) when required even blackout. during extended station Ductwork at the outlet ;
pipe and the.new vent line is connectedof the $30T system is replaced with the outlet of the 333; system. to the 20" line at Addition of a new 4" vent valve in a A0-5C25 off the torus line purge with containment isolation and vent line results flow path that the stack bypassing the s53; could vent the containment directly to operation. system during normal plant t New logic is being added that allows override containment isolation signal on existing valve of the ,
prevides the sane logic for valve A0-5025. A0-50423 and {
allow venting of the containme directly This could bypassing 633 or subject @ nthe to the stack containment pressure. 107 e to high I4 =.t'. '>' bt . L 's'6,,d..4%
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F. ANA:.YS:S OF EFTECTS w- CN SAFETT TUT *FICN5'$y n : i l Myl An analysis of the effects on sTissy~ swan ish.
so:s, and PC:s systems v. -.w s ,
vent is described as follove:for the installation of the 6treet torus i The change from AC to DC cuntrol adversely affeet its ability to on A0-50423 does not o AC-50425 when he containe.ent is being purged, or is.Me_penw Aw wet.As.& c.} h r, y The modifications to the ductwork and 20" line leading to the rain stack do the safety related systems.not affect the aatety function of any of During use thenormal plant operation, the CACs and the SGTs do not torus 20" purge and safety functions. The vent line to perfo:n their their normally containment isolation closed position, entisfying valves are in func;1on of the POIS. the safety vs MA '~M. .w o O W% A UecA % a:' S 5hb A .d 6. 4 .m .0 cs ovv %gpr.wrkg
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SAFETY EVALUATION No. 2144 REV. NO. 0 BKEET 1 0T T During plant startup and (ng-e,u.<f. y Cmf.4 & W line is in use, the logic shutdown #when the purge and vent unless SE 42 B is closed.does not allow A0 4~o23" to open SE,1 In addition a rupture disc W downstream neans of of valve A0-5025 will provide a second positive preventing leakage and prevent the stack in the event of a single f ailure ofdirect release up containment purge and vent at plant startup orA0-5025 shutdown.
during During containment high pressure not use the torus main exhaust line conditions, the CACS does SGTS for performin its safety function. to communicate to the logic cannot overri e the The existing CACS containment isolation open valves A0-5042A, ema JA single failure of A0-50423 signallogic and would still protect the 8507 from high pressure because A0- JBd 5042A, and the rupture A0-5025 would still bewould disk downstream closed. also Valve A0-5025 and inadvertent discharge up the stack. prevent any G.
SUMMARY
The installation of the Direct Torus affect the safety functions of the CACs, sGTs, Ventand (DTV5) does not PCIs systems or any other safety-related systems.
not provide justification for use of the DTVS.This safety evaluation does, The installation of Technicti Specification Change.
this modification does require a 9
The installation of this modification does not involve an
- unraviewed safety question.
ISSU:i.s m u CONSTRUCTION FDRNOMid
.- O!U
- SHEETjif OF // Safety Evaluation No.: 2.s 4 <y SAFETY EVALUATION MORK SHEET Rev. No. D A. Systes Structure Component Failure and Consequence Analyses.
Systee Structure Cosmonent Failure Modes Effects of Failure Coments SEE ATTACHED SHEET ,
2.
3.
General Reference Material Review FSAR CALCULATIONS REQJLATORY SECTION PNPS TECHNICAL SPECS. DESIGN SPECS PtocEDURES GJIDES STMDARDS CDDES SEE ATTACHED SHEET I',,,..,. .
E s- v J e.. -.*- , gg P R ' , t t' T - - . , , , ,
,. * ~g 's v s h o _
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B. For the proposed hardware change, identify the failure modes that are .
likely for the components consistent with FSAR assumptions. For each !
failure mde, show the consequences to the systee, structures or related j corponents. Especially show how the failure (s) affects the assigned '
l safety basis (FSAR Text for each systee) or plant safety functions FSAR Chapter 14 and Appendix G).
Prepared by LE' Date M 4 N )
le0TE: It is a requirement to include this work sheet with the Safety Evaluation.
Exhibit 3.07-C 3.07-18 Rev. 4 FDR NORMAltN
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SAFE!Y EVALUATION No. Es#4 REV. FO. C SHEET 9 OF /f SATIrY EVALUATION WORK SHECT O
Sys t e: ./St ru c tu re /c c=ponent : Isolation Valve A0-5025.
Failure Mode: Ta llu r e t o clo s e / F,,*. l o p u Ad e Pd'"tr *g"d7 '
I:fcc:s of Fa*1ure: Bypassing of Standby Gas Troatment System; Loss of Containment Isolation Cc= ent e : 1E Va'.ve position indication is provided in the main i contro*. room. Rupture disk provides protection. I Failure Mode: Excessive Leakage Ittects of Ta11ure: Release of Radioactive material above allowable.
Coments: Periodic LLRT performed to ensure leak tightness.
Rupture disk provides protection. (Rupture disc is ,
tested periodically) l l
System / Structure / Component: Direct Torus Vent System piping. !
Yallure Mode: Structural failure.
Iffacts of railure: Loss of containn.ent integrity and SGTS j inoperable.
Co= ent s : Qualify piping for design basis temperature and pressure to ASME III and 831.1.
System / Structure / Component: Primary Containment Isolation System.
Tailure Mode: Logic failure.
Effects of Failure: No effect.
cc=.ents: Redundant trains of logicy m) esg /s er, de's k , AM
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Safety Evaluation No, 2 # #4r Rev. No. C>
Sheett pofjt SAFETY EVALUATION WORKSHEET FSAR CALCULATIONS /PNPS REGULATORY DESIGN GUIDES / STANDARDS SECTION TECHNICAL SPECS. SPECS / PROCEDURES CODES 5.2 3.7/4.7 . Spec. SM 34 10CFR50 Spec. M300 NUREG CR 624 5.3 Spec. M600 NUREG BMI 139, Vol 1 Spec. M301 5.4 Spec. M600 NUREG BMI-139, Vol 1 Spec. M 611 NUREG 0700 7.3 Specs. 17322 M SAM 16 ASME B&PV Code Sections 10.11 17322 M SAM 12 III & XI Table 7.3 1 Specs M 603, M303 Appendix G Spec. E-347 R. G. 1.26 R. G. 1.97 Appendix 0 Spec. E 347 A IEEE 79 IEEE-23 IEEE 44 ANSI B31.1 Calculation Number Teledyne Cale./Later . .
17322 M 640 1 s r c. a r.
571 28 17322 and 571 29 17322 122 > lJ C . ' l's !di i UUP' " i CO N STRUglON_ l
. 10394 115 C3 17322 640 Cl20.0 17322 630 C200.0 17322 640 C100.3 17322 640 C110.0 17322 640 C100.5 I
I
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Safety Evaluation No. 214 4 Rev. No. D Sheet ll of Il PILGRIM STATION FSAR REVIEW SHEET
References:
PDC 86 51 Support a change to provide a Direct Torus Vent Line.
List FSAR test, diagrams, and indices affected by this change and corresponding FSAR revision.
Affected FSAR Revision to affected FSAR Section is shown on:
Section Preliminary Eini).
Section 5.3.3 Attachment 1 Section 5.3.4 Attachment 1 7 ' -.: -
Section 5.4.1 Attachment 1 -, I c. 3 .
Section 5.4.7 Attachment 1 1 Section 5.4.8 Attachment 1 : IWp V[, - ~ag.' * . .
d\ '
Section 7.3.4 Attachment I { #Np l [i(([ gI !
Table 5.2 4 Attachment 1 j Table 5.2 5 Attachment 1 =
Table 7.31 Attachment 1 Figure 5.2-16, 5.4 1 M 227, Sht.1 Figure 10.11-1 M 220, Sht.1 In addition, the PNPS Technical Specification. Table 3.7.1, Notes for Table 3.7.1, Bases 3.7 D/4.7.D.
PREllMINARY FSAR REVISION (To be completed at time of Safety Evaluation preparation.)
Prepared by: 8MA /Date: 64; M Reviewed by: N ate: MID Approved by: /Date: I f/87 flNAL FSAR REVISION Prepared following operational turnover of related systems structures of(components for use at PNPS.) (1) ,
Prepared by: /Date: Reviewed by: /Date:
(1) Attach completed FSAR Change Request Form (Refer to NOP).
Exhibit 3.07 A Rev. 3 (Sheet 2 of 3)
FDRNORATION
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Safety Evaluation No. 2 1 W e/
Rev. No. O Attachment 1 Sheet I af 10/9 ATTACHMENT 1 RECOMMENDED FSAR CHANGES The pages of the following sections, tables, & figures of the FSAR that need to be updated due to this modification (PDC 86 51) have been marked with suggested updates and included in this attachment for your review.
FSAR Sections: 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 7.3, 10.11 FSAR Tables: 5.2 4, 5.2 5, 7.3 1 The following drawings will be revised as part of the Plant Design Change package (PDC 86 51) but are not included herein.
Dwg. 1. D. FSAR FIGURE TITLE M 227, Sht. I 10.11 1 Pa!D Containment Atmospheric -
Control System M 220, Sht. 1 5.2-16, 5.4 1 P&lD Compressed Air System M 294 5.2-17, 7.18 2 Heating Ventilation and Air-Conditioning Standby Gas Treatment System Control Diagram 155Ui-; c. m CONSTRUCTION _
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A OP TIME vatyt C0ssient asceMat 150taTI0et
_yntyLa _ 575ftM_g,0(5CRIPff0's _ ._____0PC/IPC (StC) Ct a55 . _ t vet _ ___ _ (UC._ -.._ Post II04.__ GepvP_ gt IO4 cv- se65 -21 Os Analyser n -227 0PC 5 8 Gate C-904 Doen 2 Closed Cv Se65-96 Os Analprer s-227:0PC 5 8 Gate C-984 Ooen 2 Closed Sv-SeetA Post Accident Purge and vent I-227;0PC --
8 Globe C-170 Closed
- Closed Sv sea 48 Post Act 6 dent Purge and vent I-22 7;0PC -- 8 Globe C-t71 Closed
- Closed Sv-ses1A Post Acctdent Purge and vent N - 227:0PC -
8 Globe C-170 Closed' - Cie,ud
. SW 58818 Post accident Purse and vent a-227;0PC -
8 Globe C 978 Closed * -- Ciosce AO-Setoa Yorus vacusan Shrs. E-227:0PC - 8 autterftr C-7 Closed -. Closed AO-Sete8 forus vacuum She s. M-227;0PC - 8 Sutterfly C-7 Closed -- Closed B-2sta forus vacuum Stas. X-227:0PC -
, (A Check C-7 Closed -- Closed s-2828 forus Vaciasm Shrs. X-227;0PC -
N, Chech C-7 Closed -- Closed a0-Seeta Torus Enhaust Srpass x-227:0PC to d
_., n .
it Globe C-7 Closed 2 Closed ,
a0-504I8 forms t=haust Srpass X-227:0PC IP Globe C -7 Closed 2 Closed e -
ye gn y< (l A0 Se47A Torus Mann Enhaust X-227;OPC 85 8 Outterf1r C7 Closed 2 Closed *g* i
' yz a0-5e428 forus Mala Enhaust X-227;0PC 15 ' ) !-"~ 8 Outterfly C7 Closto .
7,9 Closed um 9 o o-CV-Se45-22 0, Analyser x-22eC;0PC 5 ,"8 Cate C 9e4 Deen 2 Closed k c' C CV-Se65 15 Os Analyser x-22eC;0PC 5 8 Cate C-904 Open 2 Closed [
Sv-5865-77 P.A.S. me turn to Torus X-228G;0PC - --
Globe (later) (Later) (l a t er ) Itaters SV-Se65-78 P.A.S. seturn to Torus X-228G;0PC -- --
Globe ' tater) -
Itater) (later)
Sv-se65-78 P.A.S. meturn ta forus I-22eH;0PC -- --
Globe (later)' --
It at er ) (later)
X-227 OPC 15 B Bfly C7 Cl$ sed 7,U Closed
- b AO-5025_ Direct Torus Vent cp E 9 of 12 eevtston 4 - July 1944 a
m
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- iika.C4
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G80VD_150I SL100 Ston813 c- c c a, o Group I: The valves les this group are Closed upon any one of the f ollo eng toewistions. $S 3
"o 4
! l. Reactor low-low water level -o ay o -u sis y, Ma nn St ease L ine high radiation "8 "
- 3. Main Steaan Lone htgh flow $ (^9 ay E Main Slease t one tunnet high teenperature "**'
4
- s. Maen Stcan tSne low psessu e e 3 j I
Scactor hsgh water Iceel e .'d 4 $
le . . ;
s.
so t_ s.
e Group 2: The valves in this group are Closed upon any one of the following Condit tons. f (L o _ e
! as fi g
- 1. Deactor low water level o.
6 I Mista dryweiI paessure m -- u 2.
I The valves in this group are Closed a,pon any one of the foIIowle,C9ttdltlon).
.CO Q 1 Group 3: xo ,e
- y
~
- 1. Deactor low water level ec ,
- 2. M6gh reactor pressure d O h
- 3. High drywell pressure
. o.
Group 4:
The valves in this group are Closed a,pon any one of th-'Q, c'ondi t loets , y M Q m
- 3. MPCI steam line high flow
$$ s U. -r >o we m.
n l
- 2. MPCI steam llne area high tesuperature -
f _@, ea m ,
, "pp
- 3. Low reactor pressure J hw a - en p$o**
a Group 5: The valves in this gros ,are closed upon any one of 191 1 fllo dn Conditions.
- r**
I. eCIC steam line high flow I
?.[ i , }
j R3g g
- 2. SCIC stessa line area higts tesuperature " y*~ $
- 3. Lone reactor pressure i 7 / -
) ;
Group 6: The valves Sn 1nts group are Closed upon any one of tP h h jing Conditions.
g 7
- J j l. Rean..w low water level Cleanup area hlete teneerature O "r, ew U o.
m .,
U
' 2.
- 3. Cleanup Inlet high flow Z N l
' the following Croup 7: The valves in this group are close<3 upon am 0 conditions: (for OPEN oosittori) '
_, }l y ;
I. Reactor 1(nf water level .-
g '
- 7. liigh drywell pressure Refueling iloor high radiation
.._. # ' ', j og 1. -
l y; c, ~ll of 12 me .lston < .iui r egne
- f4" . _ _ _ .
N i, 9
PNPS-f 5M **** ' ' *****'"' ** 6 ' 7 Re v . 'N o .O
- Attachmsnt 1, Sheet 5 of 19
- sele 9:!:s c' u;cn loss of instrument air to the air operators on the camcers.
(/ The demister is designed to remove entrained water droplets and mist item tne entering 6ir stream. The electric heating coil is designed to reduce tre relative humi:ity of the air stream to 80 percent. An intericek with its associated exhaust f an prevents the heating cell from ccerating when the fan is shut down. Each HEPA filter is Oesig*(3 t be capacle of removing at least 99.97 percent of the 0.30 mi:ron carticles which impinge on the filter. The charcoal filte's are tocide-imoregnated activated carbon filters capable of rem:ving in excess of 99 percent of the lodine in the air stream with 10 pe:ent of the ledine in the form of methyl iodide (CH l) under i e-tering c:rditions of 80 percent relative humidity.
Tre a:cident evaluations using the standard NRC accroach are ces:ri:e: in Se:tien 14.9. In these analyses the SGTS charcoal filters were crecited with removal of 95 percent of the influent 10 cine.
Tre system will start automatically up:n a high radiation signal frem the cceratic9 (refueling) floor ventilation exhaust duct monitor, or U:en re:eict of high drywell pressure or low reactor water level signals. Tne system can also be manually started from the control roce. U::n receipt of any of the initiation signals, both fans start, all 53T5 isolation damcers open and each fan draws air from the isolated Reactor Building at a flow rate of approximately o 4,000 ft'/ min. After a preset time delay, one fan is stopped.
Q Cross-conne:tions between the filter trains are provided to maintain the re;uire: decay heat rewval cool 'T ;-trir "flow on the charcoal filters in the ina:tive treatment tryn. Q r*sf.yt'e'm'di the main sta: . throop a 20 in under; *o ad h e'5GTsthargejVrn4% are to p .ered frem the emergency service per districution system. 3_.
QQgypW 6Uh"?lON Drywell and t:rus purge exhaust can also be directed to the SGTS for precessing before release up the main stack. See Section 5.2. The High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCIS) gland seal steam condenser exhauster discharge is also routed to the SGTS during ,
a:cident conditions. The Reactor Buildina Heatina and Ventilatina _
.Svite- it eiteutted in taction 10. 6 During a severe accident, the
( terus can be directly vented to the main stack bypassing the SGTS.
5.3.3.5 Main Stack see section s. 7.
The lo:ation of the main stack is shown on Figure 1.6-1. The tcp of the stact, is at elevation 400 ft msl. The structural design of the sta:k is discussed in Section 12.
5.3.4 Safety Evaluation Tne SCS provides the principal mechanisms for the mitigation of the consequences of an accident in the Reactor Building. The primary and !
se:endary centaineent act together to provide the principal j mechanisms for the mitigation of the consequences of an accident in i 5.3 4 FOR N O M ION c pcy
' ' * * < - g.,, , y ,, o ;
Attachment 1. Shset 6 of 19 the drywell. If the leakage rate of the building is 100, and the leakage air is filtered and discharged to the elevated release point '
. (utilizing the SGTS and the main stack) the offsite radiation doses that result from postulated accidents are reduced significantly. The Reactor Building is a Class I structure (with the exception of the i secondary containment access locks which are Class !! structures) l designed in accordance with all applicablerate codes. Design of the l Reacter Building for a maximum inleakage of 4,000 f t'/ min at !
a building subatmospheric pressure of 0.25 in of water at neutral wind conditions, results in a low exfiltration rate even during high wind conditions.
In the event of a pipe break inside the primary containment or a fuel handling accident, Reactor Building isolation will be effected and the SGTS will be initiated. Both SGTS exhaust fans will start.
Af ter a preset time delay, one fan is stopped.
With the Reactor Building isolated, each fan in the SGT5 has the ca; ability to hold the building at a $Ubatmospheric pressure of 0.25 in of water when drawing air from the building at a flow rate of 4.000 f t'/ min. Exhaust fan outlet damper controls on each fan are provided to maintain the required flow rate.
The RBICS performs the required isolation actions of the SCS following receipt of the appropriate initlation signals. Following initiation, the Reactor Building venttiation isolatten dampers close within 3 sec. The RBICS also aut- d ellys trips the Reactor star The' normal Building design flow supply and exhaust f ans, an: rate in the TReactor Building ope [b W SGTS exhaust duct is 40,000 f t*/ min. During dc tnf . F ir.+, e increased to approximately 50,000 f t' o ak chgma. l more than 3 set for fission products WmM- W m tu'ated "e handling accident to travel from the operating (refueling) floor ventilation exhaust radiation monitors to the isolation dampers.
Thus, no direct release of fission products to the environment I (bypassing the SGTS filtration processes, and the elevated retene Aeln_tyeyi ded_by the ma i n s tack) is possible Jexcept when direct torus ]
( vent path is used durine a severe accident. r--
Ine SGT5 filters einaust air from tne Reactor Building and discharges ,
the processed. air to the main stack. The system filters particulates and lodines from the air stream in order to reduce the level of airborne contamination released to the environs via the main stack.
When the system is exhausting from the Reactor Building, the building is held at a minimum subatmospheric pressure of 0.25 in of water. j Appendix G identifies requirements for establishing secondary containment (Safety Action 27), following an assumed pipe break i inside the primary containment (Event 39), and following an assumed l spent fuel handling accident (Event 40). Secondary containment is not established followir.g assumed pipe failures which result in the !
release of steam into the Reactor Building (Event 41), l The following piping which is located within the Reactor Building and normally contains hot fluids at reactor pressure was considered:
High Pressure Coolant injection (HPCI) turbine steam supply line; 5.3-5 Revision 6 - July 1986 EY
scio n ... ..... .
Rev. No. O 21/U/
FN75 -TS A."! Acccchment 1
' Sh et 7 of 19 CCtCRCL CT CCMBUSTIBLE CAS CONCE*CRA;1cN3 IN Col.'TAIN!CC
'm / 5.4 U 5.4.1 Introduction This A system for control is provided as required by 10CTR50.44(g). l contr system is provided for (LOCA) combined with following a postulated loss of coolant accidentof Core Standby Cooling Systems degradation, but not total failure, (CSCS). Degradation, but not total failure of theofcore stand.by the CSCS is cooling function means that the perforu nce postulated, for the purpose of design of the Corbustible Gas Control System (CGCS). not to rest the acceptance criteria in 10CTR50.45 and localised clad eelting and ssetal-water reaction'E 4 that there could be The degree of ! j to the extent postulated in 10CTR50.44(d)(1), &
performance degradation of the CSCS is not postulated to bei y f sufficient to cause core meltdown.
i The Contalment Atmospheric Control System (CACS) is provided to , u , f obviate the possibility of an energy release within the Prsmary,g ,
Cont aiment form a Hydrogen-Orygen reaction following a postulated g 3 J This is to be , , y LOCA co-51ned with degraded CSCS functioning. than =3 accomplished by wintaining an atmosphere containing less 4*. l 6 , m, The oxygen in the Drywell and Pressure Suppression Chamber (Torus).
system will: - , e h (i 1
- 1. Parform initial purging of the Primary Containment 3 g{j
- 2. Provide for a supply of nitrogen ukeup gas during normal l>,e { j operation or emergency - % c-- leoe Provide for normal and p rge Cn
- Akas tg., the Standby 87 k ,
- 3. ,
DudngMgions S 3 '* j Gas Treatment System (S375 !for Provide for emergency exhms S khhh f:r H1,\
- 4. 2 ees M ie L ,O E e I release of contaminated Drywed ..lT~--- t MIe Provide pneumatic supply to instruments inside the drywell { bj
- 5. es s Source of Hydgrogen Accumulation in Contalment 2 gj ,
5.4.2 1 i ge$C '
To11owing the postulated design basis 1.CCA contined with degradedj * , , , -
CSCS functioning. hydrogen and oxygen may be evolved within the )
prir,ary contalment f rom postulated metal water reactions and from ,8 "TUy '; i In the pilgrim Nuclear Power Station design, for pcst l
radiolysis. I accident corbustible gas control, the oxygen concentration is chosen yCia W'e l l
as the parameter to limit. E*OI
' J, y 5 5.4.3 System Description 7: I 3
,,t 10CTR50.44 (a) requires a esthod for control nf hydrogen gas that may <**
be generated in a BWR prinry contaiment following a postulated LOCA by metal-water reaction of fuel cladding and coolant, radiolytte 10CTR50.44 (b)
O decorposition of coolant, and metallic measure corrosion.
prin ry contalment hydrogen j h requires a system to 1
5.4
- Revision 5 - July 1985
- NU l
Safety Evaluaticn No. 2 W i PNPS-FSAR Attachment 1 Sheet 8 of 19 The valves in redundant paths are powered from independent class IE !
distribution systens each of which is powered from an emeroency D diesel generator after a loss of offsite power f 7he control switches for redundant valves are located in separate class IE control panels hg J
in the main control room. Conduit and permanently installed O l equipment required for purging and repressurization functions are g !
leeste,d, in se_isnically des,igned,,dssile protected buildings, except I g. I LMhe_ fill .copn,e c,t. ions which,,,are., located outside of,, secondary *b
.conla,ip ent but separated._, Redundant conduit systems are separated gg i l
commensurate with identified hazards. All conduit and permanently ag l installed equipment required for purging and repressurisation ,
functions are supported to meet seismic category I requirements oN except for N, supply equipment described previously.
The solenoid valves are ASME !!! class 2 and are qualified environmentally and seismically to the requirements of IEEE 323-1974 l IEEE 332-1973, and IEEE 344-1975 for the expected conditit:s. The j
valves are rated at 120V ac and are designed to operate between 80 and 110 percent of rated voltage. This range is compatible with expected bus voltages at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. = i The control switches have been qualified to the requirements of l
, *g g IEEE 323-1974 for operation in a control room environment. The switches are moented on class IE panels (see Table 7.8 3) and thel
$0 y g cor.bination has been qualified to IEEE 344-1975 for the operating gg Basis Earthquake. The switch's electrical ratings exceed loading a*
requirements, og D The cable and wire used for this medification have been qualified to 30 g,
IEEE 293-1974 for fire and ambient conditions exceeding those 6 o required for this installation. The 600 V No. 12 AWG control cable $$
has voltage and current capabilities well above that required,
~
f o[ o
{
control of the solenoid valves ic TinNCa dai '
1 slo IU j
automatic isolation capability. Iso latter h a g p. v(* there g y(been i EE provided because:
- 1. The valves are always k dvgeQed e tSma TR Q'QTION M MmM ' e'n.1 z ., g \
operation eo, I
>eu i
- 2. The valves are required to be operated during a high drywell 1Ao pressure condition and must be available independent of
- u
- f' reactor water level. High drywell pressure and low low reactor water level are the normal containment isolation { *E *~O i signals /
N, makeup and ventilation valves are also provided for use under nonaccident conditions. These will automatically close upon receipt l of an accident signal. However, these valves may be used after an accident provided the required power supplies are available and a low-low water level signal is not present. Refer to Section 5.2.3.5 and Tables 5.2-4 and 7.31.
O 5.4 3 Revision 2 - July 1983 HR NORMTM
.- RY
' a e . n o s. . o . . . . . .. .. . 4. i m Rev. N2.D PNPS-FSAR Sheet 9 of 19 5.4.5 Cor.bustible Gas Monitoring The exising Containment Combustible Gas Monitoring System (CCGMS) consists of two redundant, remotely operable, seismically qualified hydrogen analyzers. The hydrogen analyzers can continuously monitor Drywell hydregen concentration and have a remote readout in the main cor, trol room.
5.4.6 Radiological Consequences of Containment Venting An evaluation of offsite doses which would be incurred as a result of containment venting to limit containment pressure has been performe d
. in a manner consir. tent vith Regulatory Guides 1.3, 1.7, and 1.45.
The results of this analysis indicate that the doses to receptors at the LPZ would be well within the' limits of 10CFR100. This analysis assumed that venting at the rate of 50 standard it / min through the 3
SGTS would be initiated at 80 hr after t >.e reactor was made
'- +1 cal and venting would_ continue for 30 days.
4.7 .ragheftw6Tages)
References 5.4{$).e...
- 2. GE Letter No. SSX:79 64.
- 2. July 13, 1979 Letter, W. J. Heal (GE) to S. A. Giusti (Bechtel).
- 3. BLE-459 dated Septe-ber 25, 1975.
- 4. Supplement No.1 to Dresden Station Special Report No. 39 and QAD Cities Special Report No. 14. . . _ _ . _ , , ,,
ISSUED FOR '
LCONSTRUCTION L
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- Durge does ret DC Or}gJnetor at At AJs* 4provsJ Deta effact eerceptral design, At-r1* O es,es,ev.1.tlen, ,,,,,,1112, ,
FA:1d a % tion: MajorC MirerO O G. Initial , ,
h==nts effected by revision: T E E- l- /J 7" #4 Do c UM6A J7'S tasis:
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meenan for revisim: 56E NA R /2A r"/ s'/O " W24 /S t /= M "
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- A&11ticnol informationlicentificatice of ettscheentstekstctos: Priority A stevirq 1rwolved: Yes @ te C 1
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ISSUED FOR j CONSTRUCTION l !O 00l Owge ocas @ does ret O stract ** r=Sar eents (e.e uninit 3.co-r>
Ir charge adoes' effect et rigdroments; et Asertrra.1 esta NOTE: Distributkm shall befude Cognizant Design Engineer VAth Attachments We 1W AJ. WW (M( g,) c. . ,a .
05f 0YW %I*A fio 4 !SI $J//85 g/,f/gy ,
gQ C4;iJss91 Or6@ fegimett icetd GEPC. Ja*erdament wier4er / cafe ,
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M DV.)I Uf W C=*2iitEDISON NUCLEAR ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT e- 2 O Part 21 trelation aewit,e 4N #
- PG -6 \- gg (Requtfed Onh for Ma# FRN)
Ciam > PD: PA*XI Er.>Od5mlE 11C 8EV151>:
Aemites Detfared pg. " Reviste , attacPe6 Le_sen) 0 Ust of affectec su:lest Operstles Departmoet Oswretig Precoeures h O uit of Affected fecrnical $$ecificatime t4/A O Ust of Affectee rw Sections E O (4 h/A O Dravigs (Documents) nowired to leGleet Aeristen La the PQC Peekage O trotni g enterial MIa O O Sa'ety teslwati- O 3 iiia O In Setvies inspectien Aemirements N fA O Bill of outettals h o =, O ,
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a FRN8651-37 Page 1 of 7 1
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I inn l
DESCRIPTION g l N ef Includeel n ( in Ge)
GENERAL NARMTIVE 36 (S Paces )
BILL OF MATERIALS 7 (8 PAGE.)
sus ry e vn a n- rvoy 0ovnce-Q D w q s M 2.z.1 sh 1oS?- h>B l Mioco-n hC l 1 i
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Page 2 of 7
\
x LIST OF DOCUMENTI ITEM NO DOCUMENT NUMBER TITLE
/' REV.
W 1 M 227 Sh.1 of 2
- s. P&ID Containment Atasseherie Contral Syntam . / $
2 M10CC-35 Contato ent Atmos. Contro' Jys.
B" Terus Vent & 20" SGTS P4eino g
2 N /
4 8
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FRN 86 51-Page 3 of 7 NARRATIVE !
A. DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE l
l o Problem
)
PDC 86 51 was issued to install a means for venting the Torus in the i event of high containment pressure during a severe accident. The '
vent line is a 8 inch pipe connected downstream of inboard containment isolation valve A0 50428 and upstream of outboard l containment isolation valve A0 5042A. A new butterfly valve. ,
A0 5025, is to be installed in the new line as the outboard !
containment isolation valve. Due to scheduling constraints the '
butterfly valve may not be available and a blind flange asse,mbly will be installed temporarily to allow plant startup from Refueling Outage No. 7, as scheduled.
This FRN only addresses the installation of the blind flange assembly.
All items associated with PDC 86 51, except valve A0-5025. shall be
- installed as specified in the package and applicable, approved FRN's, o Desien chance Descrintion The blind flange assembly consists of two 150f raised face, blind flanges and a carbon steel spacer plate .
blind flange will be machined for double (s)0" ring seals and a testThe up!
l connection for leak testing purposes. The blind flange assembly ;
shall be bolted between existing weld neck flanges as shown on drawing M100C 35. The piping will be supported by the existing, l i
permanent supports to maintain its structural and pressure integrity. Note that the installation requirements of the piping I and permanent supports are contained in the latest issue of PDC 86 51. The effect of the revised confiluration described by this FM on the stress analysis has been ana t yzed. The blind flange assembly will have a tots 1 weight of a co:npared to approximately 330 lbs for ;alve 'pproximately A0 5025. 100r#elbs, cor/m as Nttrica o f r *e bew u xr m is u w a m u c.e o+wD 7* H f. 3 A + c s S t., P k 4 rag A* Wit dd& N' 7"p ot./5 D ucg? ;r& s+- $ e 6sw 13L y wsG 6 As r* 70 /00 M' T GuL6D eur
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FRN 86 51 Si Page 4 of 7 o Safety classification and Boundary Limits The entire assembly is safety related and quality category 'Q'.
The upstream (inboatd) blind flange is Pipe Class HBB and is designed to the requirements of ASME Section III, Class 21980 Edition through Wir.ter 1980 Addenda. The downstream blind flange is Pipe Class HE and is designed to ANSI B31.1. The spacer plate (s) shall be fabricated from A36 material due to its availability.
- 8. PROCUREMENT REQUIRiggg)
All materials are to be procured by Bechtel with BCCo approval. See the Bill of Materials and the requirements below.
- 1. Technical Recuirements- See Exhibit 3.02-1
- a. One 1508, 8 inch diameter, R.F., SA 105 blind flange, purchased to Specification M.600 Class Hil. The upstream face of tie blind flange shall be machineo as specified on drawing M100C45'.
ISSUED i:vN CONSTRUCT;ON
- b. One 150#, 8. inch diameter, R.F., A 105 blind flange, purchased to Specification M 300 Class HE.
- c. Spacer plate (s) of A36 material to match the 0.D. of the blind flages and drilled to match the blind flange bolt circle. The s shall be per the attached drawings. The width of the plate (l)l be purchased to Specification C 26 ER-Q E7.
spacerplate(s)sha
- 2. Cuality Reeuire-ents
- a. Blind flange assembly to be 'Q', Safety Related,
- b. All suppliers shall be on the Bechtel Evaluated Supplier List.
- 3. Quality Deeuwentation f0VOL); -
- b. The spacer platels) material Quality documentation shall be per Specification C 26-(R-Q E7.
..,.g ,=. . .. ..
l
FRN 86 51 fi Page 5 of 7
- 4. ihiocina Instructient-Packaging, Shipping, Receiving, Storage and Handling'shall be in accordance with the applicable portions of ANSI N45.2.21972.
Level C for the blind flanges and level D for the spacer plate (s).
- 5. Sterace Level, shelf Life. And storace Maintenancer
- a. ANSI N45.2.2 1972, Level C for the blind flanges and Level 0 for thespacerplate(s),
- b. Shelf life for piping materiais and steel plate is unlimited C. PLANT IMPACT o Maintenance N/A .
o Industrial Harards Industrial hazards are as given in PDC 86 51.
o Constructibility Constructibility is as given in PDC 46 51.
D. GOVERNING DOCUMENTS g
}]']3 ,
5" '" 52-E. SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS ~
CONSTRUCTIO A
- 1. The pressure boundary upstream of the blind flange assembly must be maintained to ensure containment InteyrlLs and 49 ellow Conteinmwnt Atmospheric Control System (CACS) operability.
- 2. The direct torus vent piping downstream of the blind flange assembly must be supported seismically to maintain the pressura integrity of the SGTS system for all normal operating and design basis events.
i 3.
leak The rate leakage testing rate by pressurizing shall be weasured the space at between the upstream the "Oflange during local rings.
F. ANALYSIS OF OtslaN ADEcuACY The following calculation was performed to support this modification:
Calculation Ntaber Deterintion i
H 640 5 A36 Material Analysis for use in the Direct Torus Vent modification y <*
) 6
FRN 86 51 D Page 6 of 7 I
. The existing system support configuration is adequate for all normal and design basis accident loads, with the reduced mass at the valve i installation location. e9 s t v b e c a. r e a oy r,5c s awyd I
).fi r r /E /?,
HO. 6 90 4 - f s ~4 NA L f3/$
r W b t t's+ 7~ G $ W t. o 4 h s A/ c /t.4 4 5 4 .T, s4 tL?
/N 3 / C HrGe C 4 Mar' gas 7 w 7"M sf 6 L / sVZ;> JC4-4W6$
AsseM/bLy, G. EDIT 10 MAL IMF0AMAT10N Following plant startup, valve A0 5025 may be installed as conditions permit. During installation, valve A0 5042A will be considered inoperable, therefore, work shall sub ect the plant to the limitin condition of operation specified in T chnical Specification 3.7,0.g2.
l 1
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is S U E D l O r. .
I CONSTRUCTION I l.
H. INSTALLATION IM$TRljCTIONS The blind flange assembly is installed using the codes, standards s)ecifications,installationinstructionsandproceduresidentifikin P)C 16 51.
Orawing M100C 35 shows the dotatis for the installation of the blind flange assembly.
- 1. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA AllacceptancecriteriaareasgiveninPOC8651,exceptthattheblini ,
flange assembly shall be leak tested rather than valve A0 5025/3 5 .
N s. t o w .s :
- The completed de' sign shall successfully pass functioney,and local lestr rate testing of air operated, valve. , ,,,,A0,50428, _ ,, _
ss wo t o cm. A e n t: et+ r's r esrswa. e s= r e s se s.o u p A T"" 6'a+4 ys(
P L'6 */d t? A O . 5 0 x,,, $ g,0 CA r j e,nf,
. The containment 1 solation valve 9 shall Close eritAis ][ ogggggg,
' receipt of isolation signals per requirements of technical specift ,
y Table 3.7.1. valve closure time for A050428.. / 3:.S. .
. based on vender documents. Added piping shall be: fr$
non. destructively tested in accordance with the Bechtel .-
Special
- , 3 Pro Manual. The added piping shall be pneumatically tested, and shall shone ' i.14 signs of leakage. . .: . j ,l ',
m n si-n PAGM oc J. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES N/A K. D15P051T10N OF RETIRED EQUIPMENT l
l l
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ISSUED FOR i CONSTRUCTIO \1 1
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1 PltGRIN STATION NUCLEAR POWER PtMI JOB DESCRIPTION: Direct Torus Vent PUWII DESIGN CHANGE # _86-51 Modification PAGE 7 Of 7 PACE BILL or FMTERIAL (Nechanical)
QtfANTITY TO BE COMPLE1[D BY FIE10 QA MARK REQ E-Q Q-00FF ESTINATE ACTUAL STOR CAT. utsW0t FOR CONS TOTAL SIZE (DESCRIPTION Of NATERIAL) REQ'O 1YPE P.O. ND. DEllVERY DELIVERY LOC.
INSTt SPRE E00E DATE DATE I' Q l 1 8" Blind Flange, SA-105 per H88 pipe No . See class,150#, R.F., fonjed & Drilled Nom. Note I Dia. flange to be provided with "0" Ring erooves and leak test connection.
Q As As 13.5 1 I/2" thicat circular steel spacer No See reg'd req'd inch plate (s) to ASIN A-36 requirements, Note 2 j t..D. belt holes drilled to match bolt
. circle of blind flances
-Q I 1 8* Slind Tiange, A-105 per HE pipe No See Pum. class, 150#, R.F., Faced & Drilled Note 3 Dia.
,Q I I 1/8" 3" long SA-IO6, Gr. 8 Sch. 80 pipe No See ca. ca. Nom. and pipe cap per H88 pipe class, te Note 1 Dia. fit test connection (Ref. M100C-351 "Notes 1: Perthase to Specification M-600 and machining detail (Ref. Dwg. N100C-35) 2: Purchase to Specification C-26-ER-Q-E7 Exhibit 3.02-I 3: Perthase to Specification M-300 l- -
p f y
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Slet4TWE DATE REV SIGHTURE DATE REV SIGMATURE '
DATE REV YU fw ([
1 1
1 Safety Evaluation No.: 1114 Md 0 MFETY EVALDaTf 0W PILCRfM EucLEAR POIER STAfffM 3D P I /'/ 0 Rev. Bo. .
PCC PQt System Calc. -
Initiator: Dett: Group: no.: Name: No.: Date:
G.V.Mileris s.!D rS&M 86-51 Direct '*
- Torus g,,'p 9 ,08/26/87 Vent Descriotton of Proposed chance, test er esseriment: Allow w.m u.noa or a sua suace w nue os rua Ao re s.r rv iseu re rse user r,s s vu.- s ws carvo sArtty TVAturif 0N rfmMIMffat:
The proposed change, test er experleent:
- 1. (x) Does liet ( ) Does increase the probant 11ty of ocevrresIct er consequences of an accident er unifunction of equipment leportant to . . . . . . .
safety previously evaluated la the FSAR. *
- 2. (x) Does llot ( ) Doe's create the possibilit f for accident er salfuncties of a different type than any evaluated prev;uously la the FIAR.
- 3. (:4 Does not ( ) Does reduce the margia of safety as defined la the basis for any technical specificatten. I BASIS FOR 1AffTY EVAf flafffM NifttCWi! No comelusion of the FSAR is affected and there is no reduction in the settins of safety. No new accident is
- l introduced eer in the erobability er congeouences of previously analysed
- I g ents increased. This modification does not involve an unreviewed
.aaisu aup tien- _ . _ . _ _ _
- ' Alto see Attached -
Dante mange '
(x) Recommended ( ) met Recommended St Performed by - N Date V2/F-2 h hlbit 3.0 M -
Sheet 1 of 3 ig .c 4. E D P Y.:.' !
i
! CONSTC.U .T!OH z...__ _. _ _
3.0 M 3 ge,. 4
batety Lyaluation W ITY ty1LUaTION 2 ##
PILC1tIW FJCLEAR PCMER STATION Rev. 50. O A. APPeCNA L w (x ) This proposed change does not involve a change in the Techalcal "
Specifications. '-
( x) This proposed change, test or experleent does ( ) does not 00 involve an unreviewed safety question as define (*in 10CFR, part -
50.59(a)(2).
(.x) This proposed change involves a change to the FSAR per 10CFR 50.71(a) and is reportable under 10CFR50.59(b).
~
( ) Comments: Nm The safety evaluation basis and conc 1ssten is: ,
/ 0() Approved () Not Approved lJQ
~ " ~ ' "
9j[fp g ' '~ .
Olscipline Group Leader /Date Supporting 01scipitze Group Leader /Date B. 4 M EN APPtfhAL (d) Cosmnts: A
~
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49,/ v$45A G(j>vp Leader /Cate
%Iv7 C. CRC R M EN .
( ) This proposed chuge involves an unreviewed safety question and
, a request for authorizattor, of this chanes must be filed with
. the Directorate of Licenslag, NRC prior to laplementation.
(t This proposed cauge does not involve an unreviewed Safety question.
($hW one eutr., eate 9 lain .
. ENC noeiin, u e,TM-e7 Cc:
ohini o .ov-4 - .
. Sheet 2 of 3 j$$UED lQ u-CONSTRi.KTION . - . - - .
3.07-14 Rev. 4 i
b Safety Evaluation No . 2 2. l4 Rev. 0 Sheet 3 of to A '. DESCRIPTION OF CRANGE This safety evaluation justifies the operation of the Primary Containment System (PCS), the torus purge exhaust line and Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGTS) following the installation of the 8" direct torus vent line (DTVL) from i line 8"-M33-45 up to the 20" main stack line without ;
installing valve A0-5025. In place of valve A0-5025 a spool ,
piece. -
consisting of two blind flanges and a so ad plate between thi existing flanges will be installed.
Safety Evaluation No. 2144 addressed the installation of the DTVL as set forth in PPC-86-51. This safety evaluation demonstrates the acceptability of replacing valve A0-5025 ,
with the spool piece. ,
B. PURPOSE OF CHANGE The purpose of this change is to allow operation of the torus purge line and SBGTS during refueling and startup with installation of a blind flange assembly in place of valve A0-5025 in the CTVL.
- c. SYSTEMS, SUBSYSTEMS, C0KPONENTS AFFECTED This modification affects the containment Atmospheric
- Control System in the following manner:
l The new 8" dixect torus vent line (DTVL) will be connected to existing 8" CACS piping between valves AO-5042B and A0-5042A.
This modification affects the Standby Gas Treatment System in the following manner:
The 8" DTvt line connects to the Standby Gas Treatment Systen and includes a rupture disc assembly between the spool piece and the connection point.
7 .- . ,
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Safety Evaluation No . 31 tG Rev. O Sheet 4 of / O
, This modification affects the Primary Containment System (PCS) in the following manner:
The addition of the blind flanged spool containment outboard isolation valve (AO-5025) location piece at affects the PCS. The blind flange will now become a primary co.ntainment boundary.
D. SAFETY FUNCTION OF AFFECTED SYSTEM /CCMPONENTS Containment Atmospheric Control System This system has the safety function of obviating the possibility of an energy release within the primary containment from a Hydrogen-Oxygen reaction following a p o * *.u l a
- e uct combined with degraded Core Standby Cooling S3* c e: .
StandL, Gas areatment System This system filters exhaust air from the reactor building and discharges the processed air to the main stack. The system filters particulates and lodines from the air stream in order to reduce the level of airborne contamination released to the environs via the main stack. The SGTS can also filter exhaust air from tne drywell and the suppression pool.
Prime.ry Containment System The primary containment system, in conjunction with other safeguard features, limits the release of fission products in the event of a postulated design basis accident so that offsite doses do not exceed the guideline values of 1CCFR100.
E. EFFECTS ON SAFETY FUNCTION Containment Atmospheric Control System The 8" DTVL with spool piece replacing valve A0-5025 connects to the torus purge and vent line between valves AO-5042A and A0-5042B. The blind flanges of the spool piece provide a pressure boundary for the CACS.
87112.5 h
'lh,SlJ e D, it;n l CONSTRIAT =-
ON .!
l
. l Safety Evaluation l No. 2 Ltd Rev. O i Sheet 5 of to ;
l Standby Gas Treatment System Ductwork at the outlet of the SBGT system has been reg.iaced with pipe and the new vent line is connected to the 20 line at the outist of the Esc; system.
Primary Containment System Addition of new 8" vent line downstream of valve A0-50425 and to the blind flange spool piece provides a flow path that could vent to the containment in the event of a structural failure.
T. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS ON SATETY FUNCTION An analysis of the effects on safety function of the CACs, SBGTS and PCS for the installation of the direct torus vent as described below: j The piping systems are qualified by Teledyne piping stress analysis. This analysis considers Mark i Progrkm Torus Loads. With the anchor on the 8" DTYL at j
. elevation 51'0" and the spool piece installed in place of valve AO-5025 the piping meets ASNI RPVC Section III i and ANSI B31.1 tequirements. (Per Teledyne Calc. ;
I i .dicated in letter 6706- 9 ) . r,#E Anus ~ /4 FMrwat. '
C. o y F t R % E D r- MT- W E Ex tSNN C- PsM4 sOMoArS
. i RE M A ty 4:p sf C V A T E Pc R. r W eg w..Q *b Es s G ey I Co ri r rG uit.k r tc y \
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The system will be pressure tested per AsNI section XI, 1980 Edition with Winter 1980 Addenda, i
The spool piece provides a second positive means of preventing leakage in the event of a single failure of valve AO-50425.
During plant startup and shutdown (non-emergency condition) when the purge and vent line is inuse, the blind flange
- In addition provides rupture the discpressure boundary downstream of for the CAC5.the blind flange will provide,a a second positive means of preventing leakage and prevent
- dirt-t release up the stack in the event of failure of the blina flange during containment purge and vent at plant
, startup or shutdevn.
1 em25 y! ' 'iS S U E D E;;mNSTRUi 2
~. . , . _ _ _ .
1 l
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- Safety } valuation '
No.Z2 lG Rev. O Sheet 6 of /c During containment high pressure conditions, the CACS doos ,
not use the torus main exhaust line to communicate to the SGTS for performing its safety function. The existing CACS logic cannot overr!.de the containment isolation signal and open valves A0-5042A. A single failure of Ao-50428 logic would still protect the SEGT from high pressure because Ao- .
5042A would still be closed and the blind flanges would !
provide a pressure boundary. The blind flange and the rupture disk downstream would also prevent any inadvertent discharge up the stack.
G.
SUMMARY
The installation of the direct torus vent line with the blanked off spool piece in place of valve Ao-5025 does not ,
affect the safety function of the 55GT5, CAS and PCS systems. These systems may be considered operable with the 8 OTYL installed including a blanked-off spool piece in place of valve A0-5025.
This modification does not increase the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, nor does it create the probability of an accident or malfunction of a different type than is avaluated for PNPS.
This modification does not involve an unreviewed safety t questions, and dcas not require a tech, spec, change.
l ISSUED Fak CONSTRUCTION ! i 87112.5 f
l PILC#IM STAT ON 7/ //d
, FLAR REVIEW RHffT
References:
Safety Evaluation: 22.l6 toy, no,: O Date:_M2h7 Support a change '.
List FSAR test, diagrams, and indices affected by this chansa and .
corresponding FSAA revision, ,
Affected F5AR tevision to affected FSAR Section is shown en:
saetion Prettsinary Final Fig. / O t 1 -f M 227. Sht. 1 Attachment 2 Attachment 3 Attac h at 4 .
, Attachment 5 AtR$Ma* l
(
PetLIMINAty rsAt arvisION (to be completed at time of safety Evaluaties preparation) ,
Prepared by:, b 4 O /Date: PNP 7 Reviewed by IDate: fr /
Approved by: W /Date: Sh/M Final rsAt trvis10m (Prepared following operational turnover of related .
I systems structures of components for use at PNP 5). ,
4 Prepared by: /Date: Revleved by: #Date:
l -
Attach completed FSAA Change Request Fors (Refer to 30P).
~
I "l3!'3 s d'i' lSSUED i:a,.:: -
I
[CONSTRUC;flON 1 3.07-15 ter 4
.- - - . _ . . - , _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.______.____..____-_____-___._______-__,._-m_ _ _ , - - - _ _
Safety-Evaluation Mo. L Z I G Rev. No. 0 8heet g**ot _fQ.
RECCMMENDEC F8AR CHANGES The following drawings will be revised as part of this F R.N but are not included here.
Dwg. I.D. F8AR Figure Title 6\ ist)' wr, / /0, // - /
P&ID Residual Heat Removal Systen l
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ISSUED FOR !
CONSTRUCTION _ ___
Safet No.: y2111 Evaluation 9 Io SArtTY EVALUAff0N IOtf SNtfT
.Rev. 50. O A. Systee Structure Cment Failure and Consequence Analyses.
Systee Structure em ment fat tura lendes Effneta of Failure b,ntt
], __See Attached Sheets 1
E. _
3.
Cameral inference 14aterial taview -- - -
FSAR CALCA.ATICR$ REGA.AltRY SECTION PWDS TTomicAL 19tc1. StifcM SPtes perrmfart anDil ITAthUtD$ CEEES Bechtel Calc.
et ~4 3. 7 /4 S #3 4 S G S _17 3 2 2-M- 6 40-f ASME BPVC
,5 4 _Teledyne Cale. _seetten III. It rM L C MAft 1 G 74 6 -7 ,
- 3. For the proposed hardware change, identify the fa11ere modes that.are likely for the components cons'staat with F3AR assumptions. For each !
failure mode, show the conseevences to the system, structures or related '
components. Especially show how the fallere(s) affects the assiped safety basis (F5AR Test for each system) er plaat safety functiess FSAA
- Chapter 14 and Appendia D. . .
Prepared by -
e Date MMf7 NOTE: It is a requirement to include this work sheet with the Safety l
Evaluation.
tuhlblt 3.07-C ~~~"~~~~'
!! ISSUEDiDR l 3.o7-is
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Safety Evaluation No.22f(
Rev. O Sheet / D ef /c .
SAFETY EVALUATION WORK SMEET A. System / Structure /Cemponent Tailure and Conswquence Analysis System / Structure / Component: CACS outlet piping or blank in l spool piece.
Failure Modes: Wald or blind flange failure I causing leakage, l Effeets of Failurei Discharge directly into reactor building.
Cements : Blank flange is adequate for maximum system pressure.'
Piping will be tested in accordance with ASME BPVC Section XI. Piping qualified for design loading per ASME III and B31.1.
53 tem / Structure / Component: Direct Torus Vent System piping.
Fa.lcre Mode: Structural failure.
Iffects of Failure: Loss of containment integrity and SGTS inoperable, l
Cement s : Qualify piping for design .
basis temperature and pressure to AsNE' III'siW R$1.T. . * . .' ~ " . '!
. 1 1
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ATTACHMENT 3 h
i rim uNP14t196 NUCLEAR ENGINEEAWO MPN
,. =>r O == 0 m m Noo .p i R Type: B3.37 -
a 10 =0 rae. n.e* .e w u.> n m) o ,.en. B fr==. O PRN # A6 5I- / 2 2
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Ome m ete offacted by evvisian: - W QL 51 taala: k/A a
nanam far twisiws:
1eetall rurture ditk P50 012n and senaarp for iattA11atinn nf valve AD.5025 whien will not be installed until formal NRC approval is recieved.
cuscripting of swislan:
(See Attached Sheet) assitiesa interestianItamnuflastian of ettanNunntsIsaetares: Priartty A ereming san 1,ug: yes O .a g Reason for Revision Sheet 3 Description of Revision Sheet 3 Table 1 , Sheet 4 Safety Evaluation No. 2265 and S.E. Worksheep (attached) 23 Q 4M SSJED 09
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' .* NOCLEAR ENQiNEERING DEPARTMENT FRNf [/>*hf-f2,L Field W Notlee . Pe00 2
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1 Actim m PCC P40WI IIIADOCS mE3J1AIC IEV1512:
i Reedses gotter,d
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o uet v ufseted italear operettwo es,seteent operstig Pressamos O '
O List of Mfected foerniaal specirleetions O O O Last of Affected rnas sections O O O Oreeige (Documents) heedred La legdesent Revisim to tJe FCC Peehage O aia O fysitd g sentaria2 O O O Safety Ivolati- ex.226 O R =>a O In=lervies trupacuan needreamts O
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t FRN 86-51 /22 sheet 3 .ef.
Reason for Revision This FRN provides a directive for completion of work under and PDC 86-51 Valve A0-5025including the installationwork pre-installation of rupture baseddisk on PSD-8180,NRC informal 3
approval received.
y ,g g Valve AO-5025 shall not be installed until formal NRC approval is received.
A FRN will be issued for A0-5025 installation when written cwrutig Mht\e NRCb i n papproval lw. .f Ao is received. N Wk. Spum h4-h Description of Revision sot.5 5 6\\ rwm in p)W d+b'i s, t in .
The Direct Torus Vent rupture disk detailed in FRN 86-51-26 was ter porarily replaced by a blank plate in accordance with FRN 86-51-69 in order to allow operation of the Standby Gas Treatment System. The blank plate shall be removed and replaced with the pe=anent rupture disx. This FRN supercedes FRN 86-51-69.
All work with the exception of A0-5025 installation and nitrogen supply and electrical connection is to be ceerteteJ. SE #2221, which was issued with FRN 86-51-95 covers the final vent system configuration including A0-5025.
Table 1 is a listing of significant FRN's and Safety Evaluations which have been issued.
SSUE6F09 CONSTPUC"ON 67104,1C O
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l O
i
- rRx sheet 4 as / 2_2 i
TABLE 1 l
1 PDC 86-51 DIRECT TORUS VENT ORIGINAL S.E. NO. 2144 Significant FRN's & SE's FRN 86-51-26 : Major FRN for installation of rupture disk.
FRN 86-51-36 : Major FRN for Concrete Chipping (7/17/87)
Dwg. C-1161 S.E._ No. 2181 FRN 86-51-66 : Minor FRN - Rupture Disk Blank j FRN 86-51-69 : Ma or FRN - Rupture Disk Blank TNo. 2197 FRN 86-51-88 : Minor FRN to Delete CIS for 5025 FRN 86-51-89 : Ma or FRN - Elank at 5025 E . No. 2216 FRN 86-51-96 : Minor FRN - Rupture Disk Blank Details FRN 86-51-112 : Minor FRN - Rebuild 5025 FRN 86-51-95 : b'A199.; FRN -
Sealed Closed Barrier A0-5025 Valve. S.E. No. 2221 l
l 7 ;
JSSUFiDt-oi) 87104.10A l___.CONSTRUCTON i
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, . Wo.s 28)
- SAFETY EVALUATION PILCRIM NUCLEAR P(kER STATION SHfE'T / OF ( 2.
Rev. IIc. O PDC POI Systes Calc.
Initiator: Dept: Group: No.: Name: No.: Date:
G.V.ultoRis NFb FS t.4C-1%'S I p,8,Q ge //n/38 VEwT Description of Proposed change, test or esperleent: hs C.E . top &h rdEs s E co. z? t i . Tau tocca6 Paopmeo U Tm tg is To ips,Att A -
o so e ct- ve, w v em t nTu s N To Twa e _LA Aio sv a, cm r SAFETY EVALUATION CDNCLUSIONS:
The proposed change, test or experiment:
- 1. 00 Does Not ( ) Does increase the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR.
- i l
- 2. 04 Does Not ( ) Does create the possibility for accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR.
- 3. (/Q Does Not ( ) Does reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification.
RASIS FOR 1AFETY EVAttlATIM CDICluSIMS: i sprw A trMw t-D CMrTS
- l Change Change K) te;mr.dsd
( ) llot Recommended SE Performed by Date ///Mlf' Enhibtt 3.07-A Sheet i of 3 3.07-13 gev 4 SSU550k CONSTRUC.=T10N
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1AFETY EVALUATICM pILC11M NUCLEAA PCkER STATION Rev. No. 42 A,
APPROYAL $NEFT 2. OP I1 l (X)This proposed change does not involve a change in the Technical Specifications.
(x.) This proposeti change, test or superteent does ( ) does not K) involve an un)9 viewed safety question as defined in 10CFR. Part 50.59(4)(2).
COThis proposed change involves a change to the FSAR per 10CFR 50.7)(e) and is reportable under 10CfR50.St(b).
(x) Comments:
PW 0F "* trrvi es Devo4 0 rwe st.4 cc. im s sq vunm Foa. o o ggoov= . A 'two su ptrtN
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s S A w m,uMw wu a s waitT m The safety evaluation basis and conc (lusion is:M weesow3op.g Q
(/4 Approved () Not Approved i
)>4Ah+s ih<hr ^Jh gu:iptq4roupfeader/Date Supporting Discipline Group Leader /Date
- 8. REVIEN APPROVAL Comments: TkN 56 um's b (** d AO- T0M' M5 klltl *M A cen .v4 4 A t ic) bd coau<s mAJ hee M42e<.4v-- /// li
(,) $ $ Grou$ L6ader/Date 1 C. ORC REVIEW This proposed change involves an unreviewed safety q'Jestion and a request for authortration of this change aust be filed with the Directorate of Licensing MC prior to laplementation. .
i
/ This proposed change does not involve an unrevleved safety
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- question.
ORC Chatraan S$ b s V ' Date //J4/RP ORC Meeting Number
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i Exhibit 3.07-A Sheet 2 of 3 h[Qld; h'Ql-]
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DESCRIPT20N OF PROPOSED CHANCE
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This modification provides a direct vent path from the torus to the ma stackexhaust purge bypassing line. the Standby Gas Treatment System ($GTS) equipme The bypass is an 8" line whose upstream end is connected to the pipe between portion of 20" torus purge primary exhaustcontainment line to SGTS).isolation valves A0-5042A&B (on 8 bypassandisAON-112.
AON-10B connected An 8"tobutterfl the 20" main stack line downstream of SGTS v i operated from the main control room.y valve (AO-5025), which can be remotely A0-50428. is added downstream of 8" valve for the direct torus vent line.This valve acts as the primary containment inclusive of valve A0-5025. Test connections are provided upstream downstream of A0-5025.
A0-5042B with a DC solenoid valve (powered from e ensure operability during a station blackout.
The new isolation valve, 4
A0-5025 is also provided with a DC solenoid powered from the redundant
! voit DC source. Both of these valves fait closed.
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are added present logic to provide backup nitrogen to valves A0 50428 and of A0-50428 The A0 5025.One mesification. The new isolation valve A0-5025 wilcontainment isolation siqnals closed barrier as defined in Standard Review Plan A 20" 6.2.4. ite AON-112 and the existing 20" pipe to the main stack. pipe will r t The existing 20" diameter vent line branch ductconnection.
downstream of A0-5042A is shortened to allow fitup of the n i A rupture A0-5025. disk will be included in the 8" piping downstream of valve The rupture disk will provide a second leakage barrier.
disk is designed to open at 30 psig which is below direct venting pressure but will remain intact during normal design basis operating cond' tions.
A tuww VAsws wM.stt Aun A amuA&
' tea a tuu Av.7 0 lu ccAc.r. os VAtv5 Ao -Go mgg gm t.g pyg yg, puttuaG Disc. TA tt e 5 env5 To #5ctMt
) c Ter DTVS Acb Daoui t f A h Parwoa.er floaub A A.y v>% Tat AM A#s tuuvTa. A e e p Te4g. g gegg, ITet R LAuk Pi. ATE I
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~ basis Vent optoper ion is ,ot Jegradet .v 'ae Nstallation of the direc Jn 15 ret accresned
! addressed by trother safety i. val u<atio't vis safety evalui'lon but will be .
l 0:erating Proced#es in c~ M etica with the Emergency i
yj s, e<4 SAFETY EVAWA?!ON NO. 2,20 h REV NO. O SHEET 4 0F 12 description of tne venting operation is provided below for in The purpose of the vent is to relieve excess containment pressure and orevent (ce ating catastrophic procedures. contain ett failure as directed by the Emergency
- o trol and would rettire:Use of tne vent will be under management administrative 1-of high dry. ell cr; essure and/orentcutier of e t e cy erecetu e to ju :er out low water level and/or Hi radiation on the re'uel Opent*.1 floor 0' t*is for salvt AG-50429. and permit remote manual valvt.
2- installation of fuset in the control circuit for valve AO-5025 and 3-o:gration tf a keylock switch (under administrative control), to unlock and c trate the remote manual control switch .
ang valves Aos-105 and AON-112 (*.he outlet of 58GT position. wn i
B. Put:0SE Or Twt CHANGE I
This modification will provide the ability to address one of the severt accident concerns by direct venting of the torus to prevent primary i containeent over-pressurization during an extended station blackout. '
can be vapor spacejustified this to main stack. modification opens a direct exhaust If usepath from the the OTVS, but not its use, does not pose an unreview {
use of the DTVS must be addressed at a later date in another evaluation.
The safety The later safety evaluation should include the criteri use, an assessment effect of isolating the SGTS of the for consequences DTVS use. of its use, and an essessmer.a for its t of the
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SYSTEWS. SUBSYSTEWS C0"DONEN75 ArrECTED l this modification the Following ranner: affects the containment Atmospheric Control Systemi The torus turge exhaust line inboard isolation valve AO-50428 and the 1 associated proposed 8" pipe are the compontnts of the CACS affected by this modification.
the CA;5 will depend on both essential AC (for valve A0-50 essential DC (for A0-50425) to perform its purging function.
bet.een valves A0-50425 and A0-5042A _ ,,The ne. 8" tor , ,,
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- This modification following e.anner: affects the Standby Gas Treatment System in the SGTS fan outlet valves (AON-108 & AON-112). ductwork from these valves the 20" line letting to the main stack, and the 20" line leading to main stack are the co ::Pents of this syste affected by the proposed r.::i fi c a t t om.
valse A0'.-103 is n;'* ally closed, fail-:cen.
Valve A0N-112 will be
?tvised to be no'-sily clCsed, fail-close . and these valves will be cr:.1ced (y 3:: !!.i"). wit % essertial 0: D: tr 49: 1ccal safety related air supplies
, fo11 ewingThis m dification affects the krimary Containeent System in the eanner:
The new torus vent line will be connected to the entsting 8" torus vent line between the redundant Primary Containment isolation ,alves.
Therefore the new isolation valve AO-5025 is a ortmary containment isolation valve. T AT 'am uAwu sparcert s o vr M.A.ar b l m n ac. em h0-5onf A,so p p ma.s ic~woAaf. see.vn As PuAaf cmurNuneur
!I This (PCIS)modification in any manner,does not affect the Primary Containment Isolation system g,
sartTY FU tt10N Or arrtCTED SYSTEW/CCwo0NENTS '
ggi n-eat A t-!!!% eri c Ceat'ei Svit e-This system has the safety function of obviating the possibility of an evergy release within the primary containment from a Hydrogen-Orygen (
reaction Cooling following a postulated 1.0CA combined with degraded core Standby System.
Sta n v Cas Trent* eat Syst h i t
This system fliters the processed erhaust air to the air from the reactor building and discharges rain stack.
todines from the air stream in ocder ti reduce the level of airborneThe conta,ination released to the environs via the main stack.
also filter enhaust air from the drywell and the suppression pool,The SGtS can l
prienry Coatnin-emt Svitem l
Theprirarycontainmentlyitem.Inconjunctionwithothersafeguard features limits the release of fission products in the event of a i postulated guideline values design tasis accident so that offsite doses do not exceed the of IOCFR100. i
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(. (FFCCTS ON SArtty FUNCTION
. Comtlim*ent atmteherie Centrol tviten_ and Standtv Cat Treatment System The modification changes the solenoid A0-50428 control from AC to DC enabling during it to open extended (from station its normally closed position) when required even blackout.
Ductwerk at the outlet of the Stat system is replaced with pipe and the new system.vent line is comettted to the 20" line at the outlet of the 5537 i
Addit off theen to of a ;e
.s w ne. 2" vent line w'tr. t containment isolation valve A0-5025
- m t 11 e relui s in a flow path that cogid vent tSe centairettt.ctr,tetly to the statt bicassin: the $537 system.
Twt 'Is.nu> VAWs 6PM. ark AuD Rarrght htWr. )@cg , yg mvAsto wSat.toF P au ist b pos iTW E Aci. 5C a 5 A N D *T et 9 6 FT W 84. O n %k g
% AWatt Ac.4uST FLo u Thaose=% "t%1: OTVt.
F, ANaD$l$ Or ErFECT$ CW SarETY FUN *TIONS Containment described 45 follows:
Syste- for the Utta11atiem of of the direct torus vent is The change from At to DC control on A0-50425 stility to open A0-50425 does not adversely affect its under accident conditions.when the containment is being purged, or isolate The modifications to the dwetwork and 20" line leading to the main stack de ret affect the safety functic't of any of the safety related systems.
During norr:1 plant operation, the CACS and the SGTS do not use the torus 20" purge and vent line to perform their safety functions. The containeent isolation valves are in their normally closed position, satisfying the safety function of the primary containment system.
There additionare no DTVS.
of the adverse affer.ts o't the primary containment system by the AS-5025 have been evaluated for Mark 1 Program Loadings, usi Section !!! criteria.
TheremainingpictogwasevaluatedusingAN5!831.1 A miqu or t wt s} 5Tt** wtw Tet SLMha. VALWF gem.pra, g g ,w,q:
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SSUED FOR 1 c
CONF
-.-.... .RUCTiOM <
i During all modes of operation analyzed in the PNPS FSAR. A(>-5025 ellt be !
caintained as a sealed closed barrier as defined in NUREG-0800. SRP 6.2.4, i
- item II.6.f. Consistent with SRP 6.2.4. A0-5025 will be a sealed closed remote manual valve under administrative control to assure that it cannot I
be inadvertently opened. Administrative control will be maintained by a 1 i
' keylocked remote manual control switch, and fuse removal to prevent power from being suppiled to the valve operator.
Branch Technical Position CSB 6-4 is referred to in SRP 6.2.4. and i
pertains to system lines which can provide an open path from the containment to the environs during normal plant operation; e.g., the lines ;
associated with the containment purge and vent systems. CSB 6-4 specifies l operability criteria which must be met, or in accordance with NUREG 0737 i
Item !!.E.4.2.7 Position 6. the valve must be sealed closed and verifted ;
as such at least every 31 days. Therefore, these precautions and features
' are considered to te suf ficient to assure the ability of the primary !
l containment system to perform its safety function as analyzed in the pnp 5 7;= r-F54R:
t, i- '
(1) enirtainaece of A>5025 as a sealed closed remote manual valve Z; I unter ad-inistrathe control (keylock H5 and control circuit h. g" Q fuse removal). ar* l I
, , L. :-*.6 (2) verificatien that the valve is sealed closed at least every 31 days c; ir; all periods of reactor operation that primary O il 4
certaintent integrity is recuired.
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In a::iti:n a PLetwre dise dc.mstream of valve AS-5025 mill provide a ..
i second cesithe rea's of emertin; leakage and prevent direct releast ue O'; 2. ? d the stact *
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- gl e f a l14'e o f A.0:.5015 dar.i ng con tai n e nt C. ) 9.~ 4
! c; ge a-: ver at ;'a*t start;;. sect: m er an7 desien basTi~e' vent.
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The installation of the Direct Torus Vent (OTVS) does not affect the 11 _:::=,-. )'d safety functions of the CAC5. SGTS, and Primary Containment Systems, or any otner safety-related systems. This safety evaluation does not provide j justificationforuseoftheDTV5.
The installa:1on of this modification does not require a Technical Srectftentl e C W gt, becaust:
Phos Technical Specifications include a component specific list of prieary j containment isolation valves in CIb the following categories:
i 1- valves that isolate a class A line and receive a prir.ary 4 containment and reactor vessel isolation signal (atr operated or motor o;erated valves). or.
j 2- valves that isolate a class A line that does not perfore an engineered safety function, or.
3- valves that isolate a class 8 line and receive a primary containment and reactor vessel isolation control signal (air operating or motor operated valves),
i i Because AD-5025 isolates a class I line but does not receive an isolation l
coetrol sig9al. it need not be listed in Technical Spectftcation Table 3.7 1.
A0 5025 is a P:!v and esst te in the closed position when primary containment I integrity is reagired by the Technical Specifications, i
J inequestion.
safety installation of this mo ification does not involve an unreviewed
irhi irvikErrt us) / 6 ~57'/2.7-.
neferences: ***e' 7- O 0 8: '2 Safety Evaluation: 7 2M Rev. No.: h Date:
/!/9[e8 Support a change List FSAR test, diagrams an corresponding FSAR revision.d indices affected by this change and Affected FSAR Section Revision to affected FSAR Section is shown on:
, Prettsinar Final
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4&% ^ C 4 I Attachment 4 t,_,,, C. A % Attachment A dd M C4 7 Mht 1 P d.*i.
- 0'--T',3 h -t'en6 ( 4. p_ Mrame - I f6 PRELIMIMARY FSAR try11f 0N (to be couple 4*d at time of Safety Evaluation preparation).
I Prepared by% A /Date://#Al' Reviewed by:. 'N ' /Date: N9/88 i F /Date: /!/f!/T Approved by:(./ /// /'
l FINR FSAR REVISION (Prepared following operational turnover of related systees structures of components for use at PNPS). (1)
{ Prepared by: /Date: Reviewed by: /Date:
I (1) Attach completed FSAR Change Request Fors (Refer to NOP).
Exhibit 3.07-A 'j t 7. .' Y'MM i Sheet 3 of 3 I
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1AFETY EVALUATION lORK 1HEET I Rev. No. _ O l A. Systea Structure Component Failure and Consequence Analyses. D #'
$ystee l Structure Casmonent Failure Modt1 fflects of Failure M
, 1. ' e' b 't 5 II 2.
3.
General Reference Material Review FSAR CALCULATIONS REGULATORY SECTION PNPS TECHNICAL SPECS. DESIGN SPECS Pi0tialRES CL! IDES STAltMADS rmE1
= e- hade AwY 10
- 8. For the proposed hardware chanite, identify the failure modes that are itkely for the components cons l stent with FSAR assumptions. For each failure mode, show the consequences to the systes, structures er related components. Especially show how the failure (s) affects the assigned safety basis (F5AR Tout for each system) or plant safety fmettons FSAR '
Chapter 14 and Appendix G).
j #
Prepared by Date ///8/M WOTE:
It is a requirement to include this work sheet with the Safety Evaluation.
Exhibit 3.07-C l
- 3. 07-18,-_ - -
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SATETY EVA!.UA7!ON WOM5 HIE ~
TSAF. CAI. U.AT:CNS/FN?S SE:::0N TI;XSICA*. _ SPIOS . REGULATORY DIS!3N
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- CES/ STANDARDS SPI 05/P700EOURES C00ES 5.2 3.1/4.7 spe:. SM-34 Spe:. M W 100rR50 5,3 NUREG CR-624 Spe:. M60C l NUREG BM:-139, spec. ",301 Vol. 1 !
5.4 Spec. M600 WUREG RM:-139, Spec. M-611 Vol. 1 7.3
- Specs. 17322-M-SAM-16 NUREG 0700 ;
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Position Cs3 6-4 Cal:alati:n Nrier l
Teledyne Cale. 531C-X2:7 17322 N-640-1 f 17321-M-647 ::
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17322-640-C100.5 i 17322-640-C110.C f 17322-640-C120.0 17322-640-C130.0 l 17322-640-C140.0 17322-640-C150.0 17322-640-C130.3 17322-640-C130.4 s
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Shee(t 120f12 SATE 7Y EVA*,UA?!ON NAK 5MEE!5 Systen/ structure /Cenpenent:
Ta:1ure Mote: ~ Valve A0-5025.
Igreets e: Tailure: Failure tc close/ fall cpen While purging and venting.
Bypassing of Standby Gas Treatment systen.;
ce..ents: Loss of Containment Isolation,
- entroi roca. It valve pesition indication is provided in the main Failure Mode: Rupture disk provides protection.
Ex:essive Leaxage.
I.: ects og railure:
cer:ents:
Ferton c 2.LRT perferned to ensure leak tightness. Release o disk provides protection.
periodica'.ly) (Rupture disk is tested Rupture Sys t er /S t ru ctu re /Cer.5ent :
Ta 1ure Moce:
cc..ents:
5tr.actural Direct railure.Torus vent system piping.
Qualify!!!pipi andg331.1.
for design basis temperature and pressure to ASME Sys t er./st ructu re/ Consent :
ta:1ure Modei Logic railure, opens AQ-50428 Primary Containment Isolation System, Igreets or Tailure No effect Cer.ents: AQ-5042A is normally closed providing a release barrier, A0-5025 assurance isthatsealed a closed releaseprovia.ng a release barrier; further cannot torus vent is provided by the rupture disk. occur through the direct
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RICOPHECED FSAR CEN*.E5 I
The pages of the follwing sections,(tables, PDC 46 51 &havefigures been of the FSAR marked that need to with suggested be updated due to this modificationupdates and included in this attachment for yo] ,
1 FSAR lections: 5.3, 5.4. 7.3. l F5AR Tables: 5.t.4, 5.t.l. 7.3 1 1 1
I The follwing drwings util be nvised as part of the Plant Design Change package (PDC B6 51) but are not included herein.
Dwg. 1. D. F5AR FIGUR.I TITLE M !!7 SM. I 10.11 1 PL10 Centalement Ataespheric l Centrel Systes M !!0. Sht.1 5.t.16, 5.41 PLIO Compressed Air lystem M 194 5.117, 7.18 2 N46ttag Ventilation and l Atr. Conditioning Standb las Treita nt lyite. Centre Dinire. ,
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Q ') / '/ / d 'Q, VI *\ Wet V 4 eq. H soleacids or up:n less of instrurent air to the air 0;trators on the c ao.; t r s .
ti The fromdettster the enterin; is designed to remve entrained water droplets and etst air stream. The electric heating to11 ts designe to redwte the relative humidity of the air stream to 70 percent. Ae i interlock with its associated exhaust fan prevents the heating tot) from operating when the fan is shut down. I designed Each NEPA filter tg 0.30 ettrontoparticles be capablewhich of remving at least 39.97 percent of the impinge on the filter. The chartegl f t1ttrs are tocidt-ie:regnated activated carbon filters capable of remving in estets of 99 percent of the todine in the sit stream with 10 percent of the iodine in the form of nothyl todide (CH 31) unge-entering conditions of 70 percent relative humidity. ,
l 1'
The atttdent osalvattens using the standard NRC descrite: in Section 14.g. antroath are In these analyGs the SGt5 chartal fliters were credited with remval of 35 percent of the influent iodine, i
The syntes will start automatically upon a high radiation signal from the operation (refweitng) floor venttistion eshaust duct contter, or upon signals. receitt of high dryvell pressure or low featter water level l
roce. The system can also be manually started from the t% trol i
- Upon recetSt of any of the initiation signals, both fans l start.
the all $GT5 isolation daegers open and each fan draws air from tsoitted Rentter
. 4,000 f t 3/rin. Dutiding at a flow rate of apprestattely '
After a preset time delay, one fan is stopped.
Cross connections between the filter trains are previded to maintain the reewtred detty heat remval tocMag air flow on the charcoal
- fliters in the inactive treatment train. The s i the main statt through a 20 in. underground line.ysten discharges to povered froe The SGT fans are distributton systet. the teergency trrvice portions of the aunt 11ery power 1
Dryve11 and torus purse otheust can also be directed to the SGTS for processing before release up the nata stack. See lection 5.2, The i Nigh Pressure Costant Injection System (NPC15) gland seal stone tendenser exhauster discharge is also routed
! attletnt conditions. The teattor, hj.!jjin,t.,M,.gtto the SG11 during .
t i ivstta is
%,p* ;ceAlltasudJf be o.r ec hg 11W.It%%3d vew +c N PM +a.,
ais/s muude +inLated
%eeN Ventt s itttne
.3.3.T ~ Main 5tatk
+cHe e 9 *+ .'7 6% % % s w rs..
j the location of the main statt is shown on Figure 1.g.). The top or i
the statt is at elevation 400 f t p 1. The structural design of the
] statt is discussed in Settien 12.
'! 5.3.4 Safety Evaluatics l j The 5C5 trovides the principal *ethaatset for the attigation of the l i
i conget.entes setemtary comteterert of an attleent att in to;tther the featter gWilding. The primary and l 1
petegnitas for to provice the principal l I the ritigation of the contetWentes of an atttdent in 5.3 4 ,
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(utilizing the SGTS and the cain stack)., . . 6 view eno cucnargeo to the elevated NT Sre'1' O ease F it poird that result from postulated accidents are reduced significantly. The the offsite radiation doses MTMuo m Raatter Building is a Class I structure (with the exception of the S E * *-
eecondary containment access locks which are Class II structures) designed in accorda ce with all applicable codes. Desig,n of the J2.6 $
Reactor Building for a maximum inleakage rate of 4.000 ftJ/ min at a building subatmospheric pressure of 0.25 in of water at neutral wind .3 b 2 2 conditions. results in a low erfiltration rate even during high vino conditions.
In the event of a pipe break inside the prirary containment or a fuel handling accident, Reactor 8uilding isolation will be effe ted and the SGTS will be initiated. Both SGTS exhaust fans will start.
After a preset time delay, one fan is stopped.
With the Reactor Building isolated, each fan in "a SGTS has the capability to hold the building at a subatmosp' ;c pressure of 0.25 in of water when drawing air from the building it a flow rate of 4.000 f t 3/ min. Exhaust fan outlet damper controls on each fan ere provided to Nintain the required flow rate.
The RBICS performs the required isolation actions of the SCS following receipt of the appropriate initiation signals. Following initiation, the Reactor Building ventilation isolation dampers close within 3 sec. The RBICS also automatically trips the Reactor Building supply and exhaust fans, an1 starts the SGTS. The normal design flow rate in the Reactor 3 Building operating ('efueling) floor exhaust duct is 40.000 ft / min. During increased to approximately 50.000 ftJ/ min at which time it takes shutdowns, the flow rate is more than 3 see for fissio) products released in any postulated fuel handling accident to travel ;from the operating (refueling) floor ventilation exhaust radiation 'menitors to the isolation dampers.
Thus, no direct release of fission products to the environment (bypassing the SGTS filtration processes pintorovjltd,Ay h -
( tt:vDK vem pa.m,.t.,t_mainJtaW-W. bj and _the elevdtd_ raleauN W verr _eddec. d lhe SLTS filters ~ exhaust air Trom the lleact3r su1I51ng ancreTicIIntges the processed air to the sain stack. The system filters particulates and todines from the air stream in order to reduce the level of airborne contatination released to the environs via the natn stack.
When the system is exhausting from the Reactor Sullding, the building is held at a einthue subatmospheric pressure of 0.75 in of wate.
Appendix G identiftes requirteents for establishing secondary containeent (Safety Action 27), followin inside the primary containment (Event 39), gand anfollowing assumedanpipe assumed breat spent fuel handling accident (Event 40). Secondary containment is not established fo11oving assumed pipe fattures which eesult in the release of steam into the Reactor Building (Event 41).
The noreally fo11ovin; piping v51cb is located within the Reactor Sullding and contains het fluids at reactor pressure was considered:
High Pressure Coolant Injectier (MPCI) turbine steam supply line; 5.3-5 Revision 6 - July 19H
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. 5.4 CotCROL or COME'JSTIBLE ';AS CON DCRAT10NS IN CONTA!NMD T gg 5.4.1 Introductitn
~
{ 3 A system for control is provided as required by 10CTR50.44(g). Thas V system is provided for control of orygen gas that may be generated pl{g}{'
following a postulated loss of coolant accident (LOCA) combined with ~
degradation, but not total f ailure of Core Standby Cooling Systems . . .O [
(CSOS). Deg ra da tion, but not total failure of the core standby .$ %
i cooling function means that the performance of the CSCS is f .al postulated, for the purpose of design of the Combustible Gas C*ontrol .
System (CGCS). not to rest the acceptance criteria in 10CTR50.46 and' W$y .4 that there could be localized clad melting and metal-water r2 action f ~i 7 $
to the extent postulated in 10CTR50.44(d)(1). The degree of performance degra dation of the CSOS is not postulated to be I *p 'dp <
I sufficient to cause core meltdown. to 't3 [
' 5 \
The Contaiteent Atmospheric Control System (CACS) is provided to fdyb U obviate the possibility of an energy release within the k -e.
Conta areent form a Hydrogen-Ozygen reaction following a postulated. Pramary/gTg ,
LcCA coebined with degraded CSCS functioning. This is to be ,4 w accoeplished by maintaining an atmosphere containing less than 4% t gDf oxygen in the Drywell and Pressure Suppression Chamber (forus). The
- syste:r will: J ilg t 4
- 1. Perfore initial purging of the Primary Containment fu?w ge%
h j
- A
- 2. Provide for a supply of nitrogen makeup gas during normal' operation or emergency
.i h.I fpQ "O4 Provide for note.a1 and purge exhaust lines to the Standby 3.
g dc l
Cas Treatment System (SGTS) fer norwl operating conditions 'y *g-
- u
- 4. Provide for emergency exhaust from the Depell and Torus for' release of contaminated Depell and Torus gases to the SGTS Ng W g
- 5. Provide pnematic supply to instruments inside ti.e drywell
),4Qg.'
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5.4.2 Source of Hydgrogen Accumula+.lon in Containment I d
rollowing the postulated design bests 14CA combined .with degraded CS;S functiontng, hydrogsn cr.d osygen may be evolved within the >c
) ,
h e) prtury contairusent from postulated metal water reactions and froal <( h [ $.
radiolysts. In the Palgran Nuclear Power Station design, for post accident coesuntible gas control, the oxygen concentration is chosen as the parameter to inmit.
5.4.3 System Description 10:TR10.44 (al requires a eethod for control of hydrogen gas that my be generated an a 3R praury contain,eent followang a postulated LOCA r reactaen of fuel cladding and coolant, radiolytte ,
$:n.etal-waterposition of coolant. and retallic corrosion. 10CTR50.44 (b) regu.res a syste- to reasare priu ry contaiteent hydrogen y .... . = ...
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, b/ SE WO. Uf,y The valves in redundant paths are powered from independent Class IE distribution systems each of which is powered from an emeroenev
' diesel generator af ter a loss of offsite power 7 The control switches for redundant valves are located in separate Class TE control panels the main control room. Conduit and permanently installed in equipment required for purging and repressurization functions are [
located in seismically designed, missile protected buildings, except ~
all the fill connections which are located outside of secondary k -
1 contaireent but separated. Redondant conduit systems are separated j(,P i coenensurate installed equipment with identified hanc-ds. All conduit and permanently @D required for purging and repressurization functions are supported to meet seismic category I requirements \( ( j except for N, supply equipment described previously. W The solenoid valves are ASME III class 2 and are qualif te d enviroreentally and seismically to the requirements of i JE 323 1974 IEEE 352-1973, and IEEE 344-1975 for the expected conr tions. The valves are rated at 120V se and are designed to operate between 80 and 110 percent of rated voltage. This range is compatible with expected bus voltages at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Stationq The centrol switches have been qualified to the requirements of IEEE 323-1974 fer operation in a control room environment. The switches are mounted on class IE panels (see Table 7.8 3) and thel h .t. T (f -
cocinatter. has been qualifted to IEEE 344 1975 for the operating $)
The switch's electrical ratings escoed loading%$
Basis Earthquake.
requirements. f9p p}
yg 3 The cable and wire used for this medification have been qualified to j E IEEE 383-1974 for fire and arbient conditions exceeding those required for this insta.lation. The 600 V No. 12 AWG control cable
- 4. O-has voltage and current capabilities well above that required.
d g *.d {
4 O.h p i centrol of the solenoid valves is remote manual, there is no k '
automatic isolation capability. Isolation signals have not been provided because I1 M gf '
>d+4 G
I
- 1. The valves operat;:n are always keylocked closed during normal f g kg 2.
The valves are require to be operated during a high drywell pressure condition and must be available independent of reacter water level. High drywell pressure and low-low reactor s17 61s water level are the normal containment isolation i Ng es<eup and ventilstion valves are alsc provided for use under nonaccident tendit'.c.s. These will tutext:1cally close upon receipt of a r. a c c a de r.: s w.a l . Ho ever, these valves may be used af ter an i se:1dtet prorided the required pc.er supplies are available and a l l e . . l e .- water level s17.a' is t.: present. Refer to Sect Ma 'e trA
- ant Ta:1es 5.2*4 ar.d 7.3 1 -
f:.i..L . . . . .;; . . ;ti:. ;..."
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5.4.5
'/ 1 [b NN i
Cortestable Gas Monitoring $F
- The exising Contaireent Corbustible PrTtAt M ta>T t
@. 7 2[ '
consists of two redundant, remotely operable, Gas Monitoring System (CCCMS) hydrogen analyzers. seismically qualified Drywell control hydrogen room. concentration and have a remote main readout in theThe i
5.4.6 Radiological Consequences of Containment Venting An evalestion contaireent venting tooflimit offsite dosespressure containment whichhas would been be incurred as a result of 5 i performed in a manner consistent with Regulatory Guides 1.3,1.7, and 1.45 ,
The the LPZ vould be well within the limits of 10CFR100.results of this ana i assured that This analysis i SGTS would be venting at the rate of 50 standard f t / min through the 3 !
initiated at 80 hr after the reactor was made j
[ s-QRee a**a.4 fed k.iopSA t itical_and_vep ing veuld continue for 30 da
~
i 5.4 @ References -
- 1. GE Letter No. SSX:19 64.
- 2. July 13, 1979 Letter, W. J. Heal (CE) to S. A. Giusti (Bechtel),
- 3. BLE-459 dated September 25, 1975. .
4.
Supplement No.1 to Cities Special Report No.Dresden
- 14. Station Special Report No. 39 and QAb
. 1 6
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,,_ g 7 aneet p vi n gf 5.4.7 Direct Torus Vent Line Se Oo,2,2h#/
5.4.7.1 Introduction The consequences of several accident scenarios are nors severe t. n the accidents previously considered herein. The primary contairment pressure dering these accidents is estimated to exceed its design capacity. Thus, the primary containment falls, releasing reactor fission products to the secondary contairunent and potentially to the environment as well. The direct torus vent line (0TYL) provides an emergency primary containment vent pata to prevent, or at least 1,1w down, the buildup of potentialpJima11puressurewithinje i
'5 5
$N$ hhhhYY ,
The DTYL is an 8' carbon steel pipeline connecting the 20' torus enin ashaust line to the underground 20' sain stack exhaust line. The 8' DTYL starts at a new branch between the existing 8' containannt isolatten valves in the s' section of the 20' torus main exhaust line. The DTYL terminates in the 20' sain stack exhaust line, several feet downstress of the ETS outlet valves.
The line includes an l' air-operated, nornelly-closed butterfly valve which serves as the outboard contairment isolation valve for the DTVL. Both electrical power and valve operatof active pas (air er nitrogen) Supply are er are backed-u i to ensure that taken the systemfreeis *available essential' duringora reliable ptation t sources} ass-hNt~rvur"nY11r M. .
event. .
The DTYL meets ASME B&PV Code (1980 [Jition vith' Winter'80'A6&sMa}{$Nthin SubsectionThe isolationvalve. RCnewfor piping Nuclear Class ! of downstress requirements tha1solnfE~itTA ep'setts to hndfincitidtsg ARS tgg ~I 331.1 (1977 [dition through Winter 1979 Addenda) requirements.
During normal er general transient conditions, the UTYL outboard isoletten valve would remain closed. In response to a severe accident, plant annagenett could direct the control roca operators to employ the BTYL to relieve excessive pressurt within the containment. In this case, the operator woeld follow a written procedure to perfore the folleving basic ,actionsi ;
o Close, or confira closed, the outboard isolation valve for Se tervs main exhaust line o Close, or confire closed, the $ CTS outlet valves to prevent the high contaireent pressures free bact. pressurizing the SGT3 filters o Open the two DTYL isolation valves e optimally, turn off the SGTS which Itkely came on automatically in response to a hign drywell pressure signal O
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. 5.4.7.3 tediological Consequences of DTYL Use b E' MO' 2 2b )
The pahaust gases released by the DTYL during a severe accident nuld have initially been
- washed' by the, suppression pool water which would reduce tne partieviates released. These exhaust gases are vented to the highest vent point (main stack), avoiding the ground level release of radioactive asterial in case of containment failure da to over pressurization.
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e b 1 mosnwnorsaV s (, 'Q 0 GeneralOffeces 800 Boylston Street h[ i Boston, Massachusetts 02199 g, N . November 14, 1986 James M. Lydon BECo 86-176 Chief Operating Officer Mr. John A. Zwolinski, Director BWR Project Directorate #1 Olvision of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington. O. C. 20555
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License DPR-3'i Docket 50-293 I Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 10CFR50, Appendix R Exemption Request . 1 l
References:
- 1) BECo Exemption Requests 11-14 dated 7/28/86 (BECo Letter No. 86-110)
- 2) Telecon dated 10/1/86, between P. Leech /J. Stang (NRC) l to T. A. Venkataraman
- 3) Telecon dated 9/22/86 between P. Leech, J. Stang and J. Klevan (NRC) and BECo
Dear Sir:
Via Reference 1. Boston Edison (BECo) revised tne exemption requests 11, 12, 13 and 14 which were originally submitted to the NRC by BECo letter $3-281 dated 11/16/83. The revision was done to address the requirements of revised 10CFR50.12(a). As part of the review of the revised exemption requests, the staff requested BECo by telecons on 9/22/86 and 10/1/86 (References 2 & 3) to provide additional clarification for exemption request #13 to address the localized flame effect from open cable trays located below structural beams in the torus l compartment. BECo was also requested to further clarify the special - l Circumstances Consideration for each of the exemption requests. The attachment to this letter provides the requested information. We trust this letter provides the information you need to approve our l request. However, should you have any questions or concerns please do not hesitate to contact us, : i Very truly yours, Attachment jb &/A // TAV/ns 7N #% l l ft"~ A W
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I 1 s Attachment Exemption Requests #11 & #12 These exemptions are in conformance with 10CFR50.12(a)(1) in that they do not present undue risk to the pubile health and safety based on tne evaluations presented in BECo letter 86-110 dated 7/28/86. We believe the exemptions are warranted and conform with the special circumstances of 10CFR50.12(a)(2) as outlined below. 10CFR50.12(a)(2)(111): "compilance would result in undue hardship or other costs that are significantly in excess of those contemplated when the regulation was adopted." Section IIIG.2.a requires separation of cables and equipment and associated l non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a fire barrier having a 3-hour 4 rating. , Exemption requests 11 & 12 were requested from the requirement of Section 3 III.G.2a due to lack of a 3-hour rated fire door and non-fire related I penetration seals between fire zones 1.30A and 1.6/1.8and 1.30A and 1.1. I Upgrading the boundaries between the fire zones would require installing
- 3-hour fire rated doors and upgrading the penetration seals to 3-hour. l However, the installation of the fire doors to satisfy any fire scenarios will l have an impact on the design requirements to address high energy line breaks postulated for these fire zones. A fire condition requires the fire door to be closed while a high energy line break would reautre the same door to be in open condition to vent any excess pressure as a result of the accident.
Compliance to both the requirements would result in undue hardship to BECo as it would be difficult to assure that a design modification installed to satisfy the requirements of a fire condition would perform adequately during high energy line breaks. In addition, the periodic surveillances that would be required to assure compliance with the two design conditions will have a significant impact on ALARA due to the high radiation levels in these fire zones during plant operattori. The design implications are significantly in excess of those contemplated when the regulation was adopted. Exemption #13 This exemption was requested from the requirement to add fire resistant l protection to structural steel members supporting fire barriers in fire zone i 1.30A that are separating redundant trains of safe shutdown equipment in the ; reactor building !n fire zone 1.9. ' Evaluation to support BECo's conclusion that this exemption will not present : undue risk to the public health and safety was provided in BECo letter 86-110 l dated 7/28/86. However, by telecons dated 9/22/86 and 10/1/86 BECo was requested to address direct flame impingement from cable trays located directly below structural steel beams in the torus compartment, which was not addressed in Refarence 3.
4 s Based on a review of the raceway configuration with respect to the structural beams, Boston Edison has decided to install solid tray covers on the top of the trays for the entire length of the cable trays in the torus compartment to preclude any direct flame impingement from these cable trays to the unprotected steel beams. Tray covers will be installed on the bottom of the trays extending 3'-0 (t)" on both sides from the center of the beam where the tray crosses the beams to preclude any downward flame from reaching the steel beams. The information requested from the telecon is provided below. Request #1 Provide specific details pertaining to the tray covers. A. The attached sketch, figure 3, and catalog cut provide the requested information. Request #2 What actions will be put in place to assure that the tray covers once - Installed will stay in place? . A. BECo will revise the surieillance procedure to include once per operating cycle surveillance of thf cable trays and covers in the torus compartment. R.eguest #3 i What is the Cable tray fill? A. The cable tray fiil Is 1%. The cables in the trays are IEEE 383 qualified and do not self. propagate fire. Request #4 Provide ali evaluation of how the tray cover will preclude direct flame impingement on the steel beams. A. Boston Edison will install top and bottom tray covers as shown on Figure 3. The continuous cable tray covers will obstruct vertical flame development. This will prevent vertical flame expansion but it could create a downward flame that could pass out of an open tray bottom and la,) around the sides of the tray. In order to prevent this "downward" flame from circumventing the top cover, a tray bottom cover will also be installed. The "bottom" cover will extend about three (3) feet beyond the centerline of the beam on both sides. The combination of the top and bottom covers will restrict air flow to the burning cables. This will also extinguish a cable fire. However, BECo has conservatively assumed the cables to continue to burn even though the cables are IEEE 383 qualified and that the covers will only function to deflect the flames to the end of the "bottom tray cover". This will confine any possible flame for three feet to the side and about 18 inches below the wide flanges and therefore prevent direct Impingement. He believe this exemption is warranted and conforms with the special circumstances of 10CFR50.12(a)(2) as outlined below. 10CFR 50.12(a )(2 )(i l i ): "Compliance would result in undue hardship or other costs that are significantly in excess of those contemplated when the regulation was adopted." Upgrading of the entire structural steel beams in the torus compartment will create an undue hardship due to scheduling impacts and manpower expenditures. 2
l l1 ' l l4 I The task will involve massive staging to support the effort and is expected to l , take approximately 2 months to complete. The actual upgrading of the steel I beams, after the staging is completed, is expected to take approximately 6 months costing approximately 52 million with substantial impact on ALARA to , the personnel implementing the task because of the radiation levels in the i i area (15-30 MR/HR). These costs are significantly in excess of those contemplated when the l regulation was adopted. l l 10CFR50.12(a)(2)(iv): "The exemption vould result in benefit to the public i l health and safety that compensates for any decrease in safety that may result from the grant of the exemption." Th? task of upgrading the structural beams in the torus compartment will require massive staging which adds a considerable amount of fire loading to the area during the entire 6 month construction duration of the task. Although temporary, this would present undue risk to public health and safety. l Exemption #14 This exemption was requested from the requirement to provide fire resistance protection to structural steel members in the steam tunnel. Evaluation to support BECo's conclusion that the exemption will not present l undue risk to the pud 11c health and safety was provided in BECo letter 86-110 l dated 7/28/86. We believe this exemption is warranted and conforms with the special circumstances of 10CFR50.12(a)(2) as outlined below. l -10CFR50.12(a)(2)(lii): "Compilance would result in undue hardship or other l costs that are significantly in excess of those contemplated when the l regulation was adopted." l Upgrading of the entire .tructural steel beams in the steam tunnel will create an undue hardship due to scheduling impacts and manpower expenditures. The task is estimated to cost $1 million and would require approximately 3-4
- months to complete and have to be scheduled during an outage. i 1
8ecause of the radiation levels in the steam tunnel (2-10 MR/HR) the upgrading i effort will have substantial impact on ALARA to the personnel implementing tne , l task. ' l l These costs and manpower requirements are significantly in excess of those ' contemplated when the regulation was adopted. ' I l I u.
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10CFR50.12 i mm dated November 4, 1986 Executrve Ofhces 800 Boylston Street ' Boston, Massachusetts 02199 Ralph G. sird Senior Vice Pres 4ent - Nuclear Aoril 21, 1987 BECo 87- 062 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Hashington, DC 20555 License DPR-35 Docket 50-293 Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 10CFR50, Appendix R Exemption Request Sucolemental Information on Tray Cover .
~
Reference:
BECo Exemption Requests 11-14 dated November 14, 1986 (BECo Letter No. 86-176)
Dear sir:
1 This letter revises our previous submittal concerning our method of compliance with Appendix R requirements for the Torus Compartment. In the referenced j letter, we advised you of our plan to achieve on a cable tray. The covers were to protect exposed structural compliance by installing ccvers i beams, located directly above the tray, from direct flama irrpingement. Further engineering has shown that installation costly and time consuming. of the cable tray cover would be excessively i Reanalysis (calculations) demonstrates that tray covers are not required, and will not be installed. The enclosure provides the methodology for the calculation, the assumptions used, and a description of the torus configuration. Please consider this as a revision to the exemption requests submitted in the reference. R. G. Bird TAV/kbc Enclosure cc: See Next Page 6 d 99tl N NI
4 s BOSTON EDISON COMPANY April 21, 1987 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1 Page 2 i l cc: Mr. John A. Zwolinski, Director I BHR Project Directorate #1 i Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Reg. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commicsion i Hashington, DC 20555 ! U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 - ~ Senior NRC Resident Inspector Pilgrim N0 clear Power Station ! 1 1 l l l b 1 l l
\
( Enclosure 1 EVALUATION OF STRUCTURAL STEEL FIRE EXPOSURE IN THE TORUS COMPARTHENT I. PURPOSE The purpose of this document is to summarize the basis for an exemption from certain NRC fire protection requirements. This document modifies the exemption request submitted in Reference (1). Evaluation has demonstrated that structural steel beams in the ceiling of the Pilgrim Station torus compartment can be left as is, without fire protection treatment, and with no adverse effect on plant safety or on the public health and safety. II. BACKGROUND NRC regulations (10CFR50 Appendix R, Section III.G.2(a)) require fire-rated barriers between redundant safe shutdown systems. Exemptions' from the .ule are allowed if analysis demonstrates that there will be no adverse effect on the public health and safety. One effect of this rule at Pilgrim is to require protection of steel . beams in the ceiling of the torus compartment. Protection of steel beams. is commonly achieved by the application of fire retardant coating on the beams. Boston Edison earlier requested an exemption frem the NRC requirement related to the torus compartment ceiling bekas (exemption request No. 13 of Reference 1) because of the configuration of the torus compartment. The only potential source of fire is a single cable tray that crosses the torus compartment ceiling beneath the beams. Application of fire retardant coating would os extremely costly, would involve a hazard to personnel, and sub beams, ject personnel to radiation exposure. Instead of coating the we proposed to install a cover on the cable tray, to prevent I direct flame impingement on the beams. The cover was expected to be i considerably less costly than coating the beams. l He have now determined that installing covers on the cable tray would be substantially more difficult and costly than was earlier understood. Recently completed analysis shows that the cable tray is not capable of l 3roducing enough heat to exceed the allowable temperature for the steel seams. Therefore, the cable tray cover is not required and the beams can be left as is. III. ANALYSIS A. Area Confiauration The structural steel members in the torus compartment ceiling are 30" and 36" wide (I) beams which support the floor slab at elevation 23'-0" of the Reactor Building.
i Enclosure 1 (Cont'd) Exposure of the beams to fire requires fixed or transient combustibles. A 12" i wide cable tray mounted in close proximity to the underside of the structural steel members, traversing the beams at a 90 degree angle, represents the only fixed combustibles. The cables in the tray are control cables, qualified to > the flame test portion of IEEE-383, and represent an actual combustible fire loading of approximately 3 pounds per linear foot of tray. Transient combustiblesarenotofconcernbecauseaccesstotheTorus{ompartpentis controlled using plant procedures. 5 A To # % d ' N 't /
% n ,s.A h B. Assumotions
- N d *M A W "h ar 4 f *'(
Thisevaluationassumes't[a the$aximum"Na't utput from the cables in the tray is transferred into the beam in the shortest possible period. The probability of cable fire occurring at all is very low, since fires in control cables from electrically induced faults arc improbable due to the low current n the cables.
/combustiblesinthetoruscompartmentisnotconsideredacredibleeventIn addition, ignition o because the tray is approximately 33 feet above the floor. Even if the cable I did catch fire it is unlikely that the fire would spread to the area under the l beam because the cable tray is horizontal except for two small risers.
Horizontal tres minimize flame spread. The evaluation acceptance criterion is that the beam temperature remains below { the industry-accepted limit. The NFPA Handbook defines 1100'F as the threshold beam temperature below which beam integrity is assured. A number of conservative assumptions were made with respect to the open tray and structural beam configuration. The asswptions pertain to: 1) Cable Tray l and Cables, 2) Heat Transfer to Structural Beam, aiid 3) Heat Effect on Structural Beam, and are listed below. Cable Trav and Cables DaitfromtheFMRC/EPRITests(Reference rate of heat generated from a cable fire below.the beam. 2)wereusedtodeterminethemaxim These tests provided
' data on free-burning fires for cable with neoprene jacketing, siellar which is used on the subject cable.M My Mc~^ " W
- d *to th(t * ' M ""
These tests provided conservative heat release data for a surface-controlled burn. The fire duration was calculated to be 17.7 minutes, based upon the actual cable tray combustible loading of approximately 3 pounds per linear l foot, and heat release rates using actual test data. Any fire that burns at a lower heat release rate will last longer, which will produce lower steel : i temperatures because the steel would have more time to conduct heat axially l l away from the source of the fire. i In addition, the following conservative assumptions were made:
/ 1
- 1. Complete combustion of all insulation and jacketing was assumed for the l cable directly below the projected area of the beam.
/
- 2. The highest BTU values for both cable insulation and cable jacket were used.
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J , Enclosure 1 (Cont'd) i ! } Heat Transfer to Structural Bean ' i
- 1. Direct flame impingement on the entire cross section of the beam (except i embedded surfaces) was assumed. This is conservative considering that the low combustibility and physical arrangement is not likely to result in ,
direct flame impingement. 1 2. Heat losses to other steel, the cable tray itself, concrete, etc., were not considered. All heat was assumed to go into the structural steel. This is a conservative assumption, since convective and radiant heat transfer to the air and other surroundings would significantly reduce heat
- applied to the steel.
3. Conservative heat transfer coefficient values were used. 4
- 4. Since the 12" wide tray runs approximately at a 90' angle to the ,
structural steel, a l'-0" length of beam is considered to absorb all the
, heat produced.
3 . 5. j An ambient temperature of 99'F was used rather than the more typical 70'F value. - Heat Effect on Structural Beam 1. No heat loss from the beam was assumed. 2. Heat section. is only conducted down the axis of the beam away from the one foot l 3. Heat is absorbed by the beam adjacent to the one foot section. 4. i The conduction down the beam is inversely proportional to distance, while the absorption specified beam). is directly proportional to mass (i.e. length for a C. Methodoloav I The objective of the analysis was to determine if there is enough energy 1 available to raise the beam to its critical temperature. The heat required to raise and maintain the h'eam cross- s
- of the maximum heat available from a hypothetical cable tray fire. In i some 1100'F.cases the hoat released was not adequate to heat the cross section to
{ i the section to 1100*F further analysis was done.In cases where the h In each instance,
- calculationsdemonstratedthatheatabsorbtion\gusheptyn,dyh the beam will maintain the beam below 11000F.
tton down g%, M A i It was thus concluded that cable tray covers are not required for this application, since by conservative analysis, the structural beams at issue J cannot be raised to a critical temperature of 1100*F by a cable tray fire. 4 1 4
l D. References I , 1. Boston Edison Company, Exemption Requests 11-14, dated November 14, 1986 (BECo letter No. 86-176).
- 2. FMRC/EPRI Test Report NP-1881, "Categorization of Cable Flammability.
Intermediate Seal Fire Tests of Cable Tray Installations," August 1982. 1
- 3. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Recomendations Related to Browns Ferry Fire", NUREG 0050, February 1976.
l 4. Fire Protection Handbook Section 5, Fifteenth Edition, (Page 5079). i l 5. Boston Edison Company Letter #2.80.039 to NRC dated March 5, 1980. l l t l l l l l l 1 l l l i i 1 l l
Qg*. } w . L a l *=.:..- ..:- - .- - .. . - . .... .-. . - .: - - ; - .- -- -- . a - -- 1 .' 10CFR50 g Appendix R
" , BOSTON EDISON E xecutw Off.ces 800 Bogsten street Boston, Masachusetts o2199 January 19, 1988 Ralph G. Bird BECo 88-010 senice vice pres >eent - Nuc' ear U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission -
Document Control Desk Hashington, DC 20555 License OPR-35 Docket 50-293 dJ 3hf 1 10CFR50 APPENDIX R EXEMPTION REQUESTS SU?PLEMENTAL INFORMATION C l
References:
- 1. BEco letter to NRC (dated November 16, 1983)
Subject:
10CFR50 Appendix R Exemption Requests (BECo Letter No. 83-281).
- 2. BECo letter to NRC (dated December 27, 1984)
Subject:
ICCFR50 Appendix R Exemption Requests, Calculations used in Evaluation of Structural Steel Supports (BECo Letter No. 84-214).
- 3. NRC letter to BECo (dated December 10, 1987)
Subject:
Heeting Between Boston Edison Company and NRC on November ' 24, 1987. l This letter provides additional information for consideration by the staff in its evaluation of BECo Exemption Requests 11, 12, 13 and 14 The need to supplement our previous submittals (References 1 and 2) resulted from discussions in our November 24, 1987 meeting (Reference 3). The information is presented in four attachments. Attachment 1, entitled Combustible Loading, contains maximum permitted fire loadings which we propose for various fire zones discussed in Exemption Requests 11 and 12. These loading limits were onservatively selected to be well below those that may constitute a challency '.o the fire area barriers and their ability to prevent fire propagatier. These limits supplement our exemption request. He anticipate no reumstances where transient comoustibles combined with fixed ccmbustibles culd exceed them. l b l
.h Q* f)
- 0
YO O .Y - w : 2b..% . a. a ..h. 5 a. :. .a .. . . - . . '.' BOSTON EDISON COMPANY Jancury 19, 1988 - U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 Attachments 2 and 3 are BECo calculations H-197, Revision 2, Fire Resistance of Structural Steel in the Torus Area (EL -17'-6"), and H-198, Revision 1, Fire Resistance of Structural Steel in the Steam TLnnel. These documents provide the basis for Exemption Requests 13 t.nd 14 and are updated versions of those used for our earlier submittals (References 1 and 2). These versions incorporate a more rigorous analytical methodology to compute temperature rise in the strt>. lural steel supporting the fire barrier. These new calculations show that oostulated fires in the Torus Area or Steam Tunnel will produce temperature rises in the unprotected steel that are well below the failure temperMmre. This means the conclusions of the previous calculations (the steel (n? fire barrier are safe from collapse) remain unchanged. Please note that some of the numerical results and statements presented in References 1 and L which were based on the old methodology, are superseded by these revised calculations. Attachment 4 is furnished for the convenience of the NRC staff reviewers. It srows how the new H197/H198 calculation methodology was appli6d to determine the proposed Torus Area and Steam Tunnel combustible loading limits were safe. He request that the NRC incorporate this information into its review of the affected exemption requests. kkN~ L R. G. Bird G0/amm/1619 cc: Hr. D. Mcdonald, Project Manager Division of Reactor Projects I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comissicn 7920 Norfolk Avenue
. Bethesda, MD 20814 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 Senior NRC Resident Inspector Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Attachments: 1. Table: Combustible Loading
- 2. BECo Calculation M197, Rev. 2
- 3. BEC0 Calculation H198, Rev. 1
- 4. Application of M*97/H198 Calculation Methodology
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- ATTACHMENT 1 TO BECO LETTER 88-010 COMBUSTIBLE LOADING Proposed Maximum Permitted Fire Zone- Leadina (BTU /SF)
SE Quad FZ l.1 40,000 (1) NH Quad FZ l.2 40,000 (1) NE Quad FZ l.6/1.8 40,000 (1) Torus Area FZ l.30A 14,000 (2) Steam Tunnel FZ l.32 8,200 (2) NOTES
- 1. The proposed maximum permitted loading for the Quad zones is equivalent to a "30 minute" fire hazard. This loading was administratively selected to represent a limit which provides assurance against spread of a fire beyond the affected zone, and is based on the realistic analysis described in Exemption Requests 11 and 12. j i
- 2. The proposed maximum permitted loadings for the Torus Area and Steam !
Tunnel are essentially equivalent to those calculated to produce a maximum average steel temperature of 255'F using the methodology of calculation H197, Rev. 2 and M198, Rev.1, and are well below those needed to produce the theoretical steel failure temperature of 1000'F used by the fire protection industry, i l l l l
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t ATTACHHENT 2 TO BECO LETTER 88-010 .
. BEco Calculation H197, Revision 2 TORUS AREA
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- 1. FIRE TEST STAUDAROL FIRST EDITloM, i182, NSR C ASTM-E-l19, TA BLE X. i s PAGE 5'3. b
- 2. SmVDARD HAUDBcct. Fce. MECHAUICAL EMIMEb1.5, SEVEUTH EblT)Du a TABLE 11. i PAGE 4 -loco, AtJD FoEMVt. A C.lgb C ATTACHED.) ,
i 11-4ERM AL CDUDUCTIVlTY i l STEEL- ASME vm D W(5 l0M ? 'TAE.E.i.(/acxec) ccOCEETE- 5TA00ARD HM)DEaC(.' FoR. MECHAUlC At ta)CoiUETEES. SEVEIMTH EDITlDO. TA8t.E .5 'P'h{ G. 4-97. Q TTA cHgp )
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Table 10. Masimum F!nx and Corresponding Over all Temperature Diference for combine to give Liquide Boiled at 1 Atm with a Submerged Herizontal Steam. heated Tube Aluminum Copper pf,w#*q 8 en!
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I000 W. d I# W. d. M. d (40. where g.M. is the Btu I# IOC0 all temperature diNert Ethyl meetate.. .... 41 10 el $$ T.' 55 Bessene...... .... $1 to la 70 7) 10o 82 100 E ta rt aleshol. , . . . . . 3) to SS 65 124 45 g'g Meteyl aleobal. . . . . . .. .. 100 15 lle lie ll) 110 Dutmed wour. . . . . . .. .. 2M OS 350 75 410 IM f 07 4
*2 E .E0.6 For forced-circulation evaporatora, vapor bindieg is also encountered. Thus with tiquid benzene entering a 4-pus steun jacketed pipe at 0.9 fps, up to the point.when "O percent by weight was vaporized, the mammum dus of 60,000 Btu per hr per sq ft
[ = 04! o.4 aas obtained at an over all temperature diference of 60 F; beyond this point, the 13 e,
- ~
coefeient and aux decreased rapidly, approaching the values obtained in superheating 3 { 01 vapor, see Eq. (6b). For comparison,in a natural convection ersporator, a mammum aux of 73,000 Btu per hr per sq ft was obtained at (M). of 100 F. .j o.i
, Combined Convection and Radiation CoeScients. In some cases of heat lose, such C as that from bare and insulated pipes, where lose is by convection to the air and radia.
tion to the walls of the enclosing space it is convenient to use a combined convection and radiation coeEcient (A. + A.). The rate of heat loss thus becomes
~~' , fio. a. Variation with ro, 4 = 0.042.
t = (A. + A.)d (F:, (18) where (M) is the temperature diference, deg F, between the surface of the hot body 0"*',', **$g$n go and the walls of the space. In evaluating (A. + A.) A. should be calculated by the appropriate convection formuis (see Fqs. (11c) to (11g)] and A, from the equation
- et an the conducti-A,5 A, is often taken A, = 0.00685e(T.,/100)8 will have but little eH' t/. with pipe size and tures of 375 and 75 F where e is the black body coeScient of the radiating eurface, p. 4-111, T.,le the averap Aemperature of the surface and the enejoains walls, das R. For oxidised bare steel
~ pipe the sum A. + A, may be tau.2 directly from Table 11. Table 11. Values of (b + A ) G :s bar aoet43 bare er Laeslatai standard steel pipe ei various stans and for ist plates la a tems a6 to F) y W., tasaperstato dL#erones, des F. frem sortaae to roen La. Mll00llle 200 l 254 l 3o0 l }40 400l 640 l 100 l lo0 l 900 l 1600 l 1100 l l 200 2.12!2.44 2.761.14 3.41! ).7){4.471.30'6.21'F.231.44 t.73111,20't!.8tlla,43 2.03 2.34 2.6512.981,29 3.42 4.3L5.16 6.0Fif.Ilf t.219.37111.44 12.613 4.44 3 f . 9 T 2. 2 Fl 2. 3 2: 2. 4 5 3.14' 3. 4 Fj 4.1814. 99' $ .19 6. 9 2 0. 0 7,1. 3 4118. 4 5 12,44l l e. 2 3 4 1.84'2.16 2.41:2.72 3.01:3.33.4.92 4.8345.72 6.71'7.89 9.21l't.4412.2714.09 8 1.16:2.06 2.29 2.64 2.89 3.20 3.40 4.68'S.57 6.64 7.73 9.05110.30il2.10 13.93 12 1.11'2.01'2.24 2.34 2. 82'). llil.8) 4.611$.50 6.32 7.65 S.S'llt. 4 24 2.01n 3. 44 N,24Ness 1.641.93 2.13 2.45 2.72 3.9) 3.76 4.48 3.37 4.39 7.118.8) 18.28 l1.90 l).;g Vertice.l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.12 2.33 2.40 2.10 3.99 3.30 4 ao 4.79 S.70 6.12 F.86 9.11,19.64 12.2514.64 B TV. . .......... . 2.00 2.3S:2.6l'2.tf 3.26 3.39 4.ii.l.12 6.04 F.87 8.21,0. ' ' 12.41'le.4% HTD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l .3 4,1. 4 3,2. 0 h 2. 34; 2. 6 3,2. 9 3; 3. A 'l 4. 3 8,5.17ie. 6 27; F. 40,8. ,.'tt 11.76!!).11 HTU heruostal. factaa apwsid: HTD. hartnostal, faaras devowstd. Heat Transmission through Pipe Insulation. (hfe.%fillan, Trorts. AS.VE,1915.) For any number of layers of insulation on any aise of pipe, Eqs. (2), (4) and (15) TDR DiTORMM10N
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*" THE INFINITE AND SEMI.!NT! NITE SOLID . 1s I 1 7"EO 2.9. The semi in8alte so!!d. The Sux of heat at :-(a pre i 1 ;
scribed function of the time. Zero initial temperature (i) Canadaniffus, T per ==il time per wait stes. era /Fr*.FA l The duz
- i / - -Kh. (I) ;
! satis 6es & same differential equation as e, namely "N"' - --
= f, a > 0, i > 0. *
.s .,
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- is, by 2.4 (10),
- f = T erfe (4) 24(#t).
Thus, from (1), using Append!z II, (9) and (11), ** , eI eric (5) gett ;, 24(at)dz b - (p p no o / z p /'t.p.t. TT ,2TJnt)g,,f,N("') A- (6)
=
- f s*-{erfe .
(7) I A table of values of b function lerfe:la given la Appendix II. The temperature at : - 0 la ven y (8)
\ k"e A s I. (s) g+Mst) ,
% boundary conditlen of constant sur is of conalderable practleal importance. It appurs if heat is genersted by a dat beating element
))). > 2'. f ) carrying electrio cunent, if but is genersted by friction, and as sa ;
~ ~~ approximation in b early stages of beating a furnace or a room. It !
s i kna aho important applications to problems on diffualon. 'N oooling . I of the Earth's surbe after ennaet on a clear windless nightt is very nearly that due to removal of best at a constant rate per unit seu per 4.s-a%. (4) unit time, thus (8) gives & way In which h surface temperature talk after sonett. .
% results above apply aho to b ones of b region -oo < z < e
, with but supply,27,in b plane z = 0. The corresponding results for t cr. se t. o.=t.J.a. arn. s . se on ) us.
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0 g B g NationalResearch Council Canada Conseil national de recherches Canada RtT 0 0 6 -
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cacepcp-62 ermen. 1 eev-z , Py FIRE RESISTANCE OF UNPROTECTED STEEL COLUMNS . i SY . W. W. STANZAK AND T. T. LIE
- atraswito rnow JOURNAL CP' THE STMUufURAL DIVISION. ASCE.
VOL. 99. NO. ST5. PROC. PAPCM 9719. MAY 1973 P. 837 352 0 .
. ,\
# ES E.AR CM PAPER Mc sty
- . es ne .
DIVISION OF BUILDING MESEARCH e CTTAWA - Pasca as cents msw t * \ TDRNOPJAGON
, DM.Y TORMORMAT10N .
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LA RESISTANCE AU TEU DES POUTRES D'AC1ER NON PROTECEES SCMMAIRE Le s auteurs deudient la reelstence au feu des poutres d' acier non pretigdes se moyen d'essais d'incendie standarde et de l' analyse numerigue. On a detouvert que la duree de la restet4nte au feu varie seien le facteur forme du peide de la poutredivies par te perimbere chauffe. Lee auteure est etabli deus equattene senples pour calculer les durdes de restetance au feu des poutres d' acier non protegies et us recommandent de les utilseer dans les norme s du batiment. m W
/
mw ++.. m :. m m mN0 MON i
' EY FORNORMATION .
RY - _ _ ------
e e
. w:_e t .o. hw.a.u . m. . w. . : . u4m .
= . a .
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_ . .. t e.. . a .m-a "m 97t9 M AY 1973 P STS i JOURNAL FTHE STRUCTURAL DIVISION
' M M7 REV-2 '
OTTN s H. I ' a
. Fine RESISTANCE OF UNPROTECTED STEEL COLDINS H3 W. W. Stantak' and T. T. Lie 8 In the past the fire resistance of unprotected steelcolumns has been cen idered so small a quantit>' that it could be ignored Fiie esperience and cortrolled fire tests on structural steel columns of small cross sectional area shes ed that unprotected steel columns could not survive the effects of fire esposure for more than 10 min to (1 min.*However;it will now be shower that ttre twomier j c'nlumns' required to carry the Tementiceds ift moderrhigN.1%%ir, cute
. capable of much beller fire performance than had Tr6iodsfy*bebn%1tred.
and that some can attain fire resistance classifications of I hr ce twtter. Fire fatalit) statistics (1) show that the number of deaths attributable to structu. ral collapse during a building fire is negligible. The main causes of life loss have been shown to be asphyxiation and burns (l 1.7). Therefure, to preside life s4fety to occupants, enough fire resistance to allow people time to escape must be prosidcJ. Escept uhere escape routes are estremel> long or the number e of occupants is very large.10 min to 20 min is usually assumed to be sufficient. However, with very tall buildings i has become evident that evacuation b) stairs can he so tirne consuming that complete evacuation is impractical (J). f in such buildings sufficient fire resistance to withstand a burnout of the contents' must be provided. Prusition of fire resistance beyond that required to present life loss is deter. '.
. mined largely be cennomic sunuderations. A recent stud) on the optimum fire -
resistance of structures (Ill has shown that for buildings with a small. loss poten. Nine.-l)nsuwmen even until O sober I.1971. To cuend the skning d'le a ime anonth. 5 . a seinen regness musa de fded with the Maior of le6hnasal Pubiacations. ASCF.. Thn paper is part of the otpighicJ Jimerrul of the Sirustural Dniuen. Pructedings of the
~
Arnetican Sociirt.s sif Cnd Engineers. Vol. 94. No. FT.s. Map.191), klanstsactipt
- as submilicJ fin resics fos pmnble publwarion on June V.19? .
' Steel InJmtries lettom. Inte Weseeish Sect.. Div of Swi3 Jing Resears h. Neuenal Ne=<arsh Cenmul of Cen.ide. Ottan 4. Canada, rHesearth Offiset, l' ire Mesear6h Sest.. Dn. of Wwilding Research. National Newersh Couns-d of Canada. (ktas a. Can aja.
837 _.a.....--r-,,-,... t
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.' 8)$ r+ w cH. I MAY 1973 %a 7 tial et would be uneconomiest to proude an> fire protectwn besonJ that inherent STS
(
+
in the snueture, prosided such fire resistansc is sufficient to allow esavuaimn bs the occurants. BuilJings representing a smalllow espectation are those that are small in size and not saluable: those with no saluable contents: th*vse forI which the probabiht) of a serious fire is low te.g, completely sprinLivred build. ing n or those hasing a low fire load. The use %f unprotected steel columns ! in such builJings is generall) justified if these elements base the mmimal fire ! t resistance required to present loss of life. Anordingl), the writers hase insestipted the fire resistanee of unprotested
, sie.'l columns b) methods of numerical calculation and b) full.seale fue tesis 1 l in their laborator). with a siew to descloring simple espreuions for valsulatmg I the fire resistance of these building elements. l t
Tsn Mewcos um Camex Tesesurums * '
)
1 On this continent, two test methods are acceptable. The most recent ASTM St;;ndard prescribing these is Ell 941 (161. The older load test requires a sample at least 9 ft in length in N tested under an arrlied load calculated to develop theoretical merking stresses contem. , plated by the design. The column is required to sustain the arrlied load for ' a retiod of fite exposure equal to that for whieh classification is desiteJ. The newer alternate test of protection for structural steel columns requires that a sample at least 8 ft in length be tested in a vertical position without arrlied load. This test is applicable when the protection is not required.by I design to carry any part of the column load. The applied protection must be retirained apinst longitudinal thermal expansion greater than that of the steel solumn. Temperatures are measured by at least three therrnovouples located at each of four lesels rerou sections). The urper and louer lesels are 2 ft from the ends of the steel column, and the two intermediate lesels are equall) sr. aced. The test is considered successfid if the transmission of heat through . the protection, during the period of fire caposure for which classification is ! desired. does not raise the average (arithmeticall temperature of the steel to
- any lesel above 1.000' F (.4.18' C), of above 1.200* F (649' C) at an) one of the measured points.
The 1.0iu' F average allowable temperature that usually determines the fire ! enJurance time in a test may be reprded as a critical temperature for struetural I
) failure established for protected columns as a result of many fire tests on asiall) loaded column sectionl y Thus, forjhe analr}isMis paper,it has been as y.msil {
*- that structural failure k imminent when the steel cross section altams an aserage teinperatu're of ,l.1%s inIl calcialltidhi'aMtM'TeTinTire made 7t'he 1
l
.- Fitis 'of heat conduction Ame.
- whde complete theoretical justification for the use of temperature criteria
- l is be)end the scope of this raper. ,il can readil) be show n th.it 1.titl' F is l I e seasonable salve. For long columns, auuming that the member is unifornd) I heated, the buckling stress is given by Euler's formula: !
w .F, .
- I i'
ceg=
..................,................(l) )
t l
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.. g. ,, , + r -
- 0,' ' 3 [ [q ;-( . . ;'.p c '
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- . . - - -.~..w.--
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ggg gg.g STS FIRE RESISTANCE 839 7' and & allomaNe design sitco for long columns is snen >> SA S16 1969 ggQ, y
, E.
.,, , = .. ........... .... .. . . (21 ,
in uhish 1.92 is a safety factor prescribed b) the.fude and \ :Ph.us.1 s.e , P
= 1.11 < A s 2tui. b 8
i i i 4 6 i i i 6 i
. R 3
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s e. . y 1 - - to f NN .-
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t t t t i i e t t t , , e too aos ses ese itse itse
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t t at e t t a t g e t. t FIG. te-Avstage Compressive Propertise of ASTM A34 Structvtsi Steel . At elevated temperatures failure is due to occur when the left hand sides of the equations are equal,i.e.: E,= E"...............$........ 1.92
...... . . . . . . . t .1 ) 6 I
. Accepting the commonly a,numed value for carbon steels of E,, = 29 x 10'
. Lsi. thsn ,
E , = l.4.1 x lu%i (IN x Iff N / m') . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (41 { Using Fig.1. Nssd on data reported by InrNr and Safe (10), it is found th.it the temperstvie at budling is arprosim.itely Mu' l- (471 C). Fire tests of kwded solumns tv)h.sve shown that the point of maximum caparision tarrroti. matel) the point ut u hkh the column buckleslis followed b) a further ifW F.l.M' e 1 i
._ i l
I
. I TDRMORMAT10N TORNORMATION i E - 2 l CHl.Y - - - - -
b[kh ?E h ' W [.L h- .f . _d. _.2, , .h_fh,[U C I, u
- k. -
1 _;;) ^ "b MM'l get ,e mm
., g g(,, N a [ @ 3A le t.s.s' C.W Ci rinc in temperature Nfore comrkte failure of the column oe s,
Thus failure of columns can be uMeted at crowsect,onal temperatures 0 from W ".l.050' r. ($10" C..s6.s' Cl. Jerending on the design method anc
- I slenderness ratio. A value of I.Oluf F has twen assumed as a reason for any column. as has been indiented by the MTM fire test standard.
Te==snaruna Riae se Usenorsevso 8: ass Catunesa Ihe solumn is esposed on four sides to the heat of a fire that follow s ap rutcl> the temNtatore time course prescribed in ASTAf EllV foi the stand.ard ' fue of "controlicJ extent and severit)." Heat is transferred fro in the i fuituce and from the furnace walls to the sMeimen b) s radut on, with radiation as the primary mechanism w hen the flames hate suffs cient t.WLness(INI.The coefficient of heat transfer tihe evantityof heat receisc ,
,s. .
rer unir area of the column, per umt timgyd remaersture di(ferener wgggn pc column surface and f,ren derends on mans factors. The most sigmfae. int ate,column: anJ cmmnit) of the flames; thickncts of the llames Ntucen furnaec , walls
- site of specimen; and thermal properties n! the furnace ualls. 1 l
Esperimental data (.4) have indiented that the heal transfer to the speci {
- in test furnaces arrrosimates the radiative heat transfe at the so called "furnace temperature." Similar heat transfer ma) also be e1 ,
ed in most building fires because the flames are luminous and haseusuall) l considerable thickness, giving them a correspondingly high emissisil). The coefficient of heat transfer can vary significantly, homever. for different inJisisfual later herein. conditions, and the effect of varying this quantity will be esamin{ i I Cacu.anose os Teneenatuu Rams I Tse Dimensional Numerical Peecedvet.-To determine the temperature distri. i bution in massise square steel columns. a numNr of calculations b.ned oni ~ a two Jinismismal procedure (12) were carricJ out. In these tests black b radiation at the prescrih J furnace temperature was assumed as the onl) nism of heat transfer. The two equations used for the calculation are: r, ,' . r',.
+ (ec) A t. (2 0. (ILL,.n + (8, ][r'u..n - r, )
+ (LL.... + 1. ][ru .,, - r; ) + WT a o e , [ttp' - tr,..)*n . . . Ih
'* for the temperature of an elementary surface element of the column. and
~
I ai r,; ' . ii , + 7. f e e) L, ta p . (( t,'.. ,, .. n + t'. . ) [ 7'.. ... . n
. - r!. . ) + l t!.. n,. ,, + t '... ) I r!.. n.,
n - 7:. . ] ( t !. .n.,,,,
+ t.' . ) I r!.. n,.. n - 7'.. ) + ! t,'.. ..... n .+ t ' .1 [ 7'.. ,,,,, ,, - r. . ) ) . . isi for the temperature at any reint inside the steel cross section, in whwh 7 is expressed in Jegreet Rankine and I in houts, it should be noted that the W NOR M 08 DHLY -
._ - - - - - - - - ~
0}U
. -- ---- - - - - ~
, a f
., .y* k 5, ' ,e ' * ^ , g.
rg - 2 .L _ n , d' t ,,,,,d .:a ; O .a g Q} g h.Z STS Fine TESiSTANCE , sat ,, ANH.I *"'""'"*"'"8""'""*"""*"""'"d'r'"d'" quannt). but it is suf fssiently accurate, for the purpose of thn stuJ). to be regarded as a const. ant. Also, since most builJang materiait hase emnsisities in the range of 0 Mt to 0 9.4 11.11 a salue of 0.9 wat u.ed, although the results ,
, indecated that a salue of 0.93 would have been more apprerriate. l The dependence of the thermal properties of steel o,n temperature was tak'en a into aauuni en the calculations. The material properties used were derncJ '
a l TAtl.E 1.-Thermal Properties of Steet 1 < l
. . . nr . . . . s - u- - s . .--
VotumetrH: heat capacity. Thermal conductivity. in British thermal units in British thermal units Temperature. in per cub.c foot- per foot hour- I degrees Fahrenheit degrees Fahrenheit degrees Fahrenheit ! (1) 121 13)
, Tu M ..k i 2n wi
- I stui 9 M6 2A tio 7tn 36 3A
{ 26 m2 1
.tm 3a.27 26 41 mas 6o.13 '23 87 )
.%At ' 62.44 23.M 1 Nat M.90 24.7I l 7tal 67.32 23.72 tm 70.36 22.50 9ial 74.39 21 M6 l l . ital ao.12 21tm j l.luu 23.72 20.u7 ,
1.2LEl 90 42 15 911 I l.2M 94 .N 15 .43 l l Jt81 !!7 85 15.16 l 1.330 IM 13 11 31 1
- 1. 4 51 117.73 17.tio '
1.446 a4 Sit 17.M l .N ul #*. l A 16.7a 1.448 A2.2 % 13.h9 i i f.edan up.74 It.26 . l.450 42.01 1.4.43 ; 1
~
1.7813 66 (N l$ da . I l .'a t t 67.9A 16 0)
. 2.tm 69.63 16 83 =
2JN - -
?u.97 17.56
, . - - <-i ss . vs. mnsm.-n s.rserw-wwusa_w-s
, from available data (13) and are reproduced in Table 1. As is arpatent, the involved nature of the calculation makes utilization of a high speed digital computer almost mandatory.
Calculated temperature profiles for a 6-in. (0.132 ml square unprotected steel I column are shown in Fig. 2 at 10 min intervals. Similar profiles for a 12.m. IU.104.ml square column are shown in Fig. 3 after 50 min and 60 min of fire esposure. Fig. .kb) shows that al 60 min the masimum temperatura difference f between the surface and the core was 225 F (125' Ci and the temperature at i 1 TDRNORMA110N DNI.Y - TORN 0RMEON . RY
1 p k~s,\ .
..A:' ; ,'k ,;
^ , \,
- . . . .A .' .J- '.' > ,
A -- :~ A '-
. .n. . . *.. . .
* * ' ' ' " " " ' * * " ^ ~
,'s
.f M~i ' NQ:. '
842 MAY 1973 5*t M137 REW- 2 C l'19 . AmH. _T a.- a. w "a' N ,;, i,
. ., . a. qa -
.,si -
,i,
,1, -
,r, fle tif 364 * .
s
's .
II
- 2h * *..lle 25, I lie % fit ../ . til . f IH
. lie.
' ,8 9 '. IIf ,/ 10.,.h 30. i?
fee -
....> i. s ,n -
I e- IM s. \,,i..
. . s: . ,i... .gl.s. ...
, fit . '. 2 0 s
. Ill . II.
.nis . , . .. .. . , n i. -
*Its.x106
. ter . f t. Ili .
, la. ' .
s* a. it
'Ngs is.
- 30. rif te.
,s . N.
3.d s. i4 :. D. sie., ., . ser
- a % f.4 *
\ nIf. * # $. '.' tli, g ., t f i, 854 lif
. sts ei, N, j
. N
.p , ...s ....ep s , ..<.- : . ih
...s.:1,x.se.,j .es,.
fel 10 MIN
., n. ,
",'- , y u, yu ,. y... . is:y.nM,"
in ne,ih,'Y.ih,.N, v it., Nil. s 48 gik . qle.g. e N il ' , axi ,N s n. e ' ;si. X 4,. N Nit. \ s .\n . '. "', e- ,. in . s',so . ,a'. , ik su
;i in.'s' ile 'N-, io
. -s , i n ',,.- .o.
.l. N ses
.N, s- . ..
Nm.. x ta s..' s . Nm.
's . ,m, . , is / .,ils
' is & in. >', iri > ..ih,> *-
' .,4. kil.sa in . Nsh,. ih . <. i.x.x\ d..
K', s* "' N .iis ', it. ' ' .1, . x, it. .M ii. ' "'
~..
- h. , .,ih v.sh sh .yx sie . -.. sis
'g".s .a' u t s . i p N ,' . .. . ,' . N ils .' e44 l
it. .
.p x
~
. it.N.ih.i.J'"* ,
(b) 10 MIN . . F10. 2.-Tempeestwo Neo in Unprotect.d Steel Sgvece Column (6 in.) mUDMION
.' ONLY 10RN0 Mil 0H ~
QHLY
. . . - g_2,,, ;.'..qw.
A
.g ' , v i.'.~~. -'.,,,':c _.
. q,
-_,.i._. ...
_ .c __
,,,,a,,,,,
., . . g. ,g ST5 Fl%E RESISTANCE $41-Pyu eq M. L%7 R Ev'- 2 ~
HTTMc H. "E
;;, . ,;. a, ,i , .:, aq
..., .... ,.x .
..n
, i. , =
,.,, . .. , . . .. , ..... tp
-,- .i, .i. N 4. . .;. - .;,
,s,.,..<,' a. .;. ,..
- a. x, a. s a, in-
- ,n - a, a. s
,., ......,.ss
.. s..,..,,..
,c. .t. a. a. a. a,
,. , , , . ,;, . ,1, . ,;, . ,; , . .. .. .
. a. .i ,i, . a. . a, . a.
a,s - a, a., .., a..",J' L ,a. m ..,
,i, , t, . ., ..
(c/ 30 Mt.v
. .. .. . . . . s, .... ...
p".,
,/.. .. .., h a.
' ' a
, .:, ' .a c.,,;,,.' 9.-
a, sp
,,, a, . a. . ,;,,'
. a. s s ,.... . . , , . , . . . .. . . , , . , . . . .
- 4. a, ,:,. ,, a. a,
-i- a, ..a. 1,a., .s . .ii, ir s . s.
< n ,, , . ,,s.
..,. a. a. "
- ,,4, ,,<. a, a, a. ,,;,
- s. . ,,,..
. L,. ., . ,. ., ,. , , s , ,,,',i,.,' ,4,s . , n , 1,. , ,.. ._J
.i (d) 40 Mt.v
- m. ,- .
3
. TDRNORMA110N t
ONI.Y FORNORMAT10N ._ l OHl.Y _ - - - - - - - - - -
, . ., , , . l y 4',
. ot '.b ::;. . .y .
' W.. e,..'",..
. c, . .: i A. pn i & _
fg.. J-y. W sW ,E.4 -.. n _- %. . .. t
. :i ,.A..
m tv R6V-L '
..- )
$ M N e 1
,u n . ,, 09 19 q ,,l .
, Olehei .mJ point2 madmay Ntmeen the suif.iee and soir aas about I.ino F I r .
JI it n seen that the masimum tempeiature differense herm een Ibe suiface of the Gin. column and the cote is about ltti' F. Thn can N i
.n a te.nonable masimum for niost steel columns likel) to N enc building practice. For the purpose of Jeterminig ture rise the temperature at the point halfway, fire endurance time by {
between the surfaer and sore I of the cross section tor flange in the case of a wide flange scesionI regarded as represe,nting the average ternperature of the crou scetion. l'o t+ut set) thisk sections this temperature will be almost equal to the tem } at the column .urfaer. i Ifig. J show. temperature rise curses for a Gin. Square column IcAulaI or measurcJ as was just descriNJl. As i'. seen, the auumption of r di.iine heat transfer enl) Joes not adequatcl) terresent the sonditions pres !
. 1 I
ph 1 4 , A 4:(da 4 M,Ue~*"A1 s4474- gh .i 9,,
- des
- xb 's W, ?,.. de '.ilr. '; a Na,9e:b s .4, H""'. 4e ' ..fr de a \ As ' .37. \ ,,6 '\ 4 4. .,g, ' 9h ga .4 *,
..}le dri icii ** de ' th,*e\ d,J.pTo.' of / A N d,a g,,a'.,la* in
- iur
'eds' de
- 4 ' d \ ,k
- ek
- di. de W a. 4. j me ' .ios d. \,f.
l 4, \,d, ,r N .,0.
- de' . d, .
- 4, ' 4 ' . 4, * ,;, g, e g, ,4, * .6, g ,s h ' .g. p.. g,
- s. . d. s
. o, c. a. s,u . d, . d s. ,;, g, o , g, ,,. a, 4.,
l
) .a . w, ' m so. . c. c. s a. o, a, ,b i
,,,. ' ,<, s. a. s a. sa, a \ a, s a.
,,, j i
,3
- A
- et, \ d N
- a. a. ,h ,,,
., si a. a,\e sh ' .ine.s i
- t. W,.d4'..;r
- g. * ,i, l
- c. - a, 4. ,:, ,;.
l or v. a, u.Na,a. s, a, \ d, d, ,2, 4, 1
,,, j d x a, ,:,
4 ai . .a Na, Na. '. 4. di ,;. ,: .: - a, na, .,
' de '.41' sd, 'Nat Nde es .,b T eli ,si.N d e \nethh' tie de ' sde sh ' de
' dade* dv d, **ieriA
- 4: '
et ds #ei..ds\ d. 'N*.
.s *E.de.\ A ' pis ' 's. si * 'sde"e4e' d,' de'-de I 4, a, .,:. >.s. a. n N di \ 1a, ',a,%.de ' O. ' l..
,o, o , . ,:, '. ',;,d * ,? <,, j
. . <e. y . ci. w, .a. di d, .,;,
,j 4.e..
ea, ,f. ' ,4. sk ' 4 e4\ n '
'.d. di,d, x 4, ,;. .h.4., g,, .
o t ' .a ' s,6s ' . ,6 ' de ' , *, ' ,t. *
,i, ' . , *
, 1,
- g,,
A,'Mi%4'of.Xa,'a,*A'.sh\).y),
' 63, 4
i4, a ', a. ' ..n > ,b \.A. * . 6 ' mit l t.411,; 2't L *Ut st w r',,4 e-', a,eut 4 , a, \ie,q <=, i '4 s - efu., te : m.), i ' (al 30 MN - F10. 3.-Tempe,etu,v Als4 la Uny,eteced Steel Sevate Column (12 in 1 n TDRNORMON
; BRU ._
TDRMORME0H -
,. - " - ~ ' ~ ~ " '
Yh$_' 'Y
- 3.@QQ3
. ; l ; ,
- z,.. ,a ' i. .
, J- _ , , .5- _
/4197 8. 5 V su rci cisis=t 3,q m .
[/ITM,k [ the DilH , NCR finnace w hen short fire . nduranse times a,e insobed The cuite labeled 121 in l eg. 4 was calculated by awum,ng that lW of the heat transfer is due to convect.on and produces good agreement with the esperimental re, ult. Uhfortun.ilels . th.s find.np is .4 no tenerat s alue because Ibc conse. tis e he.it tr.,nde, s , . ie s ith iuh ta 'n ett o ' u- ' on. W ith most fires ut ,hort Juiai,on the conweinin component of heat transfer can be in the ordet of to ' lif; to Otr;. In the calculathin the cffect of connectle heJt transfe, was simulat. 3 V\ ed b) raising e , from tim to the ficticious salue of 1.1. The hedi transfer coefficients to columm of square ero,s ,ection m e,e calculai- % lel ed b.ascJ on an eminis,1) se .1 of (13 using results obtainsd by Eys. and ris A.11,c resulti are shown in Fig. .t. w here the coeffieisnt of heat transfer fias 4 i
.~
been plotted as a function of the duration of standard fi,e esposure. As is seen, the heat transf er evelficient ,ises almost linearl) m ath time, and the smaller i
.u . t ,
- i pf, .u t. sal, iJ s , . le .. /. .. f. at a,. *a,, s. 31 ]
,,,, a. . s, a. . . a. . . ,,,, a. . ., a , . a. a. . ,,1, a . ,,i.
- a. s, a. a,. ...., a, a, a, a, i a. .. a, a. \
- a. a, a, a, .,. u, s a, e.,, a, . a, a, .a.
a, a. a, a, e,i
. + a.. a, a. s., a, a, a, a.. a,. ,<. e., ,,,...>,. a. a, a, a, a. s.
I+ a, ,a , e , ,4, ,,e, a, e, ,,,, a, a, a. <
,,,, a , ,0. ,a, a, a, a, a a, a, s. a, c -
l ..<. a w, .a u, s. ,,. a, a, a., a. a. < a, a. a, a. a, e, a, a, .., . a,
.:.. a, .a
. la, e, a. a. a. . a, a, a. a. .,. ,, ,,
,,,, a , e , s., .... u, a, a. ,i. a, em - a, .. ,
I a, <,, a. a, a, a, a, a, a, a. .. , . a ,
..s, a, .a. a, ,,. u . a, a, ,,. a, a. a, <,
g- ra, a , 4. a.,a a, . ,<,
- u. v ,,, '
x o. a, a, t a,; a,
. ,. a, a, w a, v a ' a,
- a. a, a, u
, e .,. <., ,,,, a .x ,,. ,,. u, .., a, e. a, t e,. e... ,,,< a, a, a'. < a,. a a, ,a,
, a
,0.
3,,,4.. .a,. a, a, a, a , 4 , e, a, a, a, a. t a,, a. a, a , a ,. a a ,. a,, - a. a-le , a, a, a. <,, .., a, s, y a, a,
.a. a, a, e, j a,a ..,, a,sa, a. a,a,a.,.
<,, a, a, . w .0, .s a. ,1, a, a. a, ,,,,/ w a,Ja
,0.
ls ' '
. .ag a;l,e ;,,+ .,;,4 .;,+. ,,af a, ; aq,+ ,c,, ', e,.+.,b, i . .
o (b) 60 WIN
- FIG 3 --Centwived TDRNORMAD0N i
E .- FORMORMATION EY
, 1
'a. _. . :x J. . . : < - . . Li-
. ... .3 ih:b.,--
'. .._].iCi4ll_ -. ~Os? .- '] } . ;. _ .
. =' . _..j. . ,'.. ..
~ ~ ~
U E 'A n.te M liie column the higher the etiefficient of heat tr.anifer. MAY 1973 .
$g ggg , [ One. Dimensional Numerkal l'rucedure.-l he temperature Jistributions. Jetvi.
nutied by the tuo.Jimenuonal calcul.4 aisi method Jeweibed pres a.ust), shim
. i . .
4 3
. _. . . . . . . . . , . , }h*9 '*
/., - .
. /
/i
. ~
l :
- i. I
. / I 1
{
.c . n s .,
..=......,~.s...4
/ I ' ' i t
* '. .. se u . . . .u 6. e, s .,
. . j FIC 4.-Tempeestwee Rase Cerves. 6 m 8 5+W Cedome 4 4 i 4 4 4 4 i t
- s. -
.'*~
lP 84 =
' P.
'i..
* - I
, ta ==
it =.
, ' i t i , , ,
i
, is se .. .. .. .. r, ,,
i -i . .. .. . o Flo. s..-Coetr=4ents of Heat Trensfee for uv,eetected Columns During Esposwee
. to Standard Fire Ilist the temperature differen.:es in the steel are relatisely small eseert for set) thick sections. Mosi columns uwJ in buildings hase wetions less than 10in.10.2.5 mHhisk, in siwh cases detaileJ caleulation of Iemperatbre Jntributson in the steel croin section is unnecessary. and a one. dimensional model of the
.s . men TDR NORM.GON no ,m mi, .
.i ON1.Y
[Wn HUU llyM - ONLY
>.u. - .;muu .,., .
I**:'.;; . ? ;'.,. c.:. '. ' a.
. w-. * -
s . . *. , 515 FCE RESIS7 ANCE [ g, 847 { heated uilumn can be usef ull) etnployed. The model omsnts of a stesl plate - M117 R E V 'Z. h.,,e,ine s..m, s,.s..suia,n i ..d so,f.iu reas n , on,i hei,hi as ihe fou, sides of the heatvd o'lumn. math the edges and unegrosed side Mrfeet!) insulat. ggg* cd. Thn model reotuts u e of a one dimensional numersal reucedure by in hsh TABLE 2.-Sample Catsvlation for 10 in. Square Column
- r- -s , s e s . -s.-- :sp s- -- s. r I s e s i . e.
s 7, 7, 17 ,- 7,1 A T, T, i i # (3) (4) 1 (5) (61
- 11) .11 n 1,3 us - 3 in 4 1 ust 1.8.41 1.n*2 l'N las i i til 6.4 si 1.141 1.tNJ ll? 234
= 14 1. M l .Ji n 1.utM 110 .t v.I
'o 1.4%' I .4m 9At 1.'u 3*t l 1..* ki RA7 Ill 644 1 23 1.3 tc ki I,3 to I .tA1 Nit lit' 144 14 1.444 1.3W 74) vt it
- h
,r. 9Jw
-- Ja I .A l ' IRA 677 83 43 1. hts I .otJ Note: a
- IN.44; r = 012. D e 1.3); %* e .W, A 7, = 0.12) (7, - T,3 for a t e 1/l! ht. ,
. . - -r=s rumL.s P.t uruLrsa.zzarsvrumrummers t- m t .s. .a :'e r a -e am a .=.._ _
.. ... . .=. . . .. . . /
, 7
./ / A' k
. I .' ,
t, . . . .
. l . .
. , f t t t 1
.. r. . .. ,, ,. s
= e w. . . . ... n FIC. 8 -Temperatute Ri6e of Square Solid Steel Columns (Catculated. e = 18 451 1 the temperature of the steel crou section can be cakulated with only a desk salentator or shde rule. In the calculation, mith cash intersal of time, al. the rise in steel temperJture. a r,. is gisen by: . . u D .<>l ar...- -ir,- r.ia,...................... . rM DEY TDRNORMAT10H I . DN1.Y
N.'s a :. *,.i . _.
.. x. . a. ...e, .
u.. . u.. _
.....: _ .s .
h\Mi 6,5 V-2. .. D . W ..t.. t- :- ATTMcH .I . , j x., . , g, . . g ,
=
.N.,- .
[. f 1 j j i . . i 5.; . K
. . 2
. . r ,
I I l j j g
. i !.. ,. t ,
I aires.....s,.. ,,,, ,,,,,,. : : : : ,
,,,,,, a m
1 I 1 l l l 1
, . . 1
,\, m i
,s - >
3 0 -S s j i.,
- .- i j
'\ ', 1 3
5
- 1 a , , i s 17 i a . ?. . . . . r., . . . .n . . , -
p a a t TDRN0PMA110N DHl.Y - TORMORMA110H DNLY
.N' ,y @- .* Y ,. . v_.
. t ., - c_v_.',.
. ;j. , s ;
._.,q,.-
s% ., , ,. ,,i.
. , .x . .--- ,. ,
....____..,.....n M d) b
~
$75 fint RisiSTANCE p ATML.H. L in which .it is espressed .m hours. The results of sample calculation for a 10.in. squ. ire colunm with a e IM.45 IllW Ms and r = 0.12 1502 art sfiou n in l'able 2. A famil) of temperature riw eutses obtained b) similar calcul tsons is show n by the soled lines m 12ig. fi.
Esperimental Rnutta.-To obtain information on the temperature rise of un*p io- , tested steel columns in the DHR/NRC floor furnavegise fire tests were carried out on square solid solumns of sarious erou scetioh The temperatures mes. I sured at the point hallsa) between the surface and the cere at m J.hsight I i of the columns are ploited in Fig. 7. Fig. It shows a plot of fire endur.ince i time sersus the dimensional parameter. W/D.on logarithmic scales. As is seen. ' < the rel.athmship is linear and, from the graph.lt is pouible to obtain the following i relation darrell); * , g w- 1 f = 10.1 -
. .. .. .. . .... . .. .... . .. . ..... . . . .(Mi j D . 1
- l in which W/D <' 10. To obtain a relation for entumns whose W/D s 10 1
( . ... .... .. Y .-: - - . - - I 1
,,..,y,.y,.,. ...,., -n \
o ,. .s . ,vs. i,/, */. , . . . ,., ,
\
, ,;. , s' ,. . i
. . .. . S ... /.'. .i... , ,
- h J',[.$ k .
i
~
5
. ; . .. // ././ . , . ,i,.. i .' .
.,,,/;: y. ., .L.
. /, s s.; .. ,;.
. 7,.,. ;, .
L..r: J .
. rio. s. soew coawna.-s rue
., ... 1 a straight line temperature riw for the 16 in. sfuare column is muumed, as l
; show n b) ilte dashed line in Fig. 7. From this it is possible to obtai'i the relation:
. p ..
Ts = 120 -
...............................(9) and by wiling T. equal to the critical temperature of !.11U0' F:
w .. f=5..%(7. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (101 1he lines resulting from Eq. Y are plotted in Figs. 6 and 7 islashed lmed. The line resulting from 1:q. In is plotted in Fig g and that equation should be uwd for columns having W/D = 10. However, as is seen from Fig. 7 FORN0REON . QNLY
.g . y
'he:M U % '<yv.l,.;,..
.L ,'
; .r.,u . ,,~
. c- ,:. ., . , , _ .. 3 5., . . .. . .
~~.- w .,. . ,,. ,. ,
.MM M V-U e50 MAY 1973 T5
- it can be consersaliset) arrlied to an) column sectism, and prosides a rel.ition -
. g' that soulJ readii) be sneerporated into a builJms b) lam.Githough the experi.,
,[ gensni.d. data are-wnft:redy s,ob,u ,.,,schnneremus'itrical analyses'1how --
'that Eqs. 9 and 10 ean cri rly ,in any share of cross section.)
,\* an esarnple of the fire sesistance t)Pi eal in columns of scr> taff bmidmp.
a cal nlation for the seeiion show n in Fig. v. one of sescral maone sections I used in Toronto's .4 story Toronto Dominion Ce e. is worked out: (1,i l D e t.to . is) . 24.10 - 7) + 2t10) = 174 in. ............... W W
- 1.1870 lb per it. O
= 10.7 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . t l :1 Est 10 vields a fire endurance time of:
t i .11 r = lt..t g lo 7,4)" = .4A min ......................... As is seen, these trusshe testions can luwe fire endurarwe times appruashing h, I hr. esen shen unprotected. Recent North American practice has seen increased insta!!alion of sprinkler systems in large (especially taill buildings. including wme that are not considered io hase a ser) high fite load (2.6)$ . rw .. r._-- -40!idgh buildifist, becomeY"Met *thmm'orf the'use of unprotected massive'rolumn sections with a fire resistance tapability of about I hr'should prove adequate for fire safety, provided that"thit fire idad it'no more than $ Ib/eg it to-10 lb/sq ft..which
- sheulJ not result in a fire of severity greater than a 1.hr standard fire Lati.
It' ire load is the heat of combustion of the combustible contents espressed
- in equisalent rounds of wood per unit floor area.)It can be reasonaNy deduced from Refs 4 and 14 that no safety factor need be applied to the actual, fire kuJ if the building is fully sprinklered, although such a safety (actor is implicJ
- by all current North American building regulations now la force.
Acusowusomsins This paper is a contribution from the Division of Building'Research. Natismal Research Council of Canada, and is published with the approval of the Dirce, tor of the Dhision. Ameers I.-4tmessess , p., u
- 1. Clumfler. 5. E.. "Deaths in Fires Attended b) Fire BrigaJes in 1969." Ferr Mmert h
! Tc han el Poper No. 3. H. bl. Sutionery oflice. Lanam. EnstaM.1970.
, 2. "Fire Prnterten for High Rise BuiWings." "Swddine Syssems Drsian. Sert.197s.
.t. Gatheath. kl.. "Fire in High Buildire. Flir StuJr Nes. 21. Disiwan of WuWing
. Researsh. National Research Counsil of Canada. Ottama. Canada,196A.
""" 4. Galheath. M., "Time of Evagion by Stairs a High SuMenss." Fire fle6tias is CeavJd. Feb.1969.
.* , Ha rmath).T. Z.."Thermal perfewmance of Concrete Masonry *We!!s in Fire." Srtriel Trihanel PwN4etisme No daJ. American Societ) for Tesung and statemis.1970.
rti. .%:4,4
- 6. "High Rise.lall Dilemma." New s Bell 1in.Camelian Automatic Sprinkler Awwisuon. !
Ma). Aug.,1971.
- 1. Hvishevn. N. B., aM Shiwter. G. W.. We proHems in Highrise SwiWengs."
l l l l l 7DRNOW110N DNI.Y FORNORMME i ~ OM.Y
-m:. m, <
"es g .
.t;:..~. -
.....m 3 _ e , .4 , , , _ __ , o .
M m. <t sv-t STS FIRE RESISTANCE 851 .
- ASHRAl. J.nirnal. Anwikan %. cwt > of Healing Refrig.* rating and Air ConJirionseg F.nguwers. \ .4 ill. N i v.l*Jt. pp St.Al.
N. IngNig. $ H "Tesh of k scrit> of HuilJir; bres." (Juartirl.i. Nahmal Fue Prote6 smwi Au. 6 saenm. %J 22. Net. 41.19?x. 4 IngNeg. 5 H.. ce s.1. "tire Tesh of BudJing Odumns." Trelin.d.'ci. Polirr$ of slw linoe uu i.l haan lassli. No Ika. t'lil . amJayN rg 5. H.. sad Sale. P. D.. "Compresswe Strengek and DefntmarinnM %)t' vest'
..hl anJ .t.:. 4.lrun Shapen sa Tsapesasuretr up tov 50' C 11142* P r.9mus,vemns
, .irf sise Amenten $r'esers for lestine end Mettriait.W6.W1tMvP 11.1.se.1. T.. "Oriutusm >we kcesarwe of Sirwtures." J.=ernel of elv Sr ,e rural Diii.
u.we. ASCE. %d. Vu No. STl. Proc. Paret sia.tm. Jan. 1972, pp. 2 8.t.:.12.
,42- Lae. T. T., and Harmat hi. T. 7... " A Nweeza.alJ. - ~ Cor**'e'fvfemreta-ture of Protected Sleel Columnt EsposcJ to Firc." NRCC 12$8!. Natiohaf RittMt?f*
- Council of Canada. Division of Building Researeb. Mar.1972.
I1. line). P. li. li=>limLi.an. Y. S.. and I.,anihdt W. R., "Phpical ard Chem cat D.id." kt 1. (1= >wrial e ncacm Handbn.4. J. H Pers). cJ.. McGram Hdl RivL Co . lw.. hee buk. N.Y.. limi)
- 14. "Neinw da skime/ed per la peiweimanc contro il fuo6o dei f4N'twati J 4truitura en
=- accumidesanutiad ie isisN"I"Lfety StandarJsfew the l'are Protectam of Setwtural hicvl BuilJmsn insenJed for Cisdian Use"). Oriolare N. wl. Ministero slett'inaceno.
L)irrimine Genetaic Jci 5ersi/i AnuncenJa Rome. Ital).1961. (Asailable as NRC
- Tri Anis el Trenitethwi TT l.147. Ottana. Canada.19Nti.
- 15. Pts.ideelConstants of some Canmercial Strein et FletaosJ Temperatures. Br,tish fron anJ 5teti Research Associatirms. Buttermorks Scientihe Pubikauons. London Erig.
tarmJ.1931
- 16. "$44rskrJ MethiaJs of Fire Tests of BuaJms Construd' m m sad Materish." ASTM ikssantawi Ell % 71. Pir 14.19718.=4 of ASTM Standards. Asietican Societ) for 1csima and Maittials.1911.
- 17. 54evi 54ructures f or SvilJang.CSA SIA.lvn9. Canadian 54andards Association. Ottam a.
Can Ja. tw 9. lit. Trmin. W., anJ Ma=hinney. M. W.. ladsstrial Formeres. Carnesse lestitute of Tech-nolon. John WJey and Soes. Inc.. Hew YorL. N.Y.,1961. Asetisms N.--Notarum The folluming syrnbisis rare sosed in this paper: c = specific heat of steel,in Bruish thermal urdts per pound--destces Fahren. heit (nr degrees Rankine)(jouks per kilogros-degrees Kelvin);
- D = healed perimeter. in inches (meters);
E = modulus uf el.astici:y of steel,in kips per square inch (newtons per square meter): * ~ ~ FE = fire endurance time,in minutes:
& = thermal sonductivity,in British thermaliaits per foot. hour depeet Fahr-enheit (3atts per meter.destees Kelvinh 7 = temperature. in degrees Fahrenheit (degrees Celsius): - = lime. in minutes (unkst specified otherwiwh W = met of steel section in pounds per foot (Lilograms pet meteth a = coefficier's of heat transfer,in Britidi thermal units per foot. hour. degrees Fahrenheit twelts per meter.deptes Kelvinl:
A = inerement:
- a( = mesh width,in feet (metersh
, = emistisity 1 = slenderness ratio: -
TDRN0RMAll0N FDRN0RMON i E - RY .
. l
.:.ilb.' b ' ,'2.Ja.: '' 2.'. $t' U I.
.. . _ .' J . . ?. * * - s .ku:.d.:_ ;l.:
. $ w. .n-f)hY. .?DM M 197 RE V- f- .
,,, - tin l
- p = densii) of Steel, in poundt per cubk foot (kikigrams per cubic meter);
- i. Iand
,, = stress. Lsi IN/m?); Stefan.Iloliimann constant. 0.171.1 x 10 *. in Dritish )
thermal units per hour square foot.degiers Rankine to the fourth power (watts per square meter-degrees 14elsin to the fourth pomer); E Subscripts ; \ u = allowable. aserage; > l cr - critWal; . j f = of furnace; , m = at of around mesh point in mth town j n = at or around mesh point in nth column l o - at room temperature: t = of steel crew section; g 7 - at temperature 7; and y
- at )ielJ stress.
Superscripts 1 - at : - p r. . 1 1
. . \
b .
, ,. p . . A .
.-w,---ww - -w YORN0RMADON OklY TORNORYE0H .
i gy _-
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M i'17 R EV-E - ATD%H. I. 5 b t 1 1 l
. \
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................ ............... ... _ ......m...........,!
h D 9119 F1Rr. RESISTANCE OF UNPROTICTED STEEL COLUMNS ! XEY WORDS. BsDdises (codesh Colemas: Flee sweeties: Fue remuner. Heat transfert Stett; Structurni easimewtec Tempersente j ABSTR ACT: Fire resatente as weertnected stret colw.nns 6 esamined: by standard test failute.sad It is nwrnenest shoe n that firesaal>ses based remun.e tiene on the unes sah e 1.000 D F (SJs shape factiv u( sWwmnD:* C) entlest o seight dainded b) thS hesied penmeter, and son tirpple equ.atums few!-eskwlating th fits trustance times of unprigeeted steel eviumns are estabimhed shi es tha' tar $r eNumns used in high nse beule8%p a;an hat t fire resisaanet tisws s4 a up 1..one hs. The rncee consenstne ut the too squetes is retcnnemended for wie in hvildicg standards ,
"Fire Resistance of Unmweeted Steel Crdumas." J,wenst it tA.-
14EFERENCE: 5stwrurJI Driria w. ASCE. Vol. 99. Nas hT.S. I' roc. I'sper 9189. Ma>.197J, . rr. 331. 432 ; 5 . Y0HiTORMAT10N i D)D.Y m!NORMAT10N UDN1.Y
L. ..J L C c w.
- .2J: : : .....~:
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C - E l TDRNORMATION i E ' FORN0RMATION , DN1.Y I
R 7. tJ 0.'l j [ ent.c.p. uw I 97 g.sv-r ' - - -
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Q Armcs. Z . te es-29 c r. g Assessment of Fire . Resistancd Requirements
- J. R. MEll AFFEY and T. Z. II ARMAT11Y ,
Netwost Reseerth Council of r==-t= i J Division of BuiMing Research l he calculaties of .
'M beat lead, a =narr4=rt quest Ger of the pese-i.es .t co=pers-e.t rirse i. e, reed by destruction. s. snedy su phr.e4 by mistr d.ctwo.it es=l<=pirice --- '-- mee etferd d rect leeight into the relaties between the destructive poten-ti. of r.ro end the g, '='; ' cherectoristics of h fire coopertment ;-
d its consents of cose6 en- I ALTIlOUGli the bases on fire reelstance on-- =which r=qul-_ code writers heve changed over thebring years,down the la- their deciefcas r, l
! l dusace of Iagberg's fire loed concept' le soll recognisable. "Ihat concept ,
developed some 40 years ass clal=e that the destructive potential of coen- . partswat fires le proportional to the specific fire load Imass of cosnbustibles j, per sait floor areet. and that the fire resistance requireaneet for compart- T-sneet bousederies should alas be eBocated la proporties to the specific fire . g Although still widely used, the concept was somedy disproved by thel l results of suL. ,--- esp '-- -8 reeeerch.*Ihe outBase of a retional wayI ^ of assigning fire resistance r$ - = has recently emerged, following the identification of a paramester as a unique q== wirier of the potentist of - - i 4.- deci- -
~
'g .
' -el=='-e sieme e fires
; fire forrequiressants resistance destructive g' With are a anattar of - this of the paremmeter calculas,d for real-world conditions erith t ese new maderstap/'-
-the . .
d h l l,'
~
ad for teet en-aut=== s ,% '. h . calculaties of the i _ " quantifyQ the deatractive apread . - .'[ en d of fires mader real-world conditions is quite straightforward; but ~ , E CS @ lavelves an km tlyd n_^ - ' ,i It, unay prove somewhat time con-for 'ha== who ettempt, to performe it without a programunable h @S;er. To etiadneta the need for iterstlen, the feasibility.of empreening - c d rameter by an apprealmate auspirical equatlass has boom ====Ia=A If Zults of the ====I== eta = are reported la this paper. [ . 999 .y . y. (.
theorem of uniformity of normalized heat bd. e Muetionc 0.7&Jh?]6
#" whicheveri tess SE M I-E M PIRIC A L E X PC ESSIO N FO R TIIE i,, Q {.
N O R M A LIZE D IIE AT LO A D - whers &c is & height of the compartment. L' According t'o statistical data, the fire bd in modern buildings, despite + is o variable that characterizes t3e ventilation of h compartment. It [. the increasing use of plastics, consists predominantly of cellulosics. Since, la defined as ' in addition. fires of cellulosics excel in their destructive potential.* It ap- - peers to be a safe practice to assume that the fire load consists fully of -
+ " e. A </g.4 19) cellutonics.
Cy reflecting on the meaning of Ingberg's fire load concept.' ene I where e.le the density of environmental atmosphere. A,la the area of ven- ; recognizes that it has been built on the implicit assumption that in a fire the a tilation opening (window or door). 4 is the height of the ventilation opening. f-bulk of the fuel energy is eventually absorbed by the compartment boun- ! and g is the acceleration due to gravity. The considerations that have led to daties. %o normalized heat load pertaining to the assumption that all heat the development of Equation 7 are discussed in the Appendix. [: p. release by the fuel is, absorbed within the compartment is . As the speci'ic fire load G/A,(where A, is the floor area of the compart- tf ment) may vary rather markedly fr: m compartment to compartment, the f I Gaff selection of the value of G for the fire safety design must be based on an ' N. - ! (6) analysis of statistical data. If the compartment boundaries are simple i^ JA g_e A. "dividinc elements" without essential structural functions, the design 8: l value for G/A, is usually taken as the 80th g.ercentile in the cumulative plot where the subscript m has been affixed ta R to indicate that k represents l h h applicable occupancy. If, on the other hand. Se compartment boun-the conceiveble absolute maximum. O is the total fire load (total fuel mass). daries are ** key elements ** that play an important part in the structural per- .' and *Fr' ^ ' ' a meInnafah,r,-t . formarce of the building as a whole. somt entra degree of safety is justified. Fortunately it has been found ht the normaliaad heat Iced on the com]a.
~
he selection of G may be based on considerations propounded by Lie' and
- partment boundaries is only 10 in 40 narc ==* of LJSome or tne suel energy outlined later by liarmathy.'
- is released outside the compartment, but even o, the portion released laside he vend'adon parameur. 4. la a meesure of h minimum ventilation of some energy will leave the compartment with the fire gases as sensibla heat ; the cupportment. %Is occurs under "classic'* draft-free conditions. As ..
and some will be lost by radiation through h ventilation opening. A e discussed by Hermathy.* (Le presence of drafts causes b value of + to in-
- multitude of calculations performed by th detailed karative technique crosse over that calculated from Equation 9 and thus (by virtue of Equation '
mentioned earlier indicatae that th normalized heat load, in other words 71 to reduce h vab of the vormalized heat bd. a vah for + obtained the potential of fire for destructive apread, from Equation 9 may be used .in assessing the potenual of fires for destruc- !
- Increases less than in proportion to the fire loed. -
4 hva sp.oed. a decreases as the ventilation of the compartment Increasse.kad ' It is .of laterest to examine the normalized best load in relation 'to its r o decreases as & thrmal Inertia of the boundaries increases. t llenluce salue, as expressed by Equation 6. Conibiningquations 6 and 7 i he numerical results of thess' calculations formed the basis lfor as In- sul un'nt AH = 18.8 X 10' J kg-' in the former (belause the fire load la b vestigetion that resulted in th following semi 4:npirical equation: !~ assume 2 to be ce!!uloeicl. b fo"owing equation is obtained: $ 5=
- 4 H 5 l'
a
' 0.585 & + 0.085 g
y H = 10' (11.0 4 + 1.6) O A.JAc.e . + 935/+G (7) l l
'#1 ~I +~935~ 7.af A.vaec
. = _
.J T
.A<:41 8 c;;nh;i '
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HEAT, MASS, , i AND l M0 MENTUM TRANSFER ) C I l Warren M. Rohsenow
- P90Fil802 0F ilttNAalCAL tueitttRiBG 9tA&&ACMWitTT1 lutflTVTE OF TEC1tuCLOGf ..e, .
Harry Y. Chol !. : . :S - ,
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M M - R ] AEV-1. ),f,fff*f l mma. x TABLE E.1--Continued
)
r , . . . . 1 (2) Nonatals ('F) Ch./ft') (Btu /L. F) (Btu /hr ft F) (ft%r) ! Aartcl. ouica . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 8.3 0.208 0.013 0.012 32 3s 0.28 0.0s7 0.010 As$wtos................. 800 38 0.130 Br'ck. comunon . . . . . . . . . . . 88 100 0.20 0.20 4.10 0.01 4.02 Are clay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1472 l 148 0.23 0.79 0.034 i Bak elite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 79.5 0.38 0.134 0.a m I Concnte . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 119 144 0.21 0.47-0.81dE019-0.027 5 *
, . Cor bard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 10 0.4 0.038 0.uus Diatoawoous earth, powdered . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 14 0.21 0.0B0 0.01 Mber insulatlog board. . . . . 100 14.3 0.034 Glass. window . . . . . . . . . . . . e4 142 0.18 0.81 0.030 Glaas wool.Sae.......... 100 1.8 0.0B1 pachad................ 100 4.0 0.032 Ice...................... 32 37 0.48 1.3 0.048 j Magnema 83 fe . . . . . . . . . . . 100 17 0.u38 M arble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 156-100 0.193 1.0 0.064
(.- Paper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . no. .oa............... Rubter, hard . . . . . . . . . . . . . iOO 32 12 74.8 0.48 0.0T8 0.0. 0.087 0.0034 oss souti Wood, oak. A to snia. . . . 70 81 0.87 9.L3 0.004
, , Wood, oak. ll to graia. .... 70 81 0.87 0.38 0.0008 Btu /hr ft F) (It'/h')
i (2i2 F) (1112 F) (68F1 . ggg 3.C63 ... j' ... c .. !.t*; ..
': l#[w/;2[.; fly,;. ;i'[e .
74 18" - 1 23 0.21* . 4 .: . J.L , . . 219 204 4M y.. . "; '/. j I/; , ' 39 23 0.7M .. ....i..
- 0. tM .
- s* ' :. V ib'1 33 21 0.Mi . * '~ ,* 4
,/P ,
19.3 0" l- 'jr ' M.' l g7 c3 48 81 J.foJ MI8 Og
~, l 37 32 0.9..
f' " ' I ' 240 . l 19 23 13 01*' . f.4 10 , , it i si 65 J l '" 6.8 63 i . il __ %RNORMA110N
. , DN1.Y _
. i w, .w, a., - -
s + a .: - . . . . .w _w.. . . .......:... .:_._._..... . .. ..
.=
1 p e-gg pev s. pgangac - - --- ' 2FEREMM ,_3 GDIJCesty P9 M /?.1 cmrenCN g7p-0,H, T Coxocenos 4-95 .. i.w. i. n.,.a c .. awe a m-.u s.ua s.w . e us.e e, . .re to d m s,e, e e.ie,e t- at t~ ete.e re e -i.o
.e>. !
. 0 5..5 0. .ln , .
w. a i
- m. ... m .05 5 ,, , g. . rg . ,
ea st M ft rgy , ; Aatentse beard. seap Saarts. effettL parth
- i premme satseus sad l . let to C a.aas. . .. ... = 20. 33.6 1
- 8. 0. 5
.b esores. . . . . . . . . . . Asheseen multbaard. . . . Ill. 68.8 H. 66. 6.335 0.476 M8. 4. 3 l l 0.064 Robber hard . . . . . . . . . 74.3 600. 0.D93 g) Aatmosas we.d . . . . . . Aaaan, eats peed., Il. 13.9 Ill. el. 8.004 Rebber, esin, vslena.
- 31. Me. 4.133 6ase . . . . . . . . . . 64.4 06. 0.M k'# "IIII/N)s &Od II Cartse
.tanse. West...
eulesene ..... .. 13.
. . lH. .l 0.013 Imad. dry . . . . . . . . H.8 H. 4. l H
. Dan states that the Cardbensd. earreented. 0.417 So w dest. dry . . . . . . 13.4 64. 4.443
...47.5 ...44. 8.13 hhan. fmed . . . o o n ... 3M. e 08 Poss-eettio:al A(s) aot. W M W.o IH. 8. M Cau Whe h ."me.e. - 33.5 St,e/h &loIg the condue. de Foot . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 43. 0.03) Rent dry. . . . . . .. 44. (.373
> 888MM 868d8ddf7 Cameveen, enad. and SmL dry,insiedane groval . . . . . . . . 143. fl. l.05 , ensens....... ..... 1 37. 44. 8. M t 14tsperature, 6Ad the Canarm. seerv ono 97. fl. 0.48 Seew . . . . o n o o n . 7-H ll. 4.54 6.3 CharsonL powdet . . . . ll.l el. 8.0 29 Blaasem A 6ents Cart.greme Med .... l.4 33. e.tte greend . . . . . . . . . St. 1400, 0.H1 Cesame ween... . . . . . l. 0 fee, 0.035 Weel, peso. . . . . . . . 5.6 06. 0.031 4.hameed....... . Ill. 18. SM. Seveena remas . . . .. Ill. 600. 8.18 Earth pies 43 % ester. lH. 9. 8.43 h eads. eeme dry. Fiber. red . . . . . . . . . . . M.S 64. 0.33 erveu semaste [ "" ut d & 6% t.be F1stedemm* (vi Rebter Col. . .. l.6 i
- 93. 0.007 Aaere... ........
Esletyyr e ..... at. 34.
$1.
S$. 9.049 0.469 Cansa. pyvee .. teasa . . . . . . . . . . 16. St. G.0 54 tad i Class. seda lene .
. Ilt l 290.
. 3 0. II t.19
- 9. H Saseweed . . . . . . . . .
- 34. 48. 0.014 Crteeste, sei.d . . . . .
..93.5 i lit. l 87. Timentas F1r . . . . . , 29. al. p.HS C ee vel . . . . . . . . . 114. 64. 5.33 H ae.rerb.. ..... 44. Bl. e.097 (3) Crosum bened . . . . . St. H. 8.#el F w. =*i ta . . . . . . 36, al. 0.069 lee... ...... .. 37.6 - . 1.34 Hemnes t o . , ... ft. el, Esale weni . . . 19.6 000. 0.959 14rth. eurters . . . M. 4). e te,e 9.03.
Lasther. aeae . . .. 43.4 . 6.493 Matde. eusse . . 43. 14 0.994 nhee ..... . . . 13J. .. 0.35 Onh red . . . . . . . . . . . 43. SS. 4,999 Peart.u. Ansees. Pina, esemere p,4 seawrwed eMil ed op low........... St. 85. 0.978 bewees setenal.. 9.1 til. 4.0l$ 1%ae. wives... ... Il. Bl. Actee
- i Ped rory'ves. eeanaded Eed onder, westers.. 31. $ $.' .3,Ill (At
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M -iq, ?tt.v. 2.- - Attachmest 3 !ad eedent Vesificaties Stateneat /v/4 7XiMN4/it Calculatie 9 7. Revisies i ~rt m m d'O e been independently se fled by the following method (s), as _noted below: E t. Dessga Rettew ancludtag veraficaties that
- Destga inputs were correctly selected and tacluded is the calculaties.
- Assumpti <a are edequately described and are reassaable. .
!aput er assumptions requiring ceafirmaties are identm ed, and if any estat, the cal-culattee has been identified as "Freliminary" and a *1a 11: sties Due Date" has been specified. *
- Design requireeests free applicable codes, standards and regulatt ry deevnesta are identified and reflected la the design.
- Applicable toestruction and operating erperience sas ceasidered la she desirs.
- The calculation saber has been properly obtained and estered.
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- As appropriate destga method or cesputer code was used.
A modematical check has beta perferrad.
- The outpet is reaseaable tempered to the laput.
Alternate Calculation Q iscludlag verificaties of astertaked itane seted above. The altarsate calculation ( pages) is attached. Qualifiesttee Testing O for design feature inclue-
%ee tag verificaties of seterisked itema seted above and the followtas:
The test was performed is accordance with erittee test procedures.
- Ilest adverse design condittees were seed in tie tast.
- Scaling lave wra established and verified and error analyses were performed. if applicable.
Test acceptance criteria wre clearly reltted to the desiga calculattee.
-
- Test resalta (decweented la ) were rec ewed by the calculattee Preparer er other cegatsaat eastseer.
p a Yerifisr Commeats[ *[J/d 4Id'AY M M _/ VMMM l1 $.//4)fWO 79 W S/Wfik) 66' M [B/YfA/ W A & d &
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Attachment,# = ladependent Vetificatica Statement hEO $ MC) gg7 - Calculation , Revision f 8.__hasbeenindependentlyverifiedbythefollowing . method (s), as note below: Deatgn Review tecludtag vertiscation that:
- Design inputs were correctly selected and included in the calenistion.
- Assumptions are adeqsately described and are reasonable. a
- 1aput or assumptions requirirg confirmation are identified, and if any esitt, the cal-culation has been identified as "Preliminary" and a "yinalisation Due Date" has been specified. * ,
- Design requirements from applicable codes, standards and regulato:7 documents are identified and reflected in the design.
- Applicable coastruction and operattag experience was canaidered in the design.
- The calculatica asambor has been properly obtained and estered. l An appropriate design method or coeputer code was used.
- A sathematical check has been performed.
I
- The output is reasonable coagared to the input.
l t Alternate Calculattos Q including verificatica of asterisked items acted above. t The alternate calculation ( pages) is attached. $ oualifiestion Testing O for design feature includ-D ing verification of asterisked itans noted above ase the follovt.ag
- The test was performed La accordance with writtas test procedures.
- Nest adverse design condittoaa were used in the test.
- Scaling laws were established and verified and error analyses were performed, if applicable.
- Test acceptance criteria were clearly related to the design calculaties.
- Test results (deciamented la ,, _ ) wert reviewed by the calculation Prepeter or other cogatasas engineer.
~
ladereade Ver1fier Comments M #a WJ&^ = , se d / ~4 See MID Procedure 3.05, Sec. 7.1.1 / s /, Al J /g I adent Ta'rtiser
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Aet{ f / PJ Preparer coarurrence with findings and coseest resolu- /s/
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,i ATTACHMENT 3 TO BECO LETTER 88-010
. BEco Calculation M198, Revision 1 STEAM TUNNEL
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Auct!' oC STRutTutAL TTesu lu O w -o.*" ggn' _ _ tl5R - Discipline Group teader ~3 V M/ Prelimihary Calc Q _
/ CU & c.L Aud Finalization ApprovalLs/g A ,, /_ , _
due date JW Date ....................;.
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Final Calc. Independent verifierbN Page(s) c>09L/677?MJikbrL WM M W ~5tatement Attached
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Srenw? Tlwh6 L ~ 5 Hall BE HDDELED TD FOU.oCA) THE P2oPILE PEESEUTED EV TEMPERATVEE THE STAMBhED TIME-TEMPEEATUEir CORUE iu AST M- E-l 19. THE MODEL i' 5 HALL ASCOME AMElEUT TEM PE2ATU RC 0F (cB*P , I AS THE TEMPERATUPE 01: THE MODELED i 3.2. THE O_ SPACE RISES C PER. ASTM-E ilo)) THE TEMPER.ATURE DIFFEE.EWC i GETVJEEU SPACE BOUU D AR.y CTw) SPACE. C T ) AND THE 15 C.ALCULATED C AT ), TWti (UlTI A L ~ TFMPER.ATVRE' DiPPERENCE IS UTIL1?fb To DeiePK.MiUE THS CDM B11)ED COJUEC.T100 l AWD R.AD4T2U C.0E FFCIEMr5 C hc %)= h REG.UIRED TB CALCULATE- THE- HEAT FLUX ( F. T. PEE. U NIT A-RE A . . F o = aT h 3.3 TWE HEAT PLUk. PER \JNIT APEA.LF.S i5 THEU U r l u -7 E B T D T O IMOEFEUEBJTW TDRNORMA110N i GNLY B E.Co.FO81M 3600 cle .cooi )
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- 1. FIRE TEST STRUDARDL FIRST EDITlDU, I 982, NSR ASTM-E41% TASLE X.i > PAGE 8J3. i
- 2. STAUDAR.0 HAUDEcot. FOR. NEC.HAurAL EfJGifJEERS, SEVEUTH EblT)Du a TABLE 11. i PAGE 4 -logo, AMD Foe MUt., A, C.10,, C A1TACHED.)
i THERM 0,L CDUDL)CTIVITY *. STEEL - A 5M E. v m . D W15109 L- TAELE i.CAmKneo) ccOCEETE- 5TA0DAE.D HAUDEaot. FOR. MECH ALM AL t3.)CoiTJE~ERI. SEVEWTH ED ITlDr.), T A 8 t. E S i Tr%E 4-97.[i+1nene9)
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APPebXIM&TlCLI RETWEEXJ TkBLE TEMPERAT*UEE UkLUES . - CDUDCCTIVITY,-ASSu tHC~ S. THE THER MM. TM81.E I UUEAR. kPPROXIMATidu BET"X/SEV TEMPEE&TlMC t/AU/85 h22 STbcLo CDIVOUC77Viry THE CDAXfETE 77dEM4L . IS RSSUNED CUISTpur CV52 TBWAS7AftME RRUGS. D 4. THE STEEL THERM 1\G DIFEUSMTV- ASSUME ~ ULEAE. kfF26FIMR779A/ EE7k/ EEL / TR$t c' VE'4727#' Tl/EE" L/AU/E5 FBC . Sis:ci.. /C TWE CDUCLQ6TE THEtAtAL PtPFlEtvtTy nsSUMED CbMSTRUr met 72H FE2hTVGC 4%NSE-A. 2 TEEL 15 A550 MED TD FAIL W HEU
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. - .;.m . . - CAT A ' CALCULATION EET o ryo#' p AUTHO:'l2 ATION NO. g O PRELIMINARY caue,
^yfie L.! y#() Ia 7 4 4 PREPAREo BYM -DATELLb
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SUBJECT:
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T CALCULATION SHEET C'jso^bznios No. . PREL)MINARY
..nEv. _ DATE Pateamte avM N ATEOh//3 C FINALM Nh ~ g- CHtCKtD BY DATE I mEv_L oATE Edison envo sv E ' ent /Ft'//8
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c osJc n e n=~- SU8 JECT: ,3 7 crg M 7 gggg [. : rj, 3 7. g 1, ::h SHettjy_0vg n M G /? . OWGS. c.GSASG~?,Cl59 SR . A 4 F /, .5 i NSR C OM C. fl. 2 4.'0's.2 2.G 7 ' = 7 ff 4 " CMSfic WA L. L S : 7 'N y 2 'rf y '2 4 'L H i L c' ev i t. a' t C a 7 x 2 4.
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.. REV _ DATE pu s to80 4 OfD MTEUN
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5, sR R W/o x 4 9 Vd' " = NSF; a 92' W / 2 x G5 -y@ r = 5 9G' - 12. fue r (Npati),[ I 2" = . 4' ruergwe).i S f'g of ,*,g iI2-s
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" REV_ DATE PREMED 88@ 'iP o k@^"I
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(125/2.) Q 2 y r.% v 7. r' a 2. 4
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CALCULATION SHEET caytag,z,vcg No. O PRELIMINAQY '
.. REv- onE ,, w n eo . , n V t ti fy s ,
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CALCULATON SHEET C'ys'o^$3,ey yo, O PRELIMINAGY '
,, REV_ DATE PREPamco o f N [AN Idt/ b
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'4-100 TRAN5 MISSION bF HF.AT BY CONDUCf10N AND CO!NXCTION combine to give Table 10. Ms.zimum Fluz and Correeponn 4 mroll Temperature Diference for Liquide B3iled at 1 Atm with a Submew .u mtal Steam-heated Tube d
m i u. c.,,- ','**, e
% 14 $
d > iS % % % where q./A. Le the Stu I I# ICOO ~# I# 611 tamperature diferet 2 4rissotate........ di 70 el SS FF 33 5emaene............ Si eo 54 Fe H leo 82 10e 0.8 Tth yl a1echol . . . . . . . . 35 es el el 124 65 . Metsyt slaobol. .. .. . .. .. 100 95 IIS lie ISS 110 F O.7 230 43 3 50 F) ele ISe 4 Ihaused veter...... .. .. I o.6 Y For forced dtculation evepwstors, vapor binding is also encountered. %ua with
- & 03 11guid bessene er. taring a 4-pass rteam jseketed pipe at 0.9 fpe, up to the point.where I E o.e 60 percent by weight was vaporised, the mmmum flux of 60.000 Btu per hr per sq ft Ij was obtained at an ovsr-all temperature diference of 60 F; beyond this point,6 I* o3 coefEcient and aux decreased rapidly, approaching the values obtained in'euperheating -
vspor, see Eq. (eb). For comparison,in .uturs! convection evaporstor, a *maximum Aux of 7;,000 Btu per hr per sq ft was ob*ned at (M). of 100 F. - l { o'i o.2 O
, Combined Con *ection and R.adiation Coemeients. In some cases of heatless, such .
as that from bare and insulated pipes, where lose la by convection to the air and radia. . tion to the walla cf the enclosing opses it le contenient to use a combined convection b . and radiation coefEclant (A. + A,). De rate of heat lose thus becomme , Fm. a utlan with
- . sor. a. . .m . ; f = (A. + 41)d(M). (13)
- where (u). la the tempersture afference, des F, between the surface of the het body ..
N ,g d$gyn g, f and the walla of the space. In evaluatina (A. + 1.), A. should be onlculated by the " appropriata conteetion formula (osa Eqs. (11c) to (11g)! and , from b equation ; [Mthe oonduf,tii pgt ,t ,
'cwG have but little of t A. = 0.0068%(f./100)4 7 '
- < ' U, with pipe sine and t
- [ sures of 375 and 75 F.
where e la the black body coeScient of the radiating surface, p. 4-111, f.e is the aversco . . . ' . ** , tempersture of the surface ani! the -aalW walls, des R. For addl=d bare eteel . . ~ . id . pipe, the sum A. + A, may be takan directly from Tahia 11. .# ,', -
- u. - .V . p . .
Table 11. h!aes of (A. + A,) .
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- 12,44 14.3a 2 1.93l2.2Fj2.33l2.1) 5.841.47 4.18 4.99 l.09 6.92 4.07l9. Milt.8) '*
4 1.6412.14 2.4112.12:3.9113.33 4.1214.83 f.72 4.7517.99it.2110.6612.27 14.pe ., I l.1643.64 2.29 2.6e 2.Hil.20'.l.64 4.64 S.57.4.Hif.F).9.tl it.Mfl!.le ll.H . . Il 1.712.0112 24 2.54 2.82:3.Ill3.ll 4.6115.M 4.llif.63't. 10.42'12.05 13.64 24 1.64 1.93 2.15'2.41 2.7 1.03 10.28 11.90 13,re . Fue Ptares l
.79l4.44'S.37 .99f .1 6.H Varusal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l.82 2.112.40l2.79 1.H2. .M 4.71 S.Ft .72 . 9.18 10.64 II.D 14. M . .
2.M 2.35'2.65' 2.97 4).265.394.3t5.126.64f.tF'4.2 11. 01 12.63 14.45 E rv . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . EID. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l . 5 4 !! . 83l 2. H 2. 34 2. 4 3 l2. H 3.,0.Fl,18.16 3 3 61l[4. Hil Il.76 . 21;4. 13. 17 27 j f. 4.119. S4 d EIT. henas tal, tassas apwstd; ETD. herseosta,l. lastae dewsword. . Lat Transmission through Pipe Insulation. (McMillan, Trena. ASMF,1915.)
- For eny number of layers of insulation on any sise of pipe, Eqs. (3), (4), and (18) '
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TnE INFIN!?E ANb SEMI.INFIN1*i'E SOLID . 16 2.9. The saml.inonite solid. The flux of best at a = Ok pre. ' l acribed Aanctjon of the time. Zero taitial temperature , l
, (1) Canadant)fus, T per wait time jwr wait ares. em/Fr*.fm e
j h Sus / - - Kg ,, (1)
! antis 6es & same differential equadon as e, namely i ,
. .l' pJ.D.-g G5-5 " ma- . m .
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, and we have f = T.e eonstant, * = 0, i > 0, (3) .
is, by 2.4 (10), f = Tearfe (4)
.N(.*f). $
Thus, from (1), using Appendix II, (9) ar.d (11), * . ,
,=#'erfe 8
sy(.1) ds (8) b '
.phvit 1 -
(p tar.it WI =
,,a.,.a.n lede ~" (4) i
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, , m temperstun at a = 0 h * )
m y '-
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m boundary condicon of sonstant flas'k of aceJdersble
. . . . . . ._ \
- importance. It appean if best is genersted by sismaat 's 3at ?,'.sinating,paattaal
. . . 3 ,.
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~ approximadon in b early stages of beating m.fsraneo ar4 recen. .It - . '-
,. i has aho important appliostkaa to problesos an difestoa.',,2he,,sodilag i .. F' . c.f.'.
of & Earth's surface after saneet en a alear windhes mightt. . -e '! ".' .,: nearly that due to roam al of heat at sa constaat rate'pensul ,e-a' *.m - anit time, thm (s) gins the way in wkseh h surf.ee tomrperstenm % . : ' . - i after annt. ' 1
.. m i.j f.y.
m runits above apply aho to e eue of the neton dso ...:.eow - n/. 'g gg . , m, ,, , with heat apply 27. la th* P l ane s = 0. % menspedfag rwshe for
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- FIRE RESISTANCE OF UNPROTECTED STEEL COLUMNS i
1 sv . l W. W. STANZAK AND T. T. UE l 1 1 t merewma reev . JOURNAL of 71.E STRUCTURAL OlVistoN. ASCE. voi os. No. S7s. PROC. PAPER 9719. MAY 1973 P.337 35a
. 1
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,anSANCH NFtn see,.syp.* , ' . . . . ,
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e I LA RZ31.57ANCC AU TEU DES POUTRES E' ACIER
- h. NON FACTEGELS .
SCD4MA.DLE Les esteurs etud6ent 14 reelstance se feu des postres d'atter men protagoes au moyen d'escale d'tacendie etendarde et de l' analyst owner 6qwe. On a dessuvert que la dur6e de la reelstante se fee verle seien le facteur forme
- de pode da la pentredivielparle portralite abauffe.1.as setes.r ont 6tobli deu.s equattene eonples peer calculer les derdes de'edeletence se few des poutres d' aster sea protegese et us recommonameens de leewtuiser dame les mermes de b&tassent. ,
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sn - r 1 JOURNAL OF THE STRUCTURAL DIVISION c' PP7/e9 i M -tw Rsy-) ATTedH..T
. Fine RESISTANCE OF UNPROTECTED STEEL. COM'.% INS
- 8
- 5) W. W. 54ansal ' and T. T. Ue 1
.. . I l
in the past the fire resistance of unprotected steelcolumns has been censidered so small a quantity that it could he ignored. Fire esperience and controlled fire teus on structural steel eclumns of small stoss sectional ares showed that
. unprotected steel columns could ret survive the effects of fire esposure for more than 10 min to 20 min.*Nowevet: it will now be shower thstthe teewier j cblumns'regweed to carry-the'eemseliseds ist metrefnigK7ter$oddmys vre
, capable of much better fire performance than,hadlernloWy"betW"m? feed.
- and that anme can attain fire resissance ciassdications of 1 &r or better.
Fire f atality statistics lit show thal the number of deaths' attributable to structu. ral collapse during a hulkling fire is' negligible..'Thiiitain ca6ses of life loss have been shown to be asphysiation and.bvens (IJ.7)/Ther-fore, so provide life safety to occupants, enough fire nsistance se allowpeople time to escape must be provided. Encept there es' ape routes are estrianely loss ce the number of ocevrants is very large.10 sd , to 20 min is womally assumed to be . sufficient. However, with very tall buik', ass' k has'bocese swidentjhat' evacuation by stairs can he so time conw.ing that.-d'.%Mesenat'esn 4s'4sepractical (4). 3 in such buildings sufficient f .t resi'stanceTo withstasils'lumo' dol the contents' f must be provided. .
. ' . s l ';.~ry,J.{ ' 'y.4.' .: '. ~~-
35-@j$fe es is deiev. ._ Provision of fire resistanc ? bensid thasset . _ . preven
. uincJ tarpely be economic s msederations. Ayecen,t,igudf ' spliams fire.
, redstance of structures (111hs s siwAr .- d.lvsa,*poten. *
. . . . .t.1.hni I ... . . . . . . . . ..' 1 Newe.-lhormai syce usual On %e 4.4 .fdeu,.c ..asm.reutr$&g n anivuh.i., j,. -
a sintes teges aw.4 k fiel sist,M l . . . ef rieppAseg. Uwi , 4 paper is pact of the s1Wehud.Jourase '4 air - ,;' ; bf tsir -d *- Ameriewn Susiet) el Cnit fJgilieers..Vec . e i.as ; .
, Wwn.Hed few teview for gwssNe pwNeenfiesa 2)s= , . '. J, h. . v.J'
', ' teel lemhnaric Fcke. p*selltepse et Jett liecest (*iwucil id ('arunie.1,Ustas a.Can,ars.P. .J 7,,,, ,* .4 . v(.Natkwel .' - a . , :* , *. " .~.'
36teseorch (Miirt. Fire MeteurthM ' ~ asismet ReicarJh . *
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Caesacil id Canada. (htats.. .
.Canada.
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" - M tialit uoulJ be uneconomical to proside any fire protection besonJ that inherent in the structure, prosiJed sueh (ire resistance is sufheient to allom esacu.inon bs the occupants. BmlJings representmg a small khs espectation are those that are small in site and not saluable; those mi : no saluable suntents: thqse for shich the probabiht) of a serious fire is los tr.g.gcompletel) sprinkloed t uilJ- 8 innt or those hasing a low fire load.1he uw el unproteeted steel columns I in such buildings is generall) justified if these elements hase the mmimal fire resistance required to present loss of life.
Accordingl), the writers base insestigated the fire resistanee of unprote61eJ steel columns b) methods of numerical calculation and b) full.seale fue tv t-
,, m their laborator). mith a sica to Jescloping simple espressions for cal.ulaimg the fire resistance of these building elements. b Test Meticos sae camex Team saatuse On this continent. Imo test methods are acceptable. The most recent ASTM Standard prescribing these is Ell 941 (161. .
The older load test requires a sample at seast 9 ft in length in N tested unJer an applicJ load calculated to develop theeretical mocking stresses contem. plated by the design. The column is requised to sustain the applicJ load for a period of fire esposure equal to that for which classification is desireJ. The sewer alternate test of protection for structural steel columnt requires that a sample at least 8 ft in length be tesled in a veetical position without applied load. This test is applicable when the protection is not requirrJ by
- design to carry any part of the column load. The applied protection must be revirained against longitudinal thermal expansion greater than that of the steel column. Temperatures are measured by a: least three thermocouples located at each e'l four lesels feross sections). The upper and lomet lesels are 2 ft from the ends of the steel column and the two insermediate levels are equall) spaced. The test is considered successfulif the transmission of heat through
, the protection during the period of fire esposure for which classification is l
desired, does not raise the average (arithmeticall traiperature of the steel to any lesel above 1.000' F (.94* C). ce above 1.200' F (649' C) at any one of the measured points. . The 1.0tW F average a!!omable temperature that usually determines the fire enJurance time in a test ma) be regarded as a critical temperature for structural 8 failure established fof protectrd columns as a Msult of man c fire tests on asially
, loadsd column sections. Thus, for the analysis o this paper,it has_been assumed that~ structural failure is imminent mhen the steel cross section att.aJns an agerare ITinperature os i.tui t_ as all calcul.shons arm iirs tests sete made on the
, Fa~su ur heai conJuction.alang.
While complete theoretical' justification for the use'of ternperature eviteria is be)ond the scope of this paper. ,it can rendil) be shown that 1.tav F is a teasonable salue. Foe long columns assuming that the member is uniferml) heateJ. the buckling stress is given b> Euler's formula: S l er,, a . . . . .
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At elevated temperatures failurt is due .:to,'occu.r . .a <. s.the.left. .v hand sides .
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Uung Fig.1. bewd on <14ta ter'otted. try tagbo. E' g .Say. %(C of. h .it' found '. ;. i Ihat of lendcJthe tempe solumns (9) have atuteshown Osat at twkling the poi "of an is ererolismoIcly'ijdsnum'M4 * *:
- matel) the point et t hish the solurai14c.idei) T'o Hofe%ystwether iff F-130',' . ' . e.
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- ST! T F t.45' C.itiCitise in temperature before complete failure of th ulu o,; eor s -
Thus failure of colu'nns can be espected at cruss.secteunal temperatutes et from 9.sv F l.0$v F. t310' C.565' C). Jerending on the design method ane sknderness ratio. A value of 1.000* F has been assumed as a reasonabic averag! for any column. as has been inJicated b) the ASTM fire test slanJ4fd. . Tss.snatuns R,se as Uw=otscres Stsu Causes 1 l l Ihe solumn is esposed on four sides to the heat of a fire that follous apriosi. rn. del) the ten.perature. time sourse prescribed in ASTAf Elfv foi the stand.oJ
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fine of "conitolled essent anJ wverity." Heat is transfertrJ from the flames ! in the furnace and from the furnace malls to lhe specimen b) contestism and t aJulion. with radiation as the primary mechanism when the flames hase suffi. cient thi,ckness(lit).The coefficient of heat transfer tihe cusmiss or heat receiwd A. _pt'r YrUf Jtea af the eutufNn. Dfr UPHf time antf terrimersture difference A tw 6.n _the column surface and forel Jer< ends e.1 many factors. The most significant are; emeunit) of the flamest thickness of the flames between furnaec malls anJ column: sire of specimen: anJ thermal proper 1ics of the furn.see malls. ; ISpesimental data (5) have indicated that the heat transfer to the specimen ! in test furnnes approsiar"cr the tafative heat transfer from a black boJ) at the so-called "furnace temperature." Similar heat transfer may also oc espe st. ! ' ed in most building itres because the flames are luminous and usually hase cot.sidershle thickness giving them a correspondingly high emissisity. The coefficient of heat transfer can vary significantly, however, for different inJisidual conditions, and the effect of varying this quantity wit! be esamincJ Liter herein. . - ' Canaates ce Tamuutuir lhes ' Teo.Dimeannenal Nunnetical Precedure-To deterraine'the temperature distri. bution in mtsshe square steel columns, a nomNr of.cafculatiom based sm a luo.dimenskmal procedure (121 mete carticd out.Js,these tests black boJ)
. radiation at the prescribed furnace temperature esa' assumed as the only m$ctw l nism of heat 3I transfer. The two equations used foriAer.w .tio.n alcula "
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for the temperature at any point 'eside the stol r(d. .o..,. , is empressed in degrees Rankine and i in'. hosts, it 4hrd}'ad
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Fi EPE5157ANCE a1 575 , term. e.. in Fy 3 is, strictly speAing, a material and tempera re endent i
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I ggg _ in the range of 0.x3 to 0.9311.1) a salue of 0.9 was used, although the results indicated that a salue of 0.95 would have been more appropriate.
- The Jerendence of the therm 41 properties of steel o,n temperature ass taken E into aauunt en the calculations.1he material props used were JerkeJ TABLE 1.-Thermal Propeetles ed Steel
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Volumetric heat especity. The, mal conductivity.
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- 1 Cakulated temperature profiles for a Ha. tilf2 40 nguer's w'prefected steel column see shown in Fig. 2 as 4,4enn hnterveh.~~5isnlO tirofiirs foi a 12.in. .
*I' to.304 ml square column are shown la Fia. 3 alth M. cole' sad M min of fire j'
'. esposure. Fig. .kH shoes that al 60 min the fahim'um eensehiuir difference ,.',-
between the surface and the core des 22P F (12P Cfaial thewmperature at .
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