ML20209E960

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Informs That Commissioner Gilinsky Requested Looking Into Desirability of Asking NSC to Initiate Interagency Study on Returning reactor-produced Plutonium to Us.Recommends That NRC Suggest full-scale NSC Study & Forwards Draft Ltr
ML20209E960
Person / Time
Issue date: 09/12/1975
From: Huberman B
NRC
To: Anders, Gilinsky, Kennedy, Mason, Rowden, The Chairman
NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
Shared Package
ML20209E648 List:
References
NUDOCS 9907150188
Download: ML20209E960 (3)


Text

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WASHINGTON, D, C. 20555 j C. %, ,,

g . k, Wa cog September 12, 19~

MEMORANDUM FOR Chairman Anders Commissioner Gilinsky Commissioner Kennedy Commissioner Mason Commissioner oude FROM: Ben Huberman ,

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SUBJECT:

RETURN OF REACTOR-PRODUCED PLUTONIUM TO THE UNITED STATES As a follow up to your discussion with Myron Kratzer on the Tarapur fuel shipment, Commissioner Gilinsky asked that we look into the desirability of asking NSC to initiate an interagency study on return-ing reactor-produced plutonium to the United States.

The appropriate NSC mechanism for doing such a study would be the Verification Panel Working Group on non-proliferation. During the preparations for the suppliers' meetings, the VPWG looked briefly at the question of leasing reactor fuel to foreign recipients rather than selling as we do now. However, the subject was not formally studied and the emphasis for purposes of the present suppliers' discussions has remained on regional reprocessing centers.

While there are u Joubtedly formidable legal and practical obstacles to this course, as Kratzer suggested, I think it would be appropriate for NRC to suggest a full-scale NSC study of the subject. I have prepared the attached draft letter from the Chairman to Dr. Kissinger suggesting that an interagency study be undertaken.

I would appreciate your con': rants by September 19. -

Attachment:

Draft Ltr. to Dr. Kissinger

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.1mpummes _ s Draft Letter to -

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

As you are aware, the problem of the ultimate disposition of the plutonium produced overseas in U.S.-supplied reactor fuel is one of the most formidable issues which the United States faces in the aress l

of export control and non-proliferation. We believe this probicm will become more acuce in the near future as the expansion and proliferation of indigenous reprocessing capability in recipient countries increase.

We are familiar with the work which has been done and which is continuing within the U. S. government and in the international non-proliferation community on the possibility of utilizing regional reprocessing centers as a solution to the problem of disposing of the plutonium produced in exported reactor fuel.

We believe that a second approach to this problem, which could serve either as an alternative or a complement to regional reprocessing, might be presented by provisions for the U.S. repurchase or lease of exported reac, tor fuel. Suchameasurewouldofcourserequireachangeinthelong-standi[g United States policy on reprocessing, as reflected in our existing Agree-ments for Cooperation with recipient countries. It would also entail significant implications for international safeguards, for domestic environmental concerns, for economic and balance of payments effects and for international negotiations. These implications would differ as between the case where such a policy were adopted by the United States unilaterally 6

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Dr. Kissinger and the preferable case of its integration into uniform export policies by major supplier nations. To our knowledge, this subject has not been fully assessed by the U.S. government agencies involved in non-prolifera-tion and export policy, at least recently. The Commission would like to suggest that the Verification Panel Working Group on non-proliferation undertake an interagency study of this subject to assess its complex implications and evaluate the aesirability of incorporating it into U.S.

export policy.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff would be available to participate in such a study, particularly in areas where its expertise might be of i i

special value, such as the domestic implications. I Sincerely, William A. Anders Chairman e

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