ML20209F186

Requests That Meeting with Commission Be Scheduled at First Opportunity This Wk to Discuss Listed Items.Draft Plan for Action for Meeting Encl.Recommends That Person Make 30 Minute Unclassified Talk on Listed Talking Points

ML20209F186
Person / Time
Issue date:	09/17/1975
From:	Gossick L NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To:	Anders, Gilinsky, Kennedy, Mason, Rowden, The Chairman NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
Shared Package
ML20209E648	List: ML20209E644 ML20209E893 ML20209E909 ML20209E923 ML20209E934 ML20209E941 ML20209E953 ML20209E960 ML20209E972 ML20209E989 ML20209F147 ML20209F186 ML20209F190 ML20209F200 ML20209F211
References
NUDOCS 9907150254
Download: ML20209F186 (10)

Text

' ;. . r UNITED STATES -

f NdCLEAR REGULATORY. COMMISSION s

w Asmwovow, p. c. aoss s ,

SEP 1 7 1975 Chairman Anders .

' Comunissioner Gilinsky i Commissioner Kennedy Commissioner Mason

• 1 Commissioner Bowden MEETING BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY 0FFICIALS ON NUCLEAR EXPORT -

POLICIES - OCTOBER 22, 1975 '

,I would like to discuss with the Commission the following item at the first opportunity this week. .

i The enclosure is a draft Plan of Action for the subject meeting.' ERDA l organizers have discussed NRC participation in this meeting with Connissioner Mason and J. D. Lafleur, ISP. We are being asked to make a presentation on

" Export Licensing and Regulatory Outlook."

I reconanand that our person make a 30 minute unclassified talk on the following " talking points":

1. Export License Procedures

2. Status of Licansing Actions

3. NRC Cooperative Arrangements with Other Countries.

ERDA would lika to have a list of NRC " talking points" and the name of the NRC speakers by the close of business Friday, September 19, 1975. Por speakers, I suggest either (a) a Commissioner, (b) L. V. Gossick, Executive Director for Operations, or (c) Joseph D. Lafleur, Acting Director, Office

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of International and State Programs. -

3, v. Ge**k Lee V. Gossick

• Executive Director for Operations *

Enclosure:

Draft Plan of Action for October 22 Meeting cc w/ enc 1: -

L. V. Gossick J. D. Lafleur

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DRAFT PLAN OF ACTION FOR MEETING SETWEEN GOVERNMENT & INDUSTRY OFFICIALS

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NUCLEAR EXPORT POLICIES <

4 Background

• As a result of top level disctissions between ACDA (I' kle, Davies) and -

ERDA (Seamans, Pri) and at the suggestion of ACDA it was agreed that it *

• would be useful for Government representatives to meet with a small group of Industrial organizations to improve communications on international issues and considerations concerning nuclear exports, particularly as -

related to nonproliferation objectives. The following relates to a first meeting between Government and Industry representati.ves on the subject.

1. Timina: Tentatively Wednesday, October 22, 1975 - 9:00 - 12:00 a.m.

2. Location: Washington, D.C. (specific location to be determined -

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~ ither ERDA Mass. Avenue or Germantown Office) -

3. Purpose & Scope of Meeting: To review with industry representatives international issues and considerations concerning nuclear exports, particularly from the standpoint of nonproliferation objectives. Meeting should be classified.

4.

Participants:

Government - ACDA, ERDA (Assistant Administrator Level)1.

NRC and State. Industry - Babcock & Wilcox, Bechtel, Burns &

Roe, Combustion Engineering, General Electric, General Atomic, h A participants - ANE, ANS, AIA, and ISL e

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2 NUS, Stone & ' debater, Westinghouse (President and Vice '

President Level).1

5. Ananda: (Agency to lead discussion in parentheses) s.

Introduction - Overall Meeting Obfective (ERDA-Seamans/Fri),

b. Issues and Agenda (ERDA-Sievering) ,,.

c.

Overall International Considerations (State-Kratzer)

d. Nonproliferation Objectives, Approaches and Problems (ACDA-Ikle)

e. Nuclear Safeguards Programs (ERDA-ANS)

f. Export Licensing and Regulatory Outlook (NRC)

g. Open Discussion (ERDA-Sievaring)

Consideration also being given to inviting firms in the enrichment technology field as well as scheduling a separate afternoon meeting with them: Electro-Nuclu nics, Inc./ Atlantic Richfield Co. (CENIAR), Exxon Nuclear Company, Garrett Corporation, and Uranium Enrichment Associates. Othe.r firms which could be included are: Goodyear Aerospace Corporation, United Technologies Corporation (Pratt-Whitney), General Atomic, and Boeing.

Firms in the~ chemical reprocessing field, which could be combined with this group,are: Allied General Nuclear Services, Exxon, GE, NFS, Bechtel, and Flour.*

• Meeting with above firms now being considered at a later date. *

. . i DISTRIBUTION NO. OF COPIES Secretary 5 Chairman Anders 4 Commissioner Rowden 2 Commissioner Mason 3 ,

commissioner Gilinsky 2 Commissioner Kennedy 3 Exec. Dir. for Operations 2 Asst. Exec. Dir. for Operations 1 Congressional Affairs 2 General Counsel 5 Exec. Legal Director 2 Administration 3 Policy Evaluation 2 International & State Programs 3 Nuclear Material Safety &

Safeguards 2 Materials & Fuel Cycle Facility Licensing 1 Safeguards 1 4

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g i 18 Sep I')75 ,

Meeting Between Government and Industry _ Officials on U.S. Non-Proliferstion Policios Talking Points _for_Myron B. Kratzer, Acting Asst.

Secretary DES .

Overal'1 International Considerations 1 I. Historical A. Initial development and objectives of " Atoms for Peace" program:

-- The Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

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-- The " bilateral" period; research and test

. reactor assistance.

- .Early Agrcoments for Cooperation. i B. The Growth of Power Reactor Cooperation (the decade beginning in early 1960's): l

-- USG policies stimulating this cooperation:

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- Declassification of civil power reactor technology.

-l The Euratom program. .

Specific technology exchange arrangements.

. Fuel supply policies. ,

-- USG support for the IAEA._

- -- The evolution of the "Poucr" Agreement for Cooperation. .

C. Early 1970's to Prcsont .

'. utMTdl. development of a competitive nuclear s e'

'll* 5 C

] f\ h .,....c-.!LEindustry

.rt t fuelabroad.

supply policy.

n. con *L , p' y!>bg)vQving US 1

-- Impact of proposed agreements with Ecypt/

Israel and the Indian nuclear c.xplosive test.

s 1 -- Evolutjon of. t'ho TAEA ca'f egua rds of f v- '

its roIc in NPT. Enclosure 3 (Cont

- Pana i of 3 s

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I Physical security considerations.

-- Changing attitudes of the Congress and public toward international nuclear cooperat. ion.

II. State Department Objectives A. Support of U.S. foreign policy objectives:

-- Foreign trade.

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-- General technical and political objectives. -

1 I I B. ' Reducing western world dependence'on imported 1 j

oil (IMA) : '

-- Cooperative programs with possible industry l impact:

I IEA R&Dp 'rogram (involves waste disposal, reactor safety and, prospectively, chemical processing and uranium exploration, mining and milling). l  !

Possible transfer of U.S. enrichment l technology.  !

C. Lessening the prospects for nuclea!r weapons proliferation:

2.

-- Carefully conceived nuclear cooperation fosters, rather than hinders, this objective.

-- The need for cooperation among supplier l nations: I

• • • Role of.the U.S. as leader!in non-proliferation.

-- Major elements in carrying out U.S. objectives (some interrelated):

• • • Agreements for Cooperation. -

. Nuclear export licensing (NRC and Commerce) .

Controls on sensitive nuclear technology //

(10CFR810).

Participation in NPT. ,

Participation and assistance in strengthening IAEA safequards.

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Bilateral and multilateral negotiations (e . g . , Supp]iers' Meeting).

Enclosure 3 (Cont'd.) '

, Page 2 of 3

III. S1 ate Department Operative Role A. Participation in developing general USG .

non-proliferation policy.

B. Negotiation of international arrangements f related to non-proliferation.

C. Participation in development and negotiation of Agreements for Cooperation. '

. D. Represents Executive Branch in NRC export and import licensing actions.

E. Assessm'ent of political implications of non- l proliferation developments and prospective policies. .

IV. Attitudes and actions of other major nuclear nations

'V. Attitude and role of the Congress A. In Agreements for Cooperation. ,

B. In efforts to restrict or limit cooperation: 3

-- Export Reorganization Act of 1975.

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-- Bills to permit exports only to NPT parties; .

cut off U.S. exports to other nations export-ing chemical processing technology without I adequate controls, etc.

C. Reactions to developments a, broad: ,

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-- The FRG-Brazil agreement. -

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-- Korea, South Africa, etc. .

VI. Summary. ,

' I A. Where we stand today in efforts to balance often$ i conflicting objectives and prensures and maintain  !

the U.S. credibility as a supplier without sacrificing our non-proliferation goals.

Enclosure 3 (Cont'd.)

Page 3 of 3 cc: ACDA - D. Oyster H. Dengelsdorf .

M. Kratacr -

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- Meeting Between Government.and Industry

! Officials on Nuc1 car Export Policies l

Talking Points for Dr. Fred C. Ikle, Director, ACDA General

. The general structure of ACDA's remarks is to cover briefly most of ACDA's major points in order to stimulate industry's response on those points of immediate concern to industry, while at the same time giving something of an overview. These points will include our nuclear non-proliferation objectives and principal approaches to achieving those objectives.

At this time these talking' points will be limited to confidential classification. If the meeting is arranged for the. secret level of classii'ication, these points would become more specific and that portion covering the nucicar suppliers discussions would be expanded as well as being made more specific.

Talking Points

-- The fundamental, near term, objective of nuclear non-proliferation is to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries without placing undue constraint on nucicar energy growth. As a fall-back in those countries where this objective has not

'bec.i or in the future may not be achieved, tlic f all-back objective is to inhibit the future growth of nuclear weapon development within those countries.

-- While there are meass to help atta'in the overall objective outside of nuclear energy such as mutual security arrangements and overa1] economic means including alternate energy mixes, today remarks ,.

will be confined to nuclear energy.

-- There are four, interrelated major approaches toward achieving our objective of stopping the spread of nuclear weapons:

Non-Proliferation Treaty International Safeguards and Phytical Security and IAEA Enclosure 3 (Cont'd.)

,,- Page 1 of 3 I'

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Common Nuclear Supplier Policies U.S. Nuclear Exports Poli *cy and l ., o Imp 1cmentation ,.

-- Related to the NPT, the Rc' view Conference in May reaffirmed support of and future strengthening of -

the NPT by the three principals

• and other members.

Ratification by Korea and Euratom countrics-this year i was encouraging, and now opportunities to urge l significant countrics like Japan and Spain to join I the NPT will continue to be explored and implemented. l 1

-- Related to the NPT is IAEA and safeguards, i i Successful detection of diversion of SNM is '

l cxtren.ely important and the effectiveness of detection I can be strengthened. The principal safeguard method is inspection related to material accountancy which is being increasingly supplenented by measurement, scaling-locking, and surveillance. ACDA has a small '

l but important RGD program aimed at material accountancy

. and these suppicmental measurements, seals-locks and l surveillance.

-- International safeguards differ in very ,

significant ways from U.S. and other national domestic safeguards. For exampic, the U.S. has extensive means l -to control the nuclear industry and extensive access i' to facilities. IAEA has no control over national industries and inspection access to facilities is constrained. In addition, for a nation intent upon diversion, the IAEA and that nation are cl.carly adversaries. While the extensive U.S. safeguard developments have considerabic applicability, the problem is clearly quite different. .

-- Physical security is important especially relative to sub-nationals and terrorists. The IAEA has only an advisory role. Its revised grey book l contains improved guidance for physical security.

I A physical security symposium is under consideration j for late next spring, with the possibility of an

• • U.S., UK, and USSR Enclosure 3 (Cont'd.)

Page 2 of 3

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l international convention on physical security 1ater. ~

Clearly ERDA and NRC have much to co,ntribute from their U.S. oriented, physical security programs.

-- Nuclear suppliers discussions involving seven major countries are underway with significant progress to date. These discussions are extremely sensitive. 1 However progress has been made in a number of areas I

j including: I 1

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App?.ications of safeguards to all

, i significant exports  ;

Constraint on Pu reprocessing Limiting technology transfer to a

, third country Assurance of adequate physical security l

arrangements within the recipient l country  ;

Special restraints relative to some l countrics l

-- U.S. nuc1 car export policy is extremely impor-tant in our foreign policy and in our non-proliferation policy. ACDA has a role along with State, NRC and often ,

DOD. While State will primarily cover this, ACDA l particularly supports: continued constraint in sensitive portions of the fuel cycle, especially U enrichment and Pu reprocessing; restraint toward sensitive countrics like Libya; and caution relative to advanced reactors using SNM.

-- Congress represents an increasing forum relative to all aspects and viewpoints of nuclear, export activities.

Concerns from proliferation and U.S. nuc1 car industry export sales viewpoints mix with various concerns from '

the U.S. public. Clearly bot.. the Executive Branch and U.S. industry should continue and strengthen our interaction with Congress in constructive ways.

Enclosure 3 (Cont ' d. )

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