ML20245A294

Proposed Tech Specs Re Limiting Conditions for Operation & Surveillance Requirements for Containment Isolation Valves

ML20245A294
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	06/13/1989
From:	TOLEDO EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20245A227	List: ML20245A225 ML20245A292 ML20245A294
References
NUDOCS 8906210192
Download: ML20245A294 (5)

Text

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- , . Docket Number:50-346' License Number NPF-3 Serial Number 1667 j Attachment I ~l FORINFORMAT10N ONLY CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 1

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES l

LIMITING CONDITION FOR'0PERATION l

3.6.3.1 The containment isolation valves specified.in Table 3.6 ,

i. shall be OPERABLE with isolation times as shown in Table 3.6-2.  :

4 APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.~

ACTION:

With one or more of the isolation valve (s) specified in Table 3.6-2 inoperable, either:  ;

L a. Restore the inoperable valve (s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, or

b. Isolate each affected penetration'within.4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of -

at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation.

position, or

c. Isolate each affected penetration within 4-hours 'by use of at -

least one closed manual valve or blind flange; or

d. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within'the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and -

in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

I SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4. 6. 3.1.1 The isolation valves specified in Table 3.'6-2 shall be I demonstrated OPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work is performed ~ on the valve  ;

or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by performance af a cycling test and verification of isolation time. .

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT.1 3/4 6-14 8906210192 890613 PDR ADOCK 05000346 P FDC .,

- , Docket Number 50-346 License Number NPF-3 Serial Number 1667 y j t E2 p ' eat (jp Attachment 1 Page 6 gg jg gzigg ,g g h.{,gy CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 4.6.3.1.2 Each isolation valve specified in Table 3.6-2 shall be I demonstrated GTERABLE during the COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING MODE at least once per 18 months by: l

a. Verifying that on a containment isolation test signal, each i automatic isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.

b. Verifying that on a Containment Purge and Exhaust isolation <

test signal, each Purge and Exhaust automatic valve actuates I to its isolation position. l l

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DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 6-15

. Docket Number 50-346

.

• License Number NPF-3 Serial Number 1667 Attachment 1 Page 7 TABLE 3.6-2 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (Continued)

PENETRATION VALVE ISOLATION NUMBER NUMBER FUNCTION TIME (seconds)

• 29 DH11 Decay Heat Pump Suction Line N/A 3*-

• 2 DH23 Decay Heat Pump Suction Line N/A l l 29 # PSV4849 Decay Heat Pump Suction Line N/A  ;

35 # AF599 Auxiliary Feedvater Line N/A i 36 # AF608 Auxiliary Feedvater Line N/A 37 # FV601 Main Feedvater Line N/A 38 # FV612 Main Feedvater Line N/A

• • 39 # MS100 ' Main Steam Line N/A- )

• • 39 # ICS11A Main Steam Line N/A 39 # MS375 Main Steam Line N/A 39 # MS100-1 Main Steam Line N/A

• 39 # MS107 Main Steam Line N/A

• 39 # M5107A Main Steam Line N/A

• 40 # MS106 Main Steam Line N/A

• 40 # M5106A Main Steam Line N/A J

• • 40 # MS101 Main Steam Line N/A'

• • 40 # ICS11B Main Steam Line N/A 40 # MS394 Main Steam Line N/A 40 # MS101-1 Main Steam Line N/A 41 RC113 Pressurizer Quench Tank Inlet Line N/A 42A . SA502 Service Air Supply Line N/A 42B CV124 Containment Vessel Air Sample Return N/A 43A IA501 Service Air Supply Line N/A l 43B CV125 Containment Vessel Air Sample I Return N/A i 44A CF15 Core Flood Tank Fill and Nitrogen Supply Line N/A 44B NN58 Pressurizer Quench Tank Inlet Line N/A

• 47A CF2A Core Flood Tank Sample Line N/A l *47A CF2B Core Flood Tank Sample Line N/A i *47B CF5A Core Flood Tank Vent Line N/A l *47B CF5B Core Flood Tank Vent Line N/A l

j DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 6-21 Amendment No. 3,114, 127

, Docket Number 50-346 i

."L'icense Number NPF-3 ,

Serial Number 1667 I

. aciment 1 ' TABLE 3.6-2 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (dontinuec )

PENETRATION VALVE ISOLATION' NUMBER NUMBER FUNCTION TIME '

(seconds) J 49 DHB7 Refueling Canal Fill Line N/A 49 DH88 Refueling Canal Fill Line N/A 50 # HP48 High Pressure Injection Line N/A i 50 # HP2C High Pressure Injection Line N/A i 50 MU6421 RCS Makeup Line N/A 52 MU242 RCP Seal Vater Supply N/A }

53 HU243 RCP Seal Vater Supply N/A 54 MU244 RCP Seal Vater Supply N/A 55 MU245 RCP Seal Water Supply N/A 59 Flange Secondary Side Cleaning (Inside  !

Containment) N/A- j 59 Flange- Secondary Side Cleaning (Outside i Containment) N/A l

57 # MS603 Steam Generator Blovdown Line N/A 60 # MS611 Steam Generator Blovdown Line N/A l ]

I 67 CV209 Hydrogen Dilution System Supply N/A  !

69 CV210 Hydrogen Dilution System Supply N/A 71A # CV2000B Containment Fressure Sensor N/A I 71C CFl6 Core Flood Tank Nitrogen Fill Line N/A ,

72A # CV2001B Containment Pressure Sensor N/A 72C # CV624B Containment Pressure Differential Transmitter- N/A 73A # CV2002B Containment Pressure Sensor N/A 73C # CV645B Containment Pressure Differential Transmitter N/A 74A # CV2003B Containment Pressure Sensor N/A

• 74C DB2735 Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray N/A

• 74C DH2736 Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray N/A

• May be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control.

1. Not subject to Type C leakage tests.

• • Surveillance testing not required prior to entering MODE 4 but shall be performed prior to entering Mode 3.

1. 1. Provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable provided the valve is in the closed positions and deactivated.

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 6-22 Amendment No. 3,31,79,112,114, 127-1

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. Docket Number.50-346 License Number NPF-3 Serial Number 1667 Attachment 2 i Page 1 SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION Description of Proposed Technical Specification Change The purpose of this significant hazards consideration is to review a proposed change to the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Technical Specification (TS).

3/4.6.3.1, containment Isolation Valves, Table 3.6-2. This request proposes to' apply an existing Table 3.6-2 footnote'to decay heat removal valve DH23 j vhich vill clarify that the valve is not subject to 10CFR50, Appendix A,. Type C testing. Valve DH23 is a normally locked closed, manually operated- .

j containment isolation valve, located inside the containment vessel in series j with valve DH21 (also normally closed) in the bypass line around valves DH11 and DH12, decay heat pump suction isolation valves. Type C testing of valve DH23 is not required since the valve does not meet the criteria which requires ',

Type C testing. The Technical Description (Attachment 1) discusses this change in detail.

Significant Hazards Consideration The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has provided standards in 10CFR50.92(c) for determining whether a significant hazard exists. A proposed amendment to an Operating License for a facility involves no significant hazards if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed changes vould not: . 1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; 2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or 3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration because the operation of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit Number 1, in accordance with this change vould:

1. Not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because no operating requirement of valve DH23 is changed. As a containment integrity boundary, any potential leakage past valve DH23 vould be contained in the closed loop system.

[10CFR50.92(c)(1)]

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2. Not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because no operating requirement of valve DH23 is changed. On matters related to nuclear safety, all accidents are bounded by previous analysis and no new malfunctions are involved.

[10CFR50.92(c)(2)]

3. Not involve a significant reduction in a 'argin of safety because the assumptions in the USAR remain unchanged .1d the containment integrity function of valve DH23 is not changed. [10CFR50.92(c)(3)]

Conclusion Based on the discussion above, it is concluded that the proposed change not involve a significant hazards consideration.

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