RBG-25281, Annual Operating Rept for 850829-860228
| ML20213A581 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 01/28/1987 |
| From: | Booker J GULF STATES UTILITIES CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| RBG-25281, NUDOCS 8702030368 | |
| Download: ML20213A581 (10) | |
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1 GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY RIVER BEND STArlON POST OFFICE 80X 220 ST FRANCISVILLE, LOUIStANA 70775 ARE A CODE 604 635-6094 346 8651 b January 28, 1987 RBG- 25281 File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.5 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlement:
River Bend Station - Unit 1 Docket No. 50-458 Gulf States Utilities Company (GSU) hereby submits its annual report in accordance with 10CFR50.59(b). This report describes the facility and procedural changes, and test and experiments conducted without prior NRC approval .from August 29, 1985 (Operating License issued) to February 28, 1986.
Sincerely,
. f. Be~h
. E. Booker Manager-River Bend Oversight River Bend Nuclear Group JEB/E je cc: Mr. Robert D. Martin, Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, TX 76011 NRC Resident Inspector l \
8702030368 870128 PDR ADOCK 05000458 R PDR
9 SECTION A - PLANT MODIFICATIONS This section contains brief descriptions of and reasons for plant modifications completed between August 29, 1985 (Operating License issued) and February 28, 1986, and summaries of the safety evaluations for those changes, pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR, Part 50.59.
The basis for inclusion of a Modification Request (MR) and temporary alterations in this report is " Field Work Completed" in the time frame of interest.
MODIFICATION REQUESTS MR-85-0159 DOWNGRADE HVAC CHILLED WATER REFRIGERANT PUMP OUT UNITS (Fig. 9.2-8h,j) TO NON-SAFETY RELATED DESCRIPTION AND BASIS: The control building chilled water pump out units on HVK*CHLIA, B, C & D were down graded from safety related to non-safety related.
These units are a service item used only during maintenance to pump refrigerant to/from storage tank and chilled compressor. Downgrading will reduce maintenance documentation requirements. Only the Piping & Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID) is affected in the FSAR.
SAFETY EVALUATION: This change does not impact the function of any safety related equipment since the subject units are not part of the chiller freon cycle during chiller op<3 ration. The downgraded units will still remain seismically mounted.
MR-85-0221 INSTALL RESTRICTING ORIFICE ON HIGH PRESSURE CORE (Fig. 9.2-lb) SPRAY (HPCS) DIESEL JACKET WATER COOLER DESCRIPTION AND BASIS: The HPCS diesel jacket water heat exchanger was experiencing flow much greater than that required for adequate diesel cooling. A restricting orifice (RO) was installed to the outlet side of the HPCS heat exchanger which reduce flow to approximately 950 gpm when standby service water pumps SWP*2A & C were operating. The addition of the RO will reduce the rate of erosion of the heat exchanger tubes. p&ID revision only.
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SAFETY EVALUATION: The RO size was calculated such that minimum flow through the heat exchanger is achieved. Since the RO is a passive element, it will not result in the malfunction of equipment important to safety.
MR-85-0232 INSTALL ISOLATION VALVES ON MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF (Fig. 10.3-lb) VALVE (SRV) COMPRESSORS FOR MAINTENANCE DESCRIPTION AND BASIS: Isolation valves were installed on the discharge lines of non-safety related compressors SW-C4A & B to permit maintenance on the compressors without isolating the safety related air supply to the main steam SRV's. P&ID revision only.
SAFETY EVALUATION: Addition of manual isolation valves is a minor change which does not affect the overall integrity of the air compressors or the lines on which the valves are installed.
MR-85-0274 DELETE LIQUID RADWASTE LINE INSTALLED FOR UNIT 2 (Fig. ll.2-ld)
DESCRIPTION AND BASIS: This line and valve in the liquid radwaste system was originally installed as a system tie-in to the cancelled Unit 2 plant. Its orientation was such that a significant crud trap would result after the radwaste system was operational. It was eliminated due to ALARA concerns. P&ID revision only.
SAFETY EVALUATION: Deletion of this unused section of piping and valve does not impact the operation of reliability of any plant systems or equipment but instead reduced radiological exposure to personnel.
MR-85-0323 ADD BIMETALLIC THERMOMETER TO CONTAINMENT ANNULUS (Fig. 9.4-7c) EXHAUST DESCRIPTION AND BASIS: Local temperature indicators were added to permit monitoring of the annulus exhaust gas temperature, to aid in detection of fire.
The added indicator supplements the existing containment building smoke detectors. P&ID revision only.
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SAFETY EVALUATION: This change does not affect any safety related ductwork or equipment nor any existing fire detection systems. The addition of these thermometers is for convenience only to reduce the number of required surveillances inside the annulus during operation of the plant.
MR-85-0370 INVOKE LATEST ANSI STANDARD FOR CHARCOAL ABSORBENT (Section 6.5)
DESCRIPTION AND BASIS: The change was made to permit the use of the ANSI N-509-1980 in lieu of ANSI N-509-1976. The change was made to permit purchasing charcoal under the later standard due to difficulty in purchasing charcoal under the earlier standard.
SAFETY EVALUATION: Use of the later revision of this standard does not reduce the effectiveness of the charcoal filter trains. The radiological calculations for these trains were also based on the 1980 revision.
MR-85-0643 RELOCATE HVAC INTAKE REGISTER IN CONTROL BUILDING (Fig. 9.4-lb)
DESCRIPTION AND BASIS: A 6" X 6" intake register was moved from the downstream side of two fail-closed air operated dampers to the upstream side. The previous installed condition of this register resulted in excessive out leakage during control room pressurization testing.
SAFETY EVALUATION: Relocation of this register does not affect the design or safe operation of the affected system or related dampers, but instead will permit positive control room pressure to be maintained.
MR-85-0933 CHANGE HVAC AIR FLOWS IN AUXILIARY BUILDING CUBICLES (Fig. 9.4-7d)
DESCRIPTION AND BASIS: After Auxiliary Building main exhaust system balancing, the transfer and exhaust air in certain cubicles was outside of permissible tolerances. The final accepted air flows resulted in changes to the values given on the FSAR P&ID. P&ID revision only.
SAFETY EVALUATION: The subject air does not perform any cooling function. Instead, it is for establishing the flow path from areas of low potential radioactivity. The balancing results indicated that the required flow paths were maintained as confirmed by a smoke test.
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MR-85-0942 CHANGE TO DISTRIBUTION OF AIR FLOW IN REACTOR BUILDING (Fig. 9.4-7a)
DESCRIPTION AND BASIS: After reactor building air supply balancing, the accepted distribution of air into the general areas was different from that given on the FSAR P&ID.
SAFETY EVALUATION: Although the actual values of air flow from two different outlets in the reactor building general area's were changed, the total air flow was still within the permissible tolerances of the values given on the P&ID. Neither the FSAR text nor the technical specification was impacted.
MR-85-1096 STANDBY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM P&ID (Fig. 9.2-le)
DESCRIPTION AND BASIS: Equipment identification numbers were changed and valves (which function as a vacuum release for the standby service water system) were added. These changes were made during the construction phase and the P&ID required revision.
SAFETY EVALUATION: These drawing changes are of minor significance and have no impact on the probability of a malfunction of the system. The changes reflect final design of the system.
MR-85-ll24 INCRI:ASE AIR FLOW INSIDE REACTOR DRYWELL HEAD (Fig. 9.4-8)
DESCRIPTION AND BASIS: During hot flow test of the reactor, it was determined that additional air flow was required to cool the space under the drywell head. During final air balance, the dampers were set to permit this higher flow rate. Therefore, a change to the FSAR P&ID was necessary.
SAFETY EVALUATION: The increased air flow does not have a negative impact on the safe operation of any l component in the drywell ventilation system. Air l balance tests verified that other areas in the l drywell ventilation system maintained adequate air l flow.
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TEMPORARY ALTERATIONS NOTE: Status is provided for each Temporary Alteration as of March 1, 1986 85-CND-023 PROVIDE BACKUP AIR SUPPLY TO CONDENSATE SYSTEM (Section 9.3.1.1)
DESCRIPTION AND BASIS: A piping cross tie from instrument air to service air at elevation 67 of the turbine building was installed to provide a backup source of air.
SAFETY EVALUATION: The condensate service air and instrument air systems are not safety related and this change will not affect the safety analysis.
STATUS: In place 85-EGS-001 DISCONNECT VIBRATION INSTRUMENTATION FROM (Section 8.3.1.1) EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DESCRIPTION AND BASIS: Vibration sensor to Div. I diesel generator turbocharger, which indicates
- excessive wear, was disconnected after confirming the instrument was causing spurious trips of the diesel generator.
SAFETY EVALUATION: The turbocharger high vibration shutdown switch is bypassed during emergency i operation of the diesel generator; therefore, it is not required in order to perform its safety related function.
STATUS: In place 85-HVK-021,022, DISABLE 'OFF' POSITION OF CONTROL SWITCH FOR HVAC 023,024 CHILLER OIL PUMPS (Section 9.2.10)
DESCRIPTION AND BASIS: Contacts in the control room jumpered out to disable 'off' position for HVAC chilled water chiller oil pump, only ' auto' and 'on' contacts used. Change enhances reliability of l chillers by insuring oil supply availability.
SAFETY EVALUATION: This change will enhance the availability of the oil supply to the chiller pumps.
The system operation remains as originally designed including protective oil pump trip functions.
STATUS: To be removed by MP 86-0221 Page 6 of 10
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85-HVK-026 CONTROL BUILDING HVAC CHILLERS LOW AIR FLOW TRIP (Section 9.2.10) RELAY REMOVED DESCRIPTION AND BASIS: Low air flow trip relays for both trains of the Control Building chiller air handling units were removed because of excessive trips. Chiller refrigerant and chilled water temperature trips remain in place to protect chillers from freezing. The removal of the low air flow signal will increase availability of the chillers which have safety related functions.
SAFETY EVALUATION: The safety evaluation failed to adequately establish the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. NRC Inspection Report 50-458/86-36 (dated 10-24-86) identified an apparent inadequate design review.
STATUS: In place 85-MWS-001 ALTERNATE DEMINERALIZED WATER SOURCE (Fig. 9.2.3a)
DESCRIPTION AND BASIS: Check Valves (1MWS-V28 & V29) internals were removed at the transfer pumps to allow an outside source of demineralized water in the event that the plant demineralizers are inoperable.
SAFETY EVALUATION: Makeup and demineralized water systems are not involved in safety analysis; therefore, the only FSAR effect is to allow alternate demineralized water source.
STATUS: Removed by MR 85-0276 85-RDS-016 MODIFICATION TO PREVENT GANG MODE OPERATION OF CONTROL (Section 4.3.2.5) ROD DRIVE (CRD) SYSTEM DESCRIPTION AND BASIS: Startup test exception to 1-ST-5 deleted testing of CRD gang mode of operation; therefore, this mode is removed from system functions. This mode is not required for operation or shutdown of the plant.
SAFETY EVALUATION: The gang mode of operation on the CRD system is not a safety related function and does not affect or inhibit other safety related functions.
STATUS: To be removed by MR 86-0452 Page 7 of 10
85-RHS-027 & 28 DISABLE RHR STEAM CONDENSING MODE ALARMS (Section 9A. 2.1. 2)
DESCRIPTION AND BASIS: Operating License NPF-47 does not allow RHR steam condensing mode operation. As a result of River Bend design and specific actions taken to disable this feature, RHR inoperable alarms were being received. To eliminate this unnecessary alarm, the signal from the steam supply shutoff valves 1RHG*MOVF051A,B and valves 1RHS*MOVF087A,B were disconnected. The remaining functions of the alarm are not effected.
SAFETY EVALUATION: The steam condensing mode is not allowed, therefore, defeating the alarms for this mode will not affect the present safety analysis which does not include this mode of operation, i STATUS: To be removed by MR 86-0380 85-RHS-029 DISABLE RHR SHUTDOWN COOLING DURING POWER OPERATIONS (Section 5.4.7.1)
DESCRIPTION AND BASIS: NRC commitment to ensure shutdown cooling mode of RHR is closed at pressures greater than 135 psig were accomplished by shutting and removing power to the above valves. As a result, the instrumentation locks in NSSS inboard and outboard isolation alarms which have additional monitoring functions. To remove the unnecessary alarms, the RHR applicable shutdown cooling valve instrumentation was disabled.
1 SAFETY EVALUATION: The RHR shutdown cooling mode is not required during power operations or in support of the safety analysis; therefore, the isolation of the systems from the reactor and disabling the instrumentation will not effect the safety analysis.
STATUS: In place 85-SAS-003 PROVIDE ALTERNATE SOURCE OF SERVICE AIR (Section 9.3.1.1)
DESCRIPTION AND BASIS: Leakage monitoring air compressor is placed into service as a backup to the
- service air system. This air compressor is an oil i free with air dryer and meets service air design requirements. The instrument air system is isolated i from this supply.
< SAFETY EVALUATION: The leakage monitoring and service air systems are not required to respond to l
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any event within the safety analysis and the additional supply will not affect the safety analysis.
STATUS: In place 85-SWP-026 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM VALVE DELETED (Section 9.2.1)
DESCRIPTION AND BASIS: Valve 1SWP*MOV61A was to be
- used as a cross tie between units 1 and 2. Unit 2 is not constructed and the line has been capped.
Therefore, the valve no longer has'a use as installed and the valve seat has been removed.
SAFETY EVALUATION: This portion of the service water system is not required for the safety analysis and the valve is not in-service; therefore, there is no effect on the safety analysis.
1 STATUS: To be removed by MR 86-0241 85-WTW-004 WASTE WATER TREATMENT ACID PUMP ISOLATION (Section 9.2.3)
DESCRIPTION AND BASIS: The second acid pump discharge check valve (lWTW-V48) was not isolating the pump from the recirculation line. To ensure
, isolation, a manual gate valve was installed and the
- system was placed under manual control.
l SAFETY EVALUATION: This system is not required by safety analysis for the safe' shutdown of the plant.
The gate valve provides additional assurance of
, isolation of acid from recirculation line when the i acid pump is not in operation.
STATUS: To be removed by MR 86-0287
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SECTION B - PROCEDURE CHANGES During this time frame, various procedures were revised within the descriptions in the safety analysis report pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59. No procedure changes were performed that constituted unreviewed safety questions.
The emergency operating procedures (EOP) were placed in effect in 1985. These site-specific procedures were derived from the BWR Owner's Group EPGs which had received prior NRC review.
Special test procedures performed were also reviewed and no unreviewed safety questions were found. No special tests which were different than those described in the safety analysis report were identified.
Procedure Revisions TEMPORARY PROCEDURES i
TP86-02 REACTOR PLANT COMPONENT COOLING WATER OPERABILITY (Section 9.2.2.1)
DESCRIPTION AND BASIS: The procedure tests reactor plant closed cooling water (CCP) system flow and pressure characteristics within present design conditions.
SAFETY EVALUATIONS: The procedure maintains the system in configurations described by the safety analysis report and the Technical Specifications, and therefore, will not exceed margins of safety used in the Safety Evaluation.
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