ML20211N265
| ML20211N265 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 12/15/1986 |
| From: | Lowry E GRUENEICH, D.M. (FORMERLY GRUENEICH & LOWRY) |
| To: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20211N234 | List: |
| References | |
| OLA, NUDOCS 8612180174 | |
| Download: ML20211N265 (13) | |
Text
_________ - ________________________ ______________ _____ _____ ____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
- O UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
)
In the Matter of: ) Docket Nos. 50-275-OLA
) and 50-323-OLA PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY )
)
(Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power )
Plant, Units 1 and 2) )
)
\
MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION I. INTRODUCTION This is a motion for summary disposition concerning the _
proposed high density "reracking" of spent fuel storage racks at !
\
the Diablo Canyon nuclear plant, Units 1 and 2. PG&E proposes to replace the original spent fuel racks with new racks that will expand from 270 to 1324 the number of spent fuel assembly racks I
at each unit. The older, low-density racks, now welded to the floor of the spent fuel pool, will be replaced with free-standing racks which can slide on the floor of the pool and collide with each other and the walls of the storage pools during an earth-quake.
Several contentions have been set for hearing. Those contentions address, inter alia, whether alternatives to the proposed reracking have been adequately considered (Mothers for Peace) and whether reports and data submitted to the NRC were adequate and accurate (Sierra Club). This motion, which addres-ses the NRC's failure to prepare an Environmental Impact State-ment, and the failure to follow the NRC's Standard Review Plan, 1
8612180174 861215 PDR ADOCK 05000275 G PDR
does not seek to prove a particular contention set for hearing.
Nevertheless, it is directly related to the contentions raised by Mothers for Peace and the Sierra Club and should dispose of the now pending license amendment application.1 This motion is brought pursuant to section 2.749 of the NRC's regulations (10 CFR S 2.749, p. 92). It has two indepen-dent legal bases. First, because the NRC has failed to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement on the Diablo Canyon reracking, it has failed to comply with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. S 4321 et seq.
Until it has done so, an amended reracking license cannot be issued.
Second, the reracking application fails to meet the NRC acceptance criteria for spent fuel storage at civilian nuclear power stations. These criteria, contained in the "OT Position for Review and Acceptance of Spent Fuel Storage and Handling Applications," have been incorporated by reference into the
" Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG-0800." Although it is under these critoria that the NRC's Safety Evaluation was ostensibly done, it is clear that the design currently before the NRC fails to meet these criteria. Because of this failure, and because there has been no request to evaluate the racks under a different 1
Indeed, the basis for the second part of this motion, relating to the Standard Review Plan, NUREG-0800, did not become evident until after PGGE supplied various technical reports and articles in response to a discovery request. Those documents are discussed in this motion.
2
standard --
a request that would require a new, independent and rigorous review of the proposed new criteria --
thu license amendment must be denied.
II. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS ABOUT WHICH THERE IS NO DISPUTE Mothers for Peace and the Sierra Club contend that the following are facts about which there is no dispute:
(1) There has been no site-specific Environmental Impact Statement prepared concerning potential environmental impacts of the Diablo Canyon reracking.
(2) NRC ataff's safety evaluation was performed pursuant to its Standard Review Procedure, NUREG-0800, which assumes that the spent fuel racks do not collide with each other or the pool walls in a postulated seismic event.
(3) The proposed high-density spent fuel racks at Diablo Canyon will collide with each other and the pool walls during the postulated Hosgri seismic event.
III. THE LICENSE AMENDMENT MUST BE DENIED BECAUSE THE NRC HAS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF NEPA AND PREPARE AN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT Prior to making a licensing decision concerning a proposed action which might significantly affect the environment, NEPA requires the preparation of an environmental impact statement
("EIS") regarding the possible environmental effects of the proposed action. 42 U.S.C. S 4332(2)(c). It is undisputed that no such EIS was prepared for the Diablo Canyon reracking; nor is any planned. Instead, the NRC haa merely prepared an Environmen-tal Assessment ("EA") which summarily concludes that the Diablo 3
i
Canyon reracking will have no significant impact on the environ-ment.2 In some circumstances, an Environmental Assessment is a proper vehicle under which the mandates of NEPA can be met. In this case, however, the EA relies on a hopelessly outdated, seven-year old Generic Environmental Impact Statement ("GEIS").
Thus, the summary conclusions of the EA are equally out of date and defective.
NEPA requires the agency to take a "hard look" at the environmental impacts of the Diablo Canyon reracking and feasible alternatives. Kleppe v. Sierra Club 427 U.S. 409. Only a new, current, site-specific EIS can meet that requirement.
The GEIS upon which the EA relied was completed in 1979.
Although the passage of time itself would not necessarily invalidate the conclusions of the GEIS, they do so in this case because (a) there have been changes in the law, and in possible alternatives which were not considered in either the GEIS or the EA; and (b) the GEIS is based on assumptions which are neither applicable to Diablo Canyon nor distinguished in the EA.
Three years after the GEIS was completed, for example, Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. S 10101 et seq. This law established, for the first time, that the federal government has the responsibility to provide for interim storage of spent nuclear fuel for nuclear powerplants that "cannot reasonably provide adequate storage capacity at the sites 2 Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact - Spent Fuel Pool Expansion, Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, dated May 21, 1986. i 4
l l
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of such reactors when needed to assure the continued, orderly operation of such reactors." 42 U.S.C. S 10151(a)(3). Thus, federal responsibility for storage of spent nuclear fuel at Diablo Canyon is a critical alternative which should be addressed under NEPA. Yet, the GEIS' discussion of alternative federal responsibility for Diablo Canyon spent fuel is almost nonexis-tent, and this deficiency was not addressed in the EA. Similar-ly, the EA assesstr.ent contains only cursory consideration of alternatives which should be thoroughly analyzed in a detailed EIS. The EA asserts that trans-shipment of the fuel from Diablo Canyon to another reactor "would entail potential environmental impacts greater than those associated with the proposed increased storage at the Diablo Canyon Site" (Environmental Assessment, pp.
3-4), yet it does not identify which, if any, trans-shipment locations were considered and provides no basis whatsoever for its conclusion that this alternative is not feasible.
The GEIS does not discuss the seismic hazards of Diablo Canyon -- hazards unique in the field of atomic power generation.
l The EA does not remedy this deficiency, as it similarly contains no site-specific seismic analysis and simply adopts the GEIS f
conclusion that the " environmental impact costs are essentially negligible, regardless of where such spent fuel is stored."
Environmental Assessment, p. 2.
There are further deficiencies in the GEIS which render it inadequate as the required "hard look" under NEPA. It assumes that the cost of reracking will be between $1.9 and $2.2 million 5
and will involve between 868 and 833 assembly spaces. PG&E has estimated the cost of the Diablo Canyon reracking at $16 million; it involves 1324 spent fuel assembly spaces at each reactor. The GEIS looks only to spent fuel storage until the year 2000; the spent fuel will be stored at Diablo Canyon until at least the year 2008, with no guarantee that alternative storage will be available then. Similarly, the GEIS assumes that both the original and reconfigured racks will be bolted to the floor of the spent fuel storage pool. The reconfigured racks at Diablo Canyon are free standing. The EA ignores each of these factors which render the GEIS, and, hence, the conclusions of the EA, obsolete.
In light of these deficiencies and non-compliance with NEPA, it is not surprising that the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in its decision concerning whether pre-araendment hearings were required for the Diablo Canyon reracking, took the somewhat unusual step of strongly suggesting in dicta that the NRC comply with NEPA on remand:
With respect to petitioners' NEPA claims, however, we note that the site specific environmental assessment was based on a seven year old generic environmental assessment and that no worst case analysis, 40 C.F.R. S 1502.22, appears to have been conducted. We strongly suggest that any doubt concern-ing the need to supplement the NEPA documents be resolved in favor of additional documentation. San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace and the Sierra Club v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission No. 86-7297, slip op. at 8.
Clearly, NEPA requires preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement concerning the reracking at Diablo Canyon.
Unless and until that is done, the reracking amendments should be 6
)
denied. I IV. THE LICENSE AMENDMENT APPLICATION SHOULD BE SUMMARILY DISMISSED BECAUSE IT DOES NOT COMPLY WITH ESTABLISHED ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 4
PG&E's reracking application incorporates sliding racks that ,
collide with each other or the pool. walls during earthquakes.
The application has been approved-by staff as safe in reports prepared by staff and private consultants paid by staff which cite well-established acceptance criteria. These acceptance criteria state that the racks should not collide. There has been 4
S no formal request or other motion to change the acceptance criteria; nor did the agency discuss whether new and different criteria should be adopted in its safety report.
l The NRC's primary review document is titled " Safety Evalua--
l tion By the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Relating to the
}
Reracking of the Spent Fuel Pools At the Diablo Canyon Nuclear
- Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 As Related to Amendment No. 8 to Unit i
l 1 Facility Operating license No. DPR-80 And Amendment No. 6 to Unit 2 Facility Operating License No. DPR-82, Pacific Gas cnd Electric Company Docket Nos. 50-275 and 50-323 (hereinafter
" Safety Evaluation"). The Safety Evaluation relies on ' the findings of a technical report which is incorporated es an h appendix. This technical report, prepared by the Franklin i
Research Center in Philadelphia, titled " Evaluation of Spent Fuel Racks Structural Analysis Pacific Gas & Electric Company Diablo i
! Canyon Units 1 and 2, TER-C5506-625, Technical Report, (herein-1 after, " Technical Report") had as its principal author R. C.
I 7 i
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lierrick.
The foreword of the Technical Report states that its evaluation was " conducted in accordance with criteria established 4
by the NRC." Technical Report, p. v. These criteria, called Acceptance Criteria, are identified at page 3 of the Technical Report, which further defines " Principal Acceptance Criteria" as follows:
"The principal acceptance criteria for the evaluation of the spent fuel racks' structural analysis for Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 are set forth by the NRC's OT Position for Review and Acceptance of Spent Fuel Storage and Handling Applications (OT Position Paper)."
The "OT Position Paper" and its acceptance criteria, cited in the Technical Report, has been incorporated as an appendix into the NRC's Standard Review Plan, NUREG-0800.
In the main body of the Safety Evaluation, Staff notes that both it and PG&E used the same acceptance critu la from the OT Position Paper. Safety Evaluation, p '. 10. Staff stated that "These criteria were previously reviewed and accepted by the staff during other spent fuel pool expansion applicaticns, and therefore, are also acceptable for this reracking design." Id.
Nowhere in the Safety Evaluation or the Technical Report does the NRC attempt to apply or justify a new set of acceptance criteria. Yet, the acceptance c'riteria, by their terms, provide that the racks must not collide with the each other or the poo]
walls during an earthquake. Thus, the racks, as proposed, fail to meet the acceptance criteria of the Standard Review Plan, NUREC-0800.
Specifically, the Standard Review Plan classifies spent fuel 8
- _- - =_. . ___ _ - - --_ .
racks as Category I seismic equipment. Category I equipment must remain functional during earthquakes. The Standard Review Plan requires factors of safety which prohibit all Category I equip-ment from " gross sliding and overturning. " Standard R3 view Plan 7
3.8.5-7. Without gross sliding or overturning, the racks, of -
course, cannot. collide, and there is no need to write acceptance '
criteria to define acceptable collisions. Thus, while detailed criteria exist for the analysis of impacts from externally and
, internally generated missiles, dropped loads, and so forth, there was no need for, and no acceptance criteria developed to set j limits on rack-to-rack collisions.
i With the advent of free-standing racks, it is understood that there will be some rack movement along the floor of the pool. But, the acceptance criteria has been carefully written so that even though movement is allowed, rack-to-rack and rack-to-wall collisions are not. Relaxation of the standard against all rack movement is found in exceptions (a) and (b) below to the j Standard Review Procedures:
"When considering the effects of seismic loads, factors of safety against gross sliding and overturning of racks and rack modules under all probable service
- conditions shall be in accordance with the Section 3.8.8.5.II-5 of the Standard Review Plan. This position on factors of safety against sliding and tilting need not be met provided any one of the following conditions is met
(a) it can be shown by detailed nonlinear dynamic analyses that the amplitudes of sliding motion are minimal, and impact between adjacent rack modules or between a rack
] module and the pool walls is prevented provided that the factors of safety against tilting are within the values permitted by 9
Section 3.8.II.5 of the Standard Review Plan.
(b) it can be shown that any sliding and tilting motion will be contained within suitable geometric constraints such as thermal clearances, and that any impact due to the clearances is incorporated."
OT Position Paper, Section IV-6, cited in Technical Report,
- p. 5.
As can be seen by reading the OT criteria, exception (a), by its terms, prohibits impacts. Exception (b), which allows for movement within thermal clearances or other geometric con-straints, still contains no provisions that allow rack-to-rack or rack-to-wall collisions.
There is considerable evidence that both the utilities and rack designers have interpreted this OT standard and its excep-tions to prohibit any rack collisions. K. P. Singh is the vice-president for engineering at the Joseph Oat Corporation, manu-facturers of the proposed high density racks for Diablo Canyon.
Alan Soler is a consultant to Joseph Oat Corporation, and is the author of the report " Seismic Analysis of High Density Fuel Racks for Pacific Gas and Electric for Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Station" TM Report #779, Revised September, 1986. This document was provided in discovery by PG&E. Messrs. Singh and Oat published a paper titled " Seismic Response of a Free Standing Fuel Rack Construction to 3-D Floor Motion" in the professional journal Nuclear Engineering and Design 80 in 1984, also provided in discovery by PG&E. This paper discussed techniques for evaluating the effects of fuel elements rattling in a rack during an earthquake. Their criteria for acceptable motion precludes 10
rack to rack collisions:.
"In addition to stress limitations, adj acent racks must not impact during a seismic event. In the simulation herein, virtual mass effects from gaps between racks hevo been included based on adjacent rack separation equal to 3" (76.2 mm). Therefore, assuming the worst motion of adjacent racks, inter-rack impact is precluded if the maximum corner deflection of the rack in either direction is less than 50% of the rack spacing."
Meeting notes, provided by PG&E in response to a discovery request, disclose that the acceptance criteria and prohibition against collisions was also discussed by representatives of PGGE and the NRC. These December 5, 1985 notes referred to the acceptance criteria as:
" Acceptance Criteria
- Kenematic (sic) [No inter-rack impact, 1.5 against tilting]"
These are the only notes which have been provided by PG&E, but they clearly refer to exception (a) of the OT position, which prohibits inter-rack impact and states the Standard Review Plan safety margin of 1.5 egainst tilting motion.3 3
Owners of other nuclear plants have also recognized the prohibition against rack collisions. K. P. Singh and T. Lee-Ng, also of Joseph Oat Corp., published a review of several spent fuel facilities entitled " Planning Study for Experimental Measurements and Analytical Correlations of Fluid Drag of Fuel Assemblies in Fuel Rack Storage Locations," provided by PGGE through discovery in this proceeding. They cite reports from the Crystal River Unit 3 and Ocobee nuclear plants which state, for Crystal River:
"It has been concluded, therefore, that the gaps provided between storage racks (1 inch minimum) and between storage racks and pool structure (7/8 inch minimum) are sufficiently ample to preclude any rack-to-rack or rack-to-pool structure collisions under the SSE event . . .
11
Because the racks are expected to collide with each other and the pool walls, they violate tha OT acceptance criteria and the Standard Review Plan, NUREG-0800. Mothers for Peace and the Sierra Club are aware that the Standard Review Plan states that it may not represent all possible solutions and approaches.
Standard Review Plan, p. 2. Nevertheless, this reracking plan was approved by staff and consultants in the Safety Evaluation under the provisions of the Standard Review Plan, without an attempt to justify non-standard review criteria, if indeed any were ap-plied.4 Accordingly, the license amendment must be denie'd.
Dated: December 15, 1986 Respectfully submitted, GRUENEICH & LOWRY
. I By: A 7 p-Edwin F. Lowry The report further states, "The free standing concept would preclude the need for any pool structure / liner modification if it could be shown that (1) the racks will not collide with each other and with the pool structure, and . "
For the Ocobee plant, Singh and Lee-Ng quote from the report as follows:
"The racks rest freely on the pool floor and are evaluated to ensure that under various loading condi-tions they do not impact each other, nor do they impact the pool walls."
4 The method by which the plan was approved underscores the need for an evaluation, conducted by an independent laboratory, of the reracking plan, as has previously been requested by Congressman Panetta by letter to the NRC. Mothers for Peace and the Sierra Club make the same request.
12
a .
PROOF OF SERVICE
.!UQEH.-
I, Deborah M. Hunt, declare that on December 15,'1986, I deposited copies of the attached Motion to Allow Filing of Summary Disposition Motion Motion and For Summary for Reinstatement Disposition of Original in the United State gE411 hgpujg,w 3 postage thereon fully prepaid and addressed to the parties listed below: GFF n - ^'
00CKfi A a l'M Dr. Jerry Harbour Mr. Leland M. Gustafsonf'#""
Administrative Judge Federal Relations Manager Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm. 1726 "M" Street, NW, Suite 1100 Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20036-4502 Glenn O. Bright Philip A. Crane, Jr., Esq.
Administrative Judge Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
Atomic Safety & Licensing Board P.O. Box 7442 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm. San Francisco, CA 94120 Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. Gordon A. Silver Henry J. McGurren, Esq. Ms. Sandra A. Silver Lawrence J. Chandler, Esq. 1760 Alisal Street Office of the Exec. Legal Dir. San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.
Washington, D.C. 20555 Ms. Laurie McDermott, Coordinator Atomic Safety & Licensing C.O.D.E.S.
Board Panel 731 Pacific Street, Suite 42 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm. San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 Washington, D.C. 20555 Mrs. Jacquelyn Wheeler B. Paul Cotter, Jr., Chairman 2455 Leona Street Administrative Judge San Luis Obispo, CA 93400 Atomic Safety & Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm. Dr. R.B. Ferguson Washington, D.C. 20555 Sierra Club / Santa Lucia Chapter Rocky Canyon Star Route Atomic Safety & Licensing Creston, CA 93432 Appeal Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm. Ms. Nancy Culver Washington, D.C. 20555 192 Luneta Street San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 Bruce Norton, Esq.
NORTON, BURKE, BERRY & FRENCH P.O. Box 10569 Phoenix, AZ 85064 I am, and was at the time of the service of the attached paper, over the age of 18 and not a party to the proceeding.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
, 't&1tt 1 -
Deborah M. Hunt
'