ML20214X187

Order Imposing Civil Monetary Penalty in Amount of $25,000 Based on Four Severity Level III Violations Noted During 860721-0808 Insp

ML20214X187
Person / Time
Site:	Byron
Issue date:	06/11/1987
From:	Taylor J NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To:	COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
Shared Package
ML20214X179	List: ML20214X175 ML20214X187
References
EA-86-163, NUDOCS 8706160365
Download: ML20214X187 (10)

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COM ISSION .

In the Matter of '

Docket No. 50-454 '

COMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY License No. NPF-37 (8YRON, UNIT 1) EA 86-163

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ORDER IMPOSING CIVIL MONETARY PENALTY O

I Comonwealth Edison Company (licensee) is the holder of Operating License No. NPF-37 (license) issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Comission/

NRC) on October 31, 1984. The license authorizes the licensee to operate the Byron Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, in accordance with the conditions specified therein.

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r An NRC safety inspection of the licensee's activities was conducted from July 21 l through August 8, 1986. The results of this inspection indicated that the licensee had not conducted its activities in full compliance with NRC require-ments. A written Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty i

(Notice) was served upon the licensee by letter dated November 18, 1986. The i

Notice stated the nature of the violations, the provisions of the NRC's require-ments that the licensee had violated, and the amount of the civil penalty proposed for the violations. The licensee responded to the Notice by letter dated December 30, 1986.

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III After consideration of the licensee's response and the statements of fact, explanation,'and argument for mitigation contained therein, the Deputy Executive Director for Regional Operations has detemined, as set forth in the Appendix to this Order, that the violations occurred as stated and that the penalty proposed for the violations designated in the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty should be imposed.

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In view of.the foregoing and pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

The licensee pay a civil penalty in the amount of Twenty-Five Thousand '

Dollars ($25,000) within 30 days-of the date of this Order, by check, draft, or money order, payable to the Treasurer of the United States and mailed to

! the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, l ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555.

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L The licensee may request a hearing within 30 days of the date of this Order.

A request for a hearing should be clearly marked as a " Request for an Enforce-ment Hearing" and shall be addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conunission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington,

D.C. 20555, with copies to (1) the Assistant General Counsel for Enforcement.

Office of the. General Counsel, at the same address, (2) the Regional Admini-strator, Region III, 799 Roosevelt Road, Glen Ellyn. Illinois, 60137, and (3) the NRC Resident Inspector, Byron Nuclear Station.

If a hearing is requested, the Comission will issue an Order designating the time and place of the hearing. If the licensee fails to request a hearing within 30 days of the date of this Order, the provisions of this Order shall be effective without further proceedings. If payment has not been made by that time, the matter may be referred to the Attorney General for collection.

In the event the licensee requests a hearing as provided above, the issues to be considered at such hearing shall be:

(a) Whether the licensee was in violation of the Conmiission's requirements '

as set forth in the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of

- Civil Penalties referenced in Section II above, and (b) whether, on the basis of such violations, this Order should be sustained.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMISSION M

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mes M. Tay1 , Deputy Executive Director fo Regional Operations Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 11 day of June ;1987,-

APPENDIX EVALUATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS On November 18, 1986, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) was issued for violations identified during an NRC inspection.

Commonwealth Edison Company responded to the Notice on December 30, 1986.'

While the licensee acknowledged the occurrence of the violations as stated in the Notice, the licensee requested full mitigation of the Provided below are (1) a restatment of the violations, (2) proposed a sumarycivil of the penalty.

licensee's ar penalty, (3) guments the NRC'sinevaluation support ofoffurther mitigation the licensee's of the proposed arguments, civil and (4) the NRC's conclusion.

4 Restatement of Violation A. Technical Specification 3.4.2.2 requires that all Pressurizer Code Safety Valves be operable in Modes 1, 2, and 3 with a lift setting of 2485 psig il percent, and that with one Pressurizer Code Safety Valve inoperable, either restore the inoperable valve to an operable status within 15 minutes or be in at least Hot Standby within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in at least Hot Shutdown

.within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

Technical Specification 3.0.4 requires that entry into an Operational Mode shall not be made unless the conditions for the Limiting Condition for Operation are met without reliance on the provisions contained in the Action requirements.

Contrary to the above, on July 17, 1986, Unit 1 entered Mode 3 with-Pressuriter Code Safety Valve, Serial No. N56964-00-0031 inoperable in i

that the valve disc was not installed and the lift setting was not 2485 psig il percent. In addition, on July 17-18, 1986, while in Mode 3, actions were not taken to restore Valve No. N56964-00-0031 to an operable status within 15 minutes or be in at least Hot Shutdown within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

! B. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XV, Nonconforming Materials, Parts, or Components, as implemented by the Comonwealth Edison Quality Assurance Manual, Quality Requirement 15.0, requires that measures shall be esta-blished to control materials, parts, or components, which do not conform to requirements in order to prevent their inadvertent use or installation.

4 These measures shall include, as appropriate, procedures for identification, documentation, segregation, disposition, and notification to affected organizations.

t Contrary to the above, in October 1985, the licensee's program did not assure the control of nonconforming mater' as in that after partial maintenance on Pressurizer Code Safety Valve. Serial No. N56964-00-0031, was performed, the valve was not properly identified, documented, or segregated and on July 6, 1986, the valve was inadvertently installed.

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Appendix

• C. Technical Specification 4.0.5.a requires that inservice inspection of ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components and ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 pumps and valves shall be performed in a'ccordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code and applicable Addenda as required by 10 CFR 50.55a(g), except where specific written relief has been granted by the Connission.

The applicable ASME B&PV Code is the 1980 Edition, Winter 1981 Addenda, which in Section XI, Division 1. Subsection IWV-3200 requires that when a valve or its control system has been replaced or repaired or has undergone maintenance that could affect its perfonnance, and prior to the time it-is returned to service, it shall be tested to demonstrate that the perfor-mance parameters which could be affected by the replacement, repair, or maintenance are within acceptable limits.

Contrary to the above, on July 6, 1986 Pressurizer Code Safety Valve Serial No. N56964-00-0031, an ASME B&PV Code Class 1 valve,'was installed and placed into service after it had undergone maintenance that could affect its performance without any testing being performed to demonstrate 4

that it would perform acceptably.

D. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix-8, Criterion V. Instructions Procedures, and Drawings, as implemented by the Consnonwealth Edison Quality Assurance i Manual, Quality Requirement 5.0, requires that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accom-plished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings.

Instruction.s, procedures, or drawings shall include appropriate quantita-tive or qualitative acceptance criteria for detennining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished.

Contrary to the above, the licensee's program failed to assure that appropriate quantitative acceptance criteria were specified in instructions

' or procedures. Nuclear Work Request B31703, used on July 19, 1986, to test the lift setting of Pressurizer Code Safety Valves 1RY8010A and IRY8010C, referenced Maintenance Procedure BMP 3100-9, Revision 1, which specified a

' tolerance of 23 percent instead of il percent as required by technical specifications. As a result, Pressurizer Code Safety Valve IRY8010C was i

set with a tolerance greater than il percent.

Collectively, these violations have been categorized as a Severity Level III problem (Supplement I).

Cumulative Civil Penalty - $25,000 assessed equally among the violations. ,

l Sunnary of Licensee's Response l The licensee acknowledges the occurrence of the violations but requests that

, the proposed civil penalty be completely mitigated. The licensee contends

that enforcement discretion should be applied to the situation relating to I

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• these violations because the safety significance of-the misinstallation was minimal, that Violations A, B, and C should not be considered as separate violations, that Violation D was unrelated t6 the other violations and should - <

not have been aggregated with them, and that a civil penalty would be simply a punitive fine.

Furthemore, the licensee feels mitigation of the proposed civil penalt is warranted for the factors of (1) prompt identification and

~ reporting,2 (y) corrective actions, (3) past performance, and (4) no prior notice or multiple occurrences. .

The following is a sumary of the discussion presented by the licensee to support the above request:

A. Minimal Safety Significance The licensee asserts that the safety significance of the event was minimal because the possibility of overpressurization of the Reactor Coolant System was not present in that the pressurizer safety valve _actually lifted at 1750 psig, well below its normal setpoint, and both pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORVs) were operable during this event.

B. Separate Violations Aggregated The licensee contends that, since Violations A and C were the unavoidable consequences of Violation B, the NRC should not have considered these as separate violations. According to the licensee, Violations A, B, and C resulted from a mixup of two valves, of which one was internally incomplete.

The licensee asserts that the installation of an. untested, inoperable valve did not result from a separate failure to follow procedures for i

testing the valve or determining its operability. Instead, the required i tests and inspections had been performed for the valve that the licensee l personnel believed that they were installing. The licensee thus asserts that the event does not warrant treatment as independent violations.

Further, the licensee contends that Violation D is related to the other i violations only in the broadest sense that it was maintenance related.

The licensee asserts that specification of an incorrect tolerance is unrelated to the repair-related events in Violations A through C, and thus, does not justify aggregation with the other violations.

C. Punitive Aspects of Proposed Enforcement Action l The licensee claims that its long-term corrective actions reflected its i comitment to disciplined control of maintenance. The ifcensee asserts that, in view of its comitments, a civil penalty would add nothing to the licensee's appreciation of the problem but would be simply a punitive fine.

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l D. Prompt Identification and Reporting

• According to the licensee, the NRC failed to mitigate the proposed civil ,

, penalty for prompt identification and reporting because it considered the length of time the valve had been installed prior to discovery, and, as the licensee became aware of the problem only after the valve actuated as opposed to when it was installed, mitigation was not warranted. .'However, the licensee states that the NRC's Enforcement Policy 10 CFR Part 2 Appendix C IIV.B.1, provides that, in weighing prompt identification and reporting, consideration will also be given to the opportunity available to discover the violation, the ease of discovery, and the promptness and completeness of any required report. The licensee argues that, once the mixup of the two valves occurred, there was no opportunity to discover the mixup until the incomplete valve actuated. Moreover, the licensee 1

argues that the focus of Violation A was the inoperability of the valve when Mode 3 was entered, so that the violation actually occurred when Mode 3 was entered, not when the valve was actually installed, and was disco-vered almost immediately after this occurred. Similarly, according.to the licensee, Violation D was discovered one day after it occurred. As Violations A and C were unavoidable consequences of Violation B, the' length of time for which these violations went undiscovered should not.

weigh heavily against mitigation. Finally, the licensee argues that it provided the NRC with complete reports for all of the violations.

1 E. Past Performance 4

i The licensee claims that Byron's perfonnance in the maintenance area has been good since operation began approximately 1.5 years prior to this event.

F. Prior Notice and Multiple Occurrences 1

i The licensee claims that no earlier notices have been received and there have not been multiple occurrences in this general area.

NRC Evaluation The NRC staff has carefully considered the factors addressed by the licensee in the request for mitigation of the civil penalty. The staff considered each of the factors encompassing the general principles of the " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions", 10 CFR Part 2 Appendix C, along with the technical significance of the violations and the surrounding 4

circumstances, in determining the severity level and appropriate enforcement

action.

In addressing the specific items of the licensee's response, the following

evaluation is provided:

-A. The reactor coolant system design basis includes utilization of the pressurizer safety valves for protection from overpressurization transients with no credit taken for the PORVs, a non-safety grade relief i

Appendix .

system. The design bases-transient in the FSAR describes that no credit is taken for operation of the PORVs. While the proper operation of the ,

PORVs could reduce the severity of an overpressure condition, full credit is allowed only for spring-loaded safety valves designed and installed in accordance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.

This violation is significant because of the failures to properly segregate a deficient component and document post-maintenance testing which caused a defective component to be improperly installed in the plant. This deficiency went unnoticed until the safety valve actuated fortuitously below its specified setpoint. This was cause for significant regulatory concern. Also, it was fortuitous that the valve deficiency in this case lowered the setpoint. The program failure could have as well led to a safety valve being installed which would have had a high lift setpoint or insufficient capacity.

B. The NRC staff classified these four violations collectively as a Severity

' Level III problem because they demonstrated a fundamental problem in the licensee's management control over the maintenance, control, and testing of components. In its request for further mitigation, the licensee focused narrowly on the operability of individual components and did not address the significance of the failure of management to control maintenance and testing. The NRC recognizes that Violations A, B, and C are violations related to a single event and that Violation D was another separate event.

The categorization of the violations as a Severity Level III problem was to focus attention on the need for improvement in the maintenance, control and testing area, as is permitted by the NRC's Enforcement Policy.

Due to the lack of planning by licensee management, no facilities existed to store rebuilt or repaired contaminated parts prior to their reinstalla-tion in the plant. As a result, the licensee did not follow its nomal repair the Nuclear procedure, Work Requestwhich NWR) sp(ecified after removing the QAthe repair and testing hold tag and and component closing out then attaching a red stores tag. The red stores tag would have indicated that the component is ready for use. Since no contaminated storage facility existed, the red stores tag was not attached to the safety valve after repair and testing, and the QA hold tag was kept attached so that the NWR would remain open. Consequently, the repaired valve and the defective i

valve remained in the hot shop next to each other, increasing the potential for a mixup and misuse. Thus, the failure of the licensee to plan for the

' generation of contaminated spare parts and the deliberate decision to bypass the normal repair procedure constitutes a significant lack of management oversight over the maintenance and quality control programs.

As with the other violations, Violation D indicates another maintenance and testing problem in which a NWR inadequately specified a pressurizer safety valve setpoint tolerance. This resulted in the safety valve being set outside of Technical Specification Ifmits.

C. Because of the licensee's corrective actions, a 50 percent reduction of the base civil penalty was deemed to be warranted and was reflected in the amount of the proposed civil penalty. With respect to the licensee's I

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argument that a civil penalty in these circumstances is punitive, the NRC views the purpose served by the civil penalty being imposed in this matter as emphasizing the need for lasting remedial action on the part of a specific licensee and deterring future violations on the part of licensees generally.

D. The premature actuation of a Pressurizer Code Safety Valve was a self-disclosing event and was not one which has been identified by the licensee.

While the NRC staff agrees that once the violations were identified they were promptly reported, the violations had not been identified prior to the time the valve actuated, an event which was required to be reported to the NRC. Therefore, the NRC staff does not consider mitigation of the proposed civil penalty for prompt identification and reporting appropriate.

E. Byron's performance in the maintenance area has been categorized as SALP Category 2 during the last two appraisal periods. Significant improvements in the maintenance and quality control programs were not initiated until management focused greater attention in these creas in response to this event. Therefore, the NRC staff does not consider it appropriate to mitigate the proposed civil penalty for prior good perfonnance in the area of maintenance.

F. The lack of either prior notice or multiple occurrences does not provide a basis for mitigation of a proposed civil penalty. Instead, these factors are used for escalation if prior notice or multiple occurrences exist.

NRC's Conclusion The NRC staff has concluded that the violations occurred as stated in the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty. A sufficient basis for further mitigation of the proposed $25,000 civil penalty has not

! been provided by the licensee. Accordingly, a civil penalty in the amount of Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($25,000) should be imposed.

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