ML20215C781

Exam Rept 50-455/OL-86-03 of Exam Administered During Wk of 860903.Exam Results:All Five Reactor Operators & Seven Senior Reactor Operators Passed Exam

ML20215C781
Person / Time
Site:	Byron
Issue date:	09/22/1986
From:	Burdick T, Isaksen P, Picker B, Reidinger T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20215C763	List: ML20215C761 ML20215C781
References
50-455-OL-86-03, 50-455-OL-86-3, NUDOCS 8610100438
Download: ML20215C781 (3)

Text

y U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III Report tio. 50-455/0L-86-03 Docket flo. 50-455 Construction Permit CPPR-131 Licensee: Connonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Byron Nuclear Power Staion Examination Administered At: Byron Nuclear Power Station and Commonwealth Edison Company Production Training Center Examination Conducted: September 8, 9, 10, and 11, 1986 N

Examiners: T. D. Re~dinger V '

Date B. P cke 7

Ddte P. Is s , ,

(! L 9 Approved By: . M. Burdick, Chief V '

Operator Licensing Section te

_ xExamination Sunmary Examination administered duri JR_eport No. 50 4}jif_0L-86-07) _ng_t_h_e_ wee _k_ _of_ Septepmber_8,1986 Results: All five reactor operators and seven senior reactor operators passed the examination.

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0 REPORT DETAILS

1. Examiners T. Reidinger, NRC - Chief Examiner P. Isaksen, INEL B. Picker, INEL

2. _ Exit Meeting

a. On September 11, 1986, an exit meeting was held. The following personnel were present at this meeting:

R. E. Querio, Station Manager L. Sues, Operations T. K. Higgins, Station Training Manager P. G. Brochman, NRC Resident Inspector at Byron T. D. Reidinger, Chief Licensing Examiner P. Isaksen, INEL Examiner B. Picker, INEL Examiner

b. The chief examiner discussed that the candidates, in general, exhibited a lack of operational familiarity with the remote shutdown panel, i.e. not accustomed to reacting to malfunctions on the remote shutdown panel and unable to procedurally address the malfunctions presented.

The scenario involved a failed open pressurizer spray valve failure (PCV-455B) at power upon which the senior reactor operator elected to trip the reactor and carry out actions of Byron Emergency Procedure (BEP-0) Reactor Trip / Safety Injection.

Subsequent to the reactor trip, a fire protection annunciator had alarmed followed by a report that there was a fire in process in the upper cable spreading room, smoke from which rendered the control room uninhabitable for continued operations. Candidates evacuated the control room to re-establish control and operations at the remote shutdown panel. The candidates completed up to step 6 (Table A -

alignment of shutdown panel for local control) of Byron abnormal procedure PRI-5 (Control Room Inaccessibility) and were following and completing subsequent steps.

An unisolable steam leak on S/G "A" inside containment was initiated after the candidates completed step 6 of PRI-5 procedure. While '

maintaining the continuation of abnormal procedure step sequence, the operators recognized and belatedly isolated auxiliary feedwater to the effected steam generator. The safety injection actuation that ensued from the high containment pressure was just monitored by the candidates while they continued completing the steps in BOA-PRI-5.

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The candidates could not correctly procedurally exit from the BOA (PRI-5) procedure to BEP-0 (Reactor Trip / Safety Injection procedure) step 31 (initiate monitoring of critical safety function status).

The' proper sequence would have directed the candidates to exit the' BOA-PRI-5 procedure (Control Room Inaccessibility), step 4 (check if SI actuated) to BOA-PRI-5, Appendix C (Safety Injection Unit 1).

Upon completion of Appendix C, Step 8 (verify SI reinitiation not required) response not obtained, the transition to BEP-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection) step 31 (initiate monitoring of critical safety function status) would have occurred.

After BEP-0 step 40, return to step 23 (check RCS overage temperatures), then transition to step 26 (check if S/Gs are intact) would direct the candidates to proceed to BEP-2 (Faulted Steam Generator Isolation). Procedurally, there is no caution statement or note after step 4 (check if SI actuated) in 80A PRI-5 (Control Room Inaccessibility) to direct the candidates if they received a faulted steam generator subsequent to step 4 in 80A-PRI-5.

Subsequent NRC conference telephone calls with Byron Plant Manager and Staff indicate they will submit a letter outlining the Byron plan of action to address the procedural oversight for Regional review.

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