ML20127J194

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Exam Rept 50-454/OL-92-02 Administered Wks of 921130 & 1207 for Both Units.Exam Results:All Candidates Passed Written & Operating Exams
ML20127J194
Person / Time
Site: Byron  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 01/14/1993
From: Burdick T, Clyde Osterholtz
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20127J173 List:
References
50-454-OL-92-02, 50-454-OL-92-2, NUDOCS 9301250061
Download: ML20127J194 (7)


Text

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liUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO!1 3.EGIOli III Report flo.

50-454/OL-92-02(DRS)

Docket lion.

50-454; 50-455 Licences 11o.

11PF-3 7 ; llPF-66 Licenneo:

Commonwealth Edicon Company 1400 Opun Place Downers Grove, IL 60515 Facility !!ame:

Byron lit. clear Power Station Examination Adminiatored At:

Byron 11uulear Power Station Examination Conducted:

During the wooks of Ilovember 30, 1992 and Pecember 7, 1992 RIII Examineru:

J.

llansen u.

Shepard Chief Examiner:

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C. Osterholtf Date Approved By:

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T. Vurdick, Chief Dste

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Operator Licensing Section 2 EXRaluat1911.Jymmary EXBRination adm1DIEinrod dttr. ills the week') of 11ovember 30, 1992 DDil Deqember 7, 1992 (Report 11o. 50-4141QL-92-02(DRS)1 Initial written and operating examinations were adminintered to five reactor operator (RO) candidates: five senior reactor operator (SRO) instant candidates, and three senior reactor operator (SRO) upgrade candidates.

11esults :

All candidates passed the written and operating examinations.

The following is a summary of the strengths und weaknesses noted during the performance of this examination.

9301250061 930114 PDR ADOCK 05000454 V

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Siten51M1H 8 The ability to offectively communicato during the dynamic f

simulator scenarios.

The ability to work offectively as a team.during dynamic simulator scenarios.

Weaknesses The ability to correctly transition betwoon omorgency contingency action (ECA) procedures.

Details on strengths and weaknessos are in Section 3c.

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ItEPORT DETAILS 1.

Examinerg ic osterholtz, Region III

.!anuen, RIII shopard, RIII

  • Chief Examinor 2.

Persons Contacted Facility

  • J.

Kudalis, Services Director 4M. Brown, Instructor

+L.

Bunner, Instructor

  • M.

Burgess, Technical Superintendent

  • +J.

Heaton, instructor

+R.

Kolo, Instructor

  • 4 D.

Popkins, Simulator Supervisor

  • J.

Schroch, Operations Engincor, Administrator

  • E.

Zittle, NRC Ccordinator

+ Denotes those personnel present at the training exit meeting.

  • Denotes those personnel present at the management exit poeting.

3.

Ljrense Traininn Fronram observations This information is being provided as input to the licensee's system approach to training (SAT) process.

No response is required, a.

Written Examination The post examination review of the written examination by the NRC identified the following deficiencies in the candidates' knowledge as evidenced by the majority of the candidates failing to provide the correct response for each particular knowledge area examined.

Determining the minimum distance to be maintained from a radiation source to provent exceeding a radiation dose limit.

(R0 and SRO Question No. 1)

Identifying a pressurizer surge line leak using Chemical and Volume Control System indications and component status. (RO and SRO Question No. 25) 3

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Identifying a pressurizor surgo lino leak using Chemical and Volume control System indications and component status. (R0 and SRO Question No. 25)

Dotormining the minimum number of.Roactor coolant System (RCS) loops that are required to bo operable for a given RCS temperature. (R0 and SRO Quontion No. 63)

Dotormining the maximum heatup and cooldown ratos of the RCS and pressurizer.

(R0 Question No. 76)

Dotormining an overtomperaturo - delta temperature trip sotpoint decronuo on a pressure transmitter failure.

(R0 Question 77)

Identifying the basis for checking steam generator e

secondary pressure boundarios intact in BEP-1,

" Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant".

(SRO Quontion 77)

Determining the preferred method of steam generator cooldown during a steam generator tube rupturo casualty.

(R0 Quontion No. 79) l L

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Operatina Examination During the administration of the simulator portion of the operating examinations, the NRC oxaminors observed both strengths and deficiencies on the part of the senior reactor operator (SRO) and reactor operator (RO) candidates.

The following strengths wore observed:

The ability to offectively communicato among crew members.

The ability to work offectively as teams; reactor operators provided positive and valuable input while the senior reactor operators maintained authority over the crews.

The ability of senior reactor operators (SRO's) to keep their crews informed of plant status.

The following deficiency was observed:

The ability to correctly transition in emergency contingency action (ECA) procedures portinent to post accident plant conditions.

One example was a candidate, acting as senior reactor operator, failing to properly transition from BEP-3, " Steam Generator Tubo Rupture" (SGTR), to BCA-3.1, "SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant, Subcooled Recovery Desired", even though entrance criteria for BCA-3.1 was satisfied.

4.

General a.

Trainino The licensee training staff provided the NRC excellent support during validation of simulator scenarios and job performance measures.

In addition, the facility's pro-review of the written examination was thorough and considered valuable in the development of a plant specific valid examination.

During the development of the written examination, the following deficiencies in the facility materials were notedt Some of the books received were in poor physical condition.

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Several volumes or information were missing that had to be provided to the NRC after written examination preparation had begun.

The facility generated a checklist procedure for use on subsequent examinations to preclude recurronce of this problem.

5.

EimRLator observations Simulator discropancios woro identified.

These dincropancies are noted in Enclosure 3.

6.

Exit Mootinct A training oxit mooting was hold on December 9, 1992 and a management oxit mooting was hold on December 10, 1992.

Those attending the meetings are listed in section 2 of this report.

The following items woro discussed during the exit meeting:

Strengths and weaknessos noted in this report.

The general observations noted in section 4.

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o SIMULATION FACILITY REPORT Facility Licensect Byron Nuclear Power Station Facility Licensee Docket Nos.

50-454; 50-455 operating Tests Administered During: Weeks of November 30, 1992 and December 7, 1992 This form is to be used only to report observations.

These observations do not constitute audit or inspection findings and are not, without further verification and review, indicative of noncompliance with 10 CPR 55.45(b).

These observations do not

-affect NRC certification or approval of the simulation facility other than to provide information that may be used in future evaluations.

No licensee action is required in response to these-observations.

While conducting the simulator portion of the operating tests, the following items were observed:

ITEM DESCRIPTION 1.

Make-up Water control Switch The switch needed to be manipulated several times to work properly.

2.

Fuel Building Fans The automatic starting sequence of the fans was incorrect.

3.

System Auxiliary Transformers SAT's opened during a (SAT's) simulator JPM, which resulted in having to reset the simulator.-

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